

CIVIL PROCEDURE IN BRITISH INDIA, &c.

WOODROFFE & AMEER ALI'S

CIVIL PROCEDURE

IN

BRITISH INDIA

A Commentary on Act V. of 1908

SECOND EDITION

By

Sir JOHN GEORGE WOODROFFE, Kt., M.A., B.C.L.,

BARISTER AT LAW A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT FORT WILLIAM
IN BENGAL,

AND

FRANK JAMES MATHEW

BARISTER AT LAW,

CALCUTTA & SIMLA
THACKER, SPINK & CO.

1916.

PRINTED BY
WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
LONDON AND BECCLES

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

SINCE the first Edition was published in 1908, the effect of the changes introduced by this Code has been interpreted by a great number of legal decisions. All these, up to August, 1914, have been considered in the text of this Edition or recorded in the footnotes; and some later cases of importance, up to May, 1915, have been added while it was in the Press. The Notifications and Rules made under the Code have been added in new Appendices, including those issued by the Government of India and the Local Governments, and by the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, the North-Western Provinces, the Punjab, and Burma.

Our thanks are due to the Registrars of the High Courts at Madras, Bombay and Allahabad, and of the Chief Courts of Lower Burma, the Punjab, and the Revenue Secretary to the Government of Burma for having supplied us with the valuable material in the Appendices, and to Baba Jyotish Chandra, Assistant Registrar of the Calcutta High Court, for having assisted in the collection and preparation of this material.

JOHN GEORGE WOODROFFE
FRANK JAMES MATHEW.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION	v
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION	vii
COMPARATIVE TABLE ETC., ETC.	xxxix
TABLE OF CASES CITED	lxi
PREAMBLE	1

PRELIMINARY.

SECTIONS	
1 Short title, commencement and extent	31
2 Definitions	32
3 Subordination of Courts	50
4 Savings	50
5 Application of the Code to Revenue Courts	61
6 Pecuniary jurisdiction	62
7 Provincial Small Cause Courts	62
8 Presidency Small Cause Courts	63

PART I SUITS IN GENERAL

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS AND RES JUDICATA

9 Courts to try all civil suits unless barred	65
10 Stay of suit	95
11 <i>Res judicata</i>	99
12 Bar to further suit	100
13 When foreign judgment not conclusive	100
14 <i>Presumption as to foreign judgments</i>	101

PLACE OF SUING

15 Court in which suits to be instituted	156
16 Suits to be instituted where subject matter situate	158
17 Suits for immovable property situate within jurisdiction of different Courts	167
18 Place of institution of suit where local limits of jurisdiction of Courts are uncertain	170
19 Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or moveables	171
20 Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises	172
21 Objections to jurisdiction	190

SECTIONS	PAGE
22 <i>Power to transfer suits which may be instituted in more than one Court</i>	190
23 <i>To what Court application lies</i>	190
24 <i>General power of transfer and withdrawal</i>	193
25 <i>Power of Governor General in Council to transfer suits</i>	200

INSTITUTION OF SUITS

26 <i>Institution of suits</i>	200
--------------------------------	-----

SUMMONS AND DISCOVERY

27 <i>Summons to defendant</i>	202
28 <i>Service of summons where defendant resides in another province</i>	203
29 <i>Service of foreign summonses</i>	203
30 <i>Power to order discovery and the like</i>	203
31 <i>Summons to witness</i>	204
32 <i>Penalty for default</i>	204

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

33 <i>Judgment and decree</i>	204
-------------------------------	-----

INTEREST

34 <i>Interest</i>	204
--------------------	-----

COSTS

35 <i>Costs</i>	207
-----------------	-----

PART II **EXECUTION**

GENERAL

36 <i>Application to orders</i>	210
37 <i>Definition of Court which passed a decree</i>	228

COURTS BY WHICH DECREES MAY BE ENFORCED

38 <i>Court by which decree may be executed</i>	229
39 <i>Transfer of decree</i>	230
40 <i>Transfer of decree to Court in another province</i>	231
41 <i>Result of execution proceedings to be certified</i>	231
42 <i>Powers of Court in executing transferred decree</i>	232
43 <i>Execution of decrees passed by British Courts in places to which this Part does not extend or in foreign territory</i>	234
✓ 44 <i>Execution of decrees passed by Courts of Native States</i>	234
✓ 45 <i>Execution of decrees in foreign territory</i>	235
46 <i>Provisions</i>	235

QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED BY COURT ENFORCING DECREE

47 <i>Questions to be determined by the Court enforcing decree</i>	236
--	-----

LIMIT OF TIME FOR EXECUTION

48	Execution barred in certain cases	268
----	-----------------------------------	-----

TRANSFERS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

49	Transfer	271
50	Legal representative	272

PROCEDURE IN EXECUTION

51	Powers of Court to enforce execution	276
52	Enforcement of decree against legal representative	279
53	Liability of ancestral property	284
54	Partition of estate or separation of share	284

ARREST AND DETENTION

55	Arrest and detention	286
56	Prohibition of arrest or detention of women in execution of decree for money	289
57	Subsistence allowance	291
58	Detention and release	291
59	Release on ground of illness	291

ATTACHMENT

60	Property liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree	293
61	Partial exemption of agricultural produce	294
62	Seizure of property in dwelling house	294
63	Property attached in execution of decrees of several Courts	294
64	Private alienation of property after attachment to be void	294

SALE

65	Purchaser's title	
66	Suit against purchaser not maintainable on ground of purchase in behalf of plaintiff	
67	Power for Local Government to make rules as to sales of land in execution of decrees for payment of money	

DELEGATION TO COLLECTOR OF POWER TO EXECUTE DECREES AGAINST IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY

68	Power to prescribe rules for transferring to Collector execution decrees	
69	Provisions of Third Schedule to apply	
70	Rules of procedure	
	Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred	
71	Collector deemed to be acting judicially	
72	Where Court may authorize Collector to stay public sale of	

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS

73	Proceeds of execution sale to be rateably distributed as	
----	--	--

RESISTANCE TO EXECUTION

74	Resistance to execution	
----	-------------------------	--

PART III. INCIDENTAL PROCEEDINGS

COMMISSIONS

SECTIONS

PAGE

75	Power of Court to issue commissions	341
76	Commission to another Court	341
77	Letter of request	341
78	Commissions issued by foreign Courts	342

PART IV SUITS IN PARTICULAR CASES

SUITS BY OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY

79	Suits by or against Government	343
80	Notice	344
81	Exemption from arrest and personal appearance	348
82	Execution of decrees	348

SUITS BY ALIENS AND BY OR AGAINST FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS

83	When aliens may sue	348
84	When foreign States may sue	349
85	Persons specially appointed by Government to prosecute or defend for Princes or Chiefs	350
86	Suits against Princes, Chiefs, ambassadors and envoys	351
87	Style of Princes and Chiefs as parties to suits	353

INTERPLEADER

88	When interpleader suit may be instituted	354
----	--	-----

PART V SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

ARBITRATION

89	Arbitration	355
----	-------------	-----

SPECIAL CASES

90	Power to state case for opinion of Court	355
----	--	-----

SUITS RELATING TO PUBLIC MATTERS

91	Relief of natives	355
92	Relief of charities	356
93	Exercise of powers of Advocate General outside Presidency towns	356

PART VI.
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS.

SECTION	PAGE
94. Supplemental proceedings	377
95. Compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds	378

PART VII.
APPEALS.

APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES.

96.	Appeals from original decree	381
97.	" " " "	391
98.	" " " "	392
99.	" " " "	
	merits or jurisdiction	391

APPEALS FROM APPELLATE DECREES.

[illegible]

APPEALS FROM ORDERS.

104. Orders from which appeal lies	423
105. Other orders	426
106. What Courts to hear appeal	430

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPEALS.

107. Powers of Appellate Court	430
108. Procedure in appeals from appellate decrees and orders	432

APPEALS TO THE KING IN COUNCIL.

109. What appeals lie to King in Council	434
110. Value of subject-matter	434
111. Bar of certain appeals	434
112. Savings	435

PART VIII.

REFERENCE, REVIEW AND REVISION.

113. Reference to High Court	457
114. Review	457
115. Revision	458

PART III

INCIDENTAL PROCEEDINGS

COMMISSIONS

SECTIONS	PAGE
75 Power of Court to issue commissions	341
76 Commission to another Court	341
77 Letter of request	341
78 Commissions issued by foreign Courts	342

PART IV

SUITS IN PARTICULAR CASES

SUITS BY OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY

79 Suits by or against Government	343
80 Notice	344
81 Exemption from arrest and personal appearance	348
82 Execution of decrees	348

SUITS BY ALIENS AND BY OR AGAINST FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS

83 When aliens may sue	348
84 When foreign States may sue	349
85 Persons specially appointed by Government to prosecute or defend for Princes or Chiefs	350
86 Suits against Princes Chiefs ambassadors and envoys	351
87 Style of Princes and Chiefs as parties to suits	353

INTERPLEADER.

88 Where interpleader suit may be instituted	354
--	-----

PART V

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

ARBITRATION

89 Arbitration	355
----------------	-----

SPECIAL CASE

90 Power to state case for opinion of Court	355
---	-----

SUITS RELATING TO PUBLIC MATTERS

91	356
92	356
93	356

towns .

PART VI

SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

SECTIONS	PAGE
94 Supplemental proceedings	377
95 Compensation for obtaining arrest attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds	378

PART VII

APPEALS

APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECISIONS

96 Appeals from original decree	381
97 " " " " " "	391
98 " " " " " "	392
99 " " " " " "	394

APPEALS FROM APPELLATE DECISIONS

100 " " " " " "	407
101 " " " " " "	407
102 " " " " " "	417
103 " " " " " "	422

APPEALS FROM ORDERS

104 Orders from which appeal lies	423
105 Other orders	426
106 What Courts to hear appeal	430

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPEALS

107 Powers of Appellate Court	430
108 Procedure in appeals from appellate decrees and orders	432

APPEALS TO THE KING IN COUNCIL

109 What appeals lie to King in Council	434
110 Value of subject matter	434
111 Bar of certain appeals	434
112 Savings	435

PART VIII

REFERENCE, REVIEW AND REVISION

113 Reference to High Court	457
114 Review	457
115 Revision	458

ORDER IV

Institution of Suits

RULES		PAGE
1	Suit to be commenced by plaintiff	636
2	Register of suits	636

ORDER V

Issue and Service of Summons

Issue of Summons

1	Summons	637
2	Copy or statement annexed to summons	639
3	Court may order defendant or plaintiff to appear in person	639
4	No party to be ordered to appear in person unless resident within certain limits	640
5	Summons to be either to settle issues or for final disposal	640
6	Fixing day for appearance of defendant	640
7	Summons to order defendant to produce documents relied on by him	641
8	On issue of summons for final disposal, defendant to be directed to produce his witnesses	641

Service of Summons

9	Delivery or transmission of summons for service	641
10	Mode of service	643
11	Service on several defendants	643
12	Service to be on defendant in person when practicable, or on his agent	644
13	Service on agent by whom defendant carries on business	644
14	Service on agent in charge in suits for immoveable property	645
15	Where service may be on male member of defendant's family	645
16	Person served to sign acknowledgment	646
17	Procedure when defendant refuses to accept service or cannot be found	646
18	Endorsement of time and manner of service	649
19	Examination of serving officer	650
20	Substituted service	650
	Effect of substituted service	651
	Where service substituted time for appearance to be fixed	651
21	Service of summons where defendant resides within jurisdiction of another Court	652
22	Service within Presidency towns and Rangoon of summons issued by Courts outside	653
23	Duty of Court to which summons is sent	654
24	Service on defendant in prison	655
25	Service	656
26	Service	656
27	Service authority	658
28	Service on soldiers	658
29	Duty of person to whom summons is delivered or sent for service	659
30	Substitution of letter for summons	659

ORDER VI

Pleadings generally

1	Pleading	661
2	Pleading to state material facts and not evidence	661
3	Forms of pleading	661

CONTENTS

RULES

- 4 Particulars to be given when particulars are required
- 5 Further and better statement of particulars
- 6 Condition precedent
- 7 Departure
- 8 Denial of contract
- 9 Effect of document to be produced
- 10 Malice, knowledge, etc.
- 11 Notice
- 12 Implied contract or relation
- 13 Presumptions of law
- 14 Pleading to be signed
- 15 Verification of pleadings
- 16 Striking out pleadings
- 17 Amendment of pleadings
- 18 Failure to amend after order

ORDERS

Plaint

- 1 Particulars to be contained in plaint
- 2 In money suits
- 3 Where the subject matter of the plaint is
- 4 When plaintiff sues as representative
- 5 Defendant's interest and liability to be stated
- 6 Grounds of exemption from liability
- 7 Relief to be specifically stated
- 8
- 9
- 10 Return of plaint
- 11 Procedure on returning plaint
- 12 Rejection of plaint
- 13 Procedure on rejecting plaint
- 14 Where rejection of plaint does not lie

Documents filed and produced

- 14 Production of document on which plaintiff relies
- 15 Last of other documents
- 16
- 17
- 18 Original entry to be marked and filed
- 19 Inadmissibility of document not filed

ORDERS

Written Statement and Defence

- 1 Written statement
- 2 New facts must be specially pleaded
- 3 Denial to be specific
- 4 Evasive denial
- 5 Specific denial
- 6 Particulars of set-off to be given when required
- 7 Effect of set-off
- 7 Defence or set-off founded on facts

CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. Verdict of defence	735
2. Judgment of pleadings	745
3. Default when party fails to present written statement at call if for	746

ORDER IX

Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Non appearance

1. Parties to appear on day fixed in summons for defendant to appear and	747
2. Dismissal of suit where summons not served in consequence of plaintiff's failure to pay costs	751
3. Where neither party appears suit to be dismissed	752
4. Plaintiff may bring fresh suit or Court may restore suit to list	753
5. Dismissal of suit where plaintiff after summons return does not	754
6. Procedure when only plaintiff appears	755
When summons duly served	755
When summons not duly served	755
When summons served but not in due time	755
7. Procedure when defendant appears on day of adjournment and assigns good cause for previous non appearance	757
8. Procedure where defendant only appears	758
9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit	760
10. Procedure in case of non attendance of one or more of several plaintiffs	763
11. Procedure in case of non attendance of one or more of several defendants	763
12. Consequences of non attendance, with out sufficient cause shown, of party ordered to appear in person	763

Setting aside Decrees ex parte

13. Setting aside decree <i>ex parte</i> against defendant	764
14. No decree to be set aside without notice to opposite party	771

ORDER X

Examination of Parties by the Court

1. Pleadings are admitted or denied	773
2. Admission of party	773
3. Denial	775
4. Consequence of refusal or inability of pleader to answer	775

ORDER XI

Discovery and Inspection

1. Discovery by interrogatories	777
2. Particular interrogatories to be submitted	782
3. Costs of interrogatories	782
4. Form of interrogatories	782
5. Corporations	782
6. Discovery by inspection	783
7. Discovery by inspection	786
8. Discovery by inspection	786
9. Discovery by inspection in answer	787
10. No exception to be taken	787

xi

11 Order to a party to answer interrogatories	785
12 Appointment of a referee	786
13 Affidavit of due service	788
14 Production of documents	793
15 Impounding of documents	794
16 Notice to produce	795
17 Time for production of documents	796
18 Order of impounding	796
19 Verified copies	797
20 Perjury in discovery	798
21 Non-compliance with order of discovery	798
22 Using answers to interrogatories as final	800
23 Order to apply to minor	800

ORDER VII

Admissions

1 Notice of admission of case	801
2 Notice to admit documents	801
3 Form of notice	802
4 Notice to admit facts	803
5 Form of admissions	803
6 Judgment on admission	803
7 Affidavit of signature	804
8 Notice to produce documents	804
9 Costs	804

ORDER VIII

Production, Impounding and Return of Documents

1	805
2	806
3	806
4 Endorsements on documents admitted in evidence	807
5 Endorsements on copies of admitted entries in books, accounts and records	807
6 Endorsements on documents rejected as inadmissible in evidence	808
7 Recording of admitted and return of rejected documents	808
8 Court may order any document to be impounded	809
9 Return of admitted documents	809
10 Court may send for papers from its own records or from other Courts	810
11 Provisions as to documents applied to material objects	812

ORDER IX

Settlement of Issues and Determination of Suit on Issues of Law or on Issues agreed upon

1 Framing of issues	813
2 Issues of law and of fact	813
3 Materials from which issues may be framed	813
4 Court may examine witnesses or documents before framing issues	814
5 Power to amend and strike out issues	814
6 Questions of fact or law may by agreement be stated in form of issues	820
7 Court, if satisfied that agreement was executed in good faith may pronounce judgment	821

ORDER XV

Disposal of the Suit at the first hearing

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	1																																																																																								

ORDER XVI

Summoning and Attendance of Witnesses

1	Summons to attend to give evidence or produce documents	821
2	Expenses of witness to be paid into Court on applying for summons	826
	Experts	827
	Scale of expenses	827
3	Tender of expenses to witness	828
4	Procedure where insufficient sum paid in Expenses of witnesses detained more than one day	828
5	Time place and purpose of attendance to be specified in summons	828
6	Summons to produce document	829
7	Power to require persons present in Court to give evidence or produce document	829
8	Summons how served	829
9	Time for serving summons	829
10	Procedure where witness fails to comply with summons	830
11	" be withdrawn	831
12	"	831
13	"	832
14	Court may of its own accord summon as witnesses strangers to suit	832
15	Duty of persons summoned to give evidence or produce document	832
16	When they may depart	833
17	Application of rules 10 to 13	833
18	Procedure where witness apprehended cannot give evidence or produce document	833
19	No witness to be ordered to attend in person unless resident within certain limits	834
20	Consequence of refusal of party to give evidence when called on by Court	834
21	Rules as to witnesses to apply to parties summoned	835

ORDER XVII

Adjournments

1 Court may grant time and adjourn hearing	837
Costs of adjournment	837
2 Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed	838
3 Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc	839

ORDLE XVIII

Hearing of the Suit and Examination of Witnesses

1	right to begin,	842
2		812
3		842
4		813
5		811

6	When deposition to be interpreted	815
7	Evidence under section 113	815
8	Memorandum when evidence not taken down by Judge	815
9	When evidence may be taken in English	816
10	Any particular question and answer may be taken down	816
11	Questions objected to and allowed by Court	816
12	Remarks on demeanour of witnesses	816
13	Memorandum of evidence in unappealable cases	817
14	"	817
15	"	818
16	"	818
17	Court may recall and examine witness	819
18	Power of Court to inspect	819

ORDER XX

Affidavits

1	Power to order any point to be proved by affidavit	850
2	Power to order attendance of deponent for cross examination	850
3	Matters to which affidavits shall be confined	851

ORDER XX

Judgment and Decree

1	Judgment when pronounced	852
2	Power to pronounce judgment written by Judge's predecessor	852
3	Judgment to be signed	853
4	Judgments of Small Cause Courts	854
	Judgments of other Courts	854
5	Court to state its decision on each issue	854
6	Contents of decree	855
7	Date of decree	855
8	Procedure where Judge has vacated office before signing decree	856
9	Decree for recovery of immoveable property	856
10	Decree for delivery of moveable property	857
11	Decree may direct payment by instalments	858
	Order, after decree for payment by instalments	858
12	Decree for possession and mesne profits	870
13	Decree in administration suit	882
14	Decree in pre-emption suit	883
15	Decree in suit for dissolution of partnership	886
16	Decree in suit for account between principal and agent	887
17	Special directions as to accounts	887
18	Decree in suit for partition of property or separate possession of a share therein	887
19	Decree when set off is allowed	888
	Appeal from decree relating to set off	888
20	Certified copies of judgment and decree to be furnished	889

ORDER XXI.

*Execution of Decrees and Orders**Payment under Decree*

1	Modes of paying money under decree	890
2	Payment out of Court to decree holder	890

Courts executing Decrees

RULES	PAGE
3 Lands situate in more than one jurisdiction	897
4 Transfer to Court of Small Causes	897
5 Mode of transfer	898
6 Procedure where Court desires that its own decree shall be executed by another Court	898
7 Court receiving copies of decree etc, to file same without proof	899
8 Execution of decree or order by Court to which it is sent	900
9 Execution by High Court of decree transferred by other Court	901

Application for execution

10	901
11	902
12	902
possession	901
13 Application for attachment of immoveable property to contain certain particulars	904
14 Power to require certified extract from collector's register in certain cases	905
15	906
16	907
17	912
18 Execution in case of cross decrees	914
19 Execution in case of cross claims under same decree	916
20 Cross decrees and cross claims in mortgage suits	917
21 Simultaneous execution	917
22 Notice to show cause against execution in certain cases	917
23 Procedure after issue of notice	919

Process for execution

24 Process for execution	920
25 Endorsement on process	921

Stay of execution

26 When Court may stay execution	922
Power to require security from or impose conditions upon judgment debtor	922
27 Liability of judgment debtor discharged	923
28 Order of Court which passed decree or of Appellate Court to be binding upon Court applied to	923
29 Stay of execution pending suit between decree holder and judgment debtor	923

Mode of execution

30 Decree for payment of money	924
31 Decree for specific moveable property	925
32 Decree for specific performance for restitution of conjugal rights or for injunction	926
33 Discretion of Court in executing decrees for restitution of conjugal rights	929
34 Decree for execution of document or endorsement of negotiable instrument	930
35 Decree for immoveable property	931
36 Decree for delivery of immoveable property when in occupancy of tenant	933

Arrest and detention in the civil prison

RIFES

PAGE

37	Discretionary power to permit judgment debtor to show cause against detention in prison	931
38	Warrant for arrest to direct judgment debtor to be brought up	935
39	Subsistence allowance	935
40	Proceedings on appearance of judgment debtor in obedience to notice or after arrest	936

Attachment of property

41	Examination of judgment debtor as to his property	938
42	Attachment in case of decree for rent or mesne profits or other matter, amount of which to be subsequently determined	939
43	Attachment of moveable property, other than agricultural produce, in possession of judgment debtor	939
44	Attachment of agricultural produce	940
45	Provisions as to agricultural produce under attachment	941
46	Attachment of debt share and other property not in possession of judgment debtor	942
47	Attachment of share in moveables	945
48	Attachment of salary or allowances of public officer or servant of railway company or local authority	945
49	Attachment of partnership property	947
50	Execution of decree against firm	948
51	Attachment of negotiable instruments	952
52	Attachment of property in custody of Court or public officer	952
53	Attachment of decrees	954
54	Attachment of immoveable property	956
55	Removal of attachment after satisfaction of decree	958
56	Order for payment of coin or currency notes to party entitled under decree	959
57	Determination of attachment	959

Investigation of claims and objections

58	Investigation of claims to and objections to attachment of attached property	964
	Postponement of sale	964
59	Evidence to be adduced by claimant	964
60	Release of property from attachment	964
61	Disallowance of claim to property attached	964
62	Continuance of attachment subject to claim of incumbrancer	965
63	Saving of suits to establish right to attached property	965

Sale generally

64	Power to order property attached to be sold and proceeds to be paid to person entitled	976
65	Sales by whom conducted and how made	977
66	Proclamation of sales by public auction	978
67	Mode of making proclamation	983
68	Time of sale	984
69	Adjournment or stoppage of sale	985
70	Saving of certain sales	986
71	Defaulting purchaser answerable for loss on re sale	986
72	Decree holder not to bid for or buy property without permission	988
	Where decree holder purchases amount of decree may be taken as payment	988
73	Restriction on bidding or purchase by officers	991

Sale of moveable property

RULES		PAGE
74	Sale of agricultural produce	991
75	Special provisions relating to growing crops	992
76	Negotiable instruments and shares in corporations	992
77	Sale by public auction	992
78	Irregularity not to vitiate sale, but any person injured may sue	993
79	Delivery of moveable property, debts and shares	994
80	Transfer of negotiable instruments and shares	995
81	Vesting order in case of other property	996

Sale of immoveable property

82	What Courts may order sales	996
83	Postponement of sale to enable judgment debtor to raise amount of decree	997
84	Deposit by purchaser and re sale on default	999
85	Time for payment in full of purchase money	1000
86	Procedure in default of payment	1001
87	Notification on re sale	1002
88	Bid of co sharer to have preference	1002
89	Application to set aside sale on deposit	1004
90	Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud	1010
91	Application by purchaser to set aside sale on ground of judgment debtor having no saleable interest	1020
92	Sale when to become absolute or to be set aside	1021
93	Return of purchase money in certain cases	1027
94	Certificate to purchaser	1029
95	Delivery of property in occupancy of judgment debtor	1031
96	Delivery of property in occupancy of tenant	1033

Resistance to delivery of possession to decree holder or purchaser

97	"	property	1035
98			1035
99			1038
100			1040
101	<i>Bona fide</i> claimant to be restored to possession		1040
102	Rules not applicable to transferee <i>litis pendente</i>		1043
103	Orders conclusive subject to regular suit		1043

ORDER XXII

Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties

1	No abatement by party's death if right to sue survives	1045
2	Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives	1048
3	Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff	1049
4	Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant	1053
5	"	1057
6	"	1059
7		1059
8	When plaintiff's insolvency bars suit	1059
	Procedure where assignee fails to continue suit or give security	1059
9	Effect of abatement or dismissal	1060
10	Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit	1060
11	Application of Order to appeals	1062
12	Application of Order to proceedings	1066

ORDER XXIII

Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits

RULES	PAGE
1 Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim	1067
2 Limitation law not affected by first suit	1073
3 Compromise of suit	1073
4 Proceedings in execution of decrees not affected	1080

ORDER XXIV

Payment into Court

1 Deposit by defendant of amount in satisfaction of claim	1081
2 Notice of deposit	1081
3 Interest on deposit not allowed to plaintiff after notice	1081
4 Procedure where plaintiff accepts deposit as satisfaction in part	1081
Procedure where he accepts it as satisfaction in full	1081

ORDER XXV

Security for Costs

1 When security for costs may be required from plaintiff	1084
Residence out of British India	1084
2 Effect of failure to furnish security	1084

ORDER XXVI

Commissions

Commissions to examine witnesses

1 Cases in which Court may issue commission to examine witness	1088
2 Order for commission	1088
3 Where witness resides within Court's jurisdiction	1088
4 Persons for whose examination commission may issue	1088
5 Commission or Request to examine witness not within British India	1089 ✓
6 Court to examine witness pursuant to commission	1091
7 Return of commission with depositions of witnesses	1091
8 When depositions may be read in evidence	1092

Commissions for local investigations

9 Commissions to make local investigations	1093
10 Procedure of Commissioner	1095
Report and depositions to be evidence in suit	1095
Commissioner may be examined in person	1095

Commissions to examine accounts

11 Commission to examine or adjust accounts	1097
12 Court to give Commissioner necessary instructions	1098
Proceedings and report to be evidence	1098
Court may direct further inquiry	1098

Commissions to make partitions

13 Commission to make partition of immovable property	1100
14 Proceeding of Commissioner	1100

RULES	General provisions	PAGE
15	Expenses of commission to be paid into Court	1103
16	Powers of Commissioners	1104
17	Attendance and examination of witnesses before Commissioner	1104
18	Parties to appear before Commissioner	1105

ORDER XXVII

Suits by or against the Government or Public Officers in their official capacity

1	Suits by or against Government	1106
2	Persons authorized to act for Government	1106
3	Plaints in suits by or against Government	1106
4	Agent for Government to receive process	1106
5	Fixing of day for appearance on behalf of Government	1106
6	Attendance of person able to answer questions relating to suit against Government	1107
7	Extension of time to enable public officer to make reference to Government	1107
8	Procedure in suits against public officer	1107

ORDER XXVIII

Suits by or against Military Men

1	Officers or soldiers who cannot obtain leave may authorize any person to sue or defend for them	1108
2	Person so authorized may act personally or appoint pleader	1108
3	Service on person so authorized or on his pleader to be good service	1109

ORDER XXIX

Suits by or against Corporations

1	Subscription and verification of pleading	1110
2	Service on corporation	1110
3	Power to require personal attendance of officer of corporation	1110

ORDER XXX

Suits by or against Firms and Persons carrying on business in names other than their own

1	Suing of partners in name of firm	1113
2	Disclosure of partners names	1113
3	Service	1114
4	Right of suit on death of partner	1120
5	Notice in what capacity served	1121
6	Appearance of partners	1122
7	No appearance except by partners	1122
8	Appearance under protest	1122
9	Suits between co partners	1123
10	Suit against person carrying on business in name other than his own	1125

ORDER XXXI

Suits by or against Trustees Executors and Administrators

1	Representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in trustees etc	1127
2	Joinder of trustees executors and administrators	1128
3	Husband of married executrix not to join	1128

ORDI 1. XXVII

Suits by or against Minors and Persons of Unsound Mind

1	Minor to sue by next friend	1129
2	Where suit is instituted without next friend plaintiff to be taken off the file	1132
3	Guardian for the suit to be appointed by Court for minor defendant	1137
4	" " " "	1137
5	" " " "	1138
6	minor	1140
7	Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit	1140
8	Retirement of next friend	1144
9	Removal of next friend	1144
10	" " " " " " " "	1145
11	" " " " " " " "	1145
12	" " " " " " " "	1145
13	" " " " " " " "	1146
14	" " " " " " " "	1147
15	Application of rules to persons of unsound mind	1147
16	Saving for Princes and Chiefs	1148

ORDER XXVIII

Suits by Paupers

1	Suits may be instituted <i>in forma pauperis</i>	1148
2	Contents of application	1151
3	Presentation of application	1151
4	Examination of applicant	1152
	If presented by agent, Court may order applicant to be examined by commission	1152
5	Rejection of application	1152
6	Notice of day for receiving evidence of applicant's pauperism	1154
7	Procedure at hearing	1154
8	Procedure if application admitted	1155
9	Dispaupering	1156
10	Costs where pauper succeeds	1156
11	Procedure where pauper fails	1158
12	Government may apply for payment of court fees	1159
13	Government to be deemed a party	1160
14	Copy of decree to be sent to Collector	1160
15	Refusal to allow applicant to sue as pauper to bar subsequent application of like nature	1160
16	Costs	1161

ORDER LXXIV

Suits relating to Mortgages of Immoveable Property

1	Parties to suits for foreclosure sale and redemption	1162
2	Preliminary decree in foreclosure suit	1165
3	Final decree in foreclosure suit	1165
	Power to enlarge time	1166
	Discharge of debt	1166
4	Preliminary decree in suit for sale	1166
	Power to decree sale in foreclosure suit	1166
5	Final decree in suit for sale	1166
6	Recovery of balance due on mortgage	1167
7	Preliminary decree in redemption suit	1167

	PAGE
8	1168
9	1169
10	1169
11	1169
12	1169
13	1170
14	1170
15	1171

ORDER XXXV

Interpleader

1	Plant in interpleader suit	1172
2	Payment of thing claimed into Court	1172
3	Procedure where defendant is suing plaintiff	1172
4	Procedure at first hearing	1172
5	Agents and tenants may not institute interpleader suits	1173
6	Charge for plaintiff's costs	1173

ORDER XXXVI

Special Case

1	Power to state case for Court's opinion	1175
2	Where value of subject matter must be stated	1175
3		1175
4		1176
5		1176

ORDER XXXVII.

Summary Procedure on Negotiable Instruments

1	Application of Order	1177
2	Institution of summary suits upon bills of exchange etc	1177
	Defendant showing defence on merits to have leave to appear	1180
4	Power to set aside decree	1181
5	Power to order bill etc to be deposited with officer of Court	1182
6	Recovery of cost of noting non-acceptance of dishonoured bill or note	1182
7	Procedure in suits	1182

ORDER XXXVIII

Arrest and Attachment before Judgment

Arrest before judgment

1	Where defendant may be called upon to furnish security for appearance	1183
2	Security	1183
3	Procedure on application by surety to be discharged	1185
4	Procedure where defendant fails to furnish security or find fresh security	1185

Attachment before judgment

1	Where defendant may be called upon to furnish security for production of property	1186
2	Attachment where case not shown or security not furnished	1188

PAGES	PAGE
7 Mode of making attachment	1190
8 Investigation of claim to property attached before judgment	1191
9 Removal of attachment when security furnished or suit dismissed	1191
10 Attachment before judgment not to affect rights of strangers nor bar decree holder from applying for sale	1192
11 Property attached before judgment not to be re-attached in execution of decree	1192
12 Agricultural produce not attachable before judgment	1193

ORDER XXXIX

*Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders**Temporary Injunctions*

1 Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted	1195
2 Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach	1195
3 Before granting injunction Court to direct notice to opposite party	1210
4 Order for injunction may be discharged varied or set aside	1210
5 Injunction to corporation binding on its officers	1212

Interlocutory Orders

6 Power to order interim sale	1212
7 Detention preservation inspection etc., of subject matter of suit	1213
8 Application for such orders to be after notice	1213
9 When party may be put in immediate possession of land the subject matter of suit	1214
10 Deposit of money, etc. in Court	1214

ORDER XL

Appointment of Receivers

1 Appointment of receivers	1215
2 Remuneration	1215
3 Duties	1215
4 Enforcement of receiver's duties	1216
5 When Collector may be appointed receiver	1216

ORDER XLI

Appeals from Original Decrees

1 Form of appeal	1259
What to accompany memorandum	1259
Contents of memorandum	1259
2 Grounds which may be taken in appeal	1261
3 Rejection or amendment of memorandum	1263
4 One of several plaintiffs or defendants may obtain reversal of whole decree where it proceeds on ground common to all	1264

Stay of proceedings and of execution

5 Stay by Appellate Court	1267
Stay by Court which passed the decree	1267
6 Security in case of order for execution of decree appealed from	1272
7 No security to be required from the Government or a public officer in certain cases	1274
8 Exercise of powers in appeal from order made in execution of decree	1274

Procedure on admission of appeal.

RULES	PAGE
9 Registry of memorandum of appeal	1274
Register of Appeals	1274
10 Appellate Court may require appellant to furnish security for costs	1275
Where appellant resides out of British India	1275
11 Power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to Lower Court	1279
12 " " " "	1280
13 " " " "	1281
" " " "	1281
14 " " " "	1281
" " " "	1281
15 Contents of notice	1281

Procedure on hearing

16 Right to begin	1281
17 " " " "	1282
" " " "	1282
18 failure to deposit costs	1285
19 Re admission of appeal dismissed for default	1285
20 Power to adjourn hearing and direct persons appearing interested to be made respondents	1288
21 Re hearing on application of respondent against whom <i>ex parte</i> decree made	1289
22 Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal	1289
Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto	1290
23 Remand of case by Appellate Court	1290
24 Where evidence on record sufficient, Appellate Court may determine case finally	1303
25 Where Appellate Court may frame issues and refer them for trial to Court below	1304
26 " " " "	1306
" " " "	1306
" " " "	1306
27 " " " "	1307
28 Mode of taking additional evidence	1310
29 Points to be defined and recorded	1310

Judgment in appeal

30 Judgment when and where pronounced	1310
31 Contents, date and signature of judgment	1311
32 What judgment may direct	1317
33 Power of Court of Appeal	1317
34 Dissent to be recorded	1318

Decree in appeal

35 " " " "	1318
36 " " " "	1319
37 Copy of decree to be sent to Court whose decree appealed from	1321
" " " "	1322

ORDER XLII

Appeals from Appellate Decrees

RULES

- 1 Procedure

PAGE
1323

ORDER XLIII

Appeals from Orders

- 1 Appeals from Orders
2 Procedure

1324
1325

ORDER XLIV

Pauper Appeals

- 1 Who may appeal as pauper
Procedure on application for admission of appeal
2 Inquiry into pauperism

1326
1326
1326

ORDER XLV

Appeals to the King in Council

- 1 Decree defined
2 Application to Court whose decree complained of
3 Certificate as to value or fitness
4 Consolidation of suits
5 Remission of dispute to Court of first instance
6 Effect of refusal of certificate
7 " " "
8 " " "
9 " " "
10 Power to order further security or payment
11 Effect of failure to comply with order
12 Refund of balance deposit
13 Powers of Court pending appeal
14 Increase of security found inadequate
15 Procedure to enforce orders of King in Council
16 Appeal from order relating to execution

1330
1330
1330
1332
1333
1334
1334
1337
1338
1338
1339
1339
1339
1343
1343
1348

ORDER XLVI

Reference

- 1 Reference of question to High Court
2 Court may pass decree contingent upon decision of High Court
3 Judgment of High Court to be transmitted and case disposed of accordingly
4 Costs of reference to High Court
5 " " "
6 " " "
7 " " "

1349
1349
1351
1351
1352
1352
1352

Causes
under

1352

ORDER XLVII

Review

- 1 Application for review of judgment
2 To whom applications for review may be made

1353
1356

RULES	1361
3	1367
4	1368
5	1368
6	1377
7	1372
8	1373
9	1375
	1377
	1378

ORDER XLVIII

Miscellaneous

1 Process to be served at expense of party issuing	1380
Costs of service	1380
2 Orders and notices how served	1380
3 Use of forms in appendices	1381

ORDER XLIX

Chartered High Courts

1	1382
2	1382
3	1382

ORDER L

Provincial Small Cause Courts

1 Provincial Small Cause Courts	1383
---------------------------------	------

ORDER LI

Presidency Small Cause Courts

1 Presidency Small Cause Courts	1384
---------------------------------	------

APPENDICES TO THE FIRST SCHEDULE
FORMS

A —PLEADINGS	1385
1 Titles of suits	1385
2 Description of parties in particular cases	1385
3 Pleadings	1386
4 Written statements	1404
1 —PROCESS	1409
C —DISCOVERY, INSPECTION AND ADMISSION	1416
D —DECREES	1420
1 —EXECUTION	1431
E —SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS	1446
F —APPEAL, REFERENCE AND REVIEW	1451
H —MISCELLANEOUS	1456

THE SECOND SCHEDULE

ARBITRATION
APPENDIX—FORMS

PAGE
146
1473

THE THIRD SCHEDULE

EXECUTION OF DECREES BY COLLECTORS

1475

THE FOURTH SCHEDULE

ENACTMENTS AMENDED

1482

THE FIFTH SCHEDULE

ENACTMENTS REPEALED

1483

APPENDIX A—INDIA

1484

APPENDIX B—BENGAL

1488

APPENDIX C—MADRAS

1491

APPENDIX D—BOMBAY

1510

APPENDIX E—ALLAHABAD

1513

APPENDIX F—PUNJAB


1526

APPENDIX G—BURMA

1529

GENERAL INDEX

1583



COMPARATIVE TABLE

SHOWING

DISPOSAL OF PROVISIONS OF LAST CODE AND THE
CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT CODE

Section of Act VII of 1889	Section of present Code	Order and Part of same
1	1	
2		
Chapter	Omitted	
district	} 2 (4) and 3	
District Court		
pleader	2 (15)	
Government pleader	2 (7)	
Collector	Omitted	
decree	2 (2)	
order	2 (14)	
judgment	2 (9)	
judge	2 (8)	
judgment debtor	2 (10)	
decree holder	2 (3)	
written	Omitted	
signed	2 (20)	
foreign Court	2 (5)	
foreign judgment	2 (6)	
public officer	2 (17)	
Government	Omitted	
3	154 156 167 158	
4	4	
4A	5	
5	7	
6 paras (c) and (d)	Omitted	
6 last para	6	
7	Of 4	
8	8	
9	Omitted	
10	Omitted	
11	9	
12	10	
13	11	
Explan VI	14	
14	13	
15	15	
16	16	
16A	18	
17	20	
Explan III	Omitted	

Section of Act XIV of 1882	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
18	19	
19	17	
20	Omitted	
21	Omitted	
22	22, 23 (1)	
23	22, 23 (2)	
24, paras 1 and 3	22, 23 (3)	
24 para 2	Omitted	
25	24	
26		O J rr 1, 4 (a)
27		r 10 (1)
28		rr 3, 4 (b)
29		r 6
30		r 8 (1)
31		r 9
32		rr 8 (2) 10 (2), (3), (5)
		11
33		r 10 (4)
34		r 13
35		r 12
36		O III r 1
37		r 2
38		, r 3
39		r 4
40		r 5
41		, r 6
42		O II r 1
43		, r 2
44		, rr 4, 5
45		, rr 3, 6
46		
47		Cf O II, rr 6 7
48		
49	26	O IV r 1
50	Cf 137.	
51		O VII rr 1, 2, 4 5 6
52		O VI, rr 14 15 (1)
53		, r 15 (2) (3)
54		, r 17, cf O. VII, r 11
55		O VII r 11, cf O VI, r. 18
56		, r 12
57		, r 13
58		r 10
58 last para		, r 9
59		O IV, r 2.
60		O VII r 14
61		r 15.
62		, r 16
63		, r 17
64		, r 18
65	27	O V, r 1
66		, r 2
67		, r 3
68		, r 4
69		, r. 5
		, r. 6,

Section of Act XIV of 1880	Section of present Code	Order and Title of same
70		O V, r 7.
71		" r 8.
72		" r 9
73		" r 10
74		" r 11, cf O XXX, r 3
75		" r 12
76		" r 13
77		" r 14
78		" r 15
79		" r 16
80		" r 17
81		" r 18
82		" rr 10 20 (1).
83		" r 20 (2)
84		" r 20 (3)
85	28	rr 21, 23
86		" r 22
87	}	rr 24, 29
88		
89		" r 25
90		" r 26
91		" r 30 (1) (2)
92		" r 30 (3)
93		O XLVIII, r 1
94	142	" r 2
95	143	
96		O IX, r 1
97		" r 2
98		" r 3
99		" r 4
99A		" r 5
100		" r 6
101		" r 7
102		" r 8
103		" r 9
104	Omitted	
105		O IX, r 10
106		" r 11
107		" r 12
108		" r 13
109		" r 14
110		O VIII, r 1
111		" r 6
112		" r 9 cf r 1
113		" r 10
114		Cf O VI, r 2
115		" rr 14, 15
116		O VI, rr 16, 17.
117		O X, r 1
118		" r 2
119		" r 3
120		" r 4
121		O VI, r 1
122		Cf O XLVIII, r 2.
123		O XI, r 3

Section of Act XIV of 1889	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
124		O XI, r 5
125		" r 6
126		" r 8
127		" r 11
128		O XII, r 2
129		O XI, r 12, 13
130		, r 14
131		, r 15
132		O XI, r 17,
133		, r 18 (1)
134		" r 18 (2)
135		" r 20
136		" r 21
137		O XIII, r 10
138		" r 1 (1)
139		" r 2
140		rr 1 (2), 3,
141		r 4
141A		r 5
142		r 6
142A		, r 7
143		r 8
144		, r 9
145		, r 11
146		O XIV, rr 1, 2
147		" r 3
148		" r 4
149		" r 5
150		" r 6
151		" r 7
152		O XV, r 1
153		r 2
154		r 3
155		r 4
156		O XVII, r 1
157		r 2
158		r 3
159		O XVI, r 1
160		r 2
161		r 3
162		r 4
163		r 5
164		r 6
165		r 7
166		r 8
167		r 9
168		r 10
169		r 11
170		r 12
171		r 14
172		r 15
173		r 16
174		rr 10 to 13, 17, 18
175		" r 19
176		

COMPARATIVE TABLE.

xliii.

Section of Act XIV of 1882.					Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
177	O. XVI, r. 20.
178	r. 21.
179	O. XVIII, rr. 1, 2 (1).
180	" rr. 2 (2), (3), 3.
181	" r. 4.
182	" r. 5.
183	" r. 6.
184	" r. 8.
185	" r. 9.
185A, first and second paras.	138
185A, third para.	O. XVIII, r. 7.
186	" r. 10.
187	O. XVIII, r. 11.
188	" r. 12.
189	" r. 13.
190	" r. 14.
191	" r. 15.
192	" r. 16.
193	" r. 17.
194	O. XIX, r. 1.
195	" r. 2.
196	" r. 3.
197	139
198	33	...	O. XX, r. 1.
199	" r. 2.
200
201	Cf. 137	...
202	O. XX, r. 3.
203	" r. 4.
204	" r. 5.
205	" r. 7.
206, first and second paras.	" r. 6.
206, third para.	152
207	O. XX, r. 9.
208	" r. 10.
209	34
210	O. XX, r. 11.
211	" r. 12.
212	2 (12)	...	" r. 13.
213	" r. 14 (1).
214	" r. 15.
215	" r. 16.
215A	" r. 19.
216	" r. 20.
217
218
219
220	Cf. 35.	...	" r. 6 (3).
221
222
223, first para.	38
223, second and third paras.	39
223, fourth para.	41
223, fifth para.	O. XXI, r. 4.
223, sixth para.	" r. 5.

Section of Act XIV of 188	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
224		O XXI, r 6
225		r 7.
226		" r 8
227		" r 9
228	42	
229	43	
229A	45	
229B	44	
230 first para		O XXI r 10
230 second para		" r 21
230 third and fourth paras	48	
231		O XXI, r 15
232		, r 16
233	49	
234	50	
235		O XXI, r 11 (2)
236		O XXI r 12
237		, rr 13, 66
238		r 14
239		, r 26 (1), (2)
240		, r 26 (3)
241		, r 27
242		, r 28
243		" r 29
244	47	
245		O XVI, r 17 (1) (3), (4)
245A	56	
245B		O XXI, r 37
246		, r 18
247		, r 10
248		r 22
249		, r 23
250		, r 24 (1)
251		rr 24 (2) (3), 25 (1)
252	52	
253	<i>Cf</i> 145	
254		O XXI r 30
255		, r 42
256		r 11 (1)
257		, r 1
257A	Omitted	
258		O XXI, r 2
259		r 31
260		" r 32
261		" r 34 (1) to (4)
262		, r 34 (5)
263		r 35 (1)
264		, r 36
265	54	
266	60	
267		<i>Cf</i> O XXI, r 11
268		O XXI, r 46
269		, r 43
270		, r 51
271	62	

Section of Act XIV of 188-	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of XXI, 10
272		O XXI, r 52
273		" r 53
274		" r 54
275		" r 55
270	64	" . .
277		O XXI, r 56
278		" r 58
279		" r. 59
280		" r 60
281		" r. 61
282		" r. 62
283		" r 63
284		" r 64
285	03	
280		O XXI, r. 65.
287		" r. 66, 70
288	Omitted	
289		O XXI, r. 67.
290		" r 68
291		" r. 69
292		O XXI, r 73
293		" r 71
294		" r 72
295	73	
296		O XXI, r 76.
297		" r 77 (1), (2)
298		" r 78
299		" r 79 (1)
300		" r 79 (2)
301		" r 79 (3).
302		" r 80
303		" r 81
304		" r. 82.
305		" r 83 (1), (2)
306		" r 84 (1)
307		" r. 85.
308		" r 86
309		" r 87
310		" r. 88
310A		" r 89
311		" r. 90
312		" r 92
313		" r 91.
314		" r 92
315		" r 93.
316	85	" r 94
317	66	" .
318		O XXI, r. 95.
319		" r 96.
320	68, 70, and 71	

Section of Act XIV of 188.	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of said
321	The Third Schedule	
322		
322A		
322B		
322C		
322D		
323		
324		
324A		
325		
325A	The Third Schedule	
325B		
325C		
326		
327		
328		O XXI, r 07
329		" r 98
330		" r 98
331		" r 99
332		rr 100, 101, 103
333		" r 102
334		Cf O XXI rr, 07, 98
335		Cf O XXI rr 07, 99, 103
336	50	
337	57	O XXI r 38
337A		" r 40
338		
339		O XXI r 39 (1) to (4)
340		" 1 30 (5)
341		
342		
343		
344—360A		O XXI, r 25.
361	Repealed by the Provincial	Insolvency Act, 1907
362		O XXII, r 1
363		" r 2
365		" r 3 (1)
366		" r 3 (1)
367		" r 3 (2)
368		" r 5
369		" r 4
370		" r 7
371		" r 8
372		" r 9 (1) (2)
372A		" r 10 (1)
373		" r 9 (3)
374		O XXIII r 1
375		" r 2
375A		" r 3
376		" r 4
377		O XXIV, r 1
378		" r 2
379		" r 3
380		" r 4
381		O XXV, r 1 (1), (3)
		" r 2

Section of Act XIV of 1852.	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
382		O XXV, r 1 (2)
383		O XXVI, r 1
384		" r 2
385		" r 3
386	76	" r 4.
387		" r 5
388		" r 6
389		" r 7
390		" r 8
391	78	
392		O XXVI, r 9
393		" r 10
394		" r 11
395		" r 12
396		" rr. 13, 14.
397		" r 15.
398		" r 16
399		" r 17 (1)
400		" r 18
401		O XXXIII, r 1
402	Omitted	
403		O XXXIII, r 2
404		" r 3
405		" r 5 (a)
406		" r 4
407		" r 5
408		" r 6
409		" r 7
410		" r 8
411		" r 10
412		" r 11
413		" r 15
414		" r 9
415		O XXXIII, r 16
416	79 (1)	
417		O XXVII, r 2
418		" r 3
419		" r 4
420		" r 5
421		" r 6
422		O V, r 27
423		O XXVII, r 7.
424	80	
425	Of 81	
426	}	
427		O XXVII, r 8
428	81	
429	82	
430	83	
431	84	
432	85	
433	86	
434	87	
435		O XXIX, r 1
436		" rr 2, 3

Section of Act XIV of 1882	Section of Present Code	Order and Rule of 1811
437		O XXXI, r 1
438		" r 2
439		" r 3
440		O. XXXII, rr. 1, 4 (2)
441		" r 5 (1)
442		" r 2
443		" rr 3 (1), 4 (2)
444		" r 5 (2)
445		" r 4 (1)
446		" r 9
447		" r 8
448		" r 10 (1)
449		" r 10 (2)
450		" r 12 (1)
451		" r 12 (2), (3)
452		" r 12 (4)
453		" r 12 (5)
454		" r 13
455		" r 14
456		rr 3 (2), (3), 4 (4)
457		r 4 (1)
458		r 11 (1)
459		" r 11 (2)
460	Omitted	
461		O XXXII, r 6
462		" r. 7
463		" r 15
464		" r 16
465		O XXXVIII, r 1
466		" r 2
467		" r 3
468		O V, rr 28, 29
470	68	
471		O XXXV, r 1
472		" r 2
473		" r 4
474		" r 5
475		O XXXV, r 6
476		" r 3
477	}	
478		O XXXVIII, r 1.
479		" r 2
480		" r 3
481		" r 4
482		" r 5
483		" rr 5 (1), (2), 6 (1)
484		" r 5 (1), (3)
485		" r 6
486		" r 7
487		" r 8
488		" r 9
489		" r 10
490		" r 11
491	95	

Section of Act XIV of 1884	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
432		O XXXIX r 1
493		r 2
494		r 3
495		r 5
496		r 4
497	90	
498		O XLIX r 6
499		r 7
500		r 8
501		r 9
502		r 10
503		O XL r r 1 to 3
504		r 5
505	Omitted	
506		
507		
508		
509		
510		
511		
512		
513		
514		
515		
516	The Second Schedule	
517		
518		
519		
520		
521		
522		
523		
524		
525		
526		
527	Of 90	O XXXVI r 1
528		r 2
529		r 3
530		r 4
531		r 5
532		O XXXVII r 2
533		r 3
534		r 4
535		r 5
536		r 6
537		r 7
538		r 1
539	92 and 93	
540	96 (1) (2)	
541		O LII r 1
542		r 2
543		r 3
544		r 4
545		r 5 (1) (2) (3)
546		r 6

COMPARATIVE TABLE.

Section of Act XIV of 1882	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
547		O XLI, r 7
548		, r 9
549		" r 10
550		, r 13
551		" r 11
552		r 12
553		" r 14
554		, r 15
555		" r 16
556		r 17
557		r 18
558		" r 19
559		, r 20
560		r 21
561		" r. 22 (1), (2), (3), (5)
562		1 23
563	Omitted	
565		O XLI, r 24
566		" r 25
567		r 26
568		r 27
569		1 28
570		r 29
571		r 30
572		
573	Cf 135	
574		
575	98	O XLI, r 31
576		
577		O XLI, r 34
578	99	" r 32
579		
580		O XLI r 35
581		" r 36
582		, r 37
582 A	107 (2)	O XXII r 11
583	Cf 149	
584	144 (1)	
585	100	
586	101	
587	102	
588	103	
589	104	O XLIII, r 1
590	106	
591	108	O XLIII, r 2
592	105 (1)	
593		O XLIV, r 1
594		" r 2
595		O XLV, r 1
596	109	
597	110	
598	111	
600		O XLV, r 2
601		" r 3
602		" r 6
		, r 7

COMPARATIVE TABLE

h

Section of Act XIV of 188	Section of present Code	Order and Rule of same
603		O \LV r 8
604		r 9
605		r 10
606		r 11
607		r 12
608		r 13
609		r 14
610		r 15
611		r 16
612	<i>Cf</i> s 12)	
613	<i>Cf</i> s 130	
615	Omitted	
616	112	
617	<i>Cf</i> 113	O \LVI, r 1
618		r 2
619		r 3
620		, r 4
621		, r 5
622	115	
623	114	O \LVII r 1
624		, r 2
625		r 3
626		r 4
627		r 5
628		r 6
629		rr 7, 9
630		r 8
631	116	
632	117	
633	<i>Cf</i> 122	
634	118	
635	119	
636		O XLIX r 1
637	128 (2) (i)	
638	120 (1)	O \LIX r 3
639	120 (2)	
640	132	
641	133	
642	135 (1) (-)	
643	Omitted	
644		O \LVIII r 3
645	137 (1) (4)	
645A	140	
646	Omitted	
646 \		O XLVI r 6
646B		, r 7
647	141	
648	136	
649	36, 37	
650	Omitted	
650A	29	
652	122 129 130 and 131	
653	59	

TABLE OF CASES.

[illegible]

	PAGE		PAGE
Acharya v Ratnavelu	425, 426, 481, 1374	Acharya v Ratnavelu	425, 426, 481, 1374
Achha Min v Durga Churn Law	68, 106, 406, 1357	Achha Min v Durga Churn Law	68, 106, 406, 1357
Achul Mahta v Rajun Mahta	817	Achul Mahta v Rajun Mahta	817
Achumbit v Kanhaya Lal	217	Achumbit v Kanhaya Lal	217
Achut Ramchandra Pal v Nagappa	508, 719	Achut Ramchandra Pal v Nagappa	508, 719
Bab Balgaya	975, 1044, 1359	Bab Balgaya	975, 1044, 1359
Achuta v Mamavu	1072	Achuta v Mamavu	1072
Achuta Menon t Achutan Najar	1468	Achuta Menon t Achutan Najar	1468
Achuthayya v Thummayya	640	Achuthayya v Thummayya	640
Adair t New River Co	1123, 1124	Adair t New River Co	1123, 1124
Adam t Townsend	535	Adam t Townsend	535
Adamson v Arumugam	1160, 1357, 1364, 1368	Adamson v Arumugam	1160, 1357, 1364, 1368
Adarji Edulji v Manikji Edulji	317	Adarji Edulji v Manikji Edulji	317
Adhar Monee Dass t Monmotha Nath	249	Adhar Monee Dass t Monmotha Nath	249
Bose	239, 246	Bose	239, 246
Adhar Singh t Sheo Prasad	29, 577	Adhar Singh t Sheo Prasad	29, 577
Adhiram t Raghu	317	Adhiram t Raghu	317
Adhur Chunder Banerjee v Aghore	126	Adhur Chunder Banerjee v Aghore	126
Nath Aroo	300, 039	Nath Aroo	300, 039
Adi Deo Narain Singh v Dukharan	708	Adi Deo Narain Singh v Dukharan	708
Singh	750	Singh	750
Adjoodhya Pershad v Middleton	772	Adjoodhya Pershad v Middleton	772
Admedbhoy v Nulleebhoy	1220, 1227, 1251	Admedbhoy v Nulleebhoy	1220, 1227, 1251
Administrator General v Dyaram Das	310	Administrator General v Dyaram Das	310
Administrator General v Lala Dyaram	358	Administrator General v Lala Dyaram	358
Administrator General t Prem Lall	373, 376	Administrator General t Prem Lall	373, 376
Mullick 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1220, 1227, 1251	310	Mullick 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1220, 1227, 1251	310
Adurmonce Dassee t Kamunee Soon	358	Adurmonce Dassee t Kamunee Soon	358
duree	373, 376	duree	373, 376
Advocate General t Damothar	365, 855	Advocate General t Damothar	365, 855
Advocate General t Moulvi Abdul	365, 790	Advocate General t Moulvi Abdul	365, 790
Advocate General t Muhammad Hu	365, 582	Advocate General t Muhammad Hu	365, 582
soni	1201	soni	1201
Advocate General of Bombay v Adamji	321	Advocate General of Bombay v Adamji	321
Advocate General of Bombay v Bai	70	Advocate General of Bombay v Bai	70
Punjabai	257	Punjabai	257
Advocate General of Bombay t Ganji	866	Advocate General of Bombay t Ganji	866
Akhari	936	Akhari	936
Afatooli Sirdar v Dwarka Nath Monty	1193	Afatooli Sirdar v Dwarka Nath Monty	1193
Aftabooddeen Ahmed t Mohunee Mo	32, 69	Aftabooddeen Ahmed t Mohunee Mo	32, 69
hun Doss	1089	hun Doss	1089
Afr Moonissa Begum t Parbutty ko	819	Afr Moonissa Begum t Parbutty ko	819
onwar	418, 424	onwar	418, 424
Afzul Hossain t Umda Bibi	1117	Afzul Hossain t Umda Bibi	1117
Amo A. B. J. v.	174	Amo A. B. J. v.	174
.	110	110
.	125	125
.	309, 1013	309, 1013
.	910	910
.	986	986
.	1181	1181
.	1375	1375
.	445	445
.	1053	1053
.	999, 1018	999, 1018
Ahmad ud din v Majlis Rai	296, 301	Ahmad ud din v Majlis Rai	296, 301
Ahmadji t Mahamadji	1318	Ahmadji t Mahamadji	1318
Ahmed v Khalifa	240	Ahmed v Khalifa	240
Ahmed v Mondun	139, 145	Ahmed v Mondun	139, 145
Ahmed Ali v Gladstone Wylie	1187, 1188	Ahmed Ali v Gladstone Wylie	1187, 1188
Ahmed Ali v Najabat Khan	128, 129	Ahmed Ali v Najabat Khan	128, 129
Ahmed Ali v Salima Bibi	1313	Ahmed Ali v Salima Bibi	1313
Ahmed Ali v Waris Husain	1261	Ahmed Ali v Waris Husain	1261
Ahmed Hossein v Khadija	560	Ahmed Hossein v Khadija	560
Ahmed Khan t Abdul Rahman	165	Ahmed Khan t Abdul Rahman	165
Ahmed Khan v Madho	1177	Ahmed Khan v Madho	1177
Ahmedabad Advance, etc, Co v Lak	740, 742, 743	Ahmedabad Advance, etc, Co v Lak	740, 742, 743
shmsbanker	158	shmsbanker	158
Ahmedabad Municipality t Muhammad	1304	Ahmedabad Municipality t Muhammad	1304
Jamal	102, 121, 555, 556, 558, 563, 1065	Jamal	102, 121, 555, 556, 558, 563, 1065
Ahmedabad Municipality v Manilal	536, 639	Ahmedabad Municipality v Manilal	536, 639
Udenath	1276, 1278	Udenath	1276, 1278
Ahmedbhoy v Vuilleebhoy	1099, 1100	Ahmedbhoy v Vuilleebhoy	1099, 1100
Ahmedbhoy Habibhoy v Balkrishna	985	Ahmedbhoy Habibhoy v Balkrishna	985
Mukund	164	Mukund	164
Ahmed bin Shaik Essa v Shaik Essa	415	Ahmed bin Shaik Essa v Shaik Essa	415
1276, 1278	861	1276, 1278	861
Ahmed Nanahhai v Khasaji Karimbhai	708	Ahmed Nanahhai v Khasaji Karimbhai	708
1099, 1100	468, 1408	1099, 1100	468, 1408
.	418, 424	418, 424
.	528, 603	528, 603
.	397	397
.	884, 885	884, 885
.	885	885
.	971	971
.	858	858
.	195	195
.	451.	451.
.	1332	1332
.	928	928
.	770	770
.	1376	1376
.	7, 1101	7, 1101
.	905	905
.	830	830
.	873	873
.	6, 383, 721	6, 383, 721
.	168	168
.	530	530
.	243	243
.	386, 398,	386, 398,
.	412	412
.	1012	1012
.	120	120
.	121	121
.	974	974
.	472	472
.	1154	1154
.	1312	1312

	PAGE		PAGE
Akbar Ali t Bhyea Lal	726	Amareband t Javalja	472
" " " " "	"	Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v Kally	"
" " " " "	"	Kissen Thigore	788, 791, 792
" " " " "	"	Ambalathulakath t Ambalathulakath	971
" " " " "	"	Ambalavani v Subramanna	838
" " " " "	"	Ambarani Harivallab Das v. Himat	"
" " " " "	"	Sing Kallianji	227, 233, 570
" " " " "	"	Ambika t Ram Udit	623
" " " " "	"	Ambika Churn t Bengal Spinning Co	791
" " " " "	"	Ambika Churn Dis t Kala Chandra	"
" " " " "	"	Dis	1297
Alagappa t Vennan	663, 666, 675	Ambika Partap t Dwarla Prasad	1166
Alagirisami t Innasi	73	Ambika Prosad v Jopal Bikhsh	323, 326
Alagirisami t Ramanathan	991	Ambu t Kethilamma	580, 584, 585
Alagirisami Naicker t Sundareswara	"	Amdeo Mujan t Muhammad Davud	478, 496
Ayyar	120	Ameena Khatoor t Radha Benodo	"
Alagu t Abdoola	599	Misses	439
" " " " "	283	Amcer Ali t Imamooddeen	818
" " " " "	610	Amcer Ali t Kassim Ali	54
" " " " "	780	Amcer Begum t Noor Begum	1077
" " " " "	1161	Amceroonissa (In the matter of)	1341
" " " " "	893	Amceroonissa Begum t Gopal Sahoo	"
" " " " "	1119	"	793, 704
" " " " "	1, 618	Amceroonissa v Dunno	1341
" " " " "	325	Amceroonissa Khatoon v Abedoo	"
" " " " "	781	nissa Khatoon	679, 819, 931
" " " " "	3, 972	Amceroonissa t Meer Mahomed	223, 281,
" " " " "	1374	"	283, 1317
" " " " "	1358	Amceroonissa t Woomarooddeen	704
" " " " "	848	Amceroonissa Khatoon t Mozuffer	"
" " " " "	1011	Hossein Chowdhry	251
" " " " "	9 780	Amceroonissa v Indurjeet	440, 1357
" " " " "	1306	Amcerun v Waseehun	432, 698
" " " " "	1005	Ames v Birkenhead Docks	1232
" " " " "	543	Amichand Talakechand t Collector of	"
" " " " "	727	Sholapur	1133, 1138, 1140
" " " " "	0, 321	Aminabi v Sidu	859
" " " " "	1, 588	Amir Balsha t Venkatachala	988
Amir v Jhalo	1139	"	1468
Alman v Hareba	453, 455	"	999
Alla Bikhsh t Madharain	431, 1056	"	109
Allcock t Hall	52	Amir Duthun v Administrator General	"
Allhusen t Labouchere	784	"	1018, 1197
Allhusen t Margarejo	112	Amir Duthun t Bay Nath	281
Allum t Kanjusha	120, 122	Amir Hasan t Ahmad Ali	496, 1268, 1269,
" " " " "	66	"	1271, 1357, 1361, 1363
" " " " "	875	Amir Hassan t Sheo Bakhsh	67, 68, 462, 473
" " " " "	383	Amir Hossain t Babu Nanak	507, 719
" " " " "	sub	Amir Hossein t Imambandi	680
" " " " "	280, 321	Amir Jan t Rivett Carnac	209
" " " " "	ndro	Amir Kazim t Darbari Mal	322
Amam Ghose	594	Amir Rai t Basdeo Singh	244, 261, 1010
Alwar Ayyangar t Sesbammal	753, 754,	Amir Saheb t Jamshedji	217
"	759, 838, 839, 840	Amir Zama t Nathu Mal	115, 741, 742,
Amalak Ram v Sahib Singh	1210	"	743
Amanat Ali t Mt Bindhoo	860	Anurbibi t Abdul Latif	545
Amanat Begam t Bhajan Lal	451	Amurtham t Alwar Manikkam	1153, 1155
Amanat Bibi t Imdad Hussain	112, 116, 579,	Amurtolal Bose v Rajoneekanta Mitter	126
"	584, 597, 600	"	215
Amanee t Koorban Ali	1001	"	218
" " " " "	"	"	1335
" " " " "	"	Amjau Ali t Ali Hussain	461, 1213
" " " " "	"	Amjad Ali Khan t Syad Fazal Hossein	917
" " " " "	"	Amjad Ali t Kunkoo Shaw	973
" " " " "	"	Amlook Chand v Sarat Chunder	1162, 1167
" " " " "	"	"	1288
Amann Mukerjee	212, 395, 396, 409	Andu t Kethilamma	600
Amur Nath t Raj Nath	1226	"	"

	PAGE		PAGE
Appasami r Ramasami	536 591	Ashutosh Bannerjee r Lakhimouri	
Appasami r Scott	957	Debva	91 270, 808
Appasami r Varadachari	1076	Ashutosh Nath Roy r Abdool	111
Appava r Rama	816	Ashutosh Sikdar r Behari Lal Kutumba	213
Appava r Collector of Vizagapatam	1177	Asun r Raj Mohan	495 760
Appava Shetti r Kamhali Bera	1006	Asimuddi r Pranmohini	265 267 1009
Aranasi Gounden r Nachammal	139		1010, 1026
Aravamudu r Samiyappa	890	Asimuddi r Sundari	425
Arbuthnot & Co r Betts	680 816	Asiruddi r Mokhada	1006
Arbuthnot r Oolagappa Chetty	277	Asirun Bibi r Sharip Monilal	1137
Arbuthnots Industrials r Mathu Chetty	277 1063	Asma Bibi r Ahmad Husain	1280
Archakan Srinivasa Dikshatulu r		Asman Sing r Durga Poy	421
Udyagiry Anantha Charlu	135	Asmedh Koonwar r Taylor	157
Ardesar Jahangir r Avabai	928	Asmutunnissa Begum r Ashruff Ali	1012
Ardesar r Hirabai	1127	Asoka Kumar r Khettramon	1351
Ardesar Lumji r Sorabji Estonje	1083	Asundi r Bareddi	1267
Ardesherji Framji r Kalvan Das	425 491	Assam r Iathummi	7 13 200 202 719
Arumuthu r Vapuripandaram	335 336	Assamatthem r Luchmeeput	280 981 1024
Arya Pellai r Thangammal	353		1031
Arjun r Shankar	1308	Assanulla r Tirthabashini	422 534
Arjun Mollah r Jadu Nath Roy Chowdry	1006	Assanullah r Hafiz Mahomed Ali	1314
Arjun Singh r Sarfaraz Singh	885		1316
Arman Sardar r Sathkura Joint Stock Co	1032	Aston r Heron	1241
	1249	Asudoolah r Akbar Ali	1032
	1032	Assur Ali r Woolfutoonessa	1375
	1297	Assur Purshotam r Ruttonbai	16
	572	Atab Pramanik r Arif Tarafdar	596
Wadadar	106	Ataur Singh r R	431
	114	Athappa Chetty r Rama Krishna Nayan	1017
	248		361
	1141	Athavulla r Gouso	501 506 1055
	248	Atmakuri r Selli	188
	265	Atmaram r Amirchand	725
Arunachella r Venkatachella	1284	Atmaram r Bhola Ganpat	1143
Arunachellam r Arunachellam	502 503	Atmaram r Sadasbiv	422
979 980 1023 1273 1348		Atri Bai r Arno Poarna	398
		Atta Oollah r Sukeooddeen	723 726
		Atta Sundari r Smiti	398
		Attermoney Dossee r Hurry Doss Dutt	19
			97 63 34
Asad r Haidar	305 909 910	Attorney General r Birmingham & Drainage Board	1137
Asad ul lah r Muhammad Nur	1464 1466	Attorney General r Brodie	354 365
	274	Attorney General r Gaskill	778 781
	903 913		801
	16 441	Attorney General r Mayor of Calcutta	1234
	1042	Attorney General r Newcastle	783
	860 1346	Attorney General r Sittingbourne	561
	624	Attotram r Balunkee Doss	1032
Ashanulla r Haroonamoyi	1333 1343	Atturmoney Doss r Begun Behary	18
Ashanullah r Hali Kunkur Har	1103		18
Ashfaq r Gauri	105	Aubhoy Churn r Shamont Lochan	425 426 1312 1374
Ashiq Ali r Moti Lal	289		1161
Ashootosh r Tara Prasanna	1078	Aubhoya Churn r Bissesswari	
Ashootosh Bose r Huree Churn Nag	189	Aubhoya Dassi r Pudmo Lodun Mondul	424 1026
Ashootosh Dutt r Doorga Churn Chat terjee	269 301	Aubhovesuree Dabee r Gouri Sunkur	146 224
	14 137		
	0 1375		
	1009		
	168	Das	69 80
Ashruffunnissa r Leharevut	75 773	Aulta Bibi r Abu Jafar	913 956
Ashur r Behari	1170	Aushootosh r Tara Prasanna	387 1362
			1363

	PAGE		PAGE
Acharya v Ratnavelu	125 126 481, 1374		
Achut Nani v Durga Chinn Law	68 106		
	106 1357		
Achul Mahta v Rajun Mahta	817		
Achumbat v Kanhaya Lal	317		
Achut Ramchandra Pai v Nagappa			
Bab Balga	508 719		
	1014 1270		
Adam v Townsend	1123, 1124		240
Adamson v Arumugam	535		19, 145
Adarji Edulji v Manikji Edulji	1160, 1357, 1364, 1368		7, 1188
Adhar-Monee Dassi v Monmotha Nath			129
Bose	249		1313
Adhar Singh v Sheo Prasad	239, 246		1261
Adhirani v Raghu	29, 577		560
Adhur Chunder Banerjee v Aghore			167
Nath Aroo	317		1477
Adi Deo Narain Singh v Dukyheran			
Singh	126	shamshanker	740, 742, 743
Adjoodhya Pershad v Middleton	300 939	Ahmedabad Municipality v Mahammad	158
Admedbhoy v Nulleebhoy	798	Ahmedabad Municipality v Manilal	1304
Administrator General v Dyaram Das	750	Udenath	102, 124, 555
Administrator General v Lala Dyaram	772	Ahmedbhoy v Vulleebhoy	556 558, 563, 1065
Administrator General v Prem Lal		Ahmedbhoy Habibhoy v Balkrishna	536, 539
Mulbek 3 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1220, 1227, 1251		Mekund	1276, 1278
Adurmones Dasse v Kamunee Soon		Ahmed bin Shaik Essa v Shaik Essa	1099, 1106
duree	310	Ahmed Nanabhai v Khasaji Karmabhai	935
Advocate General v Damothar	358		164
Advocate General v Moulvi Abdul	373		415
	376		861
Advocate General v Muhammad Hu			799
seni	365 855		1468
Advocate General of Bombay v Adamji			8, 424
	365, 790		6, 603
Advocate General of Bombay v Bai			397
Punjabai	365, 582		4, 885
Advocate-General of Bombay v Ganji			
Akhai	1261	kool	885
Afatoola Sirdar v Dwarka Nath Motry	321		971
Aftabooddeen Ahmed v Mohunee Mo			858
hun Doss	70		185
Afzaloonissa Begum v Parbutty Ko			451,
onwar	257		1332
	600		928
			770
			6 1376
			7, 1161
			905
			830
Agandh Mahto v Ahullah	418 424		873
Agar v Kaufman Bros	1117		83, 721
Agha Gholam Hussein v Cassoon	174	Ajoodhya v Prasad v Gobind Ram	188
Aghore v Kamini	110	Ajudhia Nath v Anant Das	530
Aghore Nath v Ram Churn	125	Ajudhia Pershad v Baldeo Singh	243
Aghore Nath v Shama Sun Lari	309 1013	Ajudhia Prasad v Balmurund 9, 384	398
Agra Bank v Cripps	910		412
Agra Bank v Hamlin	966		1012
Agra Bank v Minto	1181		120
Ahur Konkar v Mohandra Lal De	1375		121
Alma v Coliad	445		974
Almad Ata v Mata Badil Lal	1053		472
Alma v Bakshi v Lalla Prasa	991 1018		1164
			1312

Akbar Ali t Bhyra Lal	226	Amarchan t Javalia	172
"	"	Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v Kally	
"	"	Kissen Tagore	788 791
"	"	"	791
"	"	"	838
"	"	"	3 570
"	"	"	623
"	1230	"	791
"	200	"	
"	526, 612	Dis	1207
"	581, 688	Amrika Partap t Duarka Prasad	1156
Agarwal t Anant	73	Amika Prasad t Jopai Biksh	323, 326
Agarwal t Ramanathan	991	Ahibu t Kethlumina	580 584, 585
Agarwal t Nacker t Sunareswara		Amloo Mujan t Muhammad Davud	478 496
Ajyar	120	Ameeta Khatoor t Padma Benodi	
Alagu t Abdoola	599	Messer	411
"	283	Amier Ali t Imamoo Idean	818
"	10	Amier Ali t Kassar Ali	54
"	780	Amier Begum t Noor Begum	1077
"	116	Amieroomissa (In the matter of)	1341
"	531	Amieroomissa Begum t Gopal Sahoo	
"	1111	"	703 701
Aldridge t Barrow	518 520 521, 618	Amieroomissa t Dunno	1141
Aldwell t Hahn Bakshi	125	Amieroomissa Khatoor t Abedjo	
Alexandra Co (Ic)	781	nissa Khatoor	679, 819, 911
Ali Ahmed t Binsidhar	313 972	Amieroomissa t Meer Mahomed	233, 261
Ali Akbar t Khurshed	1361 1174	"	287, 1317
Ali Aram t Ram Manick	1358	Amieroomissa t Woomarooddeen	701
Ali Buksh t Shukh Sumeeruddin	848	Amieroomissa Khatoor t Mozaffer	
Ali Cuhar Khan t Binsidhar	1011	Hossain Chowdhry	501
Ali Kader t Golind Dasi	778, 779 786	Amieroomissa v Indurject	110 117
Ali Sher Khan t Ahmad Ullah	1306	Amierun v Waseehun	432 108
Ali Shah t Ramjan	1003	Ames t Birkenhead Docks	1212
Ali Mir t Gulab Din	543	Amichand Talikchand t Collector of	
Ali Nukee t Torah Ali	727	Sholapur	1123, 1138, 1140
Ali Saleh t Kaji Ahmed	320 321	Amnabi v Silu	809
Ali Serang t Bealon	521, 588	Amur Baksha t Venkatachala	988
Alim v Jhalo	1139	Amur Begam t Badrud din	1468
Altman t Hasiba	453 455	Amur Begum v Bank of Upper India	999
Alla Baksh t Madharam	431, 1006	Amur Begum t Prahlad Das	199
Allcock t Hall	52	Amur Dulhm v Administrator General	
Allhusen t Labouchere	784	"	1018 1197
Allhusen t Margarejo	112	Amur Dulhm t Baij Nath	281
Allum v Kunjusha	120 122	Amur Hasan t Ahmad Ali	496 1268, 1210
Aloo Nathu v Gagnbha Dipsangji	66	"	1271 1357 1361, 1364
Altat Ali t Lalji Mal	875	Amur Hassan t Sheo Baksh	67, 68, 462, 473
Alta Soondari t Sreenath	383	Amur Hossain t Babu Nanak	507, 719
Alukmonce Dabee v Bancee Madhub		Amur Hossein t Inambrami	680
Chuckerbatty	280 321	Amur Jan t Rivett Carnac	209
Alut Krishna Ghose t Nripendra		Amur Kazun t Darbari Mal	322
Narain Ghose	594	Amur Rai t Bisdeo Singh	244 261 1010
"	772 771	Amur Sihel t Jamsheji	217
"	"	Amur Zama t Nathu Mal	115 711, 742
"	"	"	743
"	"	Amurhbi t Abdul Latif	545
"	"	Amurham t Alwar Manikkam	1153, 1155
Amanat Begam t Bhajan Lal	451	"	126
Amanat Bibi v Imdad Husain	112 116 579	"	215
"	584 597 600	"	218
Amancee t Koorban Ali	1001	"	1000
"	"	"	1213
"	"	"	117
"	"	"	113
"	"	"	111
"	"	"	128
"	"	"	128

TABLE OF CASES.

LVII

	PAGE		PAGE
Appasami & Ramasami	586 531, 593	Ashutosh Banerjee & Lakkhmoni Debba	91, 270, 858
Appasami & Scott	957		
Appasami & Varadachari	1076		
Appasa & Rama	816		
Appasa & Collector of Vizagapatnam	1157		
Appasa Shetty & Kamhali Bera	1006		
Aranasi Gounden & Nachimmal	139		1010, 1026
Aramudu & Samiyappa	590	Asmudda & Sunlari	425
Arbuthnot & Co & Betts	680, 816	Asmudda & Mokhada	1006
Arbuthnot & Oolagappa Chetty	277	Asmud Bala & Sharip Mondul	1137
Arbuthnot & Industrials & Muthu Chettiar	277 1063	Asma Billa & Ahmad Hussam	1280
Archakan Srinivasa Dikshatula & Udyagiri Anantha Charlu	135	Asman Sing & Durga Roy	421
Ardesar Jahangir & Ayabai	928	Asmedh Koonwar & Taylor	107
Ardesar & Hirabai	1127	Asmutunnessa Begum & Ashraff Ali	1012
Ardesar Lumpy & Sorabji Pestonji	1083	Asoka Kumar & Khettramon	1350
Ardesarij Framji & Kalyan Das	425 491	Asundi & Baredi	1267
Arimuthu & Vayyampandaram	335, 336	Assam & Pathunima	7, 13, 200, 202, 719
Arya Pellai & Thangammal	383	Assamathem & Luchmeeput	250, 981, 1021, 1031
Arjun & Shankar	1308	Assanulla & Tirthabashini	422, 594
Arjun Mollah & Jadu Nath Roy Chowdry	1006	Assanullah & Hafiz Mohamed Ali	1314
Arjun Singh & Sarfaraz Singh	885		1310
Arman Sardar & Satkhura Joint Stock Co	1032	Aston & Heron	1241
Armstrong & Armstrong	1249	Asudoolah & Akbur Ali	1032
Arunuga & Chockalingim	1032	Assur Ali & Woolfutoonessa	1375
Arunugam Chetti & Jagavsera Pami	1297	Assur Purshotam & Ruttonbai	210
Arunugam & Sundarajev	572	Atab Pramanik & Arif Tanfidar	509
Arun Moyi Dasi & Mohendra Nath Wadadar	106	Ataur Singh & B	416
	114	Athappa Chetti & Rama Krishna Nayakan	1017
	248	Athavulla & Gouso	361
	1141	Athappa & Ayanas	551 560 1055
	248,	Atmakuri & Selli	188
	265	Atmaram & Amichand	721
Arunachella & Vencatachella	1284	Atmaram & Bhula Ganpat	1143
Arunachellam & Arunachellam	502 503, 970, 980, 1023, 1273 1343	Atmaram & Sadashiv	422
Arunachellam & Ramanadham	893, 1142	Atri Bai & Arno Poarna	158
Arunachellathudayan & Veludayan	1319	Atta Oolih & Sukceooddeen	721 730
Arundathi Ammyar & Natesha Ayyar	254	Atta Sundari & Srinath	308
Aryan Bank & Kamra Venkata	246, 266	Attorney Dosses & Hurry Doss Ditt	10
Asaban Banu & Ananda	249 896		92, 91, 91
Asad & Haider	305, 909 910	Attorney General & Birmingham, & Co	1147
Asad ul lah & Muhammad Nur	1464, 1466	Drainage Board	
Asceemoonnissa & Ameeroonnissa	274	Attorney General & Brodio	158, 361
Asgar Ali & Trolokya Nath Ghosh	901, 913	Attorney General & Gaskill	779 761
Asghar Reza & Mehdi Hossein	126 441		801
Asgur Ali & Asgur Ali	1042		1234
Asgur Ali & Nugendro Chunder	860, 1346		781
Ashabai & Haji Tyeb	621		614
Ashanulla & Karoonamoyi	1133, 1313		1032
Ashanullah & Kali Kunjur Kur	1103	Attorney Dosses & Begun Bhary	18
Ashfaq & Gauri	108	Dhur	
	909	Auboy Churn & Shymont Lochin	425 426 137
			111
		Auboya Churn & Bessswari	
		Aulhoya Dasa & Pulmo	12 111
		Mondul	421 102
		Aubhovassurec Dabba & Guri Bunkur Panday	11
		Aubimash Chunder Mokerj & Co	
		Augustine & Medlycott	10
Ashraf un nissa & Ali Ahmad	114 137	Aujomssa & Sary Kart	
Ashrafanissa & Inact Hossein	1370 1375	Aukhi Chunder & Mohan	
Ashraf Ali Chowdhry & Net Lal Saha	1009	Dus	
Asrut Hossein & Lazarus	168	Aula Biba & Abu Jafar	
Ashruffunnissa & Lehareaux	708 773	Aushooto h & Tara	
Ashur & Behari	1170		

TABLE OF CASES.

lix

[illegible]

	1877	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100	2101	2102	2103	2104	2105	2106	2107	2108	2109	2110	2111	2112	2113	2114	2115	2116	2117	2118	2119	2120	2121	2122	2123	2124	2125	2126	2127	2128	2129	2130	2131	2132	2133	2134	2135	2136	2137	2138	2139	2140	2141	2142	2143	2144	2145	2146	2147	2148	2149	2150	2151	2152	2153	2154	2155	2156	2157	2158	2159	2160	2161	2162	2163	2164	2165	2166	2167	2168	2169	2170	2171	2172	2173	2174	2175	2176	2177	2178	2179	2180	2181	2182	2183	2184	2185	2186	2187	2188	2189	2190	2191	2192	2193	2194	2195	2196	2197	2198	2199	2200	2201	2202	2203	2204	2205	2206	2207	2208	2209	2210	2211	2212	2213	2214	2215	2216	2217	2218	2219	2220	2221	2222	2223	2224	2225	2226	2227	2228	2229	2230	2231	2232	2233	2234	2235	2236	2237	2238	2239	2240	2241	2242	2243	2244	2245	2246	2247	2248	2249	2250	2251	2252	2253	2254	2255	2256	2257	2258	2259	2260	2261	2262	2263	2264	2265	2266	2267	2268	2269	2270	2271	2272	2273	2274	2275	2276	2277	2278	2279	2280	2281	2282	2283	2284	2285	2286	2287	2288	2289	2290	2291	2292	2293	2294	2295	2296	2297	2298	2299	2300	2301	2302	2303	2304	2305	2306	2307	2308	2309	2310	2311	2312	2313	2314	2315	2316	2317	2318	2319	2320	2321	2322	2323	2324	2325	2326	2327	2328	2329	2
--	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	------	---

TABLE OF CASTS.

Lxiii

[illegible]

	PAGE		PAGE
Bhyroo Paoot t Anooroo leb Deo	209	Bundo Ram t Dy Coll ctor Santhal	
Bhyrub Chunder t Huro Prosunno	874	Parg	283
Bhyrub Chunder t Madhub Ram	411, 427	Bindobashinee Dossee v Penny	974
" " " "	1371 1375	Bindu Bashini Dasi t Peari Mobun	
		Boso	561
	317	Bindu Bisni Chowdhrao t Jahnabi	
	1261	Chowdhrao	1199 1209
	1359	Binodo Behary t Beer Narain	1061
	1	Bipin t Jatindra	986
Hossein	970	Bipin Behary Chowdry t Ram Chan	
Bhyrubnath t Mahesh Chunder	557	der Roy	69
" " " "	403	Bipra Das v Rajaram	966
	9 501	Bipro Protap t Deo Narain	300
	161	Bipradas Dey t Secretary of State	180, 343
	1036	Biproo Chunder t Ramlochan Deb	1058
	669	Bir Narain t Darpa Narain	869
	1142	Biraj Mohini t Chinta Moni	147 387 1078
B bee Tamacoonussa t Wooljilmoneo		Biraj Koor t Ram Churn Lal	
" " " "	514 517	Mahata	1226
	1308	Birbadra Nath v Kalpataru Panda	1077,
	1, 973	" "	1079
	986	Birch t Furzind Ali	817
	68	Birchunder Mamckya t Hurrah	
	338	Chunder Doss	146
Bibi Mutto t Habi Begam	768 774, 1358	Bird t Lake	851
Bibi Phul Kumari v Ghanshyam		Biresur t Baroda	814
Mara	974	Biresur t Jogendro Chunder	561
Bibi Sharifan t Mahomed	1110 1025		
Bilder t Bridges	851		
Bildra Soon lerce t Doorganund	359 504		
	688		
Bid Iya Moyce t Pam Lal Misser	872		
Bidhoo t Bonomaleo	652		
Bidhoo Beebee t Kesbub Chunder	892		
Bidhoo Mookheo t Beejoy Keshul	281		
Bidhu Sudhury t Mahatabuddin	868 1167		
Bidhumukhi v Kefyutullah	403 405		
Bidya Prasad t Asrafi Singh	119		
Bigsby t Dickinson	1312		
Bihari t Sheobalak	141		
Bihari Lal t Ganpat Rai	986		
Bihari Lal v Khub Chand	224		
Bihari Lal t Trailakhomayi	1360		
Bihari Lal Paul v Gopal Lal Seal	334		
Bjai Bahadur v Bhup Indar	880		
Bijamma t Venkataiamayya	516, 517		
Bijoykushen t Joykushen	828		
Bijoy Gobind v Kallee Prosunno	8 6 1104		
Bijoy Gopal Mukerjee t Krishna Ma			
hili	127		
Bijoy Singh Du Khuria t Hukum			
Gani	1012		
Bikani Mia v Shuk Lal	370		
Bikrama Singh v Prab Dal	584 591 594		
Bikrama Singh v B r Singh	31 51, 66 148		
	170, 152		
Bilas Singh t Salig Ram	208		
Bimola Soondureo t Kal e h shen	773 918		
Bisnait t Sasi	1960		
Bisnath Bee t Lalla Cooper Nath	961		
Bisnath Deke Dassen t Copee S n			
dree Dossan	1019		
	10 9		
	1091		
	1288		
	171		
	207		
		Bisest war t Jasoda	266
		Bisnath Lert v Rattan Geor	773 818
		Bisnath Sahayo t Beer K shore	684 6 5
			701, 717
		Biseshar Das t Ram Prasa t	762
		Biseshar Kuar t Hari Singh	46
		Biseshur Lert t Pam Churn	611 700
		Biseshur Singh t M l essur Bikesl	430
		Bishna Coomar t Joy Hurrah	1077
		Bishmath Prasad t Jagarnath Prasad	718
			1327
		Bisnath Lert t B nath Sin lart	110 111

TABLE OF CASES.

lxv

	PAGE		PAGE
Bahun Churn Poy v Jogen Iranath	1284	Bombay Burmah Co v Duraloji Cur	1176
Balannath v Hahu Baksh	151, 156	Bombay Burmah, etc., Corp v Smith	415
Baram Malton v Sahib un nissa	201, 1018	Bombay Coast and River Steam N	
Bissamlhur Sircar v Sooroodhuny	831	Co v René Helenx	149
Bissessar Singh v Nim Chanl Poy	1053	Bombay and Mediterranean Bank v	
Bissessur Bhugut v Murli Sahu	57, 113, 495	Bladee Beebeo	183
Bissessur Das v Johann Smilt	476	Bombay and Persia S N Co v Shep	
Bissessur Lall v Luchmessur	281	berd	24, 50, 551, 698
Bissessur Poy v Kanchun Roy	1104	Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation	
Bissessur Singh v Gunput	97, 98, 99	Co v S S Zuari	1374
Bissessurce Datta v Soolram Doss		Bommanapati Veerappa v Chinta	
Mohunt	1221, 1234	Kunta Srinivasa	263, 911, 912
Bissesswar Poy v Braja Kant Roy	550		915
Bisokha Moyce v Sonatun	987		
Bissagath v Tara Prosonno	651		
Bissarup Gossamy v Gorachanl G v			
ramu	129	Dey	133
Bistoporia v Mund Dhul	1317	Bonomally Deo v Ram Sadoy	1349
Biswa Nath Chaki v Beni Kant Dutta	37	Bonomally Kesh v Hinghessur Roy	1139
	38, 427	Bonomally Nawn v Campbell	81, 82
Biswa Sonan v Binan la	753, 759, 961,	Boojha Roy v Ram Kumar Pershad	1030
	963		1357, 1365
Biswanath v Collector of My mensingh	627	Boolee Singh v Hurobun Narain	671
Biswanath v Jog lip	1163	Boothroonnissa Bebeo v Kureemoon	
Bithal Das v Nanl Kishore	332, 333	nissa Khatoon	671
Bitto Kunwar v Kesho Prasad Mier	142	Booth v Briscoe	512
Byyakkia v Fakira	1041	Booth v Trail	296, 302
Blackburn Union v Brooks	850	Boro Khasia v Jata Sirdar	412, 774
Blackett v Blackett	1276	Borrodale v Gregory Bourke	194
Blackwell (In re)	23	Bostock v Ramsay Urban District	
Blain (Ex parte)	1125	Council	213
Blake v All ion Assurance Society	672	Bourke v Davis	519, 685
Bland v Bland	655	Borall v Cowan	790
Blaquiere v Ramdhons Doss	161	Bower v Hartley	534
Blenthorn v Penrose	683	Bowles v Bowles	51, 151
Bligh v Tredgett	1132	Boydonth Bag v Gush Chunder	415, 672
Boake v Stevenson	782	Boydonth Surmah v Ojan Bibco	706, 1266
Bodli Sing v Guneschun ler	225, 326	Boyle Chund Dutt (In re)	922
Bodun Buroah v Abdul Gunny	1305	Braddon v Abbott	12
Boharia Budrati Keer v Pam Partap		Brahannayaki v Krishna	596
Mull	372	Brahmomeyi Das v Andi Si	718, 720
Bol lonath v I ussick	403	Braja v Moti	1020
Bodya Nath Adya v Malhan Lal		Brayabala v Gurudas	464, 1042
Adya	83, 1226, 1224	Brojeshwari v Guroo Churn	1294
Bollean v Rutlin	119	Brand v Sandground	950
Boungomoff v Nahapiet Jute Co	1091, 1093	Bremabas v Y amunabas	856
Boy tubehurn v Battye	296	Brenan v Morissey	1255
Bolakee v Thal oor	159	Brid t Malzy	778
Bolakee Lall v Perlam Singh	154	Briyessurce Dossa v Kishore Doss	1130
Bolakee Lall v Badha Sing	1310		1132, 1151
Boloram v Kameeneo	152, 153		771
Bol ram Dey v Bam Chun tra	78, 127		123
	1192		971
Bolye Chunl Sing v Moulanl	819		1096
Bolye Meah v Khetoo Gorai	819		210
Bomlay Baroda Bulway v Sassoon	1137, 1144		745
		Brijratan v Jaynaram	508, 861
Bombay Burma Trading Corporation		Brimdabun v Dhunumjoy	413
v Dorabji	447, 449	Brimlabun Chunder v Ram Gomar	
Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation		Chowdlry	215
v Mirza Mahomed	847	Brimdabun Chunder Poy v Tara Chanl	
		Bannerjee	1042

	PAGE		PAGE
Barjorji Curwety & Munch &ji Kuvary	728, 808	Caselli & Nurlaba	705
Bary &ji Doralji & Dilunji	969	Caselli & Darton	1181
Burnes & Banking Co (P)	787	Cashin & Craik	672, 794
Burney & Lyre	1000	Casper & Kishori Lal Loy Chowd	1200
Burns & Co	708	Chary	1200
		Cassavally & Currimbla	101
		Castrigue & Belitina	179
		Cassanell & Soures	187, 771
		Cazee Mazhar & Denobindo	1086, 1275
		Cecil Gray & Cantonment Committee	
		of Poona	58, 316
Bustoo & Rainburnes & Co	281		
Bustros & White	791		
Butelanna & Varahalu	704		
Butterfield & Macomber	697		
Buttoo Khan & Comani Singh	332	Chaitan Charan Malik & Co	
Buzloor Jabeer & Shunisser Ali	592	Chaitra Mullik	1251
Buzul & Satia	407	Chajju & Slew Sahai	104
	630	Chajju & Umra Singh	120, 1266
	755		
	1352		
	1377		
	1875		
	8309		
	1, 856		
Debia	323		
Dykunt Nath & Icaroo Monce	109, 1095		
Dykunt Nath & Prosunnomoyee	406		
Dykunt Nath Sandyal & Jugut Mo			
hun Shaha	1017		
Dykunt Nath Sanlyal & Kalee Churn			
Paal	817		
Dyredda & Chinna	564	Chamros Singh & Tota Loy	401
Lyrno & B	567, 601	Chanbasappa & Mainaba	641, 648, 768
		Chand Kour & Partab Singh	40, 144, 183, 762
		Chand Pam & Brojo Gobind	1098, 1099
		Chandaba & Kuvir Sahab	1156, 1158
Cacinnerer & Birch	389		
	50		
Cambefort & Chapman	12, 583	Chandi Charan & Jogendra Chandra	591
Cameron & Carroll	765	Chandi Charan & Monranjan	1356, 1360
Cammel & Sewel	152	Chandi Charan Mandal & Lant	
Campbell & Campbell	11	Bhary Manlal	1007
Campbell & Jackson	1111	Chandi Charan Poy & Ambika Charan	
Cannan & Kylash	516	Dutt	107
Cannon & Bissonath	561		
Cantonment Committee & Barjorji			
Bamanji	1110		
Carapiet & Panna Lal	300		
Cardigan & Curzon Howe	112	Chandmonce & Santomonse	265
Carrick & Hancock	1118	Chandmull & Soonlrv Dassee	29
Carrison & Rodrigues	10, 5	Chando B bi (In re)	1207
Carter & Muree Lal	130	Chandra & Kaljrasanna	1285
Carter & Rugby	512	Chandra & Primalho	98, 101, 115, 887
Carter & Young	113	Chandra Kalyan (In re)	1201
Carrigue & In re	114	Chandra Kalyan & Pahlal	80

	PAGE		PAGE
Chandra Kumar Nath & Kamini Kumar Ghose	1006	Cheruvath Thalungal & Neruthi Thalangan	918
Chandra Nath Pal & Sree Gobind Chowdhuri	1200, 1211	Chetan Charan Das & Balbhadra Das	2, 2, 803, 1009
Chandrakant Roy & Pogose	1150	Chetty & Sundaram	716
Chandramathi & Narayanasami	638, 1318	Chetty & Mahomed Essa	1098, 1099, 1100
Chandramohan Dutt & Biswambhar	1016, 1018		115
Chandrareka & Secretary of State	1153		345, 316
Chandu & Kombi	71, 80, 81		752
Chandu & Kunhamed	129, 136, 168, 399, 563		974
Chandu Lal & Awad Sultan	352, 353		15
Chango & Kalarani	893, 895		127
Chaplin & Levy	802		1353
Chapman & Lemon	769		23, 943,
Chappan & Moidin Kutti	21, 50, 381, 426, 458, 459, 480, 1329		967
Charan Lal & Rughu Nath	139	Chattambara & Srinuvasa	508
Chardon & Ajeet Singh	874, 875	Chiddo & Pearl Lal	318
Charitan Patgosi Mahapatra & Kunja Behari	22	Child & Stenning	543, 613
	155	Chilton & Corporation of London	804
	1241	Chinnai Lal & Hari Chand	455
	1179	Chinnai & Sakhamam	679, 686
		Chinnai & Gangaya	26, 471
Lachmiram	24, 436, 450	Chinna Keerayya & Lakshminara	1048
		Chinna	181
			552
			116
			47,
			431
Poy	317, 321	Chinnasami Pillai & Krishna Pillai	1033
Chattr & Kondaji Vithal	222	Chinnatambi & Chinnanna	424
Chattar Singh & Ganga Sahai	465, 466	Chinniah & Baribun Saib	1130
Chattarpal Singh & Raja Ram	465, 466, 473, 1153, 1154	Chinnaya Mudali & Venkatachali Pillai	140
Chattell & Dail / Mail	686	Chintaman & Dhondo	360, 366, 370, 372, 373
Chattell Lal & Phaceor Pershad	58	Chintaman & Madharay	163
Chattrapat Singh & Jadukul Prosad Mukerjee	1012	Chintaman Damodar & Bahadri	960
		Chintaman Nihant & Gangabai	431, 1048, 1266
		Chintaman Vithoba & Chintaman Bajai	233, 240
		Chintaman & Pyari Mohun	1361
		Chintamanray & Vithoba	241, 316, 990
		Chintamonce Sein & I. M. Chunder	972
		Chintamoney & Haladhar	1469, 1471
			11, 2
Chedambara Potter & I amasamv	969	Chintamoney Dutt & Mohesh Chandra Banerjee	2, 3
Chellam Lal & Amir Beg	1014	Chintamony Das & Jaghoonath Sahoo	423, 430, 764, 774
Chedi Lal & Kuarji Dicit	1157, 1188	Chiranj Lal & Jawahar Mal	309
Chedumbara & Ratna Ammal	895	Chiranj Lal & Kundin Lal	700, 1285
Chema Peddi & Peddabai Peddi	1738	Chiranj Mut (In the matter of)	105
Chena Pemaji & Ghelabhai Narandas	917	Chisholm & Gopal Chunder	38, 763
Chenbasaipia & Lakshman Panchan	176, 18	Chitambar & Krishnai pa	202
		Chockaling Modali & Subbaraya Mudali	130
		Chockaling Pillai & Kumara Vira	591, 595
			401
Chen & Simon & Krishnan	500, 510	Chockalingam & Mayandi	575
Chenavappa & Puttappa	119	Choo Singh & Bahadoor Singh	232
Cherag Ali (Is re)	729	Choga Lal & Trueman	178
Cherryoni & Nera Poyil	120	Chostunno & Zameerood Iq	416, 693
Cherry & Thompson	112	Chomi & Umma	561
Cheru & Ch ru	1367	Chooli Lal & Akul Singh	510, 639
		Chooce & Hur Prasad	

TABLE OF CASES

145

[illegible]

TABLE OF CASES

LXI

	PAGE		PAGE
Dagdusa Tilakchand t. Bakhan Covind	466	Darumba t. Nilmonco	414
Dahoo Munder t. Goopee Nund Jha	119	Darley Main Colliery t. Mitchell	580, 592
Daimodlee Paik t. Kaim Taridar	7	Darraigat t. Purshotam	183
Daji Himat t. Dhuragram Sadaram	1139	Darvesa Sahib t. Jainudin	366, 367
Dakeshur v. Rewat	1134, 1135	Daryat Badri	1344
Dakhin Din t. Rahimunnissa	350	Dasarath t. Brojo Mohon	1266
Dakhin Din t. Syed Ali	115	Dasmani Das t. Srinath Ghose	729
Dakhina Churn Chattopadhyay t. Bilash Chunder Roy	227	Dasondhay t. Muhammad	359, 540
Dakhina Mohan t. Saroda Mohan	872, 875, 1316, 1347	Dasruth Rai t. Sheodun Rai	474
Dakhiani Debea t. Dolegobind Chowdry	115	Dataram t. Ram Kristo	115
Dakshina Mohun Roy t. Sm. Basumati Debi	2, 7, 939, 1018	Datta Mal t. Hari Das	280
Dakshinamoorthy t. Municipal Council of Trichinopoly	1234	Dattacam t. Gangaram	564, 998
Dale t. Sollett	536	Dattatraya v. Mahadji	235
Dalglish t. Damodar Narain Chowdhry	459, 453	Dattatraya t. Rahimulla	375
Dalgleish t. Ramdin	740	Dattatraya t. Vaman	26, 1131
Dalchand Bhudar t. Rai Shivhar	270, 906	Datto Atmaram t. Shanhar Dattatraya	868, 1167
Dalip Singh t. Kundan Singh	47, 423, 431	Dattu t. Kasai	414, 1261, 1269
Daltu Mal t. Hari Das	972	Daulat t. Bhukandas	851
Dalpat Zopdoo t. Mahadu Uka	1350	Daulat Ram t. Durga Prasad	218
Daman t. Hari	505	Daulat Singh t. Jugal Kishore	245, 261
Damant v. Hennell	1131	Daulatram t. Abdul Hayum	311
Dambar Koeri t. Rai Sham Kissen	296	Datalava t. Bhimali	281
Dame Janbai v. Sab Mahomed	1340	David t. Grish Chunder Guha	139
Dammar Singh t. Pribhu Singh	1136	Davies t. Andrews	950
Damoda t. Gokulchand	1264, 1337	Davies t. Morris	940, 940
Damodar t. Bhat Bhoge Lal	372, 373	Davis t. Abdool Hamed	703
Damodar v. Panalal	851, 1243	Davis t. André	910, 1123
Damodar t. Purmanandas	683, 687	Davis v. Andrews	1117
Damodar t. Paghunath	463	Davis t. Angel	515
Damodar t. Sarat	766	Davis t. Billing	672
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davis t. Duke of Marlborough	1255
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davis t. Hyman & Co	951
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davis t. James	673
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davis t. Middleton	489
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davis t. Morris	1117, 1122
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davul Beg t. Kullappa	974
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dawson t. Le Capelain	655
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dawubai (In the matter of the Will of)	25, 496, 1149, 1150
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davey t. Bentinck	665
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Davy t. Garrett	671
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Day t. Radcliffe	1127
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Daya Chand t. Hem Chand	80, 451, 97
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Daya Kishan t. Nanhi Begam	862, 863, 864
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Daya Nand t. Bakhtwar Singh	45
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dayabhai t. Bapalal	1197
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dayabhai t. Gopalji	564
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dayabhai t. Lakhmichand	703
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dayabhai Tapudas v. Damodardas Tapalal	209
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dayal t. Durga Singh	967
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Dayaram t. Govardhan Lal	463, 468, 471, 965, 945
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Deanuth Biswas t. Issur Gurie	967
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Debandra Nath Chatterjee t. Sarbo mangala Debi	1468
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Debandra Kumar Mandi t. Rup Lal Das	957, 995
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Debenira Nath Buttacharjee v. Prosonno Kumar Chakravarti	240, 252, 391
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Debenture Corporation v. Murrieta	558
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	De Bernal v. New York Herald	1116, 1119
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Debi Baid t. Habib Shih	508, 779, 761, 763, 1052, 1059, 1062
Damodar t. Sonaji	918	Debi Churn Manna v. Bipra Prasad Jana	1069, 1463
Damodar t. Sonaji	918		

	PAGE		PAGE
D. bi Das r Ejaz Hussain	460	D. no Nanth Puckit r Mutty Lal	141
D. bi Daval r Bhan Pro ap	9	Paul	9
D. li D al Sabu r Moharaj Singh	90	D. nomovee Dassee r Chooney Money	1040, 1041
D. li Dial S. n. h r Ajab Singh	91	Dassee	1040, 1041
D. bi Din r Chunnal Lal	100	D. nomovee Dossee r Tara Churn	7, 746
D. bi Prasad r Baldo	311	Coondoo	7, 746
D. li Prasad r Jamna Das	51	Dent r Dent	302
D. bi Prasad Chowdhury r Colap	58	D. o Chand r Hira Chand	303
Bharat	223	Deo Churn r Beni Pathak	303
	1101	Deo Gopal Savant r Va under V. hal	106
	144	Savant	106
	21	D. oha. i Singh r Lala Sewsurun Lal	143
	21	Deokee Vannun r Oomrao S. n. h	109
	21	D. oha r Banai	30 41 106 9 3
	4 5	Deoki Nandan r Tape-i Lal	900
	4 6	Deokinandan r Sri Pam	9
D. boka Nandan Sen r Hart	330	Deoki Sen r Banai	400 1200
D. Luker r Madhoo Muttee	41	Deonaran r Gnni Singh	403 1333
D. Co. e B. isac r Pathber	103	Deoputtee r Dhumoo Lal	100
Deesholts r Peters	90	D. erar Kri. bua r Halambhai	114
Deen Dral r Dabee Por	143	D. osaran r Svednna	1040
Deen Dral r Pam Coonar	19	Deputr Collector Sonthal P. rgunnals	1000
Deen Dral Sahoo r Padma Muddun	25	r Binoe Ram Se o	1000
Deendral Lal r Jandeep Narain	20	Depu r Commissioner Akheri r Khan	120
Defries r Creed	1 30	van Singh	120
De. ambe Morumda r Kallvna b Por	1000	D. ai Panchoed Das r Rawal Nathul	403
D. gumbari D. bi r An hootosh Ban	100	bhai	403
Dejye	100	De. ai Lakhmaje r Bhavanadas Naro	210
D. number Mitte r Abetter Mohun	10 6	tamdas	210
Mitte	510	D. Suren r Hurta b Chunder Bawas	80
D. La Cl. rra r New Hall	500	D. Silra r De Silra	402 453
D. Cendre r Bogardus	546	D. Silra r Snd Teharance	8 3 8 0
D. Ha. t r Steven on	500	D. Souza r British South African Co.	161
D. bi Jaramadha Pow r Brun's	11	D. Souza r Coles	10 53 50 110 160 163
raram She-hirva	11		184 189
D. bi ar l London Bank r Chaudhri	326	D. Souza r P. eton i	30
Partab	326	D. Souza r Pangraian	1100 1100
D. i and London Bank r H m Lal	8	D. Prasad r Gopi Kishen	1233
Dut	8	Dei Gopal r Varudev	200
D. h and London Bank r Miller	6 6	Devi Singh r Pam Manohar	4
600	600	Derachand r Harachand	34 30
D. l and London Bank r Ol har	600	Deraji r Godadbbhai	50
1112	1112	Devendra Nath r Annada Hal	400 50
D. bi and London Bank r Partab	900	Devraj Guru (Ex part)	1101
S. n. h	900	Devi Das r Nerpat	503
D. bi and London Bank r Pam	1001	Devi Prasad r Lewis	0 0 203
Narain	1001	Devidas r Purjada	0
D. bi and London Bank r Uncove	33	D. khalai r Jefferson	10 1131 1130
nanted Service Bank	33	Devi hore r Banai	1 00
D. h and London Bank r Word	16	Devu r Pamamurti	104
163 160	1100	Dewali r Apai	00
De roe Banco r Arthur Fahman	5	D. wan Ali r Soroshibala Dabee	19
De Morn t (In the mat er o)	1 1 8	D. wan Por r Snialr Tewary	4 1
D. na Nath Bannerjee r Hari Das	401	Dhan Pharat r Ramessur Dutt	1
Deobandhu Choe r N. tarini Das	100	Dhan D. vi r Zamurad Beram	0 4
Deo undho Chowdhry r Kristomoo	100	Dhan Kunwar r Mal tab S. n. h	210 200
Dossee	110 120 01 06		003
D. n. tuniloo r Shu hi Mohun	00	Dhan S. n. h r Ba. an S. n. h	67 40 4
D. o. D. n. hu Nundy r Hari Mati	00		4 0 501 500
Da. n	016 210 501 50		
D. no Nath Batai val r Nuffer Chund	117 0 1 000		
Nundy	117 0 1 000		
D. no Nath Van la r I am Kumar	21		
Chu kertutte	21		
D. no Nath r Alh r Chunder	60 041		

TABLE OF CASES

	PAGE
Dhanpal Lal Gudl arbhau r Mathurbhai	147
Chudalhai	147
Dhanjibhoj Peghuo t M heralk Maraj	36
Dhanno Srang r Upen tro Molun	308
Dhanpat e Juermal	194
Dhanpat Rai r Kahan Dava	1471 1472
Dhanpat Sing r Leelnun l Sing	403
Dhanraj r Gobindaram	188
Dhapir Para P rhad	463 471 788 790 796 798 799
Dhara Sun'ari r Suruti Ba'a	458
Dharan Chand r Bhawani Mi rai	441
Dharan Chand Lal r F	471
Dharan Singh r Angan Lal	130 131
Dharan Singh r Kailash Singh	1268
Dharamdas r Hafasji	301
Dharamdas Santidas r Vaman Girin l	897
Dharamsi r Narotam	101
Dharani Ranta Lah i r Cyber Ah	140 141
Khan	140 141
Dharanjit r Chandeshwar	431 1006
	17
	22
	304
	92

		1295
Dhondiba : Pamchan Ira		415 622
Dhonduram : Taba Sarad'an	202	718 719
		1260
Dhondo : Pavji		982
Dhondo Gobind : Panj a Lal	1301	1303
Dhondoli : Ram		206

Dhoondli Bal adoor t Priag S ngli	407
D Hormusgee v Grey	531
Dhoroney Dhur Ghoso t Radha	
Cobind Kur	1213
Dhoroni Dhur Sen v Agra Bank	278
Dhun Pao t Ramphul Rao	1315
Dhuncooverbhai t Advocate General	365 537
Dl undi t Ram Lal	114
Dhund ram Santukram t Chanda	
Nabai	1224
Dhuma Lal Seal t Copi Nath khettry	857
Dhunjesha t J forde	181 189
Dhunjibhoj Cowasji t Lisboa	1273
Dhunnoo t Sunnoo	1064 1065

	PAID
Dial Singh & Jewah Dey	107
Dick & Dhunji	107
Dick & Dick	107
Dick & Hecellum	32
Dickinson & Smith	121
Digambar Chatterjee & Pamlodro	120
Digamburee Dabir & Eshan Chund	102
Digamburee Dibee (In re)	1019
Digumburee Doss & Rance Madhub	973
Ghose	418

Chunler Goswami	86 571, 571
Duramoni Choudhuran	Flialalut
Khan	273 275 277

Dinakar Manohji Potit & Jamsetji	372
Dintarini Debi (<i>In re</i>)	496
Dinnweller & Bailey	730
Durgopal & Boral co	693
District Munsif of Furuvall & (<i>In re</i>)	488
	510, 810
Dwarkanath Salasardas	471, 1353
Dixon & Smith	139
Dobson & Bengal S & W Railway	183

Rai	116
Dongrat Gdl	80
Donoghue (Int'l matt r f)	30
Dontaraju N Khalapuli	384
Doogar Churn N Nem Cland	1101
Dookhee Khan Bajassure Range	770
Dolar Chandi Lalla Chandel	300
Dooler Chandi Oomda Begum	31
	1314
Dooler Chandi Nirban Singh	618
Doly Chandi Nirban Singh	84

Dhurum Das v Shama Soon Iri 415 416
Dhittaloor Subbayya v Parigantari
Subbayya 391 1-66

[illegible]

TABLE OF CASES.

lxxyv

	PAGE		PAGE
Durga Kunwar & Matu Mal	127	Dwijendra Narain Roy v Purnanlu	1200
Durga Mohan Gango Padhya & Sukumar Das	87	Dwyer & Collins	801
Durga Mohun & Tahir Ali	1116	Dya Gazet & Ram Lal	381, 386
Durga Narain & Goburdhun Ghose	468	Dyebukee Aundant & Muthoo Mutty	419
Durga Prasad (<i>In re</i>)	431, 432	Dymond & Croft	10
Durga Prasad & Khairati	432	Dyson & Morris	1128
Durga Prasad & Sashihala	117		
Durga Prasad & Sheo Charan	461		
Durga Prasad Bannerjee & Laht Mo			
		E	
		Eagleton & Horner	274
		Eales & Municipal Commissioners of Madras	317
		Easin & Abdul	416
Durham & Spence	112	East India Bank & Vullie Goolwany	1178
Durpati Bitt & Ramrach Pal	309	East India Company & Syed Ally	77
Dutt & Corcorius	976	East Indian Railway & Bengal Coal Co	161, 163, 166, 1195
Dutta & Khedu	397, 1464	East Indian Railway & Jordan	817
Dutto & Gonesh	256	East Stonehouse Lorne Board & Victoria Brewery Co	802
Dwaji & Godadbbhai	410	Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co & Fakiruddin	428 1231, 1325
Dwar Bahar Sircar & Fatik Jali	243 259, 262	Eberle & Hotels & Jonas	740
Dwarakonda & Dwarakon la	855	Ebrahim & Foolbai	613
Dwarka & Brij Mohan	655	Ebrahim Ismail Timol & Proras Chander	162
Dwarka & Haji Mahomed	418	Ebrahim Pir & Cursetji	561
Dwarka Das & Akhay Singh	117	Ecklin & Little	677, 678
Dwarka Das & Kameshwar Prasad	83	Eekowrie Singh & Bhojnath Chatterjee	9 219 880
Dwarka Das & Shorialal	175		
Dwarka Dass Agurwallah & Gurish Chunder Roy	1082, 1083	Eden & Weardalo	780
Dwarka Lall & Nirunder Narain	878	Ederam & Cohen	780
Dwarka Mohun & Luckhumon	297	Edulji Bur orje & Manekji Sorabji Patel	151
Dwarka Nath & Aloke Chunder	979	Edulji Muneherji & Vulleebhoy	559
Dwarka Nath & Banku Behari	309	Edunt & Bechun	117
Dwarka Nath & Bhabatarini	1374	Edunt & Mahommed Siddiqi	89
Dwarka Nath & Gunga Naya	1092	Edward Daleleigh & Ramdin	740
Dwarka Nath & Muddon	407	Edwards (& Re)	1256
Dwarka Nath & Prosunno Kumar	1091	Edwards & Edwards	1235
		Edwards & Muller	849, 1089
		Ehrmann & Ehrmann	798
		Eknath (& Re)	1155
		Eknath & Ramoji	479, 1068
Misser	878, 1102	Ekrum Mundol & Holodbur Lal	115
Dwarka Parshad & Ram Antar	1003	Elayachandathil Kombi Achen & Ke natumkora Lakshmi Amma	136
Dwarka Prasad & I achhoman Das	765	Elias & Chuckerbutty	1276
Dwarkadas & Adam Ali	401	Ellert & Bashier	1362
Dwarkadas & Isabhai	289	Ellis & De Silva	215
Dwarkhalall Mitter (<i>In re</i>)	292	Ellis & Wadeson	950 111 1123 1124
Dwarkanath & Grish Chunder	562	Elokesht Dasi & Abinash Chandra Bose	239
Dwarkanath & Kushenlall	1360	Elphinstone & Beltrechunl	
Dwarkanath & Manick Chunder	1360	Emamooddeen Sowdagur & Shaikh Futch Ali	140 141
Dwarkanath & Ram Chunder	311	Emlyn & Cart	518
Dwarkanath & Unnoda	409	Emperor of Austria & Day	313
Dwarkanath & Wooma Soonduree	1312	Empress & Amar Nath	288
Dwarkanath Hallar & Kamalakanth Hallar	856 861 867	Farristall Saligram & Redd	17 177 178
Dwarkanath Hallar & Kumola Kant	931 938		173 63
Dwarkanath Mitter & Lam Dhun Bhwas	873	Frost Hassen & Nuprebowtssa	301
Dwarikanath Roy & Jannokai Chowdhuran	817	Fuat Motlal & Bal ram Day	473 474
Dwarkanath Roy & Lam Chand Ash	116	Fuatulla Bauna & Jili & Mahan	176
Dwarkanath Messat & Joges ur Lall	876	Fayyaz & Rah & Ladha Churn	838
		Fendout & Venkatachamulu	965

	PAGE		PAGE
	1778	Patch Chand : Muhammad Baksh	1067
		Patch Muhammad : Gopal Das	892, 895
		Pathula : Munyappa	975
		Fatma : Sakina	176, 176, 178
	875	Fatma Begum v Muhammad Zakaria	613
Erode Manikkoth : Puthiedeth Chem		Fatma Bibi : Abdul Majid	199, 591, 608,
bakkoseri	1006		625, 878
Erskine (<i>In re</i>)	806	Fatma Khatoon : Mahomed Jan	
Erusappa Mudhar : Commercial		Chowdry	986
Bank	239 246, 266, 892	Fatmunissa : Doli Pershad	56, 1287,
Escott v Gray	1115		1369, 1372
Eshan Chunder : Shaikh Dhonaye	820	Fatma Bibi : Advocate General	359, 1176
Eshan Chunder : Shama Churn	52, 404	Fatmabai : Aishabai	116, 123, 842
	679, 817, 858	Fatmabai : Dossabhoj	1160
Fshan Chunder : Soorjo Lal	759	Fatmabai : Pirbhai Virji	569
Eshan Chundra Safooi : Nundamoni		Fatmabai : Sonbai	387
Dossee	1143	Fatfeh Singh : Mussamut Luchmer	
Lsmail : Haji Jan Mahamed	759	Koor	143, 620
Esoof Hasshum Dooply : Fatima Bibee	25	Fazal Imam : Fazal	89
Evans (<i>Ex parte</i>)	1235 1238	Fazal Karim : Moula Baksh	401
Evans : Coventry	1217	Fazal Rahaman : Imam Ali	323
Fvelyn : Lewis	1238, 1239, 1249	Fazal Shau Khan : Gafar Khan	151, 153
Everett : Frere	170, 177, 492	Fazal Biswas : Jamadar	1367
Everett : Prythergh	671	Fazl Howladar v Krishna Bundhoo	
Ewing : Fwing	166	Roy	269, 337
Ewing & Co : Gosaldas	768 769 1182	Fazlar Pahman Chowdhry : Raj	
Eyre : Rodgers	778	Chunder Sen	115
Ezra : Secretary of State	345	Fazlur Rahim : Dwarka Nath Chow	
		dhry	157, 173, 187
		Fazul un Nissa : Mulo	1337
		Feda Hoseem (<i>In the matter of the</i>	
		petition of)	435, 454, 455, 1331
Iadhu Jhala v Gour Mohun Jhala	5, 6	Fegredo : Mahomed Mudeesur	312
Fahamidunissa Begum v Secretary		Fennessy v Clark	785
of State	4	Fergusson : Government	560
		Fergusson : Nilkomul Lahuree	1041
		Fernandez v Rodrigues	363, 536, 540
		Fetch v Rockfort	1212
		Fida Husam : Kutub Hosain	980, 1014
		Fida Husam : Maula Baksh	944
		Fidhaghani : Dunn	1350
		Fink : Buldeo Dass	1250
		Fink : Maharaj Bahadur Singh	333, 336,
			1244
	1318	Finlay, Campbell & Co : Steele	763
Fakhr ud din : Ghafur ud din	656, 658,	Firozi Begam v Abdul Latif	1279
	766, 757	First Assistant Collector : Arlikar	
Fakir v Ananda	414	Frampi	199
Fakir Chand Dey : Lincolnshire Dock	1463	Firth (<i>Ex parte</i>)	382 416
Fakir Chandra Dutta : Gisborne & Co	738,	Fischer : Kamali Naider	213, 1321
	739, 743	Fischer : Owen	672
Fakira : Bisai	1376	Fischer : Secretary of State	565
		Fisher : Nagappa	1071
		Fitzwalter v Waterhouse	804
		Fleming : Dollan	672
		Fleming : Shearman	1277
		Flowers & Co (<i>Re</i>)	1119
		Floodcomary : Woodly Chunder	1078
Fanny Skolfelt, ship (<i>In re</i>)	41, 408, 838	Foolbhai : Ramyatab Samratrai	110, 555
Laquerer Senar : Khud run	321	Fommalro Deb vikut : Panu Jugodi	
Lardunji : Nayabhai	187	shwari	1040
Lari Ahmad : Dulari Bibi	195, 465	Forbes : Amecr nissa	127, 145
Larrand : Abdullah	936	Forbes : Dyanutorallah	1379
Larrand Ali : Yusuf Ali	1301	Forb : Chesterfield	20
Latchel and Marchand : Kisan	474, 47	Forester : Secretary of State	77 217, 233,
Patch Chand : Mansabhai	614, 675		800, 861, 1346 1347
		Forester : Farquhar	213, 214

Forsyth & Brastowe	711
Foster & Townshend	1238
Fowler & Fowl	210
Fraas & Bailement	1201
Framjee & Hormasji	182
Framji Bhanji & Hornsby & Stanton	901
Francisco de Assis & Anjos	215
Frankenburg & Co Horseless Carriage Co	533 672
Frankenstern & Cayman & C	785
Franks & Nunch Mal	761, 903
Fraser & Cooper	537, 507
Freeman & McArthur	1210, 1212
Freeman & Poshier	802
Frizoni & Pam Narain Singh	501
Fry & Moore	601
G	
Ganga	1338
Fulchand & Bar Ichha	901
Fulkumar & Ghanshyam Mura	10 120-
Fuller & Mackey	183
Fulrah & Goouldas	1002 1053, 1062
Fussell & Dowding	1127
Futeck Parooee & Mohender Nath Mozoomdar	214 217
Futteh Narain Chowdry & Chundrahati Chowdrain	270 271
Fuzal Mahammad & Phulkuar	1261
Fuzeelun Bibee & Omdah Bibee	617
Fuzloor Ruhman & Altaf Hossein	903
Fyaz ooddeen & Ouraud Singh	998
G	
Gadecherla & Gadecherla	213
Gadgeppa & Appaji	250
Gahan & Owen	1085 1103
Gajar Khalipa Bipari & Kasmudhi Jamadar	266
Cajadhari & Bhagwanta	127
Gajadhari Prasad & Ganesh Tewari	359
Gaja Ilur Pershad & Widows of Emam Ali Beg	138
Gajapati & Bhagavan Dass	359
Gajapathi & Yasudeva	414
Gajapati & T	177
Gajapati & A	178
Gajapati & I	179
Gajapati & S	180
Gajapati & D	181
Gajapati & K	182
Gajapati & R	183
Gajapati & T	184
Gajapati & V	185
Gajapati & Y	186
Gajapati & Z	187
Gan Savant & Narayan Dhar & Sarant	91
Gan Savant & Narayan Dhar & Sarant	104 117 131 133 111
Ganala Prosad Roy & Shub Narain Mulcrjee	506 767
Ganapathi & Balasunlara	71
Ganapathi & Balasunlara	72
Ganly & Gandy	508 570
Gange Mahomed Sarkar & Larmi	275
Charan Chuckerbutty	551 1307
Ganendra & Surva Kant	525
Ganesh Lal & Charan Singh	50 584
Ganes Chandra & Ram Kumar	592
Ganesh & Banwari	963
Ganesh & Jewach	621 623
Ganesh & Malida	1168 1172
Ganesh & Pushottam	315 968
Ganesh & Vithal	1008 1025
Ganesh Bhikaji & Bhikaji Krishna	17, 433
Ganesh Koeri & Umdat un nissa Begum	143
Ganesh Lal Tewari & Ramnaram	981
Ganesh Lal & Bapu	1139
Ganesh Maha levi & Narayan Balset	210
Ganesh Prasad & Kashinath Jivan	872
Ganesh Patil & Kalka Prasad	10 0
Ganesh Ram & Mohesh Ram	602
Ganesh Ramchandra & Shankar Ramchandra	301
Ganesh Pow & Tuljaram Pow	1142 1144
Ganga Bakshi & Pudar Singh	326 327
Ganga Charan & Sasti Mandal	466 468 471
Ganga Charan Bhattacharya & Soshi Biswas Roy	474 1012
Ganga Das Seal & Yakub Ali Dobashi	245
Ganga Dass & Kushali	250 263 912
Ganga Dass & Adhikaree (In re)	335
Ganga Dayal & Mani Ram	1154
Ganga Din & Khushali	131
Ganga Dinee & Issur Chunder	314
Ganga Narain & Dhuckram	1305
Ganga Persai & Salu & Gopal Singh	718
Ganga Prasad & Cajadhari Prasad	102, 1201
Ganga Prasad & Cajadhari Prasad	1297
Ganga Prasad & Cajadhari Prasad	1297
Ganga Prasad & Jag Lal Pat	373
Ganga Prasad & Jag Lal Pat	984 999
Ganga Prasad & Kura	1014 1015
Ganga Prasad & Kura	1468
Ganga Prasadi & Lal Bahadoor Singh	1301
Ganga Prasad & Narain	160
Ganga Prasad & Raj Coolmar Singh	211
Ganga Prasa & Umbica Clorn	215 9 9 95
Ganga Ram & Cur Saran Das	330 1139
Ganga Ram & Data Lam	900
Ganga Ram & Data Lam	41 431 1069
Ganga Ram & Data Lam	1073
Ganga Pami Marwar	Jaullu
Ganga Pami Marwar	343
Ganga Pami Marwar	10 1
Ganga Pami Marwar	95
Ganga Pami Marwar	43
Ganga Pami Marwar	10 6
Ganga Pami Marwar	114 115
Ganga Pami Marwar	200
Ganga Pami Marwar	87
Ganga Pami Marwar	1011 1012

[illegible]

	PAGE.
Ghanashyam Nalkant Nadkarni :	324
Moroba Ramchandra	211, 212, 1169, 1196
Ghanashamdas : Joburni Mull	292 1185
Ghazi ud din : Bishan Dial	324
Ghe'la Icharam : Sankal Chand	144, 147, 385 789
Ghelabhai : Bat Javen	117
Ghelabhai : Uderam	368
Ghulam Hassan : Mulla	105
"	107, 506
"	871
"	281
"	33, 1035
"	415
"	600
"	467,
"	1463, 1468 1471
Ghulam Kadir : Mustakim	543
Ghulam Khan : Muhammad Hassan	1066, 1422 1470
Ghulam Shabbir : Dwarka Prasad	247, 265
"	468
Ghulappa : Baghvendra	138
Gilbert (in re)	218
Gilbert : Endean	851, 1078
Gilbert : Smith	804
Gilkinson : Subramania Ayyar	40, 760, 1281
Girdhar Damodar : Kassarig	174, 181, 184
Girdhar Das : Har Shankar	331
Girdhar Manordas : Dayabhai Kalyan	113, 115 122, 687
Girdhar :	113, 115 122, 687
Girendronath Jagore (In the matter of)	858
Girijanund : Sadajanund	272, 279
Girindra : Rajeshwari	170
Girindra Chunder Roy : Jarawa	384
" Kumari	224, 1345
Girindra Nath Mukerjee : Jagor	1318
Gopal	1318

	PAGE
Gurish Chandra Chaudhary & Golani	
Karim	271, 1022
Gurish Chandra Lahiri & Fakir Chandra	910
Gurish Chunder & Juramoni	1361
Gurish Chunder Lahiri & Sasi	1248
Gurish Chunder Lahiri & Soshi Shikhareshwar	871, 873, 881, 882, 1305
Gurish Chunder Lahorey & Koomarce Dabca	916
Gurjashankar & Gopalji	853
Gita Ram & Kirpa Ram	405
Giyana & Kandasami 354, 364, 369, 370, 372	
Cledhill & Hunter	623
Glossup & Harrison	1257
Glyn & Bonnaud	15, 65
Gnana Sambanda & Vayalaga	212
Gnanambac & Parvathi	103
Gobardhan & Mani Bibi	410
Gobardhan & Mano Bibi	1337
Gobardhan Das & Gopal Ram	221
Gobardhan Das & Jai Kishore	1469
Gobardhan Das & Jai Kishen Das	1471
Gobardhan Roy & Bishan Prasad	239, 260
Gobind & Hargopal	201
Gobind & Kunja	459, 793, 791
Gobind Chandra & Ganga Divo	20, 673, 688, 717
Gobind Chunder & Bykuntnath	693
Gobind Chunder Addya & Afzul Habhani	116, 144, 762
Gobind Chunder Coondoo & Taruck Chunder Bose	127, 131
Gobind Chunder Mookerjee & Ram Komal Chatterjee	1021
Gobind Chunder Nundy & Sri Gobind Chowdhry	129
Gobind Chunder Roy & Guru Churn Kurmoker	933
Gobind Chundra Majumdar & Charan Sen	1011
Golind Koomar Chowdhry (<i>In re</i>)	460, 461
Golind Lal Roy & Ram Janam Missir	1015
Gobind Mohapattur & Madhub Persad	691, 692
Gobind Mohun Chuckerbuly & Sheriff	116, 707
Golind Parshad & Murree Brewery	738, 739
Golind Persad Khan	1189
Gobind Prasad & Chandar Sekhar	471, 518, 565
Gobind Ram & Naram Das	565
Gobind Ramanuja & Lakshmi	109
Gobind Row & Girdhari Sahoo	692
Gobind Singh & Kallu	71, 80
Gobind Singh & Zahmi Singh	313
Golinda & Lala Harilal	596
Gobinda & Meenatchi	305
Gobinda Chandra Shaha & Hemsanta Kumari	565
Gobinda Lal & Shibdas	1365
Gobinda Ram & Bholanath 1374, 1378	
Gobindnath Roy Bahadoor & Luckmeo Koomarce	214
Gobardhan Majhee & Baboo Chunder	374
Golind Chunder & Ahmud trator General	1063, 1064

	Page
Gocool Coomar t Blackhook Singh	710, 712
Gocool Dass t Soonderjee	975
Goculchund Banerjee t Camdeb Meeherjee	179
Godard t Gray	1061
Godha t Naik Ram	153
Gokul Chandra t Khwaja Ali Shah	593
Gokal Chand t Lal Chand	160
Gokul Sahu t Jodu Nundhum Roy	110
Gokibai t Lakhmias	121
Gokool Pershad t Iwarra	561
Gokool Pershad Dacult t Brojo Moonee Dalia	381
Gokul Singh t Kisan Singh	273
Gol Mahomed t Abdul Jubban	1285
Golak Nath t Mathura	290
Golam t Hurrish Chunder	1367
Golam t Rahman	381
Golam Ali t Buttick Chunder	717
Golam Ahad Chowdhry t Judhister Chundra Shaha	251, 1016
Golam Asgar t Lakhman Debi	977
Golam Gaffar Mandal t Goljan Bibi	800
Golam Hossein t Alla Rukhee	91
Golam Hossein Ariff t Fatima Begum	1216
Golam Hossein t Ram Gopal	1311
Golam Mahammad t Saroda Mohan	465, 168, 171
Golam Mahomed t Indro Chand	296, 294, 300, 0
Golam Mohamed t Asmit Alu	721
Golam Mukdoom t Hafeezroomssa	408
Golam Mustafa t Sheo Soonduree	180
Golam Russul t Kishen Mohun	410
Golam Saheya t Sham Soonduree	213
Golap Singh t In Ira Coomar	950
Golap Coomary Dossee t Sankar Narain Do	118, 76
Golaupmonce t Prisonom y	811
Golt t Gollenburg	117
Golt t Keir	13
Goluck Chund t Cunga Natam	518
Goluck Chunder t Mohun Lall	1
Goluck Chunder t Nundia near	1
Goluck Chund t G. C. t M. L. t der Glose	1
Goluck Chund t K. S. t L. t	1
Goluck Nath t Kirtika	1

[illegible]

	PAGE		PAGE
Copi Mohun Mulh k r Taram m		Couri Sahai r Ram Sahai	711
Ch wdrani	88	Couri Shankar r Karuna Bibee	409
Copi Narain Khanna r Bibu Banu		Couri Sunkur r Aubhoyessury	297
dhari	217, 1161	Gourmoni Dabee r Jugut Chundra	
Copi Nath r Moheshwar	51, 56	Audhikari	108 126, 270
Copi Nath Chattopadhyay r Sayani		Gourmony Dabia r Khaja Abdul	
Kanta Singh	238 260	Gunny	451
Gopi Nath Chobey r Bhugwat Pershad	115	Gour Mahomed r Khawas Ali Khan	508
	129, 139	Goutard r Carr	212
Gopi Nath Chowdhry r Benode Lal		Goutiere r Charriol	379, 1184
Loy	1086	Goutare r Robert	378, 1181
Gopinath Birlar r Goluck Chunder		Government r Howrie Bhoomiz	560
Bhose	110, 456, 1357	Government r Ferguson	559
Gopi r Sanu Royar	110	Government r Sanooli	211
Gora Chand r Basanta	432, 579, 621	Government of Bombay r Rinnal	
Gora Chand Ghose r Raj Coomaz		Amarsingi	68 142
Doss	825	Governor r Meredith	89
Gora Chand Lurk r Mahan Lal		Govind r Dida	918
Chakravarti	1246	Govind r Dhondbaray	139
Gorachand r Roghu	765	Govind r Jyibai	99, 130
Gorakh Babaji r Vithal Narayan	476	Govind r Parashram	574 575 590
Gorakh Singh r Sidh Gopal	301	Govind r Radha	1294 1295
Gordhandas r Harivallubdas	1131	Govind r Ramkrishna	301
Goree Monce r Juggat In ira	439	Govind r Sakharam	221, 222 1480
Gort r Rowney	512 513, 531	Govind r Vithal	392 407
Gosain Money Purce r Guru Pershad		Govind Abaji r Mohomiraj Vinayak	338
Singh	471, 1109 1202, 1203	Govind Atmaram r Santai	973
Gosain Tota r Raja Rukminiballab	726	Govind Balvant r Lakshman	1043
Goshain Jag Roop r Chingun Lal	991	Govind Chunder r Rungunmoney	1064
Gosmah r Ruffuzzul	327	Govind Das r Ramahoy Jemadar	1086
Gossain Dalmar Puri r Bopin Behary		Govind Hari Walekar r Shidram Shid	
Mitter	90 1033, 1031	murat	231
Gossain Dulmar Puri r Tekait Het		Govind Koomar Re Petition of	498
narain	1226 1227 1230 1243	Govind Valekar r Bank of India	981 985
Gossain Gunga r Dabee Dass	514	Govind Venkaji r Sadashiv Bharmu	931
Gossain Munraj r Deen Dyal	297 313	Govinda r Karunakar	412
	959	Govinda r Mana	623
Goato Behary Sardar r Hari Mohan		Govinda r Mayji	602
Adah	40 49	Govinda r Perum levi	6 8 600
Gosto Bihary Pat r Johur Lal Pat	780	Govinda Nair r Kesava	1030
Goswami r Madhowsdas	77	Govin Irao Krishna r Balu	1203
Goswami Ranchor r Sri Girdharaj	565	Govindray r Ragho	692
Goudoin r Venl atesa	305	Gowdu Magata r Gowdu Blavaan	45
Goundu Pillai r Thayammal	5	Gower r Bennett	1941
Gour Chun ler r Chunder Coomar	988	Gower r Couldrie	521 672
Gour Hari r Prannath	1072	Gowree Kumal r Surat Chun ler Dass	1031
Gour Huree r Pran Huree	896	Graham r Lewis	180
Gour Huree Chowdhry r Mahomed		Graham r Lopez	409 1090
Hossein	263	Gram r Alrich	582
Gour Mohun Gouli r Dino Nath Har		Grand Junction Canal Co r Dimes	1201
makar	218	Grant (Fe)	722
Gour Mookh Singh r Lall Gour Sun		Grant r Anderson	1115, 1116 1118, 1119
ler	1000	Grant r Subramanian	335
Gour Pershad r Anjub Ali	1375	Graves r Heinemann	793
Gour Sundar Laluri r Hem Chunder		Graves r Lebanly	601
Chowdhury	260, 901	Gray r Cantonment Comm ittee of	
Gour Surn Dass (In the matter of)	1336	Poona	58 346
Gour Surun r Ram Surun	307	Gray r Chaplin	133
Coura Chundra r Vikrama Doo	68, 30	Crathall r Bronly	121
Gourchurn Soor r Peary Lal	755	Green r Chund r r r r Mick atosh	273
Courdas Mistry r Hewitt	1181		275 276 282
Couri r Vigueshwar	203	Creesh Chunder r Gour Mohun	1266
Gouri Dutt r Amar Chan l	316 420	Cregory r Dooley Chand 100 1070,	1091
Gouri Koer r Audh Koer	110 113		1092
Gouri Prosad r Bholanath	928	Cregory r Molesworth	111
Gouri Prosad Kundu r Jam Jatan		Gr r Hazari Lal	279
Surcar	331		

	PAGE		PAGE
Goluckbur t Bishonath	740	Gopal Chunder t Kurnodhar Moechee	1090
Goma Mahad Patil t Gokaldas Khimji	904	Gopal Chunder t Ram Chunder	1072
Gomes t Carter	1199, 1204	"	125
Gomme v West	1239	"	691
Gomti Kunwar t Guari	137, 140	"	1375
Gondoin v Venkatesa Moodelly	299, 305	"	367
Gonesh Chunder Dass t Troylucko		"	648
Nath Biswas	1246, 1251, 1255	Gopal Gonesh t Ramchandra	431, 1046
Gonesh Das Bagria t Shiva Lakshman		Gopal Gundapa v Vishnu Krishna	724, 725, 726
Bhakat	338	"	726
Gonesh Lal Tewari t Sham Narain	908	Gopal Kashi t Ramabai	562
"	1024	Gopal Krishna Parachure v Sakhouarav	5
"	1038	Gopal Lal Seal t F J Marsden	304
"	397	Gopal Lal Seal (In the goods of)	1089, 1247
"	1062	"	
"	1065	Gopal Lal Thakoor t Feluk Chunder	
Googlee Sahoo v Premilal Sahoo	410, 427, 554, 556, 569	Rai	1332
Gool Khan t Ietar Goala	124	Gopal Lal t Banarsi Pershad Chow	
Goolam Hoosein t Fatmabai	208, 1136	dhury	120
Gooneshar v Gonesh Das	439	Gopal Nanashet t Joharimal	955, 956, 977, 1270
Goonjessur t Luchmee	313, 959	"	
Goonomoneo Dossia t Parbuty Dassia	391	Gopal Narhar t Hanmant	413, 1376
Goonoo Moneo v Ram Kumol	1139	Gopal Pershad v Rama Woogra Sing	768
Goopce Nath Dobey v Roy Luchmee		Gopal Purshotam t Bai Divali	972
put Singh	1016	Gopal Rao t Krishor Kalidas	1314
Goor Bux Sahoo t Brij Lal Benka	123 431	Gopal Sah v Janki Koer	913
Goor Dyal t Deha Noonya	1371	"	915
Goordas t Puran	417	"	
Gooroo Churn Sircar t Brij Nath		"	
Dhur	113	"	
"	971	"	
"	92	"	
"	452	"	
"	018	"	
"	844	"	
Gooroo Dass Roy t Stephens	1347, 1348	Gopalasami v Sankara	1244
Gooroo Doss t Anund Moyee	875	Gopalal t Chunni Lal	336
Gooroo Dosa Roy t Bungshee Dhur	877	Gopalasahu t Brij Kishow Pershad	221, 222
Gooroo Doss Poy t Sona Moneo		"	70, 115
Dossia	969 971	"	1264
Gooroo Dyal Mundur t Baboo Gopal		"	312
Singh	874	"	857
Gooroo Persad Roy t Juggobundhoo		Gopee Lal t Mus t Sree Chundradolee	
Mozoomdar	70	"	670, 691
Gooroo Prosad Khoon t Juggut Chan		"	116
dra	452	"	181
Gooroo Prosunno Banerjee t Guggun		"	953
Chunder	561	"	1312
"	1345	"	843
"	851	"	
"	1035	"	
"	897	Gosain	516
Gopal t Narsingh	577, 599	Gopeenath t Gopeenath	406
Gopal t Nitobar	164, 970	Gopeenath Mookerjee t Kally Doss	
Gopal t Ooday	499	Mullicl	1199
Gopal t Fekatt	110	Gopeenath Singh t Anundmoyee Debia	30
Gopal t Finecourt	403	Copceswar Pal v Jiban Chandra	510, 1046
Gopal Chandra t Bigu Mistry	166 476, 1153 1154	Gopi Chand Bothra t Kasimunnas	309
"		"	976
"		Gopi Koeri t Gopi Lal	423 474 1026
"		Gopi Krishna Gosain t Nilcomul	
"		Pannerjee	183 184, 186, 189
"		Gopi Mahabickwar t Shewo	158
"		Gopi Mohan Roy t Doybaki Nundun	
"		Sen	169 170, 226, 1025
Gopal Chunder t Gunam ni Dasseet	910	Gopi Mohun Dey t Induri Gupta	91

TABLE OF CASES.

1550

	PAGE
Gopi Mohun Mullik & Taram Das Chowdhuri	88
Gopi Narain Khanna & Jyoti Banerjee	217 1161
Gopi Nath & Moheshwar	51, 56
Gopi Nath Chattopadhyay & Sanyal	258, 260
Gopi Nath Chobey & Bhugwat Pershad	115
Gopi Nath Chowdhury & Benode Lal	129, 139
Gopinath Barbar & Goluck Chunder Bhose	410, 456, 1357
Gopinath Sami Royer	110
Gora Chand & Basanta	472, 579, 627
Gora Chand Ghose & Raj Coommar Doss	825
Gora Chand Lurki & Mahan Lal Chakravarti	1216
Gorachand & Roghu	765
Gorakh Babaji & Nithal Narayan	476
Gorakh Singh & Sidh Gopal	301
Gordhandas & Harivallubdas	1131
Goree Monee & Juggat Indra	439
Gort & Rowney	519 519, 531
Gosain Money Purce & Guru Pershad Singh	471, 1198 1202 1905
Gosain Tota & Raja Rukminaballab	726
Goshain Jag Poop & Chingun Lal	991
Goswami & Taffuzul	327
Gossain Dalmar Puri & Depin Behary Mutter	90, 1933, 1031
Gossain Dulmir Puri & Tekait Hee Narain	1226 1227 1230 1243
Gossain Gunga & Dabee Dass	514
Gossain Munraj & Deen Dyal	297 313
Gosto Behary Sardar & Hari Mohan Adak	40 49
Gosto Bihary Pal & Johur Lal Pat	780
Goswami & Madhowsdas	77
Goswami Ranchor & Sri Gurdharaj	565
Goudont & Venkatesa	305
Goundu Pillai & Thayammal	5
Gour Chunder & Chunder Coommar	958
Gour Hari & Prannath	1072
Gour Huree & Pran Huree	866
Gour Kishore Chowdhury & Mahomed Hossain	263
Gour Mohun Gouli & Dipo Nath Kar	218
Gour Mookh Singh & Lalla Gour Sun	1000
Gour Pershad & Anjub Ali	1375
Gour Sundar Lalur & Hem Chund Chowdhury	260 901
Gour Surn Dass (in the matter of)	1336
Gour Surun & Ram Surun	307
Coura Chundra & Vikrama Das	68 30
Courchurn Soor & Mary Lal	77
Courdas Mistry & Hewitt	1181
Couris & Vigneshwar	217
Gouri Dutt & Amar Chandra	336 420
Gouri Koer & Audh Koer	110 143
Gouri Prosad & Bholanath	925
Gouri Prosad Kundu & Jami Jatan Sircar	33

Couré Sahai t Ram Sahai	711
Gouri Shankar t Karuna Bibee	400
Gouri Sunkur t Aulhojessury	297
Gourmoni Dabee t Jugut Chundra Aulhikari	109 126, 270
Gourmony Dabee t Khaja Abdul Gunny	451
Gous Mahomed t Khawas Ali Khan	908
Goutard t Carr	212
Goutiere t Charriol	373, 1181
Goutiere t Robert	374, 1181
Government t Bawrie Bhoomiz	560
Government t Ferguson	553
Government t Sanoola	211
Government of Bombay t Annual Amarsingji	98, 112
Governor t Meredith	8
Govind t Dida	118
Govind t Dhonebharas	113
Govind v Jipbar	93 120
Govind t Panshram	571 575 590
Govind t Radha	1291 1275
Govind t Ramkrishna	301
Govind t Sakharam	221, 222 1180
Govind t Vithal	312 407
Govind Abaji t Mohoniraj Vaniyak	319
Govind Atmaram t Sintai	971
Govind Balvant t Lakshman	1013
Govind Chunder v Rungunmoney	1001
Govind Das v Ramasahoy Jemadar	1088
Govind Hari Walckar v Shidram Shil murti	234
Govind Koomar Re Petition of	408
Govind Valekar t Bank of India	981 985
Govind Venkaji t Sadashiv Bharm	931
Govinda t Karunakar	412
Govinda t Mana	623
Govinda t Mavji	603
Govinda t Perum levi	1 8 890
Govinda Nair t K. Sava	1036
Govind Rao Krishna t Balu	1203
Govindray t Ragho	612
Gowda Magata t Gowdhu Bhavagan	45
Gower t Bennett	1211
Gower t Coulndrie	521 672
Gowree Kumal t Sirat Chunder Dass	1031
Graham t Lewis	180
Graham t Lopez	103 1095
Graun v Aldrich	542
Grand Junction Canal Co t Dunes	1291
Grant (Pe)	722
Grant t Anderson	1115 1116 1117, 1119
Grant v Subramannu	1119
Craves t Heunemann	7
Craves t Lebau ty	1
Gray t Cantoni ent	1
Loon	11 116
Gray t Chaplin	11 11
Greathart t Brails	11
Greener Chund t	11
Greesh Chund t	11
Gregory t Dooley	11
Gregory t Molloy	11
Gregory t Hazari Lal	11

	PAGE		PAGE
Gr y v Woo _{ra} Mohun Thakur	1217	Gumant Hardwar	311
Gridharibhai t Mathurbhai Ghulabhai	1229 1232	Gumant Ram Sadarath	596
Gridhari Lal v Crawford	422	Gumamant Das t Prankishori Das	894
Gridhari Lal Roy t Sundar Bibi	211 217	Gunaputty Roy Agarwalla t Thakur	
Greig t Clements	697	dye Thakurani	897 900
Griendtoven t Hamlyn & Co	1111 1118	Gundappa t Lobosa	1315, 1316
Griffith t Griffith	1257	Gundo Anandav v Krishnazay	881
Grish t Brojonath	577	Gunes Chunder Shah t Ram Dhunee	
Grish Chandra Bannarjee t Bhanoo		Dassee	977
Motee	918	Gunes Dutt t Bulwant Singh	873
Grish Chunder v Collins	181 182	Gunes Ram Surmah t Robinee	
Grish Chunder t Ramessee	581	Dassee	1309 1371
Grish Chunder Chuckerbutty v Grish		Gunga Das Dev t Ram v Dev	47
Chunder Chuckerbutty	981	Gunga Das Seal t Akub Ali	267
Grish Chunder Lahiri v Soshi Shak		Gunga Dass (In r)	115
hareshwar	875 1097	Gunga Dutt v Dabee Das	516
Grish Chunder Lahoory t Koomaree		Gunga Dutt Singh t Mungree Ram	
Dabee	713	Chowdhry	1342
Grish Chunder Mookerjee v Muller	1139	Gunga Gobind Gooptoo v Makhun Lal	
Grish Chunder Mookerjee t Ramsee		Hattee	907
suree Dabee	113 168 581	Gunga Gobind Mandal t Collector of	
Grish Chunder Sein t Obhoy Churn		Purgunnahs	1303
Mullick	271	Gunga Monce v Copal Chunder	783 772
Grob t Palmer	1180	Gunga Monce v Issur Chunder	411 1238
Grosso t Amrutamayi Dossee	195	Gunga Narain t Tiluckram	700 710
Grumbrecht t Parry	778		717, 770
Gubboy v Ramdoyal Chowbar	937	Gunga Narain Ghose v Haradhin	
Guda Shur v Nonmohinee	1260	Ghose	971
Gudadhur Bannarjee t Musst	Mun	Gunga Narain Gupta v Annanda	
Mohinee Dossia	391	Moyee	169 227, 989
	560	Gunga Pershad v Jowahir	900
	1296	Gunga Pershad Sahu v Maharani Bibi	443
	0 122		819 820 1362
	9 164	Gunga Prosad v Rajcoomar Ghose	267
	745	Gunga Ram t Moola	1003
	467	Gunga Ram Sidhookhan t Panchi	
Gujadhar Lauree t Nait Lauree	1001 1089	Cowree	114
Gujadhar Pershad t Saheb Roy	528 590	Gungabshen Bhugut t Raghoonath	
Gujendro t Himanginee	704	Ojha	140 145
Gujja Lal t Fattch Lal	124	Gungadhar v Radhainowey	410
Gujraj Singh (In re)	633	Gungagotti Pal v Ram S onder Dit	312
Gujraj Singh v Bijai Singh	412		961
Gulab Chandra t Shankar Lal	768	Gungaram v Punamchand	510
Gulab Das t Jivan Ram	752	Gungaram Dutt v Chowdhry Jan	
Gulab Khan t Abdul Wahab	386	joy	1306
Gulab Koer t Badshah Bahadur	106 107, 108, 1078		894
	299 304		564
Gulab Kumar t Hansidhar	429 430		1309
Gulab Kunwar t Thakur Das	1287		915
Gulab Nair v Mangli Lal	47 467		1079
Gulabdas t Lakshmin Narhar	279		3 202
	1049 10 0		544
Gulabhai t Jinabhai	1041		1283
Gulabsingh v Lakshman Singh	80		16 18
Gulam t Ha t Bidrudin	116		98 114, 123 129
Gulam Hussein t Syad Musa	418 1298	Gurdial Singh t Raja of Faridkote	119
	1376		151 152 153 350
Gulam Hussain t Mahamadalli	596	Cureeballa v Chunder Kant	1132
Gulba t Kishen	734	Cureebullah Sircar t Mohun Lal	
Gulbai v Japannath Chavankar	973	Shaha	4 508
Gulkanli Lal t Manni Lal	1072	Gurnami v Mahan	794
Gulzar Singh t Kalyan Chind	183		1020
Gulzar Lal v Daya Ram	111		113
Gulzari Lal v Madho Ram	2 1 60		113
Gulzari Lal v Kalirunm	1303		

	PAGE
Carunath Shrivastav v Chandraappa	474, 476
Curu Prasad v Gossain Munraj	1137
Curu Prasanno Lahiri v Jotindra	
Mohun Lahiri	448
	314
	469
	561
	101
	1151
	12 998
	30 952
	971
	858
	115
	591
	0 265,
	907, 911
Gyan Chunder v Durga Churn	1101, 1102
Gyanananda Asram v Kusto Chandra	357,
	374 431, 551, 552
Gyanund v Bepin Mohun	1370, 1375, 1376
Gyanundra v Rani Nihalo	2-5
Gyaram Seal v Issur Chunder	408 555

H

Haberley v Bason	179
Habib Bakhsht v Baldeo Prasad	453 553
	1300, 1301
Habibul Hossain v Mahomed Reza	718

Hafiz Abdul v Hari Raj	445 1299
Hafiz Abdul Karim v Sri Kissen Rai	
	408 1309
Hafizabai v Kazi Abdul Karim	1128, 1243
Hafizaboo v Mahomed Cassum	624
Hafizullah v Abdul Aziz	108
Haggard v Pelcier	191
	440
	1050
	68, 1071
	1278
	188
	1314
	1315 1316
	132
Haji Atharaman	
Haji Abdul Rahman v Khoja Khaki	
Aruth	896
Haji Abdul Rahman v Haji Noor	
Mahomed	1082, 1083

Haji Jiva v Abubakar	PAGE
Haji Mahomed v Subba Naidu	1188
Haji Musa v Purmanand Nursey	723
	232
	235 899
Haji Noor Mahomed v Macleod	101 112
Haji Syed Mahomed v Galab Rai	1200
Haji Umar v Goostadji	199
Haji Wedina Cassam v Luxmibai	1422
Hajon Manick v Bur Sing	350
Hajrat Akramulla v Valulmusa	
Begam	495 510, 748
Hakim v Na'im Gul	582
Hakumir v Basdeo	767, 1358
Haladhar Dey v Ambika Charan Bose	936
Haladhar Maiti v Choytonna Maiti	463,
	471
Hall v Hall	1222
Hall v L & N W Ry Co	734 778
Hall v Lardet	778
Hall v Truman	792
Halodhar Shaha v Haragobin Das	
Koburto	910
Hallett v Estato (In re)	10
Haloo v Atwaro	749
Hambling v Wallant	693
Hamedoolah v Muteconussa	108
Hameeda Beebee v Noor Beebee	1357
Hameedoolah v Mahomed Asghur	
Hossein	157
Hamid Ali v Gwyadin	409
Hamid Bakht Mozumdar v Buktair	acq

I

Hamfa Bai v Haji Siddick	1154 1328
Hanken v Turner	1276
Hanlon v East India Railway	638
Hanlon v India Branch Railway	1112
Hanmer v Flight	701
Hanmant v Annaji Hanmanta	1280
Hanmant v Surabhat	248
Hanmantapa v Yivabai	133
Hanmantray v Subaji	1032
Hannay v Smurthwaite	512 603 624
Hanooman Singh v Luchman Sahoo	1008
Hansraj Lakshmdas v Lalji Anandji	597
Hansraj v Mukhrari Kunwar	908
Hansraj v Ratni	410, 420
Hanuman Kamut v Hanuman Mandur	588
Hanuman Prasad v Bhagwati Prasad	430
	453 455
Hanumantamma v Rama Reddi	409
Hanwant Singh v Ram Gopal	10-8
Har Bhatat Das v Anandaram Marwari	
	310 33.

	PAGE		PAGE
	33	Hari Bhaiji v. Naro Vishwanath	473 474
	309		
	1374		
	69, 69		
Har Naram Singh v. Kharg Singh	427 428		
	552 1058	Hari Charan Singh v. Har Shankar Singh	140
Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali	66 67 68 140 474		845
	476 479	Hari Churn Singh & P	
Har Prasad v. Jagan Lal	309	Hari Das Acharjee Chowdhury v. Baroda Kushore Acharjee Chowdhury	137 295 304
Har Prasad v. Sheo Ram	247		771
Har Shankar v. Baijnath Das	305		1240
Har Shankar Partab Singh v. Lal Pagharaj Singh	101		897
Hara Dhan Kalia v. Purna Chandra Mondul	239, 965		1028
			15
			517
			7 88
			1030
			7, 899
			441
			1163
			1212
			200
Harai Sahi v. Faizlur Rahman	336 1007	Hari Lal Juttich (In re)	200
	1008	Hari Mohan Misra v. Secretary of State	345
		Hari Mohan Shaha v. Baburali	30 932
			1032
		Hari Mohun Messer & Suren Ira Narayan Singh	400 451
		Hari Narayan v. Moro Narayan	155
		Hari Narayan Brahme & Ganpatrao Daji	119 168 582
Haran & Rossick	412	Hari Nath & Ram Kumar Bagechi	1086
Haranund & Prosunno 13 531, 600 609 615		Hari Nath Chatterjee & Mothur Mohun Goswami	126
Haran and Roy Chetlangia & Ram Gojal Chetlangia	116	Hari Raghunath Joshi v. Krishnaji Anant	224 858 901, 1074
Harbars & Tota Sahu	526 589		
Harbins Sahai & Bhuro Pershal Singh	30 931 1229		
Harchan Lal Singh v. Lal Buladur Singh	108 606 611 614		
Harchara & Sibramanya	340		
	509		
	708		
	590		1074
	808		1008
	1022		565
	1463		711
	396		1171
	769		1047
	29	Harihar Chait v. Kannaath	108
	1336	Harihar & Madal Chandra	1010
	190	Harihar v. Mathura	1140
	564	Harihar & Rama Pandi	251 1010
	200		
	185		
	126		
	329		
	603 597	Harinath v. Syed Hassan	906 983
	901	Hariram Mohan Lal	1071 1072
Hari & Narayan			1087
Hari Balu Cackawal & Ganpatrao Lakhurao	191 474		
Hari Manji & Secretary of State	180		
	311 315 1-10		

[illegible]

	PAGE
Hira Ambaid s t Pechchand Ambaidas	1030
Hira Chand Harjivandas t Kastur Chand Kasdis	272 919 1045
Hira Dasi t Hira Lal	638 747 749 766 839 1283
Hiralal t Bai Asi	55, 480
Hira Lal v Bhairon	533 540
Hira Lal v Karim un nissa	320
Hira Lal t Ramju	572
Hira Lal t Udov	1070
Hira Lal Chatterji v Gourmoni Debi	260 501
Hira Lal Ghose t Chundra Kanto Ghose	48 249, 250 268 389
Hira Lal Mozumdar t Prosunno Chunder	530 708 276 566 429 762 9 54 55 1272 121 671 778 849 1091 1370 1201 161 169 1198 634 302 785 3 6 512 1203 53 54 471
Houston v Layton	
Hoffman t Framjee	849 1091
Hoghton v Fiddey	1370
Holkar t Ashburner	1201
Holkar t Dadabhai	161 169 1198
Holkar t Pitambardas	634
Hollick (In the matter of)	302
Hollis t Burton	785
Holme v Guy	3 6
Honduras etc Co t Lefevre	512 1203 53 54 471
Humar Dutt	791
Hori Dasi v Secretary of State	365
Hormaji Ardair (In re)	24
Hormaji Dorabji t Bhurji Jamsetji	894 896 556 31 1085 46 1072 1057 943 1315 1316 739, 740 242 266 549 117 358 334 781 304 1312 912 71 767 1714 1018 1019 111 146
Hornwall v London Omnibus Co	
Hossain Ali Mirza t Abed Ali Mirza	31 1085
Hossain Bux t Mutookdharee Lall	46
Hossain Bibi t Peri Khanum	1072
Hossain Ali t Al har Rahim	1057
Hossain Ally t Ashotoch Cangoofy	943
Hossain Bulsh t Ameena Khatoon	1315 1316 739, 740 242 266 549 117 358 334 781 304 1312 912 71 767 1714 1018 1019 111 146
Hossaina Bibee t Smith	739, 740
Hotalar t Hardeo	242 266
House Property Co t Horse Nail Co	549
Houston t Marquis of Slen	117
Howard t Weston	358
Howatson t Durrant	334
Howell Morgan (Pe)	781
Hoymobutty t Koroona	304
Hoymobutty t Sreekissen	1312
Hriday Kant t Bchari Lal	912
Hriday Nath t Mohobutnessa	71 767
Hubeekoolah t Cowler Ali	1714
Hubeekool Hossain t Allen ler	1018
Halhal t Kanhai Lal	1019
Hallersfall Banking Co t Henry Lister & Son, Ltd	111 146

	PAGE
Hudson t Bisdeo Bappyo	1288
Hudson v Morgan	1235, 1258
Hughes t Delhi Bank	564 549 965 44 412 1282
Hukum Chand Baid t Kamalanand	
Smoo 15 10 17 21 497 498 503 1269 1272 1273 1341	
Hukum Chand Aswal t Gyanender	
Chunder Lahuri	235
Hulari t Sheo Prasad	884, 885
Hulas Rai v Partha Singh	204 266 1131 1029 431
makar	250
Hunlur Singh v Madho Jall	1037
Hunooman Persaud t Musst Babooee	14 132, 683 403 218 1239 1000 111, 118 154 412 1155 869 1032
Hunsa Koor t Sheo Gobind Rawat	
Hunt (Re)	
Hunt t Priest	
Hunt Monnet & Co t Blolagar (In re)	
Hunter t Stewart	
COOMAR t OKRJEI	
Hurechar t Judoonath	1244 1245 409 877 970 216 494 1296 719 417 1750 844
Hurechar Moolerjee t Mollah A	
Hurechar Mookerjee t Nobin Chunder Doss	
Hureenath Banerjee t Daybo Chunder Bannetjee	
Hureenath Koondo v Madhoo Soodan	
Hurgovindas t Jadvavahon	
Huri Mohun t Narmul lin	
Hurish t Copal	
Hurish Chunder t O Brij n	
Hurish Chunder Ghose t Copal Chunder Ghose	

Harmungal t Athul	PAGE 916
Harmusit Bomonji	174
Huro Chunder t Gobind	1038
Huro Chunder v Ram Coomur	408
	1232 1236
Huro Clunder Riswas t Nobo Hassan	1237
Mookerjee	36
Huro Gobind Bhukat t Degnmbarce Debia	876
Hury Krishno Doss t Motee Chand Riboo	770
Huro Mohun Mookerjee (<i>In re</i>)	1370
Huro Pershad v Fool Kishoro	217, 742
Huro Pershad Roy t Shama Pershad Roy	913
Huro Prosad v Kali Prosad	331
Huro Prosad Roy v Ramessur Misry	I
Jalia	1013
Huro Prosad Roy t Womatara Debee	401,
	101
Huro Soonduree v Baboo Rungshee	379
Huro Soonduree v Bingshee Mohun	379
	741 744
Huro Soonduree v Unnopoorna	692
Huro Soonduree Debee v Brojo Gobind Shah	1018
Huro Soonluree D bia v Ameena Begum	816
Huronath Roy t Scott	66
Hurprasad t Sheo Dyal	1304 130, 1307
	1309
Huri Bhusan v Upendra Lal	412
Huri Pershal Chawdhry t Nasib Singh	891
Huri Sunker Mookerjee t Muktaram Patro	140
Hurunath Rai t Krishna Kumar Bakshi	857
Hurrish Kushto v Motee Chand	933
Huro Chunder v Ram Kissore	1377
Huro Chunder t Shoorthoonce Delia	11, 20, 497, 499
Huro Durga Chowdhary v Surat	" 3 882
" " "	1 618
	223
Soondery	881
Huropersaul Roy t Shamapersaud Roy	881
Hurosecondary Dassee t Jugobundho Dutt	270
Hurreck Lall t Sreenibash Kurmakar	874
Hurreck Singh (<i>In re</i>)	50
Hurry Behari Bhagat t Purgun Abir	114 134
" " " "	903
" " " "	40
" " " "	57
" " " "	20
" " " "	500
Husein v Shankagiri Gura	932
Husenbhoy v Ahmedbhoy	450 451
Husen Begam v Collector of Mora dabad	368, 373 374
Hussain v Mutookdhar	381
Husseini Ahmad v Sajja Mahammad	232
Hussen Bhamjee t Hicks	302
Hussan Ali t Nasirooddeen	1361
Hutchinson v Glover	791
Huxley v West London Extension Ry	217
Iba Hasan v Brij Bhukan	21
	564
	1060
	1044
	80 82
Ibroti v Sangaram	371
Ido (<i>Re</i>)	1119
Iyatulla Bhuiyan t Chandra Mohan Banerji	186
Iyyatollah Khan v Ram Churn Gun goolee	728
Ikrani Singh v Intizam	1037
Ikratul Haq t Wilkie	45
Rabi Baksh t Baij Nath	989
Rahi Baksh v Imam Baksh	1071
Rahi Baksh t Sit	974
	413
	1305
	120
	08 571
Imam ud din t Sadarath	1034
Imam un nissa v Lekat Hussain	910
Imambandi v Kamakswari Pershad	411
Imami t Gobind	582
Imbihunni t Lahri	281
Imdad v Tasadduk	382
Imdad Ali v Jagan Lal	232 210 241 213
	1041
Indad Hasan Khan t Balraj Prasad	20,
Imrit Konwar v Roop Narain	1077
Imrit Nath v Baboo Joy	601 612
Imrit Nath v Roy Dinput	618
Intiaz Bano v Latifat un nissa	212 381
Intazi Begam v Dhuman Begam	244
Indar Kunr v Laiba Prasad	1111
Indarat Prasid v Richha Lai	117
Indarpal Singh v Nawa Lal	1171
Indarman (<i>In re</i>)	(<i>G.</i>)
Indar Subbarani t Kanabai Raja mannar	14
Indergeet v Dewaran	8
Indigo Co v Ogilvy	111 11,
Indo Mati v Ganga Prasad	
Indra Chantra Mukherji	" 6
Chandraraj v	
Indra Chantra Singh (<i>In re</i>)	
Indre Chun t r Da i	
Indro Lo hin v Gori	

	PAGE		PAGE
In lro Narain t Kristo Chunder	282	Issur Chunder t Mohnee Mohun	967
In lu Mesh t Dar Baksh	768	Issur Chunder t Nobo Kristo	1137
Indor Chunder t Radha Kishore	413 692	Issur Chunder Sein t Cruz	138
	700	Issur Ghose t Hills	1291
Indur Chunder Doogur t Gopal Chun		Iswar Chandra t Jugat Kishor	1093
der Sinha	968	Iswar Chandra Dutt t Haris Chandra	
Indur Subbaram t Kondadar	1469	Dutt	243 894
Indurjeet t Luchmon	312	Iswar Pershad t Jai Narain	1032
Indurjeet Singh t Radhey Singh	871 872	Ittappan t Manavikrama S	578 580 587
	878	Ittiachan t Velappan	132 970
Inglis t Ram Singh	721	Iyyappa t Rama Lakshminamma	514 704
In izam Ali Khan t Narain Singh	999		816
Irama t Satyappa	143 147		
Isak t Khatija	167	J	
Isan Chunder t Luchun Gope	1356	Jackson t Lichfield	949 1124
Isapa t Apasahch	565	Jackson t Sprittila	112
Ishan t Bishu	405	Jackammal t Palneappa	1309
Ishan Chandra t Rameshwar	527, 531, 607	Jacobs t Schmalz	685
	603 609	Jacobson t Campbell	699
Ishan Chandra Burdhan t Amuddin		Jadab Chandra t Dinanath Das	934
Mia	876	Jalloomony Daboo t Hafez Mahomed	859 870
Ishan Chunder t Buksh Ali	282	Jadow Mulji t Chhagan Raichand	346
Ishan Chunder t Haran Sirdar	1350		1137, 1145
Ishan Chunder t Hurish Chunder	776	Jadn t Harihar	391
Ishan Chunder t Sharoda	692	Jadu t Kaulash	417 1464
Ihan Chunder Pandopadhy t Indro		Jadu Mini t Ram Kumar	1079
Namin Cossami	89, 896	Jadu Nandan t Deo Narain	1204
Ishan Chunder Poy t Ashanoollah		Jalu Nath Kundu t Brya Nath	97
Khan	901	Kundu	
		Jadu Nath Mookerjee t Hari Pada	
		Mookerjee	1303
Ishri t Gopal Saran	16 19 217 736 834		
	880, 917		
Ishri Dutt t Newalal	265		
Ishur Dutt t Shib Pershad	630	diek	29 1362
Ishur Hant Bhadooree (In re)	901	Jadubansa Narain t Mohunt Hari	
Ishwar Lakshmidat t Harjivan Ramji	1024 1027	Charan	0 1
	445	Jadulla Khan t Bhana Val	571
Ishwargar t Candasama		Jadumoni t Pu li Bibi	126
Ishwar Chunder Dutt t Rati Krishna		Jaduputte t Chunder Kant Bhatta	
Dass	563 564	charjee	389
Ishwar Lal Singh t Jagoo Sahn	383	Jafir Hussain t Ranjit Singh	129
Ishwardas Tribhovandas t Kalidas	1350	Jafir Khan t Gholam Muhammad	140
Iema Sundati D t t Binli Bishini		Jafree Begum t Ahmed Ameen	809
Clow Haran	863	Jalri t Amur Mohammed	280
Ismail Kani Fowthan t Nazarah Sahib	87	Jalri Begam t Sira Bibi	278
Ismail t Arum	674	Jalir Hossein t Hingun Jan	279
	210	Jag Lal t Har Narain Singh	71, 80 142
	115	Jayabandhu Chattopadhy t Deenu	
	1020	Pal	900
	606	Jagabhat t Bhukan las	276 299
			169
			500
Ismaji t Macleod	401 468		444
Iraile Sharma t Aliman	1198 1200		370
Isti Dutt Koer t Musamit Handatti			162
Koerain	127	Jas, Nait t Jahan	316 317
Koer t Sates	407	Javan Nath t Balgobind	93, 243
Koer Chandra t Gopal Chandra	71	Javan Nath t Balkushan	120
Koer Chandra t Anandesh Chit		Javan Nath t Bhawan	1300
	638	Javan Nath t Canesh	972

	PAGE		PAGE
Janki Tewari v Gayan Tewari	45	Jeswant Singhjee v Jai Singhjee	52, 843
Jankibai v Atmaram	748	Jetha Bhuma v Lady Janbai	315, 335 944
Jankibai v Shrinivas Ganesh	624	Jetha Mulchand v Gulraj Jasrup	1157, 1159
Jannobee Chowdhram v Collector of Mymensingh	1096	Jethabai v Chapsey	508
Janokee Nath Mookerjee v Joy Kishen Mookerjee	860	Jewat Dube v Kali Charan	686
Janokee Nath Mookerjee v Raj Kristo Singh	879	Joy Narain v Torabun	872
Janokey Nath Roy (In re)	53, 56	Jeynarayan Meghraj v Kurimali	954
Janoley Nath Guha v Brojo Lal Guha	471, 1469 1472	Jhama Lal v Sant Lal	528, 586
Janoki Singh Roy v Kaloo Mundni	292	Jhamman Lal v Kewal Ram	262
Janokinath v Ramrunjun	530 544, 604		719
	613		1298
Janoky Bullabh Sen v Johiruddin Mahomed	334 339		933
Janssen v Daudas	1091	Persa l	979, 1017
Jarao Kumari v Gopi Chand	1310	Jhotce Singh v Gopal Singh	411
Jardine Skinner v Nabaranee Surno moyce	589 668	Jhoti Sahu v Bhubun Gir	270, 870
		Jhubhoo Sahoo v Mussamat Jusoda	201
			1094, 1095, 1371 1375
		Jhummon v Dingoanath	301
		Jibin Krishna v Sripati Charan	302
		Jibaneasa v Mayidunessa	1233
		Jibanti Nath v Gokool Chunder	550
			569
		Jibanti Nath v Shib Nath	585
		Jiji Amba (Ex parte)	1229 1234 1236
		Jijibhoy v Byramji	209
		Jino v Manon	704
		Jitmal v Jivala Prasad	961
		Jivan Bhaga v Him Bhajji	300
		Jivraj v Bibaji	270
		Jivraj v Praggi	473 860
		Jivat Dube v Kali Charan Ram	18 913
		Jora Mull v Munmoo Lal	188
		Jodoo Monce Dosses (In re)	495
		Jodoonath v Brojo Mohun	991
		Jodoonath Roy v Dwarkalath	206
		Chatterjee	
		Jodoonath Roy v Pam Buksh	909
		Chunlungo	239
		Jogemoya Das v Thackoman Dassi	241, 252
			255 266
		Jogendra v Gobind	1277
		Jogendra v Janindra	1013
		Jogendra v Monmotho	
		Jogendra Chandra Chose v Moheah	900
		Chandra Ditta	
		Jogendra Chunder Sen v Wazimuss	199
		Khatun	
		Jogendra Dub Poykut v Tunmdio	125 131, 1276 1328
		Loykut	
		Jogendra Narain v Rance Surno	241
		Moyce	316 678
		Jogendra Nath v Price	
		Jogendra Nath Gossam v Debendero	1238
		Nath Gossam	
		Jogendra Nath Mookerjee v Methana	207
		Abraham	
		Jogendra Nath Roy v Ravik Chandra	273
		Lanerce	
		Jogendra Nath Sir v Provath Nath	895 897
		Jogendra Nath Sircar v Gobind	710
		Chunder Addi	
		Jogendro Bhattacharya v Hiranya	108 955
		Kumar	
		Jogendro Chandra v Dwarka Nath	636
Jasoda v Bati Ula Das	903		
Jasoda Deyo v Kirtibash Das	903		
Jaswant v Dip Singh	502		
Jathu Naik v Venkappa	280		
Jathave lan v Kunchu	1018		
Jati Pam v Dasi Pam	388		
Jatin Lal v Sarfaraj	558		
Jatin Lal Molan v Srinath Roy	1134 1135		
Jatunga Tea Co v Chera Tea Co	1292		
Jatli Mallayya v Madajalli	219, 1103		
Jatra v Ankul	1362		
Jatra Mohan Nandi v Pitambar	1316		
Jatra Ramji v Jidavji Natha	975		
Javermal Hirachand v Umayi Haya bati	908		
Jayberbai v Haribhai	987 990 1000		
Jawahir Mal v Kistur Chand	806 1319		
	1320		
Jawalir Singh v Debi Sin	1283 1287		
Jawthra v Albar Hussain	360 363 366		
	638		
Jawthra v Emile	90		
Jay v Budd	651		
Jay Kurun v Aswudhi Koor	502		
Jaynarain Geer v Shihpersad Ceer	1297		
Jaynarayan Meghraj v Ismail Kara mah	335		
Jibanti Nath Khan v Shib Nath			
Chuckerbutts	574		
Juchant v Aba	307		
Jeyanay v Ranchoddas	232		
Jeswan v Goolab Khan	824		
Jehan v Sanaak	588		
Jhangir v Secretary of State	9 15, 77		
	343, 347, 393 391		
Jhangir Cowasji v H po Mills	243		
Jenkins v Herbertson	142 147		
Jee Lal Singh v Sarfun	111		
Jeshankar Manoharam v Janiya Puli	244 263		
Jeshin Ramji v Awaker Mullan Isagata	845		

Jogendro Chunder Ghose & Nabin Chunder	1102	Joy Chunder Ghose & I am Naram	1102
Jogesh & Kali Churn	564	Joddar	339
Jogeshwar & Dinaram	95 500	Joy Coomar & Bundhoo Lall	1091
Jogeshwar Roy & Rajnarain Mitter	411	Joy Doorga & Manick Chand	81
Jogeshwar Atha & Gunga Bishnu	711	Joy Gobind Das & Gourcesproshad	
	90 861	Shaha	559 560
	1364	Joy Gobind & Monmotha Nath	431, 1056
Jogjobundhu Mitter & Purnanunl Gossami	36 1032 1034	Joy Gopal & Thakoomonee	414
Jogi Ahir & Bishen Dayal	1359	Joy Kalee Dass & Chand Malla	380
Jogi Singh & Kunj Behari	1139	Joy Kally Debi & Shub Nath Chat	
Jogobundhoo Dass & Hori Rawoot	270	terjee	1230
	870	Joy Kushen & Roy Kushen	560
	1000	Joy Kushen Das & Turnbull	156
		Joy Kushen Mookerjee & Parbutty	
		Churn Ghosal	427
		Joy Koomar & Esharce	1370
		Joy Naram & Goluck	1314
		Joy Prokash Singh & Abhoy Kumar	
		Chund	987
Jogul Kishore & Shub Sahal	297	Joy Prokash Singh & Meghraj Singh	775
Joharima & Sant Lal	288	Joykishen & Ataoor Rohoman	801, 1361
John & Carter	491		1378
John Tiel & Abd ul Hye	903 1223 1244	Joykisto & Nittyanund	1206
Johnes & Claughton	1218, 1241	Joynarain Geerce & Shibpersad Geo	
Johuroodeen & Dabeo Pershad	411	reo	1187 1207, 1223, 1214
Jointo Chunder Sein & Anundo Lall		Joynarain Singh & Mudhoo Sudun	
Doss	20 208	Singh	14, 50
Jonab Ali & Golam	553 707	Joyrath Roy & Lall Bahadur	423 714
Jonardan & Barclay	1068	Joytara & Iran Kushen	241 201
Jonardan Dobe & Ramdhone Singh	9, 387, 766	Joytara Dass & Mahomed Moharuck	72
	1311		413, 850
Jonardhan & Ram Chandra	562	Joytara Dasses & Roy Chunder	411
Jones & Chappell	347	Jubb & Bibbs	782
Jones & Nicholls	792	Jubbayya & Krishna	12
Jones & Montevideo Co	1111	Judoo Kapalee & Issur Chunder Roy	1012
Jones & Tagore	296	Judoo Nath & Girija Bhosun	517
Jones & Thompson	150	Judoo Nath Mullick & Kaleo Kristo	
Jones & Zahru Mal	1376	Tagore	411
Joumenjoy & Dossmoney	1147	Judoo Nath Singh & Kaleo Pershad	1012
Jonnagadla & Thatiparthi	988	Judoonath Roy & Ram Buksh Chat	
Jooberaj Sing & Cour Buksh	1333	terjee	903 916, 977
Joogul Kishore & Jotindra Mohun	282 293	Judooputties & Chunder Kant	546 561 511
Joogul Kishore & Kalee Churn	1375	Juga Lal Chaudhuri & Audh Behari	
Joogul Kishore & Oogur Naram	58 346	Prasad Singh	270
Joosub Hajj & Kemp	1046 1066	Jugal & Deoki Nandan	198
Josiam & Sawmi Iyengar	945	Jugal Kishore & Ambika	371 1034
Joselyne (Ex parte)	474 478	Jugal Kishore Bannerjee & Abhaya	
Joseph & Salt Company	414 677, 693		1024
Joseph & Solano	413		16
Jote Kuruvetappa & Izari Sirusappa	1079	Juggermanth & Bir	
Jotendra Mohun Poddar & Raja Sri		Jiggessur Mookerjee	
nath Roy	643 615 774		
Jotendro Mohun & Jogul Kishore	280	Juggermanth & Bir	
Jotendronath Mitter & Paj Kristo		Jiggessur Mookerjee	
Mitter	193 194 1138		
Joti Kuruvetappa & Sri Devandra	1079	Juggermanth & Bir	
Jotin Ira Mohan Tagore & Bejoy Chand		Jiggessur Mookerjee	
Mahatap	505		
Jotindra Mohan Tagore & Mahomed		Juggermanth & Bir	
Basir Chowdhry	247 218	Jiggessur Mookerjee	
J tindra Mohan Tagore & Shumliu		Juggermanth & Bir	
Chunder	116	Jiggessur Mookerjee	
J tindro Nath & D arka Nath	1157	Juggermanth & Bir	
	1157	Jiggessur Mookerjee	
Jouthavie & Thanakapula	41	Juggermanth & Bir	
Jowad Ali (In re)	444	Jiggessur Mookerjee	
Joy Chan Ira Banerjee & Srinath Chat		Juggermanth & Bir	
terjee	135	Jiggessur Mookerjee	

	PAGE	PAGE	PAGE
Jugobundhu v Ram Chunder	1034	1035	
Juggurnath v Kishen Pershad	1245	300	
Juggurnath Sahoo v Syud Shah Mahomed	877		
Juggut Chunder v Ear Mahomed	627		
Juggut Chunder Sein v Kishwanund	132		
Juggut Mohun v Dwarka Nath By sack	857		
Juggut Narain v Foolseo	313		
Jugjeebun Gupto v Goluck Monoo Debia	903		
Jugmohun Tewari v Baldeo Natch	1036		
Jugo Mohun Bukshoo v Soorondronath Poy Chowdhury	917		
Jugobundhoo v Bhugwan	312		
Jugobundhoo v Sree Narain	411	412	
Jugobundhoo Dutt v Mascyk	521		
Jugobundhu Pattuck v Jadu Ghose	476		
Jugodumha Debia v Rohunoo Debia	1095		
Jugol Kishore v Jotendro Mohun Tagoro	282		
Jugoo Lal v Lalit Bhikan Lal	389		
Jugub Sahay v Kasee Nath	1263		
Jugul Kishore v Lakshmandas	366	368	
	370	371	
Jugul Kishore v Kartic Chunder	708		
Juma Singh v Kamar un nusa	129		
Jumswar v Mahabeer	161		
Jummali v Terbee Lal Dass	320		
Jummoonah Persad v Zaibunessa	183	184	
Jumna Bai v Vissandas	507	1276	1327
Jwala Devi v Bhugobundhu	1137		
Jwala Prasad v Sali Ram	75		
Jwala Sahai v Masiat Khan	1159		
Jwarathnam Mudaliar v Srinivasa Mu Lihar	272		
Kabir Khan v Khawani	613	704	
Kachar Ala v Sha Oghadhai	875		
Kachar Mohan v B. T. B. S.	811	812	
Kadambini v Madan	196	197	
Kadarbhai v Rohumbhai	1200		
Kadarsur Sen v Mohun Chandra	918		
Kader Khan v Juggeswar	751	766	839
			839
			1463
			552
			4 5 8
			83
			115
Kadir Mohsdeen v Muthu Krishna Ayyar	1056		
Kadumhnee v Koylashlaminee	288	307	
Kadumhnee v Unnopoorua	723		
Kagendra Nath Mahatu v Pran Nath Roy	765		
Kahan Das v Nival Singh	46		
Kahanaram v Ranga	897		
Kahn v Ali Mahomed Haji Umer	953	1232	
		1235	
Kailash v Bissonath	474		
Kailash v Gurni Sundari	1317	1319	
Kailash Chandra Halder v Bissonath Paramame	479	1011	
Kailash Chandra Kundu v Kunja Bai	410	433	
Kailash Ghose v Jugul Lohar	1031		
Kailash Mondul v Baroda Sundari	121	142	
Kam Ali Jawardar v Lakhikant Chuckerbuddy	271		
Kapi Ahmad v Haji Mahomed	476	875	
		826	829
		578	579
Kakarla Abbayya v Raja Venkata	409		
Kakeshur v Rewat	1134		
Kalakada Pillai v Vasanatha Pillai	1292		
Kalandan v Pakrichi	008		
Kalavati v Chedi Lal	1142		
Kalo v Dhumunjoy	53		
	6	571	
		278	
		300	
		765	
		740	
Kaleo Coomar Dutt Roy v Pran Kis	904		
			113
			339
			1096
			830
			1082
Kaleo Deboo v Modhoo Soodun	931		
Kaleo Doss v Khettro Pal	1093		
Kaleo Doss Nagoy v Huro Nath Roy	1011		
Clowdhury	1011		
Kaleo Haldar v Sreeram Ghose	1131		
Kal v Kinkur v Kristo Mungul	815		
Kaleo Kristo v Hureehur	1287		
Kaleo Kristo v Mahomed Kader	435	758	
Kaleo Mohun Das (In re)	1298		
Kaleo Narain v Chunder Narain	706	857	
		864	
Kaleo Narain Singh v Irotab Chunder Buroobh	1012		

	PAGE		PAGE
Kalee Nath Lal & Nuboddaj Chinn	857	Kalima & Nunan Kutti	1033
Kalee Pershad & Binda Lal	444	Kaliprasad Singh & Jai Narayan Roy	560
	1	Kalishunker Doss & Gopal Chunder Dutt	136
Kaleenath Doss & Rajah Meah	877 879	Kaliyugam Chetti & Chokalinga Pillai	93
Kaleshar & Jagan	599		151
Kali & Dhunanjay	398	Kalka Persad & Kanhaya Singh	117 142
Kali & Fazlar	419	Kalka Prasad & Basant Ram	263 267
Kali & Misrijan	258	Kalka Prasad & Chandan Singh	492
Kali Chandra & Raj Kushoro	550	Kalka Prasad & Ramdin	915 917
Kali Charan & Parbath Charan	1074	Kalka Singh & Parasaram	453 879
Kali Charan & Ram Kumar	539	Kallapa & Venkatesh	1044
Kali Charan & Sheo Buksh	131	Kallar Singh & Toril Mahton	971
Kali Charan & Surja Kumar	17 4 9 627	Kallian & Dassu Panle	140
Kali Charan Sirdar & Sarat Chunder Chowdhury	474 1468	Kalida Pershad Dutt & Ram Hari Chuckerbutty	809
Kali Churn & Golabi	357 359	Kallooram Baboo & Doorganath Taloor	206
Kali Das Mullick & Kanhya Lal Lun dit	321	Kallu & Ilalki	205 870
Kali Dutt Jha & Abdul Ali	728	Kallu & Manu	1201
Kali Kanta & Gouri Prosad	510 563	Kally Doss Bhadury & Golam Ally Choudhry	310
Kali Kushoro & Dhunanjay	760		
Kali Kushoro & Guru Prosad	988		
Kali Krishna Chandra & Harihar Chuckerbutty	432		
Kali Krishna Sarkar & Raghunath Deb	277		
Kali Krishna Tagore & Izzatunnissa	419, 490		
Kali Krishna Tagore & Secretary of State	115 117 213 856 880		
Kali Kristo Pal Chowdry & Ram Chunder Nag	56 1306		
Kali Kristo Tagore & Judoo Lal Mullick	1309	Kalyata Chowdhram & Ramecomar Goopla	1017
Kali Mandal & Ram Sarbasya	1012	Kamalakshmi & Ramasam Chetti	1130
Kali Mohan & Kali Krishna	414		1131
Kali Narain Roy & Shaikh Bijoo	814		
	283	Kamappan Nambiar & Ukkaram Nambiar	132
	402		3 4
	257	Kamaraju & Asanali	132 308
		Kamat & Secretary of State	218 400 854 1291 1232
			1314
		Kamata & Audukari	276
		Kambhai Ajubai & Humatsanjali	352
		Kameene & Hurromoney	721
		Kameshwar Pershad & Amanutulla	399
			401
		Kameshwar Pershad & Jai Bahadur Singh	25 258 263 25
		Kameswar Pershad & Rajkumari Iuttun Koer	150
		Kaminath & Manappa	47 710
		Kamunee Deb & Isur Chunder Roy	971
		Kamunee & Ramlochan	29
		Kamunee & Aghora	891
		Kamunee & Asutosh Mukherjee	11
		Kamunee & Kam Nath	1073
		Kamunee & Sorada & Chowdhram & Kali Iroo & Chese	158
		Kamunee & Mun Somokdar & Gopal	317
		Kamunee & Katha	157 185 190
		Kamunee & Balla	108 1018
Kaliappan & Varadarajulu	23		
Kalidas & Vallabhas	87		
Kalidas Jivram & Cor Jivram	3 1 33		
	3 1 350 53		

[illegible]

	PAGE
Hasimunnissa v Nidra	631
Hasinath v Sadasiv	689 691, 70
Hasinatha Ayyar v Uthuman	259
Hassa Mal v Copi	212 924
Hassam Goolam v Dayalhai	911
Hassim v Iuis	591
Hassim Ajim v Hasim Mohammed	612
	656 660
Hassurav Sahab Holkar v Vithaldas Mangalji	968 970
Hassondas v Gangabai	418
Hastolno v Rustomji	667 668 669
Hastur v Fakira	508
Hastur Chand Gujar v Parsla Mhar	221
Hastura Kunwar v Gaya Prasad	218 1033
Hasturchand v Sagarmal	548
Hasturi v Venkata Chalapati	982
Hastubal Dey v Tremearne	664
Kasumri v Beni Prasad	133
Katama Natchiar v Srimut 1 vjh Mootoo	126
Katchi Kaleyana v Kachivijaya	390 815
	804 1313 1338
Kathama Natchiar v Dorasingh Tever	13
Kattayat Pathumaji v Raman Venon	216
	267
Katyanee v Madhub	1266
Kauleswar Rao v Dost Mahomed Khan	200
Kavaji Bhujji v Dhondiraj	1272
Kaveri v Venkamma	01 270
Kaveri Ammal v Sastro Ramier	110
Kazei Mahomed v Lallah Jassodal	90
Kazem Ali v Azim Ali Khan	40 57
Kazi Gulam Aldi v Aga Khan	844
Kazi Hassan v Sagun Balkrishna	309 360
	368 372 374
Kazim Sheik v Danesh Sheik	720
Kazimuddin v Faruzdar	290
Kearsey v Phlipa	790
Kebul Kishen v Mt Ambala	1296
Kedar Mal Marwari v Dewan Bishen Persad	120
Kedar Nath v Lalji Sahai	213 262
Kedar Nath v Saday Chandra	1042 1043
Kedar Nath v Seeva Veyana	1183
Kedar Nath Banerjee v Kulman Sardar	868
Kedar Nath Chatterji v Rakhal Das Chatterji	971
Kedar Nath Mukerjee v Prosunno Kumar Chatterjee	2,2
Kedar Nath Sen v Uma Charan	244 466
	1000 1010
Kedari v Gajai	892
Kedarnath v Bungshee	197
Kedarnath v Doya Moyee	495 502
Kedarnath v Harachan	106
Kedarnath v Rughoonath	88
Kedarnath Doss v Irotah Chulir	648
Keemoo Bacc v Luchman Das	406
Keemo Singh v Eshan Chunder	668
Kefayat Ali v Ram Singh	495
Kelaram Majee v Naram Dass	1184 1185
Kellie v Fraser	107 163
Kelu v Vikrishna	438 400
Kelu Mulachari v Clend	433 1291 1301

	PAGE
Kenarim v Kailas Chandra	986
Kendall v Hamilton	14 1, 512 585
	951 1115
Kenelly v Wyman	791, 792
Kennedy v Dodson	778 784
Kennedy v Iyell	799
Kenoo Singh v Eshan Chunder	841
Kenrick v Wool	1132
Kent Coal Co v Martin	672
Kerakooso v Serle	1130 1132
Kerala Varma v Shangaram	277
Kerr (In the goods of)	451
Keshab v Durga	252
Keshab v Maniruddin	87 100
Keshal Ico v Radhe Prasad	329 1011
Keshadji Naik v Nasarvanji Ardesir	671, 727
Kesharia Accomar v Potooah Sett	767 799
Keshav v Vinayak	68 69 159 160 161
	164 166 167 414
Keshav Bapuji v Narayan	630 632
Keshav Lal v Pitamber Das	1481
Keshav Mohadev v Pandurang Wanan	1301
Keshav Pandurang v Venayak	393
Keshav Ramchandra v Krishnarao Venkatesh	1161
Keshava Tharagan v Pudran Namudra	141
Keshavlal v Mayabhai	1161
Keshavlal Giridharilal v Bai Parvati	116
	891
Keshavji Naik v Nasarvan Ardesir	671 727
Keshavram v Ranchhod	560 590
Kesho Pershad v Hirday Narain	69 770
Keshobati v McGregor	1204
Kesri Narain v Abdul Hasan	1014
Kessowji v Khumpi	171 181, 184
Kessowji Damodur v Lucimidas	160 190
Kessowji Issur v G I P Railway Co	1308
	1359 13 0
Kethilamma v Kelappan	247 261
Kevaldas v Pestonji	796
Keran v Crawford	128
Kewal Kishan Singh v Sookbari	880
Kewal Sahai v Issur Dyal	552
Khadar Bhai v Rahuman Bhai	641
Khadar v Chottibai	556 509 620 626
Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein	35 36
	37 38 427
Khagendra Narain Singh v Saghadhar Jha	424
Khagendra Nath Mahata v Prannath Roy	118 1014
Khaja Mahomed v Manja Begum	691
Khajaj Abdool v Bhutto Sheikh	1096
Khajaj Abdul Mannet Logose	509
Khajaj Assenellaj v Nomon	1081
	1271
Khajaj Assenellaj v Khajaj Alul Ar	79
Khajaj Mahata v Abdul Wahid	854
Khajaj Wahid v Khajaj Jehan	105
Khalilay Raza v Ganesh Shah	97

[illegible]

[illegible]

	PAGE	PAGE
Kristo Sunkur Dutt v Keshubhath Dutt	572 562	
Kristodass Kunwar v Ramkant Roy	576	
Kristomohun Doss v Rama Churn Nag	242 921	
Kristomohun Moolerjee v Adarmoney Dabee	1090	
Kristomoney v Norendra Krishna	209	
Kuber Singh v Shub Lal	1010	
Kubra Bibee v Wajid Khan	638	
Kubra Jan v Ram Bali	168	
Kudhai v Sheo Dayal	903 911	
Kulakada Pillai v Viswanatha Pillai	1265 1267, 1292	
Kuljo Singh v Thakor Singh	498 1309	
Kumar Saradindu Poy v Dhurendra Kant Roy	1128	
Kumar Suttia Suttia Ghosal v Rama Golapmoni D bi	1211	
Kumara v Srinivasa	323 324	
Kumara Tirumalai v Panayira Tirumalai	1243	
Kumara Upendra Krishna v Nabin Krishna Bose	56 1294 971	
Kumarasami Peddhar v Sabbaraya Kumbalanga v Arisputra	63 32	
Kumud v Prasanna	949 1012	
Kumud v Jotindra	642 647 648 768	
Kunhi Moideen Kutta v Ramenhumu	879 1164 1138	
Kunhi Moudin v Terayil Mo din	1021, 1029	
Kunhianima v Kunhunni	972	
Kunhummu v Viyyathamma	89	
Kunhya Singh v Looydan Singh	1082	
Kunyal Parkum v Pathukkayi Varini	97, 969	
Kunj Behari v Kanth Prashad	1037	
Kunj Behari v Keshav Lal	1205 1211	
Kunj Lal Marwari v Bahitram Marwari	1273	
Kunja Behary Mondal v Sambhu Chandra Poy	1005	
Kunja Amma v Raman Menon	139	
Kunja Lal v Durga Prasad	41 1471	
Kunjo Behari Ghose v Dirgamoni Dassi	717 771	
Kunjo Behari Goswami v Hem Chandra Lalari	111	
Kunjo Behary Singh v Mahub Chandra Ghose	421	
Kunnathurath Vasulvan Nambudri v Narayanan Nambudri	13	
Kuppala v Kunjavalli	1302 1303	
Kuppusami v Subbaraya	935	
Kuppusami Chetti v Rathnavela Chetti	1247	
Kuppusamy v Venkataramier	1072	
Kuppuswami Chetti v Zamindar of Kalabarti	211 213 214	
Kurizali v Mayan	254, 273	
Kurritulun v Aurlat ud Doula	106	
Kuriz v Spence	684	
Kusaji v Venayak	503 505	
Kusamoonissa Bibee v Hall	909	
Kushal Sidashiv v Punamchand Jussupji	218	
Kustoor Mulla v Sookeram	631	
Kustoor v Binoderam	283	
Kusum Kumari v Satya Ranjan	11 1071	
Kutab ud din v Pupa	71	
Kutabullah v Durga Charan	997	
Kutuumma v Madhava Menon	20	
Kutti Ali v Chindhi	120	
Kutty Sabaramani v Chinnai Muttu	817	
Kuttiya v Pari Makri	751	
Kuverji v Babal	816	
Kwaja Muhammad Khim v Husam Begam	21	
Kylash v Jilo	181	
L		
La Trinidad v Browne	850	
Lachlan v Abdulla	667	
Lachman v Bahadur Singh	414 415, 1263	
Lachman v Ganga	971	
Lachman v Jamma	1306	
Lachman v Ram	851	
Lachman Das v Abparkash	1164	
Lachman Das v Haddett	164 167	
Lachman Singh v Tansukh	728	
Lachman Singh v Mohan	117, 135 131	
Lachman Singh v Ram Lagan Singh	393	
Lachman Singh v Sanwal Singh	781	
Lachmeswar Singh v Manowar Hossain	441	
Lachmi Narain v Jwala Nath	856 861 1312	
Lachmi Narain v Kunja Lal	270	
Lachmi Narain v Mankul Singh	312	
Lachmi Narain v Ram Lal Saran Das	1292	
Lachmi Narain v Ram Lal Saran Das	1212 1321	
Lachmi v Har Sahai	12	
Lachmi v Har Sahai	1317	
Lachmi v M. Haddi Das	903, 128 131	
Lalla v Parthiv	18	
Lal Singh v Har	18, 715	
Lal Singh v Har	515 621	
Lal Singh v Har	207 1221	

TABLE OF CASES

[illegible]

[illegible]

	PAGE		PAGE
Madhub Chuni r Mozamdar r Noto	895	Mahamad Haja Zakaria r Ahmadbhai	1349
deep Chunder Pun lit	212	" " " " " "	1350
Madhub Lal Khan r Noyan Ghose	206	" " " " " "	391
	860	" " " " " "	1351
Madhuban Das r Naram Das	431, 433, 1054		1301
" " " " " "	1054	Mahammad Akram ud din r Najiban	438
" " " " " "		Mahammed Alum Oollah r Secretary of State	210
" " " " " "		Mahant Ibhargar Budhgar r Canda sama Amarsan	445
" " " " " "		Mahant Ibhargar r Chudasama	233 212
" " " " " "			267, 1271, 1350
" " " " " "		Mahant Puran Atal r Darshan Das	370
vetinagarum	13		571
Madras Railway Co r Rust	1211	Mahant I van r Nathun	1170
Madud r Jaleem	583	Maharaj Adhury Mansingh r Mhta Harishram Nisharan	39 42 773
Magazzel Hossain r Barid Sheikh	400	Maharaj Dhury Mahitab Chuni r I r rodanath Munil	90,
Magaluri r Narayana	572	Maharaj Singh r Chatter Mal	381 1174
Maganlal r Chhotalal	109	Maharaj T wari r Har Charan	1 5
Maganlal r Govind Lal	476	Maharaj Bahadur Singh r I r h Nath Singh	531 740
Maganlal r Lalchand	115	Maharaj Beerehan ler Munick r I r h kshen	146
Maganlal Mulji r Doshi Mulji	156 261 265 267, 1006	Maharajh Beer Chunder r Ishan Chunder	352
	1009	Maharaj of Benares r Jali Doyal Nomi	7
Magbul Fatima r Lalita Prasad	117, 208	Maharaj of Benares r Jali Singh	263
Magni Ram v Jiwa Lal	473	Maharaj of Bharpur r Kachern	28 310
Magnuram r Bakubai	1481		350
Mahabala r Kunhamu	13, 542 513	Maharajh of Bharpur r Paurhamu	205 217
Mahabeer Singh v Rambhajan	143 688	Maharaja of Burilwan r Ayurha Krishna Roy	330 461 172 1241
Mahabir r Natbin	1374	Maharajah of Burilwan v Hecnalill Seal	301
Mahabir Pershad r Dhanukdhar Singh	970, 1017	Maharaja of Cooh Bher r Manindra Chandra	3 3
Mahabir Pershad Singh r Macnaghten	120, 989	Maharaja Durga Charan Lohi r Hst teen Mandul	141
Mahabir Prasad r Collector of Allaba bad	1359	Maharajah Jagadim Ira Binwari r Bh t I r arini Dasi	1109
Mahabir Prasad r Dhuman Das	1021	Maharajh of Jaipur r Lalji Bahin	352
Mahabir Prasad r Parma	1037, 1038	Maharaja Jotm Ira Nkhun Tagore v Shumliu Chunder Bhattachary r	134
Mahabir Prasad r Partab Chand	260	Maharaj Jugtendur Bunsare r	848
Mahabir Singh r Behari Lal	47, 80 81 84 472		431
Mahabir Singh r Pam Bhagowin Chowbay	261	Maharajh Mahatab Chand r M Pearce Dossco	16
Mahadaji r Vithal	1368	Maharajh Muza Ananah r I r parti	729
Mahadaji Karandakar r Hari Chitne	320	Maharajh Mittery et Song r H r r r I Widow of Jusswant Sing	1029
	869	Maharajh Molehar Singh r Bengal Government	427
Mahad r Ram Kshen	718	Maharajh Moh se r r St r r r r r	64
Mahadeo r Dirsan	261	Maharajh Netras r r St r r r r r Singh	416
Mahadeo r C ajadhur	97	Maharajh Ratha Kesh r r Chakra varti	302
Mahadeo r Janu	90, 94, 1034	Maharajh H r r r r r r r r r r r r r	251
Mahadeo r Parashram	1035		66
Mahadeo Chintaman r Vasud v Karti kar	117 129 1005 1006	Maharajh Sath Chait r r r r r r r r r	66
Mahadeo Dubey r Bholi Nath Deth	1014		66
Mahadev r Bili	563 1014		66
Mahadev r Lakshman	1325		66
Mahadev Narsingh r Raghu Kishary	418		66
	1298		66
Mahadeva r Sappant	1361		66
Mahadappa r Basagonda	403		66
Mahadappa r Brimira	312 726		66
Mahadappa r Neelamani	105 141		66
Mahalakhamamma r Vekaratara tnamma	353		66
Mahalinga Mospanar r Koppura chinar	41 10 1		66
Mahant Lal r Rajalax	111		66

Makund Ram t Malun I Rani	223
Malapa v Dutt	1061
Malchus t Broughton	209
Malcolm t Smith	12
Mallat t Narsinha	368
Mallhari t Narso	335
Mallhi Kunwar v Imam ud din	112
Malkarjun v Narhari 919 1015 1017	1023
Malkayan t Nashan	63
Mallamma t Venkappa	891
Mallika t Ralanmani	300
Mallikarjuna t Patilareni	390 1297
Mallu Mal v Stamman Lal	147
Maloji t Sagari	92 115 120
Mammali t Pakki	563 564
Mammad t Locke	965
Man Gobind Sircar t Umbuka Monce	682
	716 816
Manaji Lajpat t Khand o	1150
Manahu t Behari Lal	80
Manaku t Sitaram	770 771
Manappa v McCarthy	73
Manasing t Amad Kunhi	710
Manathode v Appu	580
Manavala t Kumarappa	403
Manby t Manby	740
Mancharam v Bakshi	92 93
Mancharam t Falirchand	1037 1039
	1041
Mancharan t Kalidas	106 104 275
Mancharji (In re)	9
Manjerji Thakor vs	379 396
MANDARDAR Anteh t Secretary of State	518
	961
	1276
	390
	51
	199
	119
	9 267
	1035
	7 125
	900
	590
	109
Dassu	1221
"	1370
"	36
"	369
"	14
"	1010
Manckara t Talayya	1 10
Man k Lal Seiler Barwal	-
Man Moh Laloo t Lamdas Maron t r	-
Man Mohl Vandal t Lakha	138
" " "	307
" " "	1471
" " "	1001
lal	335 336
Manindra t Bilaram	1378
Manindra Chandra Nandi t Secretary of State	347
Manisami t An manu	304
Manisha Iradi t Syid Hoya	4 0 478
"	476 180
Manjit Hoorbui	321
Manjunath t Venkatesh	108 270
Mania t Gulzar	415
Manlappa t Baswantrao	305
Manly t Latterson	of 133 1318
Manmotha t Pakhal	1066
"	"
Manohar Das t Manzur Ali	564
Manohar Das t Ram Autar Land	1201
"	1208
Manohar Ganesh t Bera Ham Charan	60
"	171
Manohar Lal t Jadunath Singh	1141
Manohar Ramchandra t Lakshman Mahadev	1104
Manohar Tambekar (In re)	1366
Manomohuni Chaudhurani t Nara Maran	471
Manasa Devi v Jivan Lal	808
Mansingji v Mehta Harihararam	1284
Maréchal Suchet Tho	513
Mariamissa Bibi t Joynab Bibi	115
Mariamissa t Ramkalpa Gorain	758 761
"	838
Marie t Garrison	711
Marisi (In re)	1327
Marivittal t Latham	300
Marshall t Blesler	703
Marshall t Chiens	1090
Marshall t Langley	781
Martand Frumbak Gard t Vinayak Khavnate	31
Martin t Lawrence	16 29 320 1201
"	1031
Martin t Martin & Co	67
Martud H t Toman	179
Marriot t Hampton	30 14
Marriott t Chamberla n	84
Maruti t Krishna	10
Maruti t Vithu	616
Masnoollah Khan t La Lodi Nur wollah	10
Masyk t Hill	179
Maseyk t Sted	103 170 227
Mashaulah t Abu Isallah	1307
Mash ullah Khan t May d un missa	10
"	491 501 503
Maslamat t Th ravengra Lam	121 100
Mason t Mordaw	1116 1100
Massev t H vna	530
Ma s u t Sa r Lat fan	11 1
Mata t I u tace	10

[illegible]

	PAGE	PAGE
Mohunt Das t Nil Komul Dewan	124	128
Mohunt Deo Saran v Moonshee Ma	160	402
homed		
Mohesh Chunder Doss t Madhub	427	409
Chunder Sirdar		1308
Mohesh Chunder Mookerjee (In the		999
matter of)		
Mohesh Chunder Shah t Sloashee		1309
Mookhee		73
Mohesh Mahto t Sheikh Piru		419
Moheshur Singh v Government of		1375
India	1363	1367
		389
		381
		1079
		125
Pillai		716
Mohim Chandra Bhattacharjee t Pam		1032
Lochan Dey	247	
Mohim Chandra Ray t Kalyan		403
Debya	141	
Mohima Chandra t Atul Chandra	397	412
	519	541
Mohima Chandra Biswas t Taran		383
Sankar Ghose		1042
Mohima Chunder t Mohesh Chunder		416
Mohima Chunder t Ram Kishore		816
Mohima Chunder Dhar t Jugul K		141
shore Bhattacharji		
Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v Asra		114
dha Dasgupta		507
Mohim Krobhoosun v Sloosheehhoosun		503
Mohinee Moh in Dass t Ram Kant		1244
Chowdhry	998	
Mohini t Ram Narain	1251	1258
Mohini Chandra Cutra t Anna		771
Charan Dutt		738
Mohini Mohin t Binest Billan	396	603
Mohini Mohun Das t Satis Chandra		80
Loy		
Mohini Mohin Dass t Bhoot mooy		401
Shah		
Mohind Ben Ibrahim t Malome l Mura		1029
Lewis		373
Mohind Ben t Sayalid Ben	310	306
		538
Mohumme l Zaloor t Ritta Koer		677
Mohummu l Zahoor t Tikoorance		414
	679	687
Mohunt Jalie		403
Mohun Chunder t Azem Gazeo	637	699
Mohin Chunder v Mohesh Chunder		285
Mohin Lal v Unnopoorna Dass		1101
Mohun Lal Sokol t Bibee Dass	431	441
		451
Mohun Lal Sokol t Colock Chunder		732
Dutt		1780
Mohun Lal Sokol t Colock Chunder		411
		1325
		170
		90
Mohunt Narsingh Doss t Moonshee		985, 1016
Kunrooddeen		36
Mohunt Ram Rucha v Doorga Dutt		1244
Misser		1265
Mohunt Rung Lal t Gouri Mundul		403
Mohur Matoon v Umatum		410
Mohurum Sheikh v Nakowri		564
Mohinkatti v Krishnan	415	563
		572
Mozzunnissa t Mooraree Dhar		402
Mokha Harakray t Biseswar	572	630
Mokhoda Soondary t Ram Churn		683
Mokoond Lal t Mahomed Sami		95
Mokund Lal t Chotay Lal	409	563
		614
Mokun Lal t Harbulla h Narain		1297
Mokunda Bullav kar t Bhogiban		29
Chunler Das		1068
Mokun to v Bhogaban		1341
Molka t Sumpul		780
Molloy t Kirby		811
		32
		500
		419
		809
		591
		1070
		1054
		1005
Monsieur t Beer Protap		304
Monsieur t Krishen		301
Monglu Dass t Slarodh Dass		1131
Moni Lal Kar t Uma Charan	402	1302
Moni Roy t Mast Pajbunsee Koer		114
		115
Monilal t Khirali		411
Monmohun Gih t Binoo Chandra		26
Das	835	1074
Monmohney Dass t Padha Kristo		903
Dass		398
Monmohini t Khetter		
Monmohini Chowdharani t Nara		471, 769, 771
Narayan Poy		245
Monmohini Dist v Jackhinarain		268
Chandra		
Monohar Das t Jitich Chandel		909
Monohur Dass t Jomanauth Law	211	212
Monhar Dass t Satal Pershal		592
Monhar Lal t Gouri Sankur		591
Monhar Mookerjee (In re)		1370
Monhar Dass t Kishan Begum		1271

TABLE OF CASES

CIV

[illegible]

Moham ad S la man Khan v Ma Jamad Ya Khan 1 100 223 60	600	Munshi Abdul D l i e C r a k a n t 107 171 270	261
M Yamma l l m a t j a n Khan v Z e m s t Begam 602		Murappa v S a l r a m a n a	1
Mul an m a l Y a c o b v H m a l a y a I a r k	688	Mun a y a N a i l a r I r a s a m y M i l l e r	1299
	1111		700
Moham m a l Y u s u f Khan v A b d u l l a h man Khan 68 471 1308	1376		1281
M u l a m m a l Z a t u r v C h o l a L a l	1071		1001
M u l a m m a v J i w a n	701		971
M u l a m m e d B a k a v L a m l a t	701	A v a r	9
M u l a m m e d I s m a i l v C h u l i e r b o n a	414	Mun m a n D a s v A v i d a l	737
" " " "	701	Mun n a S o h a v C a a t h a S o n b i	1021 1027
" " " "	700		1028 1029
" " " "	605	Mun n a l a l v C a r a j	411
" " " "	207	Mun n i L a m v B o u l e t k a s h	174
	9	Mun n o o L a l v L u g e	10
M u l l m a n n a s a v N a l e S n a l	410	Mun n a L a l v C h u l a m A l h a v	390 1134
M u l h L a l v J a g l o o T e w a r i	11	Mun n o D o s e e v J h a n C h i n l e r	071
M u l h i e F a k e r	29	Mun r o v C a w n p o r e M u n i c i p a l B o a r d	170
M u l h o d a v L a m C h i r n	68 1005	M u n l a l v L a c h m e e p u t	1702
M u l h o d a D a s v C o p o l C h i n l e r D u t t a	602 607 1021	Mun l e e B a l s o r I t h e m a v S h m	751
M u k t a r A h m a d v M u q a r r a t H a s a n	205	Mun l i L a l v R a m N a s a n	1001
M u k t a j i r M a n a j i	1071	Mun h i N a l m e d A l i v K a l i a	1001
" " " "	205	Mun h i M u s t a f i v S a m a l a	121 1359
" " " "		Mun h i B r a g N a r a i n v T h a k i r K a m a l h i a	241
" " " "		Mun i t c f D i l r e g h a r (D e c r e e m a t e r i t h e C o u r t o f)	19
" " " "		Mun s o o l B i b e v A h M e a h	1310
" " " "		Mun s t e r v C o x	101
" " " "		Mun t a s s a r A l i v K e l m a n t h	1268
" " " "		Mun t a r H o s e i n v B a l h a B i b i	411
" " " "	1390	" " " "	173
" " " "	163 184	" " " "	1477
" " " "	1006	" " " "	031
" " " "		" " " "	1020
" " " "	911	" " " "	710
M u l l a A b d u l v B a k h i a b o o	773	" " " "	5 265
M u l l a A d j m (I n r e)	743	" " " "	911
M u l l a p u d i B a l k r i s h n a y y a v V e n k a t a n a r a S n h a	418 421	" " " "	1009
M u l l a v V i r a m m a l	8.9	" " " "	064
" " " "	1077	" " " "	003
" " " "	1019	" " " "	000
" " " "	910	" " " "	7
" " " "	273	" " " "	
" " " "	910	" " " "	
" " " "	1269	" " " "	807
M u l u k F u q u e e r B i k s h v M o n o l i r D o s s	574	" " " "	158
M u m t a z B e g a m v F a t e h H u s a n	1307 1312	" " " "	442
	1313 1315	Mun a j i A b d u l l a v D a m o d a r D a s	249 267
M u m t a z a n v R a s u l a n	430 1153 1160		1271
M u n M o h i n e e D o s e e v I c h a m o y e e D o s e e	1203 1229 1242	Mun a l a R e f l i v R a m a y y a	275 1000 1001
M u n c h e r s h a w B e z o n j i v N e w D h u r u m s e y C o	729 747		1002
M u n e e D u t t v C a m p b e l l	407	Mun g r o v e v C h u n T e o n g	349
M u n g e s h a r K u a r v J a m o o n a P r a s h a d	255	Mun h a r a f B e g a m v G h a l i b A l i	269
" " " "	273 275	Mun s o o d i n L a l v B h e e k a r e e S n g h	807
" " " "	510	Mun s o o r o B a n k L t d v B a r l o w	675 697
" " " "	691		709 710
" " " "	1197	Mun s o o r e B a n k v R a y n o r	433
" " " "	807	Mun t a s t a K h a n v P h i j a B i b i	1407 1471
			1472
		Mun t h a A y y a r v R a m a s a m i S a s t r a l	1008

	PAGE		PAGE
	953	Nusr Mahomed v Razbar	650, 651, 652
	1315		655
	1018	Nuzerun v Amrooddeen	281
	979	Nuzhat ud Doola Abbas Hossein v	
		Murza Kusratulain	156
Dasi	3	Nyan Chandra v Nayan	1293
		O	
(In re)	1076	Oakshott v British India Steam Navigation Co	1350
Nourang Iai v Latif Choudhuri	223 1319		321
Nouvion v Freeman	151		817
Nowah Khan v Rughoob Nath Das	102		227,
	403		1021
Nowab Syud v Sarussutty Debi	1095	Obhoy Churn Sen v Debendronath	
Nowhat Singh v Chutter Dharee Singh	399	Mulhek	209
	405 407	Obhoy Gobind v Hurychurn	518 563, 564,
			678
		Ohhoya Churn v Rajendro Coomar	1033
			1041
		Oboy Churn Mookerjee (In re)	431
		Ochsenton Papelier	151 153
		O Connor v Star newspaper	14 051
Nubo Kisto v Parbutty	1371	Odhyay Peishad v Mohadeo Dutt	907
Nubolashore v Jadub	1360 1375	Official Trustee v Krishna Chandra	1303
	1371		1316
	1341	Oh Lao Lee v Aulmfee	551
			105
Luckat Moore v Dyer	114		970
Nugenderchunder Ghose v Kaminee			1150
Dossce	126 710		1280
Nund Lal v Dilwar Ali	1015		75 77
Nund Lal Bose v Meer Aboo Mahomed	579		1020
Nund Mohun Chowdhry v Goluck			1006
Nah Noogce	843		1073
Nundoot v Urquhart	979 991		1316
Nundo Coomar Bukshee v Moonje			1 72,
Kishoro Roy	915		5,
Nundo Lal v Nustarini	65 83 1075		1147
Nundo Lal Bhattacharye v Bidhoo			1360
			131
			859,
			986
		Omur Ali v Weylayet Ali	530 590
		Omur Chunder Doss v Soorimunn sea	
		Klatoon	977
		O Neile v Clason	1117
			33,
			1707
			1376
			417
			451
Narsingh Roy v Anderson	874	Omnet v Sunur Dutt	863
Narsinghdoss v Amrooddeen	91	Oodoy Tara v Syud Jonab	208
Narsinghoojee Gooplia v Peary		Oodoyessuree v Huro Keshore Dutt	164
Soonduree	1134	Oohwunt Mahtoon v Billco Chund	761
Nusserwanjee Mastonjee Ardesur Wadia		Oojagur Roy v Ram Khehawan	321
v Eleonora Nusservanje	26 177 179	Oolagappa Chetty v Arbuthnot	816
Nusservanji Merwanji Panday v		Ooma Churn v Gurish	217
Gordon	519 1196	Ooma Churn Dutt v Beckwith	113
Nusservooddeen v Indurnaram	1373	Ooma Soonduree v Bepin Beharee	70
Nusservooddeen v Lall Mahomed	399	Oomatool Fatima v Azhar Ali	1316
Nussuroo Hossain v Ujjal Biswas	127,	Oomatool Fatima v Ghunnoo	411
Nusrut Hossain v Mahomed Sayem	1099	Oomatool Fatima v Bhujoo Gopal	407

TABLE OF CASES

Osturn & Co. Ltd. (London)	1211
Oster & Co. Ltd.	174 183
Oriental Bank & Co. Ltd.	17 180
Oriental Bank & Co. Ltd. (Bombay)	781
Oriental Bank & Co. Ltd. (Calcutta)	781
Oriental Bank & Co. Ltd. (Colon)	12 13 133 136 140 146
Oriental Bank & Co. Ltd. (Mer- cantile Credit Corporation)	701
Oriental Loan Association & Hatch	1300
Orr & Co. Ltd. (Bombay)	3 1174
Orr & Draper	7
Orr & Muthia Chetty	1 18 1219 1229
	1237 1215
Osborne & Lowlett	10
Ossunmussa Khatoun & Ameroon Khatoun	38 211 1
Oman & Co. Ltd. (Chummun Mahtoon)	417
	814
Owale & Taharunnissa Bhai	1
Ottaput & Co. Ltd. (Ceylon)	60
Oudh & Co. Ltd. (Nagelwar Lal)	243
	1 25
O. L. & Co. Ltd.	18 0 1008
Oswley & Co. Ltd.	31
Outram & Co. Ltd.	111
Oversend & Co. Ltd.	668
Owen & Co. Ltd.	1018 1200 1200 1 17
Owners of the Cargo of the Aronpru- na Owners of the Cargo of the And- ana	196
Ozeer Mahomed & Co. Ltd.	631 633 634

Ialm r r	Hutchinson	15
Ialm r r	Molunt Bal Gobind	8
Ialm r r	Walsby	113
		4
		93
		100
		110
		111
Ian ham r	Jl	13 7
Ianchana l r	Vaithanath	140
Ia hanan	Rail Nath	1350
Ianchanan	Singha Joy t Dwarka	
	Nath Roy	1
Ian hanun	Lundopadhyas r Labia	969
	Bhce	
Ianchanun	Mullick t Sh b Chund r	161
	Mullick	
Iancl co v r	Mull r Chumroo Lal	366
Iancl	Mandol r Sheikh Isaf	472
Ian lhar	rth t Mshabub Khan	333
I ed t Hanuman	Dat t Mufti Asa	
	d lish	321
Iant t Sart r	t Meay t M rdl	110 141
Ianlu t	Bhavdu	460
Iandu t	Dajp	1305
Pandurang t	Ana t	390 400
Pan lurang t	Moro	1308
Iandurang t	Bhimrav	110
Iandurang t	Krishna	300

	161
	42 903
	718
	941
	316
	166
Paget t Ede	
Pagi Partap Hamir t Varajlal Mulchand	974
Pahalwan Singh t Nara n	269
Pahlwan Singh t Maharajah Moheshur Buksh Singh	116
Pahlwan Singh t Risal Singh	114
Pakhwanti Dai t Indra Narain Sing	383
Pakiam t Innasi	1068
Palakdhan t Radha Prasad	447 500
Ialani t Rangayya	543
Ialani t Sivaling a	10 3
Palanisami Cowndari t Honnala Cowndari	198 848
I danuvandi t M itusan t	403 809
Palloni Shajurji Mistry t Jordan	311 119
	1191

		15	138
			1000
			290
			1017
			422
			1375
			209
I aram Soma t. Han Goyai			1345
I aram t. Achol	390		337
Paraman v Sundarja			431
Paramanan la Das t. Malabar Dossy			2-1
			250
I aram ck (In re)			557
I aramasiva t. Krishna			57-
Parambath t. Puthengattil			13
Paramchand t. Nirvani			1290
Parashram t. Govind Ganesh			908
Paramen Chetty v Sundara Raja			1010
Parameswaraya t. Seshaguriappa	861		867
Paramesvaran t. Shangan			500
Parangodan t. Perumtoduka			536
Paranjpe v Hanade	219		896
Paras Ram v Karam Singh			960
Parashar t. Ganu			693
Parashram t. Balmakund			264
Parashram t. Miraj		817	808
Parasuram t. Seshier			381
Paravavtan v Ambalavana			562 561
Parbati t. Blola		1370	1328
Parbati t. Ganpati			408 1264
Parbati t. Tulsi Koer		750	1284
Parbati Charan v Panchanand		698	947
Parbati Churn Deb v A n ud deen			563

[illegible]

	PAGE		PAGE
Pramatha t Khetra	266 396	Pramji Trikumdas (<i>In re</i>)	216, 219
Pramatha Chandra Roy t Khetra		Premraj v Javarmal	1099
Mohan Ghose	892	Premsook v Rajkristo	723 724, 726
Pramatha Nath Gangooly t Khetra		Preo Lal Paul t Radhika Prasad	
Nath Bannerjee	1240	Paul	979, 980 1023
Pran Bandhu Singh t Brahmamoyee		Preo Nath Poy t Mohesh Chandra	
Dasya	393	Mottra	252
Pran Chunder Roy v Jagannath Moo		Preonath Mukerji v Bishnath Prasad	584, 595
ker ee	1285		
		Preonath Roy t Chowdhry	1036
bad	1157	President Taluk Board Sevagunga t	
Pran Kristo t Kalee Das	409 412	Narayanam	399
Pran Nath v Sree Kant	1377	Prag Nath Sah t Mura Munda	383
Pran Singh t Janardan	980, 983 1016	Price t Strange	274
Pranal Annee t Lakshmi Annee	1079	Prince Mahommed Rahmooddeen v	
Prangour Mozoomdar v Hemanta		Beer Protab	866
Kumari Dehya	318 1025	Prindle t Caruthers	675
Pranjivandas Harjivandas t Majaram		Pringle t Gloag	745
Samaldas	1201	Prithesingji t Umedsingji	104 113, 140, 148
Prannath v Shumboo	313	Priya Das v Vilayat Khan	1044
Prannath Chowdhry v Ganendra		Probhooram v Robinson	612
Mohun Tagore	630	Probodh Chunder t Doney	1184
Prannath Mitter v Motioornath		Proby t Bell	693
Chuckerbutty	906	Proby t Proby	210
Prannath Roy v Mohesh Chandra		Prokash v Bishambhar	722
Mottra	765 768	Prokash Chunder Das t Tara Chand	
Prannath Roy Chowdhry v Preonath		Dass	316 931, 1030
Chowdhry	241	Prosannonath Mookerjee t Benode	
Pransookh Khan v Ramzan Khan	817	Ram Sein	892
Pransukhram Dinanath t Bai Ladhkar	19	Proshad Narayan v Dulhun Genda	477
	1148	Prosonno Coomar Chowdhry v Koylash	
Prasad t Tej Singh	832	Chunder Pal Chowdhry	128
Prasanna Chunder t Prasanna Chunder	190	Prosonnomoyee Disseo v Sreenath	
Prasanna Kumari Khan v Uma Charan		Roy	336
Hazra	1028	Prosonmoye Datta t Beni Madhab	
Prasannamoyi Dasi t Kadamtini Dasi	160	Roy	1229 1243
Prasunno v Matloora	502	Prosonno v Ram Chandra	1260
Prasunno Kumari Dehya t Golab		Prosunno t Bamacharan	1013
Chand Baboo	172	Prosunno Chunder Bhattacharjee t	
Pratap Chandra t Kali Bhanjan	210, 215 218	Kristo Chantunno	276 279
Pratap Chandra t Rani Susrata			
mayi	591	Moyee Dossee	1204, 1211
Prawnkissen t Muttysoonderv	1332		1362
Prayag Doss t Tirumala	374 375		1299
Prayag Narain t Sukhdeo	384		1097
Prayag Pai v Gonkaran	413		738
Prem Chand (<i>In re</i>)	834		57
Prem Chand Dey t Mokhoda Debi	169, 227, 228 1025		608
Prem Chand Moonshce (<i>In the goods</i>			903
of)	455 1308 1309		928 929, 1202
		Protap Chunder Borooah v Collector	
		of Goalpara	1261
		Protap Chunder Chowdhry v Brojolall	
		Shaha	1043
		Protap Chunder Chuckerbutty v	
		Pan oty	1021
		Protap Chunder Dey t Toolsey Das	
		Dey	1163 1471
		Protap Narain t Raghurani	400 402 410
		Protecteur Assurance Co v Erwin	652
		Provat Kumari t Oporbakissen	1090

	PAGE		PAGE
Pulcan t U S A	783	Purshottam t Vimarani	120 121 581 586
Pryag Singh t Raja Sam li	18 878		598
Puddabattu Dissee (In re)	340	Purshottam t Harbhajji	147
Pud lo Lochun t Sirdar Akhri	841		
Puddolochun t Lall Chand	560		
Puddomonce Dassee t Shama Churn	619		
Puddomonce Dossee t Roy Mothoora nath	312 313 960		
Pudmannud t Doorga Pershad	1374		
Pudmannud Singh t Chundi Dat Jha	926, 953	Mullick	143
Pugardin t Moidin	466, 476	Parumsookh t Subban	593
Pulamada t Ravuthu	689	Purus Ram t Juvantee Pershad	749
Pulandar Singh t Jwala Singh	120	Purushottama t Raja	565
Pulin Behari t Watson	516	Purushottam t Rajbai	272
Pullayya t Ramayya	1032	Putali Meheti t Tulja	143
Pulukdhari Roy t Radha Pershad Singh	900	Putli Valappi t Velloth Assenar	1157
Puna Bibee t Khoda Buksh	69	Puthandi Mammed t Avalil Moidin	911
Punchanan t Gurudas	1360	Puttangowda t N. Kanth Kalo Des phande	71, 162
Punchanan Bundopadhyia t Rabia Bibi	235 253, 266 273 963	Puttappa v Yellappa	1280
Punchanan Poy t Troylucko Mohinee	820	Pydel t Chathappan	861 862
Punchanand Bose t Davison	176		
Punchanun Singh t Dwarkanath Roy	16 18 21	Q	
Puninthavelu t Bhashyam Ayyangar	1062, 1063, 1064	Quarme (In re)	280
Punja Kuvarti t Bai Kuvart	693	Quartz Hill, etc Co v Beall	851
Punna Lal t Seth Cowaji	464	Quazie Mahmudar Rohman t Sirat Chandra	1179 1180 1181
Puran t Grah	403	Queen Empress t Chagan Dayaram	1220
Puran Chand t Roy Radha Kishen	878	Queen Empress v Sri Churn Chungo	8
Puran Chard v Sheodat Rai	765	Quinn t Lealhem	9
Puran Chand v Surendra Narain	338	Quilter t Heatley	735
Puran Chunder Roy v Juggessur Mookerjee	876	Qurban t Ashraf	312
Puran Mal t Janka Pershad	465 471		
Puran Mal v Krant Singh	1266	R	
Purander v Ram Narain	1365	R t Abdul Rahman	31
Purbhoo v Ramjeawan	577	R t Amar Nath	921
Purdy v Rapaljo	1253	R v Babu Lal	4
		R v Bal Krishna Vithal	4
		R v Bapuji Dayaram	89,
		R v Beharee Bose	546
		R v Bembridge	10
		R t Bishop of Oxford	7
		R t Bolton	82
		R v Chagan Dayaram	10 11 30
		R t Fischer	5
		R v Ganga Ram	65 66 77
		R v Gangadhar Tilak	7 8
		R v Ghalet	4 5 13
		R v Gobardhan	10
		R v Gopal Barick	467
		R v Gopal Doss	4 786
		R v Har Prasad Das	463 467
		R v Harakh Nath	491
		P v Hutchings	113
		R v Janka Prasa l	638, 921
			66
			181
			58
			849
			643, 646
			4 5
			631
			853
			646

Purshottam t	Amaram	120	121	584	PAGE
					586
Purshottam t	Harbhajit				598
					147
Mullick					143
Parumsookh t	Subban				593
Purus Ram t	Jayuntce Pershad				749
Purushottama t	Raju				565
Purushotum t	Rajbat				272
Putah Mehet t	Tulja				143
Putt u Valappil t	Veloth Assenar				1157
Puthandi Mammed t	Avalil Mojdun				911
Puttangowda t	N lkanth Kalo Des				
phande					71, 162
Puttappa v	Yellappa				1280
Pjdel t	Chathappan				861, 862

Q.

Quarrie (<i>In re</i>)	230
Quartz Hill, etc (o v Beall)	851
Quazie Mahmudar Rohman v Surat Chandra	1179 1180 1181
Queen Empress v Chagan Daryaram	1220
Queen Empress v Sri Churn Chungo	8
Quinn v Lealhem	9
Quilter v Heatley	735
Qurban v Ashraf	313

R

R t Abdul Rahman	31
R t Amar Nath	021
R v Babu Lal	4
R v Bal Krishna Vithal	4
R v Bap ut Dayaram	89
P v Beharee Bose	546
R v Bembridge	10
R t Bishop of Oxford	7
R t Bolton	82
R v Chagan Dayaram	10 11 30
R t Fischer	5
R v Ganga Ram	65 66 77
R v Gangadhar Tilak	7 8
R v Ghulet	4 5 13
R v Gobardhan	10
R v Gopal Barick	467
R v Gopal Doss	4 786
R t Har Prasad Das	463 467
R v Harakh Nath	491
P v Hutchings	113
R v Janki Prasa l	638, 921
	66
	181
	58
	849
R t Karsanlal	643, 646
P t Kartick Chunder Das	646
R t Karuppa Layan	4 5
R t Keigh	631
R v Krishna Gobinda	853
	646

	PAGE		PAGE
R t Mahnood Hossein	58	Radha Rani v Brindhun	383
R t Mahomed Humayoon Slaw	10	Radhakant v Anantrav	135
R t Mangal Tekchan l	198	Radhakant v Chinnaji	360 366 370
R t Mayadeb Gossami	845	Radhakant v Shmrav	677
R t Mehrban Singh	664	Radhaballub Surma v Anundmooce	1298
R v Muds ood deen	58	Daba	1298
R t Muthuraman Chetti	895	Radhajeobnn v Grees Chunder Roy	844
R v Nabdwip Goswami	141	Radhakant Roy t Mirza Sudafat	937
R v Nanadeshwar	650	Radhakant v Balyant	300
R v Nantamram Uttaram	78	Radhakant v Ram Coomr	532
R t Pillala	896	Radhamadhub Holdir t Monoh r	117, 133
R t Ram Krishna Das	58	Mukerji	117, 133
R v Sanki Prasad	79	Radhamonee t Ram Narain	561
R t Sri Churn Chango	4	Radhanath t Khellut	469
R v Timmal Red h	1231	Radhanath Cundu v Land Mortgage	122
R v Tulja	51	Bank	122
Iabbaba v Noorjehan	474 475 477 556	Radhapersad Singh t Ram Parmeswar	208
	569	Singh	208
Rabeholm t Smith	1246	Radhasyam t Dinobundhoo	472 1037
Rabtabat t Mahomed Ismail	441	Radhey Singh v Mangni Dam	497, 501
Rabutti Dassee v Radhanath	440		502 503 1214
Rachawa t Shivayogapa	414	Radha v Beni	114
Radha v Balkowar	401	Radhika t Radhamani	933
Radha t Gudadhur	73	Racoonissa Begum v Sharoda Soond i	850
Radha t Mucksoodun	160	ree	850
Radha Benode Misser (In the matter		Ragava v Rajaratnam	375 536 540
of the petition of)	1334	Ragava Charar v Vedanta Charar	1104
Radha Charan Das t Sharfuddin	1014	Raghava bin Hanmapa v Parapa bin	740 759
Hosain	1014	Shivapa	740 759
Radha Churn t Zumuroonissa	871 876	Raghavendra v Gururao	1471
Radha Churn Chowdhry v Chander		Ragho t Vishnu	683 680 693
Monoo Sikdar	728	Ragho Chandrarao t Hanmati Chan	329 330 1041
Radha Churn Roy v Moran & Co	669	drarao	329 330 1041
Radha Gobind t Brojendro Chowdhry	931	Ragho Govind v Dipchand	808
	932	Ragho Nath Das v Badri Prasad	974
	1042	Ragho Prasad t Mewa Lal	1177
	1315	Ragho Salvi v Balkrishna	564
	333	Raghoobuns Sahoy t Alloo	1320
	769	Raghoonath t Rajmohun	406
		Raghu v Rajendra	860
		Raghu Nandan v Jag lis	499 771
			874
			712
			414
			68 474
			475
			741
			257
			150
			1364
			114
			57
			718
			961
			239, 345
			1015 1025
			425
			623
			399
			1028
			1025
			273
			350 360
			372, 374

	PAGE		PAGE
Raghubar Dyal v Banke Lal	28 140 308	Raj Krishna v Pramoda	11.0
	310 331	Raj Kristo v Rama Soondaree	383
Raghubar Dyal v Blikya Lal	1119		92
Raghubhai Ramchandra (In the matter of)	292		
Raghunath v Kanur Hasan	702		
Raghunath v Kashi Prasad	270		
Raghunath v Nitu	47 405		
Raghunath Charan v Shamo Koen	83 423		
	431 47		
Raghunath Das v Raj Kumar	463 465		100
	466 861 861 866		
Raghunath Das v Secretary of State	1290		
	1292		
Raghunath Mukund v Sarosh Kama	529		
	966		
Raghunath Panjah v Kesur Chunder Chowdhry	139	want	14.0 211
	1 393	Raja Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadur v	141
	348	Ram Bandhu Rai	385
	985	Raja Iertab Sing (In re)	384 385
	269	Raja Padmanund Singh Bahadoor v	
	616	George Pershad Doobey	247 264 1365
	0 971	Raja Ram v Gonesh Hari	404
	1004	Raja Ram v Jilmi	431
	245	Raja Ram Singhji v Chunnal Lal	1005
	6 467	Raja Ram Tewary v Luchmun Per	717
Rahumbhoy v Turner	38 437 438 445		
	446 447		
Rahimuddin Sirkar v Lall Meah	263 965		
Rai Babu Mahabir Pershad v Rai Mar kunda Sahai	318		
Rai Balkrishen v Rai Sita Ram	980		
Rai Balkrishen Dass v Raja Pun Bah door Singh	205		
Rai Benode v Rai Pasupati	54 56	Rajah Ali v Amir Hossein	1278
Rai Chand v Matlura Prasad	750 761	Rajagopal (In re)	425 1320
Rai Chand v Naran	222	Rajagopal Takkaya v Muttupaleni Chetti	1143
Rai Churn Ghose v Kunud Mohan Dutt Chowdhry	110 111 115 139	Rajagopal Fakkay v Subramanya Ayyar	1140 1141
	142		880
Rai Monendra Bahadoor v Luchme shwar Singh	984		701
	297		1131
	182		
	1099	shad	876
	1132	Rajah Luat Hossein v Rowshun Jehan	448
pore	447 767 1300		22
Raikhori v Kumudini	311 1091		
	686		
	1297		
	872		
	1011		
waree	776	Rajah Mokond Naram Doo v Jonar dan Dey	140 145
Raj Chunder v Dhurmo Chunder	940	Rajah Mulesh Naram v Kshanund Misr	960 993
Raj Chunder v Gunga Dass	431 1054	Rajah Nil Monee Singh v Issir Chunder Ghoshal	550
	201	Rajah Nilmoney Singh v Ramanoo	728
	1315	Rajah Padmanund Singh v Madhu Singh	873 891
	925	Rajah Partha Saradhi Appa Row v Rajah Peniah Appa Row	1214
	940	Rajah Perhad Sem v Rajender Ka shore	720
	1358		
	933		
Raj Kisbort v Madan Mohan	719		
Raj Kissen (In re)	498		

	PAGE
Iajah of Pittapur t Sri Rajah Row Buchi Sittaya Garu	112 114 116 213
Rajah of Pittapur t Sri Rajah Venkata Mahipati Surya	112
Rajah Prithce v Hara Dluu	1093
Rajah Prithce Singh t Rancee Raj Koer	858
Rajah Protap Chunder t Kanave Lal Doss	891 892
Doss	274
Rajah Roodir Narain t Coomarr Narain Patnaik	915
Rajah Rughoonundin t Wilson	1030
Rajah Rughoonundin v Arcott	860
Rajah Rughoonundin v Gopal Chandra	886
Rajah Saheb Parhlad Sem t Baboo Budhoo Singh	441 693
Rajah Saheb Perhla l Sem t Run Bahadur	444
Rajah Shamshee t Mirza Mahomed Ali	1072 721 668 1310
Bose	1299
Rajai v Appayi	388
Rajam Chetti v Seshayya	488
Rajam Harj v Ardesher	312
Rajani Kant Bigchi t Hossein Uldin Ahmed	1027
Rajani Kantli t Rammathi Neogy	933
Rajaram t Ganesh	301 723
Rajaram Bisagat v Jibai	1057 1062 1063
Rajaram Govindram v Brown	645
Rajarance Dasi v Debedro Nath	1063
Rajbullub Siba t Ramsudoy Close	970
Rajbullub Seal v Mackenzie	303
Rajbuns Sahay t Soorjee Lal	474
Rajcoomarr Ray t Gohind Chander	443 235 527 441
Rajendra Nath Haldar v Nilrattan Mitter	1009
Rajendra Nath Roy t Ram Charan Sinha	957 958 1002
Rajendro Kishore t Hyabul Singh	938
Rajendro Lal Gossami t Shama Churn Lahori	89 143
Rajeniro Narain t Rajah Kumal Narain	825
Rajeniro Narain Roy t Chunder Mohan Mitter	923
Rajeniro Nath t Hahjee Syed	647 648
Rajeniro Protap t Bhowabul	1370
Rajeniro Roy t Soma Rao	188
Rajenironath Dutt v Sheikh Mulo	51 543 573 561 565
Rajenironath v Baladeo t Chunder Mohan	893

	PAGE
Rajera v Chandra v Nandray Kripi	237
Rajeshwara Rao t Hari Baban Itri	896
Rajhunath t Ganpatji	887
Rajib t Nil Moneo	1071
Raj t Pam v Katesar Nath	396 668 669 6 0 674 675 677
Rajjo v Lalun	884
Rajjo Koer t Debi Dal	585 588 611 616 676
Rajkrishna t Pramola	1321
Rajkeshwar t Bunsidhur	283
Rajkissen t Baroda Dabee	1343
Rajlulhee t Gokool Chunder	1377
Rajmal t Hanmant	345
Rajmohan Gossain v Goumohun Gossain	388
Rajmohenny t Mudjoodoodun	1101 1103
Rajmohun Bos t E I R Co	163 1198
Rajmonee v Chunder	432
Rajnarain v Anang Mohan	70
Rajnarain t Jibai	389
Rajnarain t Universal Life Assurance Co	518 571 572
Rajoo t Raj Coomarr	1316
Rajoo Singh t Balgobind	831 834
Rajpal t Chooramun	494 495
Rajrup Koer v Abdul Hossein	693 817
Rajrup Singh v Ramgolam Roy	255 273
Rajwanta Kunwar t Shiam Narain Singh	205 1164
Rakhai t Ashtosh	47
Rakhai v Secretary of State	396
Rakhai Chunder Bose v Dwarika Nath Mitter	1012
Rakhai Chunder Munul t Watson	1039
Rakhai Chunder Tewari t Satindra Deb Rai	1280
Rakhai Das Singh t Heera Moteo Dossee	121
Rakhai Dass Mundal v Protap Chunder Harrah	569 843
Rakhai Dass Singh v Seematty Heera Moteo Dossee	114
Rakhaimoni Dassi v Adolta Irasad	1135 1141 129
Rakhman t Dhondo	129
Rakhohari Chatteraj v Bijra Das Dey	1008
Raku Bibi v Khaja Mahomed	56
Raksh t Gochen	554 683
Rall t Parmanand Jewraj	478 480
Ralli Ros v Coculbhar Mulchand	1350
Ram Adhar t Narain Das	247
Ram Bahadur v Ram Shankar	406 408
Ram Baksh v Kishori Mohan	773
Ram Baksh t Panna Lal	910
Ram Barun t Jankee Sahoo	312
Ram Bhujang t Munder Koer	35
Ram Bhuroose t Bussessir	516
Ram Bushen v Rajaram	398
Ram Chand v Durga Pershad	120
Ram Chander t Itam Mal	380 980 1015 1023

	PAGE		PAGE
Ram Chand Mookerjee v Kameeneo	1301	"	411
Debra	210	"	1316
"	800, 908	"	611
"	303 530	"	1021
"	933	"	
Ram Chandra t Jairam	982, 983	"	800
Ram Chandra t Keshav	177	"	
Ram Chandra t Madhav	623, 1283	"	1080
Ram Chandra t Rakhmabai	1013	"	
Ram Chandra Bannerjee t Ranjit Singh	246	Diss	627
Rani Chandra Bose t Sneed	613	Ram Das t Badri Narain	360
Ram Chandra Dhondo t Rakhmabai	1006	Ram Das t Monmohini	402
Rani Chandra Krishnappa t Subrao Vithoba	1001	Ram Das t Secretary of State	1157
Ram Chandra Marwari t Muleshiwar Singh	972	Rant Dis Chikarbat t Official Liquidator	201 1018 1308
"		"	1297
"		"	1214
Ram Chandra Subrio t Rayji	1041	RAM DASS LUSHKAT t HURCHUR VIO Kerjee	388 390
Ram Charan Bhagat t Sheobomai Rai	269	Ram Dyal t Durga Singh	974
Ram Charan Buhadur t Razudun	116	Ram Dyal v Madan Mohan Lal	117 123
"	145	Ram Dyal v Mastub Chand	921
Ram Charan Byak t Lakhi Kant Bannerji	223	Ram Dyal v Megu Lal	285
Ram Charitra Rai t Jinti Ahiram	87	Ram Dyal t Ramadhin	460
Ram Chowdhury v Khashe Mohun	412	Ram Dhoni t Ishanee	857
Ram Chunder t Chooneelal	668	Ram Dhul Singh v Purmesureo Per shad	875
Ram Chunder t Dhurmo	303	Ram Dhun t Joy Narain	1350 1371
Ram Chunder t Hamiran	217	Ram Dhun v Ram Monee	1003, 1005
Ram Chunder t Kisto Kamneo	209	"	1104
Ram Chunder t Kondo	117, 248	Ram Dhun v Ram Narain	401
Ram Chun ler t Mohendro Nath Bose	233	"	300
"	271	"	578
Ram Chunder v Nund Lal	298 301	"	1111
Ram Chunder v Oomachurn	590 1265	"	677
"	1266	"	222
Ram Chunder v Ram Jeebun	396	"	895
Ram Chunder Chowdhry t Khashe Mohun	115	Ram Dyal Khan t Adjooodhia Ram Khan	707
Ram Chunder Dutt t Dwarkanath Bysack	931	Ram Dyal t Ram Dhun Dass	740
Ram Chunder Gossain t Mutty Lal Bagehee	215 217	Ram Dyal v Ram Doolal	415 620 675
Ram Chunder Pedlar t Hari Das Sen	123	Ram Dyal Saligram v Nurhurry Bal Krishna	705
"	127	Ram Ghulam t Dwarka Rai	9 253 502
Ram Chunder Roy t Ram Churn Baksbee	891	"	879
Ram Chunder Sen t Durga Nath Roy	212	Ram Ghulam t Hazaree Kuar	254
Ram Chunder Singh t Madho Kumari	105	Ram Gobind Singh v Gheenoo Singh	311
"	115	Ram Golam t Ayma Begum	283
Ram Chunder Surmah t Ram Chun ler Pal	872	Ram Golam t Sheo Lalal	391
"	313	Ram Gopal v Bhoooun	214
"	1142	Ram Gopal t Khushi Ram	212
"	150	Ram Gopal t Shama Khaton	404 405 406
Bornick	863	"	409
Ram Churn Laha v Ashutosh Dutt	649	Ram Gopal Barick t Sheo Pershad Sircar	318
Ram Churn Tewary v Protap Chandra Dutt	366 367 374	Ram Gopal Chuckerbutty t Poorno Chunder Bannerjee	1011
Ram Coomra t Chanbrucanto Moo kerjee	16	Ram Gopal D y t Jaghu Nath Choshal	395
Ram Coomra t Gobind Nath	238 1157	"	1301
"		Ram Gopal Roy v Gordon Stuart	808
"		Ram Govind Jha v Mungur Ram Chowdhry	143
"		Ram Gatty t Goonemonnee	713
"		Ram Harukh t Sheodihal	627
"		Iama Iyer v Venkatachela La Lynch	1309

	PAGE		PAGE
Ram Jewan Lall & Shrim Lall Mehar	1024	Ram Narain v Mina Kooray	156, 303
Ram Jewan Singh & Radha Pershad Singh	1302	Ram Narain v Mohanram	326
		Ram Narain & Odindra Nath	311, 1094
		Ram Narain v Parneswar	439
		Ram Narain & Parneswar Narain	74, 107, 198
		Ram Narain & Ram Chunder	563 710
		Ram Narain v Ramoon Paurey	359
		Ram Narain Dutt & Annoda I road Joshi	1041
Ram Kirpal & Rup Kuari	154 270 452	Ram Narain Narsing Doss & Ram Chunder	565
	960	Ram Narain Rai & Ram Coomarr Chunder Poddar	134
Ram Kishen v Chowdhury Trelani	612 613	Ram Narain Roy & Baij Nath Malla	1478
Ram Kishen Upadhyay & Dipa Upadhyay	70	Ram Narain Roy & Nilmonce Adhikari	1305
	1261	Ram Narain Sahoo & Bandu Pershad	267
	504		1044
	1112	Ram Narain Singh v Mahtab Bibi	320
	382	Ram Narain Tanker & Chederaulah Narsiah	176
	1030	Ram Narain Tewari & Shew Bhunjan Roy	251, 252
	880	Ram Nath & Rasanta Narain	392 500
Padma Charan	257	Ram Nath & Gowhar	107 108, 1367
Ram Kristo & Naik Tara	467	Ram Nath & Kamleshwar	1263
Ram Kuber Pande & Ram Das	131, 146	Ram Nath & Uma Charan	1062 1065
	1077	Ram Nath v Luchman Rai	1163
Ram Kumar & Ram Gour	981, 1028	Ram Nawaz & Ram Charan	269 660
Ram Kuvarbhai & Damodhar	1299		951
Ram Lal & Haran Chandra	1181	Ram Narayan & Prayag Singh	1078
Ram Lal & Kabil Singh	1354	Ram Nuffer & Dhol Gobind	407
Ram Lal & Kalla	1355 1366	Ram Onogroho Singh & Mt Montorun	320, 980, 1030
Ram Lal & Lancaster	743 744	Ram Paul Singh (In the matter of)	177
Ram Lal & Mehdi Hussain	441	Ram Pearl & Kallu	408 1300
Ram Lal & Narain	108	Ram Persaud Dutt & Krishno Mohun Shaw	820
Ram Lal & Ratan Lal	466, 474 1374	Ram Pershad & Bhurosa	1060 1295
Ram Lal & Tula Ram	105	Ram Pershad & Jagannath Pam	263, 96
Ram Lal & Chhabnath	105 105	Ram Pershad Sookul & Rajunil Sahoy	1307
	460		1188
	631		186
	233		825
	69 1361		1003
	634		329
	760		477
Ram Lall Motra & Bina Sundari	169 227		7, 608,
Ram Lall Mookerjee & Chetto Cooma	164		1298
	189	Ram Prosad Das & Rajo Koor	404
Ram Lal Shaw & Okhoy Kumar	27	Ram Protap Chowdhury & Lal Chand	1053
Ram Lechan & Beni Prosad	751, 1265, 1266		1061
Ram Lochun & Nittya	321	Ram Rangun & Chandra Benode	1316
Ram Lochun & Ram Narain	866 867	Ram Ratan & Lalta Prasad	50 168
Ram Lochun Das & Munsoor Ali	879	Ram Ratan & Nandi	399 401
		Ram Roop Singh & Shoo Gulam Singh	879
		Ram Ranjan & Copce Bullab	811
Ram Narain & Bisheshwar Prasad	136	Ram Ranjan & Jowharajunah	223
Ram Narain & Dwarika Nath Paletty	218	Ram Rattan & Cobind	1161
	260 320 981, 1021	Ram Rattan & Land Mortgage Bank	998
Ram Narain & Gurlurdhian Lall	1096	Ram Rattan Ando & Ram Chunder Pal	571, 877
Ram Narain & Igloo	1309	Ram Sahai & Ahmadi	598
Ram Narain & Kurun	373		
Ram Narain & Lax	1187		

Ram Sahai r Bank of Baroda	1796
Ram Salait r Gava 37, 885,	901, 108
Ram Sahoe r Dhunoo Koharee	1077
Ram Sahoy Singh r Pookhoo Singh	208
Ram Saran r Chatar Singh	115
Ram Saran r Pershar Bat	221 863
Ram Saran Panle r Yanki Panle	247, 261
Ram Sarup r Dusrath	21
Ram Sarup r Shah Lafafat	1141
Ram Sewak r Lamber Panle	431, 1018 126
Ram Sewak r Nakhed Singh 141, 520	522 600 601
Ram Sham Hussein r Dimar Humari Dabi	271
Pam Singh r Balubat	1276
Ram Singh r Deputy Commissioner Barabanki	689
Lam Singh r Mt. Tura Kunwar 136,	836
Ram Singh r Siliig Ram 461	471 1005
Pam Soondur r Kalso Parshad	403
Ram Soondur r Taruck Chunir	857
Ram Soondur Day r Shosht Mhun Pal Chowdhry	1021
Ram Soondur Sein r Kristo Chunder	581, 591
Ram Soondur Shaha r Dhanney	590
Ram Soonduree r Rance Surut	641
Pam Sooh = Coa	384
.	319
.	916
.	577
.	1231
.	1305
.	718
.	85,
.	979
Ram Taran Gowami r Rameswar Maha	1163
Sahoo	120
Rama r Hunji	472 474
Rama Ayyan r Sreenivasa Pattar	249 891
Rama Chandra Joshi r Hazi Kassim	318 1299
Rama Kissoot Dessji r Sriranga Charlu	57
Rama Krishna r Namasivaya	970
Rama Kurup r Sri devi	323
Rama Rai r Sridhur Pershad	647 641
Rama Reddi r Raju Red h	343 398
Ramabhadra r Jagannatha	879
Ramachandra i Devu	20,
Ramachari r Durasami	1140
Ramacharya i Anantacharya	919 10. 9
Ramachendrayyar i Noorulla	419
Ramadhar r Narain Das	265
Ramadhin r Sewalak	466 419
Ramados i Hanumantha Ra	337 361
Ramagopal r Mallikarjanulu	739
Ramaien i Veerapudiran	312
Ramakissor Des jia i Srirama Charla	41 216 218 1073
Ramakrishnapappa i Minervaana	323 324

Ramalakshmi Ammal & Sivanasutha		Pirumal	808
Ramalinga & Raghunatha	97, 98	Ramalinga & Sarnappa	321
Ramalingam & Thirugnana	135	Ramanurthi & Secretary of State	102
Raman & Muppil Navar	910	Raman & Wazira	679
Ramana & Babi	270, 871	Ramani & Minatchi Ammal	1049, 1050
Ramanadan & Palikutti	690 692	Ramanadan & Rajagopala	967
Ramanadin Chetty & Kunnappu Chetty	253	Ramanadham Chetty & Narayanan	12-1
Sastral	335	Ramaswamy & Rangasayya	1102
Ramani & Humud	100	Ramanujulu & Arava Mudu	576
Ramanugra Nairn & Mahasindur		Kunwar	115
Ramanuja & D ranyka	521, 530 588	Ramanuja & D ranyka	676
Ramaswami & Vytimartha	120, 121,		415
574 575 584 59-	600		352
Ramaswami Sastrula & Kameswarama	257		1758
	263		547
Ramaya & Muhamadbbai			90
Ramaya & Ranava			911
Ramavanga & Krishnavangar			854
Ramaya & Sivova	70 156		1307
Ramavya & Subbarava lee			623
Ramavya & Vedachalla			391
Ramavya & Venkataratna n	513 523		6 717
Rimayyar & Pansvvar			0 716
Rambhadra & Jeyannatha			282
Rambhat & Shankar Baswant			884
Rambharosa Lall & Copex Beebe			471
Ramlabho Chuckerluttu & Bunsi			943
Kurnakar			944
Ramit ity Koor & Jamesur Pershal			1037
Ramit ix & Girdharilall			179
Ram hant & Jagdishchund r			124
			196
			651

	PAGE		PAGE
Lampat Singh v. Ballbadhar	401, 401	Ranger v. Great Western Railway Co	739
Rampersaud v. Callichar	1159	Rangiah Naidu v. Rangiah	469
Rampertab Moll v. Bakerram Agurwallah	770, 771, 772	Rangit v. Sheo Prasad	431
Rampal Rai v. Rani Haran Rai	237	Rangit v. Bhaiji	221, 217
Rampul v. Durga	1150	Rango v. Bomshetti	211, 215, 206
Rampasanna v. Secretary of State	132	Rango v. Mudhivappa	142
Rampatab v. Ganesh Rangnath	741	Rango Roy v. Holloway	411, 121
Rampurth v. Foolihal	160, 168	Rangoon Botatoung v. Collector, Rangoon	45, 384, 437, 1409
Ranapurth v. Premsookh	157, 160, 181, 189	Rangorithal v. Rikhiradas	972, 1041
	189, 974	Rangrav Ravi v. Sidhi Mahomed	143, 141
Ramputt v. Koor v. Kallee Churn Singh	215	Rani Dusi v. Ashutosh	1299
Ramram Dutt v. Ramnarain	171		75, 966
Ramrao v. Bhaiji	463, 469, 479		275
Ramrup Sahay v. Khushal Musser	239		211
Ramruon v. Oriental Inland Steam Navigation Co	746		114
Ramsay v. Boyle	551, 563	Rani Manu v. Jyoti Amma (ex parte)	1257
		Rani Srimati v. Khajendra Narayan	412
		Rani Sundar Koor v. Rai Shyam Krishen	205
		Rani Umasundari (In re)	1160
		Ranjit v. Bhaiji Harjwan	894, 1350
		Ranjit Singh v. Habi Baksh	17, 860
		Ranno Rai v. Dayal Singh	232
		Rao Kuran Singh v. Fyz Ali	588
		Rao Oomrao v. Jutun Lall	237
		Raru Kutti v. Mamad	1358
		Rash Beharee v. Nobaye Poddar	30, 682
		Rash Beharee Lall v. Beebe Wajim	241
		Rash Behari v. Sudhar	420
		Rash Behary v. Sahab Roy	409, 1093
Ranchod Humbar v. Secretary of State	893	Rash Behary Dey v. Bhowanoo Charan Bhowe	1197, 1203
Ranchod Moar v. Bezantji Edulji	112, 114, 1160	Rash Behary Mondal v. Rakhial Churn Mondal	253
Ranchodji v. Lallu	408, 1261	Rash Dhareo v. Nathonee	640
Ranchordas v. Bhagnubhai	709	Rash Munjoreo v. Radha Soondureo	30, 858
Ranchordas Vithaldas v. Bihasi	218	Rashibhary Singh v. Joynanda Singh	240
Ranchordass v. Manekhlal	680	Rashibhary v. Rakhial Churn	95
Randall v. Lithgow	295	Rashibhary Mookerjee v. Maharani Surnomoyee	259, 265
Randfield v. Randfield	1240	Rashbhari Mukherji v. Sakhi Sundari	564
Rance Ahmed Koor v. Indarjeet Koor	871	Rashid un Nisa v. Muhammad Ismail Khan	256
Rance Bromo Moyee v. Rajah Anund Lall Roy	127	Rashomonoe Doss v. Junmoy Mallick	1329
Rance Emamun v. Hur lyal Singh	94	Rasibi v. Olaga	709
Rance Khajooroonissa v. Rance Pyee Soomera	1160	Rasik v. Jitendra	967
Rance Madhub Lahoree v. Biprodass Dey	817	Rasik Chandra v. Rani Rani Ranjan	1362, 1364
Rance Sarut v. Rabhoos Prosunno	1077	Rasik Lall Dutt v. Bulhu Mukhi Dasi	16, 19, 21, 1148
Rance Shama Soondore v. Jardine Skinner & Co	933		732
Rance Shibe-hurree v. Mothooranath Acharye	872		918
Rance Shurno Moyee v. Luchmeeput Doogur	51		1338
Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju	1141		396
Rangacharian v. Yagna Dikshitar	858		235
Rangamma v. Vohalvyva	601		115
Rangan Lal v. Jindhu	1290, 1318		1307
Ranganasary v. Shappani	213		
Rangasami v. Periasami	956, 961		
Rangasami Naichan v. Varadappa			1211
			907
			167
			631
			991
			340
			171
			1133

	PAGE		PAGE
Rattanjit Hari Har Das	961	Relier v Comptoir d'Escompte	498 502
Pavaneshwar v Chandi	1318	Roe v Davies	683
Ravi v Mahadev	516 547	Poghoonath Doss v Hydonath Doss	968
Ravi v Sayajirao	302	Poghoonath Mundul v Juggutt Bund	115 116
		hoo Bose	278
			241
			403
			1129
			1312
			8 501
			1016
Rayachand Miyachand v Sultan Ra	464 469	Roma Nath Das v Mohesh Chander	4
Rayappa Chetti v Ali Sahib	711	Pal	655
Raynor v Mussoorie Bank	467 1060 1065		272
Read v Brown	183 586 622		934
		Mondal	4 5
		Romon Kissen v Hurrololl Sett	1143
		Remoona v Manicko	615 619 620
		Romon Kishen Dey v Shaikh Kalir	810
		Buksh	591
		Rookmune Koor v Ram Fohul Roy	738
		Rookmny Bulbul v Malik Jamanra	253
		Roop Lal Dass v Bekani Meah	1056
		Roop Narain v Ramayee	766
		Roshan Lal v Lachmi Narayan	896
		Roshan Singh v Mata Din	723 806
		Roshan Jehan v Inayut Hossain	334 1008
		Roshun Lal v Ram Lal Mullick	470 474
		Ross Alston v Pitambar Das	477
			944
		Ross Johnson v Secretary of State	740
			1181
			1237
			702
			1077
			150
		Roussai v Linto	1378
		Rowland Hudson v Morgan	1233 1258
		Rowlandson v Champion	9
		Rowell v Morris	1128
		Roy Bhopendro Nath Chowdhry v	69 142
		Kaleo Itosunno Ghose	667
		Poy Dhunput v Jhoomuk	92
		Roy Dinkur Doyal v Sheo Golab Singh	115 133
			414
		Roy Goodal Roy v Dhunshur Koor	415 906
		Roy Gource Nath v Tulcer Chund	910
		Roy Jotindra Nath Chowdhury v Rai	1336 1337
		Irisanna Kumar	680
		Roy Krishore v Hurce Mohun	1015
		Roy Juchmoopt Singh v Aloyto	1211
		Gurn Mullick	678
		Roy Luchmiput Singh v Secretary of	675
		State	247
		Roy Mohun v Bishnu Chandra	1075
		Roy Molun v Buhoo Soonduree	1308
		Roy Sundolal Bose v Mir Abu Syed	147 1333
		Roy Sultan v Laloo Koor	
		Royal Insurance Co v Akloy Coomar	
		Dutt	

	PAGE
Sadhu Krishna Ayyar & Kuppan Ayyangar	387 773
Sadhu Sarun Singh & Dwarka Singh	1057
Sadhusaran & Panchleo	984
Sadik Ali Khan & Imdad Ali Khan	45
Sad q Hussain & Inalta Irosad	439 501
Sadler & C W Ry Co & Midland Ry Co	523 672
Sadu & Baiza	115
Sadu & Sambhu	940
Sadu Bin Rajhu & Ram Bin Govind	610
	973, 974
Saeefollah & Luchmeeput	953
Saem Sirdar & Kamaludddy	591
Safir Ali & Raj Mohun Guha	1012
Safdar Ali & Lachman	382
Sagor Chunder & Sheobourne	1270
Sagore Dutt & Ramchandra Mitter	73 642
	656
Sah Man Mull & Kanagasabapathi	258 467
	1002
	968
	134
	145
	3 982
	919
	1299
	1374
	1
Marahayar	541, 1197
Sajed ur Raja & Baidynath Deb	357 358
	360 535
Sayed ur Raja & Gour Mohan	357 363 367
	368 373 390
Sakan Singh & Gopal Chunder Neogi	447
Sakarial Jaswantra & Bai Parvatibai	277
	928 1197
Sakhal Chand & Velchand	109 1319
Sakharam & Damodar	249 990
Sakharam & Hari Krishna	285
Sakharam & Secretary of State	345 347
Sakharam & Vishram	160 940
Sakharam Bhaskar & Padmakar Ma	
hadeo	647
	94
	975
	1286
	1318
Rulshet Lodha	392
Sakhichan & Kulanand	3, 979
Sakina & Gauri Sahai	648
Sakubai & Ganpat Ramkrushna	1328
Sakyahani Ingle Rao & Bhavani Bozi	1048
Salakshi & Lakshmaya	304
Salaman & Wadner	447
Salamat Hossein & Luckhi Lam	307
Salimra & Martava	1036

	PAGE
Salig Ram v Brij Bilas	1303
Salig Ram v Har Charan	693
Salig Pam v Ram Lal	453
Salig Ram v Pam Dewak	858
Salig Ram v Secretary of State for India	77
Saligram t Chaha Mal	187
Salik Ram t Azim Ali	436, 437, 1331
Salma Bibi t Sheikh Muhammad	112 585
	See case etc etc
Samarapuri t Parry	491
Samat t Amra	859
Sambasibi t Srinivasa	912
Sambasiva v Ramasami	201
Sambasiva Ayyar v Vydimadasami	1000 1002
Sambasiva Chetti t Veera Perumal	767, 1054
Sambayya v Gopala Krishnamma	859
Sambhunath v Sarjamon	443
Samed Sheikh v Naba Nepal	1289
Sami v Copal	188
Sami Achari v Somasani Iram	115 133
Sami Ayyar v Krishnasami	957 996
	^
Saminatha v Rangathammal	601
Samina'ha v Varisai	178
	7, 406
	1270
	0 391
	920
	1011
	672
	94
	801
	209 533
	244
	259
Sangappa t Shivbasawa	1225
Sangaratnam (In re)	431
Sangili t Voolan	1094
Sanjeeviyah t Ranjiyah	91
Sanjivi v Ramasami	257
Sankali t Muridhar	498 429 430 1008
Sankana Kalana v Virupakshapa	413 693
Sankar t Madan	762 966 1042
Sankara t Kela	806
Sankara Blatta t Subrava Blatta	432
	769 1289
Sankara Menon t Gopala Pattar	917
Sankaralinga v Ratnasabhapati	648 758
	766 722
Sankaralinga Peldi t Kandasami Teran	210
	206
Sankaran t Ananthanarayanayyan	561
	580 711
	66 425
	891
	202

	PAGE		PAGE
Sankaravallabhai v. Alr. Kumaraswami	212	Saroda Doss v. Barada Kant Roy	833
Sanku v. Pattamma	1148	Saroda Prashad v. Kalyan Chunder	560
Sankumani v. Il. ran	114 108	Sarola Prasad v. Kalyan Chunder	121
Sankunni v. Narayanan	32	Sarola Prasad v. Lachmeput Singh	30 270
Sanny v. Ganapa	622 676	Sarola Prasad v. Mullik v. Intellence	898
Sansar Prasad v. Indira Prasad	680	Sarola Prasad v. Chandra Mouli	1263
Sant Kumar v. Dho. Saran	126 146 314	Sarodaswami v. Tincowry Nundy	1312
Sant Lal v. Lamps Day	1021	Sarop Chunder Pal v. Dombal	390
Sant Lal v. Sri Kishan	1260	Saroti v. Kinnj Belari	423 602
Sant Lal v. Umrao Unnisa	977, 1013 1017	Saroti Begam v. Taj Begam	933, 1032
Santaji v. Ranji	710	Saroti Bhuvan v. Jash	674
Santi Ram v. Bhikant Panja	561	Sasurama v. Meherban	407 963 980
Santishwar v. Lakhi Kanta	1315	Sassoon v. Hurry Dis Bhukut	383 384
Santo Prasad v. Shew Narain	1020	Sati Churn v. Annojurna	325
Santomony Doss v. Kedar Nath	1031	Satapa v. Karibappa	324
Sarwal Singh v. Mahu Pan Jay	979 1016	Satappa Pillai v. Jaman Chetti	83
Sanyasi Baritya v. Ardaswar	144 14	Sathanatha v. Subba Lakshmi	808
S. A. P. v. La Cour Franco H. Lee	783	Sathappayyar v. Parasami	358 369 760
Sarada Charan Chatterji v. Jawar		Sathuayyan v. Muthusama	1014
Saradhi	606	Sathu Chandra Mukerjee v. Ahara	
Saral Chand Mitter v. Mohun Bibi	12 691	Prasa l Mukerjee	1282 1283
Sarala Sun lri Dasi v. Sarola Prasa l	397	Sathappayyar v. Parasami	370
Saran v. Bhagwan	216 503	Sattappa Chetti v. Jogi Soorappa	18 686, 913
Saran v. Biswas	827, 828	Sati v. Hanmantrao	776
Sarangipani v. Narayanasami	1367	Satya Charan v. Madhub Chunder	310 311
Sarangipani v. Secretary of State	313		944
Sarapa v. Malai	1100		1241
Saraswati v. Nabadwip	297		1269
Saraswati Barman v. Golap Das			120
Barman	41 242 26		431,
Saraswati Barman v. Moti Barmonya	44		10 2
Sarat v. Apurba	1240	Satyendra v. Kastura Kumari	803
Sarat v. N. v. v.	160 1162	Satves Chandra v. Monmohini	687 734
	1064		757
	8 469	Siudament Dist v. Thakomant D. l	95
	1037	Siurendra v. Harukhan l	35
	187	Siva Rimp v. Jai v. Jai Nathu	1189
Hossein	18	Savit v. Panchanun	401
Sarat Chan lra Singh (In the matter of)	1066	Savitra v. Rimp	335 427
Sarat Chunder v. Kedar Nath	517	Sayad Abdul Hik v. Chlam Jilani	501
Sarat Chandra Kunlu v. Doyil Chund		Sayad Hashim Subh v. Huseinsha	80
Seal	338	Sayal Hussein v. Collector of Kaira	337
Sarata Subba v. Kamsala Immayya	975		367 369 373
Saravara Pillai v. Sesha Reddi	1313	Sayad Muhammad v. Fattch Muham	
Sarbhav Doyalji v. Raghunathji	1295	mad	814 815
Sardarmal Jagonath v. Aravayal			
Sabhapathy	547 966		
Sirdarsingji v. Ganpatsingji	345 346 383		
	565, 677, 690 722		
Sardhari Lal v. Ambika Prasad	966 971		
Sarit Ram v. Chanda Singh	598		
Sarju v. Bin lshri	326		
Sarju Prasad v. Bir Bhaddar	517		
Sarju Prasad v. Sita Ram	495 1068 1073		
Sarkies v. Bundhoo Baco	312 1186 1189		
	1190 1192 1193		
Sarkies v. Prosonomoyee Dossce	877		
Sarkum Abu Torab Abdil Wahab v.			
Rahaman Balsh	122		
Sarman Lal v. Khuban	462		
Sarnam Tewari v. Sakina Bili	463 471 479		
Saroda Churn Chuckerbutty v. Ma			
homed Isuf Meah	249, 311 1025		

	PAGE		PAGE
		Settiappan v Sarat Singh	972
		Seva Ram t Kanshi Ram	599
		Seva v Muttusami	90 257, 1032 1043
		Sevujan Chetty v Krishna Ayyangar	687
			690
	465	Sevraji Vijaya t Chinna Nayana	399 401
	922	Sew Bux Dogla t Shib Chunder Sen	335
	345		336 340, 475 477
		Sewa Ram v Tandy	216
	7	Sewdnt Poy v Sree Canto Maity	332 1013
	301		1193
	737	Sha Karamchand v Ghelabhai	375
		Sha Nagendas t Halalkore Nathu	339
	218		967
Secretary of State t Mir Muhammad	1174	Shahabuddin v Deemoorat	1294
Secretary of State t Mutu Sawmy	1264	Shadaf Khan v Aminullah Khan	125 128
Secretary of State t Narayan	48 257 1158	Shadhoo Sarau t Bhiggoo Lall	1037
	1159	Shadhoo Singh t Ramanoograha	1094
Secretary of State t Narayan Pal		Shadi v Anup Singh	1229 1231
krishn	1159	Shadi v Ganda	579
	285	Shadi v Gunga Sahai	894 896
	413	Shafi ud din t Lochan Singh	1042
	347	Shafkat un nisa t Shib Sahai	588
	346	Shagur t Mohamaya	402
	711	Shah Ahmed t Taree Rai	717
	107	Shah Farced Alum v Sheo Charun	
		Ram	993
t Durj oy st	117	Shah Jughun v Shaikh Muksood Ali	406
Secretary of State for India in Council		Shah Koondu t Noor Ali	649
t Kajmully	140	Shah M Iammal t Hanwant Singh	1107
	215		1103
	1371	Shah Makhun Lal t Baloo Sree Kus	
	908	hen Singh	215 427
	1156	Shah Nuthoo t Ghunesam Singh	1096
		Shaharulla v Bingos Mondal	1314
Mookenjee	1097	Shahazadee Hazra Begum t Khajr	
Settharama Bhagavatur t Venkata		Hossein Ali	51
giri	462 468	Shahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v	
Settilershal t Malo elikure m	494	Fergusson	78 345 346
	758	Shahi Ram t Shib Lal	339 340
	60	Shaida Husain v Hub Husain	70
		Shah Abdul Az t (In re)	89
		Shahk Ab lulla t Han Ab lulla	281 300
		Shahk Ali v Mafomed	755
		Shahk Raz t Mokuna B li	3
		Shahk Ibrahim t Shahk Suliman	843
		Shahk Moosa t Shahk Essi	56 275 709
			890 844
			879
			903 978
			400
			417
			757 768
			1153
			am
	273	Shah Charoo t Zobe Is Khatoon	84
Seth Dunraj t Hanks	688	Shahk Ikhce Baksh t Baboo Shao	403
Seth Gokildass t Murli	507 864	Naram Singh	143
Seth Gungun H t Mussumat Chalee	1100	Shahk Futeh Oollah t Oon lins	
Seth Jaitival t Jam Sahao	371	B be	1303
Seth Jay ar t Stankar Das Dula	24	Shahk Hamdooli n v Bladao	197
Sethurani t Vanta	1143	Shahk Jafur t Cooroo Pershad	831
Sethurayar t Shanmugan Pillai	909	Shahk Koordeh Hossein t Nubbeo	
beton t Bohn	901	Fett v	128 150
Seth Umarimal t Sruthi Roy	239 507 77	Shahk Komaroo Ikken t Monve Min	
	983	dal	1308

	PAGE		PAGE
Shahk Kuleemooddeen & Ahruf Ali Khan	318	Shamboo Chunder Halder (<i>In re</i>)	935, 936
Shahk Kamrud Din & Jawahir Lal	960	Shamee Mahomed & Prodhan Palce	410
Shahk Lal Mahomed & Shahk Peer Nazur	412 509, 845	Shamji & Poona	923
Shahk Mahomed & Lam Kant Chowdhry	212	Shamnugger Jute Factory & Ram Naram Chatterjee	1196 1199, 1200
Shahk Mahomed & Sheik Anwar Ali	1265, 1266	Shamray Pandey & Niloy Ramaji	71, 81, 226, 472 900
"	1287	Shamsar Ali & Jagannath	1367, 1375
"	1227	Shamsheer & Ram Chunder	1371
"	6, 591	Shamsher Mundal & Ganendra Narain Mitter	199
"	723	Shamshonessa Begum & Anno Loic	935
"	767	Sham Patter & Abdil Kadir	818 820
"	1304	Shangara & Krishnan	123 516
"	134	Shankar & Narsingrao	1032
"	--	Shankar & Umabai	299
"	--	Shankar Baksh & Daya Shanker	144 586
"	--	"	762
"	--	"	71, 1334
"	--	"	439
"	--	"	65, 769
"	--	"	750,
"	--	"	766 1283
"	--	"	5, 965
"	--	"	187
"	--	"	266
"	--	"	1295
"	--	"	339
"	--	"	132
"	--	"	868
"	--	Shankarappa & Danappa	
"	--	Shankaribhai Khojabhai & Sonabhai Ranchodbbhai	384 420 471
"	--	Shanks & Secretary of State	57 216 890
"	--	Shanmuga Pillai & Pamanathan Clatti	63
"	--	"	197, 230, 900
"	--	Shanmugam Pillai & Syed Gulam Ghos	591 595
"	--	Shannon (<i>In re</i>)	79
"	--	Shantappa Chedambaraya & Sibrao Ramchandra	967 982
"	--	"	445
"	--	"	1028
"	--	"	994
"	--	"	1140,
"	--	"	1141
"	--	Shard (<i>In re</i>)	417
"	--	Sharfudin & Govind	404 414
"	--	Shari & ditta Khan & Itchyab Khan	875
"	--	Sharada Koomaree & Mohunee Mohun	817
"	--	"	819
"	--	Sharada Moyee & Nobin Chunder	968 1012
"	--	Sharada Moyee Burmonee & Wooma Moyee Burmonee	939
"	--	Sharada Pershad & Luchmeput	860 131
"	--	Sharala Proshad Mullick & Joy Dhun put Singh	1043
"	--	Sharada Sooti Luree & Gobind Mon & Sharp & Lush	1294
"	--	"	209
"	--	Sharup Chand & Fat Dasse	1360
"	--	Shathuk Paul & Gudadhur Roy	1316
"	--	Shaw & Beers	589
"	--	Shaw & Smith	780 783
"	--	Shelu Bera & Chauhan Mohan Jana	123
"	--	Shedaya & Shivaya	853
"	--	Shreen & Johnson	164
"	--	Shreetanath & Madhub Narsin	323 327
"	--	Shik Balam & Ram Chandra	103
Sham Sundar & Jaisar	498		
Shama Charan & Radha Kristo	1295		
Shama Charan Chatterji & Madhab Chandra Mookerjee	217 248 932		
Sham Lal Charan Chowdhury & Rani Mina Kumari	1062		
Shama Charan Chose & Farik Nath Mukhopadhyay	409		
Shama Churn & Bindabun	1262 1359 1375		
"	1376		
Shama Churn & Madhub Chandra	36		
Shama Churn Chatterjee & Prosunno Coomar Santiharee	119		
Shama Dass & Hurbhins Narain Singh	773		
Shama Keshee & Raj Kishore	327		
Shama Pershad & Harro Pershad	95 498, 499 503		
Shama Puddo & Dino Nath	1056		
Shama Puddo Dutt & Nobin Chunder Bose	909		
Shama Sen & Abdul Latif	336		
Shama Soonduree & Rohmood leen	411		
"	609 174		
Shama Sunilur Chowdhury & Sreenath Banerjee	872		
Shamanind Surnah & Shunboo Chunder Doss	310		
Shamasoon lerce Dossee & Brindabai Mitter	746		

	PAGE
Shib Chund Lahiri v Joyram Das	1303
Shib Chunler v Allad Mouce	1282
Shib Gopal v Balie	551
Shib Krihni v Satish	507, 1468
Shib Krsto v Ab lool	535, 602, 673, 680, 686, 691, 703
Shib Krsto v Miller	1189, 1192
Shib Krsto v Satish	1468
Shib Kunwar Singh v Sheo Prasad Singh	976
Shib Lal v Collector of Barilly	1077
Shib Narain v Kishore Narain	497
Shib Narain v Ram Narain	707
Shib Narain Mookerjee v Baikuntha Nath Isar	474
Shib Narain Shaha v Bep.n Behary Biswas	229
Shib Narain Singh v Gobind Dass Bhukut	1018
Shib Nath Chatterjee v Nubo Kishen Chatterjee	114, 144
Shib Pershad Lattuck v Nubo Kishen Mookerjee	1301
Shib Prakash Singh v Sardar Doyal Singh	931, 1016
Shib Prasad Chaudhuri v Akai Pal	606
Shib Sahai v Thika Ram	1003
Shib Singh v Mukat Singh	330
Shib Singh v Sita Ram	944
Shib Suhagi v Nursingh Lall	113
Shib Haldar v Gopi Sundari	171
Shubban Lal v Tiloki Chand	384
Shubendra v Jozoo Ram	750, 1237
Shubjoy Thakur v Pogoso	322
Shubo Raut v Biban Raut	137
Shubo Soonduree v Ram Chunder	1104
Shuboo Narain v Mudden Ally	974
Shuboo Poy v Kasee Roy	618, 768
Shuboo Soonduree v Chunder Kant Ghoso	402
Shiva v Mahito Mahto	80
Shiva Devi v Jarn Hageade	739, 741
Shiva Nathaji v Joma Kishinath	15, 459
	462, 464, 468, 472, 476
Shivabasa v Sangappa	401, 402, 403
Shivabhasan v Secretary of State	7
Shivalingaya v Nagalingaya	126
Shirapa v Dod Nagiya	414, 908, 911

	PAGE
Shivlingappa v Chanbasappa	312, 313, 315, 993, 999
"	168
"	8, 276
"	0, 973
"	316
"	1030
Shivram v Sarasvatibai	1037
Shivram Vithal v Bhagurthebai	396, 1109
Shohrat Sing v Bridgmann	223, 1319
Shokhee Bewa v Medhee Mundul	144
Shomaed Ali v Eusoof Khan	1286
Shonar Bewa v Monoram Mundul	1139, 1140
Shoobul Chunder v Koylash Chunder	405
"	412
Shookram v Ram Lal	403
Shoorkoomar Singh v Cruise	817
Shooshee Bhusan Indro v Gobind Chunder Roy	890
"	901, 904, 906, 911
Chandra	550
Shoshi Bhoosun Pal v Guru Churn Mukhopadhyay	707, 857
Shosi Bhusan Sadhu v Ahmed Hus sen	1019
Shostee Churn v Collector of Chittagong	1157
Shoylendra v Patoo Das	422
Shri Bhawani Devi v Devrao Midhavrao	857
Shri Dhundiraj v Ganesh	368

Shri Vishvambhar v Shri Vasudev	476
Shritar Vinayak v Narayan Vakil Babaji	112, 115, 122
Shridhar Hari v Chama	77, 716
Shridhar Vinayak v Babaji	321, 973
Shridhar Vinayak v Narayan	397
"	77
"	1231
"	0, 833
"	285
"	989
Shripati v Puraj	1011
"	223
"	1291
"	455
"	71
"	338

[illegible]

Sri Chitambal Debi v. Munia Kumari	PAGE 917
Sri Jogemaya Dassi v. Guremla Nath Mookerjee	953
Sri Kamini Dasi v. Asutosh Mookerjee	529
Sri Klermukree v. Nelmumbur Mamlal	816
Sri Nisa Bibi v. Raiba Kishore	389
Sri Nohun Mince Dasse v. Joy Gopal Goswami	260
Sri Raye Kishore v. Bonomally Churn Mitee	1293
Sri Sarat Kumari v. Nimali Churn Dey	881
	249
	1016

mittee	11
Smith v. Lyster	1256
Smith v. Richardson	512, 672
Smith v. Roberts	635
Smith v. Secretary of State	106, 141
Smith v. Vaughan	1357
Smith v. West	1253
Smurthwaite v. Hinnay	701
Sobbee Jha v. Sosheenath Jha	512 519 522 672
Sobha Bibee v. Mirza Sakhamut	811
Sobha Chand v. Bhai Chand	012
Sohan Lal v. Azizunnisa	321
Sohan Lal v. Hardeo Sahai	1293
Sohawan v. Babu Nanai	1101
	433 1304 1313
	1315 1316
Sohochurry D. v. H. H. Kuto Roy	1210 1212
Sohri v. Khalak Singh	1283
Sohni Lal v. Lala Gya Persai Lal	393, 324
	396
Sour v. Narayanrao	129 301, 1288
Solomon v. Abdool Azev	1075
Som Gopal Bhogale v. Vinayak Bhaikambhit	26
Somasandiram Chetti v. Admittorator General	33 5,
Somasekhara v. Sibhadramaji	417
Somasundara v. Kulan Isavel	136 519
Somasundara v. Vythilinga	57
Somasundaran v. Fischer	526
Somayajula v. Savayya	698
Somayya v. Subamma	40 769 1286
Somchand v. Chhaganlal	367
Sonabai v. Tribhovanadas	1086
Sonaka Chowdhram v. Bhoobunjoy Shaha	39 424

S. Odikhani Chowdhram v. Raj Mohun Bose	PAGE 806
S. Ojrat Ali Khan v. Kho sal Chaul	720
Sookh Raj v. Mooltee Tuffozzo	1011
Sookoomar Singh v. Kasee Singh	1027
Soomut Dass v. Bhoobun Lall	232
Soonder Bibee v. Khulloo Mull	599
Soonder Lal v. Cor Prasa	381, 630 718
	749 750, 751, 761, 1283
	816
	2, 961
	987
	403
Thakoor	586
Soorendra Nath (In re)	491
Sooren Rao Nath Roy v. Raghoober Dyal	415 416

Soorja v. Gunja	113
-----------------	-----

Sooruj Pershad v. Saheb Lal	582
Sorabji v. Buchoober	1134
Sorabji v. Rattongji	162 513 561
Sorabji Coovary v. Kala Raghunath	336
	953
Sorabji Elilji v. Govind Ramji	314, 335
	336 914 914, 1012
Sorooop Chunder Harrah v. Troylokho Nath Roy	911
Soshi Bhusan v. Grish Chunder	1014
Soshi Bhusan Gha v. Cogin Chauler Shaha	113
Sotish Chunder v. Nil Council	474 576
Soudamnee v. Mihatib Chauli Baha door	448 1774 1378

Sourindra Mohan Tagore v. Stromont Debi	12 1063
South American and Mexican Co. (In re)	145
Souza v. Gulam Mordin	261
Sowdamnee v. Juggessir Soor	397
Sowdamni Chowdhram Krishna Kishor Poddar	11
Special Officer Salsette Building Survey v. Dossabhai Bezongji	4 10 184 431

Spedding v. Fitzpatrick	11
Spence v. Hotel v. And v.	11
Spencer v. Borough	
Speyer v. Jansen	
Spiles v. Crosvon v.	
Sree Dasse v. Lan v. Jalun v.	
Sree Krishna v. Chandra v.	
Sree M. hant v. Chandra v.	

S. ni Runt v. Kanhuja Lal	451
---------------------------	-----

TABLE OF CASES

cylu

[illegible]

	PAGE		PAGE	
Sun Lari Reddiar t Sibbiah Koundan	1164	Surjo Jendad t Haslee Rowat	702	
Sun Laringa Swami t Rama Swami	441	Surjyamoni t Kalikanta	393 396	
	443	Surm Rae t Ubbmam Rae	411, 844	
Sundaram t Annanar	1293	Surnamoy t Dasi t Ashutosh Coswami	970	
Sundaram t Sankara	1227, 1244	1230	Surno Moyce t Bk int	333
Sundarappa t Sreeramulu	240	Surno Moyce Dassee t Krishen Coo	863	
Sundari Dassee t Mudhoon Chunder	681 682	marie Bibee	863	
Sunder Das t Mansa Pam	330 468	473	Surno Moyce Dabe t Dikhun Panjan	1017
Sunder Diss (In re)	338	Sauyal	403 450	
Sunder Koer t Chandeshwar Prosad	448	Surnomoyee t Lutchmeeput	441	
	861	Surnomoyee t Shoshee Mokhee	441	
	853	Surnomoyee Dabee t Purresh Naram	742	
	421	Roy	742	
	181	Surnomoyee Dabi t Dullina Ranjan	979	
	910	Sanyal	690	
Sunt Gopal Chunder t Jugut Inlar	970	Suroop t Nimchand	871	
Bunwaree	858	Suroop Chunder Roy t Mohender	103	
Suput Singh t Imrit Tewari	980	Chunder	60 476	
Surj Bunsu Koer t Shro Prosad	310	Surroop Narain t Ram Tahul	1363	
Shobh	276 310		203	
Suraj Din t Chatter	1303	Surya Narayan Rao v Sarabalaiah	1470	
Suraj Din t Mahabir	292	Surya Pillai v Aryakannu Pillai	431 433	
Suraj Prosad v Golab Chand	303	Sushcedhur Bhattacharjee t Kalee	807	
Surama v Rama	1027	Doss Dey	213	
Suran Singh v Ram Bahal Lal	420 507	Sutcliffe t Smith	783 798	
	772	Sutherland t Singhee Churn Ditt	687	
Surat Lali Mondal t Amar Haji	160	Suthi Kutti t A hutan Nair	1330	
Surbessir t Arizollah	403	Suttees Chunder t Gunesch Chunder	504	
Surbhait t Rachu Nathji	1264	Sutto Churn Ghosal t Obhoy Nund	1930	
Surdharee Lall t Girindar Chunder	961	Doss	873	
Surender Keshub Ray t Doorgasoon	1039 1241	Sutton v Rees	1246	
dry Dossee	1039 1241	Suttia Nun lo t Suroop Chunder	1241	
		Suttia Sunkur Ghosal t Golap Money	417	
		Dabee	1257	
		Suttia Sunkur Ghosal t Rani Colap	1143	
		Monee Dossee	1185	
		Sittiyabirna Dassee t Krishna Chn	346	
		der Chatterjee	273	
			1237	
			911	
			1143	
			1185	
			346	
			273	
			1237	
			259	
			131	
			245	
			961	
			580	
			41	
			1071	
			403	
			563	
			121	
			1171	
			1218	
			57	
			1266	

	PAGE		PAGE
Syed Ikram Hossain & Ram Lachman Dutt	80	Tara Chand Ghosh & Anand Chandra Chowdhry	416
Syed Jaffer & Sheikh Mahomed	1274	Tara Chunder & Ameer Munda	561
Syed Mahomed & Aribika Pershad	122	" "	116
Syed Mahomed & Shaik Muntozul	719, 758	" "	316
Syed Moazim Hossain & Robinson	151, 153	" "	92
Syed Moltan Allee & Sheo Baksh	100	" "	259
Syedur Raj & Baija Nath Dab	208	" "	1167
Syed Abbas Ali & Yadeem Bamy	808	Tara Prosunno & Koomaree	619, 626
Syed Abdool & Kallee Koomar	1001	Tara Prosunno & Satish Chandra	210, 218
Syud Abdool Ali & Mullick Sudher ooddeen	826	Tara Soondree & Oajul Monco	325
Syud Ambur & Kait Chan	719	Tara Sundree & Saroda	305
Syud Asherooddeen & Syud Daulo Moyee	35, 360	Tarachand & Kashinath	1073
Syud Dahan & Musht Khodja	491	Tarachand Mookerjee & Jydomath	211
Syud Imam & Haran Chund	104	Tarachurn Chatterjee & Suresh Chunder Mookerjee	209
Syud Jafar Hossain & Sheikh Mahomed Amir	1264	Tarack Nath Sircar & Prasanno Coomare Ghose	5
Syud Khadim Ali & Nazir Begum	703	Taraktant Binnerjee & Puddomoney Dosee	855, 1034, 1042, 1318, 1318, 1
Syud Lotfoolah & Mt Nussebul	877	" "	"
Syud Mahomed & Omdah	848	" "	"
Syud Mehdi Ali & Konwar Ram Chunder	1074	" "	"
Syud Nadir Hossain & Bissen Chan Bassarat	278	" "	"
Syud Nadir Hossain & Paroo Thoval dattnee	331, 979	Awastee	1290
Syud Hussain Ali & Manooar Ali	1299	Tarini Kant & Krishna Moni	501
Syud Nujmooddeen Ahmed & Abdool Azer	1011	Tatinprosd & Narayan	924
Syud Reza Ali & Purnanun	707	Tarrack Chunder Bhattacharjee & Dundero Nath Sanyal	892
Syud Shad Ekbal & Bunsco Sahoo	1316	Tarsi Ram & Man Singh	860, 861, 863, 866
Syud Shah & Meer Rezaul	860	Taruck Chunder Mookerjee & Panchu Mohini	594
Syud Shah Ameer & Syed Shali Zameer	880	" "	"
Syud Vahyet Hossain & Syed Walee Ahmed	213	" "	"
T			
Tacoordeen & Nawab Syed Ali	413	Ussaidiq Rasul Khan & Anshi Ram	449
Tadhin Proshad Singh & Sarfar Coomar Narayan Singh	1101	" "	453
Taff Vale Ry Co & Anandamated Society, etc	538	Tasudik Ali & Maksud Ali	1003
Tagore & Tagore	176	Tata & Ramachandra	869, 870
" "	201	Tata Charier & Singora	928
" "	329	Tatayya & Pichayya	1074
" "	1039	Tatya Vithoj & Bapu Balago	35
" "	1311	Tayimnaut & Sachachalla Nulker	41
" "	252	" "	3314
" "	346	Taylor & Oller	1117, 1123
" "	421	Taylor & Eckersley	12
" "	892	Taylor & Abbott	181
" "	1280	Teenaram & Lam Latt n	1181
" "	156	Taj Mal & Pijay moni	317, 412
" "	535	Taj Ram & Harsookh	459, 460
" "	987	Taj Singh & Chabeli Ram	37, 100
" "	710	Taj Singh & Gopal Singh	1001
" "	182	Tam Singh & Rajnarayan Singh	906
" "	989	Tam Singh & Kashed	302
" "	1131	Tel Lal & Sripada	1471
" "	1286	Tekant Datta & Chhal & Must Datta	413
" "	131	Tekant Datta & Persad Singh & T Kumi Datta Konwar	128

	PAGE
Tekait Rai v. Mirza Bandeh	979
Temperton v. Russell	738
Templeton v. Laurie	172
Temulji v. Pustamji v. Fardunji	1299
Kavasji	
Tepu Khan v. Pooni Mohun Das	116
Teretput Sing v. Gossain Sidersan Das	413 680 682
Tewaree v. Syud Mohamed	610 620
Thacoor Prosad v. Baluck Ram	1358 1377
Thackersey v. Hurbhum	358 360 366 370
Thakardas v. Nand Lal	520 744
Thakoor Chund v. Muddun Mohun Singh	1093
Thakoor Chunder v. Chowdhry Chotee Singh	1244
Thakoor Das v. Hardeo	979 1260 1290 1 875
Thakoor Deen v. Ali Hossain	6 945 689
Thakoor Doss Roy v. Nobin Kristo Ghoso	873
Thakoor Dyul Singh v. Sarju Pershad Musser	223
Thakoor Hajil Nath v. The Government	440 1337
Thakoor Lall v. Brohmo Moyee	776
Thakoor Lall Mree v. Kanye Lall Tewaree	893
Thakoor Mahatab Deo v. Teelanund Singh	1023
Thakoor Patuck v. Ramsomoon	722
Thakooranee Doss v. Celuck Chunder	817
Thakore Becharji v. Thakore Pujaji	585 706
Thakur Nuk v. Kondi Belili	990
Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari	981, 1013
of Hindnaga	1279
Thakur Pershad v. Nalka Pershad	632
Thakur Pershad v. Sheik Fakirullah	220 491, 495 901 960 1068
Thakur Prasad v. Alsan	22
Thakur Prasad v. Fakirullah	220 494 495 901, 960 1068
Thakur Pang Lal v. Kavaneshwar Pershad	677, 688 986
Thakur Pohan v. Thakur Surat	816
Thakur Shankar v. Dya Shankar	383
Thakur Slunker Biksh v. Balvant Singh	1369
Thakur Shere Bihair v. Thakuram Durni	877
Thakur v. K. in lau	1261, 1262
Thama Sing v. Kalis	297
Thamboo Lilla v. Sraman Nali	273
Thamnan Singh v. Ganga Jati	877

	PAGE
Thari Singh v. Chaudun Singh	1375
Thanaloti v. Munirappa	136, 536
Thandavan v. Vallamma	120
Thang Karippa v. Arumaga	370
Thar	131 324
Thirthasami v. Gopal	615 552 567
Thirumalai v. Ramayyar	503 504
Thiruvengadathiengar v. Vandathia Ayyar	146 147 140
Tholan v. Kunhikutty	1374
Thomas M. Pigeon v. Syed Mohamud Abou Syed	111
Thompson v. Calcutta Tramways Co	434, 1143
Thomson v. London City Co	533
Thomson (I. re)	936
Thomson v. Thomson	210
Thornton v. Thornton	20
Thorp v. Holdsworth	664 700 731 733 734 804
Thota Velatachellasami v. Krishna sawmy	1076
Thoy Ammal v. Subbaroya	1075
Thrikakat Madathal v. Thiruthiyil Krishnan	120 598
Thucker Bhagvan Das v. Murari	1356
Thum Rajah v. Junilabdeen	1331
Thyila Kandi Ummatha v. Thyila Kandi Cheria Kunhammed	122 123 584
Thiel v. Ablool Hye	1220 1221
Tiluck Chunder v. Brojo Soondar	893 1304
Tiluk Chandra Roy v. Jasodh Kumar Roy	743
Timanna v. Mahabala	423
Timappa v. Lakshminarayana	563 970 517 1012 1274 7, 1279
Timulji v. Farvanji	414
Tin Coir v. Dey v. Fakir Chand Dey	1075 1470
Tincouri D. bi v. Suttva Doyal Bannerji	1104
Tincouri Dabya v. Shib Chandra Lal	170 28 1014 1025
Tiruluvann v. Rameshar	109
Tiruchettambala Chetti v. Seshayyar	31 310 468
Tirumal Rai v. Syed Dastagi v. Miyah	1007 1007
Tirumayana v. Cepulaman	445
Tirupati v. Mitta	1073
Tirupati v. Narasimha	584 731

	PAGE		PAGE
Vasudevan v Sankaran	132 230	Venkata Vigaya v Thunnya Lintim	1408
Vaughan v Weldon	112	Venkatachala v Kuppusami	688
Vedachala v Boomsappa	140	Venkatachala Pillai (In re)	71
Vedala Lakshminarasimha v Iyer	1009	Venkatachala Pillai Rangiah Reddi	1075
Vedala Lakshmi Uma	1150	Venkatachala Reddi v Venkatarama	1470
	92 91	Reddi	207
	510	Venkatachala v Mahalakshmanam	841
			1131
Vaidu	283	Venkatachalapathi v Subbarajulu	379 361
Veerabhadra Aiyar v Maruduga Nachiar	283	Venkatachallam v Veerappa	928 929
Veerabhadra Chetty v Nalaraja	1089	Venkatachella v Narayana	509
Desikar	1089	Venkatachella Appa Pillai v Iyer Venka	
Veerana Pillai v Mutlukumar Ayyar	110	yamma	114
	537		1032
Veerappa Chettiar v Ionnayya	89 103		715
Veerappa Chettiar v Rama Swami	275		18
Aiyar			1150
Veeraswamy v Manager Irttayar	424		401
Estate	333		178
Veerayya v Annamala Chetty	316 317		108
Velam v Kumara Sani	156		153 270
Velayudam v Arunachalam	63 75	Venkatapathi Naidu v Arumalai	1202
	414	Chetti	263
	975		833
	902		1080
	917		131
	970		132
	1024		183
	1310		598
	0 463		61
	211		468
	1302		135
	120		
	0 424		
	858		
	795	Ayyangar	71
Vengamuthu v Lankarasa	3 363	Venkatarama Charlu v Krishnan	357 361 370
Vengannat Swaroopathil v Chirak	1334	Charlu	48
nath	424		83
Vengunayyan v Ramesan Ayyar	129		126
	255		479
Vengapayyan v Niligal Bhat	300		852
Venulal v Lakshmi	94		
Venkanna v Artunna	503 504	Venkaiah v Govindrao	718
Venkata v Baslingappa	1137	Venkatesh v Govindrao	438
Venkata v Alakaramamba	168	Venkateswara (In re)	57 164
Venkata v Bhashya Karlu	163	Venkatarama Rambhat v Thappa	1148
Venkata v Krishnasami	577	Devappa	1148
Venkata v Ranga	955, 931, 1011	Venkatrao Paje v Madhabrao	336
Venkata v Rama	1015	Venkatrav Bapu v Pijasing Vithal	11
	1016	Venkatrav Ghorpale v Madhavrao	
Venkata v Venkatarama	44 97 200	Ramchandra	301 39 631 711
Venkata v Venkataramanna	1100	Venkatrayudu v Nagai	1357
	1023	Venkayya v Lakshmi	950
	239	Venkayya v Narasami	121
	983	Venkayya v Narasami	70 500
	441	Venkayya v Ramachari	135
	146	Venkayya v Saranam	622
	53	Venkayya v Murugappa	162
		Venkoba v Rambhai	574 579 591
		Venkoba v S. bhanna	110
		Venkoba v Mahalingam	473
		Venkoba v Lakshman Venkoba	478
		Venkoba v Venkaji Anaji	1157
Venkata Subrao v Aiyar v K. Man	222	Venkaiah v Collector of Nask	1023
Kannan Ahmed	1375	Venkaiah v Venkata Charvar	402
Venkata Sirva Malipati v Collector of		Vasaram v Isalla Ram	
Wards			

	PAGE
Vibhudapriya v Vidyanmohi	67
Vibhudapriya v Suthaswami	311
Virethapriya Turthasami v Yusef Sahi	314 336
Vickers v Bell	1128
Victoria (In re)	105
Vidyanada v Sitarama	554
Vine v Raleigh	1238
Virabhadrapa v Chinnamma	840
Viraraghava Ayyangar v Varada Ayyangar	337 989
Viraraghava v Krishnasami	174 191 580
Viraraghava v Parasumara	334
Viraraghava v Veikata	243 990
Viraraghava Venkatacharyar	249 990
Viraraghava I ediri Subbikka	894
Virama v Annasami	269
Virasami v Rama Das	564
Vimsiam v Athi	1028
Viravaram Gnanini v Ayyaswami Chinnami	689 817
Virsugappa v Shalishappa	1015
Virupakshappa v Shilappa	1141 1142, 1143
Visalatil v Ammal v Sivasankara Taker	271
Vishnu v Krishnarao	228 586
Vishnu v Ramachandra	472
Vishnu v Ramling	110 119
Vishnu Chutaman v Balaji Bm Ragi	115
Vishnu Dhal v Narsimharav	339 968
Vishnu Keshav v Panchantra Bhaskar	1139
Vinay Panchantra v Ganesh Appapa	403 422
Vil v Sakharani v Krish Rao Malli	69 101
Vilvanath Malshur v Virchand Lalachani	33, 34 336 340

	PAGE
Vithal Krishna v Balakrishna Janardass	383 467 722
Vithal Ramchandra v Sitabai	141
Vithaldas v Dattam	1135 1141
Vithalrao v Vachhoji	169 164 1199
Vithalinga v Vithalinga	385
Vithoba v Esat	1028
Vithoba v Teppam	154 155
Vithu v Rhuma	106 1058
Vithu v Narayan	17 559 109 610 628
Viyathen v Neela Kant	120
Voleti Chenchuramaya v Annamraju Narasimhayya	927
Von Lintzy v Narayan Singh	1178 1181
Vora Isabhai Dandbhai	465
Vrean Iron Works v Bissumbher	51
	43
	145
	155
	6 561
	1315
Vythnada v Vythnada	117, 139 878
W	
Wacott v Lyons	562
Waggoner v Brown	70
Waghela v Masid n	15 1359 1306
Wahya Bibi v Nayar Hasan	878 880
Waljee Mathura Das v Liji Umersey	1468
Walker v Bell	123
Wall v Jones	1900
Wall v Howard	228 1055
Wallace v Jefferson	714
Waller L I (In the matter of)	44
Wallisford v Mutual Society	152 700
Walpole v Orford	708
Walters v Creck	672
Wama v Nahu	80
W	505
	0 85
	855
	565
	3 8
	401
	43
Watkins v Shalzada	502
Watkins v Zulooroo H	221
Watson v Agamello	1058

	PAGE		PAGE
Watson & Carey	37	Willis & Jawad Hussain	472, 474
Watson & Chattopadhyay	147	Wilson & Church	53
Watson & Hurst & Co. Ltd.	208	Wilson & Government	102, 104
Watson & Lloyd	52, 54	Wilson & Kanhya Saloo	383
Watson & Prani Lal Saha	874	Wilson & Raffulovitch	799
Watson & Railroad Co.	70	Wiltshire Iron Co. (In re)	1508
Watson & Rodwell	671	Winchelsea & Beckley	685
Watson & Sree Krishna	422	Winter & Attorney General	84
Watson & Co. & Ambika Bai	1287	Winters & May	184, 189
Watson & Co. & (Re) & Newburne		Winter & L. and	188
Dubai	741	Winters & Dabbs	781
Watson & Co. & Dhanendra Chandra	1082	Wise & Ameroonnissa Chatoona	1097
Watson & Co. & Kuntze Bahadur	806	Wise & Gureeb Hossain	611, 613
	1295	Wise & Heera Lal	401, 410
Watson & Co. & Nilfou Dilwar	409, 423	Wise & Huro Lal	1361
Watson & Co. & Ram Chandra Dutt	933	Wise & Ishan Chandra Banerjee	1305
Watt & Barnett	601	Wise & Jugbundo	1277
Watt & Brookover	699	Wise & Rajendur Coomar	879
Wazeer Ali & Kaler Coomar	433	Wise & Rajkishna Poy	1270
Wazeer Jemal & Noor Ali	416	Wise & Saniloonnissa	442, 1311
Wazer Mathon & Chani Singh	145	Wong & Khayum & Rajna	107
Wazir Ali & Janki Rassi	329	Wong & Chander	345, 400
Wazir Khan & Kafe Khan	885	Wood & Cox	214
Wazir Singh & Thakur Kishori	1357	Wood & Earl of Durham	712
Wazirun Nissa & Hahit Baksh	1101	Wood & Hitchings	1231
	1259	Wood & Singh & Bul ten bin h	704
	1327	Wood & Tara Chowdhram & Khajab	
Weall & James	901, 1115	Abdool Gunes	1012
Weatherall & Eastern Mortgage		Wooma Churn & Tail	411
Agency	1229	Wooma Soondra & Co. & Co. & L. & Co.	501
Webb & Macpherson	110		502
Webb & Stenton	301	Womaniath & Sreenath	1088
Webster & Whewall	705	Woomatara (In re)	1357
Wegg & Irower & Evans	901	Woomatara & Babu & Ann poorna	
Weiss & Aaron	699	Disce	111
Well & Neal	654	Woomesh & Matungmee	1261
Wells & Kelpin	1239	Woomesh & Chandra R. & Journal m	
Welsbach Co. & New Sunlight Co.	783	Hydr	1307
Wendman & Societe Generale d'Electricite	542	Woomesh & Chandra R. & Markun L	
West & Downman	89	Wookerjee	82
West of England Bank & Nicholls	778	Woomesh & Chandra Matra & Baroda	
West Hoptown Tea Company (In re)	196	Das Matra	121
	496		1
Western National Bank of New York			
& Perez Triana & Co.	901, 1116		
Weymouth & Fich	672		
White & Spafford	718		
White & Witt	416		
Whitfield (Ex parte)	1224	Worman & Worman	121
Whitney & Morgan L	612	Wuzzecrood & Sheobun I	409
Whitworth & Darlishire	672	Wymer & Dadds	57
Wickens & Townshend	1235		
Widemann & Wilpole	797		
Widemann & Co. & Co.	901, 1116		

	PAGE		PAGE
Yashwant Shenvi v Vithoba Sheti	971	Zahur un nissa v Khuda Yar	1070
Yelnath v Gulibchand	1112	Zarbunnissa v Jiram	312
Yella Chetti v Munisami Pedda	223	Zamab Begam v Manawar Hussain	1284
Yellamilli Suresh	971, 1032	Zam ul abdin v Ahmed Raza	739, 747
	382	Zam ul Abdin Khan v Muhammad	
	1266	Asghar Ali	502, 772, 989, 1024
	316	Zalem Towarree v Gobindgeer Gos	
	391	sam	178
Yeshwant v Shankar	25		
Yeshwant Bhagwant Phatarpakar v			
Shankar Ram Chandra Phatarpakar	25		
	1227, 1230, 1243		
Yesu Ramji Kalnath v Bulkrishna	6	Zamundar of Pittapuram v The Pro	
Yonosuke v Ookerda	20, 210	prietors of the Mutta of Kolonka	116
	1000		125, 127
		Zamundar of Tuni v Bennaya	1239
		Zamundar of Vallur v Adinarayudu	228
		Zamur Hussain v Daulat Ram	881
		Zamuran v Fatch Ali	175, 472
		Zamorin of Calcut v Narayanan Mus	
		cad	133
			286
			931
			706
			903
			763
			120
Zabir kio v Smith	716	Zonnia v Hanu Lam	43, 261
Zabadi Jari v Muhammad ul Isaab	1212, 1325	Zohra Bibi v Zobeda Khatun	1300, 1302
Zafary ibi v Bikhatar	560, 538	Zohuruteollah Chowdhry v Asalood	
Zaharia v Debi	115	deen Chowdhry	1090
Zahooran v Mahomed Wajid	1044	Zulekabat v Ebrahim Haji Vyedina	162
Zahrun v Gouri Sunkar	1101		163
Zahur Hussain v Muhammad Hasan	600	Zameer Sirdar v Asceen ooddeen	
Zahur Khan v Bikhatar	696	Sirdar	213
Zahuran v Tizler	960	Zameerunnissa v Cayer	742

THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

ACT No V of 1908

PASSED BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL

*Received the assent of the Governor General on the
21st March, 1908*

*An Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the Procedure
of the Courts of Civil Judicature*

WHEREAS it is expedient to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature, It is hereby enacted as follows —

Preamble

Previous Legislation Up to the year 1862 the Courts in the Presidency Towns and in the Provinces were governed by different rules of procedure. The Supreme Courts were governed in matters of procedure by their own practice rules and orders, and certain Acts (1). The Provincial Courts were governed by Acts and Regulations particularly applicable to them (2). In 1859 the first Code of Civil Procedure (Act VIII of 1859) was passed which enacted that where it came into operation the procedure of Civil Courts was to be regulated by it only (3). This Act however was originally intended for application in the Courts not established by Royal Charter and it was not till the year 1862 that it was extended to the Courts in the Presidency Towns. In that year the Supreme Courts and the Courts of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut in the three Presidency Towns were abolished. Letters Patent constituting the present High Courts were granted in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of the Session 1861, 24 & 25 Vict c 101. With the abolition of the Supreme Courts their former procedure in civil cases between party and party was abolished and by the 37th section of the Letters Patent establishing the High Court at Calcutta, and the corresponding sections of the Letters Patent establishing similar courts at Madras

(1) See Acts XVII of 1852, VI of 1854

(2) See the Schedule to Act X of 1861 which was passed to repeal certain Acts and

and Bombay, the proceedings in civil suits between party and party brought in the High Courts, were to be regulated by Act VIII of 1809, and by such further or other enactments of the Governor General in Council, in relation to Civil Procedure, as were in force at the date of the several Charters. Provided always that the regulation of such proceedings respectively should be subject to such laws and regulations as should be thereafter made by the Governor General in Council in relation to such proceedings. This was modified by the 37th sections of the new Charters of 1865, which ran as follows: "And we do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the said High Court, &c, from time to time to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases, which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings in its Admiralty, Vice-Admiralty, Intestate and Matrimonial Jurisdictions respectively. Provided always that the said High Court shall be guided in making such rules and orders, as far as possible, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, being an Act passed by the Governor General in Council, and being Act No VIII of 1809, and the provisions of any law which has been made, amending or altering the same." (1) Other

given below (3). In 1877 the second Code was enacted (Act X of 1877). This very considerably amended and added to the Code of 1809. Whereas the latter contained 388 sections only, the former contained 652. This Code was followed by amending Acts, (4) and then by Act XIV of 1882, which was also repealed in part and amended by subsequent Acts (5).

The present Code repeals that of 1882, as also the amending Acts VII of 1888, XII of 1891, V of 1894, XIII of 1895. The chief feature of the present Code is the distinction drawn between matters dealt with by the Act, viz those matters which affect more than one Province and matters in which it is essential that there should be uniformity in all Provinces and minor matters which are relegated to a schedule and treated as mere rules which may be varied or amended by the High Courts and Chief Courts. These rules are to a large extent sections of the Code of 1882, amended in certain parts and added to in others. As regards the body of the Act, the greater number of alterations perhaps occur in the provisions relating to execution, although other parts of the Code have been amended, and additions made thereto. The provisions relating to insolvency have been altogether removed from the Code and now form the subject of a separate Act III of 1907, which came into force on the 1st January, 1908.

(1) See Broughton Civil Procedure Code, pp 1, 2, and Appendix.

(2) Acts XX of 1862, XXIV of 1862, XXIII of 1863, XXXII of 1863. See Broughton Civil Procedure Code, 2nd ed 1 and 4th ed p 2.

(3) Acts IV of 1860, XLIII of 1860, XXIII of 1861, IX of 1863, XXXI of 1867, VII of 1870, XIV of 1870, IX of 1871, XXXI of 1871, VII of 1872, I of 1877.

(4) Acts XVIII of 1878, VII of 1879.

(5) Repealed in part by Acts XIV of 1885 s 3, IV of 1886 s 2, V of 1886 s 21(2), VIII of 1887, s 2 and sched XIII of 1889, VIII of 1890 s 2, and amended by Acts VII of 1893 ss 3-64, VII of 1891. Amended by Acts XV of 1892 s 3, VII of 1897, s 11, VI of 1898 ss 2, 8, V of 1898 ss 1, 1, VIII of 1890 s 53, VI of 1892 ss 2, 4, V of 1891, VII of 1890 ss 1, 2, VIII of 1890

"Consolidate and amend"—The Code is a consolidating Act. The method of construction to be adopted in the case of such a Code has been expounded by Lord Herschell (1) in terms which have been adopted by the Privy Council (2) and cited and applied in other cases in this country (3) dealing with the English Bills of Exchange Act, which was intended to be a Code of the Law relating to negotiable instruments, he said—

"I think the proper course is, in the first instance, to examine the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any consideration derived from the previous state of the law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view. If a statute intended to embody in a code a particular branch of the law is to be treated in this fashion, it appears to me that its utility will be almost entirely destroyed, and the very object with which it was enacted will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute surely was that, on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used, instead of, as before, by turning over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions, dependent upon a knowledge of the exact effect even of an obsolete proceeding, such as a demurrer to evidence. I am, of course, far from asserting that recourse may never be had to the previous state of the law for the purpose of aiding in the construction of the provisions of the Code. If, for example, a provision be of doubtful import, such resort would be perfectly legitimate, or, again, if in a code of the law of negotiable instruments, words be found which have previously acquired a technical meaning, or been used in a sense other than their ordinary one, in relation to such instruments, the same interpretation might well be put upon them in the Code. I give

on some special ground' (4)

It has been said that a reference to the previous history of the law and legislation on the subject is one of the means by which a Court is entitled to seek assistance in construing an Act of the Legislature (5). And the practice of the Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay High Courts has been to consider as aids towards construction the history of the transition of an Act through the Legislature and to refer to the Reports of Law Commissioners, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Reports of Select Committees, Draft of Bills and

(1) In Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers, L. R. App. Cas. (1891) 107, at pp. 141, 145.

(2) In Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalabai Dasi, 23, I. A. 18, 26 (1896).

(3) Dagdu v. Pancham Singh Gangaram 17 B. 3-2 (1892), Damodura Mulhar v. Secretary of State, 18 M. 91 (1894), Hendavva Chetti v. Narasimulu Chetti, 29 M. 103 (1896), Lala Suraj Iroo v. Gulab Chand,

28 C. 517 (1901).

(4) See also Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick 22 C. 789, Lalla Suraj Iroo v. Gulab Chand, 28 C. 517 (1901) and other cases discussed, post.

(5) Prabhakarbhut v. Vishwambhur Pandit, 8 B. 313 (1884). Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick 21 C. 70, 71 (1891) per Jervis J., citing H. v. H. v. Guy, L. 1 C. Ch. D. 1905.

Statement of Objects and Reasons The Privy Council have, however, in the case of the Administrator General of Bengal v Prem Lal Mullick, (1) observed upon the use of these means of interpretation, expressing their disapproval of the practice of referring to the proceedings of the Legislature which result in the passing of an Act. A large number of decisions exist upon this question, which is one of some difficulty (2)

It is, no doubt, a well established rule of construction that when the terms of an Act are *clear and plain* it is the duty of the Court to give effect to them as they stand, according to their plain meaning, neither adding to, nor subtracting from them. The Legislature must be taken to have intended to mean what it has so plainly expressed, and when the terms of an Act admit of but one meaning a Court is not at liberty to speculate on the intent of the Legislature, or to construe them according to its own notions of the reasons supposed to have been the cause of its enactment (3). The primary question, in short, is not what may be supposed to have been intended, but what has been said (4). Where, however, an Act has been considered *not* to clearly express the intention of the Legislature, it has for some years been the practice of the Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay High Courts (5) to consider (as aids towards construction) (A) The history of previous Legislation (6) (B) and of the transition of an Act through the Legislature viz—

(1) 22 C 788, S C, 22 I A 107 (1895), followed in R v Sri Churn Chundo 22 C 1017, 1022 (1895)

(2) See an Article on the Interpretation of Statutes in the Madras Law Journal, vol v p 280 by E. H. Monnier, where a full analysis of most of the cases here given will be found

(3) Gureebullah Sircar v Mohan Lal Shaha, 7 C 127, Buzloor Rubecm v Shumsoonnissa Begum 8 W R P C 3, 12, R v Bai Krishna Vithal, 17 B 577, 578

(4) Per Lord Herschell in Brophy v Attorney General of Manitoba, L R (1895) App Cas 216

(5) The Allahabad High Court held, on the other hand, in Kadir Baksh v Bhawan Prasad 14 A 145 (1891) dissenting from R v Kartick Chunder Das, 14 C 721, and Romesh Chunder Sangal v Hiru Mondal, 17 C 852, that in construing a statute the Court cannot refer to the statement of Objects and Reasons attached to a bill or to the report of a select committee, or to the debates of the Legislature, but can only look to the statute itself and this rule as regards debates in Council was affirmed in Maharaj Tewari v Har Charan, 26 A 111, 117 (1903). It is further, to be noted with regard to the Calcutta High Court that it was ruled in 1862, by Sir M. Wells in Mu Hoo-soo Ien Day v Bama Churn Mookerjee,

1 Hyde, 100 that the meaning of an Act is to be gathered solely by reference to the Act itself and not to any official report of proceedings in the Legislative Council. These two cases are therefore, in accord with the Privy Council case now considered (Administrator General of Bengal v Prem Lal Mullick)

(6) Prabhakarbhut Vishwambhar Pandit, 8 B 313 (1884) [held that the pre existing state of law as recognized by the Tribunals, is one of the chief means of interpretation]. In Ishamuddinissa Begum v Secretary of State 1886-1889 the High Court (14 C 67) as well as the Privy Council (17 C 590) fully reviewed the earlier legislation in order to determine upon the construction of Act IX of 1817. Similarly the Allahabad Full Bench in R v Babu Lal, 6 A 509 (1884), considered the provisions of English law and the repealed sections of the older Codes bearing upon ss 24 and 27 of the Evidence Act, and the same Court, again in R v Ghulet, 7 A 44 (1884), discussed the law as to alternative charges prior to the Penal Code. Sect 132 of the Evidence Act was construed in R v Gopal Das, 3 M 271 (1881) with reference to the previously existing state of the law on the point. And in the main case (Administrator General v Prem Lal Mullick), all the Judges in the High Court, including the dissentient Judge Letherum C.J. referred to

- (a) Reports of the Indian Law Commissioners, (1)
- (b) Proceedings of the Legislative Council; (2)
- (c) Reports of Select Committees of the Legislative Council (3)
- (d) Draft stages of a bill, (4) and
- (e) Statements of Objects and Reasons, (5) attached to bills

The question of the right to make use of these aids to construction came before the Privy Council in the case referred to The Calcutta High Court in

the previous and subsequent course of legislation in construing Act II of 1874. See also *R v Fischer*, 14 M 342 (1891), and numerous other cases.

(1) *Shah Moosa v Shah Essa*, 8 B 241 (1884), where Sargent, C.J., adopting the view of Lord Westbury in *In re Mew*, 31 L. J. Bankruptcy, 87 [where the Lord Chancellor referred to a Report of the Commissioners on Bankruptcy law], held that the Reports of Law Commissioners could be referred to in aid of the construction of a statute. In *R v Chulet*, 7 A 44 (1884), Duthoit, J., with the apparent approval of his colleague, Straight, J., referred to such reports. The admissibility of such reference was expressly ruled in *Romesh Chunder Sanyal v Hiru Mondal*, 17 C 852 (1890). However, in *Tarnek Nath Sircar v Prosono Coomar Ghose*, 19 W R 48, 53 (1873), Couch, C.J., said "You cannot interpret Acts by Reports of Commissioners."

(2) *Mathoora Kant Shaw v India General S N Co*, 10 C 166 (1883) [reference by Prinsep, J., to speech of member in charge of a bill when moving for leave to bring it in, and when introducing a bill], *Fadhu Jhala v Gour Mohun Jhala*, 19 C 544 (1892) [a speech of a member introducing a bill and assigning its objects and reasons may be looked at], *Yesu Ramji Kalnath v Balkrishna*, 15 B 583 (1891) [Sargent, C.J., referred to speech of member when presenting Report of Select Committee on bill and moving its consideration], *Fadhu Jhala v Gour Mohun Jhala*, *supra* [Prinsep, J., quoted speech of member in charge (Mr Peacock) made even during debate]. But as to speeches of others upon a bill, it has been held by the Bombay High Court in *Gopal Krishna Parachure v Sakho prav*, 18 B 133 (1894), that the debate on the bill, when before the Council, is not to be referred to. However, in *Chunilal Panalal v Bomani Manherji Modi*, 7 B 310 315 (1887), Birdwood, J., referred to the speech

not only of a member introducing a bill, but of a member speaking upon an amendment, and see also *Mahomed Jackariah v Ahmed Mahomed*, 15 C 137 (1887). The Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, has held generally that the Courts cannot look to the debates of the Legislature. *Kadir Baksh v Bhawan Prasad*, 14 A 145 (1892), *Maharaj Tewari v Har Charan*, 26 A 144, 147 (1903); and see *Coundu Pillai v Thayammal*, 14 M L J 209 (1904).

(3) *R v Kartick Chunder Das*, 14 C 721, 728 (1887), *Romesh Chunder Sanyal v Hiru Mondal*, 17 C 852 (1890), *Fadhu Jhala v Gour Mohun Jhala*, 19 C 544 (1892), *Administrator General v Prem Lal Mullick*, 21 C 732 (1894), *Yesu Ramji Kalnath v Balkrishna*, 15 B 583, 585 (1891); *Ramchandra Joshi v Iffaz Kassim*, 16 M 207, 210, 212 (1892), *Mahomed Jackariah v Ahmed Mahomed*, 15 C 139 (1887). The Allahabad High Court has, however, held to the contrary that these reports cannot be referred to. *Kadir Baksh v Bhawan Prasad*, 14 A 145 (1892).

(4) In *R v Kartick Chunder Das*, 14 C 720 (1887), s. 22 of the Draft Bill on Evidence was referred to, but in *Shah Moosa v Shah Essa*, 8 B 241 (1884), it was held that the Court could not look at the various forms in which a bill was brought before the Legislature.

(5) *Fadhu Jhala v Gour Mohun Jhala*, 19 C 545 (1892), *Administrator General v Prem Lal Mullick*, 21 C 732 (1894), *Shah Moosa v Shah Essa*, 8 B 241 (1884). However, in *Mathoora Kant Shaw v India General S N Co*, 10 C 166 (1883), Prinsep, J., considered it unusual to refer to the Objects and Reasons though he did in that case read an abstract from the Legal Member's speech containing the Objects and Reasons, and in *Kadir Baksh v Bhawan Prasad*, 14 A 145 (1892), the Allahabad High Court held that the Objects and Reasons attached to a bill could not be referred to.

that case (The Administrator General of Bengal : *Prem Lall Mullick*), (1) in aid of the construction of Act II of 1874, referred (a) to the course of legislation (2) (b) the statement of the objects and reasons of the Act, (3) and (c) Report of the Select Committee (4)

The Privy Council, before whom the case came in appeal, (5) held with regard to (a) that (1) "a *positive enactment in a statute of 1874 can not be qualified or neutralized by indications of intention gathered from previous legislation upon the same subject* And there is no legislation subsequent to that of 1874, with respect to the power of an executor to make over his office with all its rights and liabilities to the Administrator General," (6) and (ii) that it is against reason and authority to maintain the proposition, "that in dealing with a *Consolidating Statute, each enactment must be traced to its original source, and when that is discovered, must be construed according to the state of circumstances which existed when it first became law* The very object of consolidation is to collect the statutory law bearing upon a particular subject and to bring it down to date, in order that it may form a useful code applicable to the circumstances existing at the time when the Consolidating Act is passed (7) With regard to (b) and (c), the Privy Council observed as follows —(8) 'The two learned Judges who constituted the majority in the Appellate Court although they do not base their judgments upon them, refer to the *proceedings of the Legislature which resulted in the passing of the Act of 1874 as legitimate aids to the construction of sect 31* Their Lordships think it right to express their dissent from that proposition *The same reasons which exclude these considerations when the clauses of an Act of the British Legislature are under construction are equally cogent in the case of an Indian Statute*"

The question next to be considered is how far, if at all, does this decision of the Privy Council affect the practice of the Indian Courts to which reference has been made The result of their Lordships decision appears to be as follows —

(i) *Pre existing legislation may still be referred to as an aid towards construction* (9) subject to this that (a) if the terms of an Act are *clear, positive and express*, they cannot be modified or neutralized by indications of intention to be gathered from previous legislation upon the same subject, (b) that in the case of a *Consolidating Act*, it must be construed not with reference to the *circumstances existing at the time of the preceding Acts* but in relation to those *existing at the time of the Consolidating Act* (10) This last dictum, it is conceived,

(1) 21 C. 732 (1891) In this case, *Petheram, C.J.*, however, stated that in his opinion the history of the Act II of 1874 was inadmissible to explain it and that the Court ought not to consider what was the intention of the members of Council by whom it was introduced. *Ib.*, at p 753 *Trevelyan J.* also expressed a doubt on this point, *ib.*, 775

(2) *Ib.*, 735, 751, 764, 766, 771

(3) *Ib.*, 737, 766, 767

(4) *II*, 753, 766, 767

(*) 22 C 758 (*ib.*)

(5) *II*, at p 797

(7) *II*, at p 798

(8) *Ib.*, at pp 799-800

(9) See cases cited *ante* and (accepting the Privy Council test as to the English rules of Construction) *Holme & Guy, L P 5 Ch D 905*, referred to by *Trevelyan, J.*, in the *High Court*, 21 C 771

(10) See also *per Lord Halsbury in Bank of England & Vagliano Brothers L 1 (1891) App Cas 107, 120* Nor is it an answer to the direct provisions of a particular section of an enactment to say that the enactment was described in terms as an enactment to consolidate amend and define the provisions of previously existing laws and that the par-

refers to cases where the two sets of circumstances differ (1) In all cases, however, the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the Act, uninfluenced by considerations as to the previous state of the law, and to resort to a consideration of the latter only if the meaning of the Act itself be not clear

(ii) *Reports of the Indian Law Commissioners*—These were not referred to in the lower Court, and the Privy Council have said nothing directly as to their use. They have, however, indicated that the law in these matters should be the same as that which prevails in England, and according to this test reference is permissible. See Lord Westbury's view in the case of *In re New*, cited *ante*, p. 5, n. (1). In the case of *Chum Lal Mancharam & Manishankar Atmaram* (2) the Bombay High Court in dealing with the Easements Act referred to the recommendations of the Law Commission.

(iii) *Proceedings of the Legislative Council*—Upon a reference to some of the terms of the Privy Council judgment, it would seem that reference to these is not now permissible. But in the case of *In re New* (3) the Lord Chancellor read a speech made in the House of Commons by the member who introduced the Bankruptcy Bill of 1860. The Privy Council itself also in *Hebbert & Purchas* (4) referred to the Commons' and Lords' Journals and to the details of a conference between the two Houses of Parliament. And in the Queen & Bishop of Oxford (5) Bramwell, J., read passages from the Lord Chancellor's Speech made in the House of Lords upon the Church Discipline Act. The Bombay High Court has, however, since held that it is not permissible to refer to the speech of the Legal Member of the Indian Legislative Council when proposing the enactment of a bill (6).

(iv) *Reports of Select Committees of the Legislative Council*—These were referred to by the High Court in *The Administrator General & Prem Lal Mullick*. The Privy Council must therefore it seems be taken to have disapproved of the reference to those reports though reverting again to the English rule upon which the Privy Council rested their judgment, it appears that Sir George Turner, L.J., in *Drummond & Drummond*, (7) referred to the proceedings of a Select Committee of which he had been a member. In the case of *Assani & Pithunima* (8) the Madras High Court referred to the report of a Select Committee.

(v) *Draft Stages of a Bill*—These were not referred to in the principal case either in the judgments of the High Court or Privy Council. But they appear to fall within the principle of exclusion laid down by the latter and

the same rule contended for is not to be found among the previously existing laws. It is sufficient if the provision relied upon is a part of the Act whatever the description of the purposes of the Act may be. *Dumodde* Paik & Karm Taniar, 5 C 300 303 (1879).

(1) In the cases of *In re New* 31 I J Bankruptcy 87 a Consolating Act was construed with reference to circumstances existing at the time of the earlier Act where however the circumstances had not changed (as in

had in the Privy Council case) at the time of the latter Act. See observations in *Mal I J supra* 259 260.

(2) 18 B 616 625 (1893).

(3) 31 L J Bankruptcy 87 *supra*.

(4) 1 I 31 C 648 649.

(5) 4 Q B D 535.

(6) *R & Gangadhar Tilak* 22 B 125 128 (1885).

(7) 1 R 2 C App 37 47.

(8) 1 M 44 501 (1881).

there is but little authority to be found for their use. In *Chuni Lal Mancharan v. Manishankar Atmaran* (1) the Court referred to the Drafts of the Tacements Bills of 1870 and 1881 as also to the opinions of the draftsman of the first mentioned bill.

(vi) *Statements of Objects and Reasons* - These were referred to by the High Court in the principal case and the Privy Council must, therefore, it seems be taken to have disapproved of their use. The attachment of a statement of objects and reasons to a bill being a procedure peculiar to this country there is no English authority upon the point. The preamble of an Act, which may be referred to affords the nearest analogy. But if there be any grounds for the admission of reports of Select Committees or proceedings of the Legislative Council it certainly seems that strong grounds also exist for the admissibility of these statements. In the case of the *Delhi and London Bank v. Hem Lal Dutt* (2) Trevelyan J. referred to the Objects and Reasons of the Tacements Act, for the purpose of seeing what was the law at the time, and in the case of *Chuni Lal Mancharan v. Manishankar Atmaran*, (3) *Candv, J.*, also referred to the statement of Objects and Reasons.

The Privy Council decision has been shortly referred to by the Calcutta High Court in the case of the *Queen Empress v. Sri Churn Churno* (4) where Pigot, J. (Prinsep and Macpherson, JJ. concurring) said "We do not propose to consider the history of the Penal Code from its original draft by Lord Macaulay in 1840 to its becoming law in 1860. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the recent case of the *Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullik*, have held that it is not competent to refer to proceedings of the Legislature as legitimate aids to the construction of a law." This decision of the Privy Council was also referred to by the Bombay High Court in *R. v. Gangadhar Tilak* (5) in which it was broadly stated that it is inadmissible to take as an aid in construing an Act the proceedings in the Legislative Council which resulted in the passing of that Act.

In any case and whether or not admissible to construe the Acts to which they relate the Acts of the Legislature are instructive historically, if one has to consider not what the statute says but what may have been the motive of one or other party in promoting the legislation (6). And there is but little doubt that there will be a continued reference to such Acts if not as technical, at any rate as private, aids towards the comprehension of the intention of the Legislature.

The primary question in each case is of course What are the facts? It is, however, a common fault in this country to disregard the facts of a case in favour of authorities (7).

The next question is, What are the words of the Code itself?

(1) 18 B. 616, 625, 626 (1893)

(2) 14 C. 839, 846 (1897)

(3) 18 B. 616, 625 (1893)

(4) 22 C. 1917, 1922 (1895)

(5) 22 B. 112, 126, 127 (1899)

(6) *Jee Flee C.J.* in *Kadir Bish v. Blawan Prasa* 14 A. 149 (1892)

(7) In *Kash Nath v. Anant* 21 Com. I. P. 47,

at p. 49 (1899) *Jenkins, C.J.* dealing with ss. 16 and 17 of the Code said "In fact this case only illustrates how important it is that Courts should first ascertain with accuracy and appreciate the facts under consideration before turning their attention to the authorities."

The Act must be taken as one continuous Code the different sections being simultaneously enacted in view of each other (1) The Court must be governed by the language of the Legislature without considering what may have been its intention, if the words themselves are clear (2) Its limited function is not to say what the Legislature meant, but to ascertain what the Legislature has said that it meant (3) It is always dangerous to paraphrase an enactment, and not the less so if the enactment is perhaps not altogether happily expressed (4) Where the Code contains provisions upon a particular question, it must be tested, not by general principles but by the expressions of the Code which relate to that question (5) Where two procedures or two remedies are provided, one of them must not be taken as operating in derogation of the other (6) In many cases reference has to be made to judicial precedent For it is a principle peculiar to the English Common Law (7) that a decided case has an authoritative and binding force and is, subject to certain well known limitations to be followed in other similar cases It is however an unfortunate circumstance that the greater bulk of the reported Indian cases deal with questions of adjective law, unfortunate because a great diversity of opinion, such as exists touching the interpretation of rules of procedure, limitation, stamp or registration, is to be avoided involving, as it does uncertainty in the administration of justice and an encouragement of appeals which in many cases are due to the hope entertained of overturning the judgments of the lower Courts not upon the merits but upon some technicality or other (8)

In this country the use of judicial precedent frequently leads to abuse

Every case is independent of every other, and no decision upon facts forms a precedent for any other decision And every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found A case is only an authority for what it actually decides It cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it (9) "The only use of authorities or decided cases is the establishment of some principle which the Judge can follow out in deciding

(1) *Jonardan Dobey v Ramdhone Singh* 23 C 738 at p 743 (1896)

(2) *In re Mancharya*, 5 Bom D C R, O C J 55 58 (1868) Possibly this was meant though it is not clear when it was said that for the application of Equitable considerations there is, as a rule no room in matters of procedure *Debi Dayal v Bhau* 100 Ind 31 C 433 440 441 (1903)

(3) *Lala Surya v Colab Chand* 27 C 721 at p 755 (1900)

(4) *Durga Chowdhry v Jewshur Singh* 18 C 23 at p 30 (1890)

(5) *Blup Indar v Brij Bahadur* 23 A at p 156 157 (1900) As to the use of Headings Interpretation Clauses Illustrations and Marginal Notes see *Authors*

Evidence Act 5th ed, pp 100 101

(6) *Ajodhya Prasad v Balmukand* 8 A 351 (1886) *per* Mahmood J *Rung Lal Musser v Tokhun Musser* 25 W P 304 at p 305 (1876)

(7) The Roman law and modern continental systems derived from it reject the notion See Article in 6 Bom L J 156

(8) See Article in 7 Mad L J 309

(9) *Per* Lord Halsbury 1 C in *Quinn v Leatham* 1901 A C 500 cited in *Jehangir v Secretary of State* 6 Bom L P at p 189 (1903) and see as to *dicta* *Rowlandson v Champion* 17 M 21 at p 27 (1897)

the case before him "(1) Lord Mansfield, C J, said, "It certainly is very hard upon a Judge if a rule which he generally lays down is to be taken up and carried to its full extent. This is sometimes done by counsel, who have nothing else to rely upon, but great caution ought to be used by the Court in extending such maxims to cases which the Judge who uttered them never had in contemplation. If such is the use to be made of them, I ought to be very cautious how I lay down general maxims from the Bench "(2)

It is well to bear the remarks cited in the last paragraph in mind, though, of course, the nature of procedural law does not always admit of their application. In many cases the rules are of an artificial and arbitrary character, though in others, such as those dealing with bar by judgment or by suit and the like, questions of principle are widely involved.

As Holloway, J, said, the application to practical life of sound principles presents no more difficulty than that of empirical maxims (or, we may add, case law), based mainly upon a misunderstanding (or lack of understanding) of the great practical jurists, whom all admit to be the only guides (3)

In questions of procedure it is generally important that there should be uniformity of decision, and that existing practice should not be upset, (4) for

(1) *In re Hallett's Estate*, 13 Ch D 712, per Jessel, M R., *Osborn v Rowlett*, per Jessel, M R., 13 Ch D 774, 785. See remarks of Edge, C J, and Straight, J, in *R v Gobardhan* 9 A 528 555, 575 (1887), *R v Mahomed Humayoon Shaw*, 13 B L R 353 (1874). Lord Mansfield, in *R v Bembridge*, 3 Doug 332, said "The law does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles which are illustrated and explained in these cases", and as to *dicta* see remarks of Best, C J, in *Pickard v Mellish*, cited in *R v Chagan Dayaram*, 14 B 346 (1890). "The expressions of every Judge must be taken with reference to the case on which he decides, otherwise the law will get into extreme confusion." Mr Ramanathan, K C, in his speech on behalf of the Ceylon Bar upon the news of the death of Sir John Phear, late Chief Justice of Ceylon, said "The so-called 'uncertainty of the law' is nothing more than the uncertainty of ill-trained Judges as to the true facts of the case and the proper principles of law applicable to it. He (Sir John Phear) made the Bar argue cases upon first principles of law. Before his advent legal principles were of little avail in the determination of a case unless supported by a judgment of a competent Court here or in England. If in arguing an advocate cited a decided case without going into first principles he would say, 'I don't want authority. Let us solve this case even as a

mathematician would solve a problem by applying the axioms and propositions we have learned in our books.' If they passed on to authorities too speedily he would say, 'We do not want authorities just yet, they are only of corroborative value. Let us solve the question by the proper application of first principles and then look into authorities to discover whether our conclusions on first principles are corroborated by them.' In this way first principles became paramount" (*Ceylon Court*, April 10, 1905, *cor* Sir Charles Jayard, C J, and Moncrieff, J.)

(2) *Brisbane v Daerios*, 1 Taunton, p 162.

(3) *De Souza v Coles*, 3 Mad H C R 384, at p 420 (1808).

(4) *Fulkumari v Ghanshyam*, 31 C 511, at p 513 (1903), per Rampini, J., *Mundal & Co v Fazul Illah*, S C C Rep 2 of 1912, 3 Feb 1912, *cor* Jenkins, C J, and Woodroffe, J. In *Dymond v Croft*, 3 Ch D at p 515, James, L J, said "What my decision would have been if this point had come before me in the first instance I need not say. The rule (as to substituted service) has already been construed by Huddleston, B, in accordance with what seems to have been the general understanding of the Judges in Chambers, and it is very important that there should be uniformity of decision." And see per Edge, C J, in *Sheo Prasad Lalit Kuar*, 18 A at p 409. "Settled principles of law administered by a Court of Justice ought not to be lightly dis-

in such cases it is often not so much the nature of the rule as the fact that there is a fixed rule which really matters. In *Sadasiva Pillai v Ramabhar Pillai* (1) the Privy Council said 'The alleged consensus of the Indian Courts being thus established their Lordships whatever their opinion upon the construction of this clause might have been, had the question been *res integra* do not think it would be right to run counter to so long a course of decision upon what is in fact merely a question of procedure it being admitted that the plaintiff may assert rights of this nature, if they exist, in a separate suit.'

"It is the duty of a Judge not to decide what he considers the law ought to be but to decide what, according to the best of his judgment, he finds it is, and if he finds a principle laid down upon competent authority it is far better to accept and apply it broadly and honestly even if he is not in his own mind satisfied with the foundation of the rule than to attempt to fritter it away in its application to cases which manifestly come within it (2). The reasons however which Judges have assigned for their opinions have not the same degree of authority as the decisions themselves (3). As regards these if two cases are not to be reconciled the authority which is at once the more recent and the more consistent with general principles ought to prevail (4). As already stated if a principle is laid down upon competent authority it is far better to accept and apply it broadly and honestly even if the Judge is not in his own mind satisfied with the foundation of the rule than to attempt to fritter it away in its application to cases which manifestly come within it (5). The same rule applies when dealing with the provisions of the Code itself. 'We ought not' said Sir Barnes Peacock C.J. 'to fritter away the law by construing words according to a mere technical sense instead of giving them a broad meaning so as to embrace all cases intended by the Legislature to be provided for' (6).

The Courts here must be guided in the first place by the terms of the Code itself and secondly by those decisions of the Indian Courts which interpret the Code and which are binding on them. The Subordinate Courts are bound to follow the rulings of the High Courts to which they are subject where there are different rulings of different High Courts (7) and in the absence of such

turbid or doubt cast upon them without very sufficient reason. And as to overruling a series of precedents see *Prabhakarbhut v Vishwambar* 8 B 313 317 (1884) *Kusum Kumari v Satya Ranjan* 30 C 999 1003 (1903).

(1) 15 R L R 383 at p 398 (1875) 5 C 21 A at p 275.

(2) *Usilt v Hal v I R 3 C P D 37 per Lord Coleridge* 1 v Clagan *Diyaraj* 14 B 352 (1890).

(3) *Caledonian Railway v Walker v Trustees* 7 App 259.

(4) *Per Lord Selborne* L C *Campbell v Campbell* 5 App Cas 587 798. In the *High Court* a case of (1) v (2) two 1116 referred to

a Full Bench. See also *Caledonian Ry Co v Walker v Trustees* L R 7 App Cas 25 279 *Redgrave v Hurd* L R 20 Ch D 1 14 *Ex parte Reynolds* ib 294 298. As to judgments of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction see *Cathercole v Son* (h 44 L T 43) 440 *Smith v Lambeth Association* (L C) 11 L 10 Q B D 3 378 *In re Billers v Settlement* 8 Jur N S 10.

(5) *Per Lord Coleridge* in *Usilt v Hal v I R 3 C P D 37*.

(6) *H v Lord Coleridge* v *St v Goodhouse* J W R 402 at p 406 (1875).

(7) *Swan v Narayan v Krishnath* *Krishna* L R 419 (1890) *Balaji v Anand* v *Saklaram* *Parasram* 17 B 52 (1897).

ruling will do well in following the decisions, if any, of other High Courts and Chief Courts in India. As regards the High Courts themselves, Norris, J., sitting on the Original Side of the Court, said, with reference to a decision of an Appellate Bench of the same Court, that though he was not prepared to say that he should consider every judgment of an Appellate Bench binding upon him when sitting on the Original Side, yet every such judgment should receive respectful consideration and careful attention and should be followed, unless the Court was very clearly of opinion that the conclusion arrived at was an erroneous one (1). As regards Appellate Benches all are bound by decisions of the Privy Council and by Full Benches of the same Court, and if one Appellate Bench differs from a previous decision given by another the matter must be referred for determination of a Full Bench (2). The High Court is, however, not bound by, though it will give respectful consideration to, the decisions of another High Court. As regards other countries, reference may be made to English case law, when in point, as also to the decisions of those countries such as the United States (3) whose law is derived from a common source with our own. As regards, however, the decisions of the United States Courts, citation should not be generally approved unless where it is shown to be necessary by reason of the novelty of the point involved and the want of Indian or English precedents (4). As regards these latter it has no doubt, been said that "the Code of Civil Procedure does not prevail in England, and we must interpret its terms as best we may without reference to English cases" (5). It is, however, submitted with all respect that this is neither a correct nor useful view of the matter. The Courts in this country can ill afford to disregard the results of the learning and experience of the English Judges. And for the most part they have been glad to avail themselves of both. This has been where either general legal principles are involved—principles of common application in all countries, or in those in which English notions of jurisprudence prevail—or in cases where similar provisions to those prevailing here exist elsewhere, as in the case of many sections of the Code which are based upon or taken from the English rules under the Judicature Act. Where it was argued that an English decision had no application to India, the Privy Council said, that though that case would not be binding as an authority upon a Court in India not administering English law, their Lordships were far from holding that, decided as it was on the application of

(1) *Oriental Bank v. Gobind Lal*, 9 C 604 at p. 607 (1883) [but see *Jubbayya v. Krishna*, 14 M at p. 191 (1890)] for example the decision of an Appellate Bench might proceed upon law or practice different from that prevailing upon the Original Side of the Court. On the other hand a decision on appeal from the Original Side would be clearly binding. See *Sahai Chand Mitter v. Mohan Bibi* 23 C at p. 150 (1898).

(2) One Judge cannot refer to the Full Bench without the concurrence of the other. *Chand v. Karti v. Bindaban Chunder* 7 W P

277 (1867). A Judge of the High Court sitting alone to hear cases below Rs. 50 cannot make a reference to the Full Bench. *Nabu Mondul v. Cholim Mullik* 25 C 896 (1898).

(3) See *Malcolm v. Smith*, Taylor & Rep 283 288 (1818), *Braddon v. Abbott*, ib., 342 349 *per* Sir Laurence Peel C.J., *Scammanga v. Stamp* 5 C P D 295, 303.

(4) See *In re Missouri Steamship Co.*, 42 Ch D 321, 330 331.

(5) *Sourindra Mohan Tagore v. Siromoni Deb*, 28 C 171 at p. 176 (1900) *per* Ranjini and Pratt, JJ.

a maxim expressing a principle recognized by the laws of all civilized countries, it did not afford a rule applicable to circumstances of the same character in India (1) So also, West, J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, (2) dealing with a question arising under sect 622 of the former Code, said "In such a conflict of opinions as has arisen on the subject we are now considering, it may be useful to see how similar questions have been dealt with by the Courts in England Their decisions can, of course, only afford analogies not precedents, for Courts so differently constituted as those in India, but these analogies point to principles of general application, and thus repay our attentive consideration" As already stated, many of the provisions of the Code are taken from the English Rules and Orders and there is no reason why the decisions given on those Rules and Orders should not be applicable here, or on such portions of them as are of equal application in this country and in England Where a principle declared in an English decision does not depend on any peculiarity in English Law it may be applicable here (3) Again where a Colonial Legislature has passed an Act in the same terms as an Imperial Statute, and the latter has been authoritatively construed by a Court of Appeal in England, such construction should be adopted by the Courts of the Colony, (4) though, of course, when the Indian Legislature has rejected or declined to follow the law of England upon a particular point the case is altogether different (5)

It cannot, however, be too much insisted upon that procedure is mere machinery Its rules should be observed, but it is to be remembered that those rules exist to enable the Courts in a settled and convenient manner, to dispense justice Mere technicality is to be avoided therefore as much as possible This does not mean that the provisions of the Code are to be disregarded, but they are to be construed liberally, and if found to have been infringed it must be seen whether such infringement has affected the jurisdiction of the Court or the merits of the case (6) Courts of law should be especially careful in dealing with technical objections to see what effect their decision will have in defeating substantial justice (7) The Court may, however find itself constrained to set aside an order on a ground which has unfor-

(1) Madras Railway v Zemindar of Carve
tinagarum 22 W R 279, at p 281 (1874)

(2) Shun Nathaji v Soma Kashmath 7
B 311 at p 359 (1883)

(3) Nandi Singh v Sita Ram, 16 C 677
(1888)

(4) Trimble v Hill 5 App Cas 342,
Kathama Natchiar v Dorasinga Tevar 21 A
169 We must construe each Act on its own
wording and in accordance with its own con-
text, Mata Din v Kazim Husain 13 A at
p 407 (1891) In construing an Act pro-
visions of other statutes which are in *pari*
materiam may be referred to, Assam v
Iathumma, 22 M at p 502 (1897)

(5) 1 v Ghulet 7 A 44 50 51 (1884)

(6) See a 99, *post* So the Judicial Com-

mittee will look to the essential justice of the
case without considering whether matters of
form have been strictly attended to Ghird
harce Sing v Korlahul Sing 2 M L A 344
(1810) In Bishishur v Nam Churun 5
All H C R 25 28 (1872) Stuart C.J.,
said that he did not desire to apply strict
rules to any unnecessary requirements of
legal art to work out the requirements of the
Code

(7) Haranund v Prosunno 9 C 763 at
p 765, *per* Sir Richard Garth C.J (1883).
S C 12 C L R 556, 558, and see the dictum
of Lord Denman C.J, cited in Mahabala v
Kunhanna 21 M 373 at p 381 (1898) It
is always unpleasant to depart from strict
adherence to technical and arbitrary rules

unately no relation to the merits of the case, as for want of jurisdiction, even though no objection has been taken by the parties (1) So in the case now cited, (2) the Privy Council said "This objection to the award was apparently not brought to the notice either of the Subordinate Judge or of the High Court. But the statute is there and the Judges were bound to take judicial notice of it." And the Court is bound to take judicial notice of a change in the Statutory Law while a suit is pending, and a party is not estopped from calling attention to it, since the Court is taken to have known it (3). And though it is exceedingly undesirable that any suit should fail on account of any technical objection, such, for instance, as that of misjoinder, at the same time when the objection is raised at the earliest opportunity, and when serious inconvenience and expense are likely to be caused to the parties, it is impossible for the Courts not to adjudicate upon the objection, and to relieve the parties from it (4). Rules of procedure are, however, mere machinery, the means by which the Courts are enabled to dispense the justice for which they exist. As the Privy Council have said, it is of the utmost importance to the right administration of justice in the Courts of this country that it should be constantly borne in mind by them that by their very constitution they are to decide according to *equity and good conscience*, and that the substance and merits of the case are to be kept constantly in view (5). Again, Lord Penzance said (6) "Procedure is but the machinery of the law after all—the channel and means whereby law is administered and justice reached. It strangely departs from its proper office when, in place of facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct, and even extinguish, legal rights, and is thus made to govern where it ought to subserve."

The Code is not exhaustive—The Code is not exhaustive. It is not uncommonly thought that it is sufficient to defeat an application or to reverse an order that no particular section of the Code can be cited as an authority for it. It is true that Strachey, C.J., (7) stated that the Code contained the whole law of Civil Procedure. We are not, however, aware of any other authority to this effect, and that observation was not adopted by Banerjee, J., in the same case, and both in earlier and later cases in the same Court it was held that the Code was not exhaustive (8). The latter view, it is submitted, is undoubtedly the correct one, and is supported by numerous cases to which reference will be made. Indeed, in one of these, Mahmood, J., said (9) "I may therefore at the outset state that, according to my view of the rules of construction applicable to statutes like the Civil Procedure Code, the Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken

(1) Joyram Singh v. Mudhoo Sudun, 16 C. 13 (1888), Vaithinatha Pillai v. R. (P.C.), 17 C. W. N. 1110 (1913).

(2) Raja Haranaram v. Chaudhram Bhagwant, 13 A. 300 at p. 304 (1891).

(3) Lakshmi Bibi Kujrani v. Atal Bihari Aldar, 40 C. 534 (1913).

(4) Sudhendu v. Durga Das, 14 C. 435 at p. 438 (1887).

(5) Hur v. Mungai Chaud. Pantay v. Musst. 1 above 6 M. 1 A. at pp. 410, 411 (1856).

(6) In Kendall v. Hamilton L. R. 4 App. Cas. at p. 625 cited in 22 A. 320.

(7) Habi Baksh v. Baldeo Prasad 23 A. 167, at p. 173 (1901).

(8) Durga Dihal v. Anoraj, 17 A. 20, at p. 31 (1894), Dhonkal Singh v. Phakkar Singh 15 A. 84, 95 (1893) per Sir John Edge, C.J.

(9) Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey, 5 A. at pp. 172, 173 (1882).

as prohibited, unless it is expressly provided for by the Code but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle, prohibitions cannot be presumed, and in the present case, therefore, it rests upon the defendants to show that the suit in the form in which it has been brought is prohibited by the rules of procedure applicable to the Courts of Justice in India" (1). This statement, if it is not to be liable to misconception, is in need of explanation and qualification. It is not to be supposed that it was intended to warrant any and every rule of procedure which a Court may arbitrarily choose to devise or to follow. It has been already pointed out (2) that the Code is exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law, that is, on any point *specifically dealt with by it*, the law must be ascertained by reference to its provisions. The Code, however, is not exhaustive in the sense that, for instance, the Evidence Act has been said to be, the second section of which, it has been held, in effect, prohibits the introduction of any kind of evidence not specifically authorized by the Act itself. The Code binds the Court so far as it goes (3). If it prescribes a particular course in a particular case, that course must be taken. If, on the other hand, as in the case of the former section 561 (now omitted), it contains an express prohibition, the latter must be given effect to. Many matters are dealt with under a settled practice (4). But even such a practice, however inveterate, cannot be legal if it is contrary to an express enactment or is inconsistent with it (5). It was, however, pointed out by Wilson, J., in the case cited, (6) that if the Court had power before the introduction of the Code

(1) So in *Radha Kishen v. Radha Pershad*, 18 C 515, 518 (1891), the Court held that in the absence of any provision in the Code directing an application to be made for execution of an entire decree, a second application for execution was not barred. See observation of Mahmood, J., 'Everything is permissible unless there is some prohibition against it,' in *Muhammad Sulaiman v. Muhammad Yar Khan*, 11 A at pp 287, 288 (1888).

(2) *Idem*, p 9.

(3) *Doorga Charan Dass v. Nitto Kally Dossee*, 5 C 819 (1880), *Punchann Singh v. Dwarkanath Roy*, 3 C L J 29 (1900), *Hukum Chand Baid v. Kamalchand Singh*, 3 C L J 67 (1900).

(4) See *Prabhakarbhut v. Vishwambhar*, 8 B at pp 316, 317. 'The established practice of the Court in matters of procedure is the law of the Court, unless it be inconsistent with some higher law or legal principle,' *per* West, J., delivering judgment of Full Bench.

(5) *Jehangir v. Secretary of State*, 6 Bom.

L R 210 (1904), *Glyn v. Donnaud*, 2 Tayl & Bell, 106, at p 205 (1837). ['But if the practice has been departed from in this instance, what is the practice of a Court compared to the direction of a statute?' *per* Rich, C.J.] *A fortiori*, a definite provision of law cannot be evaded on the ground of convenience, *Ram Prasad v. Bichi Dass*, 6 C W N 585, at 583 (1902), *Balkaran Pat v. Gobind Nath*, 12 A 129 (1890). In *Palmer v. Hutchinson*, 6 App Cas 619, cited in *Rai Amrit v. Haribhai*, 8 B at p 303 (1884), the P. C. said that 'no practice of the Court can confer upon it any power or juris-

(1844)

(6) *Doorga Charan Dass v. Nitto Kally Dossee*, at p 820 (1880), *Punchann Singh v. Dwarkanath Roy*, 3 C L J 29 (1900), *Hukum Chand Baid v. Kamalchand Singh*, 3 C L J 67 (1900).

to make an order, and that power is not expressly taken away by the Code, it must remain (1) So it was held in that case, that although Chapter XXVI of the former Code only provided for suits to be brought by a pauper, the Court had yet power to allow a defendant to defend *in forma pauperis*. So also in a case (2) which dealt with the inquiry into the question of minority, where a suit was brought by a person professing himself to be adult, but denied to be such by the defendant, upon which an issue was raised for trial, the Court pointed out that sect 412 of the former Code did not apply to the case, which was not provided for by the Code. It however referred to the practice which prevailed before the Code was passed, and held that that practice had not been abrogated by any provision in the Code, and must be considered to be in force (3) As regards, therefore, matters not specifically dealt with by the Code, the Courts are empowered to act under and according to their original powers and practice. Cases may, however, arise for which no provision can be found, either in the Code or in previous enactments or practice. As the Code does not affect previously existing powers expressly given and acted upon, neither does it affect the power and duty of the Court to act according to the well known rule (governing alike the rules of substantive and adjective law (4)) in cases where no specific enactment exists, according to justice, equity, and good conscience. The Court has therefore in many cases, where the circumstances require it, acted upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to do that justice for the administration of which it alone exists (5) So it has been held that

(1) So the jurisdiction of the High Court to imprison for contempt which it has inherited from the Supreme Court and which was conferred upon that Court by the Charters which invested it with all the powers and authority of the then Court of King's Bench and Court of Chancery, has not been removed or affected by the Civil Procedure Code. *Martin v Lawrence* 4 C 655 (1879). And see *Legal Remembrancer v Matilal Ghose* (1913), 41 C 173 (the Calcutta High Court can commit for a contempt within its original jurisdiction but not for contempt of a Mofussil Criminal Court), and *in re Amrita Bazar Patrika* 17 C W N 1253 (1913).

(2) *Beni Pam Bhutta v Ram Lal Dhukri*, 13 C 189, 190, 191 (1886).

(3) See also *Ghanu Krishna v Pam Das* 20 A 162, 165 (1897), *Rattan Bai v Chabildas* 13 B 7, 11 (1889).

(4) See s 21, Beng Reg III of 1793, s 17 Mad Reg II of 1802, *Noroy v Rogers* 4 Bom H C R, O C J 1 at p 27 (1867). See, now, Act XII of 1887 (Bengal N W P 438 (1884 Civil Courts) s 37 (2), and

Hur v 1873 (Madras Civil Courts) s 16, v J. L. Saran, v A 351, 352 (1884

[the rule governs alike substantive and adjective law], *Lalla Sheo Churn v Ram nandan Dobey*, 22 C 8 at p 12 (1894), where the rule was applied in the absence of any statutory provision. These principles however, are to be invoked only in cases for which no specific rules may exist—*Pam Coomar v Chandruanto Vookerjee*, 4 I A 23 50 (1876), *Jugdeo Naram v Raja Singh*, 15 C 656, at p 664 (1888).

(5) *Panchanan Singha v Dwarka Nath Roy*, 3 C L J 29 (1900), *Hukum Chand Bair v Ramalanand Singh*, 3 C L J 67 (1900), *Rank Lal Dutt v Bidhu Mukhi Das*, 10 C W N 719 721 (1906), *Curdeo Singh v Chandrikah Singh*, 5 C L J 611 (1907). Sir John Pidge, C J, said 'Although I am most reluctant to decide questions of procedure on the basis of Courts having inherent power to invent procedure for themselves yet when I find that the Legislature has provided no procedure to be followed in cases which must and do arise, I am compelled to hold in such cases that such inherent power does exist in the Courts for otherwise the work of the Courts could not be disposed of and the Courts

although the Code contained no express provision on the matters hereinafter mentioned the Court has an inherent power *ex debito justitiae* to consolidate suits, (1) to postpone the trial of some of several suits pending the decision of a test or governing action (2) according to common practice to advance the hearing of the suit or accelerate the hearing of an appeal (3) to ascertain whether or not it has before it the proper parties (4) to add (sect 32 of the former Code not being exhaustive) parties (5) to entertain the application of a third person to be made a party to a suit (6) to allow a defence in *forma pauperis* (7) to stay on the ground of convenience proceedings in a cross suit (8) to inquire whether a plaintiff is as he professes himself to be an adult and if the finding be in the negative to suspend proceedings, (9) to decide one question and to reserve another for further investigation the Privy Council pointing out that it did not require any provision of the Code to authorize a Judge to do what in this matter was justice and for the advantage of the parties (10) to remand a suit in a case to which neither sect 562 nor sect 566 of the last Code applied (11) to stay the drawing up of the Court's own orders or to suspend their operation if the necessities of justice so require, (12) to dismiss an application for execution when the applicant fails through his own laches to put the Court in a position to proceed with his application (13) to proceed forthwith to decide an application for

would have no power to bring litigation in such cases to a close *Dhonkal Singh v Phakkar Singh* 15 A at p 95 (1893) and in *Ranjit Singh v Ilahi Baksh* 5 A 500 522 (1883) Stuart C.J. spoke of those who refused to know anything about procedure beyond the letter of the Code itself

(1) *Nehal Singh v Alai Ahmed* 15 W R 110 (1871) *Peacock v Bynath* 10 C 58 (1883) *Kalicharan v Surja Kumar* (1912) 17 C W N 526 See notes to O II rr 3 6 and 7 *post*

(2) See notes to same and *Vithu v Narayan G Rom* 11 C R 1 C J 30 32 (1868)

(3) *Dharram Singh v Kishen Singh* 12 C L R 533 533 (1883) As to the principle upon which the Court acts in allowing causes to be advanced see *Rawson v Samuel* 1 Cr & Ph at p 181 182 where the Lord Chancellor said That it could not be assumed upon an application of this kind that a cause would occupy but a short time in hearing, and that although any objections which the defendant might personally make to the application were entitled to very little attention yet that it was due to the other suitors of the Court whose causes were also waiting to be heard that no one should be allowed a precedence unless upon some special reason being shown why justice could not otherwise be effectually administered in it and that a

strong case would therefore be required to justify a departure from the ordinary course

(4) *Muhammad Hussain v Khushalo* 10 A 223 (1888)

(5) *Gayananda v Kristo Chandra* 8 C W N 404 (1901)

(6) *Oriental Bank v Charriot* 12 C 642 (1886)

(7) *Doorga Churn Dass v Nitto Kally Dossee* 5 C 819 (1880)

(8) *Meekjeet Hasowjee* 4 C L R 282 (1879)

(9) *Beni Ram Bhutt v Ram Lal Dhulraj* 13 C 189 191 (1886)

(10) *Maulvi Muhammad v Mahammad Abdul* 24 I A 22 32 (1896)

(11) *Durga Dhal v Anoraji* 17 A 29 (1894) *Ganesh Bhikaji v Bhikaji Krishna* 10 B 398 at p 400 (1886) See also notes to O VI r 17 O VII r 11 *post* dealing with the cases where a Court of Appeal has amended a plaint and remanded the case for re-trial the view expressed by Rampun J in *Dhani Ram v Bhagirath* 22 C at p 714 (1895) not having been accepted

(12) *Mussamut Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Das* 5 C W N 781 at p 786 (1901) and see *Hukam Chand Rand v Kamalanand Singh* 3 C L J 67 (1900)

(13) *Dhonkal Singh v Phakkar Singh* 15 A 94 (1893)

execution on the materials before it, when time has been granted to a party to perform any act necessary for the further progress of the application, and that act has not been done, (1) to stay, apart from the question whether the case fell within sect 515 of the former Code the carrying out of a preliminary order pending the hearing of an appeal, (2) to stay proceedings in a lower Court pending appeal and to appoint a temporary guardian of a minor upon such stay, (3) to control the Court premises, (4) to admit an appeal from an order granting a review on a ground not referred to in sect 629 of the last Code, but which is a necessarily appealable ground where an appeal is allowed, (5) to retransfer a suit withdrawn (6) to deal with an application to set aside an order made *ex parte* and to set it aside upon a proper case being substantiated, (7) and to set aside an order obtained by fraud and made without jurisdiction, (8) to amend a power of attorney by putting in the name of the attorney which has been omitted by mistake, (9) to rehear a matter before the order passed by the Court has been perfected (10) The Court in practice allowed amendments of written statements in cases not provided for by sect 116 of that Code, as also amendments of applications for execution in cases other than those provided for by sect 215 of the same Code (11) It has been held that the Court has power to prevent an abuse of its procedure and to stay or dismiss frivolous or vexatious actions (12) to return a plaint after it has been presented and admitted (13) or in cases not mentioned in sect 57 of the last Code, (14)

(1) Dhonkal Singh : Phaldkar Singh 15 A 84 (1893)

(2) Balkashen Sahu : Musst Khugno 8 C W N 572 (1904)

(3) Panchanan Singh : Dwarka Nath Roy, 3 C L J 29 (1905)

(4) In re Khoda Bux Khan 15 C 638 (1888)

(5) Pamanadhan v Narayanan 27 M 602 607 (1904)

(6) Gurdeo Singh : Chandrikah Singh 5 C L J 611 (1907)

(7) Bebeo Tulsiman v Harihar Mahato 9 C W N 81 (1903) The Full Bench adding that there was nothing in the Code to militate against this view Suderni Devi : Sovaram Agarwallah 10 C W N 306 310 (1906) Sheo Prosunno : Buldharee Lall, 13 W P 232 (1870), Ramchandra Narayan : Draupade 20 B 281 283 (1895)

(8) Sarat Chandra Mookerjee v Mahomed Hossein 8 C W N 468 (1904)

(9) Chayyemannessa : Basirar, 37 C 399 (1910)

(10) Padmshati : Pasik 37 C 259 (1909) and it was held that the Court had power to assign a guardian *ad litem* to a defendant who was of unsound mind though not so adjudged Lakhya Dasya v Uma Kant 14 C W N 256 (1909) This power is now

given by O XXII r 15

(11) Jivat Dubey v Kale Charan, 20 A 478 (1896) This was no doubt thought to be justified by reference to s 647 of the last Code Sattappa : Jogi, 17 M 67 (1893), but that section had no application to proceedings in execution which are proceeded in suits and s 215 of that Code had no words corresponding to clause (c) of s 53 of the same Code

(12) Atturmoney Dosses : Bepin Behary Dhar Suit 875 of 1904 Cal H C Jan. 23 1906 Prasad Singh v Raja Singh 25 C 203 at p 206 (1897) See notes in Annual Practice to s 24 sub s 5 of the Judicature Act 1873 and Leo v Aslam 1 Times R 291 scandalous counter claim Sham Kishore v Shooashubhoosun 5 C 707 (1880) Zamindar of Tun : Bennayya, 22 M 155, 158 (1893) [scandalous memorandum of appeal, where it was held Court had inherent power to stop abuse of its records]

(13) Prabhakarbhut v Vishwambar, 8 B 313, 318 (1884), the Calcutta High Court, however has held that this was covered by s 57 of the former Code See notes to Ord VII r 10

(14) Ladhaji v Hari 1 Bom L P 170 (1899)

or to restore to its files any case which the Court has itself removed therefrom undetermined, as where a case has been struck off under a misapprehension that the parties had settled it (1) It has been held that if sect 206 of that Code did not apply, the Court exercising appellate jurisdiction had an inherent jurisdiction to bring its decrees into accordance with its judgments, (2) and that although sect 463 of that Code applied only to cases where persons have been adjudged lunatics under the statute, and was silent as to persons not so adjudged, the Court would, in the interest of justice (the provisions of Chapter XXXI of the former Code not being exhaustive), appoint guardians *ad litem* of such persons, and allow them to sue by next friends (3) A Court has inherent jurisdiction to amend the plaint and decree, (4) and to allow a set off of costs against purchase money in a case not provided for by sect 214 of that Code (5) So also it was held that though there was no special provision in the Code enabling the Court to refuse, on the ground of fraud, to confirm a sale, such as there was in the case of irregularity, neither was there any provision declaring that the Court should not have such a power, that there was no necessity for any special provision, and that if a Court were powerless to repress fraud, and was bound to ratify it, "equity and good conscience," the leading principles of administration of the law, are violated, and the Court had inherent jurisdiction to refuse to confirm the sale (6) The Court has an inherent power to prevent an abuse of its processes, and is competent to reverse an order made in the absence of the opposite party without service of notice upon him, and which the law directs should be served (7)

What has been said applies generally. Other questions arise in regard to the original side of the High Court, which has inherited all the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (8) It has been held that the powers of the High Court in its original Civil Jurisdiction are not limited in all cases to those given by the Code, and in many respects its procedure is peculiar to itself (9)

(1) *Deen Dyal v Ram Coomar*, 9 W B 283 (1868)

(2) *Muhammad Naim ullah v Ihsan Ullah*, 14 A 226, 229, 237 (1892)

(3) *Nabhu Khan v Sita*, 20 A 2 (1897). *Venkatramana Rambhat v Timappa Devappa* 16 B 132 (1891), *Kadala Reddi v Narasi*, 24 M 504 (1901), *Pransukhram Dinanath v Bai Laddor*, 23 B 633 (1899); *Rasik Lall Dutt v Bidhu Mukhi Das*, 10 C W N 719 (1906) This matter is now dealt with

(4) *Narayanadasami v Natasa*, 16 M 424, at p 427 (1892) *per Muttusami Ayyar, J.*, *Karim Mahomed v Rajoona* 12 B 174 (1887) [the Court has inherent power over its own records so long as these records are within its power, and it can set right any mistake in them], and this power, as regards decrees, was held to be independent of ss 206, 582,

and 632 of the former Code, *Muhammad Naim ullah v Ihsanullah*, 14 A 226, 229, 237 (1892) See *Ann. Pr.*, 1903, pp. 360, 361, notes to Ord XXVIII r 11

(5) *Jahri v Gopal Saran*, 6 A 351 (1884). for another *casus omissus* in pre-emption law, see *Kashi Nath v Mukhta Prasad*, 6 A 370, 373 (1884), and notes to Ord XX r 14, *post*

(6) *Subbaji Rau v Srinivasa Rau*, 2 M 264, at pp 267-269 (1880) And see as to the inherent power in cases of fraud and misrepresentation - *Birj Mohun v Raibuna*, 20 C. 8, at p. 9 (1892)

(7) *Krishna Chandra v Protap Chandra*, 3 C L J 276 (1906)

(8) *Atturmoney Dassu v Hurry Dass Dutt* 7 C. 74, 75 (1881)

(9) *Mohali Singh v Kartick Singh*, Suit 757 of 1890 July 31, 1905 Cal H C *Hirji Jina v Naran Mulji*, 12 B H C R. 129, at

These instances (and there are doubtless others) are sufficient to show, firstly, that the Code is not exhaustive, there being matters with which it does not deal, and that in such cases the Court will, in the absence of any other express provision exercise that inherent jurisdiction to do such justice between the parties as the nature of the case requires. There are, however, cases in which a question may arise whether the exercise of a power or the right to make an application is derived entirely from express legislation. So the right of appeal must be given by the enacted law, or equivalent authority,⁽¹⁾ and it has been debated whether a question of costs is one of procedure or one affecting vested rights⁽²⁾ in which case it was held that the power to award costs was derived entirely from Acts of the Legislature. As pointed out however by Sir Barnes Peacock C.J. the laws cannot make express provision against all inconveniences, so that their dispositions shall express all the cases that may possibly happen, and it is therefore the duty of a Judge to apply them, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express provisions, but to all the cases to which a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended either within the express sense of the law or within the consequences that may be gathered from it⁽³⁾. So as is well known sects 11-14 (formerly 13 and 14), of the Code do not embody the entire rule of *res judicata*, which as a principle exists independently of the statute enacting it, and indeed even as regards sect 13 itself (now sect 11) it has been said that it cannot be applied too literally⁽⁴⁾. The principle has therefore been applied to cases with which the Code does not expressly deal⁽⁵⁾. In the undermentioned case⁽⁶⁾ Blair, J., said that there are cases of misfeasance grosser than anything provided for in the Code, and that he declined to believe that those are cases where a High Court must fold its hands and allow obvious injustice to be done. At the same time, it is well to bear in mind the observations of Sir John Edge, C.J., adopted by Sir John Stanley, C.J. "Justice, equity, and good conscience," he said "are captivating terms, and before a Judge applies what may appear to him at first sight to be in accordance with justice equity, and good conscience, he must be careful to see that his views are based on sound general principles and

p. 13¹ (1875) [the Civil Procedure Code must be considered in conjunction with the rules and practice of this Court] In Gobind (bandra & Gangs Dhye 17 B L R 333, at p. 335 (1871) Phear, J., speaking of the original side practice as regards plaintiffs said "We in some slight measure deviate from strict observance of the practice laid down in Act VIII (of 1859) because and this Court has power to mould its procedure as it thinks fit only keeping as near as it reasonably can to the procedure prescribed by Act VIII. And see per Markby, J., in Cumming v Green, 4 B L R App. 75, 76 (1870) dealing with the question of appearance. 'But in this Court the practice, ever since its establishment, appears to have

departed in some respects from Act VIII. And see Jointee Chunder v Anundo Lal Doss 14 W R A O 1 (1865), where the Court held that though there was no power under the Code of 1859 to order parties not on record to pay costs, yet that the High Court had the same equitable jurisdiction in this respect as the Supreme Court had.

(1) *Minakshi Naidu v Subramanya*, 11 M 26 (1897)

(2) *Yonosuke v Ookerda*, 21 B 779 (1897)

(3) *Harro Chunder v Shooroodhonce Debia*, 9 W R 402 at p. 406 (1868)

(4) See *post* notes to s. 11, *post*

(5) *Ib*

(6) *Durga Dihal & Anoraji*, 17 A at p. 31 (1894)

are not in conflict with the intentions of the Legislature or with sound principles recognized by authority, (1) as also what was said by West J., that the High Court, whose special function it was to curb any illegal excess of authority in others must sedulously guard against such excess in itself and resist the temptation which in some cases exists to transgress the proper limits of its authority, (2) The equity to be followed in the Courts of this country is natural equity or fairness, and is not affected by the particular meaning given to that word in English Law (3)

It has been already pointed out that the jurisdiction to act in cases for which the Code has made no provision rests upon the nature of the constitution of the Courts themselves and of the statutory rule (4) enjoining them in cases where no specific rule exists to act according to justice equity and good conscience (5) Vague notions are sometimes found to prevail with reference to clause 15 of the High Court Charter Act 24 & 25 Vict c 104 which however has nothing to do with the matter now under discussion This clause affects the High Courts only To these it gives the power of superintendence over subordinate Courts This power comes under the head of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts (6) Under clause 21 of the Letters Patent, the law equity and rule of good conscience to be applied by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is the law, equity and rule which the Court in which the proceedings were originally instituted ought to have applied to the case The proceedings therefore of a subordinate Court are revised under sect 115 (formerly 622) or superintended under clause 15 on the ground that such Court did *not* comply with the law which governs it In such cases therefore it is necessary to ascertain firstly what the law is which governed the subordinate Court in the proceedings complained of, and secondly to determine whether that law has been given effect to It is obvious that a superior Court exercises jurisdiction under clause 15 or sect 115 (formerly 622) only when the Court below has done wrong Neither provisions apply when the Court below has done right—that is has acted according to the law which controls it If a subordinate Court declines jurisdiction because there is no section of the Code which empowers it to act, the High Court must determine whether it had an inherent jurisdiction or not in the matter If it had, then the High Court interferes because the subordinate Court was bound to act according to justice equity and good conscience The subordinate Court has jurisdiction but declines to exercise it On this the High Court interferes and compels the subordinate Court to exercise the inherent jurisdiction it has Clause 15 does not enable the

(1) *Ibn Hasan v Brij Bhukan* 26 A at 427 (1904)

(2) *In re 1 leaders of High Court* 8 B at 143 (1883)

(3) *Debnaryan Dutt v Chunilal Ghose* 41 C 136 (1913) See *Debnaryan Dutt v Ramsadlan Mondal* 17 C W N 1143 (1913), *Kwaja Muhammad Khan v Hussan Begam* 1 C (1910) 32 All 410 37 I A 10., 14 C W N 862.

(4) See ante

(5) *Hukum Chand Baid v Hamalanan Singh* 3 C L J 77 (190.) *Lasli Lal Dutt v Badhu Mukhi Dasi* 10 C W N 719 21 (1906) *Panchanan Singh v Dwarka Nath Roy* 3 C L J 29 (1900)

(6) See judgments in *Chappan v Mahin Katti* & *M C S* (1878) dealt with in the notes to s. 115 post

High Court to say, "It is quite true that the lower Court had no power to make the order, but we will . . . The power given by clause 15 is not an original but a superintending power. It assumes that the subordinate Court had jurisdiction but has wrongly declined to exercise it. If the subordinate Court had jurisdiction it is because of the inherent power and duties cast upon it by the rule which binds it to act in all cases where no specific provision exists according to equity, justice, and good conscience. It has been recently held that proceedings on applications for enhancement of rent under sect 27 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (Beng VI of 1908) are judicial proceedings, and the Deputy Commissioners in performance of their duties under that Act are Courts subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, which has jurisdiction to interfere when the Courts of Collectors have either exceeded, or failed or refused to exercise, the jurisdiction vested in them by that Act (1).

Inherent jurisdiction—The inherent jurisdiction of the Court to which reference has been made in the last paragraph has now been expressly recognized in sect 151 of the present Code.

"The laws"—In the under mentioned case, (2) Stuart, C J, speaking of this expression as occurring in the Preamble of the preceding Code, observed that it meant all the laws in operation at the time of the passing of the Code, including the General Clauses Act of 1868, but as has been pointed out (3) this is not correct, as the expression must be used with the words "relating to the procedure etc, and the General Clauses Act cannot be deemed a law 'relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature'".

"Courts of Civil Judicature"—Subject to what is hereinafter stated, the Preamble shows that the Code applies to all Courts of Civil Judicature. Its provisions will therefore govern the procedure of all Civil Courts in British India, subject to the provisions contained in this preliminary portion of the Code, and to any other special Act providing a special procedure for proceedings under it. The general power to entertain suits of a Civil nature except suits of which cognizance is barred by any enactment does not include a general power to make declarations (4). The Act applies to suits in the ordinary civil jurisdiction. As to other cases, see the following paragraphs—

Special jurisdiction (a) Insolvency jurisdiction—Insolvency procedure is civil procedure. Insolvency procedure governing the Provincial Courts was formerly dealt with in the Code, but is now the subject of a separate Act (III of 1907). The insolvency law applicable to the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, is contained in 11 & 12 Vict c 21 (1848). Clause 18 of the Letters Patent, 1865, provides that the Insolvent Court in these Presidency Towns shall be held before one of the

(1) Kartik Chandra Ogha & Cons Chand Mahto, 40 C 518 (1913), Chaitan Patgosa Mahapatra & Kunja Behari Pattnaik, 38 C 83 (1911).

(2) Uda Begum & Imad ud din, 2 A 74, 90.

(3) 12701, 12702, 12703, 12704, 12705, 12706, 12707, 12708, 12709, 12710, 12711, 12712, 12713, 12714, 12715, 12716, 12717, 12718, 12719, 12720, 12721, 12722, 12723, 12724, 12725, 12726, 12727, 12728, 12729, 12730, 12731, 12732, 12733, 12734, 12735, 12736, 12737, 12738, 12739, 12740, 12741, 12742, 12743, 12744, 12745, 12746, 12747, 12748, 12749, 12750, 12751, 12752, 12753, 12754, 12755, 12756, 12757, 12758, 12759, 12760, 12761, 12762, 12763, 12764, 12765, 12766, 12767, 12768, 12769, 12770, 12771, 12772, 12773, 12774, 12775, 12776, 12777, 12778, 12779, 12780, 12781, 12782, 12783, 12784, 12785, 12786, 12787, 12788, 12789, 12790, 12791, 12792, 12793, 12794, 12795, 12796, 12797, 12798, 12799, 12800, 12801, 12802, 12803, 12804, 12805, 12806, 12807, 12808, 12809, 12810, 12811, 12812, 12813, 12814, 12815, 12816, 12817, 12818, 12819, 12820, 12821, 12822, 12823, 12824, 12825, 12826, 12827, 12828, 12829, 12830, 12831, 12832, 12833, 12834, 12835, 12836, 12837, 12838, 12839, 12840, 12841, 12842, 12843, 12844, 12845, 12846, 12847, 12848, 12849, 12850, 12851, 12852, 12853, 12854, 12855, 12856, 12857, 12858, 12859, 12860, 12861, 12862, 12863, 12864, 12865, 12866, 12867, 12868, 12869, 12870, 12871, 12872, 12873, 12874, 12875, 12876, 12877, 12878, 12879, 12880, 12881, 12882, 12883, 12884, 12885, 12886, 12887, 12888, 12889, 12890, 12891, 12892, 12893, 12894, 12895, 12896, 12897, 12898, 12899, 12900, 12901, 12902, 12903, 12904, 12905, 12906, 12907, 12908, 12909, 12910, 12911, 12912, 12913, 12914, 12915, 12916, 12917, 12918, 12919, 12920, 12921, 12922, 12923, 12924, 12925, 12926, 12927, 12928, 12929, 12930, 12931, 12932, 12933, 12934, 12935, 12936, 12937, 12938, 12939, 12940, 12941, 12942, 12943, 12944, 12945, 12946, 12947, 12948, 12949, 12950, 12951, 12952, 12953, 12954, 12955, 12956, 12957, 12958, 12959, 12960, 12961, 12962, 12963, 12964, 12965, 12966, 12967, 12968, 12969, 12970, 12971, 12972, 12973, 12974, 12975, 12976, 12977, 12978, 12979, 12980, 12981, 12982, 12983, 12984, 12985, 12986, 12987, 12988, 12989, 12990, 12991, 12992, 12993, 12994, 12995, 12996, 12997, 12998, 12999, 13000, 13001, 13002, 13003, 13004, 13005, 13006, 13007, 13008, 13009, 13010, 13011, 13012, 13013, 13014, 13015, 13016, 13017, 13018, 13019, 13020, 13021, 13022, 13023, 13024, 13025, 13026, 13027, 13028, 13029, 13030, 13031, 13032, 13033, 13034, 13035, 13036, 13037, 13038, 13039, 13040, 13041, 13042, 13043, 13044, 13045, 13046, 13047, 13048, 13049, 13050, 13051, 13052, 13053, 13054, 13055, 13056, 13057, 13058, 13059, 13060, 13061, 13062, 13063, 13064, 13065, 13066, 13067, 13068, 13069, 13070, 13071, 13072, 13073, 13074, 13075, 13076, 13077, 13078, 13079, 13080, 13081, 13082, 13083, 13084, 13085, 13086, 13087, 13088, 13089, 13090, 13091, 13092, 13093, 13094, 13095, 13096, 13097, 13098, 13099, 13100, 13101, 13102, 13103, 13104, 13105, 13106, 13107, 13108, 13109, 13110, 13111, 13112, 13113, 13114, 13115, 13116, 13117, 13118, 13119, 13120, 13121, 13122, 13123, 13124, 13125, 13126, 13127, 13128, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134, 13135, 13136, 13137, 13138, 13139, 13140, 13141, 13142, 13143, 13144, 13145, 13146, 13147, 13148, 13149, 13150, 13151, 13152, 13153, 13154, 13155, 13156, 13157, 13158, 13159, 13160, 13161, 13162, 13163, 13164, 13165, 13166, 13167, 13168, 13169, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174, 13175, 13176, 13177, 13178, 13179, 13180, 13181, 13182, 13183, 13184, 13185, 13186, 13187, 13188, 13189, 13190, 13191, 13192, 13193, 13194, 13195, 13196, 13197, 13198, 13199, 13200, 13201, 13202, 13203, 13204, 13205, 13206, 13207, 13208, 13209, 13210, 13211, 13212, 13213, 13214, 13215, 13216, 13217, 13218, 13219, 13220, 13221, 13222, 13223, 13224, 13225, 13226, 13227, 13228, 13229, 13230, 13231, 13232, 13233, 13234, 13235, 13236, 13237, 13238, 13239, 13240, 13241, 13242, 13243, 13244, 13245, 13246, 13247, 13248, 13249, 13250, 13251, 13252, 13253, 13254, 13255, 13256, 13257, 13258, 13259, 13260, 13261, 13262, 13263, 13264, 13265, 13266, 13267, 13268, 13269, 13270, 13271, 13272, 13273, 13274, 13275, 13276, 13277, 13278, 13279, 13280, 13281, 13282, 13283, 13284, 13285, 13286, 13287, 13288, 13289, 13290, 13291, 13292, 13293, 13294, 13295, 13296, 13297, 13298, 13299, 13300, 13301, 13302, 13303, 13304, 13305, 13306, 13307, 13308, 13309, 13310, 13311, 13312, 13313, 13314, 13315, 13316, 13317, 13318, 13319, 13320, 13321, 13322, 13323, 13324, 13325, 13326, 13327, 13328, 13329, 13330, 13331, 13332, 13333, 13334, 13335, 13336, 13337, 13338, 13339, 13340, 13341, 13342, 13343, 13344, 13345, 13346, 13347, 13348, 13349, 13350, 13351, 13352, 13353, 13354, 13355, 13356, 13357, 13358, 13359, 13360, 13361, 13362, 13363, 13364, 13365, 13366, 13367, 13368, 13369, 13370, 13371, 13372, 13373, 13374, 13375, 13376, 13377, 13378, 13379, 13380, 13381, 13382, 13383, 13384, 13385, 13386, 13387, 13388, 13389, 13390, 13391, 13392, 13393, 13394, 13395, 13396, 13397, 13398, 13399, 13400, 13401, 13402, 13403, 13404, 13405, 13406, 13407, 13408, 13409, 13410, 13411, 13412, 13413, 13414, 13415, 13416, 13417, 13418, 13419, 13420, 13421, 13422, 13423, 13424, 13425, 13426, 13427, 13428, 13429, 13430, 13431, 13432, 13433, 13434, 13435, 13436, 13437, 13438, 13439, 13440, 13441, 13442, 13443, 13444, 13445, 13446, 13447, 13448, 13449, 13450, 13451, 13452, 13453, 13454, 13455, 13456, 13457, 13458, 13459, 13460, 13461, 13462, 13463, 13464, 13465, 13466, 13467, 13468, 13469, 13470, 13471, 13472, 13473, 13474, 13475, 13476, 13477, 13478, 13479, 13480, 13481, 13482, 13483, 13484, 13485, 13486, 13487, 13488, 13489, 13490, 13491, 13492, 13493, 13494, 13495, 13496, 13497, 13498, 13499, 13500, 13501, 13502, 13503, 13504, 13505, 13506, 13507, 13508, 13509, 13510, 13511, 13512, 13513, 13514, 13515, 13516, 13517, 13518, 13519, 13520, 13521, 13522, 13523, 13524, 13525, 13526, 13527, 13528, 13529, 13530, 13531, 13532, 13533, 13534, 13535, 13536, 13537, 13538, 13539, 13540, 13541, 13542, 13543, 13544, 13545, 13546, 13547, 13548, 13549, 13550, 13551, 13552, 13553, 13554, 13555, 13556, 13557, 13558, 13559, 13560, 13561, 13562, 13563, 13564, 13565, 13566, 13567, 13568, 13569, 13570, 13571, 13572, 13573, 13574, 13575, 13576, 13577, 13578, 13579, 13580, 13581, 13582, 13583, 13584, 13585, 13586, 13587, 13588, 13589, 13590, 13591, 13592, 13593, 13594, 13595, 13596, 13597, 13598, 13599, 13600, 13601, 13602, 13603, 13604, 13605, 13606, 13607, 13608, 13609, 13610, 13611, 13612, 13613, 13614, 13615, 13616, 13617, 13618, 13619, 13620, 13621, 13622, 13623, 13624, 13625, 13626, 13627, 13628, 13629, 13630, 13631, 13632, 13633, 13634, 13635, 13636, 13637, 13638, 13639, 13640, 13641, 13642, 13643, 13644, 13645, 13646, 13647, 13648, 13649, 13650, 13651, 13652, 13653, 13654, 13655, 13656, 13657, 13658, 13659, 13660, 13661, 13662, 13663, 13664, 13665, 13666, 13667, 13668, 13669, 13670, 13671, 13672, 13673, 13674, 13675, 13676, 13677, 13678, 13679, 13680, 13681, 13682, 13683, 13684, 13685, 13686, 13687, 13688, 13689, 13690, 13691, 13692, 13693, 13694, 13695, 13696, 13697, 13698, 13699, 13700, 13701, 13702, 13703, 13704, 13705, 13706, 13707, 13708, 13709, 13710, 13711, 13712, 13713, 13714, 13715, 13716, 13717, 13718, 13719, 13720, 13721, 13722, 13723, 13724, 13725, 13726, 13727, 13728, 13729, 13730, 13731, 13732, 13733, 13734, 13735, 13736, 13737, 13738, 13739, 13740, 13741, 13742, 13743, 13744, 13745, 13746, 13747, 13748, 13749, 13750, 13751, 13752, 13753, 13754, 13755, 13756, 13757, 13758, 13759, 13760, 13761, 13762, 13763, 13764, 13765, 13766, 13767, 13768, 13769, 13770, 13771, 13772, 13773, 13774, 13775, 13776, 13777, 13778, 13779, 13780, 13781, 13782, 13783, 13784, 13785, 13786, 13787, 13788, 13789, 13790, 13791, 13792, 13793, 13794, 13795, 13796, 13797, 13798, 13799, 13800, 13801, 13802, 13803, 13804, 13805, 13806, 13807, 13808, 13809, 13810, 13811, 13812, 13813, 13814, 13815, 13816, 13817, 13818, 13819, 13820, 13821, 13822, 13823, 13824, 13825, 13826, 13827, 13828, 13829, 13830, 13831, 13832, 13833, 13834, 13835, 13836, 13837, 13838, 13839, 13840, 13841, 13842, 13843, 13844, 13845, 13846, 13847, 13848, 13849, 13850, 13851, 13852, 13853, 13854, 13855, 13856, 13857, 13858, 13859, 13860, 13861, 13862, 13863, 13864, 13865, 13866, 13867, 13868, 13869, 13870, 13871, 13872, 13873, 13874, 13875, 13876, 13877, 13878, 13879, 13880, 13881, 13882, 13883, 13884, 13885, 13886, 13887, 13888, 13889, 13890, 13891, 13892, 13893, 13894, 13895, 13896, 13897, 13898, 13899, 13900, 13901, 13902, 13903, 13904, 13905, 13906, 13907, 13908, 13909, 13910, 13911, 13912, 13913, 13914, 13915, 13916, 13917, 13918, 13919, 13920, 13921, 13922, 13923, 13924, 13925, 13926, 13927, 13928, 13929, 13930, 13931, 13932, 13933, 13934, 13935, 13936, 13937, 13938, 13939, 13940, 13941, 13942, 13943, 13944, 13945, 13946, 13947, 13948, 13949, 13950, 13951, 13952, 13953, 13954, 13955, 13956, 13957, 13958, 13959, 13960, 13961, 13962, 13963, 13964, 13965, 13966, 13967, 13968, 13969, 13970, 13971, 13972, 13973, 13974, 13975, 13976, 13977, 13978, 13979, 13980, 13981, 13982, 13983, 13984, 13985, 13986, 13987, 13988, 13989, 13990, 13991, 13992, 13993, 13994, 13995, 13996, 13997, 13998, 13999, 14000, 14001, 14002, 14003, 14004, 14005, 14006, 14007, 14008, 14009, 14010, 14011, 14012, 14013, 14014, 14015, 14016, 14017, 14018, 14019, 14020, 14021, 14022, 14023, 14024, 14025, 14026, 14027, 14028, 14029, 14030, 14031, 14032, 14033, 14034, 14035, 14036, 14037, 14038, 14039, 14040, 14041, 14042, 14043, 14044, 14045, 14046, 14047, 14048, 14049, 14050, 14051, 14052, 14053, 14054, 14055, 14056, 14057, 14058, 14059, 14060, 14061, 14062, 14063, 14064, 14065, 14066, 14067, 14068, 14069, 14070, 14071, 14072, 14073, 14074, 14075, 14076, 14077, 14078, 14079, 14080, 14081, 14082, 14083, 14084, 14085, 14086, 14087, 14088, 14089, 14090, 14091, 14092, 14093, 14094, 14095, 14096, 14097, 14098, 14099, 14100, 14101, 14102, 14103, 14104, 14105, 14106, 14107, 14108, 14109, 14110, 14111, 14112, 14113, 14114, 14115, 14116, 14117, 14118, 14119, 14120, 14121, 14122, 14123, 14124, 14125, 14126, 14127, 14128, 14129, 14130, 14131, 14132, 14133, 14134, 14135, 14136, 14137, 14138, 14139, 14140, 14141, 14142, 14143, 14144, 14145, 14146, 14147, 14148, 14149, 14150, 14151, 14152, 14153, 14154, 14155, 14156, 14157, 14158, 14159, 14160, 14161, 14162, 14163, 14164, 14165, 14166, 14167, 14168, 14169, 14170, 14171, 14172, 14173, 14174, 14175, 14176, 14177, 14178, 14179, 14180, 14181, 14182, 14183, 14184, 14185, 14186, 14187, 14188, 14189, 14190, 14191, 14192, 14193, 14194, 14195, 14196, 14197, 14198, 14199, 14200, 14201, 14202, 14203, 14204, 14205, 14206, 14207, 14208, 14209, 14210, 14211, 14212, 14213, 14214, 14215, 14216, 14217, 14218, 14219, 14220, 14221, 14222, 14223, 14224, 14225, 14226, 14227, 14228, 14229, 14230, 14231, 14232, 14233, 14234, 14235, 14236, 14237, 14238, 14239, 14240, 14241, 14242, 14243, 14244, 14245, 14246, 14247, 14248, 14249, 14250, 14251, 14252, 14253, 14254, 14255, 14256, 14257, 14258, 14259, 14260, 14261, 14262, 14263, 14264, 14265, 14266, 14267, 14268, 14269, 14270, 14271, 14272, 14273, 14274, 14275, 14276, 14277, 14278, 14279, 14280, 14281, 14282, 14283, 14284, 14285, 14286, 14287, 14288, 14289, 14290, 14291, 14292, 14293, 14294, 14295, 14296, 14297, 14298, 14299, 14300, 14301, 14302, 14303, 14304, 14305, 14306, 14307, 14308, 14309, 14310, 1

Judges of the High Court (called the Commissioner in Insolvency), and the High Court and any such Judge thereof shall have and exercise within the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William, and the Presidency of Madras and Bombay respectively, such powers and authorities with respect to original and appellate jurisdiction and otherwise as are constituted by the laws relating to insolvent debtors in India. The Insolvent Court in the Presidency Towns is constituted by a separate Act of Parliament. It is a Civil Court existing for the purpose of giving relief to persons unable to pay their debts. By the Royal Charter Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Viet c 104), upon the establishment of the High Courts the Supreme Courts were abolished. In 1862 and 1863 Letters Patent were granted. The Insolvent Court was not then merged in the High Court, but continued in existence side by side with the High Court. The appeal to the Supreme Court (Insolvent Act, sect 73) and the power to make rules (ib sect 76), were transferred to the High Court (1). But though the Insolvent Court is a separate tribunal from the High Court, it nevertheless stands in such a special relation to the High Court that a limitation or exclusion of the latter's jurisdiction may indirectly limit or exclude its own (2). Sect 5 of the Insolvent Act gives the jurisdiction, which is that of the Supreme Court. Sect 18 of the Letters Patent declares the jurisdiction to be that constituted by the laws relating to Insolvent Debtors in India. But under clause 41 of the Letters Patent this is subject to the Legislative powers of the Indian Government. Therefore when Act V of 1872 declared that the High Court at Bombay had no jurisdiction in Sind, it was held that the petition must be dismissed, though the Insolvent was a European British subject (3). But the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was twofold—local as regards the inhabitants of the cities and personal as regards European British subjects residing in any part of the territories subject to the Presidency Governments. So it was held that an European British subject residing in the Bombay Presidency, but outside the local limits of the High Court's jurisdiction, was entitled to petition, (4) and that though the personal jurisdiction did not now exist as regards civil actions, it had not been interfered with as regards the Insolvent Court. This would appear also to have been the view of Peacock, C J, (5) but not of Markby, J, (6) though in the latter case the actual decision was that the jurisdiction of the Insolvent Court was limited to the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William, that is Bengal proper, the petitioner's permanent residence being in the North Western Provinces.

The Insolvent Court is a Civil Court, its proceedings are civil proceedings and (as was apparent from Chapter XX of the former Code now repealed) its procedure is Civil Procedure. But under sect 120, nothing in this Code extends or applies to any Judge of a High Court in the exercise of

(1) *In re Bhagwandas Hurjiwan*, 8 B 511 (1884)

(2) *In re James Currie*, 21 B 403

(3) *Id* 403

(4) *In re George Blackwell* 9 Bom H C R 461 (1872), *In re James Currie*, 21 B 403,

411 (1886)

(5) *In re William Cockburn*, 2 Ind Jur N S 326 (1867)

(6) *In re Tietkins an Insolvent*, 1 B L R, O C 84 (1868)

jurisdiction as an Insolvent Court (1) Orders in insolvency are not orders under the Code of Civil Procedure They are orders under a special law, but they are under a special law in which different procedure is provided (2) Execution is not taken out from this Court as it has no machinery for the purpose Formerly the Insolvent Court availed itself of the machinery of the Supreme Court as auxiliary to its own Subject to the provisions of the Charter Act and Letters Patent, the High Court exercises the same jurisdiction took over all the work and inherited all the powers that vested in the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction it superseded The Insolvency Act, however, has nothing to do with procedure in execution, which is governed by the Civil Procedure Code (3) So although the Insolvent Court determines the substance of the questions relating to the insolvent's estate the proceedings in execution and the judgment are the High Court's Thus a judgment entered up under sect 86 of the Insolvent Act, in the name of the Official Assignee against the insolvent is entered up in the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court (4) The Provincial Insolvency Act does not interfere with any right of appeal to the Privy Council which may otherwise exist (5)

(b) Admiralty jurisdiction.—The rules regulating Admiralty practice were framed when the Code of 1809 was in force Rule 54 directs that proceedings not provided for by the rules shall be regulated by the rules and practice of the High Court in suits brought in it in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction The Code applies to proceedings on the Admiralty side of the High Court sect 645A of the former Code was held to show that this is so (6) In Vice Admiralty cases the effect of appearance the mode of objecting to the jurisdiction, and the mode of questioning the validity of a pleading (7) the admission of appeals (8) and costs (9) are matters governed by a settled practice under the Code the Privy Council rules issued under Statute 2 & 3 Wm IV c 51, having no operation except in case of suits *in rem* in which no appearance has been entered, and of other matters to which the Code cannot be applied (10) Though the Admiralty rules do not apparently contemplate a suit *in rem* and *in personam* being combined, they do not expressly or by necessary implication forbid it (11) In a case such as an application for consolidation not provided for by either the Rules or the Code the practice of the Court of Admiralty in England ought to be followed so far as such practice can be applied to this country by analogy (12)

(1) See *In re Horma ji Ardesir* 17 B 334 340 (1892) so s 545 did not apply ab at 340

(2) *In the matter of R Brown* 12 C at p 634 (1886)

(3) *In re Bhagwandas Hurjivan* 8 B 511 (1884)

(4) *Navivahu r Turner* 13 B 50 (1889)

(5) *Chatiprat Singh Dugar r Kharag Singh Lachmuran* 1 C 41 C 66 (1913)

(6) *Bombay and Persia S N Co r Shej*

herd 12 B 237 240 241 (1887)

(7) *In re ship Fannj Skolfell* 17 C 337 (1889)

(8) *In re ship Champ on* 17 C 66 (1889)

(9) *In re steamship Drachenfels* 27 C 860 889 (1900)

(10) *In re ship Fann, Skolfeld supra*

(11) *Bombay Persia S N Co v Shepherd supra*

(12) *In re ship Falls of Ftrck* 22 C 511 (1890)

(c) **Testamentary and intestate jurisdiction**—The procedure in testamentary and intestate jurisdiction whether in the High Court (1) or Provincial Courts, is governed by the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865) and the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), and by these Acts the proceedings in relation to the granting of probate and letters of administration are, except as in these Acts otherwise provided, to be regulated so far as the circumstances of the case will admit, by this Code (2) In any case in which there is contention the proceedings shall take, as nearly as may be the form of a regular suit, according to the provisions of this Code in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration, as the case may be is the plaintiff and the person who may have appeared to oppose the grant is the defendant (3) Although a petition before a caveat has been entered is not a suit in the ordinary acceptation of the term sect 617 of the former Code which provided that the procedure for suits should be followed so far as it could be made applicable in all proceedings other than suits and appeals made the provisions of the Code applicable to all miscellaneous civil proceedings Having therefore regard to this section and sects 233-261 of the Succession Act, it has been held that Chapter XXVI of the former Code was applicable to petitions for probate (4) If the provisions of the Code are inconsistent with those of the Probate and Administration Act those of the Code must prevail, as it is the later enactment (5)

The Code only applies so far as the circumstances of the case admit and though generally applicable, the circumstances peculiar to testamentary cases must be considered So though probate proceedings are generally regulated by the Code it was held in the undermentioned case that the Court was not justified under sect 177 of the former Code (corresponding with O XVI r 20) in deciding against a caveator because he refused to answer a question and in dispensing with proof of the execution of the will though that section would be applicable under proper circumstances (6) So also unless a will is proved in some form, no grant of probate can be made merely on the consent of parties Hence an agreement or compromise as regards the genuineness and due execution

(1) Mr Stokes in his Commentary on the Succession Act, expresses an opinion that, having regard to the definition of District Judge in s 3 of that Act (and the same definition is repeated in the Probate and Administration Act) as the judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction this section applies to proceedings of High Courts in their testamentary and intestate jurisdiction and that their proceedings also must be regulated by this Code, cf *Umaro Chand v Bindra Chand* 17 A 475 (1893). *In re Monohur Mookerjee*, 5 C. 756 (1860). *Esoof Hashim Dooly v Fatima Bibee*, 24 C 30 (1896), *Yeshwant v Shankar*, 17 B 344 (1892), *In re the will of Dawood* 18 B 237 (1893) By the Rules of the Civil High Court the procedure in all cases is to

be regulated so far as the circumstances of the case admit by the rules of procedure laid down in the Succession Act, whether the Act itself applies to the law or not, and in cases in which such rules are inapplicable the procedure is to be regulated by the Rules 60, Beauchamp, R & O

(2) Act X of 1865, s 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

(3) Act X of 1865, s 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

(4) *In re the will of D. K. ...* (1893).

(5) *Esoof Hashim Dooly v Fatima Bibee*, 24 C 30 33 (1896).

(6) *Harji Janji v ...* (1892).

chod Nakh, 9 B 24

of a will if its effect is to exclude evidence in proof of the will, is not lawful within the meaning of O XVIII r 3, of this Code (1)

(d) **Matrimonial jurisdiction**—In the case of matrimonial causes, as regards matters of procedure, all proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act between party and party are subject to the provisions therein contained to be regulated by this Code (2) Thus any question as to the time within which a respondent may file an answer to a petition is to be decided not by the Rules of the English Divorce Court but by the provisions of the Code dealing with written statements (3) But by sect 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, which does not apply to questions of procedure (4) the Court is enabled to follow the principal rules of the English Divorce Act in all matters which are not expressly dealt with either in the Act itself or in the Code Thus the Court has adopted Rule 158 of the English Rules and ordered a husband to give security for his wife's costs (5) In a recent case in the Bombay High Court where a Parsi had married a Christian in London and had remained there it was held that the jurisdiction was limited to Christian subjects residing within the Presidency (6)

Special Courts (a) **Small Cause Courts**—See notes to sects 7 and 8 *post* These are Courts of inferior jurisdiction and when in a Presidency Town are subject to the order and control of the High Court (7)

(b) **Mamlatdars' Court**—The object of the Mamlatdars Act (Bom, Act III of 1876) was to consolidate and amend the law relating to the powers and procedure of Mamlatdars' Courts The purpose of the Act was temporary only, and chiefly to provide for the cultivation of the land and to prevent breaches of the peace until the Civil Court should determine the rights of the disputants, and such being its purpose the procedure provided is of a very summary character (8) These Courts are Civil Courts and subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court (9) The Act however, provides a

(1) *Monmohini Guba v Banga Chandra Das* 31 C 357 (1903)

(2) Act IV of 1869, s 45

(3) *Abbott v Abbott* 4 B L R (O C) 51 (1869)

(4) *Abbott v Abbott supra* King King 6 B 416, 419 (1882), the principles and rules referred to are rules of quasi substantive rather than of mere adjective law A v B, 22 B 612 (1898)

(5) *Mayhew v Mayhew*, 19 B 293 (1894) followed in *Georgucopulas v Georgucopulas* 29 C 619 (1902), and as to costs of appeal, *Fowle v Fowle* 4 C 260 269 281 (1878)

(6) *Nusserwanjee Pestonjee Arlesir Wadia v Eleonora Nusserwanjee*, 38 B 125 (1913) cf *Thornton v Thornton* 10 B 422 (1886) (jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court when defendant resided in England) See also *Phillips v Battle*, 17 C W N 621 (1913)

(7) *In re Jaggessur Roy* 5 C L R 170

(1879)

(8) *Ganpatram Jebhai v Panchhod Haribhai* 17 B 645 (1892)

(9) *Kasam Sabeel v Maruti* 13 B 552 (1888) and as to the jurisdiction of the High Court over the Mamlatdars Courts as subordinate Courts and applications under s 115, *post* the cases therein cited and case in last note and *Nathekha v Abd ul Ali* 18 B 449, *Dattatraya v Vaman*, 21 B 88 (1895) *Sayad Saifulla v Sayad Haji Miya*, 24 B 238 (1899) [Minor may sue], *Chinaya v Gan gava*, 21 B 775 (1890) [dispossession of third person], *Ningappa v Adeveppa* 21 B 397 (1900) [id], *Balvantrao v Sprott* 23 B 761 (1899) [jurisdiction of Mamlatdar over officers of Government] *Som Gopal Bhagale v Vinayak Bhikambhat*, 25 B 395 (1900) [natural water course—obstruction—injunction]

special procedure, and there is no indication in it of any intention that the rules of this Code should apply to cases for which the special procedure makes no provision. The provisions of the Code therefore do not apply to such Courts in Bombay (1)

(c) **Revenue Court**—The term is defined in sect 5, clause (2), *post*, which see. There is a distinction between Rent Courts and Civil Courts, as referred to in the Rent Acts, Civil Courts being Courts exercising all the powers of Civil Courts as distinguished from the Rent Courts which only exercise powers over suits of a limited class. But a Rent Court is a Civil Court in the sense that it decides civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights (2). It has therefore been a question in certain cases whether Rent Courts being Civil Courts in the latter sense their procedure is, in the absence of any special provision, governed by the Code. The answer to this question is to be determined not so much by an inquiry into the question whether they are Civil Courts, but whether, assuming they are such, the provisions of the Acts constituting those Courts do not exclude the provisions of the Code, in other words, are those Acts complete Codes in themselves or are they governed in matters upon which they are silent by the Code? This question, which has arisen with respect to Act XII of 1881 and Act X of 1869, is dealt with *post*.

In the majority of cases however, no such question can arise, as most of the Tenancy Acts make special provision as regards the applicability of the Code to proceedings in Revenue Courts. In the case of Act XVIII of 1881 (Land Revenue Central Provinces) the Code does not of itself apply, but the Chief Commissioner may, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, make rules consistent with the Act for regulating the procedure of Revenue Officers in cases for which a procedure is not prescribed by the Act, and may by any such rule direct that any provisions of the Code shall apply, with or without modification, to all or any classes of cases before Revenue Officers (3).

The Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887) provides that the Local Government may, with the previous sanction of the Governor General, make rules consistent with the Act, for regulating the procedure of Revenue Courts in matters under the Act for which a procedure is not prescribed thereby, and may by any such rule direct that any provisions of the Code shall apply with or without modification, to all or any classes of cases before the Courts. Until rules are made and subject to those rules when made and to the provisions of the Act, the Code shall, so far as is applicable, apply to all proceedings in Revenue Courts whether before or after decree (4).

The Lower Bengal Rent Act of 1869, now repealed, enacted that save as otherwise provided all proceedings under that Act should be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure (5). Under the provisions of the present Bengal

(1) *Kasam Sahib v. Maruti*, 13 B 552 (1888).

(2) *Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherjee*, 9 C 295, 300, 304 (1882). *I am* *Lochau v. Beni Prasad*, 13 C. W. N. 791 (1908).

(3) Act XVIII of 1881 [repealed in part and amended by Act XVI of 1889, XII of 1891 and XII of 1895], s. 19.

(4) Act XVI of 1887 [amended by Act VII of 1901], s. 88.

(5) Act VIII of 1869, (B. C.) s. 34.

Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), the High Court may from time to time, with the approval of the Governor General in Council, make rules consistent with that Act, declaring that any portions of the Code shall not apply to suits between landlord and tenant as such or to any specified classes of such suits, or shall apply to them subject to modifications specified in the rules. Subject to any rules so made, and subject also to the other provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, this Code shall apply to all such suits (1) Sects 121-127, 129, 305 320-326 of the former Code and the corresponding sections of the present Code do not apply to suits for the recovery of rent, and special rules of procedure in respect of certain matters are prescribed for such suits (2) No rules have been made by the High Court declaring any portions of the Code inapplicable to suits between landlord and tenant

The N W P Rent Act (XII of 1881) appears to contain complete rules of procedure upon the trial of rent suits under it, and it was the opinion of Stuart C J in the under mentioned case (3) that it was intended to exclude the provisions of the Code. But it was held by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in that case, that the Courts of Revenue in the North Western Provinces in those matters of procedure upon which the Rent Act of these provinces is silent, are governed by the Code, and that therefore the procedure furnished by sects 43 and 373 of the former Code was applicable to suits tried under the N W P Rent Act, 1881 (4) The grounds of that decision, which is, in fact, based upon the decision of the Privy Council in *Nilmoni Singh Deo v Taranath Mukerjee*, (5) is that Revenue Courts are Courts of Civil Judicature within the meaning of the Code, and that unless exempted (which they were not) by the Code itself, they would in all matters, except those in which special procedure is provided in the Rent Act, be governed by the law of the Civil Code. The Full Bench decision does not apply where the Act provides a machinery of its own independent of the Civil Procedure Code, as in the case of references of suits to arbitration (6) And though the procedure prescribed by the Code, such as that prescribed by sect 285, of the former and sect 63 of the present Code may be applicable as between Courts of Revenue of different grades, it cannot be applied where the conflict is between a Court of Revenue and a Civil Court (7)

A similar question arose as regards the Bengal Rent Act, X of 1859, which is still in force in certain places. Formerly it was held, following the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court already referred to, that the

(1) Act VIII of 1885 s 143

(2) *Id.*, s 148, see also ss 141 147, 145 154

(3) *Madho Prakash Singh v Murli Manohar*, 5 A 406, 413 (1883), for amending Acts see Act IX of 1887, VI of 1888, s 10 (2), XIV of 1886

(4) *Id.*

(5) 9 C 205 (1882), followed in *Maharaja of Bhartpur v Kachera*, 19 A 510 (1897) [Civil Procedure Code ss 37, 432], *Raghubar Dava v Banko Lal* 22 A 182, 185 (1900)

[Civil Procedure Code, ss 285, 295] In *Onkar Singh v Bhup Singh*, 16 A 496, 498 (1894) the Court said 'We find in Revenue Courts that when the Civil Procedure Code is to be applied it is expressly so provided, so that as a general rule they are outside the scope of the Code of Civil Procedure

(6) *Fahim un Nissa v Ajudhia Prasad*, 6 A 170 (1881)

(7) *Raghubar Dava v Banko Lal*, 22 A 182 (1900)

Revenue Courts in those matters of procedure upon which the Act is silent, are governed by the Code, and that in consequence sect 43 of the former Code applied to a suit instituted under the Rent Act (1) The decision of the Privy Council in a preceding case (2) lends support to this view in so far as it was there held that though there was nothing in the Act which provided for execution beyond the Collectors' jurisdiction, there was nothing in it to forbid the conclusion that such executions were left to the operations of Act XXXIII of 1852 (an Act to facilitate the enforcement of judgments in places beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts pronouncing the same) or the corresponding portion of Act VIII of 1859 (Civil Procedure Code) When a decree for rent, made by a Collector under sect 23 Act X of 1859, is transferred for execution to a Civil Court, no doubt the latter assuming the transfer to have been validly made will act under the procedure which governs it The Privy Council however, went further and held that the Collector might make the transfer himself under the provisions of the Code which were applicable there being nothing in the Rent Act to exclude them It has, however subsequently, been held, upon the authority of the reasoning in the Full Bench decision in Nagendro Nath Mullick v Mathura Mohun Parhi (3) that Act X of 1859 is a Code complete in itself and unaffected by the general laws of limitation and that therefore the provisions of this Code do not apply to cases under Act X of 1859 (4) These cases proceed in substance upon certain of the grounds taken in the dissentient judgment in the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, viz that apart from the question whether Revenue Courts are Civil Courts, and Civil Courts within the meaning of the Code, the enactment of a special procedure in a special Act excluded the supposition that it was intended to import into that Act the provisions of the Code upon matters not dealt with by that Act If it had been so intended it would have been so enacted as was done in the subsequent Act of 1869 When however an appeal goes from a Collector to a higher Court the decree which is given on appeal is the decree of a Civil Court and a second appeal lies to the High Court, according to the same procedure which obtains in respect of second appeals in suits tried in the ordinary Civil Courts (5) In other words, the removal of the matter to a Civil Court brings it under the provisions regulating the procedure of that Court

In the case of a sale held under sect 110, Act X of 1859 it was held that sect 310A, of the former (corresponding to O XXI r 89, of the present) Code did not apply, as the Code was applicable up to the sale and not after it (6)

The Code does not apply to cases under the Chota Nagpore Landlord and Tenant Procedure Act (7)

(1) Adhiram Narain v Raghu Molapatra 12 C. 50 (1885)

(2) Nilmoni Singh Deo v Taranath Mukherjee, 9 C. 295 (1882) Hare Krishna v Bishun Chandra 35 C. 799 (1905)

(3) 18 C. 308 (1891)

(4) Mokunda Ballav Kar v Bhogalan Chunder Das, 21 C. 514 (1894) Radha Malhol Santra v Luki Narain v Chow

Jhry 21 C. 428 (1893) See Chaitan v Kunja 15 C. W. N. 863 (1911)

(5) Sadai Naik v Sarsi Naik 25 C. 537 (1901)

(6) Harish Chandra Ghose v Ananta Charan Patra 2 C. W. N. 127 (1897)

(7) Kbedu Mahto v Budhun Mahto 27 C. 508, 514 (1900) Act I of 1879 B. C. is modified by I of 1903 and Bengal Acts IV

Apparently the Code is applicable in cases under the Madras Rent Recovery Act (1) But though sect 43 (O II r 2, of present Code) precludes a landlord from suing for rent not included in a previous suit, this does not preclude him from adopting any other remedy the law gives him to recover his rent, as for instance by distress under the Rent Recovery Act (2)

The Code saves any law by a Governor or Lieutenant Governor prescribing a special procedure for suits between land holders and their tenants or agents, and gives power to the Local Government to modify the Code in its application to Revenue Courts See sects 4 and 5, *post*

Judicial discretion—The Code in many of its sections leaves matters dealt with thereby to the discretion of the Court "Discretion when applied to a Court of Law means discretion guided by law It must be governed by rule, and not by humour It must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular (3) In some sections the word "may" occurs Great misconception is caused by saying that in some cases "may" means "must" It never can mean "must" so long as the English language retains its meaning but it gives a power and then it may be a question in what cases, where a Judge has a power given him by the word "may," it becomes his duty to exercise it (4)

Construction of act of Court—The assumption on which all rules of law are founded is that the constituted tribunals are fairly competent to carry them out (5) According to the well known rule, the Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed (6) The rule is to presume that a lower Court has done its duty, neglect of duty cannot be assumed at the mere suggestion of an appellant (7) When an act of a Court can be so construed as to have an operation consistently with law, it would be contrary to ordinary rules of construction to attach to it another signification which would altogether destroy its effect (8) Courts, however, should take care that their orders are framed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law (9) The presumption of regularity is a rebuttable one Irregularity may be shown, and a mistaken petition on the part of a pleader is no ground for the Courts passing an illegal order (10)

of 1897, and V of 1903 and VI of 1908 And see *Kurth Chandra Ogba v Gora Chand Maito* 40 C 518 (1913) (appellate jurisdiction of High Court) For case where this Act was extended to a property before the final decree, see *Lakshmi Bibi Kujram v Atal Bihari Aldar*, 40 C 584 (1913)

(1) Act VIII of 1865 repealed in part of Act VII of 1870, XII of 1873 amended by Act VI of 1888, and Madras Acts II of 1871, and III of 1890 and see Act I of 1906

(2) *Rajah Eswara Doss v Venkataroyar*, 21 M 230 (1897)

(3) *Per Lord Mansfield in Wilkes Case*, 4 Burr. 2539 cited in *Harbans Sahai v Bhairo Pershad Singh* 5 C 259 (1879) 205, and see as to the manner in

which judicial discretion should be used observations of *Jardine, J.*, in *R v Chagan Dayaram*, 14 B 331 (1890), 344, 352

(4) *Nichols v Baker*, 44 Ch D 202 See cases cited in *Hukm Chand C P C* 337 340

(5) *Gopce Nath Singh v Anundmoyee Debis*, 8 W R 167, 169 (1867)

(6) Evidence Act, s 114, ill (e) See notes to this section in *Author's Evidence Act*, 6th ed

(7) *Rash Beharee v Nobaye Poddar*, 11 W R 465 (1869)

(8) *Saroda Persaud v Lulchmeeput* 10 B L R 214, at p 229 (1872)

(9) *Doucett v Wise*, 1 W R 322 (1864)

(10) *Musst Ackjee v Lallah Ramchunder*, 23 W R 400, 401 (1875)

PRELIMINARY

1. (1) This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Short title, commencement and extent

(2) It shall come into force on the first day of January, 1909

(3) This section and sections 1 to 155 extend to the whole of British India the rest of the Code extends to the whole of British India except the Scheduled Districts

Local Extent (a) **British India**—These words exclude the territories of Native Princes and States in alliance with His Majesty, the relation between such Princes and His Majesty being a political relation and the territories of such Princes and States forming no part of the British Dominions although in a political point of view such Princes and States may be subordinate to the British Crown as the Paramount Power (1) They were formerly declared (2) to mean the territories for the time being vested in Her Majesty by the Statute 21 & 22 Vict c 106 (1858) other than the settlement of Prince of Wales' Island (Penang) Singapore and Malacca and the first section of the statute there referred to vested in Her Majesty all territories then in the possession or under the Governments of the East India Company, and all territories which might become vested in Her Majesty by virtue of the rights transferred to Her Majesty from the East India Company Apparently any new province acquired would become, on its acquisition, part of British India (3) Cession of territory confers local jurisdiction (4) The term includes territories ceded "in full sovereignty" or "in perpetuity" there being no difference between the two (5) Prior to the General Clauses Act 1897 it was held not to include cases where as in the case of the British cantonment of Secunderabad there has been no actual cession of territory, (6) nor in the case of Raj Kote where the agreement between Government and the Native State although in different respects dealing with the use of the land and conferring certain powers and jurisdictions on the officers of Government did not relate to the sovereignty of the land, (7) nor as in the case of the British where

(1) *Bikrama Singh v. Bir Singh* 1885 P R No 191 Cited in *Hukm Chand*, 3

(2) S 2 Act 1 of 1858 (General Clauses)

(3) *Ouseley v. Howden Boulton* 161 162

(4) *Sayyid Muhammad Yusufuddin v. R* 2 C W N 1 (1897) in which case there

was held to have been no cession of territory

(5) *Tirumalaramchand v. Bombay Railway* 9 B 24 247 248 (1890)

(6) *Ilsehan Ali Murta v. Abdul A* 21 C 177 (1893)

(7) *Ilsehan Ali Murta* 10 B 180 (1890)

land was held under a sort of mortgage as a security for the fulfilment of certain engagements, which was held to be a tenure distinguishable from that on which the Crown held land assigned to it in perpetuity for the purpose of establishing a British station (1) The definition of the words given in the present General Clauses Act (X of 1897) is wider than that given in the former Act of 1868 The expression "British India" is now defined to mean "all territories and places within Her Majesty's dominions which are *for the time being governed* by Her Majesty through the Governor General of India or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor General of India' The effect of this altered definition is to widen the extent of what will be recognized as British India for the purposes of Indian legislation and to avoid the difficulties which arose from its restriction to the territories vested in Her Majesty by the Statute 21 & 22 Vict c 106 The question of the extent of British India will now under the Code as well as under most other Acts depend on the fact of the place or territory being *governed* by His Majesty without regard to the manner in which this government was acquired and the result being the same whether it was acquired by cession or otherwise, and permanently or temporarily (2) From the first and under both definitions the words "British India" have had a wider meaning than is understood by the term when used in its merely geographical sense as appears from the Scheduled Districts Act 1874 and the Laws Local Extent Act 1874, the Schedules annexed to which mention amongst other places the Laccadive and Nicobar Islands and Aden as parts of British India (3) So also British Burma is a part of British India (4)

(b) **Scheduled Districts**—The term is defined in Act XIV of 1874 to mean the territories mentioned in the first schedule thereto annexed and also any other territory to which the Secretary of State for India, by resolution in Council may declare the provisions of 33 Vict c 43 s 1 to be applicable The conclusion that a district is a non regulation district does not necessarily lead to the inference that the general Acts of Legislature are there inoperative If the Legislature has made the law in terms large enough to extend to the whole of the British territories in India it must have full effect It must be seen in each case in what terms the law is expressed especially in respect of its territorial operation (5)

21 2 In this Act, unless there is *anything* repugnant in the subject or context,—

Definitions

(1) "*Code*" includes *rules*

(2) "*decree*" means the formal expression of an adjudication *which*, so far as regards the Court expressing it, *conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the*

(1) *Triccam v Bombay Baroda Railway*
Ct *supra* at p 249

(2) See *Hukm Chand* 3

(3) See *Triccam v Bombay Baroda Rail*
way Co *supra* at p 249

(4) *Aga Mahomed Hamadani v Cohen* 13
C 221 223 (1886)

(5) *Dick v Heseltine* 1 N W 1 280 284
(1869)

matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 47 or section 144, but shall not include—

(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

(b) any order of dismissal for default

Explanation—A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.

(3) “decree holder” means any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made

(4) “district” means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a “District Court”) and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court

(5) foreign Court means a Court situate beyond the limits of British India which has no authority in British India and is not established or continued by the Governor General in Council

(6) foreign judgment means the judgment of a foreign Court

(7) “Government Pleader” includes any officer appointed by the Local Government to perform all or any of the functions expressly imposed by this Code on the Government Pleader and also any pleader acting under the directions of the Government Pleader

(8) “Judge” means the presiding officer of a Civil Court

(9) “judgment” means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order

(10) “judgment debtor” means any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made

(11) “legal representative” means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a suit is brought or is sued in a representative character the person on whose estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued

(12) “mesne profits” of property means the profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property has received or might with ordinary diligence have received from together with interest on such profits

profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession :

(13) "*moveable property*" includes growing crops :

(14) "*order*" means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree

(15) "*pleader*" means *any* person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a vakil and an attorney of a High Court

(16) "*prescribed*" means *prescribed by rules*

(17) "*public officer*" means a person falling under any of the following descriptions (namely) —

(a) every Judge ,

(b) every *member of the Indian Civil Service* ,

(c) every commissioned or gazetted officer in the military or naval forces of *His Majesty*, including *His Majesty's Indian Marine Service*, while serving under the Government ,

(d) every officer of a Court of Justice whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order, in the Court, and every person especially authorized by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties ,

(e) every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement ,

(f) every officer of *the Government* whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience ,

(g) every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of *the Government*, or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of *the Government*, or to execute any revenue-process, or to investigate, or to report on, any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of *the Government*, or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of *the Government*, or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of *the Government* ; and

(h) every officer in the service or pay of the Government, or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty.

(18) "rules" means rules and forms contained in the First Schedule or made under section 122 or section 125:

(19) "share in a corporation" shall be deemed to include stock, debenture stock, debentures or bonds and

(20) "signed," save in the case of a judgment or decree, includes stamped.

"Code"—Sec as to Rules, sects 121-131.

"Decree"—The term was first defined in the Code of 1877 to mean "the formal order of the Court in which the result of the decision of the suit or other judicial proceeding is embodied." This definition which was found defective, received, after several modifications the form in which it was enacted in 1882. The present Code omits the words "upon any right claimed or defence set up in a Civil Court," substituting the words "*which conclusively determines the rights,*" etc. As regards cases decided under the law prior to 1882, it was observed that the law has been altered by the introduction of a more comprehensive definition of the term "decree, (1) and that a narrow construction should not be placed upon the language of sect 2 (2). But as has been held by the Privy Council, the question whether an adjudication is an order or decree is to be tested, not by general principles but by the expressions of the Code, and those words are to be construed in their plain and obvious sense (3). Thus it has recently been held, that an order assessing no value, but only reproducing the statements of the decree holder and judgment debtor, (4) and an order assessing the value according to the statement of the decree holder alone, after rejecting the judgment debtor's application for time to prove a higher value, are not decrees, since they do not involve a judicial adjudication of value (5). There has been a considerable conflict of decisions on the former section, notably as to the question as to the meaning of the term "right" employed in the section, as will be seen from the following notes. The chief importance of the definition will be found in the question whether in any particular case an appeal lies. A decree, though not according to law, if not appealed against, is binding, (6) between the parties whether principal or *pro forma* (7) and their representatives who, after decree, cannot open up the original proceedings (8). It creates an obligation superseding that existing before it (9) which is enforceable so long

(1) Khadem Hossein; Fmda i Hossem 29
C at p 763 (1901)

(2) Padma Nath Singh & Chandi Charan Singh, 30 C at n 63 (1903)

(3) Bhup Indar : Bijar Mahabhar 23 A st
p. 150, 157 (1900)

(4) Sykkichan 1 + Kulanan 1 14 C I J
607 (1911)

() Deckert, Hans 14 C 1 J 3 (1911)
ref. truck to Sauterbra + Harrukel and 12
C W N 342 (1907)

(6) Sri I Raja Papanama : Sri Vithaladas
19 M 219 at p. 203 (1896) s.c. 23 F.V.

(7) Indochina (du Kerkhutt) 1875
Chund r 10 y 1 shon e 214 (1875)

b) 1 km Blunjen : $M = 1 \times 10^6$ kg
 $W = 1,27 \times 10^4$ J

(and it is not subject to ...)

contra t. Tatyana Vit. 1. 1.
330 (1883)

as the decree is not set aside in a suit constituted for that purpose, (1) but it must be enforced in execution, and does not support a new action, (2) though a second suit will lie for possession if the plaintiff has obtained merely formal possession under the first decree (3)

"Formal"—The expression of the Court's adjudication must be both deliberate and given in the manner provided by the Code. This word will, however, probably be not construed too strictly. In the under mentioned case (4) the point might have been, but was not, taken, and was therefore not dealt with. Pigot, J. however, said "I must add that had the point been raised I should have felt a difficulty in holding that a paragraph in the judgment not drawn up in the form of a decree, and not embodied in a separate form, is within the terms of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decree at all

"Adjudication"—An adjudication ordinarily exists where the Court exercises its mind in the determination of a contested cause. In the case of *ex parte* decrees in the Court of first instance, the Code speaks of them as decrees and treats them as such. They come within the definition the plaintiff being present, and there being an adjudication on the merits. Where, however, it was objected that a decree was not within this section, upon the ground that it was not passed after argument and after a judgment, but merely upon a default, viz. the non appearance of the appellant, it was held that the decree was none the less a formal expression of an adjudication because it was not preceded by an argument or by a judgment—written or otherwise (5). An order of dismissal for default is now excepted.

"Conclusively determines"—The expression "*decides*," which was employed in the last Code, was used to denote what is generally denoted by a "final" adjudication, the term "final" having been avoided apparently as it more usually denotes non appealable, or rather conclusive (6). Thus it has been said that when permission is given under sect. 373 (now O XXIII r 1) to withdraw a suit or appeal it does not decide the suit or appeal. When permission is given as regards the suit, the matter in issue is withdrawn from the adjudication of the Court, and when the order is made in the course of appeal, it decides nothing as to the merits of the decree of the first Court, but it merely wipes out that decree by reason of the suit being withdrawn (7). And an order

(1) Cf. Huro Chunder Biswas v. Nobo Kissen Hookerjee, W. R. 159 (1864).

(2) Rish Munjoree v. Radha Soondaree, 23 W. R. 283 (1875), Mohunt Narsingh Doss v. Moonshee Humrooddien, 20 W. P. 412 (1873).

(3) Shama Churn v. Madhub Chandra, 11 C. 93 (1884), Juggobuudhu v. Parnanund, 16 C. 530 (1889), Hari Mohan Shaha v. Baburahi, 24 C. 715 (1897).

(4) Dulhan Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer, 19 C. 452, 477 (1892). See as to the

necessity for formality, Khadem Hossein v. Emdad Hossein, 29 C. 758 at p. 760 (1901).

(5) Radha Nath Singh v. Chanda Charan Singh, 30 C. 600, 662, s. c., 7 C. W. N. 486, 488 (1903), see cases, *post*.

(6) Hukm Chand, 19, as to the meaning of the word "final," see Balkaran Rai v. Golind Nath Tewari, 12 A. 155, 156 (1890).

(7) Genda Mal v. Irbhu Lal, 17 A. 97 (1895). *Id.* *post*, 'The rights of the parties.'

di allowing in application under sect 372 (now O XXII r 10), inasmuch as although it may be a formal expression of adjudication on the right claimed to be made a party to the suit yet such an adjudication does not decide the suit so far as regards the Court expressing it (1) But an order dismissing an interpleader suit (under O XXXV) is a decree within the meaning of this section for it is the formal expression of an adjudication on the defence (2)

A final decree is sometimes understood as meaning the concluding and conclusive ruling of the Court as opposed to an interlocutory order (3) In another sense a decree becomes final when the time for the last appeal allowed has expired, or, if appealed it has become final by the decree of the High Court as the ultimate Court in the country (4) It is not however, necessary that the decree should be final in the sense that there is nothing further to be done Questions may have to be determined in order to carry the decision into effect Where a decree ascertains and fixes the rights of the parties the fact that further proceedings before a Master Referee, or other person are necessary to carry it into effect does not render it any the less final, if all the directions depending on the result of the proceedings are given in the decree (5) Thus an order determining that a certain person is a partner in a business, and directing an account to be taken is a decree (6) While every decree consists of a final adjudication such decrees are termed interlocutory or preliminary, whilst those that bring the suit to an absolute end are termed final So again the preliminary decree for partition adjudicates the plaintiff's right to obtain a partition and practically decides the suit All that remains to be done being an inquiry into minor matters necessary for the final disposal of the case (7) The fallacy in the objection to treating the preliminary order as a decree lay in treating the words

deciding the suit as equivalent to finally disposing of the suit it being argued that the suit is not disposed of until the arithmetical result is worked out In the case of the preliminary order everything has been decided except what physical pieces of property will be the equivalent of certain shares Therefore in order in a suit for partition which declares the specific rights of the parties and the property to be partitioned, decides that the suit must be decreed as after such an order the suit could not be dismissed by the Court by which it was made, and is therefore an order which adjudicates upon the right claimed and the defence set up in the suit and which as far as the Court expressing it is concerned decides the suit within the definition of a decree and is

(1) Lalit Mohan Roy v Shebock Chand Chowdhry 4 C W N 403 (1900) Jamma Bilal Sheikh Jhan, 24 A 532 F B (1902) Tej Singh v Chabeli Ram 24 A 342 (1902)

(2) Orr v Chidambaram, 33 M 220 (1909)

(3) See Neill v Duke of Devonshire 8 App Cas 135 165 Khadem Hossein v Fmdad Hossein 23 C 758 at pp 764-65 (1901)

(4) Shaikh Iwas v Muna Bito 1 A 17-18 (1876) Razi Sahar Caza 2 A 10* (1884)

(5) See Hukm Chand 21 22

(6) Bawa Nath Chakr v Beri Katta Dutta 23 C 406 (1896) See post as to order directing accounts

(7) Bepun Bihari Modu v Lal Mohun Chattopadhyaya L C 203 (1880) 10 Janath D v Sanamoni Das 12 C 23 (1880) dissenting in Bhakun M v Dabbar Shrut Suniera Dabbar, 12 C 270 (1880) in which case the position of a referee of the parties was determined but no declaration was made of the exact rights of each of the parties and see Bharat Indur Yakub 20 A 150 (1913)

therefore appealable as a decree (1) These decisions have now been recognised, and the section expressly includes a preliminary decree

An order, however, passed in a suit for partition, subsequently to the preliminary decree, appointing a commissioner to make the partition, is not an order in execution, and, therefore, is not appealable under sect 244 (now sect 47) of the Code It is an interlocutory order pending the suit which has not been finally decided, and the appellant may take objection to it in an appeal against the final decree (2)

An order directing accounts (see O XX r 16) was not appealable by the Codes of 1839 or 1877 It was only when the amending Act of 1879 was passed declaring that such an order came within the definition of a decree that it became appealable, (3) and it is still within the definition as a preliminary decree The definition of "decree" implies that an order directing accounts is separable from the rest of the decree adjudicating on the rights claimed or the defences set up in the suit, and therefore though a provisional decree, is appealable (4) An order determining that a certain person is a partner settling the shares of each of the partners in a business and directing an account to be taken, is a decree and is appealable, and was held to be so appealable in a preliminary stage or when appealing from the final decree (5) But where in a decree to take accounts an order was made which was a mere matter of procedure and not a question as to the rights of the parties, such as an order refusing to require the defendants to give inspection of certain books, the order was held not to be a decree or an order on a question relating to the execution of a decree (6) Moreover, the words "*directing an account to be taken*" were held to be used in a precise and technical sense (7) Accordingly an order declaring that the defendants were liable to pay such sum as the Government Surveyor might certify was held not to be a decree, as it neither came within these words nor was an adjudication which decided the suit (8) The substitution

(1) *Dulhin Golab Koer v Radha Dulari Koer*, 19 C 463, F B (1892), followed *Boloram Dey v Ram Chandra Dey* 23 C 279 (1895) This latter case is overruled on the point whether the preliminary order can be questioned for the first time in the appeal from the final decree by *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein*, 29 C 758 (1901), which decides the question in the affirmative But see now s 97

(2) *Jogodishury Debea v Kailash Chandra Lahury*, 24 C 725 (1897) it is an order made in further proceedings in the suit before final decree, and not an order in execution of decree *ib*, at p 739

(3) *Biswa Nath Chaki v Beni Kanta Dutta* 23 C 406, 409 (1896) As to the earlier law, see *Sreenath Roy v Radhanath Mookerjee*, 9 C 773 (1882), *Rustomji v Kessowji* 3 B 161 (1878) An omission to appeal against the preliminary order was held not to debar

the party from questioning it on appeal from the final decree *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein* 29 C 758, s c, 5 C W N 617 (1901) But as to appeal see now sect 97 As to the nature of a decree for account see *Bhup Indar v Bijai Bahadur*, 23 A at p 156 (1900)

(4) *Krishnasami Ayyangar v Pajagopala Ayyangar*, 18 M 73 87 (1893)

(5) *Biswa Nath Chaki v Beni Kanta Dutta*, *supra* approved in *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein*, 29 C 758, *supra*, overruling *Boloram Dey v Ram Chandra Dey*, 23 C 279 (1895) See *Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy v Turner*, 18 I A 1 (1890), s c, 15 B 155, but see now sect 97

(6) *Rustomji v Kessowji*, 8 B 287 (1881)

(7) *Coverji Luddha v Morarji Punji*, 9 B 183 195 (1885)

(8) *ib*

of the words '*conclusively determines*' for "*decides*" does not appear to effect any change in the law as above stated

"The rights of the parties —The last Code used the words "*right claimed or defence set up*" There can we think, be little doubt that what the Legislature originally meant by these words to refer to, were rights of a substantive as distinguished from rights of a merely processual character. In other words, that a decree was, so far as the right claimed an adjudication on the merits (that is the right to recover land, money, etc., claimed in the suit), and so far as the defence set up, an adjudication on the defence which might be grounded either on the merits using that term in its generally accepted sense, or on some point of law affecting the merits, such as limitation. The contrary construction (1) namely that the right might be one merely of procedure appeared to be negatived both by the general language of the section and by the circumstance that if it were correct there could not be any occasion for specifically making an order rejecting a plaint, a decree as such an order directly involves an adjudication against the plaintiff's right to proceed with the suit as brought by him (2)

The view here contended for has been expressly adopted or applied in several cases. In an early case *Wilson and Field, JJ* were disposed to hold that a decree must be an expression of opinion upon the rights of the parties, and therefore the dismissal of a suit on a ground wholly apart from the merits of the case such as a dismissal under sect 97 (now O IX r 2) for non service of summons was not a decree (3). It has been held that a decision under sect 5 of the Court Fees Act is not a decree and that the right obtained or defence set up must be a right or defence set up in the suit or appeal and not a right to have the suit or appeal heard on a particular stamp or the plaint or the memorandum of appeal rejected on account of the stamp (4). Similarly it has been held by the Allahabad High Court (5) and was formerly held by the Calcutta High Court (6) that the order of dismissal of an appeal under sect 556 (now O XLI r 17) is not a decree. It was observed by the Court in the first of the Calcutta cases cited that such an order was not '*the formal expression of an adjudication upon a right claimed*', that through the

(1) Contended for in *Hukm Chand* 15 10

(2) The explanation ib, 16 that this may have been expressly provided for *ex cautela*, does not seem to us to have much force

(3) *Luckhy Churn Chowdhry v Bulurumissa* 9 C 627 (1889) but see comment on this case in *Malharaj Atharaj Mahanagar Mehta Harinarayan Narsaram* 19 B at p 308 (1901) referred to post. I recently had been told that a decision rejecting a petition to be enforced under the Stamp Act was not appealable as a decree as it could not be said to affect the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court. *Senaka Choudhary v Bilalunjoy Siala* 5 C 311 (1877)

(4) *Balkaran Rai v Gobind Nath Tewari*, 12 A 129 156, F B (1890) but a distinction must be drawn according to the decisions of the other High Courts between a question relating to valuation and a question as to the clause under which valuation is to be made. In the latter case there is an appeal. *Dadar Nagesh* 23 B 486 (1898)

(5) *Mukli v Fakir* 3 A 302 (1880), *Mansab Ali v Nalal Chant* 15 A 39 (1893)

(6) *Jarnath Sen v Budhan* 23 C 115 (1893) *Anwar Ali v Jaffer Ali ib* 827 lit in *Lal Narayan Singh v Mahomed Pafuillan* 28 C 84 (1900) (dismissal for default in execution).

therefore appealable as a decree (1) These decisions have now been recognised, and the section expressly includes a preliminary decree

An order, however, passed in a suit for partition, subsequently to the preliminary decree, appointing a commission to make the partition, is not an order in execution, and, therefore, is not appealable under sect 244 (now sect 47) of the Code It is an interlocutory order pending the suit which has not been finally decided, and the appellant may take objection to it in an appeal against the final decree (2)

An order directing accounts (see O XX r 16) was not appealable by the Codes of 1859 or 1877 It was only when the amending Act of 1879 was passed declaring that such an order came within the definition of a decree that it became appealable, (3) and it is still within the definition as a preliminary decree The definition of "decree" implies that an order directing accounts is separable from the rest of the decree adjudicating on the rights claimed or the defences set up in the suit, and therefore though a provisional decree is appealable (4) An order determining that a certain person is a partner, settling the shares of each of the partners in a business and directing an account to be taken, is a decree and is appealable, and was held to be so appealable in a preliminary stage or when appealing from the final decree (5) But where in a decree to take accounts an order was made which was a mere matter of procedure and not a question as to the rights of the parties, such as an order refusing to require the defendants to give inspection of certain books, the order was held not to be a decree or an order on a question relating to the execution of a decree (6) Moreover, the words "*directing an account to be taken*" were held to be used in a precise and technical sense (7) Accordingly an order declaring that the defendants were liable to pay such sum as the Government Surveyor might certify was held not to be a decree, as it neither came within these words nor was an adjudication which decided the suit (8) The substitution

(1) *Dulhan Golab Koer v Radha Dulari Koer*, 19 C 463, F B (1892), followed *Boloram Dey v Ram Chundra Dey*, 23 C 279 (1895) This latter case is overruled on the point whether the preliminary order can be questioned for the first time in the appeal from the final decree by *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein*, 29 C 758 (1901), which decides the question in the affirmative But see now s 97

(2) *Jogodishury Deb v Kailash Chandra Lahry*, 24 C 725 (1897), it is an order made in further proceedings in the suit before final decree, and not an order in execution of decree, *ib*, at p 739

(3) *Biswa Nath Chakraborty v Beni Kanta Dutt*, 23 C 406, 409 (1896) As to the earlier law, see *Sreenath Roy v Radhanath Mookerjee*, 9 C 773 (1892), *Rustomji v Kessowji*, 3 B 161 (1876) An omission to appeal against the preliminary order was held not to debar

the party from questioning it on appeal from the final decree *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein*, 29 C 758, s c, 5 C W N 617 (1901) But as to appeal see now sect 97 As to the nature of a decree for account, see *Bhup Indar v Bijai Bahadur*, 23 A at p 156 (1900)

(4) *Krishnasami Ayyangar v Rajagopala Ayyangar*, 18 M 73, 87 (1903)

(5) *Biswa Nath Chakraborty v Beni Kanta Dutt*, *supra*, approved in *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein*, 29 C 758, *supra*, overruling *Boloram Dey v Ram Chundra Dey*, 23 C 279 (1895) See *Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy v Turner*, 18 I A 6 (1890), s c, 15 B 155, but see now sect 97

(6) *Rustomji v Kessowji*, 8 B 287 (1884)

(7) *Coverji Luddha v Morarji Punja*, 9 B 183, 195 (1885)

(8) *Id*

claimed or defence set up. And it has recently been held by the Calcutta High Court that an order for security in stay of execution is not a decree within the meaning of this section because it does not determine the rights of the parties (1). It has also been held that an order rejecting an application for permission to sue as a pauper and striking the case off the Court's file was a decree as the matter disposed of was in fact whether the plaintiff had a right to institute the suit and the effect of the order was to negative that right and to strike the case off the file (2). Here again the matter has been subject of dissent it being subsequently held that no appeal will lie from an order rejecting an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis the ground being that it was not an adjudication deciding a right claimed in a suit (3). On the other hand an order made under sect 366 (now O XXII r 3) that a suit do abate has been held to be virtually a decree though it is a question to be determined before the suit or appeal is heard on the merits on the ground that it disposes of the plaintiff's claim as completely as if the suit had been dismissed (4). This decision again has been dissented from by the Allahabad High Court (5). The Allahabad High Court has in one case (6) held that an order giving leave to withdraw a suit under sect 373 or 373 and 582 (now O XXIII r 1 and sect 107) is a decree, but subsequently that Court (7) and the Bombay (8) and Calcutta (9) High Courts have held that such an order is not a decree on the ground that it does not express any adjudication on the thing claimed but leaves all issues in the suit undetermined and relegates the parties to the position they occupied before the suit was filed. Where the Appellate Court passed an order directing the case to be sent back to the original Court with orders to pass a formal decree in accordance with the award of an arbitrator it was held that the order was a decree as the matter was before the Appellate Court on the merits and the order was intended to finally dispose of the matter (10). In the under mentioned case a person claimed to appear in a suit as guardian. The Court decided that he had not got that right and it was held per Lyrrall J that the order decided his position in the suit that the order was a decree and that it an appeal

(1) *Saraswati Barmania v Colij Day Barman* 41 C 160 (1911) and *S v De ki Nanlan Singh v Bansi Singl* 14 C 1 J 30 (1911)

(2) *Baldeo v Gula Kuar* J A 1-3 (1886)

(3) *Secretary of State v Jillo* 21 A 131 (1898)

(4) *Bhikaji Ramchandra v Lunsford* 10 B 220 (1880) followed in *Subbayya v San madayyar* 18 V 496 (1890) which also deals with s. 367 of the former Code

(5) *Hamida Bibi v Ali Husein Khan* 17 A 172 (1895)

(6) *Ganga Ram v Datta Ram* 8 A 80 (1880). The contrary had been previously held in *Kal an Singh v Lekhraj Singh* C A 11 (1884)

(7) *Jagdish Chaudhri v Tulsh Chaudhri*

1 A 19 (1893) *Canda Mal v Durbil Lal* 71 A 97 (1895) [*per curiam* it does not affect the order any right claimed or lost in the suit it decides nothing as to the merits]

(8) *Lalaji v Gana* 15 B 30 (1891)

(9) *Jogodindro Nath v Sarat Sundari* 15 C 322 373 (1891) [ref to *Lamakissoor v Suranga* 21 M 491 (1898)] *Syed Abdul Hasan v Kashi Sahu* 4 C W N 41 (1890); *s c* 27 C 362 if lower court order is appealed from and the order of Appellate Court is as to the order and dismisses the suit then the order filed with Appellate Court is a decree *Abdul Husein v Kashi Sahu* 27 A 363 (1899)

(10) *Mugwa Doss Marwar v Nu Dhall* N 12 C 173 (1880)

might have been preferred (1) In a recent case in the Bombay High Court it was said that in applying this definition of decree it will be found that in the reported cases in that Court the rights of the parties with regard to the matter in controversy have been taken to mean general rights (such as rights in relation to status jurisdiction, limitation and frame of suit) which if decided must have a general effect on the proceedings (2)

Where the plaintiff failed to reply to interrogatories and the Court dismissed the suit under sect 136 (now O Xf r 21), it was contended that the order of dismissal was not a decree as it did not adjudicate on the merits of the right claimed But this contention was overruled and the view adopted that when the procedure of the Court finally disposes of the suit it is a decree (3)

It was observed by Sargent, C J, in dealing with the objection that the order did not adjudicate on the merits of the right claimed, that having regard to the numerous authorities the other way (namely, those treating as decrees orders not dealing with the merits), it was too late to re open the question, although had it been *res integra* it must be admitted that there was force in the argument based on the words of the section and also on the circumstance of there being a special provision for an order rejecting the suit, and that where the procedure of the Court finally disposes of the suit it is a decree (4)

It appears to be advisable to adopt an interpretation which affords a ready test to distinguish between decrees on the merits and merely processual orders If this is not done each case must be more or less empirically decided as and when it arises and on its peculiar circumstances In such case the general test would appear to be—"does the order finally dispose of the suit?" It may be noted in this connection that in the report of the Select Committee (March 12, 1903) on the Bill introduced in December, 1901, the Committee stated that they omitted the words restricting "decree" to adjudications "upon the merits," as was proposed to be done because they might be held to exclude final decisions given wholly upon questions of law But as to this it is perhaps sufficient to point out that while a claim with merits in its popular sense can be defeated by a defence based upon a point of law, such as limitation, it can only succeed by virtue of a favourable adjudication on the merits The section, however, has since been expressly amended so as to exclude any order of dismissal for default This appears to indicate that the "*rights of the parties*" referred to do not include mere processual rights, and that to constitute a decree there must be an expression of opinion on the rights of the parties in the sense of an opinion upon the merits of the case, that is on the right asserted in the suit or upon the defence, whether of law or fact, set up to defend such alleged right Moreover, a dismissal for default does not "conclusively determine" the right of the party against whom it is passed

"Civil Court"—In the corresponding definition in Act X of 1877, the word "civil," which was introduced in the 1st Code, found no place It has been held that a Civil Court does not include a Revenue Court in the N W P,

(1) Buldeo Das & Gobind Shankar, 7 A 914 (1885)

(2) Narayan Balkrishna & Gopal Jiv Ghadi, 38 B 392 (1914)

(3) Maharaj Adhiraj Mansingji & Mehta Haribharram, 19 B 307 (1894)

(4) Maharaj Adhiraj Mansingji & Mehta Haribharram, 19 B 307 (1894)

and the term "decree" in this Code does not include the decree of such a Court (1) Though the words "Civil Court" have been now omitted, probably as unnecessary, the definition of course only applies to such Courts

"In the suit"—Where there is no civil suit there is no decree and in consequence no appeal (2) No doubt there is authority for the view that the term "suit" is a very extensive one (3) but the term ought to be confined to such proceedings as under that description are directly dealt with by the Code, or such as by the operation of the particular Acts which regulate them are treated as suits (4) The term "suit" has not been defined for the purposes of the Code (5) The conjunction of the words "suit or appeal" in the last Code appeared to show that appeals, which are often considered a stage of the suit, are not to be deemed to fall within it The section now refers to suit only The word is wide enough to cover every proceeding, whether original or appellate terminable in such an adjudication (as is referred to in the first part of the clause), under this Code

The particular orders mentioned in the second clause of the last Code as constituting a decree did so by way of addition and exception to the general definition of that term in the first clause (6) This, as has been pointed out, (7) is particularly evident from the mention of orders passed in execution proceedings under sect 244 of the last Code, as they cannot be said in any sense to finally decide the suit or appeal, though an order rejecting a plaint may be said to finally determine, so far as the Court which makes the order is concerned, that the suit as brought will not lie, and may have been made a decree on that ground (8) The enumeration of orders was held to be exhaustive, and not merely illustrative or explanatory (9) Though it cannot be said that the rule was always strictly observed (*vide post*), analogy could not extend the term to any orders other than, though like those specifically mentioned

(a) Execution proceedings—Under the last Code sect 617 (now sect 141) was held to show that applications for execution were not suits but only proceedings in a suit and appeals from orders on applications were dealt with

(1) Onkar Singh v Bhup Singh, 16 A 496 (1894)

(2) Minkshi v Subramanya 11 M 26 (1889) Thus a decision under s 6 of the Court Fees Act not being a decree no appeal lies Balkaran Rai v Gobind Nath Tewari, 12 A 129, 156 (1900)

(3) Venkata v Venkataswami 22 M at p 217, and see Bhospen Iro v Baroda 15 C 500 504 (1891)

(4) Watkins v Fox infra at p 948 The general power under sect 9 to try all suits of a civil nature except those expressly or impliedly barred does not involve a general power to make declarations Bai v Vaktul v Thakore Agarwani, 34 B C 1 (1910)

(5) See Watkins v Fox 22 C at p 948 (1894) The third section of the Limitation Act distinguishes suits from appeals or applications

(6) Hukm Chand 27, 28

(7) Ib

(8) It is essentially different from an order admitting a plaint as such an order determines a thing but is only the first step towards putting the case in a shape for termination Justice of the Peace for Calcutta v Oriental Assurance Co 8 B L 1 433 (1872)

(9) Coverly v Muzaj 9 B L 10 (1880), Pullin v Lab Koor v Labha Dulari Koor 11 C at p 68 (1872)

in sect 588 (now sect 104, O XLIII r 1) (1) Orders passed in execution were expressly provided for in the second clause of the section, the first clause of which referred to suits or appeals only. Under sect 48 (now sect 26) of the Code a suit must commence with a plaint, and therefore a proceeding under sect 241 (now sect 47) though it is a proceeding in a suit, is not a suit (2) The corresponding words in the Code of 1877 were, "*suit or other judicial proceeding*," which last expression was held to include proceedings in execution. But now execution proceedings are not suits, and an order thereon is not a decree unless it determines a question within sect 47 (3)

(b) **Insolvency proceedings**—Insolvency proceedings under the former Code were held to be proceedings in a suit. Thus an order under sect 358 of the former Code, declaring an insolvent absolved from further liability, was held to be a decree as finally deciding the suit, (4) but as has been pointed out, (5) it is not easy to understand what was the suit decided by such order, as even execution proceedings, though included in a suit, are not themselves a suit. An appeal from such an order, (6) as well as from an order refusing to declare a person absolved (7) has been heard, but without any objection or argument. The matter is now regulated by Act III of 1907.

(c) **Probate proceedings**—Contentious proceedings for the grant of probate were held to be a suit, as an order granting probate, though spoken of in the Probate Act as an order, is for the purposes of the Code a decree, because so far as the Court granting the probate is concerned, it decides not only a right to have the probate granted, but also the defence set up against the grant (8) This is the law now. But where in an Administration suit the first Court recorded a finding on a substantial question of right between the parties and receivers, and the plaintiff (without applying to have a formal decree drawn up) appealed against the finding on the ground that it was a decree, it was held that there was no formal decree from which he could appeal (9)

(d) **Arbitration proceedings**—As regards these proceedings the position under the former Code was this.—When an order for reference to arbitration was made in a suit under sect 508 (now clause 3, Sch II), judgment was given on the award, and upon the judgment so given a decree followed under sect 522 (now clause 16 of same), but no appeal lay from such decree except

(1) Venkata v Venkatarama, 22 M 256, 258 (1898). In Gokul Krsto v Aukhil Chunder, 16 C at p 464 (1889), it was held for the purpose there dealt with that suit included proceedings taken to execute the decree.

(2) Venkata v Venkatarama, 22 M 256 (1898). As regards proceedings under ss 523, 525, which have been held in certain cases to be suits, this is because the applications are directed to be numbered and registered as suits. See post.

(3) Bariswari Barnania v Meti Barmonya, 17 C W N 1240 (1913).

(4) Hukm Chand v Robinson, 1894, P R No 43, cited in Hukm Chand, Civ Pr Code, 25.

(5) Hukm Chand, loc cit.

(6) Rura Mal v Jalal ud din, 1885, P R No 39, cited in Hukm Chand, 25.

(7) Downes v Richmond, 5 A 258 (1883). This last case may have been decided upon the old Code.

(8) Umrao Chand v Bindrabun Chand, 17 A 475 (1895).

(9) Bai Divali v Shah Vishrav, 34 B 162 (1909).

so far as it was in excess of or not in accordance with the award. Orders under sect 514 superseding such an arbitration or under sect 518 modifying such award were appealable under the provisions of sect 588 of the former Code. There was a difference of opinion in and between the High Courts whether orders passed on an application under sect 523 of the former Code to have an agreement for reference to arbitration or under sect 525 of the same Code to have an arbitration award filed in Court were or were not decrees in a suit. The determination of this question considerably depended upon the meaning to be given to the words in both these sections—"The application shall be in writing and shall be numbered and registered as a suit," etc. and whether an order of reference under sect 523 or an order under sect 525, was the formal expression of an adjudication upon a right claimed or defence set up which finally decided the suit. In some cases the words cited were held to show that the proceeding was a suit in others it was considered that they were merely intended for administrative purposes. The Allahabad High Court held that neither proceedings under sects 523 (1) nor 525 (2) were suits, and the Madras High Court on the contrary, held that both proceedings under sects 523 (3) and 525 (4) were suits and the orders made thereunder were decrees and appealable. The Calcutta and Bombay High Courts did not deal with sect 523, but the first Court held that orders under sect 525 were decrees (5) and the second Court held that a proceeding under that section was not a suit (6). Proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) are not suits (7). It is a special Statute enacted to deal with special cases and orders made under it are outside the ordinary course of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and it gives no right of appeal to the Privy Council (8). Under this Act the High Court is the ultimate umpire in a series of arbitration proceedings and its award is neither a decree under this section nor a final judgment or order within the meaning of clause 39 of the Letters Patent (9). Clause 16 of the second schedule determines the cases in which only an appeal will lie from decrees or orders passed in arbitration proceedings. See that schedule and cases there cited.

(e) Miscellaneous proceedings not suits.—A final decision in a miscellaneous proceeding was not under the last Code a decree though it was

(1) *Diva Nand v. Dikhtanwar Singh* 5 A 333 1 B (1883) *contra* *Sadik Ali Khan v. Im Lal Ali Khan* 3 A 286 (1880)

(2) *Rhola v. Gobind Dayal* 6 A 186 1 B (1884) *dist.* *Janki Tewari v. Gayan Tewari* 3 A 427 (1880) *Kunji Lal v. Durgasasad* 32 A 484 (1910)

(3) *Cowdu Magata v. Cowdu Bhagavan* 22 M 299 (1898)

(4) *Ponnusami Mudali v. Mandi Sundara Madali* 27 M 255 1 B (1903) *contra* *Vikrama v. Kristnan Namludri* 3 M 68 (1879)

(5) *Mahomed Waliud din v. Hakim Ali* 2 C. 75, 1 B (1898) *contra* *Sree Iam Chowdhury v. Deo Sundhoo Chowdhury* 1

490 (1881) which however was not referred to in the judgments in the F B case

(6) *Mohan v. Tukaram* 21 B 63 (1881) which Farran J. said that it was only by an extension of the usual meaning of the term that an application to file an award can be regarded as a suit and that it is in truth an application to have legal proceedings to a legal decision already arrived at by a judicial body only the part of

(1) *Nolodup Chund v. Brojendra Lal Ray* 1 C 400 (1881)

(2) *Langdon v. Khatoung* 1 C 110 (1882)

(3) *Special Officer Sabette v. J. J. Sabette* 37 R. 25 (1912)

held (1) to be so under the Code of 1859 A settlement case under sect 104 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, before it was modified by Act III of 1898, B C, was held not to be a suit (2) Proceedings contemplated by sect 27, Act VIII of 1865, Madras, are summary and an order passed in them cannot, it was held, be said to have decided a suit or appeal and was therefore not a decree (3) An order under the Indian Trusts Act, refusing to remove a trustee, has been held not to be a decree (4) An order appointing a person a member of a committee, under sect 10 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, has been held by the Privy Council not to be a decree for the purposes of sect 540 (now sect 96), their Lordships observing that "*there was no civil suit respecting the appointment*" (5) An order refusing (6) or granting (7) leave to sue under the Religious Endowments Act is not a decree nor is an order passed on a contempt of Court (8) There appears to be no change in this respect

Rejection of a plaint—An order rejecting a plaint is a decree whatever may be the grounds, or absence of grounds, for that order In every case an order falling within sect 54 (now O VII r 11) is a decree (9) The words are however not limited to the cases provided for in sects 53 and 54 (now O VI r 17 O VII r 11) *post* (10) Nor does it make any difference that the rejection may be due to a misapplication of the rules of the Code or practice (11) So not only is an order rejecting a plaint on the ground that it is insufficiently stamped (12) a decree, but also an order given on the ground that the plaintiffs are minors (13) And orders which are substantially in effect orders rejecting plaints have been held to be decrees, as an order returning a plaint for including causes of action which could not be joined without leave of the Court, (14) or an order under sect 331 (now O XXI r 99) refusing to number and register a claim as a suit, which is of the same effect as a refusal to register

(1) *Reasut Hossein v Hadjee Abdoollah*, 3 I A 221 (1876)

(2) *Upadhyay Thakur v Persidh Singh*, 23 C at p 729 (1896) Proceedings under ss 84 [Goghun Mollah & Rameshwar, 18 C 271 (1891), Peary Mohun Mukerji & Baroda Churn Chuckerbutty, 19 C 485 (1892)] and 93 of the same Act [*Hossain Bux v Nutook dharee Lall*, 14 C 312 (1887)] are not suits An order under s 37, Act VIII of 1869 was held to be a decree *Brojendra Coomar Roy & Krishna Coomar Ghose*, 7 C 684 (1881)

(3) *Perumal & Rajagopala*, 13 M 248 (1899)

(4) *Nathu Wilson v McAlee*, 19 A 131 (1896)

(5) *Minakshi v Subramanya*, 11 I A 160 (1887), s c, 11 M 20

(6) *Kazem Ali & Azim Ali Khan*, 18 C 382 (1891)

(7) *Mozaffer Ali & Hedayet Hosain*, 34 C 541 (1907)

(8) *Goda Ram v Suraj Mul*, 27 A 380 (1904)

(9) *Muhammad Sadik & Muhammad Jan*, 11 A 91 93 (1888)

(10) *Beni Ram Bhutt & Ram Lal Dhukri*, 13 C 189 (1886)

(11) See last case in which the usual course

which s 44 r (a) of the last Code was mis applied

(12) *Ajoodhya Pershal & Gunga Pershad*, 6 C 249 (1890), *re* Muhammad Sadik & Muhammad Jan, 11 A 91, 93 (1888)

(13) *Beni Ram Bhutt & Ram Lal Dhukri*, *supra*

(14) *Bandhan Singh v Solhu*, 8 A 191 (1886) As to return for presentation to proper Court, see *Kahan Das & Nawal Singh*, 1 A 620 (1878)

a plaint, or which in other words amounts to the rejection of a plaint (1) An order refusing to entertain a suit because the section of the law to which it related was not cited in the plaint, was held under the Code of 1859 to be a judgment. The Court pointed out that such an order ought to state whether the suit was dismissed or the plaint rejected and under what sections respectively (2) An order rejecting an appeal stands on the same footing. An order rejecting a plaint is a decree and by sect 532 (now O XXVII r 2) of the Code the provisions theretofore contained are made to apply to appeals, so far as such provisions are applicable. An order therefore rejecting or dismissing an appeal is a decree of the Appellate Court under the terms of the definition (3) In the Code there is no separate provision which allows the Appellate Court to "reject" a memorandum of appeal on the ground of its being barred by limitation. Sect 543 (now O XLI r 3) is limited to cases in which the memorandum is not drawn up in the manner prescribed by the Code and it is only by applying sect 54 (c) (now O VII r 11) *mutatis mutandis* (as provided by sect 582 now sect 10^o O XXII r 11) to appeals that the Code can be understood to make provision for rejection of appeals as barred by limitation. Sect 4 of the Limitation Act says that the appeal shall be dismissed. It is clear therefore that such an order of dismissal is a decree as it disposes of the appeal (4) So an order dismissing an appeal as being presented out of time, (5) rejecting an appeal as not duly presented the *valahutnamah* being executed in favour of two *vahs* but accepted only by one, (6) or for deficiency of court fee, (7) an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal on the ground that it contained language disrespectful to the Court of first instance (8) have been held to be decrees. On the other hand it has been held that an order returning a memorandum of appeal on the ground that the value of the suit was beyond the pecuniary limits of the Court's jurisdiction is not a decree, as it did not decide but refused to decide the appeal (9) And an order returning a plaint for presentation to the proper Court is not a decree (10) Where there is no appeal and no appellate decree there can be no second appeal. Where an appeal petition having been presented bearing

- (1) Fomandro Deb Rajkut r Rani Jugo
dabwari Dabi, 14 C 234 (1886) f H Gopal
r Fernandes, 16 M 127 (1892)

held (1) to be so under the Code of 1859. A settlement case under sect 104 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, before it was modified by Act III of 1898, B C, was held not to be a suit (2) Proceedings contemplated by sect. 27, Act VIII of 1865, Madras, are summary, and an order passed in them cannot, it was held, be said to have decided a suit or appeal and was therefore not a decree (3) An order under the Indian Trusts Act, refusing to remove a trustee, has been held not to be a decree (4) An order appointing a person a member of a committee, under sect 10 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, has been held by the Privy Council not to be a decree for the purposes of sect 540 (now sect 96), their Lordships observing that "*there was no civil suit respecting the appointment*" (5) An order refusing (6) or granting (7) leave to sue under the Religious Endowments Act is not a decree nor is an order passed on a contempt of Court (8) There appears to be no change in this respect

Rejection of a plaint—An order rejecting a plaint is a decree, whatever may be the grounds, or absence of grounds, for that order. In every case an order falling within sect 54 (now O VII r 11) is a decree (9). The words are however not limited to the cases provided for in sects 53 and 54 (now O VI r 17, O VII r 11), *post* (10). Nor does it make any difference that the rejection may be due to a misapplication of the rules of the Code or practice (11). So not only is an order rejecting a plaint on the ground that it is insufficiently stamped (12) a decree, but also an order given on the ground that the plaintiffs are minors (13). And orders which are substantially in effect orders rejecting plaints have been held to be decrees, as an order returning a plaint for including causes of action which could not be joined without leave of the Court, (14) or an order under sect 331 (now O XXI r 99) refusing to number and register a claim as a suit, which is of the same effect as a refusal to register

(1) *Reasut Hossein v Hadjee Abdoollah*, 3 I A 221 (1876)

(2) *Upadhyay Thakur v Persadh Singh*, 23 C at p 729 (1896). Proceedings under ss 84 [*Goghun Mollah v Rameshwar*, 18 C 271 (1891)], *Peary Mohun Mukerji v Baroda Churn Chuckerbutti*, 19 C 485 (1892)] and 93 of the same Act [*Hossain Bux v Mutook dharee Lall*, 14 C 312 (1887)] are not suits. An order under s 37, Act VIII of 1860, was held to be a decree. *Brojendro Coomarr Roy v Krishna Coomarr Ghose*, 7 C 684 (1881)

(3) *Perumal v Rajagopala*, 13 M 248 (1899)

(4) *Nathu Wilson v McAfee*, 19 A 131 (1896)

(5) *Minakshi v Subramanya*, 14 I A 160 (1887), s c, 11 M 26

(6) *Kazem Ali v Azim Ali Khan*, 18 C 352 (1891)

(7) *Mozaffer Ali v Hedayet Hosain*, 34 C 781 (1907)

(8) *Gods Ram v Suraj Mal*, 27 A 380 (1904)

(9) *Muhammad Sadik v Muhammad Jan*, 11 A 91, 93 (1888)

(10) *Beni Ram Bhutt v Ram Lal Dhukri*, 13 C 189 (1886)

(11) See last case in which the usual course would have been to suspend proceedings [see *Rattonbai v Chabildas*, 13 B 7, 11 (1888)], and *Bandhan Singh v Solhu*, 8 A 191, in which s 44, r (a) of the last Code was mis applied

(12) *Ajoodhya Pershad v Gunga Pershad*, 6 C 219 (1880), *ref* *Muhammad Sadik v Muhammad Jan*, 11 A 91, 93 (1888)

(13) *Beni Ram Bhutt v Ram Lal Dhukri*, *supra*

(14) *Bandhan Singh v Solhu*, 8 A 191 (1886). As to return for presentation to proper Court, see *Kahan Das v Nawal Singh*, 1 A 620 (1878)

"decrees," and is such appealable (1) In the first place the former definition excluded matters specified in sect 588 (2) As regards others, whether it be expedient to generalize on the question may be doubtful though the test laid down by Banerji, J, (3) would probably be found sufficient in most if not in all cases (1) Banerji J, held, in the case referred to, (4) that it is not every order made in execution of a decree that comes within sect 47 (formerly sect 241) If that were so, every interlocutory order in an execution proceeding, such as an order granting or refusing process for the examination of witnesses would be appealable, and far greater latitude would be given of appealing against orders in such proceedings than is allowed as against orders made in suits before decree—a thing which could hardly have been intended An order in execution proceedings can come under that section only when it determines some question relating to the rights and liabilities of parties with reference to the relief granted by the decree, not when it determines merely an incidental question as to whether the proceedings are to be conducted in a certain way The language of sect 47, which enacts that certain questions "*shall be determined by an order of the Court executing the decree and not by separate suit*" clearly indicates that the questions contemplated by the section must be of a nature such that it is possible to suppose that but for the section they could have formed the subject of determination by a separate suit But a question of an incidental character can never come under that description and an order determining such a question cannot therefore be a decree as defined in sect 2 But however it may be as to the test suggested when the effect of an order is to determine the rights of a party with respect to a matter material to the due execution of the decree such order is a "decree," and there is an appeal (6) Thus it has been held that an order for distribution by the Court is a decree under this section read with section 47 (7) Generally it may be said that all orders passed in execution proceedings relating to the right of a person to execute a decree or the liability of a person to satisfy the same or to stay of execution relate to the execution of the decree, and are "decrees" within this section The matter is one which can be more conveniently dealt with under section 47, to the notes of which section reference should be made No appeal lies from the order as distinguished from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class (8)

(1) *Iajah Ramessur Proshad Narain Singh v Lai Sharu Kriessur* 8 C W N 207 261 (1901)

(2) This section specifies a large number of orders from which appeals lie including many made in execution proceedings but not including other orders which are, however decrees within the meaning of s 2 See *Rhup Indar v Bijai Bahadur* 23 A 172 157 (1900), *Lakshmi v Maru Dasi* (14) 37 M 29, *Venkata Giri Ayyar v Sadagopalachariar* (1901) 14 M L J 313 Orders specified mean orders in terms of sect 47 as well as of the former Code (1) *State of Mysore v*

Hari Mohan Adak 8 C W N 313 315 (1903)

(3) *In Jogodishury Debbar v Kailash Chandra Lahury*, 24 C 720 733 (1907) *vide post*

(4) *Rajah Ramessur Proshad v Lai Sharu Kriessur supra*

(5) *Jogodishury Debbar v Kailash Chandra Lahury* 24 C at pp 733 74 (1907)

(6) *Iajah Ramessur Proshad v Lai Sharu Kriessur* 8 C W N at pp 211 212 (1901)

(7) *Ben der Haria* 10 C W N 73 (1911)

(8) *Zelma v Mar v Lal* 25 A 73 (1906)
Chitra Teran v K. K. Kanan Lal 11 A Mal 2 A 373 11

Under the last Code it was held that the definition of "order," given in sub clause 14, could not be used for the purpose of defining the word "order" in the previous part of the section, because it expressly excluded everything in that part (1)

Preliminary decree—See note on "*Conclusively determines*"

"Dismissal for default"—See note on "*The rights of the parties*"

"Decree-holder" and "judgment-debtor"—The second term means only any person against whom an order has been made, and there is now a reference in the definition to the order being capable of execution. The transfer of a judgment debtor's liability is not recognized except to a very limited extent, in case of his death, to his legal representative (see sect 50 formerly sect 234, *post*). On the other hand, a decree holder may assign his right under the decree or such transfer may be affected by operation of law. The words "and includes any person to whom such decree or order is transferred," have now been omitted. It was held with regard to the former definition that it must not be applied where it was repugnant to the context. The only rule, it was held, which would harmonize this section and the provisions relating to the execution of assigned decrees, was that an assignee under an oral assignment has, as such, no *locus standi* at all to apply for execution but that as regards an assignee in writing or by operation of law the Court has a discretion whether to recognize such assignment or not (2). The definition was held to include a person to whom a share of a decree is transferred (3). Notwithstanding the omission the law is now the same. The representative of a judgment debtor was held to be a judgment debtor within the meaning of sect 258, now O XXI r 2, *post* (4).

Under the General Clauses Act (5) the word "person," unless there is anything repugnant in the context, includes "any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not." In Admiralty proceedings *in rem* a vessel is deemed invested with a personality, and the expression "defendant" in O I rr 3 and 4 (formerly sect 28), *post*, includes a vessel (6). And if a vessel can be a defendant, it may be a judgment debtor.

"District Court"—This section is one of those which, by sect 1, are excluded from consideration when dealing with a question in a Scheduled District (7) to which the Code has not been extended. In some of these districts the District Judge is designated Deputy Commissioner, but in Chota Nagpur the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, and not that of a Deputy Commissioner, is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, and therefore the District Court (8). In the other provinces the Court of the

(1) Behary Lal Pandit v Kedar Nath Mullick, 18 C at p 72 (1891)

(2) Laryata v Digambar, 15 B 507 (1890) See O XXI r 16 *post*

(3) Gyanmonee v Radha Iemon, 5 C 592 (1873)

(4) I anburang v Mudaffar v Vythilinga I edli, 50 M 537 (1907)

(5) X of 1897 s 3 (41)

(6) Bombay and Persia I N Co v Shepherd, 12 B 237, 241 (1887)

(7) Ram Ratan v Lalla Prasad 17 A 183 (1895)

(8) Joyram Singh v Mudhoo Sudun Singh 16 C 13 (1883)

District Judge is the principal Civil Court, except in the Presidency towns, in which the High Courts on their original side are such Courts. See as to the definition of "District Judge" and "High Court," Act X of 1897 (General Clauses). The definitions apply, however, only "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context," so that in construing the term in any particular Act the particular provisions of that Act will have to be taken into consideration. The concluding words "every Court, etc.," of the former definition have been re-enacted in sect 3. The words "every Court" refer to the Courts governed by this Code. Under sect 8 *post*, this section does not apply to Presidency Small Cause Courts and those Courts are not included in the words "every Court of Small Causes," but such Courts are subordinate to the High Court under the provisions of their Acts and the Charters of the High Court (1).

"Foreign Court"—"Foreign judgment"—The words "*not having authority in British India*" were inserted to exclude the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the definition. The other English Courts are, with regard to the Courts in India, as much Foreign Courts as the Courts of France or of any other foreign country (2). So also are the Courts in the Native States in India, (3) in Ceylon and the Colonies. As regards Courts situate beyond the limits of British India and established by the Governor General in Council see sect 43, *post*. On account of the extension in the definition of "British India" the number of such Courts will not be so large as before but the Courts in Residency Bazaars and in British cantonments in Native States will afford the most ordinary instances of Courts which though outside British India are not foreign Courts (4). This definition of "Foreign Court" is for the purpose of this Code only, and does not avail to extend the jurisdiction of the High Court so as to enable it to restrain suits pending in Courts which are outside its jurisdiction under the Charter (5). As to foreign judgments, see sects 13 14 *post*.

"Government pleader"—See O XXXIII rr 6, 7 9 and O XXVII rr 1 5 6 8, *post*, which deal with functions imposed by the Code on Government Pleaders. As to the definition of "Local Government," see sect 3 (29), Act X of 1897. The words italicized have been added to meet a practical difficulty said to have been experienced on occasions when it is necessary for the Government Pleader to appoint another pleader to conduct the case.

"Judge"—This definition is different from that contained in sect 13 of the Penal Code as the requirements of the Civil and Criminal Procedure Code "Officer," of course includes officers as in the case of two or three Judges constituting a Bench. The term Court is not defined (6). Where a Court

(1) *In re Pleaders of the High Court* 8 D 10, at pp 135, 147 (1883). As to appeals against orders in insolvency passed by a Court of Small Causes exercising the powers of a Subordinate Judge in connection with this section see *Delhi Press for Jan na Das* 23 A 56 (1900), *Manekchand Dhillon* 27 B 641 (65) (1903).

(2) *Lowndes v. Wells* 5 B 271, 274 (1881).

(3) *Bakama Singh v. B. Singh* (1888), P. L. No 131 cited *Hukm Chandi* 31.

(4) *Hukm Chandi* 31.

(5) *The Vulcan Iron Works v. B. Chamber,* 13 C. W. N. 310 (1884).

(6) The term has been defined in s 3 of the Evidence Act (see *In re Verlat's Estate*, 11 M. L. J. 12 (1887)). It has previously been defined by the Bombay High Court in *The Tulsi*.

is composed of more than one officer, each doing separate work allotted to him by the Chief Judge, each officer is individually a Judge, and must be deemed to be a presiding officer of a separate Court (1) As regards the appointment, disqualification, and jurisdiction of Judges, see notes to sect. 9, *post*

"Judgment"—The term has here a different signification to that it possesses in English law in which it is used in the sense attached to the term "decree" under the Code. Under the former practice it was restricted to a decision of the Common Law Courts, the term "decree" being used in the Court of Chancery. This distinction is, however, now abolished, the expression "judgment" being generally used, except in matrimonial causes, in which the term "decree" is still retained (2) The judgment must be based on relevant facts duly proved before the Court, and a Judge should not therefore import into a case his own knowledge of particular facts (3) and it must be founded on a case either to be found in the pleadings or involved in or consistent with the case thereby made (4) A Judge may, however, consult other Judges before whom the trial is not held (5)

Excessive elaboration tends to impair the value of a judgment by defeating its proper object, which is to support by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves the final conclusions at which the Judge has conscientiously arrived. The Privy Council therefore on these grounds adversely criticized a judgment of a voluminous character recording the fluctuations of the Judge's mind from day to day in the course of an exceptionally long trial, and the effect (often temporary upon him) of a particular piece of evidence or argument of counsel since from such a mass of often conflicting statements it is not easy for a Court of Appeal to extract the precise grounds on which the final conclusion rests (6) Moreover it is a substantial objection to a judgment that it does not dispose of the question as it was presented by the parties, *e.g.*, where it finds a particular signature to be a forgery which both sides admit to be genuine (7) For the provisions of the Code as to judgments see sect. 33 and O XX, *post*, and Index *sub* *loc*

Meaning of "judgment" under Letters Patent—The term "*judg*

12 B 36 (1887) dissenting from the last mentioned case and distinguishing between a judicial and administrative inquiry, the definition in the Evidence Act is framed only for the purposes of the Act itself and should not be extended beyond its legitimate scope. An Additional Judge was held to be a District Judge within the meaning of s. 112, Act VIII of 1869. *Brojo Misser v. Ahladay* 21 W. P. 320 (1874).

(1) *Hukm Chand* *loc. cit.*

(2) See *Hukm Chand*, 11, 12.

(3) See Authors' Evidence Act 5th ed. s. 115 and notes to s. 121 of that Act and as is there cited and *Jaswant Singh v. Jet Singh*, 3 V. L. J. 215, at p. 110 (1814), *Basundoss Mookerjee v. Must. Larnce*, 7

M. I. A. 169, at p. 203 (1858), *Mahomed Bulah v. Hossaini Bibi* 15 I. A. 81, at p. 91 (1888), *Lakshmaya v. Sri Raja Varadaraja*, 36 M. 168 (but he may import his general knowledge).

(4) *Eshan Chunder v. Shama Churn* 11 M. I. A. 7 (1866), *Mylapore Iyasami v. Leo Kay* 14 C. 802 (1887), *Joytara Dassee v. Mahomed Mobaruck* 8 C. 975, 980 (1892).

(5) See *Luckmidas v. Ebrahim*, 2 B. 644 at p. 649 (1878), *Larvata v. Degambar*, 15 B. 307, at p. 308 (1890), *Alcock v. Hall* 1 Q. B. D. (1891) 444.

(6) *Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brojo Kishore*, 3 I. A. 154, 175 (1876).

(7) *Id.*

ment" is used in the Letters Patent of the High Courts clauses 39 and 40 speaking respectively of appeals to the Privy Council from "any final judgment decree or order" and from "any preliminary or interlocutory judgment decree or order" (1) Clause 15 (and clause 10 of the Allahabad Letters Patent) speak of a judgment' (without any such qualification) providing that an appeal to the High Court shall lie from the judgment (not being a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial) of one Judge of the said High Court (2) The meaning of this term in this clause has been the subject matter of discussion in numerous cases. It is well settled that the term is not limited to the final judgment in the suit (3) nor, indeed to a judgment in a suit at all (4) In however the first of the cases last cited, a very wide meaning was given to the term, which was held to mean any decision or determination affecting the rights or the interest of any suitor or applicant, it being said to be impossible to prescribe any limits to the right of appeal founded upon the nature of the order or decree appealed from though assuming that a party had the right to be heard in every case it was obvious that the duty of the Appellate Court might vary considerably according to the nature of the order or decree complained of, and that the Appellate Court would rightly decline to interfere where the lower Court had been given a discretion (5) This view has, however, been considered to be too broad (6) and the definition commonly accepted is that of Couch, C.J. (7) which has become classical (8) having been approved in numerous cases (9)

(1) As to ss 39 40 see *Sonhai v Ahmedbhai*, 9 B H C R 398 (1872) *Chundi Dutt Jha v Pudmanul Singh* 22 C 228 (1895)

(2) See as to Allahabad [Umrao Chand v Hirundaban Chand 17 A 475 477, 478 (1895)] and Calcutta [Kali v Dhunanjay, 3 C 228 (1877)] letters patent an illustration as to the words excepting criminal trials. In the matter of Horace Lyall 29 C 280 (1901) s c 6 C W N 254 *Srinivasa Ayyangar v R*, 17 M 10 (1893)

(3) *De Souza v Coles* 3 M H C R 354 357 (1868), *Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v Oriental Gas Co*, 8 B H C R 433 452 (1872) *Sonhai v Ahmedbhai* 9 B H C R 398, at p. 407 (1872) in *Ybrahim v Luckhramnissa* 4 C 531 534 (1878) (Cath C.J. took a more restricted view of the term)

(4) *De Souza v Coles* *supra* *Somasundaram Chetti v Administrator General* 1 M 148 151 (1871) [which was not an appeal in a suit, but an order made under the Administrator General's Act allowing the A.G. commission at a certain rate. *Kr v Keeser Neogly v Kalemova Dasse* 1 L J 583 (1878) *In re Narroon* 10 A 14 B 255 (1890) [order appointing a receiver]

In re Janakey Nath Roy, 2 C 406 (1877) [order directing prosecution] In the Goods of *Jodra Chandra Singh* 23 C 780 (1896) for r under s 90 of Probate and Administration Act]

(5) See *De Souza v Coles* *supra* *Sonhai v Ahmedbhai* 9 B H C R 398 at p. 401 (1872) *Mt Brij Coomare v Ramrick Dass* 5 C W N 781 (1901)

(6) It has however been pointed out that though passages in *Bittleston* s 1 judge not give a more extended meaning to the word judgment the case itself is not in conflict with the others. *Somasundaram Chetti v Administrator General* 1 M 148 at p. 151 (1876) and see *Halper Jemal v Halper Malomed* 13 B H C R 91 at p. 111 (1874) where Couch C.J. approved the actual decision.

(7) The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v *Oriental Gas Co*, 8 B H C R 433 452 s c 17 W L 34 (1872)

(8) *In re Malabar* 1 M 148 at p. 151 (1876) *Mt Brij Coomare v Ramrick Dass* 5 C W N 781 at p. 781 (1901)

(9) See *Sonhai v Ahmedbhai* 9 B H C R 398 407 (1872) *In re Narroon* 10 A 14 B 255 (1890) *In re Janakey Nath Roy*, 2 C 406 (1877) *In re*

"We think," said Couch, C.J., "that 'judgment' in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." But the Calcutta High Court has held that a narrow construction should not be placed upon the term, and while concurring in the definition has held that it is not exhaustive (1). It has been said that an appeal will lie under clause 15 only in those cases in which an appeal is allowed under the Code (2). Whether this be so or not, as a question of jurisdiction, it may safely be said that an appeal should ordinarily lie where allowed by the Code, and will in most cases probably be not entertained where it is not.

Though the marginal note to clause 15 would make it appear that the section was intended to apply only to judgments of Courts of original jurisdiction, yet these notes form no part of the original, and it has been held that the words of the clause are sufficiently comprehensive to include judgments passed in the exercise of jurisdiction either original (3) or appellate. And therefore an appeal lies under this clause from the judgment of a Divisional Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction when the Judges of the Court are equally decided in opinion, but under clause 36 the decision of the senior Judge prevails (4). Clause 36 (or clause 27 of the Allahabad Letters Patent) was superseded by sect 575 of the last Code, (5) but the latter section did not take away the right of appeal given by clause 15, and if the Judges differ, but did not refer under sect 575, there was an appeal under the Letters Patent (6).

v Hurriah Chunder Chowdhry, 6 C 594, 601 (1881), Toolkey Moncy Dassce *v* Sudevi Dassce, 26 C 361, 380 (1899), Mohabir Prosad Singh *v* Adhikari Kunwar, 21 C 473, at p 475 (1894), Kushen Persad Pandey *v* Tiluckdhar Lall, 18 C 182 (1890), Chundi Dutt Jha *v* Pudmanund Singh Bahadur, 22 C 928, 929 (1895), Mt Brij Coomaree *v* Ramrick Dass, 5 C W N 781, 794 (1901), In the matter of Horace Lyall, 29 C 236, 301 (1901).

(1) Mt Brij Coomaree *v* Ramrick Das, 5 C W N 781, at pp 794, 795 (1901).

(2) Sonbai *v* Ahmedbhai, 9 B H C R 398 (1872), and see Justices of the Peace for Calcutta *v* Oriental Gas Co, *supra*, Hirji Jina *v* Narran Mulji, 12 B H C R 129, 136 (1875), as to whether s 588 of the former Code interfered with the right of appeal under the Letters Patent, see notes to ss 104-106, O XLIII.

(3) The original side of the H C is not subordinate to any other side of the H C, but an integral part of it. An appeal lies, under clause 15, from the decision of a single

Judge or where there are two Judges if they disagree. Rai Benode *v* Rai Pasupati, 13 C W N 105 (1907), Gopi Nath *v* Moheshwar, 35 C 1096 (1908). But if they agree there is no appeal except to the Privy Council. A Divisional Bench has no power to stay proceedings pending on the original side for the removal of the guardian of a minor. Iakruddin Mahomed *v* Garth, 3 C W N 91 (1898).

(4) Rance Shurno Moyce *v* Juchmeeput Doogur, 7 W R 52, 512 (1867), Ameer Ali *v* Kasim Ali, 13 W R 403 (1870). As to appeal from order of Indian Committee dismissing a Munsif, see *In re* Hurriah Chunder Mitter, 18 W R 209 (1872), Nanduput Matta *v* Urquhart, 13 W R 209 (1870), as to revisional jurisdiction, *vide post*.

(5) Appaji Bhivran *v* Sheolal Khulchand, 3 B 201 (1870), Sri Girdharji *v* Purushotam Gosami, 10 C 814 (1881), 1 B.

(6) Sri Girdharji *v* Purushotam Gosami, 10 C 814 (1881) [see s c, 17 C 7, at p 11 (1889)], Raghunath Prasad *v* Jurawan Rai, 8 A 105 (1886), Doyachand *v* Hirachand,

Moreover, there were cases to which sect 575 did not apply and to these clause 36 (or clause 27) of the Letters Patent is still applicable (1) There is an appeal from the decision of one of the Judges exercising Admiralty or Vice admiralty jurisdiction (2)

It often happens that Judges composing Divisional Benches, although they concur in the mode of deciding the appeal, either disagree as to some of the reasons or assign different reasons for their judgments But in order that there be an appeal the difference of opinion must be as to the final and complete decision of the case and not a difference of opinion upon one or more of the points arising in it (3) Points not raised before a Divisional Bench cannot be raised on appeal (4) As to limitation, see below (5)

The following orders have been held to be judgments: an order rejecting a plaint, (6) orders made in execution (7) an order passed allowing the Administrator General commission at a certain rate, (8) an order referring it to the Commissioner to take accounts between the parties to a suit, (9) a decision refusing leave to institute a suit on the original side of the High Court, (10) an order appointing a guardian, (11) a judgment dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation, (12) an order in revision (13) an order refusing stay of execution, (14) an order on an application for re-admission of an appeal (15)

13 B 449 (1889), *Haslav Pandurang v Vinayak Hari*, 18 B 355, 358 (1893) even if the difference be upon a question of costs only, *Mohendro Chandra t Ashitosh Ganguli*, 20 C 762 (1893)

(1) *Husaini Begam t Collector of Muzaffarnagar*, 11 A 176 (1889) in which it was held that where the Judges differed on a preliminary question viz, as to whether the appeal was barred the case was governed by the charter and not s 575, dist in *Narasanasami Reddi t Osurn Reddi* 25 M 548 (1901) in which it was held that there was a hearing of the petition, there having been no hearing of the appeal in the former case

(2) *In the matter of the Ship Champion* 17 C 66, 84 (1889)

(3) *In re Omrao Begum*, 13 W R 310 (1870), and see *Chunder Kant t Bindabun Chuander*, 7 W R 277 (1867)

(4) *Shirbazadeo Ilazra Begum t Khaja Hossein*, 12 W P 498 (1869)

(5) *In re Hurruck Singh*, 11 W P 107 (1869), 12 W R 458 (1869)

(6) *The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v Oriental Gas Co*, 8 B L R 433 at p 432 (1872), *Ebrahim v Fackhrunnissa* 4 C 531, at pp 534, 535 (1878)

(7) *The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta t Oriental Gas Co*, 8 B L R (1872), *Kally Soondery Dabba Chunder Chowdhry*, 6 C. 504

in P C Department rejecting application for execution], this case was affirmed by P C in 9 C 482, s c, 10 I A 4 10 (1882)

(8) *Somasundamm Chettiar Administrator General* 1 M 148 (1876)

(9) *Hari Jura t Narran Mulji*, 12 B II C P 129 (1874)

(10) *Do Souza v Coles* 3 M H C R 384 (1869) *Hafjee Ismail v Hafjee Mahomed* 13 B I R 01, 101 (1874)

(11) *Kristo Kessor Neoghy v Kadermoyo Dossie* 2 C L R 583 (1878), *In re Narran his Dhanji* 14 B 575 (1890)

(12) *Husaini Begam t Collector of Muzaffarnagar* 9 A 655 (1887)

(13) *Chappan v Mohin Kutti*, 22 M 68 (1898) (followed in *Shaw Prosad Bungshidhur t Pam Chunder Haribur* (1913), 41 C 323), *Narasanasami Reddi Osurn Reddi*, 25 M 548 (1901), *Venkata Redhi t Taylor*, 17 M 100 (1893), *contra Hira Lal v Bai Asi*, 23 B 891 (1897), on the ground that the Letters Patent apply only to the original and appellate jurisdictions

(14) *Mt Brij Coomaroo v Pamrick Das* 5 C W N 781, 795 (1901) [order refusing to stay issue of probate and discharge of receiver], *contra Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda*, 24 M 358 (1901)

(15) *Rambhari Sabu v Madan Mohan*, 23 C 1, but it was subsequently held that it could only be set aside under s 26

an order on an application under sect 90 of the Probate and Administration Act, (1) an order refusing an application to commit for contempt of Court, (2) an order refusing to set aside an award; (3) a judgment dismissing an appeal against an order of a lower appellate Court remanding a case for disposal on the merits; (4) a judgment of a Judge of the High Court sitting singly and remanding a case after dealing with the whole case and setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court; (5) an order discharging a rule to set aside a sale (6)

The following orders have been held not to be "judgments."—an order for mandamus, in that it concludes nothing but merely initiates further proceedings, (7) an order dismissing application for review of judgment; (8) an order for production and inspection of documents, (9) an order granting or refusing certificate of appeal to the Privy Council on the ground that such an order belongs rather to Privy Council proceedings than to those of the High Court, (10) an order dismissing an appeal for default; (11) an order directing a prosecution under the Presidency Magistrates Act, (12) an order determining a particular issue in a suit on the ground that there should not be partial appeals, (13) an order directing the addition of a party to the suit, (14) an order in the Privy Council Department refusing to extend time to furnish security for the costs of the respondent, and directing the appeal to be struck off, (15) a refusal to order security for costs under O XLV r 13, *post*, (16) a refusal to send for the records under sect 25 of the P S C C Act, (17) an order in second appeal directing the trial of certain issues of law and fact by the lower appellate Court (18)

of the former Code, and that this decision was erroneous so far as it decided to the contrary *Fatimunnissa v Deoki Pershad T B*, 24 C 350 (1896)

(1) In the Goods of *Indra Chandra Singh*, 23 C 580 (1898)

(2) *Mohendra Lall Mitter v Anundo Coomar Mitter*, 25 C 236 (1897)

(3) *Toolsey Money Dasseet v Sudevi Dasseet*, 26 C 361, a c, 3 C W N 347 (1899)

(4) *Vasudeva Upadhyaya v Visvaraja Thir thasami*, 20 M 407, at p 417 (1897) [see *Vengas navyant Ramasami Ayyan*, 19 M 422 (1896), *Sankaran v Raman Kutti*, 20 M 152 (1896)], it was held, however, that there was no appeal as s 588 of the last Code prohibited it

(5) *Rai Benode v Rai Pasupati*, 13 C W N 105 (1907), *Gopi Nath v Moheshwar*, 35 C 1096 (1908)

(6) *Rusuck Lall Paul v Roma Nath Sen*, 1 C W N xxvi (1896)

(7) *Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v Oriental Gas Co*, 8 B L R 433 (1872)

(8) *Raku Bibi v Khaja Mahomed*, 4 B L R, A C 10 (1879), 12 W R 459, 4 C

(9) *Senjai Ahmedbhai*, 9 B H C 12 798 (1872)

(10) *Manly v Patterson*, 7 C 339 (1881), *Mt Amrunnessa v Baboo Behary Lall*, 25 W R 529 (1875), *Mowla Buksh v Kishen Pertab Sibi*, 1 C 102 (1875), *Latf Ali Khan v Asgar Reza*, 17 C 455 (1890)

(11) *Mansab Ali v Nihal Chand* 15 A 395 (1893)

(12) *In re Janakey Nath Roy*, 2 C 466 (1877)

(13) *Ebrahim v Fackhrunnissa*, 4 C 531 (1878), *Markby, J*, was inclined to the contrary view

(14) *Kumara Upendra Krishna v Nabin Krishna Bose*, 3 B L R, O C 113 (1869) This was a decision under a 363 of the Code of 1859 dealing with appeals from orders but the principle of the decision is applicable

(16) *Kishen Pershad Panday v Tiluckdhar Lall*, 18 C 182 (1890)

(16) *Mohabir Prasad Singh v Adhikari Kunwar*, 21 C 473 (1893), explained in *Mt Brj Coomaroo v Ramrick Dass*, 5 C W N 781, at p 795 (1901)

(17) *Venkatarama Ayyar v Madurai Ammal*, 23 M 169 (1900)

(18) *Kali Kristo Pal Chowdhry v Itam Chunder Nag*, 9 C L R 461 (1881)

"Legal Representative"—See notes to sect. 10, p. 1

"Mesne profits"—See notes to O XX r 12

"Moveable property"—Growing crops—doubtless include crops of all sorts attached to the soil and leaves, flowers and fruits upon and juice in trees and shrubs. See notes to sects 4 and 16 post

"Order"—Reference should be made to the preceding cases in the commentary on the definition of "decree." Some others not there cited may be noticed. A suit having been instituted under the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, the plaintiff desired to withdraw the suit with liberty to sue again and an order was made permitting him to do so and directing that the costs be paid from the funds of the institution. It was held that the order as to costs was not a decree, and that no appeal lay (1) Orders for payment of costs under the sections noted in the decision cited are not decrees (2) The decision of a taxing officer is not an order (3) An order under O IX r 2 (formerly sect. 97), post has been held not to be a decree, (4) as also orders under sect. 10, Act XX of 1863 (Madras Pagoda Act), (5) under sect. 5, Religious Endowments Act (6) (XX of 1863), under sect. 16, clause 7 of Madras Rev. III. of 1802, (7) an order under sect. 18, Act XX of 1803, refusing (8) or granting (9) leave to sue, an order under sect. 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, (10) under sect. 173 of the same Act, (11) the decision of a special Judge under sect. 104 clause 2 of the same Act, (12) an order under the Indian Trust Act refusing to remove a trustee, (13) an order rejecting an application to restore an application to set aside a sale, (14) an order awarding compensation under sect. 491 of the last Code, (15) and under sect. 206 of the same Code (16)

"Pleader"—The construction of the last clause presents some difficulty. The meaning, however, of the definition becomes obvious if the clauses of which the sentence is made up are inverted, and it is read thus "*Pleader means every person, including an advocate, vakil, and an attorney of a High Court entitled to appear and plead for another in Court*." It is only the plural

(1) Ramakrishna Dossji v. Hiranga Chitra, 21 M 421 (1898)

(2) Shanks v. Secretary of State, 12 M 120 (1889)

(3) Balkaran Rai v. Gobind Nath Tewari, 12 A 129, 157 (1890)

(4) Bissessur Bhugut v. Murli Sahu, 9 C 163 (1882)

(5) Meenakshi v. Sulramanya 11 M 26 (1887)

(6) Somasundara v. Vythilinga, 19 M. 285 (1896)

(7) Narasayya v. Collector of Anantapur, 24 M 95 (1900)

(8) In re Venkateswara, 10 M 98 (1886);
Hazim Ali v. Azim Ali 18 C 72 (1891).
Delroos Banoo v. Abdul Rahman, 21 M 1
368 (1874)

(9) Protap v. Brojonath, 19 C 273, 283 (1891)

(10) Goghan Mollah v. Jameson, 18 C 271, 281 (1891)

(11) Raghun Singh v. Mair Singh 21 C 88 (1894), see also Harshandhu v. Harsh 3 C W N (1898)

(12) Lalji Kintu Narsin v. Balakrishna 17 C 326 (1889)

(13) Nathu Wilson v. M. M. v. A. 131 (1890)

(14) Sujatulla v. Issatulla 25 C 414 (1893)

(15) Narasimha v. G. v. M. 24 M 62, 64 (1899)

(16) Nalivakshya v. Mufakhar H. v. A. 17 C 177, 179 (1899)

duly qualified who is entitled to appear, the vakil where and as his qualification entitles him, the advocate where and as his qualification gives him the right, and the attorney where and as he too might be qualified (1)

"Public officer"—This section is the same as that of the preceding Code, with the slight alterations italicized, and the definition of "public officer" has been taken from that of "public servant" in the Indian Penal Code, with some omissions (2) For the definition of "Judge," see *ante*, and of "Court of Justice" the Penal Code (3) which gives the general signification of the expression. The following persons have been held to be public officers under this section, or public servants under the Penal Code, under provisions of that Code which correspond with this—convict warders, (4) a supernumerary person appointed by the Board of Revenue under sect 6, Act V of 1863, (B C), (5) Naib Nazir, (6) a Patwar, (7) the Official Trustee of Bengal, (8) the Official Assignee of the Insolvent Court, (9) a Collector appointed to take charge of the estate of a minor under Act XX of 1864, (10) or as agent for the Court of Wards under sect 204, Act XIV of 1873, (11) an officer in the Indian Staff Corps, (12) the Administrator General of Bengal since the passing of the Administrator Generals Act of 1902 (13) A person nominated by the Collector under sect 69 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, for the purpose of making a division of crops between the landlord and tenant is not a public servant, (14) though a surveyor employed by the Collector in the Khas Mehal Department is (15) A Cantonment Committee constituted under the Indian Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889) has been held to be a public officer within the meaning of this clause (16)

"Signed"—The word is here employed in a sense more comprehensive

(1) *In re* Pleaders of the High Court 8 B 105 (1883) As to the powers and duties of pleaders some cases will be found collected in O'Keefe's Civil Procedure Code in the notes to this section. And as to Vakils practising before the Privy Council, see *In re* Twiddle 16 C 636

(2) S 21, therefore in certain cases a person may be a public servant, but not a public officer, e.g. a municipal commissioner and engineer R v Nantamram Uttaram, 6 Bom H C R Cr Ca 64 (1869)

(3) S 20

(4) R v Kallachani Mortrie 7 W R Cr 99 (1867)

(5) R v Ram Krishna Das 7 B I P 446 16 W P Cr 27 (1871)

(6) R v Mahmood Hossein, 2 N W P 293 (1870)

(7) P v Mulsooddeen, 2 N W P 148 (1870)

(8) Shieelzad v Shalminsab Begum v Shalminsab, 7 C 411 (1881) Abdul Latif v

Doutre 12 M 250 (1889)

(9) Joosub Hajji Allit Kemp 4 Bom L P 929 s.c., 26 B 809 (1902)

(10) Bhai Balaipat Nana 13 B 343, 346 (1888) Naraingravi Lakshmanrai, 1 B 318 (1876), that is the collector appointed as such but the nazir is not anywhere mentioned in Act XX of 1864 as a person who may in his official capacity be appointed administrator, and is not a public officer Mohan Ishwar v Haku Rupa 4 B 639 (1880)

(11) Collector of Bynri v Munivar, 3 A 90 (1880)

(12) Watson v Lloyd 25 M 403 (1901)

(13) Bholaaram Chowdhury v Administrator General 8 C W N 917 (1904)

(14) Chatter Lal v Thacoor Parshad 18 C 518 (1891)

(15) Bajoo Singh v Queen Empress 26 C 178 (1893)

(16) Cecil Gray v Cantonment Committee of Bangalore 11 B 581 (1910)

than that assigned to it in the General Clauses Act 1897 which is substantially the same as the first clause of this definition of the last Code. The second clause of that Code was first added in the amending Bill 11 of 1878, on the ground that the use of a seal capable of producing an impression of the name and title of the person using it is common amongst people of rank in this country. The definition in the last Code after the word "stamped" added "with the name of the person referred to". The expression "*person referred to*" meant the person referred to in the subsequent sections of the Code, as being required to sign or verify certain documents and it is not a condition precedent to such person being able to use a stamp that he should be unable to write his name (1). As regards intailing assuming that the person signing should, if able to write, write his name in full—and certainly it is proper that this should be done in the case of a warrant—it does not follow that because the signature on the warrant is confined to the initials of the name, it was not the duty of the officer to execute it or that the debtor may forcibly resist its execution (2).

3 For the purposes of this Code, *the District Court is subordinate to the High Court; and every Civil Court of grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.*

Subordination—See notes to sect. 2, *ante*, sub *loc* "District Court". This enumeration of Subordinate Courts is not intended to be exhaustive (3).

4 (1) *In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.*

(2) *In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in sub section (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land.*

Savings—As originally drafted, the Civil Procedure Bill declared that nothing in the Code should affect (a) the Oudh Civil Courts Act (XIII of 1879), the Oudh Courts Act (XIV of 1891), the Punjab Courts Act (XVIII of 1884), the Central Provinces Civil Courts Act (XVI of 1885) the Lower Burmah Courts Act (VI of 1900), any law under the Indian Councils Acts (24 & 25 Viet

(1) *Maharaja of Benares v. Del. Dyal*
Noma 3 A 575 (1881)

(3) *Parshottam v. Mahadu Pandit*, 14 Bom
1 P 947, s. c. 37 B 114 (1912)

c 67, 55 & 56 Viet c 14) prescribing a special procedure for suits between landholders and their tenants and agents, or for the partition of immovable property, (b) the jurisdiction or procedure of village munsifs or panchayats in Madras, the Chief Court of Lower Burmah sitting as an Insolvent Court, (c) certain Bombay laws, viz Reg XIII of 1830 (jurisdiction of jagirdars, etc.) Act XV of 1840 (Agents of Foreign Sovereigns, etc.) and cases of the nature defined in the enactments specified in the third schedule of the draft. The Select Committee were however, of opinion that those provisions, which were considered cumbrous, should be replaced by the following simpler and more comprehensive saving on the lines of that contained in sect 1, sub sect 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code "*Provided that the procedure in cases tried by any Court in the exercise of any jurisdiction conferred by or under any of the enactments specified in the third schedule, and in appeals to the Civil Courts allowed therein, shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code, save in so far as those provisions are inconsistent with the specific provisions of any of the enactments as aforesaid*" They also added in their report, 'The revenue laws of several provinces contain special provisions for the more speedy recovery of agricultural rent, to which, indeed, the produce of the land is in several instances, declared to be hypothecated. The more general terms of the saving clause, as now proposed by us, would, we think suffice to save such rights and remedies. At the same time, for the sake of greater clearness we have inserted an express saving which is likely to save mistakes in practice.' The words italicized have now been omitted, the Special Committee being of opinion that the section, as it now stands, effects all the savings covered by sect 4 of the last Code. The concluding paragraph of that section has not been reproduced as it is stated to be obsolete.

"Affect"—The saving clause under the former Code was not meant to enact that the rules contained in the Code will not apply to the suits or other proceedings taken under the excepted enactments and laws, but that if there is anything in the e Acts inconsistent with the Code the latter does not prevail (1). The suits between landholders and tenants referred to in this note are suits between landholders and their tenants, or between landholders and their tenants or agents not between the tenants and agents. The Rent Recovery Act (Madras, Act VIII of 1865) is such a law and it follows that the special revisional powers given to the High Court by sect 115 formerly 622, *post*, will not affect the provisions of that Act (2). It was further held, in the case first mentioned, that although the Deputy Collector's proceedings were not strictly "*proceedings under the Act*," but rather "*proceedings taken under colour of the Act*" that circumstance alone would not give a jurisdiction which this section was designed to exclude. The Chota Nagpore Landlord and Tenant Procedure Act (Bengal Act I of 1879) is covered by this section which having regard to the provisions of that Act bars the application of sect 100 (formerly 584), *post*. No second appeal therefore lies in a suit for arrears of rent brought under the provisions of that Act (3).

(1) Aga Mahomed Hamadani v Cohen 17 C 221, 223 (1886)

(2) Vellu Periya Miru v Morlin Iadsha 9 M 332 (1887), Ajpan Lal v Srikant, 11

M 451 (1892), Venkatanarasimha v Suranna 17 M 298 (1893)

(3) Khedu Mahto v Budhun Mahto 27 C 504 F B, s c, 4 C W N 333 (1900)

As already stated, the section saves suits under laws passed under the Indian Councils Acts providing for the partition of immovable property. The word "property" in its strict sense is a right but is used also to denote the subject or rather the object of that right and when so used may be looked upon as synonymous with "a thing". In ordinary language that word has the widest extent, including every species of acquisition in which an individual may have an interest or right as lands, goods, chattels and effects (1). But where the right is common to all it is not the subject of property, as in the case of the right of the public to fish in the open sea (2). The distinction between moveable and immovable property is not coincident with the English law division as to lands and chattels or real and personal property. For property according to English law may be immovable yet personal, as in the case of leaseholds or moveable and real as in the case of dignities and titles of honour. Further things physically moveable may be considered immovable in law.

In the Code as well as in the other Acts of the Indian Legislation, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context, the term "immovable property" includes "land (including land covered by water) benefits to arise out of land (such as rents, annuities and other incorporeal hereditaments), and things 'attached to the earth,' which is defined in the Transfer of Property Act to mean (a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs (but as to growing crops, *vide ante*), (b) embedded in the earth as in the case of walls or buildings, (c) attached to what is so embedded (for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached), or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth" (3). The term "moveable property" means property of every description except immovable property, (4) and under sect 2, clause 13, includes growing crops.

5 (1) Where any Revenue Courts are governed by the provisions of this Code in those matters of procedure upon which any special enactment applicable to them is silent, the Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, may, by notification in the local official Gazette, declare that any portions of those provisions which are not expressly made applicable by this Code shall not apply to those Courts, or shall only apply to them with such modifications as the Local Government, with the sanction aforesaid, may prescribe.

(2) "Revenue Court" in sub section (1) means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not include a Civil Court

(1) See Hukm Chand 46-48

(2) Baban Nayak v. Naga Narayana

2 B 19 (1876)

(3) Act X of 1897, s. 3 (2b) (Local Clauses)

(4) *Ib.*, s. 3 (3c)

having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature

Object of section—This section was first added by sect 3, Act VII of 1888 and in presenting the report of the Select Committee on the final draft of the Bill, which was passed into that Act, Sir Andrew Scoble said, "The object is to preserve the summary character of rent litigation under local laws, and it is justified on the ground that holding the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to be applicable to the proceedings of the Rent and Revenue Courts, in all points which are not provided for in the special Acts governing these classes of Courts, may be the source of considerable embarrassment to the Administration, both by throwing impediments in the way of the easy realization of the rents from which the land revenue is paid and imposing increased labour on the Rent Courts, whose time is already fully occupied" As to Revenue Courts generally, see notes to *Preamble ante*

ast
] **6** *Save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Pecuniary jurisdiction Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction*

Jurisdiction—In view of the extended scope of sect 4 of the present Code the reproduction of sects 6 and 7 of the last Code (except as to the final paragraph which is the present section) has been considered unnecessary. The original section was first introduced into the Code of 1877, and was held by the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts to operate to limit the jurisdiction conferred by sect 223 of the former Code (see sects 38, 39, 41, O XXI rr 4, 5), relating to the Courts by which a decree may be executed, there being no provision in the Code which could if uncontrolled by this clause, have operated to give a Court jurisdiction to try a suit (assuming such term to be limited to proceedings before and up to decree) in excess of the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction. It was proposed to introduce the words "*or proceedings in suits*" to negative the view that a Court to which a decree is sent for execution has jurisdiction to execute the decree though the amount exceeds the limits of the previous jurisdiction of the Court, a point on which there was a conflict of opinion (1). See note to sect 36, O XX r 12. But these words have been omitted.

o.] **7.** *The following provisions shall not extend to Courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1857, or to Courts exercising the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes under that Act, that is to say,—*

(1) See *Shamrao v. Bhat* 11 M. and L. 101 (1883) and *Chandrasekhar v. Chandra Chatterjee*, 16 C. 171 (1889), *Cook v. Aristo* 17 B. 1 (1889)

(a) so much of the body of the Code as relates to—

(i) suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes,

(ii) the execution of decrees in such suits,

(iii) the execution of decrees against immovable property, and

(b) the following sections, that is to say,—

section 9,

sections 91 and 92,

sections 114 and 115 so far as they relate to injunctions and interlocutory orders and

sections 106 to 111 and 115

Provincial Small Cause Courts—Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act provides that the procedure prescribed in the Chapters and sections of the former Code specified in the schedule should so far as those Chapter and sections were applicable, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it, and in all proceedings arising out of such suits provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed *ex parte* or for a review of judgment, shall, at the time of presenting his application either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the Court may direct. And where a person has become liable as surety under this proviso the security may be realized in manner provided by sect 253 (cf now sect 145) *post*. The provisions of the former section have been arranged in a more convenient form. The wording of the section makes it clear that the Courts on which Small Cause jurisdiction has been conferred are to exercise that jurisdiction according to the procedure provided for Small Cause Courts. As to the rules, see O L

8 Save as provided in sections 24, 38 to 41, 75, clauses (s 8

Presidency Small Cause Courts (a), (b) and (c), 76, 117 and 155 to 158, and by the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, the provisions in the body of this Code shall not extend to any suit or proceeding in any Court of Small Causes established in the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay

Presidency Small Cause Courts—This section provides that certain sections of the Code shall apply. Sect 23 of Act XI of 1882 extended certain portions of the Code specified in the second schedule to that Act to Presidency Small Cause Courts. That section and schedule were repealed by sect 12 of the Amending Act I of 1895. By sect 5 of the latter Act the High Court may from time to time by rules having the force of law, prescribe the procedure to be followed and the practice to be observed by the Small Cause Court either in supercession of or in addition to any provisions prescribed or in force before December 31 1891 and may cancel or vary any rule

rule The law and any rules and declarations made thereunder with respect to procedure or practice in force on that date is in force unless and until cancelled or varied by rules made by the High Court under sect 5 of Act I of 1895 The High Court has made certain rules under which portions of the Code mentioned in the schedule annexed to the rules, with such modifications as are indicated in that schedule are extended to the Calcutta Court of Small Causes to be applied with due regard to the other rules prescribed This section as it formerly stood in the earlier Code contained a second paragraph authorizing the Local Government by notification published in the Official Gazette to extend to the Presidency Small Cause Court certain portions of the Code This was repealed by the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (1) As to the Rules, see O LI

(1) S. 2 Act XX of 1892 see In the matter of F P Waller, C M 430 (1883)

PART I

SUITS IN GENERAL.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS AND RES JUDICATA

9 The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. [s. 11]

Explanation—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies

“The Courts”—The original side of the High Court is a Court within the meaning of sect 9, and there is no enactment barring its jurisdiction to entertain a suit to set aside, on the ground of fraud, a decree passed by another Court of concurrent jurisdiction (1)

“Provisions herein contained”—Reference may be made to those contained in sects 10, 11, 47, O IX r 9, in which the bar of a suit is absolute, and to sects 83, 84, 86, in which the bar is of a conditional or provisional character. As regards the Government, Minors, Lunatics, Charities, see sects 79, 92, 93, and O XXXII, *post*

Suit—As to the meaning of this term, see notes to sect 2, *ante*, “Decree”

of which he is one, if the proceeding cannot be heard by a single Judge) has no jurisdiction to entertain any judicial proceeding (2) But if a person has in

(1) Nundo Lal Bose & Nistarni Dossee, 7 C W N 353 (1902), s c, 30 C 369 (1902)

(2) R v Ganga Ram, 16 A 136, 156 (1894) The validity of the appointment, under the High Courts Act, 1861 of Barkitt, J, which was there in question was again raised before the Privy Council in Bulwant Singh & Rani

Kishori, 20 A 267, 273 (1897) see also Glyn v Bonnaud 2 Tayl & Bell 205, 224, as to appearance of Judge on rule to show cause for want of jurisdiction, see R v Judge Marylebone County Court, 50 L T 97 Where a rule was obtained upon a Judge who held that he had no jurisdiction to show cause

all respects acted as Judge, that fact is presumptive proof, until the contrary be shown, of his due appointment to act as a Judge of the Court (1) If a Judge is validly appointed but is disqualified from trying a suit by reason of his personal interest in it, (2) the judgment is erroneous and voidable but not void (3)

Assuming the existence of official authority and the absence of any disqualification, the next question is as to the jurisdiction to deal with the various matters which, in the exercise of his general judicial authority, are brought before the Judge for his determination

Jurisdiction, when used in its general sense with reference to a Court of Justice, means the power or authority of judging, and that Court is said to be of competent (4) jurisdiction with regard to a suit or other proceeding, when it has power to hear or determine it or to exercise any judicial power therein (5) "Jurisdiction," said West, J., (6) "according to the exact conception of it formed by the Roman lawyers, consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some legal relation, in ascertaining the essential point of it, and in pronouncing upon them" The word, however, is commonly used in two different senses—an use which has led to much confusion. It is sometimes used to mean jurisdiction in the ordinary sense above mentioned—that is, when used with reference to local or pecuniary jurisdiction or with reference to the parties, (7) or jurisdiction with reference to the subject matter (8) of a suit. It is also used to mean the legal authority of a Court to do certain things. Thus it has been said that if a Court has "jurisdiction" to

why he should not hear the case, it was stated that it was not usual for a Judge to be represented in a rule unless the whole jurisdiction of his Court was in question. *R. v. Judge Marylebone County Court*, 50 L. T. 97, as in the case of *Blackonochio v. Ponzone*, 6 App. Cas. 424

(1) *R. v. Ganga Ram*, *supra* at pp. 156, 157

(2) The principle *nemo debet esse judex in propria causa* is one of general application apart from legislative enactment, but this disqualification is expressly provided for by s. 38, Act XII of 1887 (Bengal Civil Courts), s. 17, Act III of 1873 (Madras Civil Courts), s. 23, Act XIII of 1870 (Oudh Civil Courts). See *Hukm Chand v. Res Judicata*, Ch. 1 & seq., and the same Author's *Civil Procedure Code*, 54

(3) *Bikrama Singh v. Bir Singh*, 1889, P. R. No. 191, *Aloo Nathu v. Gagubha Dipsangli*, 10 B. GOS (1894) [No Judge can act in any matter in which he has any pecuniary interest, nor where he has any interest, though not a pecuniary one, sufficient to create a real bias] *Loburi Domini v. Assam Railway and Trading Co., Ltd.*, 10 C. 915 (1884)

(3) *Phillips v. Eyre*, 6 Q. B. 22. In *Aloo Nathu v. Gagubha Dipsangli*, 10 B. GOS (1894), the decree was set aside upon an application made in revision

(4) "I am of opinion that 'competent' means 'having jurisdiction,' that is with reference to the pecuniary value and nature of the suits which the Court has to try." Per *Mahmood, J.*, in *Nidhi Lal v. Mazhar Husain*, 7 A. 239 (1884), see *Authors' Evidence Act* 5th ed., notes to s. 44

(5) See the question of jurisdiction discussed in *Hukm Chand v. Res Judicata*, Ch. 1 & seq., and the same Author's *Civil Procedure Code*, 54

(6) *Amritav v. Balkrishna*, 11 B. 488, 490 (1887), and see definition given by *Mahmood, J.*, in *Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali*, 7 A. 356 (1885)

(7) *Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali*, 7 A. 356 (1885). See *Abdul Kadir v. Doolanbibi*, 37 B. 563 (1913)

(8) It is used in this sense in *Ledgard v. Bull*, 10 A. 191, 203 (1887), *Sadasiva v. Ramalinga*, 2 I. A. 219, 233 (1875), *Hurrenath Roy v. Scott*, B. L. R., 1 B. 636 (1867)

make a remand, that term being used in the former sense, then it is only in the latter sense that an erroneous order of remand can be treated as an order made without jurisdiction (1) Further difficulty has been introduced, it having been held that the same term may mean one thing in one section of the Code and another thing in another. So the term, it has been held, (2) is used in its former sense in sect 99 (formerly 578), that is, in the sense of local and pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction with reference to the subject matter, while the same term in sect 115 (formerly 622), may, it is said, well be taken to have been used in a more comprehensive sense (3) The term in this section is used in the first of the senses above mentioned

The judgment or order of a Court without jurisdiction in this last-mentioned sense is void and a mere nullity (4) Jurisdiction derives from the Sovereign, and in British India has been conferred by the Charters and Letters Patent of the High Courts, and as regards other Courts by various Acts of the Legislature constituting those Courts, giving them powers and regulating their procedure (5)

This jurisdiction may be of different kinds (a) over the parties, (b) over the subject-matter, (c) local, (d) pecuniary. Peculiar powers may be given to particular Courts whilst other Courts may be of restricted jurisdiction. But no Court has power to give judgment respecting a matter not submitted to it for decision, even in a suit involving other matters which have been so submitted (6)

The distinction must be kept between jurisdiction and errors in the exercise of jurisdiction. The proceedings of a Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties are not void, however erroneous they may be. A judgment is not void simply because it is erroneous. This is evident from the very notion of jurisdiction, which is the power to determine and not

(1) Mohesh Chunder Das : Jahruddi Mollah, 5 C W N 509, 512 (1901) [So it has been said that the Judicial Committee in *Amir Hasan Khan v Sheo Baksh Singh*, 11 C 6 (1884), used the term "jurisdiction," not in the sense that the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the first sense of the word to entertain an application for revision, for he had the same powers as the High Court, but that he had exceeded his legal authority and that the order was *ultra vires* *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 350 (1885) See *Hukm Chand*, *Res Jud* 461 *et seq*]

(2) *Ib*

(3) *Ib*, 514, *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 350 (1885), *Dhan Singh v Basant Singh*, 8 A 519 (1886), *per Mahmood, J*

(4) See *Authors' Evidence Act*, 5th ed, note to s 41, where the question of competency, fraud and collusion, as affecting judgments, is dealt with, and *Hukm Chand*, *Res Jud* 397, 451. A Court may, however, always inquire

as to whether jurisdiction exists. This is not an exercise of jurisdiction over the case itself, but an investigation of another question, that of whether the conditions of cognizance are satisfied. *Amritav v Balkrishna*, 11 B 488 (1887), *Hures Prasad v Koonjo Behary*, 1 Marsh, 99, 101 (1862), *Nasrun v Watson*, 3 W R 215 (1865). As to the effect of evidence given in a Court without jurisdiction, see *Authors' Evidence Act*, 5th ed, note to s 3J. As to prohibition of inquiry into jurisdiction by executing Court under O 21, r 7, see *Hari Govind Kalkundri v Narsingrao Konherra Deshpande*, 38 B 149 (1913)

(5) *Vide post*. As to the presumptions affecting jurisdiction, see *Authors' Evidence Act*, 5th ed, notes to s 114, ill (c), and under heading "Regularity", *Hukm Chand*, *Res Judicata*, 422

(6) See *per James, L J*, in *Pobinson v Dhalcep Singh*, 11 Ch D 795, *Hukm Chand*, *Res Judicata*, 451

all respects acted as Judge, that fact is presumptive proof, until the contrary be shown, of his due appointment to act as a Judge of the Court (1) If a Judge is validly appointed but is disqualified from trying a suit by reason of his personal interest in it, (2) the judgment is erroneous and voidable but not void (3)

Assuming the existence of official authority and the absence of any disqualification, the next question is as to the jurisdiction to deal with the various matters which, in the exercise of his general judicial authority, are brought before the Judge for his determination

Jurisdiction when used in its general sense with reference to a Court of Justice, means the power or authority of judging, and that Court is said to be of competent (4) jurisdiction with regard to a suit or other proceeding, when it has power to hear or determine it or to exercise any judicial power therein (5) "Jurisdiction," said West, J., (6) "according to the exact conception of it formed by the Roman lawyers, consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some jurial relation, in ascertaining the essential points of it, and in pronouncing upon them" The word, however, is commonly used in two different senses—an use which has led to much confusion It is sometimes used to mean jurisdiction in the ordinary sense above mentioned, that is, when used with reference to local or pecuniary jurisdiction or with reference to the parties, (7) or jurisdiction with reference to the subject matter (8) of a suit It is also used to mean the legal authority of a Court to do certain things Thus it has been said that if a Court has "jurisdiction" to

why he should not hear the case, it was stated that it was not usual for a Judge to be represented in a rule unless the whole jurisdiction of his Court was in question R v Judge Marylebone County Court, 56 L T 97, as in the case of Mackonochie v Ponzance, 6 App Cas 424

(1) R v Ganga Ram, *supra*, at pp 156, 157

(2) The principle *nemo debet esse iudex in propria causa* is one of general application apart from legislative enactment, but this disqualification is expressly provided for by s 38, Act XII of 1887 (Bengal Civil Courts), s 17, Act III of 1873 (Madras Civil Courts), s 23, Act XIII of 1879 (Oudh Civil Courts) See Hukm Chand, Res Jud 380 A Judge, however, is not disqualified from trying a suit to which his Government is a party Bikrama Singh v Bir Singh, 1888, P R No 101, Aloo Nathu v Gagubha Dipsangji, 19 B 608 (1894) [No Judge can act in any matter in which he has any pecuniary interest, nor where he has any interest, though not a pecuniary one sufficient to create a real bias] Loluri Domini v Assam Railway and Trading Co, Ltd, 10 C 915 (1884)

(3) Phillips v Eyre, 6 Q B 22 In Aloo Nathu v Gagubha Dipsangji, 19 B 608 (1894), the decree was set aside upon an application made in revision

(4) "I am of opinion that 'competent' means 'having jurisdiction,' that is with reference to the pecuniary value and nature of the suits which the Court has to try" Per Mahmood, J, in Nidhi Lal v Mazhar Husain, 7 A 239 (1884), see Authors' Evidence Act, 5th ed, notes to s 44

(5) See the question of jurisdiction discussed in Hukm Chand v Res Judicata, Ch v et seq, and the same Author's Civil Procedure Code, 54

(6) Amritraj v Balkrishna, 11 B 488, 490 (1887) and see definition given by Mahmood, J, in Har Prasad v Jafar Ali, 7 A 350 (1885)

(7) Har Prasad v Jafar Ali, 7 A 350 (1885) See Abdul Kadir v Doolanbibi, 37 B 563 (1912)

(8) It is used in this sense in Ledgard v Bull, 9 A 191, 203 (1886), Sadashiva v Ramalinga, 2 I A 210, 233 (1875), Hurrenath Poy v Scott, 11 L R, 1 B, 636 (1867)

Where, however, the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person and a defendant has some privilege which exempts him from the jurisdiction, such privilege may, it has been said, be waived (1). So where the objection to the jurisdiction was based on the ground of the defendant being a *Sirdar* of the *Delkhan* who as such was not subject to the jurisdiction of the *Munsif's Court* which passed the decree it was held that the defendant must be taken to have waived the want of jurisdiction and that it was too late to raise it when the decree was sought to be executed (2). And there are numerous authorities which establish that when in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties, without objection, join issue and go to trial upon the merits the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there are irregularities in the initial procedure which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit (3).

Under the former Codes it was held that an objection to jurisdiction might be raised at any stage of a suit, even after remand by the High Court in second appeal, (4) and that the Court would receive and adjudicate a point of

Vishnu Sakharani v. Krishnarao, 11 B 157 (1886), *Roy Bhoopendra Nath Chowdhry v. Baloo Prosunno Ghose*, 24 W. R. 205 (1875) [consent cannot give jurisdiction nor alter the nature of the decree. An agreement introducing fresh parties cannot be substituted for the decree or become capable of execution as if it was the original decree], *Ramasamy Chettiar v. Orr*, 26 M 176, 178 (1902), *Alie mannessa Bibi v. Mahomed Hatem*, 31 C 849 (1904), *Kumassami Reddiar v. Sabbaraya* 23 M 314 (1899) [transfer of appeal, but absence of notice of transfer may be waived *Sankumani v. Khoran*, 13 M 211 (1889)], *Krishnan Chetti v. Muthu Palandi*, 22 M 172 (1898) [appeal] *Aukhil Chunder v. Baboo Moheene Mohun*, 4 C L R 491 (1879) [id.]

(1) See *Hukm Chand, Res Judicata*, 412

(2) *Ex parte Manohar Bhivray*, 2 B H C R 374 (1865), ref. *Mora v. Gopal*, 2 B 132 (1877). It is to be observed, however, that the objection in the former case was taken in execution proceedings, and a Court executing the decree has no power to go into the merits of the decree.

(3) *Ledgar v. Bull*, 9 A 191, 203 (1886) P C., *Pisan v. Att Gen* for *Gibraltar*, 5 P C 515 (1874) [departures from ordinary practice by consent are of everyday occurrence], *Sadasiva v. Ramalinga* 2 J A 219 (1875) s c, 15 B L R 383 [Court had general jurisdiction though exercise of that jurisdiction was irregular. The P C at p 403 15 B L R stated that they were not

impressed by the observations of Markby, J, in *Ekowri Singh v. Bijaynath*, 4 B L R, A C 111, in which it was held that the conduct of the parties was immaterial], *Minakshi v. Subramanya*, 14 I A 160 (1887), *Sankumani v. Khoran*, 13 M 213 (1889), *Vishnu Sakharani v. Krishnarao*, 11 B 153 (1886), *Puna Bibee v. Khoda Buksh*, 22 W R 396 (1874), *Khemna Gowala v. Bindloo Khan*, 6 C 251 (1880) [reference to arbitration] *Seo Hukm Chand Res Judicata*, 468-473

(4) *Keshav v. Vinayak*, 23 B 22 (1897), and see *Sayad Nyambula v. Nana*, 13 B 424 (1889) [objection taken for first time in second appeal] *Velayudam v. Arunachala*, 19 M 273 (1889), *Mohan Ishwar v. Haku Rupa*, 4 B 638 639 (1880), and cases there cited, *Bipin Behary Chowdhry v. Bam Chunder Roy*, 14 W R 12 15 (1870), *Macdonald v. Riddell*, 16 W R Cr 79 (1871), *Shri Sidheswar Pandit v. Shri Harihar Pandit*, 12 B 153 (1887), *Chundee Churn Dutt v. Edeljee Cowasjee*, 8 C 678 (1882) [Small Cause Court reference—new trial—though no objection at the original hearing] In *Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhram Bhagwant Kuar*, 13 A 300 (1891) the Privy Council, holding that a Judge had acted without jurisdiction, set aside the decree, although the point was not raised either in the first Court or the Court of Appeal in India. *Andhi Lal v. Mazhar Hossein*, 7 A 230 (1884) [provided there is on the record sufficient material to substantiate the objection]

jurisdiction though not taken in the lower Court, because acts done without jurisdiction are acts of no legal effect at all and might be set aside (1) At the same time it was said that though the question of jurisdiction might be taken for the first time on appeal, yet if the want of jurisdiction did not appear upon the pleadings, evidence or admissions of the parties, the Court would not, upon a mere suggestion, remand the case to ascertain further facts in order that the question of jurisdiction might be considered (2) The objection should be raised in the course of the proceedings He who having an appeal and a special appeal on a question of jurisdiction, has not availed himself of those remedies, *renunciavit jura pro se introducto* An omission to urge objections there is to be treated when the proceedings have been completed as conclusive (3) When no objection to the jurisdiction of the first Court was raised in the grounds of a regular appeal and the first Appellate Court declined to hear the question argued, it was held that the objection should have been considered and decided (4) The present Code, however, enacts that no objection to jurisdiction ('place of suing') shall be allowed in any appeal or revision unless taken in the Court of first instance before settlement of issues (sect 21, *post*)

If a party protest against jurisdiction he is not bound to retire, he can go through the case subject to protest (5) If an objection to jurisdiction is first taken at a late stage of the suit, and the jurisdiction is doubtful, the proper course is to proceed to determine the suit (6) As to the form of the order where an objection to jurisdiction is raised and allowed, see notes to O VII r 10 In some cases a party has been held to be estopped from proving want of jurisdiction in a subsequent suit (7) or in further proceedings (8)

Subject matter—Jurisdiction over the subject matter primarily depends on the nature of the cause of action alleged and of the relief asked It is not however the existence of a cause of action which constitutes the subject-matter, but the allegation of such existence (9) Nor is the subject matter of

(1) Gooroo Persad Roy v Juggobundhoo Mozoomdar, W R Sp No., p 15, T B (1862), Ramayya v Subbasayada, 13 M 25 (1889), Rajanaram v Ananga Mohun, 26 C 198, 600 (1899) As regards estoppel against pleading want of jurisdiction, see Authors' Evidence Act, 5th ed., Introduction to Ch VIII

(2) Naimudda Jowardar v Scott, 3 B L R 283 (1869)

(3) Naro Hari v Anpurnabai, 11 B 160 n., 171, 172 (1874), *vide post* Estoppel

(4) Motilal Ramdas v Jannadas, 2 B H C P 40 (1865) Otherwise if it were only an irregularity Ram Kishen Upadhyay v Dupa Upadhyay, 13 A 580 (1891)

(5) Hamlyn v Bettely, 6 Q B D 63 (1870) cf Ledger v Bull, 9 A 101 (1886), as to costs where the plea of want of jurisdiction is raised and allowed but the party raising it is

responsible for the prior proceedings see Affabooddeen Ahmed v Mohun Mohun Doss 15 W R 48 (1871)

(6) Bagram v Moses, 1 Hyde, 284 (1864)

(7) See Hukm Chand *op cit* 416, Naro Hari v Anpurnabai 11 B 160, n. (1874), ante, Daboo Moyre v Bipin Mandal, 10 W R 6 (1869) Gope Nath v Bhugwat Pershad, 10 C 707 (1884), Ooma Soonduree v Bepin Beharee, 13 W R 229 (1870), Nehora Roy v Radha Pershad Singh, 4 C L R 353 (1879)

(8) Hukm Chand *op cit* 420, Mohammed Hossein v Alayya Narain, 2 B L R Ap 42 (1869), Naimudda v Scott, 3 B L R 283 (1869), *supra*, Koylash Chunder v Ashrup Ali, 22 W R 101 (1871) As to s 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, *vide post*, "Pecuniary Jurisdiction"

(9) See Hukm Chand Res Judicata, 240 *et seq*

a suit necessarily identical with the property to which the suit relates. The subject-matter of a suit is generally the specific thing sought in it. In a suit for damages for injuring a carriage the subject-matter would in one sense be the carriage, but the object of the suit would be the amount demanded. Where there is no material property concerned as in a suit for slander the subject-matter cannot be identified with a tangible thing. Where, on the other hand the claim is for a particular field, that field as a material object is sought and is regarded as the subject-matter of the suit. These meanings of the term are not inconsistent. They are reconciled by saying that the field is the subject-matter in so far as it is conceived as embraced in the command or adjudication sought. Hence what is sought is the true measure of the subject-matter, not what the suit is about in a wider and vaguer sense (1). It has been recently held by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court that where the main purpose of a suit was to determine a right to immovable property, a Small Cause Court had nevertheless jurisdiction to entertain it if the relief asked was not for immovable property, but for payment of a sum of money (2).

In every suit the plaintiff advances two matters for determination — whether ground exists for resorting to the Court for aid, and if it does, the relief claimed as due. Neither of these matters alone is the subject-matter of the suit, to the exclusion of the other, since each alike is matter necessary to be determined in the suit before a decree can be granted to the plaintiff (3). Nor can the nature of the defendant's plea affect the jurisdiction acquired by a Court over the plaintiff's claim (4). Even an equitable claim of set off, to which O VIII r 6, *post*, does not apply, will not be taken cognizance of by a Court if it is in excess of its pecuniary jurisdiction, though that circumstance will not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the suit itself (5). Jurisdiction over the subject-matter must exist throughout the proceedings in the suit. Jurisdiction must exist at the time of its institution as well as at that of its disposal (6). The decision in *Shamray v Nilaji* (7) is not against this view, as the decision is grounded on the circumstance that jurisdiction in proceedings taken for the execution of a decree is by law not made to depend on the amount in respect of which the execution is taken, but on the amount claimed in the suit in which the decree was given (8).

The late Supreme Court possessed no Appellate Jurisdiction but a general

(1) *Per West, J.*, in *Lakshman Bhatkar v Babaji Bhatkar*, 8 B 31, 34 (1883), *Hukm Chand, op cit* 299.

(2) *Puttangiowda v Nilkanth Hulo Desphande*, 37 B 675 (F B) (1913), and see *Vinayak v Krishnarao*, 25 B 625 (1901).

(3) *Harnam Singh v Harpa Ram*, 1887, P. R. No. 1, cited in *Hukm Chand, op cit* 299, 300.

(4) *Colind Singh v Kallu*, 2 A 778 (1880), *Bahadar v Nawab Jan*, 3 A 822 (1881), *Chandu v Kombu*, 9 M 205 (1885), *Rhaji Vast* v *Inhora* 1888, P. R. No. 160, cited in *Hukm Chand, op cit* 294 where other similar cases

from the Punjab Chief Court are cited. The value of the suit is not altered by the plea of the defendant, whether that plea be true or false. *Jag Lal v Har Narian*, 10 A 524 (1883), *Shumbhoo v Frankisto*, 13 W B 105 (1870) [jurisdiction depends upon the way the suit is framed].

(5) *Brojendra Nath v Budge Budge Jito Mill*, 20 C. 527 (1893).

(6) See *Hukm Chand, op cit* 405, *Chandlu v Kombu*, 9 M 212 (1886).

(7) 10 B. 202 (1888).

(8) *Hukm Chand, op cit* 407, 406.

as well as a local original jurisdiction embracing matters civil as well as criminal. It executed its own writs and processes throughout the provinces and districts annexed to and made subject to the Presidency of Fort William, such provinces and districts being within the limits of its general jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the High Court is in some respects analogous to that of the Supreme Court but is in other respects wholly dissimilar. It has an Appellate Jurisdiction as extensive as that possessed by the late Sudder Court which it never exercises for the purpose of enforcing its decrees or orders the same being enforced through the subordinate Courts and it has an Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and also an Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction peculiar to itself. It has besides a Civil Jurisdiction, a Criminal Jurisdiction an Admiralty and Vice admiralty Jurisdiction a Testamentary and Intestate Jurisdiction and a Matrimonial Jurisdiction. Sections 11 and 12 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court relate to its Original Civil Jurisdiction, sect 13 to its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction sects 21 and 22 to its Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction, sect 23 to its Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction, sects 31 and 32 to its Admiralty and Vice admiralty Jurisdiction, sects 33 and 34 to its Testamentary and Intestate Jurisdiction sect 35 to its Matrimonial Jurisdiction and sects 24 15 and 16 to its Appellate Jurisdiction. Its Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction unlike the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is merely local as is also its Matrimonial Jurisdiction. Its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction is to try and determine any suit being or falling within the jurisdiction of any Court whether within or without the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William subject to its superintendence, when it shall think proper to do so either on the agreement of the parties to that effect or for the purposes of justice. Its Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction is both local and general and is in all respects the same as that exercised by the Supreme Court on its Crown side. Its Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction is over all persons residing in places within the jurisdiction of any Court formerly subject to the superintendence of the Sudder Nizamut Adawlut at Calcutta whether within or without the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William and in the exercise of this jurisdiction it has authority to try at its discretion any such persons brought before it on charges preferred by the Advocate General or by any Magistrate or other officer specially appointed by the Government in that behalf. Its Admiralty and Vice admiralty Jurisdiction is the same as that exercised by the Supreme Court on its Admiralty side and by the late Vice admiralty Court. Its Testamentary and Intestate Jurisdiction is the same as that exercised by the Supreme Court on its Ecclesiastical side. As regards the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court sect 2 of the Letters Patent provides that "the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall have and exercise Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction within such local limits as may from time to time be declared and prescribed by any law or regulation made by the Governor General in Council, and until some local limits shall be so declared and prescribed within the limits declared and prescribed by the Proclamation fixing the limits of Calcutta issued by the Governor General

in Council, on the 10th day of September, 1794, and the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the said High Court shall not extend beyond the limits, for the time being declared and prescribed, as the local limits of such jurisdiction' As no law or regulation has been made by the Governor General in Council, declaring and prescribing local limits, within which the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court is to be exercised, the limits of the town of Calcutta are the present limits within which jurisdiction is to be exercised (1)

Certain Courts are of limited but exclusive jurisdiction, such as the Presidency and Provincial (Act IX of 1837) Small Cause Courts, which have limited jurisdiction of an exclusive character over certain classes of suits for money or moveable property, which may be tried summarily and which on that ground are excluded from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts. There are, however, numerous rulings to the effect that the nature of a suit is not changed because a question of title is incidentally raised in it (2). As to other Courts of exclusive jurisdiction, see *post*, "Either expressly or impliedly barred" As regards the valuation of the subject matter as giving jurisdiction see "*Pecuniary Jurisdiction*," *post*

Just as sect 9 of the last Code enacted that no person should be exempted from the jurisdiction, so as regards *subject matter* sect 10 enacted that, subject to the provisions of the Code and other enactments to which reference will be made, no civil cause is exempted from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts (*vide post*) Generally speaking, with the exception of Small Cause Courts (3) and Revenue Courts (4) the jurisdiction (subject to the conditions mentioned in sect 10) as regards the subject matter is not limited, though the power to take cognizance of a particular suit may be affected by its value So though a Munsif in Bengal may try all suits cognizable by Civil Courts, he can only do so in the case of suits the value of which usually does not exceed 1000 rupees

(a) Local jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction of a Court, apart from statutory power, can only be exercised over persons who are within its territorial limits (5) For the exercise of judicial power this country is divided and subdivided into small local areas, varying for different grades of Courts and generally liable to a change by the Executive Government (6)

(1) *Sagore Dutt v Ram Chunder Mitter*, 1 Hyde's Reports, 136 (1863) *per Wells, J*

(2) *Alagirisami v Innas* 3 M 127, F B (1881), *Manappa v McCarthy*, 3 M 192, F B (1881), *Bapuji v Krishaji* 15 B 400, 403, 404 (1890), *Mohesh Mahto v Sheekh*

in particular cases of Presidency and Provincial Small Cause Courts, as also of Courts of Cantonment Magistrates and Courts of Request, see cases cited in O Kinealy's Civil Procedure Code, notes to s 15

(3) *Vide ante*

(4) See as to these *Hukm Chand, Res Judicata*, 208, O Kinealy's Civil Procedure Code, notes to s 15, and *post*

(5) *Hadjee Kassem v Hadjee Isupf*, 6 C W N 829 (1902)

(6) See *Hukm Chand, Res Judicata*, 318 *et seq* In England local venues in respect to local matters continued down to 1872, when local venues were abolished Courts of

15 W R 160 (1871) [the decision on title is not conclusive, except as regards the claim in that suit] It is the nature of the suit as described in the plaint, and not the nature of the defence which determines jurisdiction *vide post*, p 78 As regards the juris-

The limits of these areas determine the local limits of the Courts' jurisdiction for the trial of original suits and appeals. Personal jurisdiction depends on the place of residence or business of the defendant. The former for transitory actions, that is, actions which are brought on occurrences which happen anywhere, depends on whether the cause of action or part of the cause of action arose within the local limits of the jurisdiction, and for local actions or actions relating to immoveable property or for the recovery of moveable property actually under distraint or attachment, depends on the situation of the property within the local jurisdiction. The case of moveable property attached or under distraint is an exception to the general rule that personal property has no locality, by which it is not meant that it has no visible locality, but that it follows the person and is governed by the law which governs him (1). The exception in the Code (2) is probably founded on the fact that in the case given the *situs* of the moveable property is fixed and cannot be altered by any person at his pleasure, and, perhaps, also for the convenience of judicial administration. The limits of these different areas determine the local limits of the Courts' jurisdiction for the trial of suits and appeals. The difficulty exists in what has been fitly described as the localization of suits and rules have therefore been enacted by the Legislature for determining the circumstances in which a suit may be taken cognizance of by the Courts having jurisdiction in any particular area.

Clause 12 of the Letters Patent determine the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Presidency High Courts, the High Court at Allahabad having no ordinary original civil jurisdiction (3). There has, however, been considerable conflict of opinion as to the several essentials of jurisdiction for which provision has been made by these Charters (4) chiefly as to the nature of "suits for land". To avoid such differences of opinion in the Provincial Courts, the Code in sections 16-20 *post* makes detailed provisions as regards jurisdiction and in any case governed by those sections there can hardly be any difference as to the character of the local suits to which the principle of territorial jurisdiction must be held to apply. These provisions are also those contained in the Charters are dealt with in the Notes to those sections.

It has been held that a Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit or appeal within its jurisdiction and cognizable by it, if it is instituted in a Court not having such jurisdiction (5) even though it may be transferred to it by higher judicial authority. The Calcutta Court has held (6) that it

Liquity, which were always unfettered by local venue entertained suits affecting lands abroad. See *Companhia de Mocimbuque v. British South Africa Company* 1892 2 Q B 58. The local limits of the Calcutta High Court were fixed by proclamation of the Governor General on 10th Sept., 1794 and are given at p 461 of *Belchambers Rules and Orders* ed. 1900.

(1) *Companhia de Mocimbuque v. British South Africa Co.* 1892 2 Q B 797 *per Lord F. M.*

(2) S 16 cl (f)

(3) As to the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary jurisdiction see *Narayana v. Turner* 16 I A 162 (1889).

(4) See notes to ss 17, 18, *post*.

(5) *Pachan v. Awasthi v. Ilahi Bahadur* 4 A 478 (1892).

(6) *Peary Lal Mozoomdar v. Komal Kishore Dasgupta* 6 C 30 (1880). *Pam Naran Joshy v. Parmeswar Narain Mahta*, 25 C 79 (1897), *P v. Margal Tekelani* 10 B 274 (1886) [Cr P C R 526].

could direct the transfer of an appeal only from a Court having jurisdiction to receive and try it, and that decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee (1)

As to the jurisdiction over proceedings in execution of a decree, see sect 38, *post*

An appeal cannot be heard upon the merits unless the decree from which the appeal was preferred was passed by a Judge having jurisdiction over the matter in dispute. The Appellate Court is only a Court of Error and the trial by an Appellate Court cannot be accepted in place of a trial by the Court of first instance (2). But though the Appellate Court cannot entertain the appeal on the merits where a Subordinate Court has no jurisdiction over the trial of a suit or appeal the Appellate Court authorized to hear appeals from that Subordinate Court has power as such to set aside its proceedings on an appeal (3). So where a defendant appealed from the Deputy Collector to the District Judge and the plaintiff then appealed to the High Court, upon an objection to the hearing of the appeal, on the ground that no appeal lay to the District Judge *a fortiori* no appeal lay to the High Court, the objection was overruled and the High Court reversed the decree of the District Judge and restored that of the first Court (4). As to the effect of absence of objection to jurisdiction, see sect 21, *post*

(b) **Personal jurisdiction**—As already stated, jurisdiction is conferred by the various Charters and Letters Patent and Acts of the Legislature to which recourse must be had, to determine the extent of jurisdiction in the case of any particular suit and Court. And such jurisdiction may be considered with reference to the (a) parties, (b) subject matter, (c) local and (d) pecuniary limits

In the first place this section and sect 10 of the last Code enact general rules which are applicable to all Civil Courts

Their effect may be generally, though succinctly, expressed in the language of Garth, C J, in a case in which the defendant was master of an Italian vessel (5) "There is no doubt whatever that by the law of this country, which is the same in that respect as the law of England, Civil Courts as a general rule, have jurisdiction to try *all civil suits* against *all persons* of any nationality within the local limits of their jurisdiction"

Sect 10 of the last Code dealt with jurisdiction over persons. Prior to 1850, Courts presided over by native officers were not competent to take cognizance of suits to which Europeans or Americans were parties. The Code of 1859 enacted the same rule as that contained in sect 10 of the last Code. The

(1) *Ledgard v. Bull*, 9 A 191 (1886). But see *Hukm Chanl. Res. Judicata* 458

(2) *Velayudam v. Arunachala*, 13 M 273, 274 (1889)

(3) *Jwala Prasad v. Salig Ram*, 13 A 575 (1891)

(4) 1b. In the case cited in the last note, as it was held that neither of the lower Courts had jurisdiction, the High Court set aside the

decrees of both Courts, dismissed the suit, and directed that the plaint be returned for presentation in the proper Court. In these cases there is merely an inquiry as to whether jurisdiction exists. As it is open to the first Court to make such inquiry so can the Appellate Court if the former errs. See *Hukm Chanl. Res. Judicata* 460

(5) *Oliver v. Laverne*, 10 C 528, 530 (1884)

provisions contained in that section were first enacted by Act XI of 1836, and were reproduced in the Code of 1859, and in subsequent Codes. Their retention has been considered no longer necessary, the principle of law which it embodied having been sufficiently established.

The repeal of sect 151 of the Army Act by 51 & 52 Vict c 1, s 6, has removed the limitation on the general jurisdiction of Civil Courts in regard to suits for debt against officers holding the King's Commission (1). There are particular enactments (2) exempting from the ordinary jurisdiction particular persons or classes of persons, and sect 86, *post*, contains special provisions relating to princes, chiefs, ambassadors and envoys. There was nothing, however, in sect 10 which affected such personal exemptions, as they were not on the ground of descent or place of birth, but by virtue of special enactments.

The exemption of independent foreign Sovereigns from the jurisdiction of all Civil Courts is as a general rule, universally admitted (3). As to the conditions in which protected independent native princes may be sued, see sect 86 *post*. "It is an attribute of sovereignty and an universal law that a State cannot be sued in its own Courts without its consent" (4). A Sovereign State may, however, bring and maintain a suit as any other suitor. As to suits by foreign States, see sects 84, 87, *post*. In India, however, the Government, unlike the Crown, can be and is often sued. And this is so on account of the original trading character of the East India Company, who in course of time acquired the Government of India, and from whom the late Queen took over the Government. The statute 21 & 22 Vict c 106, which transferred to the Crown the possession and government of the British territories in India, expressly provided for a continuance of both the nature and the extent of liabilities with which the revenues of India in the Company's hands were chargeable. As the Crown could, however, not be sued as the East India Company could have been, in her own Courts, it was enacted by sect 65 that the Secretary of State in Council should and might sue and be sued as a Body Corporate and that all persons might have the same remedies against the Secretary of State as they could have done against the East India

(1) *Pike v Carey*, 1897, All W N 203.

(2) These exemptions generally have reference to the head or members of certain families which ruled tracts of country since conquered by the British Government. Reference for instance, may be made to s 2, Act XIII of 1868, s 11, Act XVII of 1863 relating to the consent of the Governor General to suits against the ex King of Oudh and the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, to s 2, Act XX of 1873, s 1, Act XXXVII of 1858, which enact the same with reference to the Prince of Arcot and certain members of the family of the late Nawab of the Carnatic named in the Act the consent required being that of the Governor of Madras, to Act XVII of 1848 which enacts the same with

respect to certain members and servants of the family of the late Nawab of Surat named in the Act, the consent required being that of the Governor of Bombay.

(3) See *Hahn Chand, Res Judicata* 372 *et seq.*, *Mighell v Sultan of Johore*, 1894 1 Q B 149, but a foreign sovereign may submit to the jurisdiction by a submission in the face of the Court, as for example, by appearance to a writ, *ib.*, *per Lopes LJ*.

(4) *Per Sir Barnes Peacock, CJ*, in *P v O S N Co v Secretary of State for India* 5 B H C R App 1 (1861), *Nobin Chunder Dey v Secretary of State* 1 C 11 (1875), *The Secretary of State v Hari Bhanji* 5 M 277 (1882).

Company, and that the property and effects thereby vested in the Crown for the purposes of the Government of India, or acquired for the said purposes, should be subject and liable to the same judgments and executions as they would, while vested in the Company, have been liable to in respect of debts and liabilities lawfully contracted and incurred by the Company. It may therefore be generally said that the liability of the Secretary of State to be sued depends on that of the East India Company, and the liability alleged must be one incurred on account of the Government of India (1). But as the latter could not be, therefore the Secretary of State cannot be, sued for all its acts. The Company, though established originally for purposes of trade, acquired in time sovereign powers (2). Therefore acts done in the execution of these sovereign powers were not subject to the control of the Municipal Courts (3). Though the principle is well established, there is some conflict of opinion as to what acts are to be deemed acts of State, and therefore beyond the cognizance of the Civil Courts (4). The meaning of an "act of State" has been defined by the Privy Council to be 'something which appertains to the functions of Government' (5).

Several Indian Acts exempt from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts various acts of executive and revenue officers done in discharge of the work of administration. See, for instance, Act IX of 1859, relating to the claims to property seized as forfeited, and *post*, "Subject matter". The exemption in some cases only extends to certain Courts or classes of Courts (6).

As a general rule, the Court has jurisdiction over all persons, whether subjects or foreigners, (7) present in the State at the time of the institution of

(1) *Shivabhanjan v Secretary of State*, 23 B 314 (1904).

(2) See *Gibson v East India Co*, 5 Bing N C 273.

(3) *Secretary of State v Kamachei Boyce Sahiba (Tanjore Case)*, 7 M L A 476 (1859), *East India Company v Syed Ally*, 7 M L A 578 (1827), *Elphinstone v Bedrechand*, 1 Knapp, P C C 316 (1830), *Jehangir v Secretary of State*, 27 B 189 (1902).

(4) See *Hukm Chand, op cit pp 372 et seq*, *Salig Ram v Secretary of State for India*, 1 A Sup 119 (1872), *Bhagwan Singh v Secretary of State*, 2 I A 38 (1872), *Forester v Secretary of State*, 1 A Sup 10 (1871-72), *Hari Sadashiv v Shaikh Amudin*, 11 B 235 (1886), *Moodeley v East India Co*, Bro C C 469, *Sheo Lal Bohra v Shaikh Mahomed*, 13 W R P C 4 (1869), *P & O Co v Secretary of State*, 5 B H C R App 9 (1861), *Nobin Chunder Dutt v Secretary of State*, 1 C 26 (1875), *Secretary of State v Hari Bhanjee*, 5 M 279 (1882), *Vijaya Itagava v Secretary of State*, 7 M 466 (1884), *Coswami v Madhowdas*, 17 B

600 (1893), *Shurman v Goswami*, 7 B 620 (1878) [*Act of State of Foreign power*] *Jehangir v Secretary of State*, 27 B 189 (1902), *Shivabhanjan v Secretary of State*, 23 B 314 (1904).

(5) *Sheo Lal Bohra v Shaikh Mahomed*, 13 W R P C 4 (1869).

(6) *Eg s 32*, Bombay Civil Courts Act as amended by s 15 of Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. An attempt was made some years ago by the Executive to limit the judicial power of the Courts in India, it being proposed that the Courts should be prohibited from questioning the legality of the Acts of the Governor General in Council, and a further proposal was made for the purpose of regulating the High Courts without Parliament being consulted. See *per Edge, C.J.*, *R v Ganga Ram*, 16 A 151 (1894). As regards the protection afforded to judicial officers, see Act XVIII of 1850, and *Sinclair v Broughton*, 9 C 341 (1882).

(7) See *Olmer v Lavezzi*, 10 C 878, 882 (1884).

the suit, whether their presence is temporary or permanent. As regards non resident foreigners, Plowden J, in *Bikrama Singh v Bir Singh*,⁽¹⁾ said - "There is certainly, so far as I can ascertain, no rule of international jurisprudence universally recognized that a Municipal Court is absolutely incompetent to exercise jurisdiction over a non resident foreigner, and it is certain that in many, if not in most, countries the Municipal law authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction in such cases by its own Courts, subject, generally speaking, to the condition that notice, actual or constructive, be given to the absent defendant. For instance, the Code of Civil Procedure (sect 10 of the last Code) enacted that no person should, by reason of his descent or place of birth, be, in any civil proceeding, exempt from the jurisdiction of any of the Courts, and in sect 89 (now O V r 23) the Code provides for service of summons out of the jurisdiction, while sect 17 (now sect 20) authorizes the Court to take cognizance of certain suits when the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction." It appears, however, to be generally agreed upon, that even the personal service of a summons on a non resident foreigner at his foreign domicile can create no jurisdiction so as to render the judgment enforceable in the Courts of any other State,⁽²⁾ inasmuch as no Sovereignty can extend its powers beyond its own territorial limits to subject either persons or property to its judicial decision. And there is no principle for holding that the mere possession of property in the foreign country would, by reason of the protection enjoyed confer on the Courts of that country jurisdiction over a foreigner neither domiciled nor resident therein, in respect of matters unconnected with the property.⁽³⁾ Whilst every tribunal may execute process against property within its jurisdiction, existence of such property affords no sufficient ground for imposing on the foreign owner of that property a duty or obligation to fulfil the judgment.⁽⁴⁾ See, further, as to personal jurisdiction and residence, sects 19 and 20, *post*, and notes thereon.

No sort of jurisdiction can be obtained against one who was dead when the suit was commenced against him as a defendant or in his name as plaintiff, and a judgment for or against him must necessarily be void.⁽⁵⁾ If a suit is once validly commenced in any Court, jurisdiction is not taken away by the change of residence or country by the defendant, and the weight of authority is in favour of the view that jurisdiction is not divested by death of either party after the institution of the suit, and a judgment rendered after a party's death, though erroneous, is voidable and not void.⁽⁶⁾

The general provision of law enacted by sect 10 of the last Code was held

(1) 1888, P R No 191, p 509, cited in *Hukm Chand, op cit* 373, where the subject is generally treated.

(2) See *Hukm Chand, op cit* 373, the case of foreigners domiciled here but temporarily absent is different.

(3) *Nallatambi Mudaliar v Ponnusami*, 2 M 400, 404 (1879).

(4) *Schlesby v Westenholz*, L R 6 Q B, 155 (1870), see *Pigott on Foreign Judgments*, 137.

(5) *Freeman on Jurisdiction*, cited in *Hukm Chand, op cit* 403, 409.

(6) *Pigott on Foreign Judgments*, 130, *Hukm Chand, op cit* 406, 407, who points out that in *Bepin Behari v Brojo Nath* 8 C 357 (1882), a judgment against a person deceased was not treated as void, but denied the effect of *res judicata* on the ground that neither the deceased nor the representatives were parties to the suit in which that judgment was pronounced.

The subject matter and value of a suit is determined by the plaintiff's statement of demand. Jurisdiction is not affected by the defendant's plea it being a fundamental principle that competence is determined by the plaintiff's demand and not by the defendant's answer, which only impugns the existence of the demand but does not alter or affect its nature (1). It is the claim therefore and not the defence which is to be looked at for the purpose of determining jurisdiction (2).

As regards the mode of valuation the value need not on general principles be always the same as that for the purpose of levy of court fees. Formerly questions frequently arose as to the distinction between the valuation of a suit for the purposes of stamp duty and the valuation of the subject matter of the suit for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Court (3). Since however, the passing of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887, these questions do not generally arise, for that Act (4) provides that where in suits other than those referred to in the Court Fees Act 1870 s. 7, sub s. 11 ix a cl (d) court fees are payable *ad valorem* under the Court Fees Act 1870 the value as determinable for the computation of court fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. This provision applies to Appellate Courts as well as to Courts of first instance (5). The effect therefore of the Suits Valuation Act has been to assimilate the value for court fees and for jurisdiction and thus to avoid an independent inquiry to determine the jurisdiction of Courts (6). Where, however, the value determin-

(1) *Hukm Chand C P C 202*

(2) *Jag Lal v Har Narain Singh 10 A 304 (1888)*. See also to the application of this general principle *Cobind Singh v Kallu 2 A 778 (1880)*, *Bapuji Raghunath v Kuvary 15 B 400 (1890)*, *Chanda v Kumbi 6 M 208 (1886)*, *Bahadur v Nawabjan 3 A 822 (1881)*, *Amrita v Naru 13 B 489 (1888)*, *Hukm Chand op cit 242 252 257*

(3) See *Hukm Chand Res Jud 309 310*, *Dayachand v Hemchand 4 B 515 (1880)*, *Kirty Churn Mitter v Annath Nath Deb 8 C 757 (1882)*, *Aukhil Chunder v Mohenece Mohun Das, 4 C L R 491 (1879)*, *Manohan Ganesh v Bera Ram Charan 2 B 219 (1877)*, *Kushal Chand v Nagendas 12 B 675 677 (1888)*

(4) S. S. Act VII of 1887 and see also *Madras Civil Courts Act s. 14* and *Hukm Chand Civil Procedure Code 267 268*

(5) *Bai Varanda v Bai Manegaru, 18 B 807 (1893)*, and see *Bhagvantrao v Mehta, 21 B 40 (1892)*, *Gulabsingji v Lakshman Singji 18 B 100 (1893)*, *Ibrahimji v Bejorji 20 B 265 (1895)*. As to the valuation in particular cases such as account [*Kushal Chand v Nagendas 12 B 675 677 (1888)*] adoption administration partition

possession mesne profits [*Mohini Mohun Das v Satis Chandra Roy, 17 C 704 706 (1890)*] *Wajid ud din v Wahullah (1907) 24 A 381* pre-emption [*Mahabir v Behari Lal 13 A 320 (1891)*] partnership mortgage set off [*Rampwan Mal v Chand Mal 10 A 587 (1888)*] declaratory suits and suits to set aside alienations by a Hindu widow, an instrument in respect of attached property or sale or suits to enforce registration and suits of no value or undervalued or of a composite character see notes to *Hukm Chand Civil Procedure Code pp 257 270* and *O Kinealy's Civil Procedure Code s. 15*. As to the stamp in cases of alternative relief [*Kashinath v Guruda 15 B 82 (1890)*] additional Court Fee [*Chunni Lal v Ajudhir 19 A 240 (1896)*] appeal against decision as to class to which a suit belongs [*Dada v Nagesh 23 B 486 (1898)*] *Shiva v Mahto Mahto 28 C 334 (1901)* as to subsidiary relief asked not affecting subject matter see *Hukm Chand op cit 243*

(6) See *Harhar Prasad Singh v Shyam Lal Singh 40 C 615 (1913)*, a plaint rejected for insufficient Court fee held that plaintiff could not value his case differently for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction

able for the computation of court fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction is not the same, and it is alleged that the suit has either by mistake (1) or intentionally (2) been overvalued the Court enters upon a preliminary inquiry before going into the merits to determine this question and if the suit be found to be overvalued it will return the plaint for presentation to the lowest Court of competent jurisdiction. If the claim is amended so as to increase the original value, jurisdiction may be taken away (3). But while the subject matter of a suit is determined by the plaintiff's allegations in the plaint the valuation of the subject matter which directly determines the jurisdiction in its pecuniary aspect does not depend absolutely on them. The plaintiff can demand anything he likes and the demand will determine the jurisdiction which will further depend upon a proper valuation of it. But the plaintiff's valuation of that demand will not always be conclusive for that purpose (4). No person can value his suit at a figure higher than what his own statement of facts shows that the subject matter of it is worth (5). If however, during the trial or at the conclusion of the suit, it be ascertained that the claim has been overvalued it is necessary to see whether the overvaluation has been *bona fide* or not. The value of property depends in large measure upon opinion and the Court will therefore not declare want of jurisdiction if in good faith the plaintiff has alleged the value to be within the jurisdiction.

The approximate amount stated in the plaint may be taken it being a general principle that even where jurisdiction depends on particular facts stated the proceedings will not be null through a mere error in stating the facts so as to found the jurisdiction, though they will be voided probably by fraud or at any rate, will be voidable against him who has practised it (6).

It is the *bona fide* nature of the claim and not the amount actually recovered which determines the jurisdiction otherwise the Court would in many cases find itself in this anomalous position, it would have had full jurisdiction over the case from its inception up to the very moment of giving judgment and would then find that the conclusion at which it had arrived had the effect of depriving it of jurisdiction. So where a person sued *bona fide* in the High Court to recover Rs 843 12 0 as damages but through defective proof failed to attain a larger amount than Rs 75 it was held that the High Court had jurisdiction under clause 12 of the Charter (7). The

(1) *Krishnan v Pavi Varma* 8 M 384 (1885)

(2) *Hamidunnissa Bibi v Copal Chandra Malakar*, 24 C 661 (1897)

(3) *Chand v Kumbi* 9 M 208 (1885)

(4) *Hukm Chand* Civil Procedure Code, 266

(5) *Mootoo v Verapah Chetty*, 17 W R 243 (1872), the subject matter in *Mahabir Singh v Behari Lal* 13 A 320 (1891) was not capable of exact valuation in which case the value put by the plaintiff if *bona fide* may be adopted. With regard to estoppel

as to valuation against a defendant see *Brahmo Moyee v Anund Chander* 22 W R 120 (1873)

(6) *Kondaji Bagaji Anan* 7 B 448 41 (1883) per West J

(7) *Bikur Chand v Soringmull* 1 H J 272 (1863) ref *Donaonally Dawn v Campbell* 19 W R 20 (1872) *Joy Doorga v Mamek Chand* 16 W R 243 (1871), *Mahabir Singh v Behari Lal* 13 A 320 (1891), *Pameshwar v Dlu* 21 C 553 (1894) as to appeals see *Nilmony Singh v Jagalan Ilu* P J 21 C 770 (1896) the same rule has

does not vary the amount which is proved and claimed in a suit does not determine or affect the jurisdiction over it as if the Court has to consider and inquire in the suit, not only as to that amount, but as to the total amount asked for in the plaint and discussed in the proceedings; the claim for the portion discussed being adjudicated upon not less than that for the portion decreed. Nor is the other course practicable as the amount proved cannot be known at the commencement of the suit, and jurisdiction must be fixed before proceedings are commenced and evidence entered upon (1). The pecuniary jurisdiction of a Civil Court on its original or appellate side is ordinarily speaking, governed by the value stated by the plaintiff in his plaint; but if a suit having regard to the valuation in the plaint is within the jurisdiction it is not ousted by the Court finding that a decree for a sum exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction should be given to the plaintiff. (2)

It is a well known principle that the merits of a demand are immaterial as affecting jurisdiction. It is a mistaken conception that jurisdiction depends on facts or the actual existence of matters or things instead of upon the allegations concerning them (3). The question of jurisdiction does not depend upon the truth or falsehood of the claim, but upon its nature, it is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry (4). It has, however, been held in this country that a plaintiff cannot give jurisdiction to or take away jurisdiction from a Court by adding to his claim something to which he was not entitled upon any view of the case, and such unwarrantable addition to his claim must be struck out and the jurisdiction of the Court determined with reference to the rest of his claim (5).

But the cases referred to in the first of the last mentioned decisions appear, it has been pointed out, (6) to proceed upon a misconception of the nature of jurisdiction as stated above, unless they may be justified on the ground that an "exaggerated claim thus brought for the purpose of getting a trial in a different Court is substantially a fraud upon the law, and must be rejected,

been applied in other cases where the suit has been found to be overvalued, the nature of the demand determining jurisdiction. *Rajendra Lal Gossami v. Shama Churn Chakrabarti*, 5 C 488 (1877), *Varadachari v. Anon.*, 7 B 118 (1881); *Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal*, 11 A 720 (1891), *Mohee Lal v. Kheta Ram Marwary*, 25 W. R. 76 (1876), *Damodhar v. Trinbaki*, 16 B 376 (1885), *ditto*, *Lakshman Bhatkar v. Balaji Bhatkar*, 8 B 31 (1883); *Nihomay Singh v. Jagajalandhar Roy*, 23 C 576 (1890), *Ibrahimji Chaudhji v. Dejongh*, 20 B 265 (1895). As to the (5) *Barlow*, of the rule when plaintiffs (6) 1893), applied with a general prayer 1 B 40 (1892) *Madho Das v. Bamji*, 16 A 1892, 18 B 11 (1892), *Dejongh*, 20 B 265 and, Civil Procedure Code, section in particular *Kushal Chand v. Na Ramji Patak*, 16 A 286 (1889) adoption ad

(1891)

(3) See *Hukm Chand*, C P C 244

(4) *R. v. Bolton*, 1 A & L N S 74, per Denman, C J

(5) *Unnikrishnan v. Balu v. Gopal Chandra Malakar*, 21 C at p 666 (1897), referring to *Nanda Kumar Bannerjee v. Ishan Chandra Bannerjee*, 1 B L B 91, A S C (1863), in which it was held that the S C C could not be ousted of its jurisdiction merely by asking for an alternative relief to which the plaintiff was not entitled. *Lakshman Bhatkar v. Babaji Bhatkar*, 8 B 31 (1883), *Bonomally Nawn v. Campbell*, 16 B L B 103 (1872), and distinguishing the case where the claim is not absolutely untenable, but has to be dismissed only because the evidence is insufficient

(6) *Hukm Chand*, op cit 245

whether it arises from mere recklessness or from an artful design to get the adjudication of one Judge instead of that of another,' (1) a principle which may apply when the intention of evading the competency of jurisdiction is certain (2) In practice however the establishment of fraud which should not be presumed, involves considerable difficulties To every case in which the demand is evidently exaggerated there will be many which will be really doubtful and where the Judge might act according to his own peculiar views in declaring himself incompetent to take cognizance of a demand beyond the pecuniary limits of his jurisdiction as he finds it too excessive (3)

The general effect however of the Suits Valuation Act is as already stated, to avoid an independent inquiry to determine the jurisdiction of Courts and this question in respect of simple overvaluation as distinguished from other additions to the claim (4) is not so likely to arise as formerly And in the case of appeals the matter is now regulated by sect 11 of the Suits Valuation Act Since the passing of that Act it has been held that while it is no doubt a sound rule that Courts should not allow parties to evade the law relating to matters of jurisdiction and that where it is found that a party has intentionally exaggerated his claim in order to bring his suit in a Court which otherwise would not have jurisdiction to try it before the merits of the claim have been gone into the plaint should be returned to be presented to the proper Court, yet this rule must be taken with qualifications and one important qualification is that embodied in sect 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, namely that where the suit has been tried on its merits by the first Court, and the overvaluation of the suit is not found to have prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit on the merits there the objection as to jurisdiction should not be given effect to A plaintiff who alters the valuation of his suit for the purpose of evading jurisdiction may be punished by having no costs allowed to him, but it does not conduce to promote the ends of justice if an Appellate Court were to set aside a decision which is found to be correct on the merits simply because the value of the suit had been designedly increased or diminished to evade jurisdiction (5)

The proper valuation of the subject matter of a suit determines the

(1) *Per West J Lakshman v Babai* 8 B 31 (1883) and see *Dwarka Das v Hameelwar Prosad* 17 A 76 (1894)

(2) The dictum or part of it however seems not to have been approved in *Koti Pujari v Manjaya* 21 M at p 274 (1897) *Hamidunnissa Bibi v Gopal Chandra* 24 C 661 (1897)

(3) *Hukm Chand op cit* 245 246 In *Koti Pujari v Manjaya* 21 M 271 (1897) the H C. pointed out the distinction between the question whether the plaintiff could recover the whole or only part of the sums claimed by him and the question of the over valuation of the subject matter

(4) *Fg* a claim for alternative relief as in *Anila Kumar Bannerjee v Ishan Chandra*

Bannerjee 1 B L R 91 A S C (1868) *ante*

(5) *Hamidunnissa Bibi v Gopal Chandra Malakar* 24 C 661 (1894) See *Raghunath Charan Singh v Sharoo Koori* 31 C 344 (1903) See as to Suits Valuation Act *Hukm Chand Res Judicata* 420 Even where the valuation has been arbitrary and no objection to jurisdiction has been taken s. 11 of that Act will apply *Hamidunnissa Bibi v Mahomed Hatem* 31 C 849 (1904) but see also *Bondya Nath Advya v Mahan Lal Advya* 17 C 680 (1890) The section applies to the revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 and is enacted notwithstanding anything in s. 69 *post*

question of essential jurisdiction throughout the suit. The jurisdiction in appeals and execution is determined primarily by the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit. Appeals from decrees of original Courts, when allowed lie "to the Courts authorized to hear appeals" from these Courts (1). Appeals from orders lie to the Court to which an appeal lies from a decree (2). In the case of appeals to the Privy Council, the value of the subject-matter must be Rs. 10,000 and upwards, and the amount or value of the matter in dispute on appeal must not be less than that amount (3). But in the case of all other appeals the valuation of the dispute on appeal is not considered even in determining whether an appeal is to lie. It was formerly contended that the appeal should be held to lie to the Court having jurisdiction over the amount in dispute in the appeal, but it is now settled that the value of the original suit, and not of the matter in dispute in the appeal, is the criterion by which to determine appellate jurisdiction. It is thus the money value of the original suits that fixes the jurisdiction of the Courts throughout the subsequent litigation in its several stages, and not the value of what has been left in dispute (4). Not only does the jurisdiction continue throughout the suit, but whatever may be the result of the suit in all such proceedings also, such as execution as by the Code are brought within its cognizance as incidental to the suit. Jurisdiction is not lost in execution, because the interest accrued after decree has raised the amount due above the money limit (5). See generally as to execution sect. 38 *post*.

"Civil nature"—This will exclude all criminal proceedings, but the term 'civil' cannot be considered as merely the opposite of criminal for there are suits which though not relating to matters of a criminal, are yet not of a civil nature. Thus the explanation, which merely declares and enacts the law as it has always been administered by the Court, shows that suits as to religious rites or ceremonies, which involve no question of right to property

(1) S. 96, *post*. As to the Courts so authorized, see Bengal Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887) ss. 20, 21, Madras Civil Courts Act (III of 1873) s. 13, Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869) ss. 8, 17, 26, 27, Punjab Courts Act (XVIII of 1894), ss. 39, 40.

(2) S. 106, *post*.

(3) S. 110, *post*.

(4) *Muthusami Pillai v. Muthu Chidambaram* 7 M. H. C. R. 376 (1874), *Dooley Chand v. Nurban Singh*, 18 W. R. 212 (1872), *Jag Lal v. Har Narain Singh*, 10 A. 524 (1888), *Mahbir Singh v. Behari Lal*, 13 A. 320 (1891), nor conversely can a plaintiff value his appeal at a greater amount than the original suit. *Radha Prasad Singh v. Pathan Ojah* 15 A. 363 (1893). Mesne profits, if demanded by the plaintiff, must be admitted into the calculation of the appealable value,

the measure for determining a plaintiff's right of appeal being the amount for which the defendant has resisted the decree. As a natural result, however, of the principle in which jurisdiction in appeal is taken, interest or costs subsequently accruing cannot be included for the determination of the jurisdiction. *Hukm Chand, Res. Jud.* 315 716.

(5) *Shamray Pandoji v. Nilaji Ramaji*, 10 B. 200 (1885), *Hukm Chand, C. P. C.* 250, and see as to execution *Parashottam v. Dhondu*, 6 B. 582 (1890), but as to a claim under s. 331 of the former Code, and O. XXI r. 99 of this see *Mattammal v. Chinnana*, 4 M. 220 (1881). See the subject of the continuance of jurisdiction throughout suit once acquired, discussed in *Hukm Chand (iv)* *Pr. Code*, 246 249.

or to an office, are not suits of a civil nature, (1) and as such cognizable by the Courts, which have also in some cases refused to interfere in matters of a purely social nature. Rights of a civil nature mean such rights as are vested in the citizen and fall within the domain of private and not of public law (2). These rights relate both to property and to the person, and suits may be for the recovery of possession, or damages, or for specific relief. Wherever a right is recognized by law, a suit will lie to enforce it unless it is barred by any enactment on the principle *ubi jus ibi remedium*. What are such rights is the subject-matter of substantive law and not of procedure and therefore need not be discussed here (3). The question whether a suit is of a civil nature is not necessarily the same as that whether it is cognizable as the cognizability depends not only on the nature of the suit, but on the recognition by positive law of the existence of the rights stated and of the right to the redress sought. So suits for enforcement of rights relating to caste are suits of a civil nature, though they are not always cognizable by the Courts as such. In the Bengal Presidency, suits for restoration to caste were made expressly so cognizable by Bengal Reg. III of 1793, and have been often taken cognizance of by the Courts. Whilst, on the other hand, Bombay Reg. II of 1827, in giving Civil Courts a cognizance "generally of all suits and complaints of a civil nature," expressly provided that "no interference on the part of the Court in caste questions is hereby warranted beyond the admission and trial of any suit instituted for the recovery of damages on account of an alleged injury to the caste and character of the plaintiff, arising from some illegal act or unjustifiable conduct of the other party" (4).

(1) See *Loko Nath Misra v. Dasarathi Tawari*, 32 C 1072 (1903), *Subbaraya Mudaliar v. Vedantachariar*, 28 M 23 (1904), *Mooni Meera Sahib v. Mahomed Meera Sahib*, 30 M 15 (1906), *Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Samaram Sangrachariar*, 30 M 153 (1906), and cases there cited.

(2) *Kodiyalam v. Sudessana*, 11 M J 422. See *Hukm Chand*, Civ. Pr. Code, 57.

(3) A large number of cases will be found cited in the notes to s. 11 of O'Hanesly's Civ. Pr. Code, under the following heads — Abusive Language, Adoption, Account, Agreement, Assam Regulations, Assignment, Bottomry Bond, Caste, Compensation, Contribution Co-sharers, Decrees, Defamation, Embankments, False Imprisonment, False Charge, Ferry, Foreign State, Fraud, Hant, Hereditary Office and Pension, Karmams, Land Registration, Land Revenue, Legal Representation, Mahommedan Law, Maintenance, Mortgage, Municipality, Office Disputes, Partition, Party Wall, Partnerships, Penalty, Possession, Pre-emption, Privacy, Privilege, Registration, Religious Ceremonies, Restitution of Conjugal Rights,

Revenue, Revenue Court, Reversioner, alienation, Settlement, Specific Remedy, Stamp, Right to Sue, User, Voluntary Associations, Voluntary Payments, Water, use. The subject is dealt with in *Hukm Chand's Civ. Pr. Code*, pp. 50-76, where it is more appropriately confined to some rights in regard to suits in which questions have arisen in Courts as to their not being of a civil nature, viz. those relating to marriage, caste, caste offices, ritual and offices. As to these, see *post*. The same subject is also dealt with in the same Author's book on *Res Judicata*, pp. 243-268. Cases decided on the section subsequently to the editions here referred to are cited in their appropriate places. As to the Public Demands Recovery Act see *Ram Narain Harra v. Mosahabali Khan*, 6 C W N 11 (1901).

(4) *Hukm Chand C. P. Code* has been held that s. 21, Part II of the Code is not applicable to suits between *Sayad Hasim Sahib v. Hukm Chand* (1888) though in *Alfiah v. Hukm Chand* (1902) the Court held that it was applicable.

Again a suit for violation of a right of privacy is not generally allowed, because the suit is not recognized by the general law of India, and not because such a suit is not of a civil nature a suit of that character being allowed in Gujarat and various districts of the N W P, where the right is recognized under local custom. In addition to suits relating to caste, reference may be made to certain others in regard to which questions have arisen from time to time. Suits relating to marriage have long been held cognizable by Civil Courts having been made expressly so in the Bengal Presidency by Bengal Reg. III of 1793—such as suits to declare the validity or invalidity or pectitation of marriage, for damages for breach of, though not for specific performance of, marriage, and restitution of conjugal rights.

As already stated and as appears from the section, suits merely relating to religious rights and ceremonies will not be entertained unless they involve a right to property or to an office. The latter may be either of a personal character such as that of a family priest, or may be a local office. Personal offices are gradually losing their legal character as such, and the law now appears generally to recognize only local offices—that is offices connected with a certain temple ghat or locality which are essentially distinct from personal offices (1).

‘Either expressly or impliedly barred’—The words in the former Code ‘*barred by any enactment for the time being in force*’ were held to mean expressly barred and therefore the giving of a concurrent remedy did not bar a suit (2). As to whether the matter would now fall within the implied bar, *vide post*. Enactments affecting the jurisdiction of Courts will be construed so far as possible to avoid the effect of transferring the determination of rights and liabilities from the ordinary Courts to executive officers (3). The jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not excluded unless the cognizance of the entire suit as brought is barred (4). The most important restrictions on the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts over civil suits are enacted by the Acts relating to the revenue or the rent of the agricultural or other lands assessed with the Government demand. The provisions of these Acts are different for different provinces but they all appear to be based on the principle that matters likely to affect the liability for, or the amount of, the Government Land Revenue,

opinion that the term ‘caste’ in that regulation was not necessarily confined to Hindus. Nor are suits allowed to lie in Bombay relating to caste offices when they involve any caste question. See *Hukm Chand, op cit* 65. In the Madras Presidency the same view is taken of the autonomy of caste as in Bombay. See *Hukm Chand, op cit* 67.

(1) *Hukm Chand, C P C* 70-76. The Courts, however, ought not to be involved in the determination of trivial questions of mere dignity and privilege, although connected with an office, *Narayan v Krishnaji*, 10 B 233 237 (1885), in *Dina Nath Chuckerbutty v Protap Chunder Goswami*, 4 C. W. N. 79 (1809), the Court recognized the right of a

Shebat of the presiding deity of a certain tree; 9 C, 27 C 30 (1899), *Sayad Nuruddin v Abas Bavasahab*, 14 Bom. L. R. 573 (1912) (suit for Refai and hadrihaks), see also *Madhusudan v Shri Shankaracharya* 33 B 278 (1908) *Trimbak Gopal v Krishnarao*, 33 B 387 (1909) *Channu Dat v Babu Nandan*, 32 A 527 (1910).

(2) *Kashori Mohun Roy Chowdhry v Chundra Nath Pal* 14 C. 641, 648 (1887).

(3) See *Winter v Attorney General*, 6 P. C. 389 (1875).

(4) *Anta v Ghulam Muhammad Khan* 6 A 110 (1833) and see *Hukm Chand, C P C* 76.

should be adjudicated upon by Revenue Officers who have better acquaintance with such matters and with a procedure more elastic and summary than that of the ordinary Civil Courts (1). As instances of the particular matters falling within the cognizance of Revenue Courts and of which the Civil Courts can therefore, not take cognizance reference may be made to sects 93, 95, and 211 of the North Western Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1901), (2) sect 158 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVIII of 1887) (3) sects 76 and 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887) (4) sects 4 and 5 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (V of 1876) (5). It has however been recently held by the Bombay High Court that sect 4 (c) of the last named Act is not a bar to a suit in which there is a claim arising out of the alleged illegality of proceedings taken for the realization of land revenue (6).

In the Madras Presidency (7) and in Lower Bengal the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in rent and tenancy cases has not as a general rule been excluded. By Act VIII (B. C.) of 1869, Revenue Courts were abolished over the greater part of Bengal, and the trial of rent suits was made over to the ordinary Civil Courts (8). The bar is in some cases due to administrative requirements and practical convenience. Thus the Municipal Acts of some of the provinces contain special provisions barring the cognizance of suits by Civil Courts chiefly in matters relating to taxation (9).

Somewhat on a similar principle sect 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that no order made by a Magistrate under that section "shall be called

held that under this section the fact that a criminal trial has not resulted in a conviction is no bar to a civil suit against the accused (11). In some cases the bar

(1) See *Hukm Chand Res Jud* 268 *et seq.*, Civ. Pr. Code, 77 *et seq.*, where the various Acts referred to in the text are discussed. *Jamla Singh & Kingsley*, 17 C. W. N. 1201 (1913).

(2) See cases cited *ib.* [and see also *O. Kuncaly's Civ. Pr. Code*, notes to s. 11].

(3) See *ib.*

(4) *Ib.*

(5) *Ib.*, and notes to s. 11 in *O. Kuncaly's Civ. Pr. Code* in which also cases relating to the Khoti Settlement Act are also cited. Bom., Act I of 1889. As to special Acts for the relief of Taluqdars or Agriculturnists see s. 9 *Sindh Encumbered Estates Act*, 1881, and the *Broach and Kaira Encumbered Estates Act* 1881.

(6) *Cangaram Hatiram Gujar & Dinkar Ganesh* 37 B. 542 (1913), and for *Agra Tenancy Act*, see *Ram Charitra Patil & Jains* 36 A. 48 (1913).

(7) S. 87, Mad., Act VIII of 1869, and

sects 2 Mad., Peg VI of 1831, and s. 52 Act VI of 1861.

(8) See now Act (Beng.) VIII of 1885 ss. 144 (2), 158, as to suits to settle disputes prior to completion of record of rights see *Troylokhyanath Bose v McLeod*, 28 C. 28 (1899), *Durga Mohan Gango Padhya & Sukumar Das*, 17 C. W. N. cclxxii (1913), *Lalla Saligram Singh & Mohunt Ramgur*, 3 C. W. N. 311.

(9) See *Act of 1869* in *Punjab Municipalities Act*, 1869, s. 144, *M. D. re M.* 14.

(10) 1907.

(11) *Chuni Lal & Ram Kishan Sahu*, 15 C. 460 F. R. (1905) overruling *Abodabulish Mundal & Monglu Mundal* 14 C. 60 (1886).

(12) *Aschab & Manurddin* (1905) 13 C. W. N. 501.

no civil jurisdiction is merely of a provisional character, as in the case of the Pensions Act of 1871 (1) The Civil Courts are bound to respect an order passed by a Magistrate when he is acting within his jurisdiction, (2) but a suit has been held to lie declaring that the order of a Magistrate passed under sect 518, Act X of 1872 was without jurisdiction and giving relief by declaring the plaintiff's right (3) As also one for maintenance of a child notwithstanding the order of a magistrate refusing maintenance (4)

A judgment and decree vitiated by fraud or collusion is a nullity, and a suit will lie to set it aside (5) There is no enactment barring the Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit to set aside on the ground of fraud a decree passed by another Court of concurrent jurisdiction (6) While the question whether a decree sought to be executed was obtained by fraud is not within the scope of sect 47 *post* and can only be raised by a separate suit if however the decree is not impeached for fraud but only the execution proceedings thereunder, the question must be raised in those proceedings and not by separate suit (7) A grant of probate is not in the nature of a summary proceeding to be contested by a regular suit in the Civil Court The grant must be contested by an application to revoke in the Court of Probate (8) The grant of probate is the decree of a Court which no other Court can set aside except for fraud or want of jurisdiction (9)

The former section dealt only with bar by special enactment but there are other cases in which a suit is not allowed to lie on general principles of law The amended section includes an implied bar In some cases a suit is not allowed as there is no substantive right giving rise to a cause of action by reason of the non-recognition of the right on account of some rule of statutory or common law or of some principle of public policy or morality So a special procedure having been provided in the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to public roads a suit will not lie for obstructing a public road unless the plaintiff has suffered special damage As regards however nuisances see now sect 91 *post* Certain suits are barred in the interest of public morality These cases proceed on the ground that a Court ought not to enforce contracts injurious to and against the public good and not on the ground that the suit is not of a civil nature or there is a defect in the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts over it (10) Again a suit does not lie to recover a voluntary payment because there is no right to recover (11) Where a statute enacts a right or an obligation and provides a method of

(1) See ss 4 6 7 and 9

(2) *Hedarnath v. Rughoonath* 6 N W P 104 (1874) *Ujalamayi v. Chandra* 4 B L R 17 B 24 (1869)

(3) *Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Clowdram* 5 C 7 (1879) F B

(4) *Ghana Kanta v. Gerel* 32 C 49 (1904)

(5) See Authors Evidence Act not s to s 41 cases there cited and in *O'Kinealy v. C. Ir Code* notes to s 11 s 3 to fraud

(6) *Nundolal Bose v. Nistarini Dass* 30 C 369 (1902)

(7) See notes to s 47 *post*

(8) *Maybo v. Williams* 2 N W 1 268 (1870)

(9) *Komolochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle* 4 C 360 (1878)

(10) See *Hukm Chand C P C* 103 104 as to the necessity to enforce obligations in a specific manner see cases cited in *O'Kinealy v. C. Ir Code* s 11 Specific Remedy

(11) But see ss 69 72 Contract Act

enforcing it, that method and not the remedy at Common Law must be followed. Where however, a statute is confirmatory of a pre-existing right the new remedy is presumed as cumulative or alternative unless an intention to the contrary appears from some other part of the statute (1). The Madras High Court has recognized that principle in disallowing suits brought to enforce registration otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of sect 77 of the Indian Registration Act. The Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad High Courts hold that a suit will not lie to compel the registration of a document after a refusal by the sub-registrar to register the same except in accordance with these provisions (2). Again when by an Act of the Legislature powers are given to any person for a public purpose from which an individual may receive an injury if the mode of redressing the injury is pointed out by the Act the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts is ousted and in case of injury the party cannot proceed by ordinary action (3). So the Code providing a special method of paying the necessary expenses of a witness the latter cannot sue for them (4). Every Court is competent to award costs in any proceedings and a separate suit will therefore not lie for their recovery (5).

No bar to a suit will be implied however from the provision of a summary and special remedy in a special Act for a right existing under common law. Thus a suit for compensation for wrongful seizure of cattle will lie in a Civil Court the provisions of Act I of 1871 being no bar to it (6). A suit may be brought for confirmation of an execution sale which has been set aside by the Court (7) or if the execution should have been transferred to the Collector by the Collector (8) ordering the sale. So also under the last Code it was held that notwithstanding sects 318, 319, 328 and 331 of that Code under which action might be taken by a purchaser at an execution sale to recover possession of the property purchased a regular suit might also be brought by

(1) *Beekford v Hood* 7 T R 620. *Val lance v Falle* 13 Q B D 109 (1884). *Ram ayya v Vedachalla* 14 M 441 (1890). *Satappa Pillai v Raman Chetti* 17 M 1 (1890) and see next note.

(2) *Edu v Malommed Siddik* 9 C 150 (1882). *Kunhimmu v Viyyathamma* 7 M 535 (1884). *Bhugwan Singh v Khoda Buksh* 3 A 397 (1881). *Abdullah Khan v Janki* 16 A 303 (1894). *Venkatassami v Kastayya* 16 M 341 (1893) none in Bombay in the absence of an agreement to that effect. *In re Shaik Abdul Aziz* 11 B 691 (1887).

(3) *Governor v Meredith* 4 T R 294. *Stevens v Peacock* 11 Q B 731 (1848). *West v Dowman* 14 Ch D 111. *Hukm Chand v P C 93*.

(4) *De Saran v Hurrish Chunder Biswas* 1 W 1 S C C 101 (1864) and see also *once to take accounts may sue* *Copularat*

namayyar v Bupala Narasimha 4 M 399 (1882).

(5) *Mahram Das v Ajudha* 8 A 452 (1886). *Kadir Baksh v Sahg Ram* 9 A 474 (1887). Costs incurred in criminal proceedings may be recovered only as damages for malicious prosecution. *Mahomed Ali v Bayama* 14 B 100 (1889). *Fazal Imam v Fazal* 12 A 166 (1889). And see generally as to suits for costs. *Jalam Janja v Khoda Javra* 8 B 11 C R 29 (1871). *Ref Case* 3 M 11 C R 341 (1867). *Subbarava v Vathilingam* 20 M 91 (1890).

(6) *Shuttrughon Dass v Hohna* 16 C 150 (1889). Similarly as to Act IX of 1861. *Krishna v Reade* 9 M 31 (1880). *Act VIII of 1860 v 25 Bombay Akbari Act 1878*. *Narayan Venku v Sakham* 11 B 519 (1887). See *Hukm Chand v 1 C 100*.

(7) *Azunuddin v Baldeo* 3 A 554 (1881).

(8) *Runde Bli v Kalla*, 9 A 40 (1885).

him for the recovery of the same, (1) the two remedies being concurrent. And notwithstanding the procedure under sect 152, O XX r 6, sect 111, O XLVII r 1, *post*, may be available, there is nothing to prevent a suit to rectify a mistake in a decree (2)

Generally, where a decree holder can proceed under the execution sections, he cannot bring a regular suit. So where, having obtained a decree for money, A sues to recover the unsatisfied balance thereof from B, alleging that the property of the deceased judgment debtor was in his possession, it was held that he should have enforced his decree by execution and sale, or by execution and attachment and appointment of a receiver, and no regular suit would lie (3). A suit does not lie for damages for non compliance with a mandatory injunction to compel the performance of which the plaintiff had his remedy in execution (4). Nor will a suit lie for the costs of a receiver which were deducted in execution of a decree for mesne profits from the amount of such mesne profits, inasmuch as the objection to such deduction should have been urged in the execution proceedings (5). So, in the case of an ordinary action in ejectment in which a plaintiff gets a decree for possession of the property, if he takes no steps to execute that decree within the time allowed by law, he cannot by a fresh suit, based either on the decree or on his title as it stood at the time that the first suit was brought, evade the law of limitation (6). A person suing on his proprietary title to recover possession of mortgaged property on the ground that the mortgage had been satisfied, and obtaining an unconditional decree for possession, is in the same position (7). The principle is that once any right has been enforced by a suit in which a decree has been obtained, the decree becomes the embodiment of that right, and that right in its incchoate state is merged in the decree (8) the enforcement of which, if not barred by limitation must be by proceedings taken to execute it. As regards suits for redemption, considerable conflict exists. In some cases the existence of a prior decree for redemption unexecuted has been held to bar a subsequent decree for the same relief. The question has been variously viewed from the standpoint of the general principles referred to, and the applicability of sect 11 (formerly sect 13) and sect 47 (formerly sect 244) of the Code. It appears to be agreed that in some cases sect 13 would have barred the subsequent suit. A Full Bench of the

(1) *Kishori Mohun Roy v Chunder Nath Pal*, 14 C 644 (1887), *Seru v Muttasami*, 10 M 53 (1886), *Seru Mohun Baner v Bhago ban*, 9 C 602 (1883), *Balvant Santaram v Babaji*, 8 B 602 (1884), as to symbolical possession, see *Jaggohundu Mitter v Purpanand*, 16 C 530, F B (1889), *Gossain Dalmar Puri v Bepin Behary Mitter*, 18 C 520 (1891), *Mahadeo v Janu*, F B, 36 B 376 (1912), 14 Bom L R 115

(2) *Jogeeswar Attia v Ganga Bishnu*, 8 C W N 47 (1904). But in a recent case, *Bhandi Singh v Dowlat Roy*, 17 C W N 82 (1912), it has been held that generally

such a suit is not maintainable, though it may be so in particular circumstances

(3) *Murza Mahomed v Widow of Balma kund*, 31 A 241 (1871)

(4) *Jawatri v Emile*, 13 A 98 (1890)

(5) *Kazeer Mahomed v Lallah Jassodal*, 1864, W R 247 (1864)

(6) *Sita Ram v Madho Lal*, 21 A F B 44, at p 60 (1901), *Vedapuratti v Vallabha*, 25 M at pp 327, 328 (1901)

(7) *Sita Ram v Madho Lal*, *supra*

(8) *Vedapuratti v Vallabha*, 25 M F B 300, 312 (1901)

Allahabad High Court has held that the nature of redemption decrees makes sect 244 (now 47) inapplicable, and that the operation of the rule of *res judicata* depends upon the nature of the decree made in the previous suits in each instance. Where a Court has once adjudicated upon a mortgagor's right to redeem, so many of the issues as bore upon that and are heard and determined, become *res judicata* and cannot be reopened, but unless there has been a determination that the mortgagor has no right to redeem, there would still remain one other issue in a subsequent suit, which would not be *res judicata*. Until a mortgagee has applied for an order of sale under sect 93 of the Transfer of Property Act (see now O XXXIV r 8) the plaintiff's right to redeem exists, and can be at any time enforced. If therefore a mortgagor has obtained a decree for redemption, which does not contain a provision foreclosing the right of redemption on default, and has not enforced that decree and has not paid in the decretal amount within time, he can subsequently bring a second suit for redemption of the mortgage in respect of which such first decree was obtained (1). On the other hand a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that where a suit for redemption has been instituted and a decree for redemption has been passed therein but not executed, a subsequent suit is not maintainable for the redemption of the same mortgage. The equity of redemption no doubt remains unforeclosed, and the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee continues until an order absolute under sect 93 (see now O XXXIV r 8) is made, and having regard to the continuance of the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee, earlier decisions of the same High Court held that as such legal relation had not been put an end to a second suit would lie. The Full Bench however held that though the right might exist the remedy was barred by sect 11 (formerly sect 13) of the Code. A decree for redemption passed under sect 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (see now O XXXIV r 7) is a final judgment within the meaning of sect 11, *post*, but if the order absolute for foreclosure or sale under sect 93 is the final judgment, and the decree under sect 92 (see now O XXXIV r 7) is interlocutory then if no order is passed under sect 93 the suit is pending, and sect 10 (formerly sect 12) *post*, bars a second trial. The fact, therefore that no order absolute has been made under sect 93 (see now O XXXIV r 8), extinguishing the right to redeem, will not allow of a second suit being brought, though it will entitle the mortgagor to exercise his right of redemption under the decree if he be not barred by limitation by obtaining a postponement of the day fixed for payment (2). The Bombay High Court has held that a decree for redemption on the default of the decree-holder to pay the money declared to be due within the time fixed by the decree or, if none be fixed within the time allowed by law for the execution of the decree operates as a judgment of foreclosure and debars the mortgagor from afterwards bringing a second suit to redeem the same property (3). As regards the Calcutta High Court the only two reported decisions

(1) *Sita Ram v. Madho Lal* 21 A 1 B 44 (1901) overruling *Hav. Razindan* 19 A 202 (1897).

(2) *Vedapuratti v. Vallabha* 30 M 300

(1901) 1 B

(3) *Gan. Savant v. Narayan* 7 B 467 (1883) *Hari Dasji v. Bhapurji* 10 B 461 (1886) [the execution of the first decree was

appear to be in conflict (1) In the under-mentioned case, (2) a second suit was allowed on the ground that the first suit did not in default foreclose the right to redeem, and that the cause of action in the two suits was not the same, thus excluding the doctrine of *res judicata*. In, however, a subsequent case (3) it was contended that until an order absolute for sale was made the right to redeem existed, and that the suit should be regarded as a suit to redeem. In overruling this contention, the Court observed as follows "Even if there is no order absolute, the *decree nisi* directing the sale is in existence, and if the right to redeem be still alive, it cannot be enforced by a separate suit."

When a decree declaring a right to partition has not been given effect to by the parties proceeding to partition in accordance with it, it is competent to the parties, or any of them, if they still continue to be interested in the joint property, to bring another suit for a declaration of a right to a partition in case their right to partition is called in question at a time when, by reason of limitation or otherwise, they cannot put into effect the decree first obtained. In this respect, suits for declaration of right to partition differ from most other suits (4). In this case there was no decree actually making partition, while in the under-mentioned case, (5) in which there was a decree directing partition, it was held that such decree operated as *res judicata*, and the subsequent suit was barred.

A second suit will lie if the first suit is for money against A, and the second to realize the decree from the property of a stranger thereto (6).

Prima facie an action lies on the judgment of every Court of competent jurisdiction unless the right to sue be taken away expressly or by implication (7).

barred, the appellant then attempted to fall back on his mortgage and the right to redeem, which was not barred, the Privy Council, without deciding whether this could ordinarily be done, held that this course was not open to the appellant as it was a new case], *Maloji v Sagaji*, 13 B 567 (1888) [Decree for redemption—subsequent suit by mortgagee for sale]. See as to these cases *Vedapuratti v Vallabha*, 25 M 300 (1901). See also *Chudasama v Ishwargar*, 16 B at p 248 (1891). As to execution of decree after three years *Narayan v Anandra*, 16 B 480 (1891), *Maruti v Krishna*, 23 B 592 (1899), as to the necessity to sue having regard to the doctrine of *res judicata* that the decree covers all rights *Vinayak v Dattatraya*, 26 B at p 668 (1902).

(1) *Vedapuratti v Vallabha*, 25 M at p 311 (1902).

(2) *Roy Dinkur Doyal v Shro Golam Singh*, 22 W R 172 (1873), ref, *Dhond Babadur v Tek Narain*, 21 A 252, 261 (1899), *Sita Ram v Madho Lal*, 21 A. at

p 63 (1901).

(3) *Siva Pershad Maity v Nando Lal Kar*, 18 C 139, 142 (1890), dist, *Tara Prosad Roy v Bhobodeb Roy*, 22 C 931 (1895), ref, *Vedapuratti v Vallabha*, 25 M at p 334 (1901).

(4) *Nasratullah v Mujiballah*, 13 A 309, 313 (1891). This case, but only in so far as it was a decision on Act XIX of 1873 (N W P Land Revenue Act), was overruled by *Muhammad Sadiq v Laute Ram*, 23 A 291 (1901), *Jagu Babaji v Balu Laxman*, 14 Bom L R 1198 (1912), s c, 37 B 307.

(5) *Som Majanlal v Munshi Himatbhai*, 3 Bom. L R 94 (1900), distinguished in *Jagu Babaji v Balu Laxman*, *supra*.

(6) *Gooroo Das Pyne v Ram Narain Sahoo*, 11 I A 59 (1884).

(7) *Berkeley v Elderskin*, 1 Q B 805 cited in *Moonshee Golam Arab v Curreebux*, 5 C at p 296 (1879), *Manchuram v Bakshi*, 6 B II C R, A C 234 (1869), *Attorneycy Dossee v Hurry Doss Dutt*, 7 C 74, 75 (1881).

Upon the judgment arises a legal obligation to discharge it, on which an action is maintainable (1) It is by such an action that the judgments of foreign and colonial Courts are supported and enforced, and suits on foreign judgments are not infrequent in this country A suit will lie on a judgment of a Court in a Native State (2) Where an action on a judgment or decree will not give to the plaintiff a higher or better remedy than he already has, there is no advantage in allowing it to be brought, and it would be contrary to the spirit of the Code to do so Where it will give a higher or better remedy the case is different, and there are cases in which an action may be the only mode of enforcing a judgment or decree (3) In the case of a domestic judgment ample provisions exist for the execution of the decree not only within the jurisdiction of the Court by which it was passed, but within any part of the British territories in India And on the principles already adverted to, where provisions have been made in regard to execution and the decree holder can proceed under them, he cannot bring a regular suit In such cases the qualification to the general rule comes into operation, the right to sue being taken away by implication

A suit will not lie in a Small Cause Court on a decree of a Subordinate Judge's Court (4) or on a decree of its own (5) as the law makes full provision as to the mode of obtaining satisfaction of such decrees Nor will a suit lie on a rent decree of the Revenue Court, (6) nor in the High Court on a decree of the Small Cause Court, (7) otherwise in Bombay in order that the judgment creditor may have execution against the immovable estate of the debtor (8)

In the under mentioned undefended case (9) under the preceding Code, Wilson, J held that a suit on a decree of the High Court would lie in that Court, as the decree had remained unsatisfied, and it was too late to revive it in the usual way But this decision has been dissented from by the Bombay High Court (10) A suit has also been held to lie on a declaratory decree of which no execution can be taken (11) But a person who has obtained a

(1) *Transit in rem judicata*: So where a reference is made to arbitration and an award is given the parties to the reference cannot sue upon the original cause of action *Hassan Ali v. Hoshidar Ali* 1890 P R No 113 cited in *Hukm Chand C P C* 101

(2) *Mayaram v. Ravi*, 24 B 86 (1899) [the earlier decisions to the contrary were before the passing of Act VII of 1888 which made an addition to s 14 of the former Code corresponding in part with s 13 *post*] *Kalyugam Chetty v. Chokalingam Pillai* 7 M 105 (1883), *Sama Rayar v. Annamalar Chetty*, 7 M 164 (1883)

(3) *Mancharam v. Bakshi* 6 B H C P 231, 235 (1869) *per* Couch C J

(4) *Id*

(5) *Merwanji v. Ashabai* 8 B 1 (1883)

(6) *Ananda Mutt v. Pillai Pabam B L I*

P B, 18 (1863)

(7) *Moonshi Gholam Arabi Chirreembar v. C* 294 (1879), overruling prior decisions in same Court See Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1892)

(8) *Fakirapa v. Pandurangappa*, 6 B 7 (1881), *Merwanji v. Ashabai* 8 B at p 12 (1883), but the decree may be transferred to another Court for execution in respect of the immovable property

(9) *Attermoney Dosset v. Harry Doss* Dutt 7 C 74 (1881)

(10) *Merwanji v. Ashabai* 8 B 1 13 (1883)

(11) *Amayak v. Abaji* 12 B 416 (1857), *Jagar Nath v. Balgobind* 1 N W P 154 (1869) *Sri Krishna Tata v. Singara*, 4 M 219 (1881), if it is partly declaratory a suit will lie on that part, *Sallanatha v. Lakshmi*, 7 M 80 (1883) *Yusuf Khan v. Sirdar Khan*

decree establishing his right and entitling him to consequential relief cannot again sue for the same but can only work out his right and obtain the relief by executing the decree. And sect 47, *post*, expressly prohibits a separate suit for the purpose (1) No suit will lie where the decree orders a certain amount to be paid for maintenance at certain intervals as execution may be taken of such a decree for amounts accruing due under it subsequent to its date (2) A suit has also been held to lie in the Civil Court on a decree obtained in the Court of the Agent for Sardars against the defendant's father, the decree which was for payment of a sum of money by instalments, having become incapable of execution on the death of the defendant's father the defendant himself not being a sirdar (3)

A suit has been held to lie for the amount of an unsatisfied claim adjudged by a decree which was destroyed during the Mutiny pending an appeal taken by the defendant the cause of action to date from the lost decree (4) This was distinguished in a subsequent case in which the records were not destroyed before a decision on appeal it being held that where the records of a case are destroyed the plaintiff may prove his decree and get the execution of it but on his inability to do so he cannot bring a second suit for the same subject matter (5) A suit however should not be allowed whether the record is destroyed before or after the decision of the appeal (6) A suit does not lie on a decree of which execution is barred by limitation (7) And where a plaintiff has obtained a decree and has by his own neglect lost his right to execute it he will not be permitted to revert to the position which he held before the institution of the suit and to bring a fresh suit (8)

A decree or judgment must be considered valid until reversed or superseded. Therefore a suit does not lie to recover back money recovered in

7 M 83 (1883) [these two cases dist in *Lakshmbai v Madhavrao* 12 B 65 (1887)] *Haveri v Venkanna* 14 M 396 (1890)

(1) *Vedapuratti v Vallabha* 25 M 326 (1901)

(2) *Jouthayee v Tlanakapudayan* 4 M H C R 183 (1868) if a decree is not merely declaratory a second suit will not lie even though it is so vague as to be incapable of execution *Venkanna v Artamma* 12 M 183 (1888), and see *Ashutosh Bannerjee v Lukhmoni Debye* 19 C 139 (1891)

(3) *Sakharam Dikshit v Ganesh Sathu* 3 B 193 (1879)

(4) *Ranee Imamun v Hurdial Singh* 1864 W R 301

(5) *Must Nazur Banoo v Hossein Ali Khan* 1864 W R 378

(6) See *Pancee Imamun v Hurdial Singh* 5 W R 276 (1866)

(7) *Fakirapa v Pandurangapa* 6 B 7 (1881) *Sandee v Jomir* 9 W P 339 (1868)

Sanjeeviah v Ranjiah 4 M H C R 451 (1869) even if the decree be for possession of land *Copi Mohun Das v Tincouri Gupta* 1 C L R 254 (1877) *Narsinghdeo v Kumrooddeen* 20 W P 412 (1873) *Ramjus v Ram Narain* 2 N W P H C R 382 (1840), *Golam Hossein v Alla Rukhee* 3 N W P H C R 63 F B (1871) and followed by delivery of symbolical possession *Nabo Doorga v Seetamonies* 23 W R 407 (1875) But see *Attermoney Dossee v Hurry Das* 7 C 74 (1881) and *Mahadeo v Janu* F B 36 B 376 14 Bom L R 115 (1912)

(8) *Anradh Singh v Sheo Prasad* 4 A 481 (1882) In *Muhammad v Mannu Lal* 11 A 386 the Court thought that this principle as regards mortgages was affected by the *Transfer of Property Act* but it has been held that this is not so *Vedapuratti v Vallabha* 25 M at p 330 (1901) but see also *Sita Ram v Madho Lal* 24 A at p 66 (1901)

execution of a decree while that decree subsists, (1) and if more is recovered under a decree than is really due the excess can be recovered back by the judgment debtor only in execution proceedings and not by a separate suit (2) When however the decree is reversed or superseded the amount recovered under it may be recovered back not only by a summary process but also by a suit (3) And sect 47 of the Code being applicable only to a subsisting decree is not a bar to such a suit (4) the operation of that section coming to an end as soon as the decree is discharged by payment (5) The interest of the money (6) and the mesne profits of the land (7) realized in execution and recovered back can be recovered for the period for which the person entitled was kept out of the money or land

10 No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim *litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in British India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed or in any Court beyond the limits of British India established or continued by the Governor General in Council and having like jurisdiction, or before His Majesty in Council*

Explanation—The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in British India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action

'*Lis pendens* — The object of the rule contained in sect 12 (the present section) of the Code is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of the same cause of action the same subject matter and the same relief The policy of the law is to confine the plaintiff to one litigation thus obviating the possibility of contradictory verdicts by two or more Courts in respect of *'the same relief'* (8)

The same learned Judge adds It is scarcely necessary to say that the rule contained in sect 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure forms no part of the

(1) *Mariot v Hampton* 7 T R 469
Saudamini Dasi v Thakurani Dasi 3 B L R App 114 (1863)

(2) *Mahomed Falee Bakh v Kally Mohun* 5 C 549 (1879) *Parthab Singh v Beni Ram* 2 A 61 (1885) 1 B

(3) *Shan Lalad v Hurro Pansal* 10 Moo 1 A 203 (1860) *Joges Chund v Kali Churn* 3 C 30 (1881) as to relief generally review see *Waghela v Shakti Mal* 13 B 330 (1888)

(4) *Narayana v Narayana* 13 M 43

(1859) *Pam Chul n Dwarka Lal* 7 A 10 (1884) F B

(5) *Lal Behari v Lal Churn* 1 C W 708 (1897)

(6) *Akshay v Shasran* 11 B 4 (1888) *Jagat Singh v Lal Churn* 7 A 43 (1888)

(7) *Moksh Lal v Mal Lal* 14 C 484 (1881) *Lalman Lal v Lalman* 11 M 44 (1887)

(8) *Balku v Nulian Lal* 11 A 4 p 155 (1887) *per Malan*

rule of *res judicata*, though the reason upon which it is based is in some respects similar in principle to the doctrine of *res judicata*. The distinction between the two rules, however, is vast. The rule in sect 12 (the present section) relates to matters *sub judice*, whilst the rule in sect 13 (now sect 11) relates to matters which have passed into *rem judicatam*. The one bars only a 'suit', the other bars both the trial of a 'suit' and of an 'issue' subject to their respective conditions. Those conditions are not all the same in sect 12 (the present section) as they are in sect 13 (now sect 11), and the wording of the two sections as to the distinction is so clear that it is not easy to confound the two rules. Now, in sect 12 (the present section), before the plea can operate as a bar, the second suit must not only raise the same issue as that in the former suit still pending, but it must be for 'the same relief' (1). As to this last now, *vide post*, "Relief". It may be added that if a plaintiff were not confined to one litigation, but were allowed to conduct a number of parallel litigations at the same time, they would result in as many judgments, which, if to the same effect, would be useless and a cause of unnecessary expense. If, on the other hand, they were to a different effect, all would not admit of execution, and it would not be possible to decide which should be executed. Moreover, contradictory judgments would tend to discredit the administration of justice. The rule, therefore, should be such as to receive application only when the various incidents of the suits are so far identical that they may, and if rightly decided should lead to the same judgment (2). Though the conditions of the two rules relating to *lis pendens* and *res judicata* are different, the expressions used in enumerating them are generally used in the same sense, and reference therefore may be made to the cases cited in the next section. The rule of *lis pendens* not only affects a suit brought while another suit is pending, but also alienations of rights or interests in any property made during the pendency of a suit concerning that property (3).

Stay—The words "Except where a suit has been stayed under sect 20" have been omitted. Sect 20 of the last Code dealt with the power of the Court to stay proceedings, but, apart from this, the Court had a general jurisdiction to stay proceedings on the ground of inconvenience attending the trial of different suits in different Courts at the same time. So the High Court has stayed a suit instituted before it until after the decree in a suit previously instituted at Calcutta observing that the two suits to a very great extent covered the same ground, and that it was impossible that they should proceed together, as many inconveniences might arise—amongst others, difficulties in connection with the filing of documents and taking of accounts, and the possibility of a conflict of decisions, adding that it was necessary to follow the general rule that the plaintiff who first brings his suit, claiming an account in respect of any particular transactions, has a right to have that

(1) *Balkrishen v. Bishan Lal* 11 A 148, at p 154, *per* Mahmood, J.

(2) *Hukm Chand, C P C* 106 citing 1 *Garrison Trust Proc* 757.

(3) See *Hukm Chand, Res Jud* 682, where the subject, which is not within the scope of the present work, is fully discussed also s 52, *Transfer of Property Act*.

account taken in the Court in which he has chosen to bring his suit (1) Sect 20 has now been omitted

"Proceed with the trial"—This section in the last Code only provided that no suit shall be tried if the same issues were involved in a previously instituted suit in a competent Court. The present Code substitutes the words at the head of the paragraph to explain more clearly the action to be taken by the Court, which is in the nature of a stay of proceedings. The section however is merely intended to secure general convenience. It does not bar the institution of a suit and therefore cannot be construed as dispensing with the institution of a suit within the proper time when the law expressly requires such institution (2)

"Suit"—In the under mentioned case (3) the Court without expressing a decided opinion on the point thought that a proceeding in execution being not a suit but only a proceeding in a suit, it would be more correct to hold that a proceeding under sect 47 is not a suit within the meaning of this section

"Matter in issue"—The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must also be directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. The subject matter in respect of which the relief is claimed must be the same in the two suits the principle of *lis pendens* having no application if the subject matter of the subsequent suit is not in any sense the subject matter of the previous suit (4). Where the question of title was the same but the issues were different relating to another plot of land and to another period of time the section was held to have no application (5)

"Previously instituted (pending) suit"—Priority in time is the proper guide in determining which suit should be allowed to proceed, (6) and in accordance with the general principle that the Court which first acquires jurisdiction should retain it, this rule is formulated. The section says 'instituted', that is, mere institution of a suit will give priority without any proceedings having been taken thereunder. A suit ceases to be *lis pendens* when it has been withdrawn, and the rule has been held not to apply when the former suit has been withdrawn since the institution of the second suit (7). A suit of

(1) Meekjee v Kasowjee, 4 C L R 282 284 (1879) and as to stay of simultaneous executions see Fakuruddin v Official Trustee, 7 C at p 84 (1881)

(2) Nemagauda v Paresha 22 B 640 645 (1897) See also Ramalinga v Raghunatha 20 M 418 (1897) in which the Court while holding that there was no bar to institution pointed out that the suit if instituted would not have been for the same relief. Mahadeo v Cagadhar 16 C W N 897 (1912)

(3) Venkata Channappa v Venkatarama 22 M 256 (1898)

(4) Nisrullah Khan v Nazir Begam 15

A 103 at p 110 (1892) where the Court said. There is no doubt that if the subject matter of this suit had been any part of the subject matter of the former suit the doctrine of *lis pendens* would apply

(5) Bissessur Singh v Ganput 8 C L R 113 (1880) nor in Nainappa v Chidambaram 21 M 18 22 20 (1897)

(6) Meekjee v Kasowjee 4 C L R 282 283 (1879) in which case however, the suit was stayed not on the ground of *lis pendens* but general convenience

(7) Hakim Chand C P C 105 citry Rush v Frost 49 Iowa 163 (Amer)

course comes to an end when a decree is passed in it. It is not, however, material whether the suit is pending as an original suit or an appeal. A pending appeal will bar the trial of a subsequent suit (1). The mere applying however for or obtaining leave to appeal to the Privy Council cannot of itself amount to the pending of an appeal till such appeal is actually filed for it may happen that the parties who obtain such leave may never appeal at all against such decree or order (2). It has been held that the appeal is not "to be deemed to relate to the entry of the judgment appealed from so as to defeat the plaintiff's action properly brought intermediate the judgment and appeal" (3). In a recent case where there had been a decree for maintenance followed two years later by a decree for the sale of the property charged by it but three more years elapsed before the application for execution it was held that owing to this delay the doctrine of *lis pendens* did not apply for the sale had not been during the active prosecution of a contentious suit or proceeding (4).

"Relief.—The last Code enacted that not merely must the matter in issue be the same but the previous suit must claim the same relief. The cause of action is essentially different from the relief claimed. While the identity, or even similarity of the relief claimed is not material for the rule of *res judicata* the identity of the relief was held essential to the application of the rule of *lis pendens*. So the section was held not to apply where, though the issue may be the same as that in the other suit the relief was not the same (5). And it has been held not to apply to suits between principals and agents for accounts (6). Where the plaintiff in the first instance sued the defendant for cancellation of a *patti* lease and for mesne profits, and then brought a second suit against the defendant to recover arrears of rent for the same period it was held that sect. 12 of the last Code did not apply as it could not be said that the former suit was for the same relief as that claimed in the second suit (7). So again suits for the same dues in respect of different years are not for the same relief. If a suit for a demand for one year should bar the trial of a suit for the same demand for a subsequent year the prolongation of the earlier litigation might result in barring the later suit by lapse of the limitation period (8). If the

(1) *In Pan Ransit v Bhagabutti* 7 C W N 700 (1900) *Bissessar Singh v Gupit Singh* S C I P 113 114 (1880) the former suits were pending in appeal but no objection was taken to the application of the rule on this ground. And see next case.

(2) *Namappa v Chelimbaram* 21 M 18, 22 C (1897).

(3) *Hukm Chand* C P C 108 citing *Porter v Kingsbury*, 77 N Y 164 (Amr) where the author also points out that cases which have (with regard to the rule of *lis pendens* as affecting alienations) held an appeal to be a continuation of the original suit do not apply, as the basis of that rule is different from the one under consideration.

(4) *Bhoja Mahadev Parab v Gangabai*, 37 B C 21 (1914).

(5) *Pramatha v Paghunath* 20 M 418 at p 420 (1897) *Balkushen v Kushan Lal* 11 A at p 150 (1888). In the last cases however the cause of action was different.

(6) *Chandra v Pramatho*, 15 C W N 930 (1911).

(7) *Raja Ransit v Bhagabutti* 7 C W N 720 722 (1900). See also *Troylokhya Nath Bose v Macleod* 25 C 28 34 (1900) *Balkushen v Kushan Lal* 11 A 148 (1888) in which also it was held that there was no identity in the relief.

(8) *Balkushen v Kushan Lal* 11 A 148 150 (1888). So also there is of course no bar where the matter complained of has

subsequent suit is, however, for a part of the relief claimed in the first suit, its trial was held to be barred by that of the first suit (1). It will, however, be observed that this section omits the words formerly appearing "*for the same relief*". This was stated to have been done because the Select Committee were of opinion that the application of the provision should depend not upon the mere prayer of the parties but upon the matter in issue. Probably in a large number of cases where the matter in issue is the same the relief deriving as a consequence therefrom will be or should be, the same. But however this may be the section apparently substitutes as a test the identity of the matter in issue irrespective of the relief sought upon the proof of the facts alleged in such issue.

"Same parties"—Not only must the persons be the same, but they must be suing or sued in the same capacity. Where the same person sues in different capacities it is the same as if there were different persons (2). The section has been amended to show that the litigation must be under the same title.

"Jurisdiction"—The Court must have had jurisdiction to grant relief in the previous suit. So in the under mentioned case (3) the Court observed "It is clear that in this case the proceedings pending before the Revenue Officer were not for the same relief (that is for ejectment of the defendants and for mesne profits) as was sought in the present suit nor had the Revenue Officer jurisdiction to grant such relief."

Foreign Court—Referring to this explanation the Court observed (4) "That it seems to follow as a necessary consequence that the existence of a decree in a foreign Court is no bar to the execution of a decree of a Court in British India even though the cause of action in both suits be the same."

11. No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter [s. 11]
Res judicata directly and substantially in issue has been
directly and substantially in issue in a former
suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom
they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a
Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which
such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard
and finally decided by such Court.

Explanation I—The expression *former suit* shall denote

arisen & see the institution of the other suit
Bhaskar Singh v. Cunniff Singh 9 C. L. R.
113 (1880)

(1) See *Niazullah Khan v. Nazir Begam*
15 A. 100 *supra*. *Corbind v. Jijibai* 36 B.
180 (1911) A. C. 14 Bom. L. R. 9

(2) *Nave v. Weston* 3 Atk. 5. Law r.

Indu v. 4 Bro. Ch. 40 (Case v. Staff v. 1 I.
Yes. 544)

(3) *Tro v. M. vanath B. v. Macleod* 25
C. 22 at p. 31 (1900).

(4) *Fakirullah v. Official Trustee* 7 C.
25 (1881) per Mr. J.

a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question, whether or not it was instituted prior thereto

Explanation II—For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provision as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court

Explanation III—The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted expressly or impliedly, by the other

Explanation IV—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit

Explanation I—Any relief claimed in the plaint which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section be deemed to have been refused

Explanation VI—Where persons litigate *bonâ fide* in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating

12 Where a plaintiff is precluded by rules from instituting a further suit in respect of any particular cause of action he shall not be entitled to institute a suit in respect of such cause of action in any Court to which this Code applies

13 A foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except—

(a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case,

(c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of British India in cases in which such law is applicable

(d) where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice

(e) where it has been obtained by fraud

(f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India

14. *The Court shall presume, upon the production of any document purporting to be a certified copy of a foreign judgment, that such judgment was pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the record, but such presumption may be displaced by proving want of jurisdiction* [s. 13 Expl]

Res judicata generally considered—These sections embody the doctrine of *res judicata*, which, though it has sometimes been treated in English law as a branch of the doctrine of estoppel, is yet essentially distinct from it. Estoppel, which is dealt with by sect 115 of the Evidence Act, proceeds upon the equitable principle of altered situation, whilst the doctrine of *res judicata* proceeds on the principle that there should be a determination to litigation and that a defendant should not in respect of the same matter be harassed by several suits. Estoppel is a part of the law of evidence, whilst *res judicata* belongs to the province of procedure strictly so called (1). Perhaps the shortest way to describe the difference between the two is to say that whilst the plea of *res judicata* prohibits the Court from entering into an inquiry at all as to a matter already adjudicated upon an estoppel prohibits a party, after the inquiry has already been entered upon from proving anything which would contradict his own previous declarations or acts to the prejudice of another party, who, relying upon those declarations or acts altered his position. In other words, *res judicata* prohibits an inquiry *in limine* whilst an estoppel is only a piece of evidence (2).

The English doctrine of *res judicata* was adopted in this country before the promulgation of the first Code of 1859. As the Judicial Committee observed (3) upon the statement of the rule in the *Duchess of Kingston's case* there is nothing technical or peculiar to the law of England in the rule as so stated. It was recognized by the civil law, and was consistent with sect 2 of the Code of 1859. Though, however consistent with it, sect 2 of that Code was not identical with and fell considerably short of it (4). It only provided for bar by judgment, and did not deal with the remaining portion of the rule relating to the bar of the trial of an issue by judgment on that issue which has sometimes been called bar by verdict. The gist of this latter rule is that an actual decision on any matter directly in issue in a suit is conclusive of that issue in every subsequent suit brought on any cause and for any purpose or object. Notwithstanding this defect in the rule the Courts have

(1) *Res judicata* precludes a man from avowing the same thing in successive litigations, while estoppel prevents his saying one thing at one time and the opposite at another. *Cassamally v. Currimahor* 36 B 214 (1911). *Bhaisankar v. Morari* 36 B 283 (1911). *Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Das*, 35 C 701 (1908). *Bhagirathi Das v. Baleshwar Bagarti* 41 C 1 (1913). It is assumed where no estoppel will then have been a

change of law before the first suit. *Lakshmi Bibi Kujrani v. Atal* 40 C 534 (1913).
(2) *Sataram v. Amir* 17 (1886) per Mahmood J.
(3) In *Khugowlee* 17 C 1 (1877).
(4) See *Hukim* 17 C 1 (1877) the subject of the rule is fully treated.

on general principles recognized the conclusiveness of judgments as to issues, also, the principle of *res judicata*, whether specially enacted or not, being an essential part of the law of procedure in all countries (1) Other difficulties also arose with reference to the meaning to be attached to the words "*cause of action*," in sect 2 of the Code of 1859 This section was therefore very considerably modified in the Code of 1877, *res judicata* being made applicable to issues, and the identity of the cause of action being replaced by that of matter in issue The effect of this was to provide for an estoppel against defendants the words "suit or issue" being effective to estop a defendant from defence as well as a plaintiff from attack (2) Another material alteration made was the express extension of the doctrine of *res judicata* with certain limitations to foreign judgments the limitations being enacted by sect 14 (3)

In the rule of *res judicata*, as enacted in 1877, only two alterations were, prior to the present Code, made which were to a great extent of a verbal character One of such alterations was to make that clear which had been previously decided namely that the competency of jurisdiction in regard to the Court trying the former suit was as to the subsequent suit also The section even in its final form under the last Code was not complete or exhaustive of the effect of *res judicata*, (4) which, as a principle, exists independently of the Statute enacting it (5) It did not, for instance deal with judgments *in rem* nor with that of parties represented by though not claiming under the parties to the former suit (6) In fact as observed by Sir Whitley Stokes the question of *res judicata* is a subject of which the importance in a country inhabited by a litigious population is only equalled by the difficulty of dealing with it clearly, concisely and accurately in a legislative enactment (7) The same remarks apply to the present Code (8) In the Bill as first drafted an attempt was made to elaborately and exhaustively formulate the rule This arrangement was simplified by the Select Committee which considered that draft The framers of the present draft considered that even this modified attempt to make a complete statement of the rule of *res judicata* was

(1) *Jamiatunnissa v. Lutfunnissa* 7 A 616 (1880)

(2) *Rung Ray v. Sidhi Mahomed*, 6 B 484 (1882)

(3) *Idem post*, p 143

(4) *Ram Lall v. Chhabnath*, 12 A 578 (1890), *Padayachi v. Vethalinga* 15 M 119 (1891)

(5) In *Sitaram v. Amir Begum* 8 A 334 (1886) *Mahmood J.*, said In interpreting the language of that section we cannot ignore the fundamental principles of the rule to which that section gives expression unless indeed the express word of the Statute contradict these principles, and see *Balkishan v. His Highness* 11 A 153 (1888) In *Bholabhai v. Adsang* 9 B 81 (1884) *West J.*, said that s 13 could not be applied quite literally, as if it could the Court trying a second suit

would be bound by the decision of a point in a first suit treated by the Court in appeal as irrelevant for that case though not formally set aside Nor does the section expressly provide that a Court which has no jurisdiction finally to decide a question should follow a decision of a Court which had exclusive jurisdiction to decide it But the rules laid down in the *Duchess of Kingston's case*, and declared by the Privy Council to be applicable, meet such a case

(6) *Ahmedbhai v. Vuleebhai*, 6 B 715 (1882) See however, as to domestic judgments *in rem*, s 41 of the Evidence Act

(7) 2 Anglo Indian Codes 393

(8) *Ramamurthi v. Secretary of State for India* 24 M L J 469 (1911) s c 36 M 141 (this section does not cover all cases of estoppel by judgment)

likely to lead to increased litigation, and that it was not possible to adequately expound a subject so complex within the limits of a section of an Act. It was thought better therefore to re enact the section as it stood in the last Code, with such few modifications only as experience had shown to be necessary. The amendments consist of the added first Explanation, and Explanation II, the elimination of Explanation IV of the last Code, and the insertion of the words "*public right or of a*" in the present Explanation VI to give due effect to suits relating to public nuisances (sect 91). The former Explanation VI. has been removed and made into a separate section (14). The subject of foreign judgments is dealt with *post*. Sect 12 is new, and is necessitated by the transfer of certain of the provisions of the existing Code to Rules. The original draft contained the provisions that nothing in this section should be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which is open to any person against any judgment, order or decree in a suit or other proceeding to which such person was a party whilst suing or being sued as a minor represented by a next friend or guardian for the suit. This, however, was omitted as the Select Committee considered that such a saving was necessarily implied, and that therefore no special provision was required for the case law (1) which it was thus sought to settle. Similarly, words excepting judgments, orders and decrees obtained by fraud or collusion were omitted, because sect 44 of the Evidence Act, which it was intended to save, is confined to judgments proved by the adverse party, and the Committee considered that a provision relating to procedure was, of necessity, subject to the general law of evidence. Further, the words, "and not collaterally, incidentally, or inferentially," qualifying the adjudication were expanded as they added nothing to the words "directly and substantially." The draft Bill contained the following explanation: "*If here several issues are put in issue and tried and decided in any suit and the decision of each of such issues is material to the disposal of the suit each such issue shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in each suit*." This Explanation, it was suggested, should be added to make it clear that where in a former case several points have been involved the finding on each of which is independently sufficient to dispose of the case, each of such findings is *res judicata*. It adopted the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Peary Mohun Mukerjee v Ambica Churn Bandopadhyaya (2). It has however been omitted.

The bar is absolute against all parties, the test of *res judicata* being mutuality (3). Where it exists the original cause of action is gone and can only be restored by getting rid of the *res judicata* (1). Therefore in such case a decree holder must obtain satisfaction of his decree by execution and not by another suit which cannot be brought either on the original cause of action or, save in special cases on the decree in which that cause has become merged. The object of the Legislature has been to prevent continued litigation on the

(1) See *Cursandas Natha v Lakshayahu* 10 B 571 (1893); *Lalla Sheo Churn v Pandanar Debty*, 22 C 5 (1891).

(2) 21 C 900 (1897).

(3) *Surrendernath v Binjonath*, 13 C 301.

(1886) *Channabai v Janyath*, 10 M 477.
(1892) *Jamathunnissa v Luffathissa* 7 A 119 (1890).

(4) *Lakshay v Luffath* L. 1 2 311
Cal. 528.

same grounds, and this would obviously be defeated by allowing a decree-holder to abstain from putting his decree in force, and proceed again on the same cause as before (1) A plea of *res judicata* must be based on the grounds of the decision actually stated in the judgment (2) If a judgment be improperly obtained, so that it never ought to have been signed, when set aside it ought to be treated as never having existed So judgment obtained against a dead man cannot operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit (3)

"Court"—The term in so far as it is used in connection with the subsequent suit, means a Court governed by the Code From the provisions of sect 14 it is shown that the operation of the section is not confined to decrees passed by British Indian Courts (4) The word "Court," therefore, as used in connection with the previous suit includes a foreign Court, and the Court of competent jurisdiction which is referred to in the first paragraph includes a foreign competent Court (5) the recognition of a foreign judgment as *res judicata* being a portion of the positive law of British India (6) Upon an issue whether the defendant in possession of a *taluqa* had lost title by inheritance thereto by reason of having been validly adopted out of his own family held that an award to that effect of a committee of taluqdars was not a decision by a "Court" within the meaning of this section (7)

"Try"—This word which means the formal method of examining and adjudicating on a matter in dispute shows that the rule in question has nothing to do with the admissibility of a judgment in evidence, and which judgment may be admissible under sects 40-44 of the Evidence Act, even where it does not fulfil the requirements of this section (8) There is a conflict as to whether the doctrine of *res judicata* applies only to a trial by a Court of original jurisdiction, or also to a disposal by an appellate Court The Calcutta High Court has in the under mentioned case, (9) held in effect that a trial by an original Court only is contemplated and that the section has no application to the disposal of an appeal and that when there is no *res judicata* at the time of the trial of the original suit the appellate Court is bound to decide the appeal on the merits The contrary view, however, is taken by the Allahabad (10) and Madras (11) High Courts which have held that the rule contained

(1) Gan Savant v Narayan Dhond 7 B 469 (1883)

(2) Jalasutram v Bommadevara, 29 M 42 (1905)

(3) Haji Noor Mahomed v Macleod 9 Bom L R 274 (1907)

(4) Prithisingji v Umedsingji 6 B L R 98 102 (1903)

(5) Babubhat v Narharbhat 13 B 224 (1888)

(6) *Idem post* pp 142 144

(7) Har Shankar Partab Singh v Lal Raghuraj Singh 31 I A 125 (1907) 29 A 519 11 C W N 841 9 Bom I R 757, 17 M. L. J 354 4 A L J 497, 6 C L J 13

(8) See Hukm Chand Civ P Code 114 and see Beni Madho v Indar Sahai, 32 A 67 (1909)

(9) Abdul Majid v Jew Naram Mahto, 16 C 233 (1888) But see Chandra v Pramatho, 15 C W N 930 (1911)

(10) Balkushen v Kushan Lal 11 A 148 (1888), Chajju v Shew Sahai 10 A 123 (1887) In the first case a decision of the High Court in a suit for rent for 1292 F was held to be *res judicata* in a second appeal presented prior to that decision in a suit for rent for 1293 F

(11) Gururajammah v Venkatakrishnama, 24 M 350 (1901)

in this section is not limited to the Courts of first instance but applies equally to the procedure of the first and second appellate Courts by reason of sects 107 (formerly sect 582) and 108 (formerly sect 587) respectively, and, indeed, even to miscellaneous proceedings by reason of sect 139 (formerly sect 647), and that the doctrine, so far as it relates to prohibiting the retrial of an issue, must refer, not to the date of the commencement of the litigation, but to the time when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue. The Panjab Chief Court appears to have taken the same view (1). Similarly when there were cross appeals in a suit a decision in one appeal was held to be *res judicata* in the other, though as the suit was the same, this section could not apply (2). The correct view is that the date, not of institution but of decision, determines the application of the principle of *res judicata*. See Explanation I.

Suit—It would hardly be necessary to say, unless the contrary had been maintained, that criminal proceedings are not a suit, (3) and therefore no finding of a Criminal Court can be *res judicata* in a civil suit, both the parties to and character of the two proceedings being entirely different. Similarly it has often been held that the proceedings in the Criminal Court are not in general evidence in the Civil Court, and that a Civil Court is not bound to adopt the view taken by the Criminal Court as to the oral or documentary evidence (4). The term "suit" has not been defined (5). At the same time it has been said that sect 647 (now sect 141) shows that the law does not necessarily consider every proceeding in which there are parties, evidence, argument, and decision, to be a suit, there being proceedings other than suits and appeals (6). Proceedings therefore under the insolvency sections of the Panjab Laws Act have been held not to be a suit (7). Nor are proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, the object and nature of which differ considerably from an ordinary civil suit, a suit. (8). Nor is an application to amend clerical or arithmetical or accidental

(1) *Nur Muhammad v. Jamnu* (1830) P R No 158. Cited in *Hukm Chand, Res Jud* p 20.

(2) *Ram Lal v. Chhab Nath*, 12 A 578 (1890).

(3) *Ram Lal v. Tula Ram*, 4 A 97 (1881). *Gholam Hussein v. Mahomed Khan* (1877), P R No 56. In the first case cited, the lower appellate Court held that as the Criminal Court had decided that the defendant had abducted the plaintiff's daughter, the question whether he had or had not done so was *res judicata*. A judgment which was reversed on appeal to the High Court. See also *Doorga Das v. Doorga Churn*, 6 W R, Civ Ref, 26, and *Keshab v. Manrudin*, 13 C W N 501 (1908), in which it was held that an acquittal is no bar to a civil suit.

(4) See cases cited in *Okinaka's Civil Procedure Code* notes to s. 17 and *Hukm*

Chand C P C 123.

(5) See notes to s. 2, ante.

(6) In the matter of *Chirangi Mut* (1884), P R No 445.

(7) *Ib.* See *In re Victoria* (1894) 2 Q J 357.

(8) *Nobodceep Chunder v. Brojendra Lal Ray* 7 C 406 (1881). *Mahadev v. Neelamani*, 20 M 269 (1896). The decision in *Ram Chunder Singh v. Madho Kumari*, 12 C 484 (1885) is not against this view, as in that case the former suit was not a proceeding on a reference under any section of the Act but a suit instituted by the plaintiff independently of the Act. No appeal lies to the Privy Council from a High Court decision on appeal under this Act, for such a decision is an ultimate arbitration. *Special Officer Salsette Railing Suits v. Doodahai Begon*, 37 B 50 (1912).

errors in a decree, a suit,(1) nor is an application for review (2) Miscellaneous civil proceedings will be a suit when they are treated as a suit by the Legislature (3) In a proceeding upon an application for probate, the only question to be determined is whether the will is true or not It is not the province of the Court to determine any question of title with reference to the property covered by the will (4) In the last-mentioned case the Court further observed "And it is noteworthy that a proceeding under the Probate and Administration Act is not a suit properly so called, but takes the form of a suit according to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (see sect 83) That being so, we do not see how the judgment of the Allahabad High Court could be regarded as concluding the plaintiff as to the title to the estate either under sect 13 of the Civil Procedure Code or under the general principles of *res judicata* " But in a recent Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court where in a contentious proceeding for Probate a will had been held not proved and Probate refused, and the widow then brought a suit for recovery of the property of the deceased from the defendants, who held it as executors under that will, it was held that since contentious proceedings for Probate must take the form (as nearly as possible) of a suit, they constitute a suit within the meaning of this section, and therefore the Probate judgment operated as *res judicata* (5) In considering upon the question of competency whether the word "suit" should be construed as including an appeal, it is held that the powers of the Court in which the suit was instituted must be looked at, and not those of the Court by which the suit was decided on appeal (6) The draft Bill made the section applicable to a suit "or other proceeding," but this suggestion has not been adopted As to this, the Special Committee in their report say, "The Committee recognized that a proceeding does not come within the language of that section, but they think it better not to deal with this point in express terms, for the reason that the applicability of the doctrine of *res judicata* to certain proceedings is not open to doubt, and they foresee that any express reference to proceedings in a crystallised definition might only lead to difficulties (L R 11 I A 37, 1 L R 29 C 707) "

As regards the question of the identity of the suit it has been held that where separate causes of action were joined in one suit, the suit as regards each

(1) Langat Singh v Janaki Koer, 39 C 265 (1911), Langat v Janaki, 14 C L J 481 (1911)

(2) Srisch Chandra Pal Chowdry v Triguna Prasad Pal Chowdry, 40 C 541 (1913), following Gulab Koer v Badshah Bahadur, 10 C L J 420 (1909)

(3) Harsahai v Maharaj Singh, 2 A 294 (1879), Syud Imam v Haran Chunder, 14 B L R 408 (1875), Smith v Secretary of State, 3 C 310 (1878) Acha Mian v Durga Churn 25 C 146 (1898)

(4) Arun Moyi Das v Mohendra Nath Wadadar, 20 C 888, 895 (1893) As to the Succession Certificate Act, see Mancharam v

Kalidas, 19 B 821 (1894), and see as to Probate proceedings, Kurutulan v Nuzbut ud Dowla, 33 C 116, 127 (1905), and see Lalit v Radharaman, 13 C L J 547, 552 (1911), 15 C W N 1021, distinguishing Ramnandan v Sheoparsan, 11 C L J 623 (1910)

(5) Kalyanchand Takhand v Sitabel, 38 B 309, F B (1913) Cf Ramani Debi v Kumud Bandhu 14 C W N 974 (1910) Judgments refusing Probate are as much judgments *in rem* as those granting it

(6) Malubhai v Sursangji, 30 B 220 (1904)

cause of action was a separate suit. So if a suit for the recovery of one bond has been dismissed, on the ground that the bond was not repaid, the decision would be *res judicata* so far as the claim for that bond is concerned in a subsequent suit brought for the recovery of that and other bonds on the ground of the same repayment (1).

As regards appeals, *vide ante*, p 35, note to sect 2 *sub toc*, "Decree "

It was sometimes held, before 1892, and was enacted in that year by an addition to sect 647 (now sect 141) that execution proceedings are not miscellaneous proceedings but proceedings in suits. But though the word "suit" includes all proceedings in execution of the decree passed in the suit, the section does not apply where the proceedings, both earlier and subsequent, are in the same suit. For the section requires that the matter should have been in issue in another separate suit, and each separate application for execution of a decree in a suit is not a separate suit (2). But though in such a case this section will not apply, a prior decision in the same suit may have binding force, depending not upon this section but upon general principles of law, otherwise there would be no end to litigation. So in the last mentioned case, which was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council, the latter held that though the matter decided was not decided in a former suit but in a proceeding, of which the application in which the orders reversed by the High Court were made was merely a continuation, yet it was as binding upon the parties and those claiming under them as an interlocutory judgment in a suit is binding upon the parties in every proceeding in that suit, or as a final judgment in a suit is binding upon them in carrying the judgment into execution. It could not, in short, be held that because the prior order was made in the same suit, what it decided remained open to contest afterwards between the parties, although if it had been made in another suit it would have been final under the former sect 13 (3). As a fact the bar in such cases is due to the principle which has been designated the "*judgment of the case*," (4) the principle which is distinct from *res judicata* but which in the absence of any specific name has sometimes been spoken of as *res judicata* as falling within the literal signification of that expression under which a decision in a prior stage of the same civil suit or proceeding operates as a bar to a fresh decision on the same point in the subsequent stages of the same suit or proceeding (5). Thus it has been held that though an application

(1) Sheoraj v Kashinath, 7 A 252 (1884)

(2) Rup Kumar : Ramkrishna Shukla, 3 A 141, 142 143 F B (1880)

(3) S C in appeal, 6 A 269 (1883) See Mungal Pershad Dicht v. Gria Kant Lahari S C 51 (1891) In Behari Lal v. Majid Ali (1897) A W N 29, the Court observed that s 13 of the Code, of course in terms does not apply to a case of this kind but as has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Ram Harpal v. Itupkhar the principle of *res judicata* applies to prevent parties raising a second time in the same suit or in the same execution proceed.

ings an issue which in that suit or in the execution proceedings in the suit had been previously determined. As however is pointed out post the principle is really a differentiation from *res judicata* in such cases spoken of by that authority. See Gulab Hossain Bahadur Bahadur 13 C W N 1107 (1909)

(g) $\text{Hukm} \in \text{Lan} 1 \in 1 \in 110$

(5) I am Narain. I am aware Narain
J. C. (1971) is refusing an applica-
tion to file an appeal application to an other
person. It is barred. Secretary of State
Advises that 17th of 1973 (1973) from and

for amendment of a decree (under sect 152) is not a suit within the meaning of these sections, yet (when it has been disposed of) a subsequent application will be barred upon general principles of Law (1) *Res judicata*, on the other hand, applies to cases in which the decision was made or the point decided arose, in another suit or in proceedings taken in execution of a decree in another suit. Where there is a trial of a suit, and a point has been decided in an execution proceeding in a former suit, or *vice versa*, then the rule of *res judicata* may apply (2) It is, however, to be noted, that it has been said (3) that it is only certain descriptions of orders passed in the course of the execution of a decree that have operation by way of *res judicata*, and not every order passed in execution. There will in some cases not be *res judicata*, as all its conditions may not have been fulfilled (1) *Res judicata* will not apply when the decree, with regard to which a question arises, is really different from that with reference to which it had arisen before,

appeal after]. Bulbhab Shanker v Narain Singh, 3 A 173 (1880) [order by appellate Court on application for execution] In this country the principle has been most usually acted upon in execution proceedings, *vide ante*, and see Banu Ram v Nanhu Mal, 11 I A 181 (1884) Bandy Karim v Ramesh Chunder, 9 C 65 (1882), Futeb Narain v Chandrabali, 20 C 551 (1892), Budan v Ramchandra, 11 B 539 (1887) Chathappan v Pyder, 15 M 403 (1891), Venkatanarasimha v Papam mah 19 M 54 (1890), Sher Singh v Doya Ram, 13 A 564 (1891), Basudev Narain Singh v Seeloy Singh 14 C 640 (1887), Hafizuddin v Abdul Aziz, 20 C 755 (1893), Krishan Sahai v Aladed Khan, 14 A 64 (1891), Jogendro Bhattacharya v Hiranya Kumar 2 C L J 499 (1904), Nabi Muham mad v Jwala 27 A 148 (1904), Hukam Chand, C P C 117-119, and *post*, p 149; Gulab Koer v Badshah Bahadur, 13 C W N 1197 (1903)

(1) Langat v Janaki, 14 C L J 481 (1911)

(2) In Manjunath v Venkatesh, 6 B 54, 60, 61 (1881), the Court considered that the A H C in Rupkurni v Ramkupal, 3 A 141 (1880), had put too narrow a construction on the word "suit" in excluding execution proceedings. In Dinkar Ballal v Hari Shirdhar, 14 B 206, 209 (1889), Scott, J, said "Moreover the previous proceeding was not an independent suit, but a proceeding in execution, and although a decision in such a proceeding is binding in subsequent proceedings in the same suit, it is a matter of doubt whether they affect claims in independent suits." The learned Judge, how

ever, stated that it was under the circumstances not necessary to examine that question. Jardine, J, appears to have held that an order in execution proceedings in one suit could not be *res judicata* in another suit, though the decision in the case turned upon another point. There can, however, it is submitted, be no room for contention after the amendment of s 647 in 1902, with respect to execution proceedings, and that there will be *res judicata* provided the conditions of that rule have been fulfilled, which may often be not the case having regard to the nature of the order passed in execution proceedings in the former suit. See cases in following notes

(3) Gourmani v Jagat Chandra Audhikari, 17 C 57, 63 (1889)

(4) So in Abedoonissa v Ameeroonissa, 4 I A 66 (1876) the Court in the prior suit was held incompetent to try the particular issue, in Dinkar v Hari, 14 B 206 (1883), the subject matter was held not to be the same, and that the conclusiveness given to s 283 of the last Code exists only as regards the particular property in dispute. So also the decisions in Gourmani v Jagat Chandra, 17 C 57 (1889), Ram Lal v Narain, 12 A 539 (1890), Sheik Budan v Ram Chandra, 11 B 537 (1887) turned on the point decided not having been adjudicated upon in the former execution proceedings, the objection in the Calcutta case having been raised by the judgment debtor not in his character as such under the decree but in a different character. See Ashfaq v Gauri, P C, 33 A 264, 271 (1911) And see *post*

as the matter in issue in the two cases will be different. So a decree directing periodical payments has for its purpose been deemed to be a separate decree in regard to each of such payments (1). And a decree confirmed in appeal has also been deemed to be different from what it was before the confirmation, and a dismissal of an application for the execution of the original decree has been held to be no bar to an application for execution of the appellate decree (2).

"Issue"—The principle of *res judicata* applies both to the trial of suits and the trial of issues. A suit ends in a dismissal or a decree in whole or in part. An issue ends in a finding, and the rule contained in the section enacts that not only is a suit which has once been tried and determined not again maintainable, but an issue which has once been directly and substantially raised and decided cannot be litigated a second time—the principle upon which the rule is based applying equally to issues as to suits (3).

The first clause of the section is not well constructed. It would be clearer if it ran, "No Court shall try any issue which or any suit in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been," etc (4). The trial of a subsequent suit will be barred only if the matter is directly and substantially in issue in it (*vide ante*, first paragraph). An issue is said to arise "when a proposition of law or fact, which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue, is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other." And see Explanations III and IV (5).

There is nothing in the Code to restrict the application of the rule of *res judicata* to issues of fact as distinct from issues of law. In the original draft Bill it was proposed to affirm the view that a pure finding of law might operate as *res judicata*, but to limit the operation of the principle to adjudications on the merits, with a view to excluding, for instance, dismissals on a preliminary question of jurisdiction. Apparently it was considered that this was a matter which should be left to the Courts to determine. It has been said that a point of law can never be *res judicata* (6). But it is submitted that the rule thus broadly stated is not sound. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the decisions on the point.

The principle of *res judicata* does not depend for its application upon the question whether the decision which is to be used as a bar was a right decision or a wrong decision in law or in facts, and it is immaterial whether the decree set up as a bar was rightly or wrongly passed in law or in fact (7). It is obvious that if this were not so there would be no finality for in all cases the

(1) Kuppu Ammal v. Sanninatha Ayyar 18 M 482 (1894).

(2) Sakhal Chand v. Velchand 18 B 203 (1893), Muhammad Sulaiman v. Muhammad Yar Khan 11 A 267 (1888). See Harbant Sen v. Biraj Mohan Ray 23 C 876 (1890), Nanchand v. Vitlu 19 B 278 (1894).

(3) Jamaitunnessa v. Juffunnessa 7 A 615 (1885), Tirfhuwan v. Lameechar 28 A 227 740 (1906). See Hukim Chand Res Judicata

14 and *ante*.

(4) Hukim Chand v. P. C. 112.

(5) O. XIV. rr. 1 & 2, *post*.

(6) Channulal v. Raptlhal 22 B 661 (1897).

(7) Behari Lal v. Majid Ali 24 A 138 (1901), Sham Lal v. Chasita, 23 A 450 460 (1901), Hunis v. Jangi Nath, 15 A 327 (1893). See Nathu Ram v. Kalvan Das 1 A, 1. 3 215 (1894).

previous decision might be challenged for error. The force of *res judicata* attaching to a decision by a Court on an issue of law will not be affected, even if the decision is subsequently disapproved by a Full Bench of the High Court to which that Court is subordinate (1). Where the question is one not purely of law but of mixed law and fact, there will be *res judicata*. In such case the law has been applied to a particular state of facts and if these facts come again in issue in another suit the judgment on these facts whether it rightly or wrongly applies the law is *res judicata* (2). So where in a previous suit a particular stipulation, contained in a particular kabuhat, had been held to be valid as between the parties it was held not open to the Court subsequently to try the issue whether that particular stipulation was valid or not, the question being a mixed question of law and fact and whether the previous decision was or was not erroneous (3). It has been recently held that though where the question is one of law the judgment is *res judicata* where the parties seek to litigate again on the same cause of action yet where the dispute relates to matters which had formed a subsidiary consideration in the former suit, though the causes of action in the suits may be different the application of this principle is limited to matters distinctly put in issue and determined in the former suit and to questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law (4). The Madras High Court has held that a Court is precluded from inquiry into the soundness of the law of the previous decision in respect of the precise subject matter or immediate purpose of that suit, but that provided the decision in the latter suit does not in any way question the correctness of the former decree or in any way affect its operation, an erroneous decision on a question of law in a previous suit is no bar (5). The operation of a decree as *res judicata* so far as any rate as the subject matter of a direct adjudication contained in the decree is concerned, can in no way be affected in the absence of fraud or collusion by the fact that the suit was the result of a mistake of law or that the decree proceeded on such mistake. The remedy if any, in such a case can only be by way of review and not by separate suit for relief on the ground of mistake (6).

As regards a question of pure law it has been said that anomalous

(1) *Couri Koor t Audh Koor* 10 C 1087 (1881) [dist in *Alimunnessa t Shama Charan Ray* 32 C 749 (1903)], s c 9 C W N 466. *Namappa Chetti t Chedumbaran Chetti* 21 M 18, 25 (1897).

(2) *Rai Churn Ghose v Kumud Mohan Datta* 1 C W N 687 (1897). The head note does not correctly represent the decision in which no judgment is given as to what would happen in the case of an issue of pure law. See *post* and *Bishnu Priya v Bhalu Sundari*, 28 C 318 322 323 (1900).

(3) *Bhushnu Priya t Bhalu Sundari* 28 C 318 (1900).

(4) *Baij Nath v Pudmanund* 10 C W N 621 (1912). *Aghore v Kamini* 11 C L J 461 (1909). *Purna t Rasik* 13 C L J 119 (1910).

(5) *Mangalathammal v Narayanaswami* 30 M 461 (1907). *Gopu v Sami Royar*, 28 M 517 (1905). *Venku t Mahalinga* 11 M 393 395 396 (1888) following *Parthasarathi Ayyangar v Chinna Krishna* 5 M 304 (1882). Later case dist in *Chithappan t Pydel* 15 M 403 (1891) as it was the same decree which was under execution though property attached was different and also in *Koyyanna v Doosy* 20 M 225 (1905). In *Vishnu t Ramling* 3 Bom L R 450 (1901) s c, 26 B 25 (1901) Tulton J, referred to the second case with approval but the judgment of Chandvarkar, J proceeded on the ground that the point in issue had not been previously decided.

(6) *Kaveri Ammal t Sastro Pamier* 26 M 104 109 (1902).

results might arise if an erroneous decision on a pure question of law in a previous suit is held to operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit relating to a different subject matter, for an erroneous decision might have the effect of altering the law applicable as between the parties. Though the language of this section may perhaps make it apply to such a case it is very doubtful whether it was intended to have such application (1). It has been submitted that the facts decided in the first suit cannot be disputed and for the purpose of the conclusiveness of those facts but no further, the law applied must be accepted. Thus if a decree in a suit to declare a mortgage invalid proceed upon the constitutionality of a statute, the parties afterwards cannot deny the validity of the statute in question, when the mortgagee attempts to foreclose. It could hardly be true that they could not raise the question again in a suit upon a different subject matter (2). A previous construction of law between the parties it has been held (3) ought not to be followed after that law has been replaced by another. So a decision upon a point of limitation given when either Act XIV of 1859 or Act IX of 1871 was in force and which was subsequently held to be erroneous, was also held not to be *res judicata* in a suit which was brought when the present Limitation Act was in force (4). In a recent case in the Calcutta High Court where, after the preliminary decree in a mortgage and before the final decree the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act was extended to the district in which the property was situate it was held that the sale was forbidden by that Act and the judgment debtor was not estopped from bringing this to the notice of the Court (5).

The matter directly and substantially in issue in the second suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit—The former judgment is conclusive only upon the same matter (6). Where causes of action are different the principle

(1) *Pai Churn Ghose v. Kumud Mohan Dutta* 1 C W N 687, 690 (1897) *per* Banerjee J. and see remarks of same learned Judge in *Bishnu Priya v. Bhalu Sundari* 28 C 318 322 323 (1900) but see *per* Beaman J. in *Waman v. Hari* 31 B 128 137 (1906).

(2) *Bigelow, Estoppel* 100 and see *Hakim Chand Res. Jud.* 29 79.

(3) *Chaman Lal v. Bapulal* 22 B 1 (1897).

(4) *Id.*, but see *Namappa v. Chidambaram* 21 M 18 at p. 25 (1897) in which it was said that a change in the law or different interpretation of it cannot operate to reopen matters which had previously become *res judicata*.

(5) *Lakshmi Bibi Kujram v. Abdul Hary Aldar* 40 C 534 (1913).

(6) See *Duchess of Kingston's case* 2 C L C, 9th ed. 812. *Outram v. Morgan* 13 East 346. *Barr v. Jackson* 13 Q B 360. *Henderson v. Henderson* 11 Hare 143.

Hunter v. Stewart 4 De C F & J 169. *Gregory v. Molesworth* 3 Atkyns 620. *Srimat Raja Mootoo Nayyar v. Jagananna Natchiar* 11 M I A 50, 10 W P, 1 C 1 (1866). *Kingowlee Singh v. Hossein Bux Khan* 7 B 1 P 63. 10 W P 1 C, 30 (1871) [see as to this latter case *Hari Sunkar Mookerjee v. Mooktara Lalro* 2 B L P 235 240 (1891)]. *Imatira Debi v. Krishna Kamini Das* 2 B L P 102. 10 W P 426 (1868) [confirmed by P C 11 B L I 105. 18 W 1 163 (1871)] followed in *Projo Lal Poy v. Kheter Nath Mitter* 12 W R 50 (1869). *Sib Shankar Neoghy v. Haro Soondarce Coopra* 13 W 1 209 (1871). *Dadasar Bhee v. Sakir Barkundar* 13 W 1 168 (1871). *Tilmas ML Begum v. Syed Mohammad Aboobood* 3 C L L 253 (1878). *Dhnonoy Debi Chowdhuran v. Anungo Moysa* 4 C L L 599 (1879). *Sarjmonce Nayyar v. Suddanand Moha* latter 12 B L I 304, 20 W 1 377.

does not apply (1) But where they are substantially the same the principle applies, even though their forms or the frames of the reliefs are different (2) It is not necessary to show that the subject-matter of the former suit was the same as that of the subsequent suit, but that the question, the trial of which is sought to be barred, was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit (3) No precise rule of general applicability can be laid down for the solution of the question whether the same matter was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit (4) The question whether an issue has substantially been raised and decided is a matter of fact to be determined upon the circumstances of

(1873), *Krishna Behary Roy v Banwari Lal Roy*, 1 C 144, 25 W R 1, L R 21 A 283 (1875) and in the High Court, 19 W R 63, *Niamut Khan v Phadu Buldia*, 6 C 819, 7 C L R 227 (1880) [but see *Run Bahadur Singh v Luchu Koer* 11 C 301 (1884), *Doorga Pershad Singh v Doorga Konwari*, 4 C 100, L R 5 I A 149 (1878), and before the High Court 20 W R 154], (1873) Field Fv 237, *Caspercz, Estoppel*, 379 401

(1) *Haji Noor Mahomed v Macleod*, 9 Bom L R 274 (1907)

(2) *Naganada v Krishnamutri*, 34 M 97 (1910)

(3) *Sctanath v Basudeb*, 2 C L J 540 (1900) as to the necessity for the point having been in issue in the former suit, see *Malhi Kunwar v Imam ud din* 27 A 59, 61 (1904)

(4) Field, Lr 237, the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 enacted thus 'The Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of any suit brought on a *cause of action* which shall have been heard and determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction, in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they claim' (Act VIII of 1859, s 2) The meaning of the term "cause of action" has been the subject of difference of opinion in India as well as in England [*Allhusen v Margarejo*, L R 8 Q B 340, *Cherry v Thompson* L R 7 Q B 573, *Jackson v Spittila* L R 5 C P 542, *Durham v Spence*, L R 6 Ex 46, *Vaughan v Weldon*, L R 10 C P 48, *De Souza v Coles*, 3 M H C R 284 (1868), *Harjiban Das v Bhagwan Das* 7 B L R 102, 109 (1871), *Baboo Mohan Lal Bhaya Gya v Lachman Lal*, 5 B L R 663 674, 675 (1870), 14 W R 73, *Chander Coomar Mundal v Munnee Khanum*, 11 B L R 431, 442, *Laljee Lal v Hardey Narain*, 9

C 105 (1882), *Muhammad Abdul Kadir, v The East Indian Railway Company*, 1 M 375 (1878), *Salima Bibi v Sheikh Muham mad*, 18 A 131 (1895), see Field, Fv 203 n.] "It was no doubt with a view to elucidating the subject that the Legislature, in enacting Act X of 1877, discarded the term 'cause of action' The question chiefly to be considered is whether the matter decided in the previous suit was in substance part of the cause of action in the second suit, and the matter cannot be said to have been determined in the previous suit, unless it was put in issue and directly determined *Caspercz, op cit* 328 [and see *Pajah of Pittapur v Sri Rajah Row Buchi Sittaya Garu*, L R 12 I A 10, 20 (1884)] The term "cause of action" is not used in the present section It, however, occurs in some other sections—20, O II rr 2, 4 3, 6 The term "right to sue" has been substituted in some sections—O XXII rr 1-3 The expression "cause of action" has been frequently construed by the Privy Council [*Soorjomonee Dayee v Suddanund Mohapatter*, 12 B L R 315 (1873), *Krishna Behari Roy v Brojeswari Chowdhranes* L R 2 I A 285 (1875), *Rajah of Pittapur v Sri Rajah Row, supra*, *Rajah of Pittapur v Sri Rajah Venkata Mahapatra Surya*, L R 12 I A 119 (1885), *Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v Shumsoonissa Begum*, 11 M I A 605 (1867), *Amanat Bibi v Imdad Hussain*, L R 15 I A 111 (1886), *Mussamut Chand Kour v Partab Singh*, L R 15 I A 157, 158 (1888), see *Haji Hasam Ibrahim v Man charam Kallandas*, 3 B 137 (1878), *Sridhar Vinayak v Narayan Valad Babaji*, 11 B H C R 224 (1874), *Caspercz*, 323-325] As to the meaning of the phrase "same right to sue" see *Ranchod Morar v Pezari Indulji*, 20 B 92 (1894)

each particular case (1) The rule is that where a final decree is couched in general terms, the extent to which it ought to be regarded as *res judicata* can only be determined by ascertaining what were the real matters of controversy in the cause (2) The leading principles of *res judicata* were thus enunciated by Sir William de Grey in the *Duchess of Kingston's case* (3) "From the variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits these two deductions seem to follow as generally true *first*, that the judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction *directly upon the point* is as a plea a bar or as evidence conclusive, between the same parties upon the same matter, *directly* in question in another Court, *secondly*, that the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction *directly upon the point* is in like manner conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties coming *incidentally* in question in another Court, for a different purpose But neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came *collaterally* in question though within their jurisdiction nor of any matter *incidentally* cognizable nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment" (4) Provided the immediate subject of the decision be not withdrawn from its operation so as to defeat the direct object of the decision the parties may litigate matters incidentally or collaterally in issue between them for any other purpose as to which they may come in question The test applicable is whether the question decided in the previous suit was in substance part of the cause of action or whether it was only ancillary to the main cause (5) The cases upon this branch of the rule of *res judicata* may be divided into two classes (6) (a) The class of cases in which it has been held that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the second suit or in an issue in such second suit was not directly and substantially but collaterally or incidentally,

(1) *Girdhar Manordas v. Dayabhai Kala* 8 B L R 174 180 (1892) *per West J*

(2) *Amritesvari Debi v. Secretary of State for India in Council* 21 C 501 (1897)

(3) *Sim L. C.*, 9th ed., 812 [the doctrine laid down in this case is applicable to cases tried under the Civil Procedure Code *Klu g. v. Sing v. Hesse* *Bux Khan* 7 B L R P C 673 (1871)] The section is not a precise reproduction of the rule in this case whatever may have been the intention of the Legislature and the Court's duty is to construe the section as it stands *Prithi Singh v. Umali Singh* 6 B L R 98 103 (1903) and in *Cokul Mandar v. Tulmunnund Singh* 23 C 707 (1902) the Privy Council printed out s. 13 goes beyond the law laid down in the *Duchess of Kingston's case*

(4) *11 Barr v. Jackson* 11 A C 685 *R v. Hutchins* L R C Q B D 78 71 The rule as laid down in this case has been frequently affirmed by the

Indian Courts in the terms of Sir W. de Grey's judgment in *The Duchess of Kingston's case* [*Mussamut Edun v. Mussamut Beehun* 8 W P 175 (1867) *Kanhya Lal v. Radha Churn* B L R Sup Vol., 662 (1867) *Malum Chundra Chuckerbutty v. Pajkumar Chuckerbutty* 1 B L R, A C 1 (1865) *Chunder Coomar Mundul v. Nunnee Khanun* 11 B L R 434 444 (1873) *Cock v. Jidab Chandra Nani* 2 B L R C 45 (1865)] and in those of the judgment of Knight Bruce V C in *Barr v. Jackson* [*Ooma Churn Dutt v. Beckwith* 5 W R A C 3 (1866) *Modi v. Ram Dev v. Bijonati Doss* J W 1 100 (1865) *Cooro Churn Senar Brij Nath Dhar* 24 W L 111 180]

(5) *Durga Prasad v. Durga Kona* 11 A C 1 11 A C 111 *Barra v. Jackson* 11 A C 685 *11 B L R 98 103* *Prithi Singh v. Umali Singh* 6 B L R 98 103 (1903) *Cokul Mandar v. Tulmunnund Singh* 23 C 707 (1902)

in issue in the previous suit, (1) and (b) that class of cases in which the decision turned upon the identity of the matter, the matter in issue in the second suit, or in an issue in such suit being held (a) to be, (2) or (b) not to

(1) *Shib Nath Chatterjee & Nuboo Kishen Chatterjee*, 21 W R 189 (1871) [it may be that in that judgment there is a finding which may have some bearing upon that issue, or his judgment may contain observations applicable to such an issue, but he did not directly determine it. Any opinion which he may have incidentally expressed cannot be considered a finding upon the issue so as to make his judgment in the former suit a determination of the cause of action in the present suit, *per Couch CJ*], *Modhoo Ram Dey & Boydonath Doss*, 9 W R 592 (1868), *Mussamut Edun & Mussamut Bechun*, 8 W R 175 (1867), *Mohama Chandra Chuckerbutty & Rajkumar Chuckerbutty*, 1 B L R, A C, 1 (1868), *Raghu Ram Biswas & Ram Chandra Dobay*, B L R, Sup Vol, 34 (1863), W R, F B, 127, *Chunder Coomar Mundul & Munneo Khanum*, 11 B L R 434 (1873), *Ran Bahadur Singh & Ludo Koer*, 11 C 301 (1884), L R 12 I A 23, *Nundo Lal Bhattacharjee & Bidhoo Mookhy Dobre*, 13 C 17 (1886), *Thakur Magundoo & Thakur Mahadeo Singh*, 18 C 647 (1891), *Anusayabai & Shakaram Pandurang*, 7 B 464 (1883), *Jamastunissa & Lutfunissa*, 7 A 606 (1885), *Balak Tewari & Kausil Mier*, 4 A 491 (1882), *Moru Roy & Mussamut Rajbunseo Koer*, 25 W R 393 (1876), *Doorga Ram Paul & Kally Kristo Paul*, 3 C L R 546 (1878), *Jardine Skinner & Co & Dwarka Nath Chuckerbutty*, 14 W R 412 (1871), *Gangaraju & Kondreddi swami*, 17 M 106 (1893) [the decision of a question of title by a Revenue Court is merely incidental, and no bar to a fresh suit on title in a Civil Court, see also *Ashrafun nissa & Ali Ahmad*, 26 A 601 (1904), *Rani Kishori & Raja Ram*, 26 A 468 (1903)], *Srihari Banerjee & Khutiah Chundia Rai Bahadoor*, 24 C 569 (1897), *Nitya Nanda Sarkar & Ram Narain Das*, 6 C W N 66 (1901) [Title—question of—raised in rent suit]

(2) *Pahlwan Singh & Risal Singh*, 4 A 55 (1881), *Nirman Singh & Phulman Singh*, 4 A 65 (1881), *Wilati Begam & Noor Khan*, 5 A 514 (1883), *Jco Lal Singh & Sarfun*, 11

C L R 183 (1882), *Rakhal Doss Singh & Sremuttu Hicera Motoo Dossce*, 22 W R 282 (1874), *Hurry Behari Bhugat & Porgun Ahir*, 19 C 656 (1890), *Bakshi & Nizamuddin*, 20 C 505 (1892) [followed in *Balaram Mondul & Kartick Chandra Roy Chowdhury*, 4 C W N 165 (1899)], *Nobo Doorga Dossce & Foyzbux Chowdhry*, 1 C 202 (1875), 24 W R 103, *Mohama Chunder Mozoomdar & Aradha Dassia*, 15 B L R 251 n (1874), *Mohesh Chunder Bundopadhyay & Joykissen Mookerjee*, 11 B L R 248 n (1874), *Cook & Jadab Chandra Nandi*, 2 B L R, O C, 48 (1868), *Muthumadera Naik & Senotta Muthumadera Naik*, 7 M H C R 160 (1872), *Radha & Beni*, 1 A 560 (1878), *The Rajah of Pittapur & Sri Rajah Row Buchi Sittaya Garu*, L R 12 I A 16 (1884), *Ahdoolah Khan & Sreo Kunto Persad Hajrah*, 15 W R 252 (1871) [set off barred], *Bussun Lal Shookul & Chundee Dass*, 4 C 686 (1879), *Gopal Chandra Roy & Nobin Chandra Bhandari*, 3 B L R App 31 (1869), *Sbeoraj Rai & Kasbi Nath*, 7 A 247 (1884), *Durrav Krishna & Halambhai*, 1 B 87 (1876). A decision as to the validity or otherwise of a document, where the question has been properly in issue and determined, is binding upon the parties or other representatives in subsequent litigation [*Srimut Rajah Motoo Vijaya & Katama Natchiar*, 10 W R, P. C, 1, *Cunga Ram Sadhookhan & Panch Cowree*, 25 W P 366 (1876), *Kally Persad Sena & Mohesh Chunder*, 1 Hay, 430 (1862), *Mir Fursund Ali & Mussamut Jaffree*, 5 N W P 118 (1873), *Dhundi & Ram Lal*, 7 N W P 149 (1875)], *Arunachala & Pancha nadam*, 8 M 348 (1885), *Krishna Behari Roy & Brojeswari Chowdrance*, L R 2 I A 283, 1 C 144 (1875), *Nuffur Chunder Paul Chowdhry & Luckee Moonce Dabee*, 9 W R 300 (1868), *Bussun Lal Shookul & Chundee Dass*, 4 C 686 (1879), *Belchambers & Ahootosh Dhar*, 7 C L R 308 (1880), *Muttu Samarawuri Chetti & Shanmuga Chetti*, 5 M 47 (1881), *Rajah of Pittapur & Buchi Sittaya*, 8 M 219 (1884), L R 12 I A 16, *Venkatadri Appa Rau & Peda Venkayamma*, 10 M 15 (1886), *Ram Chunder Singh &*

be, (1) the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the first suit. This section does not enact that no property comprised in a suit which is dismissed shall be the subject of further litigation between the

Madho Kumari, 12 C 484 (1885), L R 12 I A 188, Vishnu Chintaman : Balaji Bin Paghuj, 12 B 352 (1887), Radhamadhub Haldar v Monohur Mukerji, 15 C 756 (1888), L R 15 I A 97, Triloki Nath Singh : Pertab Narain Singh, 15 C 808 (1888), L R 15 I A 113, Kamini Debi : Asutosh Mukerji, 16 C 103 (1888), L R 15 I A 139, Ananta Balacharya : Damodhar Makund 13 B 25 (1888), Balkrishna : Kishan Lal, 11 A 148 (1888), Gopi Nath Chobey : Bhugwat Pershad, 10 C 697 (1884), see Chhaganlal : Bapu Bhai, 5 B 68 (1880), Dulabhai Vahaji : Banadharrai, 9 B 111 (1884), Dakhyana Dolea : Dolegobind Chowdry, 21 C 430 (1893), Guruvayya : Vudayappa, 18 M 26 (1894) [an order under s. 258 of the Civ. Pr. Code is appealable under s. 244, no separate suit lies, since the question is *res judicata*, between the parties], Rai Churn Ghose : Humud Mohan Dutt Chowdhury, 2 C W N 297, 299 (1893), s. o., 25 C 571, Nainappa Chetty : Chidambaran Chetty, 21 M 18 (1897), Krishnan Nambiar : Kannan, 21 M 8 (1897), Chundoo Prasad : Mohendro Singh, 23 A 5, 12 (1900), Fazlar Rahman Chowdhry : Raj Chunder Sen, 5 C W N 231 (1900), distinguishing Ismad Ariff : Mahomed Gous, 20 C 834, Ram Saran : Chatar Singh, 23 A 465 (1901) [suit for perpetual injunction, previous suit for same relief], Panga : Nunnikutti, 24 M 275 (1900), Chandi Prasad : Maharaja Mohendra Singh, 24 A 112 (1901), Rampal Singh : Lam Prasad, 27 A 37 (1901), Sitamath : Bhusdeb, 2 C L J 510 (1900), Nialar Mal : Raunak Husain, 29 A 608 (1907), s. o., 1 A L J 663, Maganlal : Lalchand : Bhusdeb, 2 C L J 510 (1900), Mariammma Bibi : Joynab Bibi, 33 C 1101 (1906) [disented from in Zaharia : Debia 33 A 51 E B (1910), see also Anant Das : Uday Bhan 33 A 167 (1913), and Dakshin Din : Syed Ali, 33 A 151 (1910) Trilokya Mohini : Kali Prasanna Ghose, 11 C W N 340, 348 (1907) Cf. Chandra : Pramathe 15 C W N 430 (1911)

(1) Pami Chunder Chowdhry : Ashree Mohun, 21 W L 57 (1874), Moni Chunder : Must

Rajbunsee Koor, 25 W R 393 (1876), Kali Krishna Jagore v The Secretary of State for India in Council, 16 C 173 (1888), L R 15 I A 186, Moro Ahaji : Narayan Dhondbhat Pitre, 11 B 355 (1886), Roy Dinkur Doval : Sheo Golab Singh 22 W R 172 (1874), Samu Achari : Somasundram Achari, 6 M 119 (1882), see also Perandi : Angappa, 7 M 423 (1883), Karuthasami : Juganatha, 8 M 478 (1883), *per contra*, Gan Savant Bal Savant : Narayan Dhond Savant, 7 B 467 (1883), Maloji : Sagah, 13 B 567 (1888), Anrudh Singh : Sheo Prasad 4 A 481 (1882), and see Hurty Chunder Mitter : Anath Nath Dey 10 C 97 (1883), 13 C L P 249, Sridhar Vinayak : Narayan Valad Babaji, 11 B H C R 224 (1874), Girdhar Manordas : Dayabhai Kalabhai, 8 B 174 (1882), Nilo Ramchandra : Govind Ballal, 10 B 24 (1885), Dataram : Ram Kristo 9 W R 591 (1868), Kadir Buksh : Golam Ali Gomashtah, 9 W R 90 (1868), Kheda roomsea Bibco : Boodheo Bibco 13 W R 317 (1870), Sudduruddin Ahmed : Beni Madhub Roy Chowdhry, 15 C 145 (1887), Baboo Gooreodas Roy : Baboo Hureonath Roy, 7 W R 423 (1867), Moro Balkrishna Mulo : Shek Sahab Valad Budruddin Hamble, 5 B H C P, A C, 190 (1868), Baboo Mohan Lal Bahay Gyal : Lachman Lal, 5 B L R 663 (1870), Pamanugra Narain : Mahasundur Kunwar 12 B L R 433 (1873), Amur Zama : Nathu Maj, 8 A 396 (1886), Roghoonath Mundul : Juggut Bundhoo Bose 7 A 214 (1881) 8 C L 1 393, Ekrami Mundul Holodhur Pal 3 C 271 (1873) Gopee Mohun Mozoomdar : Hulla 3 C 789 (1878) Safur Baiza 4 B 37 (1878) Lukshman Dada Naik : Lam Hanira Dada Naik 5 B 48 (1880) Kori rra : Gurrat 5 B 549 (1881), Kishanath Morcheth : Lam chandra Gopinath 7 B 48 (1883), Mutlu Chetty : Mutlan Chetty 4 M 205 (1870), Ananda I amon Vathar : Lalul Vitul Nalla Navar 5 M 9 (1882) [but see Gopal Das : Gopinath 12 C L L 35 (1882)], Rajan Lal : Hanuman Das 5 A 115 (1882), Ahmad Husein Khan : Nihal : Iddin Khan, 3 C 945 (1873), L R 10 L A 45, 13 C L

parties (1) And an estoppel may be binding, notwithstanding that the suit which raises it relates to a different property (2) The mere fact that a claim has been included in a previous suit, without its having been directly and substantially put in issue and decided, does not, upon the dismissal of that suit, preclude a subsequent suit upon it (3) But, on the other hand the mere fact that an issue was not framed, will not prevent the operation of the rule of *res judicata*, provided that in substance the matter has been heard and determined (4) A decision may be by implication (5) The fact that the reasoning upon which the former judgment was based is equally applicable to the second suit, does not give the former judgment the force of *res judicata* in the second case (6) But a matter in issue may be one of law as well as of fact, and where a recurring liability is the subject of a claim, a previous judgment,

R 330, Gobind Chunder Addya v Afzal Rabbani, 9 C 426 (1882), 12 C L R 29, Amanat Bibi v Inmad Hossem, 15 C 800 (1885), L R 15 I A 100, Fatmabai v Aishahai, 13 B 242 (1888), Chinnasami v Hariharabada 16 M. 330 (1893), Nil Madhub Sirkar v Brojo Nath Singha, 21 C 230 (1893), The Zamindar of Pittapuram v The Proprietors of the Mutta of Kolanka, 2 M. 23 (1878), L R 5 I A 200, J C L R 365, Vallabh Dhula v Rama, 9 B H C R 65 (1872), Gobind Mohun Chuckerbutty v Sheriff, 7 C 109 (1881), Roghoonath v 7 C 214

Narain Lal, 3 A 334 (1880), Umrao Lal v Behari Singh, 3 A 297 (1880), Fatmabai v Aishahai, 13 B 242 (1888), Sheora Nun 13 B 22 1875

Lari, 21 C 784 (1894), 21 I A 89, Nil Madhub Sirkar v Brojo Nath Singha, 21 C 236 (1893) [rent suit], (distinguished in Mane Mahammed v Dhami Mahammed, 17 C L J 71 (1912)), Keshavlal Giridharlal v Baiparvati, 18 B 327 (1893) [restitution of conjugal rights], Kuppai Amal v Sammatha Ayyar, 18 M. 482 (1894), Dwarkanath Roy v Ram Chand Aich, 26 C 428 (1899), s c, 3 C W N 266, Teju Khan v Rojoni Mohun Das, 2 C W N 501 (1899), Balaram Mondul v Kartick Chandar Roy Chaudhuri, 4 C W N 161 (1899), Chandi Prasad v Mahendra Singh, 23 A 5, 8 (1900), Tara Lal Singh v Sarobur Singh, 4 C W N 532 (1899), Haranunl Roy Chetlangia v Ram Gopal Chetlangia, 4 C W N 429, 432 (1899),

Umesh Chunder Dey v Sharbessur Chunder, 5 C W N 1xx 304 (1901), Venkatarama Ayyar v Venkata Subrahmanian, 24 M. 27, 29 (1900), Dondh Bahadur Bai v Jela Naram Rai, 21 A 251 (1899) [dismissal of suit for redemption does not operate as a decree for foreclosure], Sita Ram v Madhu Lal, 24 A 14 (1901) [redemption, subsequent suit for, not barred], Nakta Ram v Churanji Lal, 32 A. 215 (1910), contra, Vedapuratti v Vallabh Vahya Raja, 25 M. 300 (1901), Veerana Pillai v Muthukumar Asarg, 27 M. 102 (1903), Bhikahhai v Rai Bhuri, 27 B 418 (1903) See as to suits for redemption notes to s 9, ante, Maharani Beni Pershad Koeri v Raj Kumar Chowby, 6 C W N 589 (1902), Balaram v Kartick, 4 C W N 161 (1899), Jotindra Mohun Tagore v Shumbhu Chunder, 4 C W N 43 (1897) [previous decision in suit for rent], Abdul Majid v Boda Nath Dhur, 6 C W N 314 (1901), Balbhaddar Nath v Ram Lal, 26 A. 501 (1904), Mana Vikrama v Gopalan Nair, 30 M. 203 (1906), Mahomed Ibrahim v Sheikh Hamja, 35 B 507 (1911)

(1) Jagatjit Singh v Sarabjit Singh, 19 C 159, 172 (1891), L R 18 I A at p 176

(2) Rajah of Pittapur v Sri Rajah Row Bucha Sittaya Garu, L R 12 I A 16 (1884)

(3) Jagatjit Singh v Sarabjit Singh, 19 C 159, L R 18 I A 165 (1891), Ram Charan Buhardur v Reazuddin, 10 C 857 (1884)

(4) Soorjomoneo Dayce v Suddanund Mohapatter, 12 B L R 304 (1873)

(5) Pahlwan Singh v Maharajah Moheshur Buhah Singh, 12 B L R 391 (1872)

(6) Chandi Prasad v Maharaja Mahendra, 13 A. 5 (1900)

dismissing the suit upon findings which fall short of going to the very root of the title upon which the claim rests, cannot operate as *res judicata*, but if such previous judgment does negative the title itself, the plaintiff cannot re-agitate the same question of title by suing to obtain relief for a subsequent item of the obligation (1) The plaintiff cannot re-agitate the same question of liability upon the pure and simple incident that the subject-matter of the latter suit is geographically distinct from the subject-matter of the previous suit (2) or that the suits related to different years (3) A decree which has been made without jurisdiction cannot work an estoppel by judgment (4) Upon the question as to what may be looked to, in order to see what has been in issue in a previous suit, and what has been actually decided the rule to be gathered from the case law is (5) that, although the decree in a former suit operates as *res judicata*, the decree is to be construed with reference to the pleadings, (6) judgment, (7) and the record (8) in order to see what was in issue and that even the acts of the parties immediately after the decree are very important to fix the meaning of indefinite terms in it (9) One of the criteria of the identity of two suits, in considering a plea of *res judicata* is to inquire whether the same

(1) Sham Lal v Ghasita, 23 A 459 (1901), Durga Prasad v Sm Sashibala, P C 16 C W N 603 (1911) (suit for maintenance on a *Britipatna*, s c, 14 Bom L R 17)

(2) Chandi Prasad v Maharaja Mahendra Singh 24 A 112, 110 (1901)

(3) Dwarka Das v Akhay Singh, 30 A 470 (1908)

(4) Kalka Persad v Kanhaya Singh 7 N W P 90 (1875)

(5) See Casperaz, 380

(6) Gurdeo Singh v Chandrikah, 5 C. L. J 611 (1907), Lachman Singh v Mohun 2 A 497 (1879), Robinson v Dulip Singh, L R 11 Ch D 78, 813, *In re May*, L R 25 Ch D 236, Houston v Marquis of Sligo, L R 29 Ch D 448, 455, Edun v Beckun 8 W P 176, Jagatjit Singh v Sarabjit Singh 19 C 159, 172, L R 18 I A. 165, 176 (1891)

(7) Gurdeo Singh v Chandrikah *supra* Kali Krishna Tagore v Secretary of State for India in Council, 16 C. 173 192, 193, L R 15 I A 186 (1888) [followed in Sri Raja Rao Lakshmi Kantayamma v Sri Raja Inganti Raja Gopal Rao, 2 C W N 337 (1898), s c, 21 M 344], Magnum v Medha Hossain Khan, 31 C. 95 (1903), Houston v Marquis of Sligo, *supra* *In re Bank of Hindustan China and Japan* L R 9 (74 App 25, Donth Bahadur Rai v Tek Narain Rai 21 A. 251, 255 (1899) I am Daval v Madan Mohan Lal 21 A 425 430 (1899), Majidul Latima v Lalia Prasad 20 A 527 (1898), Edun v Beckun *supra*

[The matter conclusively adjudicated upon in a suit *inter partes* is generally to be sought only by a comparison of the plaint with the judgment, *per Phear, J*], Lachman Singh v Mohan *supra* Jagatjit Singh v Sarabjit Singh *supra* Mahadeo v Vasudeo 5 B I R 737, 740 (1903), but if a decree is specific and at variance with the judgment the statement in the decree is to prevail Indarjit Prasad v Richha Rai 15 A 3 (1892), and see Avala v Kuppu 8 M 77 (1884), Anusuyabai v Sakharam Pandurang, 7 B 464 (1883) though there may be cases where this is otherwise See Ram Chunler v Kondo 22 A 412 (1900), Ghelebbai v Bai Javer, 16 Bom L R 1142 (1912) s c, 37 B 172

(8) Lachman Singh v Mohan *supra* [As to the decree itself where it is ambiguous or imperfect as to any essential particular, it may be read with the judgment and record *per Stuart C J*], but see as to the distinction between judgment and decree ib 501 510 and Jamatunissa v Lutfunissa - A 606 (1885) As to the interpretation of the decree by examination of the record see Amritaswari Debi v Secretary of State for India in Council 24 C 504 511 (1897), one must look at the intentions of the parties Donth Bahadur Rai v Tek Narain Rai 21 A 251 255 (1899)

(9) Secretary of State for India in Council v Durgaji v Nand Lal P 19 I A 674 (1894)

evidence would support them both (1) "At one time the test applied to discover whether a finding was incidental or not, was the fact of its being embodied in, or excluded from, the decree, and many cases appear to have been expressly decided upon this ground. Two propositions, however, appear to be well settled (a) that the decree itself is not the test of what is or is not *res judicata*, but that the question in each case is, What did the Court really decide? *Res judicata*, in other words is matter of substance, (2) (b) that where the decree of a Court is not based upon a finding but is, in spite of it, (3) such a finding cannot work an estoppel" (4) A finding in a judgment to operate as *res judicata* the Court being a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the subsequent suit must be material and necessary to support the precise and particular ground or grounds on which the decree, or some operative part of it, was made, otherwise the finding must be considered either as superseded by the decree, or as entirely immaterial, or as no more than incidental and subsidiary to the main question in the suit, although in the latter case the finding may have been necessary to the decision of the suit. A matter cannot be said to be "*directly and substantially in issue*," unless and until it is or becomes material for the decision of the suit to find as to it (5) There is no such thing as constructive estoppel. The question is not whether the previous judgment was right, but whether it finally decided the matter in issue (6) The fact that the reasoning upon which a former judgment was based was equally applicable to the second case, has been held (7) not to give the former judgment the force of *res judicata* in the second case. The rejection of applications to set aside an *ex parte* decree under O IX r 13 (formerly sect 108), *post* and sale in execution thereof under O XXI r 89 (formerly sect 311), *post*, relate only to specific matters in that suit, and is therefore no bar to a fresh suit to set aside the decree on the ground that the whole suit was fraudulent (8) The finding of a Criminal Court is not, of course *res judicata* in a civil action and no fact found or proved in a Criminal Court is on that account to be taken to be proved in a Civil Court (*vide ante*, "Suit").

Explanation I—See note, *ante*, on word "Try"

Explanation II—See note, *post*, on competency of jurisdiction

Explanation III—This *Explanation* provides that the matter must, in the former suit, have been alleged by one party, and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other (9) In order to constitute the bar of *res*

(1) Hunter v Stewart, 4 De C F & J 168, *per* Lord Westbury, LC

(2) *Vide ante*, p 110

(3) Nundo Lal Bhattacharjee v Bidhoo Mookhu Deb, 13 C 17 (1886), Thakur Mangdeo v Thakur Mahadeo Singh 18 C 647 (1891), Parbatty v Mathura 40 C 29 (1912) 16 C W N 877

(4) Caspert v *op cit* 398-401, 392, where the subject is discussed and cases are cited

(5) Shib Charan Lal v Raghu Nath, 17 A 174 (1895)

(6) Parasotam Gir v Narbada Gir, 21 A 505 (1899)

(7) Chand Prasad v Mahendra, 23 A 5 (1900)

(8) Khagendra Nath Mahata v Prannath Roy, 6 C W N 473 (1902), Golap Singh v Indra Coomar 13 C W N 493 (1909)

(9) *Supra* III

judicata, it is not sufficient merely that an issue on the same point should have been raised in the former suit, although that issue may have been incidentally decided, but it must appear that the matter referred to was alleged by one party, and either denied, or admitted expressly or impliedly, by the other, (1) and the issue must further have been a material one (2) Matter not put in question by the parties, and not necessary to the adjudication of the subject matter of the suit, is immaterial, and any observation of the Court thereupon is *obiter dictum*, which can have no effect in any other litigation (3) The rule of English law, that where the allegation on record is uncertain there is no *res judicata*, is also the rule embodied in this section "If a thing be not directly and precisely alleged, it shall be no estoppel" That rule is reproduced in this explanation (4) Matter alleged in the written statements of the parties may in subsequent proceedings be relevant as an admission, but it will not operate as an estoppel, unless, being admitted or denied, and found in favour of the person alleging it, it forms the basis of judicial decision (5)

Explanation IV—This *Explanation* deals with matters *constructively* in issue in a former suit, (6) providing that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit (7) In

(1) Shama Churn Chatterjee v. Prosunno Coomar Santharee, 5 C L R 251 (1879), see Wilaiti Begum v. Nur Khan 5 A 514 (1893), Shoo Ratan Singh v. Sheosahai Nisar, 6 A 338 (1884)

(2) Dahoo Munder v. Goopee Nund Jha, 2 W R 79 (1865)

(3) Field, Ev 270 "If the Court decide a point put in question by the parties, but not necessary to the adjudication of the subject matter of the suit, will such decision be binding? It may be said that the point was not directly and substantially in issue, certainly it was not material" See on the point the authorities cited, 2 Smith L C, 7th ed ib n, as to findings on immaterial matters, see Jamiatunissa v. Lutfunissa 7 A 606 (1887)

(4) Vishnu v. Ramling, 26 B 25 (1901)

(5) *Id.* See Boileau v. Rutlin 2 Fich, 667

(6) Hari Narayan Brahmo v. Ganpatray Daji, 7 B 272 (1883)

(7) Expl. IV "Considerable difference of opinion has prevailed in India as to the application of the principle contained in this *Explanation* which, no doubt, was enacted with the purpose of reconciling the apparently conflicting views expressed in Hunter v. Stewart (4 D C, F & J 168) and Henderson v. Henderson (7 Hare

115), both of which decisions were largely relied upon before the enactment of the Code of 1877. And even since the enactment of the *Explanation* now to be considered, the cases have been far from uniform" (Casperes, op cit 402, 403, and see Broughton, 46-50). The principle embodied in the above *Explanation* in 1877 had already been asserted and acted upon by the Judicial Committee (Srimut Rajah Mootto v. Katama Natchiar, 11 M I A 50, 73, 10 W R, P C, I (1866), Woomatara Debi v. Unnopoorana Dassee, 11 B L R 158, Mahamad Gius v. Raybuz, 15 Bom L R 266 (1912), s c, 37 B 224, 18 W P 103 (1872) see Dinobunlloo Chowdhry v. Kristomonee Dossee 2 C 152 F B (1876) in which the effect of the latter decision is discussed) and by the Courts in India (see cases cited in Casperes op cit 406-416) before the Code of 1877. In the following cases the *Explanation* has been considered or acted upon. Muttu Chetti v. Muttun Chetti, 4 M 206, (1879) Gursobhat Ahir v. Ramdutt Singh 5 C 923 C 5 (1880) 6 C L R 537, Narain Dutt v. Bhakrolal, 3 A 184 (1880) Sultan Ahir v. Maula Iakhi, 4 A 21 (1881) Nirman Singh v. Pitalman Singh 4 A 63 (1881) Chennurajappa v. Pattappa 11 B 708 (1887) Shoo Ratan Singh v. Shoo Sahai Nisar 6 A 378 (1884) Hari Narayan Brahmo v. Ganpatray Daji, 7 B 272

other words, neither party can decline to meet an issue tendered by the other and then maintain that it has not become *res judicata*. The plaintiff must support all the issues necessary to maintain his cause of action. The defendant must bring forward all the defences which he has to the cause of action asserted in the plaintiff's pleadings. But the plaintiff is under no obligation to tender issues not necessary to support his cause of action, nor is the defendant required to meet issues not tendered by the plaintiff (1). The principle has been applied to applications for execution where the point might have been, but was not, raised in the suit (2). A litigant cannot re open a case on materials which might

(1883), Churn Manjee t Ishan Chunder Dhur, 9 C L R 474 (1881), Allonni t Kunjusha, 7 M 264 (1883), Kandunni t Kattamma 9 M 251 (1885), Thandavan t Vallamma, 15 M 336 (1892), Maloji t Sagaji, 13 B 567 (1891), Hasan Ali t Siraj Hussain, 16 A 202 (1894), Dhanu Ram Shaha t Bhagurath Shaha, 22 C 692 (1895), Imam Khan t Avul Khan, 19 A 517 (1897), Peary Mohun Mookerjee t Ambica Churn Bandopadhyaya, 24 C 900 (1897), Dost Muhammad Khan v Saud Begam, 20 A 81 (1897), Sri Gopal t Pirthu Singh, 20 A 110 (1897), F B, s c, in appeal, 24 A 429 (1902) [foll in Gopal Lal t Banarasi Pershad Chowdhry, 31 C 428 (1904)], Jamadar Singh t Serazuddin, 30 C 979 (1908), Pulandar Singh t Jwala Singh 20 A 516 (1898), Ram Chand t Durga Pershad, 26 A 61 (1903), Alagarama Naicker t Sundareswara Ayyar, 21 M 278, 285 (1898), Purushottam t Atmaram Janardan, 23 B 597 (1899) [partition suit], Kutti Ali t Chundan, 23 M 629 (1900) [suit for land based on title—previous suit as lessor]. The *Explanation* has also been applied by the Judicial Committee in two cases. Mahabir Pershad Singh t Macnaghten, 16 C 682, L R 16 I A. 107, 113, 114 (1889), Kameswar Pershad t Rajkumari Ruttan Koer, 20 C 79, L R 19 I A. 334, 238 (1892), foll. in Shyama Charan Banerjee t Minmaya Devi, 31 C 79 (1902), Gudappa v Tirappa, 25 B 189 (1900) [diss from in Ramaswami Ayyar t Vithmatha Ayyar, 26 M 760 (1902), which last case was followed in Thirukalat t Theruthiyil, 29 M 153 (1905)], Rangayya Goundari t Nanjappa Rao, 24 M 491 (1901), Kachin t Lakshmanasingh, 25 B 115 (1900), Kuthu t Chundan, 23 M 629 (1900), Venayak t Dattatraya 4 B 1 R 462 (1902), s c, 26 B 661, Sri Gopal t Pirthu Singh, 4 B L L

827, 870 (1902), s c, 6 C W N 889 [foll., Gopal Lal t Banarasi, 31 C 428 (1904)], s c, 8 C W N 385, distinguished in Ajudhia Pande t Inayat Ullah, 35 A 111 (1912); Shyama Charan Banerjee t Minmaya Devi, 31 C 79 (1902)], the plaintiff must have had an opportunity of recovering that which he seeks to recover in the second action. Bhukabat t Rai Bhuri, 5 B L P 396 (1903); in Kedar Mal Marwari t Dewan Bishen Persad, 8 C W N 609 (1903), the Privy Council refused to entertain an objection taken for the first time on appeal that the appellant ought to have enforced his rights in a previous suit. Deputy Commissioner of Lahore t Khanwan Singh, 34 I A. 72, 12 C W N 474 (1907), s c, 4 A L J 232, 29 A 331, 9 Bom. L R 591, Satya badi Behara t Harabati, 34 C 223 (1907), Rukhmibhai t Venkatesh, 31 B 527 (1907), 9 Bom. L R 958, Jagan Nath t Balkashan, 4 C L J 675 (1907), Sellappa Chettyar t Velayutha Teran, 30 M 498, 17 M L J 433 (1907), Zinat un nissa t Ryan 27 A 142 (1901), Mahomed Ibrahim t Sheikh Hamya, 35 B 507 (1911), Dhanapala t Anantha Chetti, 24 M L J 418 (1913), Mahomed Ibrahim Hussain Khan t Ambika Pershad Singh, P C, 39 C 527 (1912), Bayyan Naidu t Suryanarayana, 37 M 70 F B (1914), Jamadar Singh t Serazuddin, 35 C 979 (1908). And as to execution proceedings Narayana Pattar t Gopala Krishna 28 M 305 (1904), Viyathen t Neela Kanta, 17 M L J 311 (1907) [effect of non appearance when notice sent as to relief claimed].

(1) Freeman, Jud 441, cited in Hukm Chand, Pca. Jud. 17

(2) Basdeo Prasad t Jathan Ram, 27 A 684, 686 (1907)

have been laid before the Court in the first trial, but the discovery of additional evidence, not originally available (for instance, evidence proving that a decree against him was obtained by perjury) will enable him to apply for a review of judgment under O XLVII r. 1 (1)

It depends upon the particular facts of each case to say whether a matter ought to have been made ground for defence or attack in a former suit (2) The *Explanation* is intended to meet the case of a point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation in a former suit, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might then have brought forward. The object of the *Explanation* would seem to be to compel the plaintiff to set up all grounds which were open to him in support of the claim made by him. "If the parties have had an opportunity of controverting the same thing as if the matter had been actually *controversed* and decided" (5) Although upon a literal interpretation of the words of the *Explanation*, it might be argued that a point not raised, and not decided in a previous litigation, might still be taken as conclusive in a subsequent suit between the parties, yet upon a proper construction of the section, the point ought not and cannot be treated as *res judicata* unless there is a judicial determination, express or implied, on the matter not put directly in issue. (6) Where, however, separate rights have been infringed, separate suits may be maintained, since the infringement of separate rights gives rise to separate causes of action (7) The principal consideration is whether it is possible to raise the same cause of action in both. And one great criterion of this identity is whether the same evidence will maintain both actions (8) The point to be considered is whether the cause of action or transaction on which the two suits are based is the same, and not whether the transaction is sought to be established in different modes or by different means (9) When, however, independent causes of action are available, a party is not bound to unite them all in one suit.

(1) *Munshi Mosul v Surendra* 16 C W N 1002 (1912), *Abdul Huq v Abdul Hafiz*, 14 C W N 693 (1910), *Lakshmi v Nur Ali*, 38 C 930 (1911), 15 C W N 1010

(2) *Kameswar Pershad v Rajkumari Ruttun Koer*, 19 I A 234, 238, 20 C 79 (1892). Followed in *Akayi Kunhi v Ayissa Bi*, 26 M 645 (1903). Explained in *Ramaswami Ayyar v Vithmathasayyar*, 26 M 760 (1902), *Moosa Goolam v Ebrahim Goolam P C*, 40 C. 1 (1912), and 14 Bom L R 1211, 16 C W N 937

(3) *Henderson v Henderson* 3 Hare 115 see remarks on this case in *Worman v Worman*, L B 42 Ch D 290-307

(4) *Nathu Valad Panlu v Budhu Valad Bhika*, 18 B. 537 (1893)

(5) *Newington v Lewis*, L R 6 C P 180 189, per Martin B., citing *Greathall v Bramble*, 7 T R 470. *Langmead v Mayle* 18 C B N S 253 250. See also per Black

burn 6 C P at p 133, 1 All 11
Heera Motoo Doss, 22 W J 2

(6) *Woomesh Chundra v Das Maistra* 28 C 17, 21 (1897)
Mondul v Baroda Durwan 1

(7) Per Brett M P, 15 Q B D 519 62, *Humphrey v L R* 14 Q 1 O II r 1 2, per O Kneale v Cav 1 r mentioned Full

(8) *Hutchinson v J. Grey & Co*, B 165 (1894)

(9) *Ram v. Ayyar* 27 M 1, *Atmaraj v. Ayyar* 27 M 1, *cf. Ayyar v. Ayyar* 27 M 1, *cf. Ayyar v. Ayyar* 27 M 1, *cf. Ayyar v. Ayyar* 27 M 1

he is bound to bring before the Court all grounds of attack available to him with reference to the title which is made the ground of action (1) The question what is a different title is one of great practical difficulty, and must be decided upon the circumstances of each case separately (2) All that this *Explanation* enjoins is that every ground which could and ought to have been urged in support of the claim actually made in the suit, shall be deemed to have been adjudicated upon therein, whether it was actually urged or not (3) This *Explanation* applies only to cases in which the plaintiff, having on a former occasion sued for certain relief on the strength of one title, afterwards claims the same relief on the ground of another title, of which he might have availed himself in the former suit. It does not apply to cases where the subject-matters of the two suits are different, (4) nor to cases where no relief was asked for or granted as against the particular person in the former suit though he was a party to it (5) The word "might" presupposes that the claim to be barred must be within the knowledge of the person during the first suit (6) It was proposed to add to this *Explanation* the words "and to have been heard and finally decided so far as the subject-matter of the former suit was concerned and no further" which was stated to be intended to meet such cases as rent suits in which, unless the question of title is expressly raised, such question is

(1) *Altunni v Kunjusha*, 7 M 264 (1883), see *Piltapur Raja v Sureya Rau*, 8 M 520 (1885) *Mahomed Reasat Ali v Hasni Banu*, 21 C 157 (1893), A L J 26 27

(2) *Seo Girdhar Manordas v Dayabhai Kalabhai*, 8 B 180 (1882), per West J, *hameswar Pershad v Rajkumari Rutton Koer*, L R 19 I A 238 (1892), *Caspersz*, 408, *Kashee Kishore Roy Chowdhry v Kristo Chunder Sandyal Chowdhry*, 22 W R 464 (1874), *Woomatara Debia v Unnoporna Dossee*, 11 B L R 158 (1872), *Denobund hoo Chowdhry v Kristomonee Dossee*, 2 C 152, 169 (1876) The Calcutta High Court have held that a party to a suit is bound to assert all his titles [*Denobundhoo Chowdhry's case*, *supra*, per cur Garth, C J, diss, foll in *Bheeka Lal v Bhuggoo Lal*, 3 C 23 (1877); diss in *Radhanath Cundu v Land Mortgage Bank*, 6 C 559 (1880)], but this view has been dissented from by the Madras High Court [*Thiyala Kandi Ummatho v Thiyala Kandi Cheria Kunhamed*, 4 M 308 (1881), *Sadaya Pillai v Chinna*, 2 M 352 (1879), see also in Allahabad High Court, *Babu Lal v Ishri Persad*, 2 A 582 (1878), *Sheo Ratan Singh v Sheo Sahai Meer*, 6 A 358 (1884)], and by the Bombay High Court [*Konnerav v Gurrav*, 5 B 589 (1881), see *Bhiste Shankur Patil v Ramchandarra*, 8 B H C L. A C, 89 (1871), Int see also

Shridar Vinayak v Narayan Valad Babaji, 11 B H C R 224 (1874), and *Haji Hasam Ibrahim v Mancharam Kabandas*, 3 B 137 (1878), in which latter case West, J, suggests a rule which will reconcile the decisions and the more recent decision *Guddappa v Tirakappa*, 25 B 189 (1900), s c, 2 Bom L R 872, in which Jenkins, C J, reviews the previous decisions and accepts the view of the section taken by the Calcutta Full Bench case], see *Caspersz*, 408-410 in which the question is discussed, and *Naro Hari v Anpurna bai*, 11 B 160 (1886) In *Balbathar Nath v Ram Lal*, 1 A L J 228 (1904), the title was held not to be the same

(3) *Ramaswami Ayyar v Vythinatha Ayyar*, 26 M 700 (1902)

(4) *Sarkum Abu Torab Abdul Wahab v Rabaman Bakhsh*, 24 C 83 (1896), referred to in *Koulash Mondul v Baroda Sundari Das*, 24 C 714 (1897)

(5) *Ramdas v Vazir Saheb*, 25 B 589 (1901), s c, 3 B L R 179, *Syed Mahomed v Ambika Pershad*, 39 C 527 (1912), 15 C W N 505, 14 Bom. L R 280, 22 M L J 468, 15 C I J 411; foll in *Gajadhar v Bhagwanta*, 34 A 599 (1912)

(6) *Manekbai v Virchand*, 9 Bom L R 1020 (1907), *Manilamani v Thiruvengadam* 31 M 485 (1908)

only incidental and not a matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit. The addition, however, has apparently been considered unnecessary. It has been held that if the effect of a decision in a suit is necessarily inconsistent with a defence which ought to have been raised (but was not raised) that defence must under this section be deemed to have been finally decided against the defendant who ought to have raised it (1).

Explanation V—According to the provisions of this *Explanation*, any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purpose of the section be deemed to have been refused (2). The legal effect of this *Explanation* is that of treating the omission to grant the relief asked for in the plaint as equivalent to an express refusal, and the claim thereto in a fresh suit as *res judicata* (3). This *Explanation* refers to relief applied for, which the Court is bound to grant with reference to the matters directly and substantially in issue (4). The words "relief claimed" apply only to something which forms part of the "claim" strictly so-called, that is, something which the plaintiff may claim as of right, something included in his cause of action and which if he establishes his cause of action the Court has no discretion to refuse. They do not include something which the plaintiff cannot in the suit claim as of right, but can only claim in the sense of an appeal to the discretion of the Court and which the Court may refuse in the exercise of its discretion on grounds of general expediency or otherwise even if the cause of action is fully established (5). Even if the suit, as regards the relief claimed, has been wrongly dismissed, the plaintiff cannot sue again for the same relief (6). The *Explanation* does not apply where the Court is silent on a head of relief only claimed as ancillary to the main relief, and which by implication is rather granted than refused. It only applies where the Court is silent on an independent head of relief, claimed and duly controverted (7). A decree cannot be superseded by the mere omission of the Court executing the decree to pass orders on a claim made under it (8).

The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title—This is an application of the principle contained

(1) *Mahim v. Anil Bandhu*, 13 C. W. N. 513 (1909).

(2) *Expl. IV*. See *Jiban Das Owal v. Durga Pershad Adhikari*, 21 C. 252 (1893), *Dham Ram Saha v. Bhagurath Saha*, 21 C. 692 (1895), *Kachu v. Lakshman Singh*, 25 B. 115 (1900), *s. c.*, 2 B. L. R. 781.

(3) *Rambhadra v. Jagannatha*, 14 M. 328 (1890), *see Mon Mohun Sirkar v. The Secretary of State for India in Council*, 17 C. 968 (1893), *followed in Ram Dayal v. Madan Mohan Lal*, 21 A. 425 (1899) F. B., *Bhakra v. Sitaram*, 19 B. 532 (1894), *Hays v. Indranan Singh*, 32 C. 118 (1903) where income profits claimed in second suit were finally decided subsequent to first suit.

(4) *Thyila Kandi Ummabatha v. Thyila Kandi Cheria Kuchammed*, 4 M. 368 (1881).

(5) *Ram Dayal v. Madan Mohan Lal*, 21 A. 425, 433 (1899) F. B. [claim for mesne profits accruing due after institution of former suit]. See as to taking money, decree in mortgage, and not asking for relief by sale *Shobu Bera v. Chandra Mohan Jana*, 33 C. 819 (1900), *followed in Puri Lal v. Nani Ram*, 31 A. 19 (1905).

(6) *Sakh Lal v. Bhikhi*, 4 A. 157, 160 (1885).

(7) *Fatmalal v. Anubhai*, 12 B. 451 (1886), *s. c.*, in appeal, 13 B. 212 (1886).

(8) *Narayanlal Caravet v. Chajapat*, *Manikya Dora*, 21 M. 61 (1901).

in the maxim, *res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet*, what is transacted between one set of persons ought not to injure or affect another person. Judgments and decrees only bind parties and privies (1). A person who is no party to a decree is not bound by it (2). "Parties," in the larger legal sense, are all persons having a right to control the proceedings, to make defence, to adduce and cross examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision if an appeal lies, and it may be added, those who assume such a right. The only extension given to this rule by Indian Courts is that a decree against a *benamidar* binds also the beneficial owner, in which case the parties are the same in fact though not in name (3). If the verdict were not required to be between the same parties, a man might be bound by a decision who had not the liberty to cross examine, and it is contrary to natural justice that a man should be injured by a determination that he or those under whom he claims were not at liberty to controvert (4). Except in the case of judgments *in rem*, (5) and judgments relating to matters of a public nature, (6) which are governed by a different principle, no person is bound by a decision, unless he or those under whom he claims were parties to the proceedings in which it was given (7). But it is reasonable that the same set of persons, or persons claiming under them, should be bound by previous proceedings concerning the same matter. There is no hardship in holding that a man shall be bound by that which would have bound those under whom he claims *quoad* the subject matter of the claim, for he who feels the advantage, ought also to feel the burden (*qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus*), and no man can save in certain cases excepted by the Statute law and the law merchant, transfer to another a better right than he himself possesses (8). Persons other than the parties to a suit have been divided (9) into three classes, with reference to their position as affected by the judgment —

(a) Persons who claim under the parties to the former suit, or, in the language of English law, privies to those parties (10)

(1) *Mohunt Das v Nil Komul Dewan* 4 C W N 283 (1899). In *Gool Khan v Tetar Goala*, 4 C W N 63 (1899), the judgment was not *inter partes*.

(2) *Srinanan v Chadayan Sutta Haji* 17 M 17, 20 (1892), *Gool Khan v Tetar Goala* 4 C W N 63 (1899).

(3) *Mohunt Das v Nil Komul Dewan*, 4 C W N 283 (1899).

(4) *Buller*, N P 233, *Field* Ev 307, *Gujju Lal v Fattch Lal* 6 C. 171, 189 (1880).

(5) Sec 5 41, Evidence Act.

(6) Sec 5 42, ib.

(7) *Gujju Lal v Fattch Lal* *supra*.

(8) *Field*, Ev 307, 308.

(9) In *Ahmedbhoy Habibbhoy v Muleebbhoy Qasimbhoy*, O P 703 709 (1892), *per*

3

of estoppel one person be

comes privy of another, (1) by succeeding to the position of that other as regards the subject of the estoppel, *eg*, an assignee or grantee, (2) by holding in subordination to that other, *eg*, the case of a landlord and tenant. The ground of privity is *property* not *personal* relation. To make a man privy to an action he must have acquired an interest in the subject matter of the action either by inheritance, succession or purchase from a party *subsequently* to the action, or he must hold property subordnately. Thus an assignee is not estopped by a judgment against the assignor obtained after the assignment. *Bigelow on Estoppel*, 5th ed 142-144. A person is said to claim under another when he derives his title through that other by assignment or otherwise. *Sundar Lal v Chhitar Mal* 29 A 1, 3 (1906). A privity exists between an execution creditor and a

(b) Persons who, though not claiming under the parties to the former suit, were *represented* by them therein (1) Such are persons interested in the estate of a testator or intestate, in relation to the executor or administrator, shareholders in a company, (2) in relation to the registered officer of that company, and in India members of a joint and undivided family, in relation to a member who has sufficiently represented their interests in a former suit (3)

(c) Strangers who are neither privies to, nor represented by, the parties to the former suit

The general rule is that in the absence of fraud, (4) an adjudication is binding upon the parties to a suit or persons claiming under or represented by them, but upon these only. It must be shown that the party in the former suit represented the interest claimed in the latter suit. A party represents all interests owned by him at the time of the action or subordinate to his, though belonging to others. A decision against him will bind interests acquired by him subsequently, and all subordinate interests represented by him whensoever acquired (5) The nature and object of the former suit must be regarded in order to ascertain who was really and substantially the litigant (6) When once it is made clear that the self same right and title is substantially in issue in two suits, the precise form in which either suit was brought, or the fact that the plaintiff in the one case was the defendant in the other, is immaterial (7) And the fact that there are other parties, introduced in the subsequent litigation, does not alter the case, the estoppel subsists between the parties who were parties to the former litigation (8) But there is no *res judicata* where the subsequent decision is not between the parties or those claiming under them (9) The decision in a suit by one of two zemindars against the other as to the right to the profit rental of a

purchaser at a Court sale. *Krishnabhupati Devu v Vikrama Devu* 18 M 13 (1894) As to whether decree by *jaradar* is evidence when superior landlord sues for rent, see *Balaram v Kartick*, 4 C W N 161 (1899) An auction purchaser of an entire estate, at a sale for arrears of revenue, is not the successor of the defaulting proprietor. *Kant Prashad Hajari v Abdul Jamar*, 8 C W N 676 (1904) A prior purchaser of land is not estopped as being privy in estate by a judgment against the vendor in a suit begun after the purchase. *Abdolt v Mahkhan* 35 B 297 (1911)

(1) S 11 of the Code does not however in express terms, mention representatives or the case of persons represented by, but not claiming through the parties to the former suit. As to representative suit against sect of worshippers, see *Sadagopa Charan v Iama Rao*, 30 M 185 (1907), 11 C W N 580, 17 M L J 240, 9 Bom. L. R 663

(2) Under 7 Wm. IV and 1 Vict. c. 72.

(3) See *Jogendro v Kunndro* 14 Moo I A at p. 346

(4) Secs 44, Authors Evidence Act

(5) *Seshappaya v Venkatramana* 33 V 459 (1910)

(6) *Zamindar of Pittajuram v The Proprietors of the Mutta of Kolanka* L P 51 V 206 2 M 23 3 C L R 265 (1878) see also *Ram Chunder Poddar v Hari Das Sen* 9 C 463, 466 (1882)

(7) *Gobind Chunder Goondoo v Taruck Chunder Bose*, 3 C 145 F B (1877) see *Shadal Khan v Amin ullah Khan* 4 A 92 (1881)

(8) *Mohidin v Muhammad Ibrahim* 1 M H. C R. 245 (1863) *Gopal Das v Gopinath Sirkar* 12 C L R 38 (1882) That is provided the relief sought in both the suits is the same. *Dwarkanath Roy v Ram Chand Aich* 20 C 428 (1899)

(9) *Zamindar of Pittajuram v The Proprietors of the Mutta of Kolanka* *supra*

bazaar was held by the Privy Council not to be *res judicata* in a subsequent suit for possession of a share of the bazaar, in which suit all the parties, plaintiffs, and defendants, claimed under the plaintiff in the former suit. Such a plea, however, might well be a defence to a hostile claim by persons asserting a title under the defendant zemindar in the former suit, against their claiming under the plaintiff zemindar in that suit (1). A decision of a material issue in a suit against one who is the representative of an estate, bars a suit by the true owner on the same issue (2). And a representative of the person is bound by a decree against the person whom he represents, but it is essential that there should be an adjudication as to the fact that he is representative (3). A verdict against a man suing in one capacity will not estop him when he sues in another distinct capacity, and, in fact, is a different person (4). The principle of *res judicata* has no application in a dispute between parties all of whom claim under the person in whose favour the decision in the previous suit was given (5).

Hindu widow—A decree fairly and properly obtained against a Hindu widow, relating to her husband's estate, binds the reversionary heirs, the whole estate being for the time vested in her, absolutely for some purposes, though in some respects for a qualified interest (6). It was held under the Limitation Act of 1859, that when the widow as plaintiff sues to recover the husband's estate, held adversely to her by the defendant, a decree against her would bind the reversioner and that adverse possession, which would bar her right of suit, if she were alive, on the ground of limitation, would equally bar that of the reversioner (7). But under Article 141 of the present Act, it has been decided that a reversioner who succeeds to unmoveable property has twelve years to bring his suit for possession from the time when his estate falls into

(1) Asghar Reza Khan v. Mahomed Mehdi Hossein Khan, 30 C 558 (1903).

(2) Shivalingaya v. Nagalingaya, 4 B 27 (1878).

(3) Kanai Lal v. Sashi Bhushon Biswas, 6 C 777, 8 C L R 117 (1881), see Courmon Dabee v. Jugut Chandra Audhkari, 17 C 57 (1889). Where one of the parties to a suit dies, and no steps are taken to revive the suit, and the suit abates or is dismissed, no fresh suit can be brought. This was not so under Act VIII of 1859, which contained no similar provision. Another suit should be brought. Bepin Behari Bundopadhyaya v. Brojo Nath Mookopadhyaya, 8 C 357 (1882).

(4) Babajirao v. Luxmandas, 5 Bom. L R 932 (1903), Marjovan v. Mulji, 31 B 416 (1909).

(5) Syed Asgar v. Syed Mahomed, 7 C W N 482 (1903).

(6) Katama Natchiar v. Srimut Rajah Moottoo, 9 M I A 539 604 (1863), Nugender Chunder Ghose v. Sreemutty Kamneec Dossee,

11 M I A 241, 267 (1867), Brahmomojoy Dassee v. Aristo Mohun Mookerjee, 2 C 222 (1876), Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Guru Persad Doss, B L R, Sup Vol., 1008, 9 W R 505 (1868), Nand Kumar v. Radha Kuari, 1 A 282 (1876), Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran, 8 A 365 (1889), Sachit v. Budhwa Kuor, 8 A 429 (1886), Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dulharan Singh, 5 A. 582 (1883), Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothur Mohun Coswami, 21 C 8 (1893), 20 I A 183 [the rule in the Shilvagunga case (9 Moo I A 539), to the effect that an adverse decree against a Hindu widow binds those claiming in succession, applies equally to the case of the daughter], Tribhuvan Sundar Kuari v. Sri Narain Singh, 20 A 311 (1898), Lachmi Narain v. Ram Chandra, 4 A L J 117 (1907), Behari Lal v. Daud Husein, 35 A 240 (1913).

(7) Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Guru Persad Doss, B L R, Sup Vol., 1008 (1868), s c, 9 W R 505, Amritlal Bose v. Rajonckanta Mitter, 15 B L R 10 (1875).

possession (1) A decree in a suit by a reversioner against the widow for a declaration that she cannot dispose of the property purchased by her out of the profits of her husband's estate and that her alienation is null and void except as regards her own interest, will not bind a new reversioner, should the plaintiff predecease the widow, although it "would be so strong an authority in point as to deter either party from disputing it," (2) or in a suit to restrain waste brought by a reversioner who subsequently predeceased the widow, as against the new reversioner (3) In a recent Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court it was held that a Hindu widow can not only alienate her life interest, but also can transfer the corpus of her deceased husband's estate (even without legal necessity or for a pious purpose) so that the transfer shall not be void, but only voidable by the reversioner (4) It has also been held that only the nearest reversioner is entitled to a declaration that a mortgage by a Hindu widow is not binding on reversioners (5) Where by the terms of her husband's will a Hindu widow was the full representative of his estate, a decree against her declaring that the will was revoked, and that the appellant was entitled to succeed *ab intestato*, was held to bind the respondent, whose claim was by appointment from the widow under the will, whether or not he was a party to the suit in which the decree was made (6) Where a Hindu widow and her son, the then presumptive heir to property claimed by the widow, obtained a decree against a more remote reversionary heir, and the son predeceased his mother, and the person against whom the decree had been obtained became the next reversionary heir, it was held in a suit for possession by him, that the decree in the previous suit did not operate as *res judicata* (7) For a case in which it was held that the reversioners were not affected by a former judgment, on the ground that in the suit in which it was given they merely represented the interest of their predecessor, the life tenant, see below (8) In a more recent case it was held, referring to two of the Privy Council decisions already cited, that where there are several reversioners successively entitled to succeed to property for the time being in the possession of a Hindu female, a decree in a suit by some of such reversioners will not necessarily constitute *res judicata* in respect of a similar suit brought by other reversioners (9) Au

(1) Srinath Kur : Prosunno Kumar Ghose 9 C 934 (1883) See Broja Lal Sen v Jiban Krishna Roy, 26 C 285 295 (1893)

(2) Isri Dutt Koer v Mussamat Hansbutti Koeran L. R. 10 I A 150, 157 (1883)

(3) Zamindar of Pittapuram v The Proprietors of the Mutta of Kolanka L. R. 5 I A 206 (1878), as to decrees in suits to set aside an adoption see Broja Kishore Dossee v Sreenath Bose, 9 W R 463, 463 (1868), Rance Bromo Moyee v Rajah Anund Lal Roy, 19 W R 419 (1873), Jumoona Dassya Chowdhram v Ramasooder Dassya Chowdhram L. R. 3 I A 72 (1876), see also Narendro Chundro Mitro v Sreemutty Kishen Soondory Dassee, 19 W R 133 (1873)

(4) Durga Kunwar v Matu Mal 35 A 311, 1 B (1913) the transfer of the corpus is not void but voidable by the reversioner, and see also Bhoj Gopal Mukerjee v Krishna Mahesh Dab, 34 C 129 (1907).

(5) Meghu Dutt v Pami Khawalan B, 35 A 3-8 (1913)

(6) Partal Narain Singh v Jai Lal Singh, L. R. 11 I A 197 (1881)

(7) Ram Chunder Lodhar v Jai Lal Singh 9 C 473 (1882)

(8) Mussamat Bai Kunwar v Jai Lal Singh, 5 B L R 66 (1881)

(9) Chhaddu Singh v Jai Lal Singh (1900), following Jai Lal Singh A. 32 (1879)

appellant having been a party to a former suit, in which the respondent obtained a decree for possession of the estate in question as mother and heiress of the last proprietor, is barred by such decree from afterwards recovering possession, on the ground that the respondent is not such heiress. Although such decree barred the appellant from setting up in this suit a family custom for the purpose of showing that he was entitled to possession during the life of the respondent, he is not thereby debarred from showing that upon her death, if he survives, he will be entitled, under such custom, to succeed her, and therefore to have a certain deed executed by her declared illegal and inoperative after her death (1)

Benamidar—Where the parties are parties in fact, although not in name, as in the case of a person who buys an estate for himself, but has it conveyed *benami* in the name of another, a decree properly obtained by or against the benamidar is binding upon the real owner, the presumption being that the benamidar instituted the suit with his authority and consent (2)

Co defendants—Where it was broadly contended that there would be no *res judicata* as between co defendants, it was held that such contention was incorrect. Section 11 does not preclude the decisions upon any issue from operating as *res judicata*, merely because the issue is raised as between co defendants if the matter was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit and the other necessary conditions are satisfied. The words "*between the same parties*" in this section, qualify not only the words "*former suit*," but the whole expression "*in issue in a former suit*." Therefore an issue raised and decided as between co defendants in a former suit may be *res judicata* in a subsequent suit, in which they are arranged as plaintiff and defendant (3). When the same parties were contending in the former suit, in fact though not in form as where they were co defendants on the record, but their interests were different, and there was an issue between them which was decided, its decision is a bar to a second suit or defence raising the same issue between them when in the position of plaintiff and defendant (4). The

(1) Iekant Doorga Persad Singh v. Teekauni Doorga Konwari, L. R. 5 I. A. 149 (1878), 4 C. 190, 3 C. L. R. 31.

(2) Mohunt Das v. Md. Komul Dewan, 4 C. W. N. 283 (1899), Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad, 10 C. 897 (1884), Khub Chand v. Narain Singh, 3 A. 812 (1881), Sbangara v. Krishnan, 15 M. 267 (1889), see Bhuwabal Singh v. Maharaja Rajendra Pratap Sahoy, 5 B. L. R. 321 (1870), Prosonno Coommar Chowdhry v. Koylash Chunder Pal Chowdhry, B. L. R., F. B., 759 (1867), and on the evidence disclosing who is the real owner, as to making him party to the suit, see Sitanath Saha v. Nobin Chunder Roy, 5 C. L. R. 102 (1873); Meheronussa Bibee v. Hurri Churn Bose, 10 W. R. 220 (1868), Kalso Prosonno

Bose v. Dinonath Bose Mullick, 19 W. P. 431 (1873), 11 B. L. R. 56.

(3) Manguram v. Syed Md. Hossen Khan, 3 C. W. N. 30 (1903), s. c., 31 C. 95, Kandiyal Cheriya v. Zamorin of Calicut, 29 M. 515 (1903), Yusuf Sahib v. Durga, 30 M. 447 (1907).

(4) Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev, 11 B. 216 (1886), Ahmed Ali v. Najabat Khan, 18 A. 65 (1895), Shadal Khan v. Aminullah Khan, 4 A. 92 (1881) [see Bhagwant Singh v. Tej Kuar, 8 A. 91 (1885)], Shaikh Khoorshed Hossein v. Nabee Fatima, 18 A. 65 (1895), Chamley v. Lord Dunsany, 2 Sel. & Lef. 690, Cottenham v. Earl of Shrewsbury, 3 Hare, 627 (see Kovari v. Crawford, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 29, and Caspersz,

rule has been stated to be, that where an adjudication between the defendants is necessary to give the appropriate relief to the plaintiff, the adjudication will be *res judicata* between the defendants as well as between the plaintiff and defendants. But for this effect to arise, there must be a conflict of interests between the defendants, and a judgment defining the real rights and obligations of the defendants *inter se*. Without necessity, a judgment will not be *res judicata* amongst defendants, nor will it be *res judicata* amongst them by mere inference from the fact that they have been collectively defeated in resisting a claim to a share made against them as a group (1). A decree for partition is not like a decree for money or the delivery of specific property, which is only in favour of the plaintiff in the suit. It is a joint declaration of the rights of persons interested in the property of which partition is sought, and such a decree, when properly drawn up, is in favour of each shareholder or set of shareholders having a distinct share (2). As to the effect of a partition decree as constituting *res judicata* as against the plaintiff (3) and between co-defendants, (4) see the undermentioned cases.

Joint contractors and joint wrongdoers—A judgment obtained against one or more of several joint contractors or joint wrongdoers operates as a bar to a second suit against any of the others (5). For there is but one

368], Bissorup Gossamy v Gorachand Gossamy, 9 C 120 (1882), Venkayya t Narasamma 11 M 204 (1887) [see Madhavi v Kelu, 15 M 264 (1892)], Chajja v Umrao Singh, 22 A 386 (1900). See Latchanna v Saravaya, 18 M 164 (1894). One of the defendants may appeal against the decree as between himself and the other defendant. Souru v Narayanrao, 18 B 520 (1893).

(1) Ramchandra Narayan v Narayan Mahadev, 11 B 210 (1886) *supra* [followed in Bapu v Bhavani, 22 B 245 (1896)], Rakhmini t Dhondo, 36 B 207 (1911), 14 Bom L R 128, Saroda Prasad v Kailash Bashni, 17 C W N 12b (1912), Ahmad Ali t Najabat Khan, *supra* see Juma Singh t Kamar un nissa 3 A 152 (1880), Bhagwant Singh v Tej Kuar, 8 A 91 (1885), but see also Brojo Behari Mitter v Kedar Nath Mozoomdar, 12 C 580, F B (1896) [dissented from in Chanda t Kunhamed, 14 M 225 (1891), 15 M 261 (1892)], Surrender Nath Pal Chowdhry t Broja Nath Pal Chowdhry, 13 C 352, F B (1886) [followed and applied in Gobind Chunder Nundy v Sri Gobind Chowdhry, 24 C 330 (1896)], Balambhat t Narayanbhat, 25 B 74 (1900), and remarks and cases cited in Caspersz, 371, 372. Balambhat t Narayanbhat, 25 B 74 (1900), *see*, 2 B L R 511 [such previous judgments not *res judicata* when the plaintiff in

the subsequent suit was only a nominal party in the first suit], Raj Narain v Khobdari Rai, 5 C W N clxxvi 724 (1901), Mohammad Kuni Rowthan v Viswannathanyar, 26 M 337 (1902), Balwantrao t Narayanshet, 5 Bom L R 97 (1903), Chajju v Umrao Singh, 22 A 386 (1900), Rajnarain v Khohdavi, 5 C W N 724 (1901), Ghurphekn v Purneshar Dayal, 5 C L J 653 (1897), Gurdeo Singh v Chandrikah Singh, 5 C L J 611 (1907).

(2) Sheikh Khoorshed Hossein v Nuhbeo Fatima 3 C 551 (1887), but see Hikmat Ali v Wahi un nissa 12 A 506, 508 (1899).

(3) Sonit Munshi, 3 Bom L R 64 (1900). See notes to as 10, 11, *ante*, Mahadeo t Vasudeo 5 Bom L R 737 (1903).

(4) Dost Mohammad Khan v Said Begam, 20 A 81 (1897), Saroda Prasad v Kailash Bashni, 17 C W N 128 (1912).

(5) King t Hoare, 13 M & W 491, Brinsmead v Harrison L R 7 C P 517, Kendall t Hamilton, L R 4 App Cas 504, Hammond v Schofield, L R 1 Q B 453 (1891), see Cambefort v Chapman, L R 19 Q B D 229. This rule has been applied and adopted in India as a matter of principle: see Nathu Lal Chowdhry v Shoukeo Lal, 10 B L R 200 (1872) [dissenting from Ramnath Poy Chowdhry v Chunder Sekhur Mohapatra, 4 W P 50 (1846)], Hemendro Coomar Mullick

suit by the son for recovery of the holding (1) An auction purchaser of the right of a Hindu father in joint property cannot raise the plea that a mortgage was made without legal necessity as long as there is still time for the sons to challenge the purchase (2) The obligation of a Hindu son to pay his father's debt is not an obligation which he had incurred jointly with his father, and the creditor's cause of action against the father and the son is not a single cause of action which is exhausted upon a decree being obtained against one of them only. A judgment recovered, against his father only, does not therefore bar a suit against the son (3) Where the plaintiff had sued the defendant's father for a declaration of his right to a share of property, which he claimed as ancestral property governed by Mitakshara law, and had obtained a decree, the defendant's father's plea of a custom of primogeniture being rejected, it was held in a subsequent suit by the plaintiff for partition of the property that the defendant (who had not been a party to the former suit) was barred from pleading a custom of primogeniture (4)

Manager of same—The manager of a joint Hindu family suing or being sued acts in a representative capacity. He can execute decrees on behalf of the joint family and receive payments and give receipts which will be binding on it (5) Where, therefore, the interest of a joint and undivided family being in issue, one member of the family prosecuted or defended a suit, such a decree may afterwards be considered as binding upon all the members of the family, their interest being sufficiently represented in the suit, (6) and the presumption being that he is acting for the family, unless it were made out that he acted and professed to act for himself alone (7) In defining, however, the relation of the managing member to the joint family and estate we are brought into contact with a relationship which has no counterpart in English law, neither the term partner nor principal, nor agent nor even co-parcener will strictly apply (8)

Karnavan—The Karnavan or managing member of a Malabar *tarwad* (family) is in a similar position to a Hindu father under the Mitakshara law. And a decree against him may in some cases bind the members (9) It was,

(1) *Sri Raja Varadaraya v Sankara Venkatadri*, 17 M. L. J. 197 (1907). For Hindu father's power to bind his descendants by a compromise, see *Ram Kuber Pando v I am Das*, 35 A. 428 (1913).

(2) *Bakshi Ram v Laladhara*, 35 A. 353 (1913), distinguishing *Muhammad Musamillah v Mithu Lal*, 33 A. 783 (1911).

(3) *Dharam Singh v Angan Lal*, 21 A. 301 (1899).

(4) *Kali Charan v Sheo Buxh*, 16 C. W. N. 783 (1912).

(5) *Acchaibar Singh v Ram Saruf Sahu*, following *Hari Lal v Munman Hunwar* 34 A. 519 (1912), distinguishing *Ganga Dyal v Vani Puri*, 31 A. 156 (1909).

(6) *Jogendro Deb Roykut v Fumandro Deb*

Roykut, 14 M. I. A. 376, 11 B. L. R. 214, 17 W. R. 104 (1871), see *Gan Savant Bal Savant v Narayan Dhand Savant* 7 B. 467 (1893), *Narayan Gop Habbu v Pandurang Ganu* 5 B. 685 (1891), *Khub Chand v Narain Singh*, 3 A. 812 (1881), *Caspercz*, 358, 359, *Hukm Chand*, 311.

(7) *Gan Savant Bal Savant v Narayan Dhand Savant*, *supra*.

(8) *Muhammed Iskhari v Radha Pami Singh*, 22 A. 317 (1900).

(9) See *Vasudevan v Narayanan*, 6 M. 121 (1882), *Varanaket Narayan Namburi v Varanaket Narayan Namburi* 2 M. 328 (1880) [in which a description is given of the position, powers, and responsibilities of the *karnavan*], *Thenga v Chumma*, 7 M. 413.

however, later held by a Full Bench reviewing the preceding cases that a decree in a suit in which the *karnavan* of a *nambudri illom* or *marumakkattayam tarwad* is, in his representative capacity, joined as a defendant, and which he honestly defends, is binding upon the other members of the family not actually made parties (1)

Shebait—Where a shebait has incurred debts in the service of an idol, for the benefit and preservation of its property, his position is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir,(2) and decrees properly obtained against him in respect of debts so incurred are binding upon succeeding shebaites. For if such debts and the judgments founded upon them were not held to be thus binding on successors, the consequence would be that no shebait would be able to obtain assistance in times of need (3)

Managers Guardians—In the case cited below,(4) the decision of a Forest Settlement Officer, upon an inquiry held under the Boundary Act of 1860, at which inquiry the plaintiff, then a minor, was represented by a manager of his estate appointed under sect 8 of Regulation V of 1804, was held to be *res judicata* in a suit to recover the land. A manager of an estate, who has obtained a certificate under Act XL of 1858, is the guardian of infant co-proprietors, and represents them fully in suits for money advanced in reference to the estate (5). The fact that the plaintiff, a minor, had through his guardian actively intervened in proceedings to set aside a sale of property in which he and his father were jointly interested as members of a Mitakshara family, was held to be no bar to a suit to recover the property, the purchaser having at the sale acquired the interest of the father only (6)

Minor—To maintain the plea of *res judicata* it must appear that the person whose interest it is sought to bind was in some way a party to the suit. An intention that a suit should be for the benefit of a minor is insufficient. The minor must be properly represented in it (7). A decree passed against

(1884), *Haji v Atharaman*, 7 M. 513 (1883).
Kombit Lakshmi, 5 M. 201 (1881), *Ittiachan v Velappan*, 8 M. 484, 17 B. (1885), *Sri Devi v Kelu Eradi*, 10 M. 79 (1886), *Shan Karam Kesavan*, 15 M. 6 (1891), *Kamappan Nambiar v Uklaram Nambiar*, 17 M. 214 (1893).

(1) *Vasudevan v Sankaran*, 20 M. 129 (1896).

(2) See *Hunooman Persaud Panday v Mussamut Babooo Munraj Koonwerree*, 6 M. I. A. 303, 423 (1856).

(3) *Prasuono Kumari Debya v Golah Chand Baboo*, L. R. 2 I. A. 145, 162 (1875), see 20 W. R. 86, for this case in the lower Court, *Juggat Chunder Sem v Kishwanund*, 2 Sel. Rep. 126 (1814), *Assonund Ashrom Dundy v Nursingh Doss Byragee*, 1 Marsh. 485 (1803), *Maharance Shibessource Debia* :

Mothooranath Acharjo, 13 M. I. A. 240, 275 (1869), *Tulsidas Mahanta v Bejoy Hishore Shome*, 6 C. W. N. 178 (1901). As to suits relating to muths, see *Babajirao v Luxmandas*, 5 Bom. L. R. 932 (1903), s. c., 28 B. 215.

(4) *Kamaraja v The Secretary of State for India*, 11 M. 309 (1886).

(5) *Doorga Persad v Kesho Pershad Singh*, L. R. 9 I. A. 27 (1883).

(6) *The Collector of Monghyr v Hardai Narain Shaha*, 5 C. 425 (1879), as to the position of a Hindu son, in a joint Mitakshara family, see *Ramnaram v Bisheshwar Prashad*, 10 A. 411, 413 (1888), *Mussamut Nanoni Babuasin v Modun Mohun*, L. R. 13 Ind. App. 1 (1885), Broughton 69-72.

(7) *Chaudri Ahmad Buksh v Seth Raghu bar Dyal*, 28 I. 1 (1905), 32 I. A. 229.

an infant properly represented is binding upon him like a decree passed against an adult, but it is open to the infant to impeach such decree by a separate suit in cases where his guardian has been guilty of fraud or negligence in allowing the decree to be passed against him (1). It is only where fraud or negligence is proved on the part of the guardian of a minor that the right to bring a suit to set aside a previous decision can be claimed by a minor or his administrator; where no fraud or negligence is proved a previous decision will operate as a bar (2).

Mortgagor—The acts of a mortgagor prior to the mortgage bind his mortgagee, (3) but his acts subsequent to the mortgage do not, so that a suit by the mortgagor subsequent to his mortgage, and not brought at the instance or with the concurrence of the mortgagee, does not bind the latter (4). The proprietor of an estate cannot be said to represent the whole estate after he has mortgaged it (5). A decree obtained by the mortgagees against the original mortgagors the vendors of the appellants, was held to be no evidence against the appellants, purchasers of the interests of the mortgagors, if they were no parties to that decree and if the transfer to them was before the institution of the suit in which that decree was passed, and the purchasers were in no way bound by the result of that suit (6). Where a mortgagor obtained a decree for redemption, which was not executed, and subsequently sold the equity of redemption to the plaintiff, who sued the mortgagee for redemption, it was held that the suit was not barred by the former decree, as the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee had not been terminated, and the right to redeem was inseparable from the relation as long as it existed (7).

Lessor and Lessee—A lessee claims under his lessor, but a lessor does not claim under his lessee, so that a decision in a suit by the lessee to eject a stranger does not bar a suit by the lessor against the same person with the same object (8). So also decrees obtained against the registered tenants of a

(1) Cursandas Natha v Ladkarahu, 19 B 571, at p. 576 (1895), and see Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v Ramnandan Dobey, 22 C 8 (1894).

(2) Hanmantapa v Jivabai, 24 B 517 (1900).

(3) Radhamadhab Halder v Monohur Mookerji, L. R. 15 I A 97, 15 C 756 (1888).

(4) Bonomaly Nag v Koylash Chunder Dey, 4 C 692 (1878), Dooma Sahoo v Joonarain Lal, 12 W. R. 362 (1869), Sitaram v Amir Begum, 8 A 324 (1886), Krishnaji Lakshman Rajvadi v Sitaram Marwarav Jalhi, 5 B 496 (1880), Soshi Bhusun Guha v Gogan Chunder Shaha, 22 C 371 (1894).

A purchaser from a mortgagor is in the same position, whether he purchases *pendente lite*, Radhamadhab Halder v Monohur Mookerji *supra*, or in execution of a decree or otherwise. Poresh Nath Mookerjee v Anath Nath

Deb, 9 C 265 (1882).

(5) Soshi Bhusun Guha v Gogan Chunder Shaha, 22 C 364 (1894), Seshappaya v Venkatsamanna, 33 M. 459 (1910).

(6) Basudeb Siro v Brojo Mohan Jana, 7 C W N 54 (1902).

(7) Karuthasami v Jaganatha, 8 M. 478 (1885), see Sami Achari v Somasandram, 6 M 119 (1882), Roy Dinkur Doyal v Shew Golam Singh, 22 W. R. 172 (1874), but see *contra*, Anrudh Singh v Sheo Prasad, 4 A

C 780 (1887).

tenure were held inadmissible in evidence against the real owner of the tenure, who was not a party to the suits obtained, and who did not claim through the parties against whom the decrees were passed (1) And a suit by a lessor against a *rayat* to set aside a pottah is not barred by the fact that the pottah has been declared genuine in a suit by the plaintiff's *teccadar* against the same defendant (2) Where two persons each claim title to land in the possession of a tenant and one of them sues the tenant for rent in a competent Court, and the other intervenes and claims title, and the issue is contested and finally decided that the tenant should pay his rent to one of them, the title cannot be contested in a subsequent suit between the two claimants (3) A decree obtained in a previous suit for rent by an *iyadar* does not operate against the tenant as *res judicata* on the question whether the relation of land lord and tenant exist in a subsequent suit for rent brought by the superior landlord (4) As to suits for the recovery of cesses (5) and rents, see cases also below (6) On dismissal of a suit for rent on denial of relationship of landlord and tenant, the plaintiff may sue again for ejectment, (7) though where the tenant sets up his own title to the land, the decision on the issue of title may be *res judicata* (8)

Partition—The right to enforce it is a legal incident of a joint tenancy, and as long as such tenancy subsists so long may any of the joint tenants apply to Court for partition (9)

Different titles—The words "*litigating under the same title*" do not refer to the identity of the ground of action, but mean that the question must have been raised and decided in the same right that is to say, in the right of the parties to the second suit and not in the right of any other person Thus if one is made defendant in an official capacity, the judgment will not bind him personally, and *vice versa* A plaintiff suing as next heir to his uncle was held not barred by a decision against his father, inasmuch as he claimed under a title not derived from his father (10) A suit against an elder brother for main tenance was held not to be barred by a previous order made upon other grounds dismissing a claim for maintenance against the father The adjudication in the previous suit was not between the brothers, but between the plaintiff

(1) Ram Narain Rai v Ram Coomar Chunder Poddar, 11 C 562 (1885)

(2) Shankh Wahid Ali v Nauth Tooraho, 24 W R 128 (1875)

(3) Gobind Chunder Koondou v Taruck Chundra Bose, 3 C 145 (1877)

(4) Bolaram Mondul v Kartick Chunder Roy Chowdhuri, 4 C W N 161 (1899)

(5) Picketta v Rameswar Mahia, 28 C 109 (1900)

(6) Hurry Behari Bhagat v Purgun Ahir, 19 C 656 (1890), Bukahi v Nizamud Din 20 C 507 (1892), Nil Madhub Sarkar v Brojo Nath Singha 21 C 236 (1893), Maharaja Totindra Mohun Tagore v Shumbhu Chunder

Bhuttacharjee, 4 C W N 43 (1897), Baloram Mondul v Kartick Chunder Roy Chowdhuri, 4 C W N 161 (1899)

(7) Khater Mistri v Sadruddin Khan 34 C 922 (1907)

(8) Sahadeb Dhal v Ram Rudra Haldar, 10 C W N 820 (1906)

(9) Bisheshwar Das v Ram Prasad, 28 A 637 (1906), and see Madon Mohun Mondul v Barkanta Nath Mondul 10 C W N 639 (1906), Monsharam v Ganesh 17 C W N 521 (1912)

(10) Ru ler Narain Singh v Rup Kaur 1 A 734 (1878)

and his father, and was based upon a different sort of claim (1) A suit by persons representing the public is not barred by a decision in a previous suit by the same plaintiff in their individual and private capacity (2) In a previous suit in which plaintiff had been a party it had been attempted to assert plaintiff's title to a piece of land occupied by the defendants by proving that they held the same by virtue of an alleged specific lease The Court had held that no such lease had been executed Plaintiff now claimed the land as belonging to his *detasan*, and sued to recover it on the strength of his title, he also set up the alleged lease once more *Held*, that though the question of the validity of the lease was *res judicata*, plaintiff was at liberty to sue also on the strength of his title, independently of the lease, and he was not estopped from so suing by the fact that the former suit had been based upon the lease alone (3) A claim on a *Lanam* is a claim arising *ex contractu*, while a claim on title against a trespasser is founded on tort (4)

Miscellaneous—The purchaser of land at a sale by the Government for the recovery of arrears of revenue under the sale laws, buys free of encumbrances, and is therefore not bound by the decision in a suit brought by or against the former owner (5) It has been held in Madras that a priest of a temple, as the representative of a former priest, is bound by a decree in a suit brought by the latter to establish his right to damages for the invasion of his rights as priest (6) The co-sharer of an estate cannot be bound by a decision in a suit for rent brought by another co-sharer against a tenant (7) Where all the conditions prescribed by sect 11 exist, the fact that in the first suit the defendant was an execution creditor and in the second he is a purchaser at an execution sale makes no difference as to the second suit being *res judicata* A privity exists between an execution creditor and a purchaser at a Court sale, the latter representing the former in so far as he had a right to bring the property to sale in execution of his decree (8) As to a suit by the *Lanam* of a *mitta*, (9) by one claiming as the *dharma-karta* of a *detasthanam*, (10) and by one of five trustees in whom the *uraima* right over a *detasan* was vested, (11) see the cases noted below A judgment against one holder of service *atan* lands is *res judicata* as regards a succeeding holder (12) A purchaser of land cannot be estopped by a judgment in a suit against his vendors commenced after the purchase (13)

(1) Ahmad Hossein Khan v Nihaluddin Khan 9 C. 945, 948 (1883)

(2) Lakshmandas v Jugalkishore 22 B 216 (1896)

(3) Zamorin of Calcut v Narayanan Mussa, 22 M 323 (1899)

(4) Parambath v Puthengathil, 28 M 406 (1905)

(5) Narain Chunder Chowdhry v Tayler, 3 C L R 151 (1878)

(6) Archakam Srinivasa Dikshatulu v Udyagry Anantha Charlu 3 M. H. O. R. 349 (1899)

18 M 13 (1894)

(9) Venkayya v Suramma 12 M 235 (1889), see Babaji v Nana 1 B 535 (1876)

(10) Ramalingam v Thirugnana, 12 M 312 (1889)

(11) Madhavan v Keshavan, 11 M. 191 (1887)

(12) Radhabai v Anantav, 19 B 198 (1885)

(13) Joy Chandra Banerjee v Sreenath Chatterjee, 32 C 357 (1904)

Explanation VI—This *Explanation* provides that where persons litigate *bona fide* in respect of a public or private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purpose of the section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating (1). It has been held that the Courts should be careful in their application of this *Explanation*, which should not be applied to any case which does not come within its very wording, (2) and that it only applies to cases where several different persons claim an easement or other right under one common title, as for instance, where the inhabitants of a village claim by custom a right of pasturage over the same tract of land, or to take water from the same spring or well (3). And therefore, it does not apply to a prescriptive right claimed by an individual in respect of his own house and premises (4). This *Explanation* does not refer to the case of a defendant at all but only to the case of a plaintiff (5). But it is not in terms so limited. One party having a right in common with others is not at liberty or authorized to sue in his own name to establish the right of the others except by their authority. This *Explanation* must therefore be read with the provisions of rule 3, *post*, and the principles to be found in that rule (6). A right to relief can be said to be claimed "in common" only as between parties who would be benefited by such relief if granted and who have such an interest in the relief claimed that they could join as co plaintiffs (7). The inclusion of *public rights* in the amended *Explanation* is to give due effect to suits relating to public nuisances, as to which see the new sect 91, *post*.

The Court which decided such former suit must have been a Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised.—In order to make an adjudication by one Court final and conclusive in another Court the first Court must have been possessed of a jurisdiction (8) sufficient to try the matter

(1) Expl VI.

(2) *Ram Narain v Bisheshwar Prasad*, 10 A 411, 412 (1888) *per* Edge, C.J.

(3) *Kalishunker Doss v Gopal Chunder Dutt*, 6 C 49 (1880), as to suits involving claims for land, see *Madhavan v Keshavan* 11 M 191 (1887), *Kunnathurillath Vasudevan Nambudri v Narayanan Nambudri* 6 M 121 (1882), *Varanakot Narayanan Namburi v Varanakot Narayanan Namburi* 2 M 328 (1880), see as to suits against co sharers *Hazir Gazir v Sonamonce Dossee* 6 C 31 (1880), *Ram Narain v Bisheshwar Prasad* 10 A 411 (1888), and as to decrees against *Karnavans*, *Sri Devi v Kelu Pradh*, 10 M 70 (1886), *Elayachandathal Kombi Achen v Kenatumkora Lakshmi Amma* 6 M 201 (1881), and *Madras cases* cited *supra*, and as to a suit for possession of share in the property of a Mahomedan family, *Channu*

Kunhamed, 14 M 324 (1891), referred to in *Latchanant v Suravayya* 18 M 164 (1894) As to representative suit against sect of worshippers, see *Sadagopa Chariar v Rama Rao* 30 M 185 (1907).

(4) *Lakshmishankar v Vishnuram* 24, B 77, 85 (1899), *Kalishunker Doss v Gopal Chunder Dutt*, 6 C. 49 (1880).

(5) *Kunnathurillath Vasudevan Nambudri v Narayanan Nambudri*, 6 M. 121, 126 127 (1882), *per* Innes J., *Laxmishankar v Vishnuram*, 1 B L R 534 (1899).

(6) *Thanakoti v Munappa* 8 M 496, 499 (1885) but see also remarks in *Varanakot Narayanan Namburi v Varanakot Narayanan Namburi* 2 M 328 332 (1880), *Sri Devi v Kelu Eradh*, 10 M 79, 82 (1886).

(7) *Somasundara v Kulandaivelu* 28 M 457 (1904).

(8) As to the meaning and nature of juris

which arise in the subsequent suit. In other words a decision to be *res judicata* must have been passed by a Court having jurisdiction not only over the suit in which it was passed but also over the subsequent suit in which it is pleaded as a *res judicata*. And since according to the judicial system of British India, there are, throughout the country, Courts of different grades having jurisdiction in suits of different amounts in certain prescribed local areas the Courts must be of concurrent jurisdiction as regards both pecuniary (1) limit and subject-matter of the suit before the decision of one can be *res judicata* as to matter coming before the other Court. So where a previous suit was cognizable by the Munsif and was tried and determined by him it was held that the judgment in the former suit was no bar as *res judicata* to the trial of a subsequent suit which was cognizable only by the Subordinate Judge and was tried by him (2). And it has been held that neither the decision of a Revenue Court as between the plaintiff and third parties (whose rights had been set up by the defendants in that suit) (3) nor the decision of a Prolate Court can operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent title-suit (4).

In the case of *Misir Raghol ardiar v. Rajah Sheo Baksh Singh*, (5) the Privy Council said —“*Mussumat Edun v. Mussumat Bechun* (6) may be referred to as the leading case on this subject. In that case the Chief Justice, Sir Barnes Peacock, held that the two Courts must be Courts of concurrent jurisdiction and in order to make the decision of one Court final and conclusive in another Court, it must be a decision of a Court which would have had jurisdiction over the matter in the subsequent suit in which the first decision is given in evidence as conclusive (7). As to what is a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, it is material to notice that there is in India a great number of Courts, that one main feature in the Acts constituting them is that they are of various grades with different pecuniary limits of jurisdiction, and that by the Code of Procedure a suit must be instituted in the Court of the

diction, see notes to s. 9, *ante* in which the subject is fully discussed. *Shilo Raut v. Baban Raut*, 35 C. 353 (1908).

(1) See *Geirya Chettiar v. Sabhapathy Mudahar*, 29 M. 65 (1905).

(2) *Hari Das Acharjee Chowdhury v. Barola Kishore Acharjee Chowdhury*, 4 C. W. N. 87 (1899), and see *Lakshmishankar v. Vishnuram*, 24 B. 77, 85 (1899), and as to subsequent suit non triable by rent Court, *Ashraf u nissa v. Ali Ahmad* 26 A. 601 (1904), *Makesh Prasad v. Ranjor Singh*, 27 A. 163 (1904), and as to *talukdars* settlement officer *Mahubhai v. Sursang* 30 B. 220 (1905).

(3) *Jamangal v. Bed Saran*, 33 A. 493 (1911).

(4) *Lalit v. Radharaman* 13 C. L. J. 547 (1911). 15 C. W. N. 1021.

(5) L. R. 9 I. A. 197, 203, 204 (1882), 9 C. 439. 12 C. L. R. 520. See *Sheikh Hassan v. Rau Kumar Singh* 16 A. 183 (1891), *Colul*

Mandar v. Padmanand Singh, 6 C. W. N. 825, P. C. (1902), foll. in *Gomti Kunwar v. Gudri* 25 A. 138 (1902).

(6) 8 W. R. 175 (1867), the rule in this case, which is fully affirmed by the Privy Council in the decision above cited, and in *Ran Bahadur Singh v. Luchu Koer*, 11 C. 301, L. R. 12 I. A. 23 (1884), followed in *Bharan Lal Chowdhry v. Sarat Chunder*

332 *et seq.*, and see *Hulim Chaml v. Chaml* 20, 283 391, *Hababhat v. Naharhat* 13 B. 224 (1888), *Ganapati Chattri* 12 M. 223 (1889), *Vythilinga Padayachu v. Vythilinga Mudah*, 16 M. 111 (1891).

Regulations, C. 11.

lowest grade competent to try it. For instance, in Bengal, by the Bengal Civil Court Act, No VI of 1871, the jurisdiction of a Munsif extends only to original suits in which the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute does not exceed Rs 1000. The qualifications of a Munsif and the authority of his judgment would not be the same as those of a District or of a Subordinate Judge, who have jurisdiction in civil suits without any limit of amount. In their Lordships' opinion, it would not be proper that the decision of a Munsif upon (for instance) the validity of a will, or of an adoption in a suit for a small portion of the property affected by it should be conclusive in a suit before a District Judge or in the High Court for property of a large amount, the title to which might depend upon the will or the adoption. Other similar cases are mentioned in the judgment of the Chief Justice. It is true that there is an appeal from the Munsif's decision, but that upon the facts would be to the District Court, and not to the High Court. And that the decision should be conclusive would be still more improper as regards many other of the various Courts in India, the qualifications of whose Judges differ greatly. By taking concurrent jurisdiction to mean *concurrent as regards the pecuniary limit as well as the subject-matter*, this evil or inconvenience is avoided, and although it may be desirable to put an end to litigation, the inefficiency of many of the Indian Courts makes it advisable not to be too stringent in preventing a litigant from proving the truth of his case" (1). And the Council, in a later portion of the judgment, say, "that by Court of competent jurisdiction, Act X of 1877 means a Court which has jurisdiction over the matter in the subsequent suit in which the decision is used as conclusive, or, in other words, a Court of concurrent jurisdiction". The rule may be stated to be that the judgment in the previously decided suit must have been delivered either by a Court of exclusive or of concurrent jurisdiction upon a matter falling within such jurisdiction, and where the jurisdiction is concurrent the Court which adjudicated on the previously decided suit must have been such a Court as would have been competent to adjudicate upon the later suit. The question of whether any particular judgment is passed in the exercise of exclusive or concurrent or limited jurisdiction must depend upon the terms of the law upon which the judgment relies for its authority. It has been held that the bar of *res judicata* arises where the Court deciding the first suit was competent to try the same, and its inability to entertain it arose not from incompetence, but from the existence of another Court with a preferential jurisdiction (2).

(1) The Privy Council in *Pun Bahadur Singh v. Luchu Koer*, *supra* referring to the above remarks further say — "If this construction of the law were not adopted the lowest Court in India might determine finally, and without appeal to the High Court the title to the greatest estate in the Indian Empire. *Ramdyal v. Jankidas* 2 Bom L R 415 (1900) the extent of the jurisdiction depends on that of the Court in which the first suit was instituted at the time it was

brought. In *Panga v. Unnikatti* 24 M 375 (1900) the suit was held to be *res judicata* for though brought in the Subordinate Judge's Court it ought, if rightly valued, to have been brought in the Munsif's Court in which the previous decision had been given. *Ramdyal v. Jankidas* 24 B 456 (1900).

(2) *Ghulappa v. Raghvenra* 6 Bom I R 77 (1901) s c 28 B 339.

It has also been held that 'competent to try' means 'competent to try with conclusive effect' (1) and that concurrence of jurisdiction must exist not only as to the original Court but also as to the appellate tribunals and their powers in the respective suits (2). The Calcutta High Court, and later decisions in the Madras High Court, have, however, dissented from this view, holding that there was nothing in sect. 12 of the last Code to indicate that the judgments in two suits must be open to appeal in the same way, in order that the decision upon any issue in the earlier suit can bar the trial of the same issue in the later one. So it was held that the decision of an issue in a suit in which no second appeal lies to the High Court bars the trial of the same issue in a subsequent suit in which such second appeal is allowed (3). And see now the new Explanation II which is intended to affirm the view that the competence of the jurisdiction of a Court does not depend on the right of appeal from its decision. The word "competent" is further to be considered with reference to the time when the suit is brought, and the jurisdiction of the Court at that period. The words of the section must be taken to mean competent to try the subsequent suit if it had been brought at the same time that the former suit was brought (4). A plaintiff cannot, however, evade the provisions of the Code by joining several causes of action against the same defendant in the subsequent suit and instituting it in a Court of superior jurisdiction (5). In a recent case in the Bombay High Court, where the defendant in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights pleaded *res judicata* on the ground that plaintiff had filed a previous suit, though this had been dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the leave necessary under clause 12 of the Letters Patent had not first been obtained, it was held on second appeal that the former Court had not been "competent to try" and that there was no *res judicata* (6).

The prevailing view as to the effect of an appealable decision is that it constitutes *res judicata* until appealed against, when it ceases to be such, and does not so operate again unless it is adopted by, and thus becomes the decision of, the Appellate Court (7). Where there were decrees in cross suits on

(1) *Bholabhai v Adesang*, 9 B 75 (1884), *Bahabhat v Narharbhat*, 13 B 224, 228 (1888), *Govind v Dhondbarav*, 15 B 101 (1890), *Anusuyabai v Sakharam Panlurang* 7 B 464 (1883), *Vythilinga Padayachi v Vythilinga Mudali*, 15 M 111, 118 (1891), see also *Bhayanishankar v Naranshankar*, 23 B 536, 538 (1899), but see also *N W F* cases cited in *Hukm Chand, op cit* 391, 395, and *Shub Charan Lal v Raghu Nath* 17 A 174, 185, 186 (1895).

(2) *Vythilinga Padayachi v Vythilinga Mudali, supra*, 118, *Srirangachariar v Ramasami Ayyangar*, 18 M 180 (1894).

(3) *Rai Churn Ghose v Kumul Mishan Dutt Chowdhury* 2 C. W. N. 297 (1904); s. c., 25 C. 571, followed in *Bhugwanulshi Chowdhram v Forbes* 28 C. 78 (1900), s. c., 5 C. W. N. 483, *Ahmed v Moidin*, 24 M 414

(1901), following *Subbammal v Huddleston*, 17 M 273 (1891), in, however, the recent F. B. decision *Aranasi Gounden v Nachammal*, 29 M. (1905), these last two cases were overruled, it being held there was no *res judicata*, see also *David v Grish Chunder Guha* 9 C. 183 (1882).

(4) *Bhugwanulshi Chowdhram v Forbes* 28 C. 78 (1900).

(5) *Abdul Kadir v Doolanbibi*, 37 B 563 (1913).

(7) See *Advaru v Nilvaru*, 6 B 110 (1881) [affirmed in *Balkishan v Kishan Lal*, 11 A

the same facts, and an appeal against one decree only, it was held that the decree unappealed was no bar to the decision of the appeal (1) In a suit brought in the Agency Court at Kattiawar, relating to the villages in Kattiawar, the Court decided that there existed between the parties a custom of *metap* (i.e., right to an extra share by the senior member) A second suit was subsequently brought in a British Court as regards the villages belonging to the parties situate in the British territories, wherein plaintiffs alleged that the custom of *metap* did not exist in their family It was contended, on behalf of the defendant, that the question was *res judicata*, on the ground that the test of competency to try the subsequent suit was whether the suit was one which in respect of its subject matter and the valuation thereof could have been tried by the Agency Court, and that its exclusion on territorial grounds had not to be taken into account The High Court declined to accept the contention as not being consistent with the express terms of sect 11 of the Code (2) There can be no *res judicata* unless the Judge who made the decree in the previous suit had jurisdiction to try and decide, not only the particular matter in issue, but also the subsequent suit itself, in which the issue is subsequently raised (3)

The under mentioned cases and authorities may be consulted as to the competency of special Courts, and of Courts in special cases, Revenue Courts, (4)

148 (1888), where the effect of judgments in pending suits is considered], and Gunga bishen Bhugut v Ragoonath Ojha 7 C 321 (1881) Rajah Mohond Narain Deo v Jonardan Dey, 15 W R 208 (1871) *Hukm Chand op cit* 144 *et seq* Caspersz *op cit* 344 *et seq* 397, 440, Emamooddeen Sowdaghur v Shakh Futeh Ali, 3 C L R 447 (1878) As to matters not entertained by an Appellate Court see Mussamut Imaman v Fazul Karim, 7 N W P 201 (1875), Gunga bishen Bhugut v Ragoonath Ojha *supra*, Chinmoya Mudali v Venkatachella Pillai, 3 M H C R 300 (1867), Churpbehm v Purneshwar Dayal 5 C L J 653 (1907) In Narayanan v Kannamma, 28 M 338 (1904) it was held that the H C did adopt the findings

(1) Panchanada v Vartunatha 29 W 333 (1905)

(2) Prithisingji Umedsingji 6 Bom L R 98 (1903), doubting Bahabhat v Narhorbhat, 13 B 224 (1888) See these cases referred to, post, "Foreign Judgments" In La' smishankar v Vishnuram, 24 B 77, s c, 1 Bom. L P 531 (1899), it was held that there was no *res judicata* because the Baroda Court had no jurisdiction over the defendants

(3) Chokul v Pudmanand, 4 Bom L R 791 (1902), s c 29 C 70 in which the P C

point out that in this respect a 13 went beyond the Duchess of Kingston's case

(4) Hurri Shanker Mookerjee v Muktararam Patro, 15 B L R 238 (1875), Gangaraju v Kondreddiswami, 17 M 106 (1893), Hari Charan Singh v Har Shankar Singh, 18 A 464 (1894), 18 A 59 (1895), Rangayya Appa Rao v Ratnam, 20 M 392 (1897), Kalliani v Dassu Pande, 20 A 520 (1898), Field, Er 304 305, Caspersz, *op cit* 338-340, Jafar Khan v Choham Muhammad 25 A 282 (1903), Nadar v Bani Mal 24 A 153 (1901), Viranjan Rao v Abdul Rahman, 1 A L J 123 (1904), Dharani Kanta Lahiri v Caber Ali Khan 30 C 339 (1903), Colul Mendar v Pudmanand Singh 6 C W N 825 (1902), Gomti Kunwar v Guari 25 A 138 (1902), Vedachala v Boomeappa 28 M 60 (1903), as to the decision of the special Judge under the Bengal Tenancy Act, ib, v, Shewbarat Koer v Nirpal Roy, 16 C 597 (1886), Lala Kirat Narain v Palukdhari Pandey, 17 C 326 (1889), and of Revenue Officer as to entries in Record of Rights Gokhul Sahu v Jodu Nundun Roy, 17 C 721 (1890), Pandit Sardar v Meagan Virdha, 21 C 378 (1893), Paghbar Dyal v Banke Lal 22 A 182 (1900) As to proceedings of a Settlement Officer, see The Secretary of State for India in Council v Kajimuddv, 23 C 257 (1895)

the same facts, and an appeal against one decree only, it was held that the decree unappealed was no bar to the decision of the appeal (1) In a suit brought in the Agency Court at Kattiawar, relating to the villages in Kattiawar, the Court decided that there existed between the parties a custom of *metap* (i.e., right to an extra share by the senior member) A second suit was subsequently brought in a British Court as regards the villages belonging to the parties situate in the British territories, wherein plaintiffs alleged that the custom of *metap* did not exist in their family It was contended, on behalf of the defendant, that the question was *res judicata*, on the ground that the test of competency to try the subsequent suit was whether the suit was one which in respect of its subject matter and the valuation thereof could have been tried by the Agency Court, and that its exclusion on territorial grounds had not to be taken into account The High Court declined to accept the contention, as not being consistent with the express terms of sect 11 of the Code (2) There can be no *res judicata* unless the Judge who made the decree in the previous suit had jurisdiction to try and decide, not only the particular matter in issue, but also the subsequent suit itself, in which the issue is subsequently raised (3)

The under mentioned cases and authorities may be consulted as to the competency of special Courts, and of Courts in special cases, Revenue Courts; (4)

148 (1888), where the effect of judgments in pending suits is considered], and Gungabishen Bhugut v Ragoonath Ojha, 7 C 381 (1881) Rajah Mokond Narain Deo v Jonardan Dey, 15 W R 208 (1871), Hukm Chand, *op cit* 144 *et seq* Caspersz, *op cit* 344 *et seq* 397, 440, Emamooddeen Sowdaghur v Shaikh Futeh Ali, 3 C L R 447 (1878) As to matters not entertained by an Appellate Court, see Mussamut Imaman v Fazul Karim, 7 N W P 251 (1875), Gungabishen Bhugut v Ragoonath Ojha, *supra*, Chinniya Mudali v Venkatachella Pillai, 3 M H C R 320 (1867), Ghurphekm v Purneshwar Dayal 5 C L J 653 (1907) In Narayanan v Kannamma, 28 M 338 (1904) it was held that the H C did adopt the findings

(1) Pancharada v Varthunatha, 29 M 333 (1905)

(2) Prithesingji v Umedsingji, 6 Bom L R 93 (1903), doubting Bahabhat v Narharbhat, 13 B 224 (1888) See these cases referred to, *post*, "Foreign Judgment." In Lakshmishankar v Vishnuram, 24 B 77, s.c., 1 Bom L R 534 (1899), it was held that there was no *res judicata* because the Baroda Court had no jurisdiction over the defendants

(3) Gokul v Padmanand, 4 Bom L R 794 (1902), s.c., 29 C 707, in which the P C

point out that in this respect s. 13 went beyond the Duchess of Kingston's case

(4) Hurri Sunkar Mookerjee v Mukhtaram Patro, 15 B L R 238 (1875), Gangaraju v Kondireddeswami, 17 M 106 (1893), Hari Charan Singh v Har Shankar Singh, 16 A 464 (1894), 18 A 59 (1895), Rangayya Appa Rau v Ratnam, 20 M 392 (1897), Kallan Dassu Pande, 20 A 520 (1898), Field, Ev 304, 305, Caspersz, *op cit* 338-340, Jafar Khan v Gholam Muhammad, 25 A 282 (1903), Niadar v Banu Mal, 24 A 153 (1901), Niranjan Rao v Abdul Rahman, 1 A L J 122 (1904), Dharani Kanta Lahiri v Gaber Ali Khan, 30 C 339 (1903), Gokul Mendar v Padmanand Singh, 6 C W N 825 (1902), Gomti Kunwar v Guari, 25 A 138 (1902), Vedachala v Boomeappa, 28 M 65 (1903), as to the decision of the special Judge under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1b, v. Shewbarat Koer v Nirpal Roy, 16 C 597 (1886), Lala Krut Narain v Palukdhari Pandey, 17 C 326 (1889), and of Revenue Officer as to entries in Record of Rights Gokul Sahu v Jodu Nundun Roy, 17 C 721 (1890), Pandit Sardar v Meajan Mirdha, 21 C 378 (1893), Raghubar Dyal v Banke Lal, 22 A 182 (1900) As to proceedings of a Settlement Officer, see The Secretary of State for India in Council v Rajmuddy, 23 C 257 (1895)

such as the Court making it could not alter (except on review) on the application of either party or reconsider of its own motion. Though this Explanation has been now omitted the word "final" presumably has still the same meaning. A decision liable to appeal may be final within the meaning of this section until the appeal is made (1). It is not however, necessary, in order to justify a plea of *res judicata*, to show that the first case was fully entered into and discussed, either by oral or written testimony, where no question was raised but all the parties interested declared themselves satisfied on the point; (2) and a final decree is conclusive, notwithstanding it may have proceeded upon an erroneous view of the law (3). It, however, generally speaking, follows from the rule which requires a hearing and final decision, that a finding which is inconclusive, or which is based upon technical points and which dismisses a suit for any reason not on the merits, will not operate as a bar, as where a demurrer was allowed, (4) or a suit is dismissed for misjoinder and failure to pay court fees, (5) or improper valuation, (6) or because the permission of Government was not previously obtained; (7) or because of failure to give security for costs, (8) or on the ground of jurisdiction, (9) or non joinder of all proper parties, (10) or as against a party whose name was ordered to be expunged from the record in a former suit; (11) or where a suit has been dismissed for failure to pay the costs of service of summons on the defendants, (12) or where a suit to remove an attachment is dismissed on the ground that the attachment has already been removed, (13) or where a suit has been dismissed on the ground that it was premature, (14) or wrongly framed (15). In a suit to recover principal and interest due on a bond executed

(1) See *Nilvaru v Nivaru*, 6 B 110 (1891), *Balkishan v Krishan Lal*, 11 A 146 (1898), as to *ex parte* decree, see *Modhusudun v Brao*, 10 C 300 (1889). But see *Kanakayya v Janardhana Paddi*, F B, 36 M 439 (1910) a final decree is one which is neither under appeal nor liable to be set aside or modified on appeal.

(2) *Dundas v Waddell*, L. R. 5 Ap Ca. 265

(3) *Gouri Koer v Audh Koer*, 10 C 1087 (1881)

(4) *Lakshman Dada Naik v Ramchandra Dada Naik*, 5 B 48 (1880), L. R. 7 I A 181, 7 C L. R. 320, see *Broughton, op cit* 94, 99

(5) *Muhammad Sahm v Nabian Bibi*, L. R. 8 A. 282 (1886), *Fatteh Singh v Musamat Luchmee Koer*, 21 W R 105 (1873)

(6) *Dullabh Jogi v Narayan Lakhu* 4 H H C R., A. C., 110 (1866), see also *Rajen lro*

492 (1882), see r 173

(9) *Baban Mayasah v Nagu Shrasucha* 2 B 10 (1879), *Mahabeer Singh v Rambhajan Sab*, 10 C. 515 (1889), *Bhukhandas Vajbhukhandas v Lallubhai Kashidas*, 17 B 562 (1892), *Ram Govind Jha v Mungur Ram Chowdhry*, 13 C L. R. 83 (1883), *Ganesh Koer v Umdat un nissa Begum*, 6 N W P 77 (1874), *Grish Chandra Moolerjee v Ramessuree Daboo*, 22 W R 308 (1874)

(10) *Pursun Gopal Pal v Poornanund Mullick*, 21 W R 272 (1874)

(11) *Kaleo Coomar Dutt Roy v Pranashoreo Chowdhram* 18 W R 29 (1872)

(12) *Bessassur Bhugut v Murli Sahu*, 9 C 163 (1882)

(13) *Kashunath Moraheth v Ramchandra Gopinath*, 7 B 408 (1883)

(14) *...*

(15) *...*

(16) *...*

Tulja, 3 B 223 (1879)

(8) *Rangrav Ravji v Sidhu Mahomed* 6 B

(15) *Deohari Singh v Lala Sowsuram Lal*, 3 C L. R. 395

by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff's father (deceased), it appeared that the plaintiff had previously brought a similar suit, which was dismissed for the reason that the plaintiff produced no succession certificate: it was held that the previous proceedings did not bar the present suit (1). And generally a case summarily dismissed for a technical defect or irregularity of any kind cannot operate as a *res judicata* (2). Where a suit was dismissed, having regard to sect 12 of Act I of 1877, on the ground that the plaintiffs had omitted to sue for possession, the decision was held no bar under sect 43 (corresponding with O II r 2 of the present Code) to a suit for possession and to have a deed declared void (3). In a recent case in the Allahabad High Court, two suits had been instituted by the plaintiff on the same day and in the same Court, he had made A defendant to one and A and S defendants to the other, and both suits had been decided by a single judgment, followed by separate decrees. In the first suit A appealed and in the other S only. During the pendency of A's appeal, S died and his appeal abated and the judgment in that suit became final. Held that the hearing of A's separate appeal was barred (4). Where a party agreed to be bound by the oath of certain persons, and an issue was thus decided, this was held not to be an adjudication which would have the effect of an estoppel in subsequent proceedings (5). No finding upon a question not directly put in issue, and no opinion incidentally expressed, can be regarded as a final judgment (6). The dismissal of a suit under sect 102 of the former Code (corresponding with O IX r 8) for non appearance was not intended to operate in favour of the defendant as *res judicata*. It imposes, however, when read with sect 103 of the former Code (corresponding with O IX r 9), a certain disability on the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed. He is thereby precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action (7). Where a plaintiff appeared in a suit and went into evidence, but before the evidence was closed made default and the case was dismissed, there was held to be a bar (8). There is no such thing known to the law as constructive estoppel, and if there were it would not satisfy the require-

(1) *Petaperumala Chetti v Murugandi Servaigaran*, 18 M. 466 (1895).

(2) *Ramnath Rai Chowdhari v Bhagbat Mohapatro*, W. R., Act X, 140 (1865), *Shokhee Dewa v Medhee Mundul*, 9 W. R. 327 (1868), approved in *Ramreddi v Subbareddi*, 12 M. 500 (1889), see also *Pogha Mahtoon v Gooroo Baboo Cunesch Ram*, 24 W. R. 114 (1875) [The striking off a suit on the day of hearing, because neither plaintiff nor defendant is present, does not bar the plaintiff from suing again.]

(3) *Ram Sewak Singh v Nalched Singh*, 4 A. 261 (1882).

(4) *Anant Das v Udar Bhan*, 35 A. 187 (1913).

(5) *Keshava Tharagan v Rudran Namudra*, 5 M. 259 (1882), dissented from in *Sanyasi Banitya v Artaswari*, 24 M. L. J.

321 (1913).

(6) *Shih Nath Chatterjee v Nubolissen Chatterjee*, 21 W. R. 189 (1874), *Ghela Ichharan v Sankalchand Jetha*, 18 B. 597 (1893), see *Shih Charan Lal v Raghu Nath*, 17 A. 175 (1895).

(7) *Chand Kour v Partab Singh*, 16 C. 98, L. R. 15 I. A. 156 (1888), see also *Shankar Baksh v Daya Shanker*, 15 C. 422, L. R. 15 I. A. 66 (1887), *Ramchandra Jivaji Tilve v Khatal Mahomed Gori*, 10 B. 28 (1852), *Gohrud Chunder Addya v Afzul Rabbani*, 9 C. 426 (1882), *Ramchandra v Bhikibai*, 6 B. 177, *Rungray Pavji v Sidhi Mahomed*, 6 B. 182, 486 (1882), *Ram Chandra v Narringha charya*, 24 B. 251, 253 (1899).

(8) *Roma Nath Das v Mohesh Chander Pal*, 9 C. W. N. 679 (1900).

ments of sect 11 Where in a former suit between the same parties in which the same claim upon title was made a decree dismissed the suit but the judgment in the former suit stated that it was left open to the plaintiff to sue again and that no matters affecting the rights of the parties were decided between them it was held that the prior decree was not a final decision within the meaning of the Code and the defence of *res judicata* was not maintained (1) Where, though there has been a decision on other points, the matter of the second suit has literally not been determined in the previous suit there can be as to it no *res judicata* (2) The section does not apply where the former suit is withdrawn (3) It has already been remarked that upon appeal a matter ceases to be *res judicata* When a matter although decided by the Court of first instance or by the lower Appellate Court is not decided by the last Court of Appeal it has not been heard and finally decided The fact of an appeal being in point of form dismissed is not conclusive as to every point decided by the lower Court (4) As to the effect of withdrawal from a suit, see note below (5) The dismissal of a claim after issue has been joined, because the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to substantiate it, has the same effect as a dismissal founded upon evidence, and the subject matter of such claim will be *res judicata* (6) A subsisting judgment on an award is as binding as any other judgment (7) As between the parties a decree arrived at after the taking of an oath on a question of fact in a case under the Oaths Act is none the less a final adjudication (8) A judgment by consent is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mind on a contested cause (9) And where a Court has heard and determined

(1) *Parvotam Gir v. Narbada Gir* 21 A 705 (1899)

(2) *Field* Ev 289, *Broughton* *op cit* 103 and cases there cited, so where no issue is raised and decided or an issue is raised and the Court declines to decide it there is of course no estoppel

(3) *Durdunlyapa v. Malhar*, 2 Bom L R 871 (1900)

(4) *Chunder Coomar Mitter v. Shib Sundar Doss* 8 C 631 (1882) 11 C L R 22 *Gungabai v. Bhugut v. Raghoonsath Oja* 7 C 391, 9 C L R 34 (1881) *Nilvaru v. Nilvaru*, 6 B 110 (1881), *Imamooddeen Sowdagur v. Shaikh Futeh Ali*, 3 C L R 447 (1878), *Rajah Mokond Narain Deo v. Jonardan Dey*, 15 W R 208 (1871), *Caspersz*, *op cit* 440, 344 315 *Field* Ev 289, 290 As to an appeal putting an end to any finality in the decision of the lower Court see *Seosagar Singh v. Sitaram Singh* 24 C 616 (1897)

(5) O XXIII *post* *Watson v. The Collector of Rajshahye* 13 M I A 160, 170 (1869), *Bunwari Das v. Muhammad Mashiat*, 9 A 690 (1887), *Sikh Lal v. Bhikhi* 11

A 187 (1888), *Ram Charan Buhardur v. Reazuddin* 10 C 857, 860 (1884) *Caspersz*, *op cit* 436-438, *Field*, Fv 293 231, O Kinealy, Civ Pr Code notes to s 373

(6) *Marriot v. Hampton* 17 East 269 *ref to in Field* Ev 271, *Watson* The Collector of Rajshahye, 13 M I A 170 (1869), *Sahadeo Pandey v. Nekhid Pandey*, 15 W R 573 (1871) *Mofizooddeen v. Shaikh Amooddeen* 23 W R 58 (1875), *Kartik Chandra Pal v. Srihar Mandal* 12 C 563, 565 (1886)

(7) *Wazer Mathon v. Chani Singh*, 7 C 727 9 C L R 377 (1881), *fol in Vyankatesh Chumaji v. Sakharan Dast*, 21 B 465 (1896), see as to refusal to file an award, *Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Alam Khan*, L R 18 I A 73 (1891) As to awards, see further *Caspersz* on Estoppel 235 238

(8) *Ahmed v. Moidun* 24 M 444 (1901), *fol in Sanyasi Baritya v. Artaswaro*, 24 M L J 321 (1913)

(9) *In re* South American and Mexican Co 1 Ch. (1895) 37 (explaining *Jenkins v. Robertson*, L R 1 H L (Sc App), 117, 122, 125, *ref to in Minalal v. Karstoji*, 30 B 395 405 (1906) and see *The Belcairn*, L J

the case judicially, and there has been an appeal, which has been withdrawn owing to a compromise entered into by the parties, the original decision becomes a final decision and operates as a bar to a second suit (1) When a decree is passed by consent of parties, the question whether or not the compromise on which such decree is based is valid, cannot be gone into on an appeal against that decree (2) The Court, however, has jurisdiction to set aside a consent order upon any ground which would invalidate an agreement between the parties So a consent order which had been completed and acted upon, but without affecting interests of third parties, was set aside by the Court on the ground of common mistake (3) The test for determining whether there is an estoppel in any particular case is whether the parties decided for themselves the particular matter in dispute and the matter was expressly embodied in the decree passed on the compromise (4) Compromises of suits by Hindu females are to be dealt with upon the principles applicable to alienations by them (5) The rulings as to the effect of *ex parte* and unexecuted decrees in subsequent suits (a question which has been considered principally in connection with rent suits) are conflicting (6) An *ex parte* decree is, when final, *res judicata* only so far as the decision necessarily decided an issue, but nothing more is concluded The conclusive effect is confined to the point actually decided (7) Thus an *ex parte* decree for rent concludes nothing more than that so much rent was due at a certain time from the tenant to his landlord, and assuming that the plaint goes no further, and makes no claim for a declaration as to the rate of the rent, the defendant having a proper opportunity to meet the case, the rate of rent is not *res judicata*, even although the decree may recite or declare

10 P D 161, Auhoyessury Dabee t Gouri Sunkur Panday, 22 C 860, 861 (1895), *arguendo*, foll. in *Nicholas v Asphar*, 24 C 216, 237 (1896), *Laksmishankar Devshankar t Vishnuram*, 24 B 77 (1899), see *Iala Shib Lal v Lala Gouri Prasad*, 2 C W N 174 (1897), *Lakshmi Ammal t Tikaram Govaji*, 1 M H C R 240 (1863), *Lakshmi Shankar v Vishnuram*, 24 B 77 (1899), *Uramkumarath Kannan Nayar t Uramkumarath Penju Nayar*, 5 M 1 (1882), a decree passed in accordance with a compromise may be final under O XXIII r 3, *post*

(1) *Vythilinga Muppanar v Vijayatammal*, 6 M 43 (1882), as to decrees by consent dismissing a suit, see *The Belcairn*, L R 10 P D 161, *Broughton*, *op cit* 102, and where the consent is that the action be discontinued, *Owners of the Cargo of the Kronprinz v Owners of the Cargo of the Andalusia*, L R 12 App Cas 250

(2) *Behari Lal t Majid Ali*, 24 A 138 (1901)

(3) *Huddersfield Banking Co, Ltd t*

Henry Lister & Son, Ltd (1895), 2 Ch D. 273, as to the effect of a clause not contained in a petition of compromise being added in a consent decree, see *Rameshwar Prosad Narain Singh v Chandreshwar Prosad Narain Singh*, 7 C W N 880 (1903)

(4) *Venkata Perumal t Thatha Ramasamy*, 35 M 75 (1911), *Behari Lal t Daud Husein* 35 A 240 (1913)

(5) *Sant Kumar t Deo Saran* 8 A 365 (1886), *Ram Kuber Pande t Ram Das*, 35 A 428

(6) *Field*, Ev 294-296, *Caspersz*, *op cit* 441-446, *Broughton* *op cit* 97, 98, *Ma haraja Beorchander Manick t Ramkishan Shaw* (F B), 14 B L R 370, 23 W R 128 (1874), *Birchunder Manickya t Hurrish Chunder Doss* (F B) 3 C 383 (1878), *Modhusudan Shaha Mundul t Brao* (F B), 16 C 300 (1889), where the cases will be found cited and discussed, and see *Raj Kumar v Ahmuddi*, 17 C W N 627 (1912)

(7) *Modhusudan Shaha Mundul t Brao*, *supra*

the rate (1) Such decrees generally will be held conclusive as to all matters which shall have been heard and decided on the merits. A defendant respondent cannot avoid the application of the principle of *res judicata* by saying that he did not appear at the trial of the suit and a plaintiff who has got an *ex parte* decree on proof of his title or on failure of the defendant to prove a defence the onus of proving which was on him cannot be deprived of the full benefit of the decree which he has obtained by the fact that the defendant did not appear in court to protect his own interest (2) An *ex parte* decree in a suit for rent operates as *res judicata* upon the question of relation of landlord and tenant (3) A finding on an issue not necessary for the determination of the suit will not effect a *res judicata*. Where an issue is not necessary for the decision of the suit in which it is raised the decree couched in general terms does not cover the finding on that issue nor can the insertion of such finding in the decree give it the force of *res judicata*. The Code does not contemplate findings on issues being inserted in it and there is no section in the Code which makes it necessary to appeal from the decree because such finding has been inserted in it (4) A decree in a maintenance suit is not final in the sense that the rate fixed can never be altered. Altered circumstances may justify a suit for reduction of maintenance or a suit for its increase. If there be such altered circumstances a previous decision will be no bar (5) An order of the Small Cause Court made in a proceeding under sect. 278 of the former Code, is an order made in a suit within the meaning of sect. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882) and as such is final (6) A possessory suit filed in the Mamlatdar's Court was dismissed by the Mamlatdar on the merits. The plaintiff thereupon filed another suit under sect. 9 of the Specific Relief Act in a Civil Court which allowed the claim and passed a decree in his favour. It being contended that the Mamlatdar's decree barred the second suit it was held that the Mamlatdar's decision was not conclusive (7) Where there are conflicting decisions the last decision operates as a bar (8)

Preclusion by rule (sect. 12)—See first paragraph of the notes to these sections

Foreign judgments (sects. 13 and 14)—The provisions of sect. 13 have been rearranged with a view to clearer statement, and are substantially the same as those of sect. 14 of the last Code with the exception of the addition

(1) *Modhusudan Shaha Mandal v Brae* (F B) 16 C 300 (1889). As to whether a decision on a previous rent suit as to relationship of landlord and tenant will operate as *res judicata* on a subsequent suit for rent see Article in 8 C W N (No. 26) cxxiv and cases there cited.

(2) *Braj Mohun Dass v Srimati Chanta Moni Das* 5 C W N 877 (1901).

(3) *Raj Kumar v Alimuddin* 17 C W N 627 (1912).

(4) *Ghela Ichharam v Sanhal Chand Jetla* 18 R 597 (1893), see *Shib Charan Lal v Raghu Nath* 17 A 174 (1895), *Irawa* :

Satyappa 35 B 38 (1910).

(5) *Bangara Ammal v Vijayamachi Reddiar* 22 M 175 (1898).

(6) *Deno Nath Batsbyal v Nuffer Chunder Nunly* 3 C W N 591 (1899) this judgment was reversed on appeal upon grounds which rendered it unnecessary to decide whether the order was final under s. 37 of the P S C. C. Act. 4 C W N 470 43 (1900).

(7) *Ramchandra v Narayana Charya* 24 B 201 (1899) disapproving of *Ramchandra v Bhakabal* 6 B 477 (1892).

(8) *Malin Mal v Shashman Lal* 1 A L J 13 (1901).

of clause (a) and the omission altogether of the last clause of the former section, as to which, see *post*. A foreign judgment is a judgment of a foreign Court; as to the meaning of which term, see notes to sect 2, *ante*, and *ante* "Court". A foreign judgment may be used in two ways. It may be either pleaded by a defendant as *res judicata* by way of *defence* to the claim made against him, or a suit may be brought to *enforce* it. Sects 13 and 14 recognize the effect of a foreign judgment as *res judicata*, the latter section providing that where a foreign judgment is relied on the production of the document duly authenticated is presumptive evidence that the Court which made it had competent jurisdiction.

All judgments, whether domestic or foreign, if delivered by a Court without jurisdiction are void (1). As regards competency, a question arose as to the meaning of the words "*Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit*" in connection with foreign judgments. In the case of domestic judgments these words, as has been already stated, mean a Court having concurrent jurisdiction with the Court trying the subsequent suit, whether as regards the pecuniary limit of its jurisdiction or the subject matter of the suit, to try it with conclusive effect (2). The same construction has been given also with regard to foreign judgments. It being held that the mere fact that the actual (second) suit could not have been tried in the first Court did not matter, it being enough if a suit of that class could have been tried if the subject matter of it had been within the local limits of that Court's jurisdiction (3). So it has been held that the determination of an issue as to adoption in a suit brought in the Court of a Native State for the recovery of land was conclusive on that question in a suit brought in a British Indian Court for the recovery of property in British territory (4). It has, however, been doubted whether this decision is correct in so far as it holds that exclusion on territorial grounds is not to be taken into account, it being pointed out, with reference to the contention, that otherwise Explanation VII of the former Code (now sect 14) would be deprived of all meaning, that there are many suits which are within the jurisdiction both of a foreign and domestic Court, to which that Explanation would attach (5). The existence of jurisdiction will primarily be determined with reference to the law of the country in which that Court may be situate and from the Government whereof it may derive its judicial power (6). The Courts of other countries, however, are not bound and generally not inclined to recognize the jurisdiction as sufficient when it is conferred or exercised against the general principles of international

(1) See Authors' Evidence Act, notes to s. 44.

(2) See *Babathat v Nasharbhut*, 13 B at p 228 (1888).

(3) *Ib*. [See comments on this case in *Prithisingh v Umedsingh*, 6 Bom L R 98, 102, 103 (1903).]

(4) *Ib*.

(5) *Prithisingh v Umedsingh*, 6 Bom L R 98, 103 (1903), *per* Sir Lawrence

Jenkins, C.J. It is possible that the question of Foreign Courts' Judgments was overlooked when the section was amended so as to render competency of jurisdiction necessary in regard to the subsequent suit also. See as to jurisdiction, *Hukm Chand*, C P C 207.

(6) *Cartigue v Imrie*, 4 E & I A 448 C, *Bikrama Singh v Bir Singh* (1888) P R No 191. *Hukm Chand*, C P C 217.

law (1) So in the under mentioned case (2) it was held that the Baroda Court had no jurisdiction over the defendants who were British subjects residing in British territory

The Indian Legislature however, while recognizing foreign judgments as *res judicata*, did not adopt the view of the English Courts as to their absolute conclusiveness (3) and qualified the general rule enacted in sect 11 by a number of limitations embodied in sect 13 *Res judicata*, in connection with foreign judgments, is only of limited extent Jurisdiction and the existence of the other elements common to both domestic and foreign judgments were formerly both dealt with in sect 11 but jurisdiction is now separately provided for in sect 13 (a)

The other special limitations prescribed by sect 13 in order that a foreign judgment may operate as *res judicata* are—

1 It must have been given on the merits So a judgment of dismissal of a suit, as barred by limitation will not be deemed to be on the merits and therefore to operate as *res judicata* except where that law not only bars the remedy but extinguishes the right itself (4)

2 There must be no apparent mistake of International or Indian law (5) In the under mentioned case (6) the Court relied on this clause in support of the view that the judgment of a Court having jurisdiction otherwise than in accordance with the general principles of International law would not be *res judicata*, but this clause has reference to the judgment itself and not to the question of jurisdiction, which is provided for in clause (a) and which must be dealt with on general principles As appears from the words used, a mistake of fact does not bar the operation of *res judicata*, the judgment being a bar even though the foreign Court had come on the evidence to an erroneous conclusion as to the facts Nor will a mistake as to the law of the country in which the judgment is passed, or of any country other than British India, affect the operation of the judgment as *res judicata* (7)

3 It must not be contrary to natural justice It is never advisable to limit the meaning of wide terms intentionally used by the Legislature The words are wide enough, it has been said, to allow of an investigation into the moral rightness of the decision, (8) though they would not permit the Court to inquire into the merits on the simple ground that the conclusion drawn from the facts was erroneous For such a case assumes a mere error in decision and not a contrariety to natural justice The scope of the term has however, as a matter of general practice been restricted to narrower limits being used in

(1) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 219 223 see *Parry & Co v Appasami Pillai*, 2 M. 407 (1880) and the leading decision *Gurdial Singh v Rajah of Faridkot* 22 C 223 (1894) and other cases cited *post* See *Flint on Res Judicata*, 21 *Encyc Law*, 281 As to accessory suits see *Kashee Nath v Deb Kriato Ramanooj* 16 W P 240 (1871), *Bombay Coast and River Steam N Co v René Heleux* 4 B H C, R O C, 149 (1867)
(2) *Lakshminankar v Vishnuram* 24 B

77 (1899)

(3) See *Hukm Chand*, *Res Jud.* 578

(4) See *Hukm Chand Res Jul 540*, C P C, p 225

(5) *Ib.*, 552 C. P. C. p. 226

(6) *Hindo v Ponnath* 4 M 358 (1880)

(7) See *Hukm Chand* C P C 227, 1 *res Jud* 543-585

(8) *Ib.* C. P. C. 228-231, 1 *res Jul* 545 594

reference rather to the conduct or mode of procedure of the foreign Court than to the merits of the particular case (1) Thus a decision passed without reasonable notice to the persons concerned is contrary to natural justice (2) This view is adopted by the amendment that it is the proceedings leading to the judgment which are to be looked at

4 The judgment must not have been obtained by fraud All judgments whether domestic or foreign are void if obtained by fraud or collusion (3) In the case of domestic judgments it has sometimes been held that the fraud for which they may be set aside must be extrinsic to the matter tried in the cause and not merely that consisting in false evidence or forged documents submitted to the Court (4) The rule has been held to apply to foreign judgments also (5) As regards these judgments however, the weight of opinion appears to be in favour of the contrary view (6)

5 It must not sustain a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India If so the judgment will not be enforced even though the defect be not apparent on the face of the proceedings (7) This clause refuses recognition to every foreign judgment which recognizes a legal relation condemned in this country But it has been held that a domestic judgment is *res judicata* even when its effect is to sanction what is illegal in the sense of being prohibited by Statute (8)

Foreign judgments *in rem* stand on a footing somewhat different from that of domestic judgments *in rem* as well as from that of foreign judgments *in personam* Their recognition and enforcement is still void of express legislative sanction, as while they are beyond the rule of *res judicata* enunciated in these sections there is nothing in sect 41 of the Evidence Act to directly indicate that its provisions relating to judgments *in rem* are to be construed so as to include foreign judgments But it is apprehended that in analogy with the practice of the English Courts such judgments given in the exercise of probate matrimonial admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction will speaking generally receive in India the same recognition as is afforded to domestic judgments of the same character (9) While as in the case of other judgments they are no less binding because erroneous foreign judgments *in rem* are generally

(1) See *Hinde v Ponnath* 4 M. 359-365 (1880)

(2) *Bangarusami v Balasubramanian* 13 M. 496 (1890), *Jones v Zahru Mal* (1889) P. R. No 66 [absence of actual notice], *London, Bombay, etc, Bank v Burjorji*, 5 B. 223 (1881) [no *de facto* notice or what could be deemed equivalent to it], *Bukrama Singh v Bir Singh* (1888) P. R. No 19 [notice must be given of institution of suit and probably notice a reasonable time before judgment but the question of the irregularity of the procedure in serving process cannot be discussed]

(3) See Authors Evidence Act notes to s. 14

(4) *Ib*

(5) *Castrigue v Behrens* 30 L. J. Q. B. 163

(6) *Abouloff v Oppenheimer*, 10 Q. B. D. 290, *Vadala v Lawca* 25 Q. B. D. 310, *ref Natarani Dass v Nundo Lal Bose* 26 C. at pp 910-913 (1899), and see these English cases commented on in *Hukm Chand v C. P. C.* 233-234

(7) *Duchess of Kingston's case*, Sm. I. C., 9th ed. 812, *Pousillon v Rousillon* 14 Ch. D. 351

(8) *Chaganlal v Bai Harka* 33 B. 479 (1899)

(9) See Authors Evidence Act notes to s. 41

open to the same objections as those *in personam*, such as want of jurisdiction, natural justice, or fraud (1)

While the rules applicable to the class of cases where the defendant sets up a foreign judgment by way of *defence* are contained in sect 13, yet apart from the amendment of that section introduced by sect 5 of Act VII of 1888, no statutory provision existed with reference to suits brought to *enforce* foreign judgments. That amendment, however, recognized the previously existing right to bring a suit on a foreign judgment, and in fact such judgments have been frequently enforced by suit in this country, being considered to impose a duty or obligation which the Courts are bound to give effect to (2). In respect of the latter class of suits, the general rules are that the judgment must be an adjudication upon the actual merits, (3) final and conclusive, (4) and may be impeached upon the ground that the Court was without jurisdiction to try the case, (5) or that the defendant had not been summoned, and had had no opportunity of making a defence, (6) or on the ground of fraud (7)

(1) *Hukm Chand v Res Jud.* 667

(2) *Nallatambi v Ponnusami*, 2 M 400, at p 403 (1879), *Bhavanishankar v Puresdri*, 6 B 292 (1882), *Nalla Karuppa Settiar v Mshomed Iburam Sahel*, 20 M 115 (1896), *Hukm Chand v Res Jud.* 512, 570, *Caspersz, Estoppel*, 459. An act of State, however, cannot be made the basis of a defence, and be regarded as a foreign judgment. *Sriman Goswami v Goswami*, 17 B 620 (1878)

(3) *Sreehureo Bukshoo v Gopal Chunder Samunt*, 15 W R 500 (1871)

(4) *Nouvion v Freeman*, L R 15 Ap Ca 1, but the pendency of an appeal in a foreign Court is no bar to a suit upon the judgment which is the subject of appeal, ib 13, see *Patrick v Shedden*, 2 E & B 14

(5) As to jurisdiction, see *Christie v*

v Westenholz, L R 6 Q. B 155, 161, referred to and explained in *Gurdial Singh v Raja of Faridkot*, 22 C 222 (1894), s c, L R 21 L A 171, *Mathappa Chetti v Chellappa Chetti*, 1 M 196 (1876), *Gurdial Singh v Raja of Faridkot*, *supra*, *Bangarusami v Balasubramanian*, 13 M 496 (1890), *Syed Moazim Hossein v Robinson*, 5 C W N 741, s c, 28 C 641 (1900), *Hadjee Kasseem v Hadjee Isup*, 6 C W N 829 (1902), *Mathappa Chetti v Chellappa Chetti*, 1 M 196 (1876), as to the effect of appearance and voluntary waiver of objection to jurisdiction, *Kandath Mammal v Neelancherayal*, 8 M H C R 14

(1875), *Fazal Shau Khan v Gafar Khan*, 16 M 82 (1891), *Nallatambi Mudaliar v Ponnusami Pillai*, 2 M 400 (1879), *Kalyugam v Chokalinga*, 7 M 105 (1883), where the submission to jurisdiction is not voluntary, see *Parry & Co v Appasami Pillai*, 2 M 407 (1880). Where there is no submission, see *Gurdial Singh v Raja of Faridkot*, *supra*; *Sivaraman v Iburam*, 18 M 327 (1895). As to the transactions of Joint Stock Companies formed for the purpose of carrying on business in a foreign country, see *Nallatambi Mudaliar v Ponnusami Pillai*, *supra*, *Idulji Burjorji v Manekji Sorsaji Patel*, 11 B 211 (1896), *The London, Bombay, etc., Bank v Hormasji*, 8 B H C R, O C, 200 (1871) [call order treated as foreign judgment], *The London, Bombay, etc., Bank v Burjorji*, 5 B 223 (1881), *The London, Bombay, etc., Bank v Govind Ramchandras*, 9 B 346 (1885)

(6) *Ochsenheim v Papeher*, post, per Mellish, L J; *Sreehureo Bukshoo v Gopal Chunder Samunt*, 15 W R 500 (1871), *Syed Moazim Hossein v Robinson* 5 C W N 741, s c, 28 C 641 (1901), *Hadjee Kasseem v Hadjee Isup*, 6 C W N 829 (1902), *Hukm Chand*, Res Jud. 585; and see ante, the cases relating to enforcement of foreign judgments

(7) *Sreehureo Bukshoo v Gopal Chunder Samunt*, 15 W R 500 (1871), *Kingston v a case*, 2 M 100 (1875), the dicta in which appear in the English tribunals (*supra*), *Ochsenheim v Papeher*, post.

reference rather to the conduct or mode of procedure of the foreign Court than to the merits of the particular case (1) Thus a decision passed without reasonable notice to the persons concerned is contrary to natural justice (2) This view is adopted by the amendment, that it is the proceedings leading to the judgment which are to be looked at

4 The judgment must not have been obtained by fraud All judgments, whether domestic or foreign, are void if obtained by fraud or collusion (3) In the case of domestic judgments it has sometimes been held that the fraud for which they may be set aside must be extrinsic to the matter tried in the cause and not merely that consisting in false evidence or forged documents submitted to the Court (4) The rule has been held to apply to foreign judgments also (5) As regards these judgments, however, the weight of opinion appears to be in favour of the contrary view (6)

5 It must not sustain a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India If so, the judgment will not be enforced, even though the defect be not apparent on the face of the proceedings (7) This clause refuses recognition to every foreign judgment which recognizes a legal relation condemned in this country But it has been held that a domestic judgment is *res judicata* even when its effect is to sanction what is illegal in the sense of being prohibited by Statute (8)

Foreign judgments *in rem* stand on a footing somewhat different from that of domestic judgments *in rem* as well as from that of foreign judgments *in personam* Their recognition and enforcement is still void of express legislative sanction, as while they are beyond the rule of *res judicata* enunciated in these sections, there is nothing in sect 41 of the Evidence Act to directly indicate that its provisions relating to judgments *in rem* are to be construed so as to include foreign judgments But it is apprehended that in analogy with the practice of the English Courts, such judgments given in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty, or insolvency jurisdiction will, speaking generally, receive in India the same recognition as is afforded to domestic judgments of the same character (9) While as in the case of other judgments they are no less binding because erroneous, foreign judgments *in rem* are generally

(1) See *Hindu v Ponnath*, 4 M. 359-365 (1880)

(2) *Bangarussmi v Balasubramanian*, 13 M. 496 (1890), *Jones v Zahru Mal* (1889), P R No 66 [absence of actual notice], London, Bombay, etc, *Bank v Burjorji*, 5 B 223 (1881) [no *de facto* notice or what could be deemed equivalent to it], *Dikrama Singh v Bir Singh* (1888), P R No 19 [notice must be given of institution of suit and probably notice a reasonable time before judgment, but the question of the irregularity of the procedure in serving process cannot be discussed]

(3) See Authors' Evidence Act, notes to s 44

(4) *Id*

(5) *Castrigue v Behrens*, 30 L J Q B 163

(6) *Abouloff v Oppenheimer*, 10 Q B D 295, *Vadala v Lawes*, 25 Q B D 310, *ref Nistaram Dass v Nundo Lal Bose*, 26 C. at pp 910-913 (1899), and see these English cases commented on in *Hukm Chand v C P C* 233 231

(7) *Duchess of Kingston's case*, Sm L C, 9th ed, 812, *Rousillon v Rousillon* 14 Ch D 351

(8) *Chaganlal v Bai Harka*, 33 B 479 (1903)

(9) See Authors' Evidence Act, notes to s 41

not so, and that the English Court had in fact no jurisdiction (1) It is not sufficient ground for impugning the judgment of a foreign Court, which ordinarily proceeds in accordance with the recognized principles of judicial investigation, to show that in the particular instance its procedure may have been irregular. It may be assumed that the procedure was regular, but if there was irregularity, it would not be sufficient ground for refusing respect to the judgment (2)

On the other hand, as has been already observed, the general rule is that a Court which entertains a suit on a foreign judgment cannot institute an inquiry into the merits of the original action or the propriety of the decision (3) This rule, however, was in the last Code abrogated with reference to the judgments of certain foreign Courts in Asia and Africa by the enactment in sect 5 of Act VII. of 1888, amending sect 13 of the Code, and which enactment was passed with reference to the arguments urged by the Bombay High Court (4) for distinguishing the judgments of the Courts of native States from those of other foreign Courts So where a suit was brought in a Court in British India upon the basis of a decree of the Council of Regency of the State of Rampur, it was held that the Court was empowered by sect 14 (corresponding with sect 13) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act VII of 1888, to consider the merits of the case in which the decree of the Council of Regency had been passed (5) It was held in effect by the Madras High Court that this amendment did not alter the general rule already mentioned, except by vesting in the Court a judicial discretion to inquire into the merits of any case in which it appeared that no confidence was to be reposed in the judgment of a foreign Court, being one of those which are mentioned in the amended section A party to an action on such a judgment had not a right to have the case reheard All that the section said was that the Judge was not to be precluded from inquiry into the merits (6) The last paragraph of the corresponding

(1) *Syed Moazim Hossain v Robinson*, 5 C W N 741, a c, 28 C 641 (1901)

(2) *Nallatambi Mudaliar v Ponnusami Pillai*, *supra*, at p 406, as to limitation *vide ib*, and *Perry & Co v Appasami Pillai*, *supra*

(3) *Bhavanishankar Shevakram v Puraadri Kaldas*, 6 B 292 (1882), *Boloram v Ka meenee*, 4 W R 108 (1865), *Henderson v Henderson*, 6 Q. B 288, 289, *Bank of Australasia v Mas*, 16 Q. B 717, 735, *Scott v Pilkington*, 2 B & S 11, 41, *Ochsenheim v Papcher*, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 695, *Godard v Gray*, L. R. 6 Q. B 139, *Bank of Australasia v Harding* 9 C. B. 661, *De Cossé Brissac v Rathbone*, 6 H. & N. 801

(4) *Bhavanishankar Shevakram v Puraadri Kaldas* 6 B 292 (1882), *Himmat Lal v Shivajirav*, 8 B 533 (1884), in which it was held that no suit was maintainable founded upon the judgment of a Court of a native

State The contrary opinion prevailed in the Madras Court *Samat Annamalai*, 7 M. 164 (1883), and has, since the amendment of the section been adopted by the Bombay High Court *Mayaram v Ravji*, 24 B 86 (1899) [a suit will lie on the judgment of a Court in a Native State], a c, 1 B. L. R. 539, where the preceding cases are reviewed. And in *Gurdyl Singh v Raja of Faridkot*, 22 C. 222 (1891), the Privy Council held that there was no ground for supposing that no suit will lie upon the judgment of recognized foreign Indian States See notes to a D The last paragraph to a 14 of the former Code was added to enforce the view of the Madras High Court As to execution see a 113, *post*.

(5) *The Collector of Moradabad v Harbans Singh*, 21 A. 17 (1898)

(6) *Fazal Sabu Khan v Gafar Khan*, 15 A. 82 (1891) see also *The Collector of Moradabad v Harbans Singh*, 21 A. 17 (1898)

section in the last Code has been now omitted, and no distinction now exists between the judgments of Asiatic and African Courts and other foreign Courts. Where a decree is obtained upon a foreign judgment it is to be executed according to the provisions of the Code (1). The judgment of a foreign Court obtained on a decree of a Court in British India is no bar to the execution of the original decree (2). Sect 112 provides for the execution of decrees of Courts established by the Government of India in Native States, and sect 113 allows of the execution in particular instances, upon the permission of the Governor in Council, of the decrees of other Native Courts as if they had been made by the Courts in British India.

It is a well recognized principle that crimes, including in that term all breaches of public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or otherwise, at the instance of State Government, or of some one representing the public, are local in this sense, that they are only cognizable and punishable in the country where they were committed. Accordingly, no proceeding, even in the shape of a civil suit, which has for its object the enforcement by the State, whether directly or indirectly, of punishment imposed for such breaches by the *lex fori*, ought to be admitted in the Courts of any other country (3).

Interlocutory orders and orders in execution proceedings—Sect 11 is not exhaustive of the effects of the principle of *res judicata* (4). These orders if not appealed from, are binding upon the parties in all subsequent proceedings in the same suit. Though sect 11 of the Code does not in terms apply to these orders, yet the principle which underlies it is equally applicable to them as to regular suits. The Privy Council, speaking of such an order, held that "as an interlocutory order, it is not a final judgment, and does not operate under them as an interdict." (5). Every proceeding in which the execution of a judgment depends, not upon sect 13 of Act X of 1877, but upon general principles of law. If it were not binding there would be no end to litigation" (6). The principle of *res judicata* applies to prevent parties raising a second time in the same suit, or in the same execution proceedings, an issue which, in that suit or on the execution proceedings in that suit, had been previously determined (6). Orders in execution proceedings, if not appealed from

(1) Kandasami Pillai v Moidin Saib, 2 M L R 337 (1880).

(2) Fakuruddin Mahomed Assan v Official Trustee of Bengal, 7 C 82 (1881).

(3) Huntington v Attrill (1893), A C at p 155.

(4) Manchharam v Kalidas 19 B 526 (1894).

(5) Ram Kripal v Rup Kuan, 6 A 269, L R 11 I. A. 37 (1883), and see Krishen Sahai v Madad Khan, 14 A 64, 66 (1891), Bandy Karim v Romesh Chunder, 9 C 65, 67 (1882), Mungul Pershad Dickit v Ganga Kant Lahari Chowdry, 8 C 51, L R 8 I A 123 (1881), Beni Ram v Nanu Mal, 7 A

102, L R 11 I. A. 181 (1884), cases cited in Caspersz op cit 349 351, Field, Ev 298, 297, Lakshmanan Chettiar v Kuteayan Chettiar, 24 M 669 (1901), Sheoraj Singh v Kameshar Nath, 24 A 28 (1902), Nabi Muhammad v Jwala, 27 A 143 (1904). In Bai Meherbai v Magan Chand, 29 B 96 (1901) the execution proceedings which were held a bar were in a former suit. As to awards, see Caspersz, 235, 236, Coventry v Tulshi Prasad 8 C W N 672 (1904).

(6) Behari Lal v Majid Ali, 24 A 138 (1901), Vithoba v Tejaram, 14 Bom L R 264 (1912).

are binding upon the parties to the suit in all subsequent proceedings in that suit, on principles analogous to those of *res judicata* strictly so called. It is, therefore, necessary to constitute a bar that there should be a hearing and final decision. Where an application for execution is allowed to be withdrawn, the matters in dispute are not heard and decided. There is, therefore, no *res judicata* (1). Though a decree does not in terms give a certain relief, yet if it is construed in orders passed upon it as having given that relief, it is not competent to the Court on a subsequent application to treat those orders as erroneous and put another construction on the decree (2). Sect. 47 differs from sect. 11 in this respect, that the latter section bars not only the trial of a suit or issue, where the suit or issue had been previously heard and determined, but also the trial of an issue which should have been raised in a previous suit by either party. When an issue arising out of the execution of a decree has not been raised and determined under sect. 47, there is nothing in that section to prevent a defendant, in a separate suit subsequently brought, from raising that issue in that suit (3). For a case where a previous application for execution was refused and judgment debtor's objection as to limitation disallowed, and as to the effect of such an order in a subsequent application for execution, see below (4). A judgment debtor cannot question the right of a decree holder to apply for execution when execution has been on previous occasions applied for by the latter, and granted by the executing Court (5). In the under mentioned case, (6) it was held that though the analogy furnished by sect. 11 could not be altogether left out of sight in the application there dealt with, yet the Court ought to facilitate inquiries which are necessary for the purpose of carrying out decrees passed by it, and to accept with readiness any information which shows that the litigants have disregarded any part of the Court's decree. It would be wrong to dismiss an application made with the above purpose, simply because the applicant may have made the same endeavour without success in another proceeding.

A witness in a proceeding under sect. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code had asked for his costs in the Magistrate's Court but had been refused and was referred to a civil suit. On his bringing such suit it was held that there was no
and that therefore the principle of

one High Court does not prevent another High Court from entertaining a petition for probate (8)

(1) Hari Ganesh v. Yamunabai, 23 B 35 (1897). In Bhavanishankar v. Narainshankar, 23 B 536 (1899), it was held, with reference to s. 244 of the former Civil Procedure Code (now sect. 47), that the Judge could and should have acted in the execution proceedings upon the determination he had come to upon the same point in the suit. Vithoba v. Tejram, 14 Bom. L. R. 261 (1912).

(2) Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Papamiah, 19 M. 54 (1895).

(3) Nil Kamal Mukerjee v. Jahnata Chowd

huram, 26 C 946 (1899).

(4) Bholanath Dasa v. Prafulla Nath Kundu Chowdhry, 28 C. 122 (1900), dist. in Vyapuri v. Chudambara, 24 M. L. J. 26 (1912).

(5) Umrao Singh v. Lachmi Narain, 1 A. I. J. 50 (1903).

(6) Hari Narayan v. Moro Narayan, 4 B. L. R. 960 (1902).

(7) Nema Chandra Ghose v. Ajahar Chowdhury, 8 C. W. N. 178 (1903).

(8) In the goods of Charlotte Rodgers, 8 C. W. N. cxxxix (1904).

In a suit for probate, the caveators assailed the whole of the will on the ground of undue influence, but the probate Court granted probate disallowing the objection. Held, that in a subsequent suit it was not competent for the caveators to show that any particular clause in the will had been inserted through undue influence (1)

PLACE OF SUING

- 5] 15 Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest Court in which suits of the grade competent to try it, to be instituted

"Shall be instituted"—There is no provision either in the various Civil Court Acts or in the Code prescribing a minimum jurisdiction as there is prescribing a maximum jurisdiction. A superior Court is by this section forbidden from trying a suit cognizable by an inferior Court, not on account of any inherent incompetency to try it, but on grounds of public convenience and economy. It has been thought that this section prescribed a minimum limit of jurisdiction, and that, for instance, a Subordinate Judge would have no jurisdiction to try a suit which, owing to its value, was triable by a Munsif. But it has been held that this section refers to procedure only, and regulates the practice of the Courts, but does not deprive any Court of jurisdiction which it may otherwise possess (2). The section is merely directory, and does not oust the jurisdiction of a Subordinate or District Judge, (3) and the institution of a suit cognizable by a lower Court in a Court of higher jurisdiction is merely an irregularity which does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court (4) or the merits of the case (5) and such as was covered by sect 578 of the former Code (6).

As to Lower Burma see Lower Burma Courts Act, VI of 1900, Central Provinces sect 16, Act XVI of 1885, Punjab, Act XVIII of 1884, Ajmere, sect 25 of the Ajmere Courts Regulation, I of 1877

(1) *Nuzhat ud Doula Abbas Hossein v Mirza Hurratulain*, 31 C 186 (1903)

(2) See following notes. The same view was taken under the Code of 1859. *Russell Chunder Mohunt v Ram Lal Shaha*, 22 W R 301 (1874), *Joy Kishen Das v Turnbull*, 24 W R 137 (1875) [but the plaintiff should not be allowed any more for costs than he could have recovered if he had sued in the right Court], *Sufecoolah Sircar v Begum Bibee*, 25 W R 219 (1876) [the Judge should however, if he find the suit to be triable by a lower grade Court, send it to that Court], *Masaoollah Khan v Ram Lal Agarwallah*, 6 C 6 (1880), *Hukm Chand, Res Jud.* 284, *Tangor v Jaladhar*, 11 C W N 322 (1900)

(3) *Nidhi Lal v Mazhar Husain*, 7 A 230

(1884), *Krishnasami v Kanakasabai*, 14 N 183 (1890). It appears however, to have been assumed in *Velayudam v Arunachala*, 13 M 273 (1889), that the jurisdiction of the Higher Court was excluded the objection to the jurisdiction having been taken for the first time on second appeal, but see *Ramayya v Subharayudu*, 13 M 25 (1889)

(4) *Matra Mondal v Hari Mohun Mullick*, 17 C 155 (1889), *Ram Narain Singh v Miria Keery*, 25 C 46, 48 (1897)

(5) *Augustine v Medlycott*, 15 N 241, 246 (1892)

(6) *Matra Mondal v Hari Mohun Mullick*, 17 C 155 (1889), *Najib Beg v Jodha* (1888), P R No 181, cited in *Hukm Chand*, C P C 240

Court—The term 'Court of the lowest grade' refers only to Courts to which the Civil Procedure Code is applicable (1). It has been therefore held in Madras that Small Cause Courts had concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of Village Munsifs to hear suits which are cognizable by the latter (2).

"Lowest grade"—Throughout the country there are Courts of different grades having jurisdiction in suits of different amounts in certain prescribed local areas. The pecuniary jurisdiction must be determined with reference to the various Acts constituting the Courts and the question of the valuation of particular suits in order to ascertain within the jurisdiction of which Court they fall by reference to the Court Fees and Valuation Act and the cases decided thereunder to which reference has been made in the notes to sect 9 *ante*, 'Pecuniary Jurisdiction'. Sect 141 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was held to be controlled by sects 15 and 17 of the former Civil Procedure Code. A suit for rent is therefore to be instituted subject to pecuniary limitations in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it (3). Where there were two plaintiffs one of whom should have sued if sole plaintiff in the Subordinate Judge's Court as the Court of lowest grade and the other could by reason of the provisions of Act XX of 1863 only sue in the District Court it was held that as it was competent for the plaintiffs to join this section did not apply so as to prevent the first plaintiff from joining with the second in instituting the suit in the District Court (4).

'Competent to try'—Competency here means jurisdiction. The competency of a Court depends upon the nature or subject matter of a suit and upon the local and pecuniary extent of the Court's jurisdiction. As regards the first certain Courts are Courts of special jurisdiction inasmuch as some classes of cases involve disputes with which superior or specially experienced tribunals are particularly familiar and which can more satisfactorily be disposed of by them such as Revenue Admiralty Probate Divorce Patent Insolvency Courts and the like. Further cases of importance affecting considerable interests or involving questions of intricacy are left to be determined by the higher grade or superior Courts (5). So suits for damages for the infringement of the exclusive privilege to an invention or of a copyright in a design under the Inventions and Designs Act (6) or for damages for the infringement of the copyright in books (7) have been specially made cognizable only by District Courts. So suits under sect 92 *post* can be instituted only in a High Court or District Court. Miscellaneous proceedings unconnected with suits are generally triable outside the Presidency towns by District Courts though sometimes Subordinate Courts are empowered to

(1) *Murkhan v. Kalarsa* 13 M. 145 (1889)(2) *Ib.*(3) *Fazlur Rahim v. Dwarka Nath Chowdhry* 30 C. 453 (1903) s.c. 7 C. W. N. 402(4) *Narayana v. Kumarasami* 21 M. 137 (1899)(5) *Hukm Chand v. P. C.* 238 Res. Jud. 231

(6) Act V of 1888 ss. 29-5

(7) *Hameedoolah v. Mahomed Asghur Hossain* 6 C. 499 (1880) *Ledgard v. Bull* 9 A. 191 (1886) s.c. Act XX of 1847 as amended by Act VII of 1866

dispose of them on a reference by the District Court (1) And in Bombay the District Judge can alone take cognizance of suits in which the Government or any officer of Government in his official capacity is a party (2) So in Madras a suit by a zemindar for the dismissal of a *zemindari karnam* cannot be entertained by a District Munsif such suit being cognizable only by a Subordinate or, if none a District Judge (3) On the other hand, cases of easy settlement and minor importance are relegated to petty tribunals or to special Courts such as Small Cause Courts or Village Munsifs' Courts See generally as to jurisdiction over the subject matter and persons, the notes to sect 9, *ante* and the same also as to locality of jurisdiction, which is more particularly dealt with in the next four sections and the notes thereto The present section has reference mainly to the pecuniary jurisdiction of Courts, the limitations of which in regard to different grades of civil Courts vary in the several provinces of British India See notes to sect 9, *ante*

16 Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits—

Suits to be instituted
where subject-matter
situate

(a) for the recovery of immoveable property, *with or without rent or*

profits,

(b) for the partition of immoveable property,

(c) for the foreclosure, *sale* or redemption *in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon* immoveable property,

(d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immoveable property,

(e) for compensation for wrong to immoveable property,

(f) for the recovery of moveable property actually under distraint or attachment,

shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate

Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immoveable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, *where* the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits of

(1) Sec 8 26 Succession Certificate Act
Act No. 10 of 1897

* 32 as amended by s 15 Bombay Revenue
Jurisdiction Act No. of 1876; s 3 Act XV
of 1880, Act XII of 1891 but not where the
defendant official is sued as a private person

Gopi Mahabaleswar v Sheso 12 B 358 (1887),
as to suits against a municipality. Ahmeda
bad Municipality v Mahama 1 Jamal 3 B 146
(1875) suits to which Collector is a party
Muva Miya Sahab v Sayad Gulam, 7 B 100
(1882)

(3) Venkatanarasimha v Suryanarayana,
12 M 189 (1888)

whose jurisdiction *the defendant* actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain

Explanation—In this section “property” means property situate in British India

“Pecuniary or other limitations —See as to these notes to sects 9 and 15, *ante*

Scope of section—This section deals with local or territorial jurisdiction which in the case of real actions depends on the situation of the property in litigation and sect 20 deals with personal actions which depend on the place of accrual of the cause of action or the residence of the defendant. The general rule of local jurisdiction of which this section is an embodiment is that immoveable property is exclusively subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the Courts of the country in which it is situate. It follows from this that no other laws or Courts can affect it. As expressly stated in the *Explanation* the Courts of this country have subject to the proviso no jurisdiction in respect of immoveable property situate outside British India (1). But all property which has a foreign origin is not always outside the jurisdiction of Courts of this country (2). Where however a suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mirzapur for redemption of lands lying within that district but included in the same mortgage with other lands lying within the family domains of the Maharajah of Benares it was held that as the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in respect of the immoveable property in Mirzapur that jurisdiction could not be ousted because in the course of the trial of the suit it became necessary incidentally to decide for the purposes of the suit questions relating to mortgaged property held by the defendants outside the jurisdiction in order to determine whether the plaintiff had a right to recover the mortgaged property situated in Mirzapur (3).

This section does not apply to the original civil jurisdiction of the Presidency High Courts which are governed by clause 12 of the Letters Patent which empowers them to try suits for land or other immoveable property if such land or property shall be situated either wholly or in case the leave (4) of the Court shall have been first obtained in part within the

(1) See *Hukm Chand v. Res. Jud.* 324 340 *Prem Chand Dey v. Mokhoda Debi* 17 C 699 703 F B (1890) *Paghu Nath Das v. Kakkan Mal* 3 A 568 (1881) *Keslav Vinayak* 23 B 31 (1897). So a Court cannot declare a charge on property wholly outside its jurisdiction. *Gudri Lal v. Jagannath Ram* 8 A 117 (1886) and the decree can only be given effect to as a money decree. *ib. Mahomed Khuleel v. Sons Koor* 23 W R 123 (1874). See *Bakdeo Doss v. Wool Koor* 2 N W P 19 (1870). In *Kashinath v. Anant* 2 B L R 47 (1869) the suit was held to be excluded by the explanation and

therefore not to fall within the terms of the section.

(2) *Kashinath v. Anant* *supra*

(3) *Gudhari v. Sheoraj* 1 A 431 (1877) and see *Bolakee v. Thakoor* 5 C 9 8 (1880)

(4) As to leave generally see the following cases. It must be obtained before the institution of the suit. *Abdul Haqq v. Promotho Nath Bose* 1 Ind Jur N S 218 *Rampurab v. Premsookh* 10 B 96 J (1890) the leave so given is in respect of the cause of action stated in the plaint and does not cover an amended plaint. *Rampurab v. Premsookh* 15 B 103 (1890) and where a new defendant is

local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Courts. The High Courts have therefore jurisdiction if the land is in part within the jurisdiction (1). As to what suits are deemed to be "*for land*," see *post*

Immoveable property—As to the meaning of this expression, see notes to sects 2, 4, *ante*. The following have been held to be such: lands; houses, and such other things as are physically incapable of being removed, incorporeal hereditaments not of a purely personal nature, rights of common, way, and other profits in *alieno solo*, rents pensions, and annuities secured upon land, but not pensions and annuities not so secured, (2) *taishashan* allowances charged on revenues of certain villages, (3) an easement, (4) standing crops; (5) a tree standing on land, (6) the life-interest of a widow on income arising from

added fresh leave to sue may be necessary. *Rampurtab v. Poothbai*, 20 B 767, 772, 774 (1896), *Poothbai v. Rampurtab*, 17 B 466 (1893), it is not a mere formal order or an order regulating procedure, but one giving jurisdiction. *Rampurtab v. Premsukh supra*, at p. 97, *Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee Mahomed*, 13 B L R 91 (1874) it must be distinctly sought and obtained and cannot be implied from the fact that the plaintiff has leave to sue *in forma pauperis*. *Jairam v. Atmaram*, 4 B 482 (1880), the granting of leave is a matter of discretion, and has been refused where the plaintiff defendant, and witnesses resided at a long distance from Calcutta, and the decree if obtained could be satisfied from property outside the local jurisdiction. *Radha v. Mucksoodun*, 21 W R 201 (1874) also where as to the great bulk of the claim the cause of action arose elsewhere. *De Souza v. Coles*, 3 Mad H C R 384 (1868), *Keasowji v. Luckmidas*, 13 B 411 (1889), leave has been given it being reserved to the defendant to move to have the order set aside. *Radha v. Mucksoodun*, 21 W R 201 (1874) [it was held that the plaintiff could not object as he had acted on the order], where an order is granted giving leave and the suit is withdrawn, the force of the original order is spent. *Sabhapathi v. Lakshmi*, 24 M 293 (1900), leave given may be rescinded a defendant is not bound to wait for the hearing, but may apply on summons to take plaint off the file. *Keasowji v. Luckmidas*, 13 B 404, 410, 411 (1889), or it may form the subject of an issue for trial in the suit. *Nagamony v. Jansukram*, 18 M 142 (1894), *Rampurtab v. Premsukh*, 15 B at p. 99 (1890), though formerly doubted. *Lalitha v. Mucksoodun supra*, it is now

settled that an appeal lies from the order. *De Souza v. Coles*, 3 Mad H C R 384 (1868), *Hadjee Ismail v. Rohama Bye*, 13 B L R 91 (1874), but an unsuccessful applicant should appeal and not make another application to another Judge. *Mudelly v. Mudelly*, 8 Mad H C R 21 (1875). As to absence of leave and *res judicata*, see *Abdul Kadir v. Doolan Bibi*, 37 B 563 (1913).

(1) *Prasannamayi Dasi v. Kadambini Dasi*, 3 B L R, O C J 85 (1868); *Jairam v. Atmaram*, 4 B 482, 487 (1880), *Jagadamba v. Padmamam*, 6 B L R 686 (1871), *Seshagiri v. Rama*, 19 M 448, 450 (1897), *Balaram v. Ramchandra*, 22 B 922 (1893) [partition], *Punchanun v. Shib Chunder*, 14 C 835 (1887) [id.], the words "*or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen*" should be treated as being in brackets. *Land Mortgage Bank v. Suddurudeen Ahmed*, 19 C 363 (1892).

(2) *Collector of Thana v. Krishnanath*, 5 P 322 (1880).

(3) *Keshav Gormit v. Vengal*, 1997 Poin P J 425, s. c., 23 B 22.

(4) *Mohunt Deo Sarun v. Moonshee Mahomed*, 24 W R 300 (1875), this was held for the purpose of the Limitation Act.

(5) *Cheda Lal v. Mulchand*, 14 A 30 (1891), *Maddayya v. Venkata*, 11 M 193 (1887), *Ganga Prasad v. Naram*, 15 A 394 (1893), as soon as they are cut they become moveable property. *Surat Lal Mondal v. Amar Haji*, 22 C 877, 885 (1895), *Mangun Jha v. Dolhin*, 25 C 692 (1892), but see now in all cases, s. 2 cl. 13.

(6) *Sakharam v. Vishram*, 19 B 207 (1894), *Pandurang v. Blumrav*, 22 B 610 (1897).

lands of her husband's estate, (1) but not allowances paid in compensation for rayer collections from a *Tal*, (2) nor a right to be placed on the revenue register (3) The meaning of the term, as used with regard to Hindu Law, was discussed in the under mentioned case (4)

Suits deemed to be for immoveable property—In the case of the High Courts there has been considerable conflict of opinion as to the essentials of jurisdiction for which provision has been made by the Charters, to avoid which in regard to the practice of the Mofussil Courts the section contains detailed provisions as to local jurisdiction. The High Courts have ordinarily no jurisdiction to try suits relating to immoveable property, where such property is wholly situate without the local limits of their original jurisdiction (5) and it would appear to be doubtful whether the Equitable jurisdiction of the High Courts in India is of the same extent as that which has been claimed by the Court of Chancery, namely to take cognizance of any equity between persons residing within the jurisdiction respecting lands outside it (6) Moreover, the present tendency, even in the case of English Courts is to abstain from interfering in *personam* where the matter concerns land outside their jurisdiction (7) It is generally agreed that a suit for partition of immoveable property is a suit for immoveable property (8) So also is any suit seeking delivery to the plaintiff of land or other immoveable property. The Bombay High Court formerly appeared to take a view which would restrict the words "*suits for land or other immoveable property*" to suits of the last mentioned character (9) The other High Courts have held that that expression includes suits other than those for the possession of land, in fact every suit in which a decree is asked for operating directly on the land such as to enforce a security upon it for foreclosure or redemption. Thus the decisions were conflicting upon the point whether such Courts are empowered to entertain suits for foreclosure or sale or redemption of property beyond their local jurisdiction, (10) or for

(1) *Natha v. Dhunbhai* 23 B J, 11 (1898)

(2) *Surenbro Prosad v. Kedar Nath* 19 C 8 (1891)

(3) *Bhikaji v. Pandu* 19 B 43 (1893)

(4) *Balyantrao v. Purshotam* 9 Bom II C 191 (1872)

(5) Letters Patent, clause 12 see *Hukm Chand, Res Jud* 318

(6) See *per Sargent CJ* in *H H Holkar v. Dadabhai* 14 B 3 359 (1890)

(7) *Land Mortgage Bank v. Sudurudeen Ahmed* 10 C at p 367 (1892) See *De Souza v. British South African Co.*, 2 Q B (1892) 308 *British South African Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique* 1893 A C 602 *Hukm Chand, Res Jud* 320 See *Keshav v. Vinayak* 23 B at p 97 (1897)

(8) *Ramchandra v. Dada Mahadev* 1 B II C R App 76 (1861) *Jairam v. Atmaram* 4 B 482 (1860) *Palnaman v. Jagalamba*

6 B L R 134 (1870) *Balaram v. Ramchandra* 22 B 922 (1898) *Panchanun Mullick v. Shib Chunder Mullick* 14 C 817 (1887) *Seshagiri Rau v. Rama Rau* 19 M 448 (1896)

(9) But see *Keshav Govind v. Vinayak Ramchandra* 189 P J 425 in which *Ranade J.* observed that analogy should not be pressed too far, and had been departed from in suits brought to recover money charged on immoveable property

(10) According to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court it is settled that the Court has no jurisdiction in such cases. *Fa v. Indian Railway Co. v. Bengal Coal Co.* 1 C 95 100 (18) *Juggal Lal v. D. v. J. domony Dwyer* 15 B 1 R 328 329 (18) *Bibee Jau v. Meerza Mahomed Haid* 1 Ind Jur N S 40 (1866), *Lal v. J. Juddomanth Shaw* 1 B 1 J 1 Ju (1866) *Blaguer v. Lal* 1 C D 7

specific performance of contracts relating to land similarly situated (1) In more recent cases the Bombay High Court has also taken the broader view (2) In the Madras High Court, it was held that a "*suit for land*" includes any suit in which a decree is asked for operating directly upon the land, (3) and therefore includes any suit brought to enforce a security upon land, such as a suit for the sale of land equitably mortgaged by deposit of title deeds. Moore, J., stating that the present section of the Code was simply an amplification with details of the old section of the Act of 1859, on which clause 12 of the Letters Patent was, it appears based, observed that he was prepared to go further, and to hold that the phrase "*suit for land or other immoveable property*," as used in the Letters Patent, includes all suits mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of this section. If the property is situate outside the jurisdiction, the High Court cannot take cognizance of it, even if moveable property within the jurisdiction is also claimed in it, as clause 12 does not qualify the expression "*in suits for land*," etc., with the word *only*, and the words "*all other cases*" are not to be understood as including cases of suits for immoveable *plus* moveable property, but those in which immoveable property is not involved (4) It is however, generally admitted that every suit having any reference to immoveable property is not a suit for immoveable property (5) It has been held that a suit to recover title deeds of certain land outside the local limits, even though it may involve a question of title to that land, is not a suit to obtain possession of, or deal in

O C 319 (1865) In the matter of S J Leslie 9 B L R 171, 18 W R 269 (1872), Kanti Chunder Pal Chowdhry v Masory Mohun Roy 19 C 364, n. (1885), Ebrahim Ismail Timol v Provas Chander Mitter, 36 C 51 (1908) See however, observations of Carth C J in Delhi and London Bank v Wordie, 1 C at pp 257, 263 (1876) Contrary views were at one time held in Bombay Sorabji v Rattonji 22 B 701 (1898), Holkar v Dadabhai 14 B 353 (1890) but not so now Vaghaji v Camaji, 29 B 249 (1909), Zulekaba v Ebrahim Haji Vyedina 37 B 494 (1912) Similar views prevailed formerly as to suits in the Mofussil Venkoba v Rambhaji, 9 B H C R 12 (1872), but the law is now altered in this respect by the express words of the section Vithalrao v Vaghaji, 17 B 570 (1892) The Madras High Court has recently taken the same views as those of the Calcutta High Court Nalini v Krishnasawmy, 27 M 157 (1903), Sundara Bai Sahiba v Tirumal Rao Sahib, 33 M 131 (1909)

(1) In Ramdhone Shaw v Nobumoney Dossee Bourke, 218 (1865) (see as to this case the Delhi and London Bank v Wordie, 1 C at p 256, Kellicott v Fraser, 2 C at p 453, Juggodulal Dossee v Padamoney

Dossee 15 B L R 329, Land Mortgage Bank v Suduruddeen Ahmed, 19 C 366 and H H Holkar v Dadabhai, 14 B 353 (1890), the Court was held to have, and in Sreenath Roy v Gally Dass Ghose 5 C 82 (1879), not to have, jurisdiction In Land Mortgage Bank v Suduruddeen Ahmed, 19 C 358 366 (1892) it was suggested that there is a distinction between a vendor's suit and a purchaser's suit for specific performance This case was followed in an appeal from the Mofussil in Jagadis Chandra Doo v Sastrugan Doo, 33 C 1065, 1075 (1906)

(2) See Zulekaba v Ebrahim Haji Vyedina, 37 B 494 (1912) and cases therein cited

(3) Nalini v Krishnasawmy, 27 M 157 (1903)

(4) Jairam Narayan v Atmaram Narayan, 4 B 482 (1880), Balaram v Ramchandra 22 B 926 (1898), Seshagiri v Rama, 10 M 448 (1896), Hara Lal Banerjee v Nitambini, 29 C 315 322 (1901)

(5) It has been held by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court that a Small Cause Court can entertain a suit the principal purpose of which was to determine a right to immoveable property if the relief claimed was for payment of money Puttangiawla v Nilkanth Kalo, 37 B 675 (1913).

any way with land and is therefore cognizable by the High Court, (1) but this has been disputed (2) So also where in a suit by a landlord for rent no relief is claimed in respect of the land, but it becomes necessary to determine what the nature of the tenancy was, that question does not make the suit one "for land" (3) The High Court has also taken cognizance of an application to file an award which provided for the dissolution of a partnership in lands outside the local limits, and also that the defendant's share in the property should stand charged with the payment of a certain fund to be due by him to the plaintiff, and that the defendant should execute a mortgage of his share to the plaintiff as security for such payment, and that the tea garden at Darjiling should be sold in Calcutta (4)

The general Equitable jurisdiction of the High Court on the original side which it has inherited from the supreme Court, which in its turn administered the Chancery Rules, must also be considered (*vide post*) So the Courts of Equity will exercise their powers *in personam* in the case of trustees and others resident within their jurisdiction, to oblige such persons to perform trusts to carry out contracts and to obey the rules of Equity even where the subject-matter of the trust or contract or equity may be land situate out of their jurisdiction (5) Again there is the Equitable jurisdiction by grant of an injunction or appointment of a receiver Thus a suit for damages to certain immovable property by a nuisance caused on it and for an injunction to restrain the nuisance, has been held to be a suit not for immovable property but exclusively *in personam* (6) Similarly, a suit by some of the trustees of an endowment of certain lands against their co trustees in possession for a declaration of plaintiff's title to be *shebait*s jointly with the defendants, for the settlement of a scheme for the performance of the worship for the appointment of a receiver, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the property and for an account is not a suit for those lands (7)

(1) Juggernaut v Brynath 4 C 322 (1878) foll. in Rungo Lal Lohia v Wilson 2 C. W. N. 719 (1898)

(2) Zulekabay v Ibrahim Haji Vyadna, 37 B. 491 (1912) Suit for title decs of immovable property is a suit for immovable property, and see Bussunt Koomaru v Kumal Koomaru 7 S. D. A. Sal. 168

(3) Rungo Lal Lohia v Wilson *supra* nor even though the plaintiff's title to the land in respect of which the rent is sought to be recovered may incidentally come in question Chintaman v Madhavray, 6 B. H. C. R. 29 (1869) and the property is situate in a foreign State Bhujbal v Nanhaju 19 A. 450 (1897) But such suits may be treated as local under special legislation, *vide post*

(4) Kellie v Fraser, 2 C. 445 (187) The grounds of the decision were that the suit did not involve any determination of title to

land being in this respect distinguishable from Delhi and London Bank v Wordie 1 C. 249 (1876) In the case, however of such a suit, and also others outside Presidency towns the effect of clause (d) of the section will have now to be considered.

(5) See Delhi and London Bank v Wordie, 1 C. 249 252 263 (1876), Bagram v Mosca 1 H. J. 284 (1862-3)

(6) Rajmohan Bose v E. I. R. Co. 10 B. L. R. 241 248 (1872) See also East Indian Railway Co v Bengal Coal Co 1 C. 90 100 (1875) Delhi and London Bank v Wordie 1 C. 249 251 263 (1876) and cases there cited. As to the issue of prohibitory orders see Ramlachun Sarkar v Kamineo Dabee 10 B. L. J. 63 n (1868), and Woodroffe v Jijunetti ne 2nd ed., Ch. L.

(7) Joggedumba v Poddumoney 15 B. L. R. 318 321 325, 330 (1875), but see as to receiver Hajeer Ismail v Hadjee Mahomed

An ordinary suit for administration which raises no question of title to the property in suit is not a suit for land (1)¹³ But where a plaintiff sues for a declaration that he was entitled to immediate and absolute possession of properties both moveable and immoveable the latter being wholly situated outside the jurisdiction for the construction of a will for an account by the executrix for administration and other relief it was held that the suit was one for land and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it (2)

Passing to the present section which governs the Provincial Courts having regard to its full and precise language there can hardly be any difference as to the character of the suits to which the principle of local jurisdiction must be held to apply. The insertion of the words '*with or without rent or profits*' is intended to remove any difficulty there may be where the defendant does not reside within the local jurisdiction of the Court within the jurisdiction of which the property is situate. The only clause as to which there is any room for dispute as to its application is clause (d) the words of which are very comprehensive and wide enough to include various classes of suits which might not be held to be for immoveable property under the Letters Patent (3)

The following have been held to be suits of the nature referred to: a suit to have certain lands declared liable for the satisfaction of an instalment bond (4) to enforce a right of hypothecation by sale (5) by vendor to enforce specific performance (6) A bond hypothecating the structure of a house exclusive of the land beneath was held to create an interest in immoveable property (7) A suit is for such an interest which is brought to enforce payment of principal and interest both as a simple contract liability and as a debt secured by a collateral mortgage of immoveable property (8) or for a declaration of title to a share in *raishasans* (allowances) charged on the revenues of villages (9) A right to *balute* was held to be an interest in immoveable property within the meaning of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act 186 (10) A right to hold land free from Government assessment (11) or to have a watercourse opened in one's land was held to be an interest in land, (12)

13 B J R 91 99 (1874) and *Woolf v. Receivers* and see *Mohan Lal v. Girdhar Lal Maharaj* 1 C. 30 A 283 (1913) (success on of shebat proof of title)

(1) See cases referred to in decision cited in next note

(2) *Hara Lal Banerjee v. N. Ramani D I* 99 C 315 (1901)

(3) See *Hukm Chand v. P. C. 27 Res* Jud 310

(4) *Ram Lal Vookerjee v. Chettra Coomaree* 15 W R 27 (1871)

(5) *Koroy Behari v. Ram Narain* 2 Agra 244 *Leslie v. Land Mortgage Bank* 9 B L R 171 (1871) *Ahmecia Begum v. Dabee Persaud* 18 W R 987 (1872) *Mahomed Khulcel v. Sona Koor* 23 W R 123 (1874) *B. Hoo Doss v. Must. Koor* 2

A H C R 19 (1870) *Gudri Lal v. Jagan Nath* 5 A 11 (1886) *Bolakeo Lal v. Perlam Singh* 5 C 923 (1880) *Vatlahrao v. Vaghaj* 17 B 50 (1890)

(6) *Lachman Das v. Haslett* 1891 P P No 39 it being held that the case fell within clause (d)

(7) *Narayana v. Ramasawmy* 8 W H C R 100 (1875)

(8) *Jurneswar v. Mahabeer* 1 C 163 167 (1875) See *Kristna Row v. Hecap* 2 M H C P 307 (1864)

(9) *Keshav v. Vinayak* 23 B 92 (1894)

(10) *Appana v. Nagia* 6 B 512 (1880)

(11) *Bhujang Mahadev v. Collector of Belgaum* 11 B H C R 1 (1874)

(12) *Onloj asree v. Huro K. Shore D. H.* 4 W R 107 (186)

is also a suit for the recovery of purchase money under contract for the sale of land (1) A suit for grazing dues by the lessee of the grass of certain Government land (2) and a suit for the recovery of tolls by the lessee of a Government ferry, (3) involve an interest in immoveable property, and have on that ground been held to be not cognizable by a Provincial Court of Small Causes And hypothecation of immoveable property creates an interest in that property within the meaning of that Act (4) Clause (c) has now been amended to include both mortgages and charges and suits for sale as well as those for foreclosure or redemption

A suit to enforce a foreign judgment (5) a suit upon an agreement to grant a lease (6) and a suit to follow the purchase money of land taken up under the Land Acquisition Act over which the plaintiff had a mortgage lien (7) and a suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs were the persons in reality beneficially interested in a decree for sale on a mortgage although the decree did not run in their names (8) are not suits of the nature mentioned in clause (d)

Clause (e) contemplates an essentially different class of suits viz suits for money as distinct from those for property They have been treated as local as the wrong forming their basis must usually take place where the property is situate, and they can also be most conveniently inquired into there (9) A suit for compensation for wrong to immoveable property is unless within the proviso within the intention of the section and a claim for damage to land cannot be said to be a claim which can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, even though it may be joined with a claim for an injunction (10)

As regards clause (f) it has been already pointed out (11) that moveable property is generally deemed to follow the person and the reasons why an exception is made where the property is under distraint or attachment and therefore incapable of a change of position

It is to be observed, generally, that suits for money or moveable property may be treated as local under special legislation Thus while as a general rule suits for rent are not suits for immoveable property (12) and do not therefore fall within this section sects 144 and 193 of the Bengal Tenancy Act make special provisions as regards suits between landlord and tenant (13)

Proviso—This proviso relates to the well known Equitable jurisdiction *in personam* According to the maxim Equity acts *in personam* that is

(1) *Maturi Subbayya v Kota Krishnayya* 28 M. 227 (1904)

(2) *Khuda Baksh v Dana* 1895 P. R. No. 13

(3) *Cokal Chand v Lal Chand* 1897 P. P. No. 48

(4) *Munoo Lal v Pique* 10 W. R. 3 J (1868)

(5) *Droop v Focke* J. W. 1 215 (1865)

(6) *Lalla Ram v Bibee Chowban* W. 1 157 (1874)

(7) *Venkatat Krishnasami* 6 M. 341 (1882)

(8) *Ahmad Khan v Abdul Rahman* 26 A. 603 (1901)

(9) See *Hukm Chand v C. P. C. 2 J*

(10) *Crap v Watson* 20 C. 689 (1893)

(11) *Idem* ante 1 4

(12) *Vide ante* 1 157

(13) *Chowdhry Fazlur Dwarka Nath v C. W. N. 402 (1903)* and as to Bengal Acts VI of 1862 and I of 1879 see *Nalmoni Singh Dhar v N. N. Nath* 20 C. 425 (1892).

it regards its decrees as commands or directions addressed to the defendant personally rather than as decisions directly affecting the subject matter of dispute. Though the Court cannot, in the case of lands situate without the jurisdiction, give relief *in rem* still it can enforce its judgment, which is *in personam* by process *in personam*, as by attachments of the person, lands, and goods of the defendant within the jurisdiction until the defendant complies with the order of the Court. Thus in accordance with the principle laid down in the leading case on the subject, *Penn v Lord Baltimore*, (1) the Court of Chancery has entertained actions for account and discovery of rents and profits, for specific performance and injunction, for foreclosure of mortgages, and for the execution of conveyances and the like regarding lands situate abroad, and whether within the King's Dominions or not, though if the very title itself to the lands is in question, the Court will not assume jurisdiction (2).

The Courts have thus compelled the performance of contracts and trusts, which were not either locally or *ratione domicilii* within their jurisdiction (3). But in this country the power to make orders *in personam*, though the subject matter of the suit is without the jurisdiction, which jurisdiction exists both in the case of the High Courts and the Provincial Courts must be considered with reference to the limitations on jurisdiction imposed in the case of the former by the Letters Patent and in the case of the latter by the provisions of this section. In the case of the High Courts, regard must be had to the real object of the suit and to what are the rights and intentions of the respective parties and those cases which are founded upon the principle laid down in *Penn v Baltimore* must be distinguished from those which depend not so much upon the jurisdiction generally exercised by Courts of Equity, as upon the question whether the suit is substantially one within the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts (4). So when a suit which, though in form one brought for an injunction or relief obtained through personal obedience, is in substance a suit "for land," which land is situate without the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court the latter has no power to grant the relief prayed (5). The Equitable jurisdiction of the High Courts is not as extensive as that which has been claimed by the Court of Chancery (6). Though the Courts here are governed by the same principles as those which are acted upon by Courts of Equity in England this is only so far as such principles are not at variance with express legislative enactment (7).

The test of jurisdiction in all such cases is rather the nature of the claim

(1) 2 White and Tudor, L. C. 837, 5th ed.

(2) See Woodroffe's Injunctions, 3rd ed. § 19, and cases there cited and *ante* p 157.

(3) *Ewing v Ewing* 9 A. C. 34 cited in *Kashinath v Anant*, 2 Bom. L. R. 47, 49 (1899), but the jurisdiction has its limits, see *In re Hawthorne*, 23 Ch. D. 743, *ref to in* *Keshav v Vinayak*, 23 B. at p 27 (1897).

(4) *Delhi and London Bank v Wordie*, 1 C. 219, 263 (1876), *Land Mortgage Bank v Suluruddeen Ahmed*, 19 C. 354, 367 (1892).

(5) *Last Indian Railway Co v Bengal*

Coal Co, 1 C. 90 (1875), similarly in the case of relief by receiver *Delhi and London Bank v Wordie*, *supra*.

(6) *Idem ante*, p 156. So it has been pointed out that the express words of clause 12 of the Letters Patent render the principles of the decision in *Paget v Edel*, L. R. 18 L. Q. 118, inapplicable. *Last Indian Railway Co v Bengal Coal Co*, 1 C. 95, 100 (1875).

(7) *Kashinath v Anant*, 2 Bom. L. R. 47 (1899).

made in respect of the property in suit rather than the actual situation of the latter. If the suit is not by reason of its substantial character and the provisions of the Charters within the cognizance of the Court the latter is unable to grant relief. But where the relief sought is purely *in personam* and not *in rem* the Courts are empowered to make a decree which shall be of the same character (1).

The same rule applies in the case of Courts other than the Presidency High Courts, but in this case the provisions of this section must be considered. Under it such Courts may exercise a jurisdiction *in personam* but the jurisdiction seems to be of a more limited extent. Not only are they expressly deprived of power to entertain suits for foreclosure sale or redemption but the limitations imposed by clause (d) are in terms extensive and the proviso determining their powers to act *in personam* limits the exercise of such powers to cases where the property is held by or on behalf of the defendant (2) resident within the jurisdiction (3) when the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, and where the property is situated in British India (4).

“Actually and voluntarily resides —As to the meaning of these words, see the notes to sect. 20

17 Where a suit is to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immoveable property situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts, the suit may be instituted in any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate

Provided that, in respect of the value of the subject matter of the suit, the entire claim is cognizable by such Court

Scope of section —This section gives jurisdiction to a Court to entertain a suit in respect of properties partly situate within its territorial limits and partly out of it where the same relief is sought in respect of the whole of the properties (5). The section corresponds to sects 11 and 12 of the Code of 1859, as also to sect. 19 of the last Code with the exception that the

(1) See Woodroffe's Injunctions 3rd ed p. 47

(2) Crisp v. Watson 20 C. 689 (1893) in which the proviso was held not to apply where the wrong for which compensation was sought was trespass to property in the plaintiff's possession. The reason of the restriction introduced by these words does not appear to be clear but to make the proviso applicable the property must be so held at the time of the institution of the suit. Lachman Das v. Bhaskari 1891 P. R. No. 39

Hukm Chand C. P. C. 28.

(3) Isak v. Khatija 23 B. 56 (1899) s. c. 1 Bom. L. R. 30

(4) See Keshav v. Nayak 23 B. 22 (1897) (dist. Ratanahankar v. Gulabankar 4 B. H. C. P. 173 (186) in which the question of the only incidentally arose) where the suit was held to fall within the substantive clause of s. 16 of the Code of 1859 and was not covered by the proviso.

(5) Massey v. Steel 11 C. at 1006 (185)

it regards its decrees as commands or directions addressed to the defendant personally rather than as decisions directly affecting the subject matter of dispute. Though the Court cannot, in the case of lands situate without the jurisdiction, give relief *in rem* still it can enforce its judgment, which is *in personam* by process *in personam*, as by attachments of the person, lands, and goods of the defendant within the jurisdiction until the defendant complies with the order of the Court. Thus in accordance with the principle laid down in the leading case on the subject, *Penn v Lord Baltimore*,⁽¹⁾ the Court of Chancery has entertained actions for account and discovery of rents and profits, for specific performance and injunction, for foreclosure of mortgages, and for the execution of conveyances and the like regarding lands situate abroad, and whether within the King's Dominions or not, though if the very title itself to the lands is in quest on, the Court will not assume jurisdiction.⁽²⁾

The Courts have thus compelled the performance of contracts and trusts, which were not either locally or *ratione domicilii* within their jurisdiction.⁽³⁾ But in this country the power to make orders *in personam*, though the subject matter of the suit is without the jurisdiction, which jurisdiction exists both in the case of the High Courts and the Provincial Courts, must be considered with reference to the limitations on jurisdiction imposed in the case of the former by the Letters Patent, and in the case of the latter by the provisions of this section. In the case of the High Courts regard must be had to the real object of the suit and to what are the rights and intentions of the respective parties, and those cases which are founded upon the principle laid down in *Penn v Baltimore* must be distinguished from those which depend not so much upon the jurisdiction generally exercised by Courts of Equity, as upon the question whether the suit is substantially one within the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts.⁽⁴⁾ So when a suit which, though in form one brought for an injunction or relief obtained through personal obedience, is in substance a suit 'for land,' which land is situate without the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court the latter has no power to grant the relief prayed.⁽⁵⁾ The Equitable jurisdiction of the High Courts is not as extensive as that which has been claimed by the Court of Chancery.⁽⁶⁾ Though the Courts here are governed by the same principles as those which are acted upon by Courts of Equity in England this is only so far as such principles are not at variance with express legislative enactment.⁽⁷⁾

The test of jurisdiction in all such cases is rather the nature of the claim

(1) 2 White and Tudor, L C 837, 5th ed.
 (2) See Woodroffe's Injunctions, 3rd ed. § 19 and cases there cited, and *ante*, p 157.
 (3) *Ewing v Ewing*, 9 A C 34, cited in *Kashnath v Anant*, 2 Bom L R 47, 49 (1899), but the jurisdiction has its limits see *In re Hawthorne*, 23 Ch D 743 ref to in *Kashnath v Vinayak*, 23 B at p 27 (1897).
 (4) *Delhi and London Bank v Wordie*, 1 C 249, 263 (1876), *Land Mortgage Bank v Suruddeen Ahmed*, 19 C 358, 367 (1892).
 (5) *Last Indian Railway Co v Bengal*

Coal Co, 1 C 95 (1875), similarly in the case of relief by receiver *Delhi and London Bank v Wordie*, *supra*.

(6) *Idem ante*, p 156. So it has been pointed out that the express words of clause 12 of the Letters Patent render the principles of the decision in *Paget v Edo*, L R 18 Eq 118, inapplicable. *Last Indian Railway Co v Bengal Coal Co*, 1 C 95, 100 (1875).

(7) *Kashnath v Anant*, 2 Bom L R 47 (1899).

last paragraph of that section relating to property situated in different districts, and the words 'within the limits of a single district but' before "within the jurisdiction" in the first clause of the present section, have been omitted. The words 'to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to immoveable property' should not, it is submitted, be construed in any restricted sense, but embrace all suits relating to immoveable property mentioned in sect 16 (1). The provisions of this section are intended for the benefit of litigants and to avoid multiplicity of suits. It says nothing as to one or more causes of action. And it applies to a suit in which the relief claimed is in respect of more than one cause of action unity of cause of action in respect of which relief is claimed being immaterial (2). Where there is but one cause of action in respect of different properties situate in different jurisdictions a plaintiff should avail himself of the provisions of this section, and if he does not a second suit will not lie (3). Where jurisdiction has once properly vested in a Court it will not be taken away by reason of a *bond fide* compromise withdrawing the claim in respect of property within the jurisdiction (4). The section, however, while it gives opportunities to the litigant, does not extend the powers of the Court except in so far as upon the initiative of the former it obtains jurisdiction. Neither under this section, nor otherwise, has the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction power to confer jurisdiction on a Court in District A to deal with a suit commenced and prosecuted in District B relating to lands in B. Nor does the Code empower the High Court without consent of parties, to change two suits one of which it has itself dismissed, into one suit of a totally different description from either of them (5).

A Scheduled District not being a district within the meaning of this section, a Court at Moradabad was held not to have jurisdiction over a suit relating to immoveable property, of which a large portion was in Tarai District, so far as that portion was concerned (6).

The section does not apply to the Presidency High Courts and therefore

(1) As to mortgage suits *vide post*, and as to foreclosure *Rhetter Mohun Das v Chundermoney*, Coryton 125 (1864), sales of land *Ashraf Hossein v Lazarus*, S D N W 1861 p 588, cited in O'Keefe's C P C, partition *Anup Shah Singh v Jaswant Shah Singh*, 1891, P F No 10 cited in *Hukm Chand v P C 330*.

(2) *Harchandrar Singh v Lal Bahadur Singh* 16 A 359 (1894).

(3) *Jumona Dass v Bamasoondree*, 2 W R 148 (1865). In *Sabba Rau v Rama Rau* 3 M H C R 376 (1867) however which was also decided under Act VIII of 1862, which required the leave of a superior Court [see *Harchandrar Singh v Lal Bahadur Singh* 16 A at pp 361 362 (1894)] it was held that the section was permissive, and that separate suits for partition would lie

[*cf*, *Grish Chander Vookerjee v Ramcesuree Dabee*, 22 W R 308 309 (1874), *Pattarav v Audimula* M H C R 419 (1870)]. It is submitted that is not now law. See as to suits for partial partition, *Harī Narayan v Ganpatrav* B 272 (1883), *Chandu v Annahamed*, 14 M 321, 326 (1891), *Harides Sanjal v Prannath*, 12 C 566 (1886), *Mukunda v Leheraux*, 20 C 379, 383 (1892),

Kubra Jan v Ram Bah 30 A 560 (1908).

(5) *Kamun Boradasi Chowdhram v Kaly Prosnano Ghose*, 12 I A 215 (1885), 12 C 225 (1885).

(6) *Ram Ratan v Lalta Prasad*, 17 A 483 (1895).

when part of the immovable property is without the jurisdiction, leave must be obtained prior to the institution of the suit (1) The restrictive words of clause 12 of the Letters Patent apply to the case of a plaintiff, there is no similar restraining provision applicable to a case where the person seeking the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction is the defendant (2)

Suit Execution—Applications for execution are proceedings in suits (3) being but a continuation of the proceedings in the suit in which the decree was passed (4) But they are not a suit, and the section deals with the institution of a suit Jurisdiction over execution proceedings depended, it was held, on the provisions of sect 223 of the last Code and the present provisions had reference to original suits only A decree holder could not, it was held, therefore, take execution proceedings relating to or against immoveable property at his option under this section simply on the ground that a portion of the property was situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction (5) *Prima facie*, however, every Court having jurisdiction to try a suit has jurisdiction to execute its own decree in that suit (6) If a Court has jurisdiction under this section to entertain a suit and to make a decree for sale it follows that it has jurisdiction to sell all and every parcel of property comprised in the decree although one or other of the parcels may be beyond the local limits of its jurisdiction (7) And it has been recently held that while the provisions of sects 38 and 39 indicate that no Court can execute a decree in which the subject matter of the suit or of the application for execution is property wholly situated outside the local limits of its jurisdiction yet there are several exceptions to this rule, as in cases of decrees for sale of mortgaged property or in cases of

(1) *Prasannamoyi Dasi v Kadambini Dasi*, 3 B L R, O C, 85 (1869), *Jagadamba v Padmamani*, 6 B L R 686 (1871), *Bank of Hindustan v Nundololl Sen*, 11 B L R 301 (1873), *Jairam v Atmaram* 4 B 482 (1890), *Seshagiri v Rama*, 19 M 448 (1896), and *ante*, p 164 The decision in *Narain Singh v Ram Lal Mookherjee*, 3 C 370 (1878), is not law S 19 of the last Code did not apply to the High Court

(2) *Kissory Mohun Roy v Bahk Churn Ghose*, 24 C 190 (1897) But see *Sarkar v Nahapet*, 37 C 907 (1910)

(3) S 139, *post*

(4) *Gopi Mohan Roy v Drylak Nundun Sen* 19 C 13 15 (1891)

(5) In *Shurroop Chunder v Amecrunnissa* S C 705 (1882) it was said that the change introduced by s 19 has been accepted as applicable to execution proceedings also No authority was cited, however in support of this statement and the observation was not necessary for the decision which is dealt with *post*, and which was to the effect that a Court should proceed with the execution of its

decree as against an entire revenue paying estate, even though a part of it be situate outside the jurisdiction it being added that the case would be different if the property consisted of different taluks or estates the whole of any one or more of which was situate in the other districts As regards portions of the same property the rule was independent of s 19, having been recognized under the former Code See *Hukm Chand C P C* 331 332, *Kally Prasanno Boso v Dinanath Mullick* 11 B L R 56 (1873) *Unnoool Chunder v Hurry Nath* 2 C L R 331 (1877) *Gunga Narain v Annunla* 12 C L R 404 (1883), *Ram Lal Moitra v Bama Sundari* 12 C 307 (1885) *Masick v Steel* 14 C 601 (1887) *Ghose J* held that s 223 of 2 of the last Code was to be construed as if the word wholly was inserted after *situate* See notes to s 34 *post*

(6) *Jagannath Sahai v D J Puri & Co* C 571 874 (1896)

(7) *Gopi Mohan Poy v D J Puri & Co* C 19 C 13 15 (1891)

attachment of salaries of public officers and of sale of entire estates situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of more than one Court under O XXI r 3 (1) It was held that sect 223, clause (c) of the former Code was not mandatory, but gave a discretion to the Court (2) So a Court which had jurisdiction to pass a decree for the sale of property comprised in a mortgage had also power to carry out its decree by selling the property, even though a portion of the property was situated outside the local limits of its jurisdiction (3) See now notes to sect 38, *post*

18 (1) *Where* it is alleged to be uncertain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of which of two or more Courts any immoveable property is situate, any one of those Courts may, if satisfied that there is ground for the alleged uncertainty, record a statement to that effect and thereupon proceed to entertain and dispose of any suit relating to that property, and its decree in the suit shall have the same effect as if the property were situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction

Place of institution of suit where local limits of jurisdiction of Courts are uncertain

Provided that the suit is one with respect to which the Court is competent as regards the nature and value of the suit to exercise jurisdiction

(2) Where a statement has not been recorded under subsection (1), and an objection is taken before an appellate or revisional Court that a decree or order in a suit relating to such property was made by a Court not having jurisdiction where the property is situate, the appellate or revisional Court shall not allow the objection *unless* in its opinion there was, at the time of the institution of the suit, *no* reasonable ground for uncertainty as to the Court having jurisdiction with respect thereto, *and there has been a consequent failure of justice*

Uncertainty of local limits—This section was inserted in the Code of 1882 by sect 6, Act VII of 1888, with a view to avoid a difficulty as to juris-

(1) Begg Dunlop v Jagannath 14 C L J 228, 231 (1911)

(2) Gopi Mohan Roy v Doybaki Nundun, 19 C 13 (1891)

(3) Tineouri Debya v Shub Chandra Lal, 21 C 639 (1894), Shurroop Chunder v Amcerunn v 8 C 703 (188-), Maseyk v Hill 14 C 661 (1887), Gopi Mohan Roy v Doybaki Nundun Sen, 19 C 13 (1891), Jagannath Sahai v Dip Paru, 22 C 871 (1895) which were all cases of suits on mortgages. In Maseyk v Steel, 14 C at pp 663,

670 Petheram C J, said he was not prepared to accept the view of the law laid down in some cases that where a sale takes place under a money decree—that is otherwise than under directions contained in the decree itself—sale of property without the jurisdiction of the executing Court was valid in consequence of the provisions of ss 19 and 293 of the last Code. Attention is drawn to the arguments in this case, and now to s 38, *post*, where the matter is discussed

dition which frequently arises where the boundaries of estates or holdings are destroyed or altered by fluvial action (1) The fact that no notification was known as laying down the boundaries of the district in which it was contended that a suit should have been brought was held to create a reasonable uncertainty in the matter (2) In the same suit it was held that a suit for rent of a fishery was a suit for immovable property within the meaning of this section (3) The italicized words have been added in order still further to restrict the taking of technical objections as to jurisdiction

19 *Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to moveable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts.*

Illustrations

(a) A, residing in Delhi, beats B in Calcutta B may sue A either in Calcutta or in Delhi

(b) A, residing in Delhi publishes in Calcutta statements defamatory of B B may sue A either in Calcutta or in Delhi

Suits for compensation—This section creates a special jurisdiction in the case of actionable wrongs but in the cases of tort to which it does not apply resort may be had to the next section which is of general application in all cases (4) Thus the section appears only to contemplate Courts in British India, and therefore to be restricted to cases in which both the wrong is done and the defendant resides etc., in British India (5) Inasmuch also as it refers to suits for compensation only it would appear to exclude suits for an injunction against disturbance of rights such as rights of patent, trade mark, etc., which will fall within the general words of sect 20 Whether the cause of action in such suits be the right disturbed or the disturbance caused to it or both has not been judicially settled (6) In cases however falling within this section the Court where the wrong is done will have jurisdiction quite apart from all considerations of the place where the right violated by the wrong came into existence or existed

“Wrong done”—The word wrong in this section means an actionable wrong It is essential to an action on tort that the act complained of should

(1) Vide Mr Scoble's speech Legislative Council 10th March, 1888

(2) Shiba Halder v Oop Sundari 21 C. 449 (1897)

(3) *Id.*, s c, 2 C. W. N. 163

(4) *Idea etc* 1 150

(5) Hukm Chand v 1 C. 3.

(6) *Id.* 3. for a suit for infringement of copyright and injunction see MacMillan v Zaka 19 B. 33 (1895).

be legally wrongful, that is prejudicially affecting the complainant in some legal right, such as rights of reputation, bodily safety, freedom and property (1) The words "wrong done" are, however, not altogether free from difficulty, a wrong consists of an act or omission, and both are often complex notions involving a series of acts or omissions, and sometimes extending over a lengthened period and comprising their voluntary and involuntary consequences as to which as explained in Mr Hukm Chand's work on Consent, (2) no sharp line can be drawn between those which may and which may not be considered a part of the act itself Causing a person to be falsely charged with a criminal offence is an actionable wrong but where the only act done within the jurisdiction pursuant to a conspiracy formed in a native State was the giving of false evidence, which is not in itself an actionable wrong, it was held that a suit for the injury caused in consequence of giving false evidence could not be instituted in the High Court, as no cause of action arose within its jurisdiction (3)

7) 20 Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises

- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, or
- (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution, or
- (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

Explanation I—Where a person has a permanent dwelling at one place and also a temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence

Explanation II.—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in British India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place

(1) Templeton & Laurie, 2 Bom L R 211, C 127, 128, where the subject is discussed L J, 201 (1900)

(3) Templeton & Laurie, *supra*

(2) At p 201, and see same author s C P

Illustrations

(a) A is a tradesman in Calcutta. B carries on business in Delhi. B by his agent in Calcutta, buys goods of A and requests A to deliver them to the East Indian Railway Company. A delivers the goods accordingly in Calcutta. A may sue B for the price of the goods either in Calcutta where the cause of action has arisen, or in Delhi where B carries on business.

(b) A resides at Simla. B at Calcutta, and C at Delhi. A, B and C being together at Benares, B and C make a joint promissory note payable on demand and deliver it to A. A may sue B and C at Benares, where the cause of action arose. He may also sue them at Calcutta where B resides, or at Delhi where C resides, but in each of these cases if the non resident defendant objects the suit cannot proceed without the leave of the Court.

"Subject to the limitations aforesaid"—These limitations are those referred to in sect. 16 as "pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law" and, by implication, sect. 15 (1). See Notes to that section. The jurisdiction is subject to special Acts such as the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, but inasmuch as a plaintiff may select the forum in which to bring his suit

there was in existence at the date of suit a Small Cause Court at B. To hold otherwise would be to compel the plaintiff to sue at B and thus to deprive him of his choice of forum. If, however, there had been a Small Cause Court at A the suit would, if the plaintiff selected A as his forum have to be instituted in the Small Cause Court (2).

"Every suit"—The words in the last Code were *all other suits* which was held to mean all suits other than those mentioned in sect. 16 (3).

"Shall be instituted"—This section lays down the rule as to the forum of personal actions, which may be either that of the place of accrual of the cause of action or the place of the defendant. As already observed where a suit may be filed in more than one of several Courts it is a general principle of law that the plaintiff may select the forum in which to bring the suit (4). The section mentions several independent grounds of jurisdiction and where several of such grounds exist giving jurisdiction to different Courts the plaintiff may select which of these Courts he chooses. Thus the cause of action may arise in the case of suits arising out of contracts in the three different places mentioned in the third Explanation to this section under the last Code and the defendants may reside in a fresh place and a plaintiff may choose either of such places as the forum of his suit (5). *Idem post*

(1) Fazlur Rahim v. Dwarka Nath 30 C 453 456 (1903), s.c. 7 C W N 402.

(2) Ratnagiri Pillai v. Ravuthan 19 M 479 (1896).

(3) Fazlur Rahim v. Dwarka Nath *supra*.

(4) Ratnagiri Pillai v. Ravuthan, 19 M 477 (1896).

(5) Ratnagiri Pillai v. Ravuthan 19 M 477 (1896). But see as to the limitation of such power s. 22 *post* and *Geffert v. I*

Forum of the defendant—Where the cause of action wholly arises in the jurisdiction of a Court other than that in which the suit is brought, the plaintiff must show (the onus being upon him (1)) such a residence, carrying on business or working for gain of the defendant, (2) which is within the terms of this section or in the case of the Presidency High Courts (to which this section does not apply), within the terms of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. In either case there is no question that the term "defendant" includes a foreigner when that foreigner dwells or resides or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction (3). It is well settled also that the carrying on of business need not be personal, but may be by means of an agent (4). There is however a conflict upon the point whether the Court has jurisdiction in the case of a foreigner who is non resident and carries on business through an agent (5).

As regards several defendants, the section makes express provision. Either all the defendants must reside, etc., or there must be leave by the Court or absence of objection by the defendants. If the defendants who do not reside etc., within the local jurisdiction did not apply under sect 21 of the last Code they were held to have acquiesced, the intention of the Legislature being that objection should be raised on the first opportunity (6). Under the last Code it was held that the acquiescence must be by the defendant who resides etc. outside the jurisdiction. Where therefore, the cause of action in a suit against three defendants was held to have arisen outside the jurisdiction and one of such defendants resided outside the jurisdiction but did not acquiesce in the suit, it was held that if there were any acquiescence on the part of other defendants residing within the jurisdiction, it did not give the Court jurisdiction to try the suit (7).

hand 13 B 178 (1888). If on the other hand the suit is not for immovable property, and none of the facts mentioned in this section exist the Court has no jurisdiction. See *Chung v Focke* 9 W R 215 (1863).

(1) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 11 B 541, at p 552 (1890). In an early case a bond reciting the obligor to be 'of Calcutta' was held *prima facie* evidence of residence. *Ramram Dutt v Pannaram*, 1 Mor 369 (1837).

(2) *Modhu Soodun Chowdhry v Cochrane*, 6 C L R 417 (1880).

(3) *Kessowji Damodar v Khimji*, 12 B 507, 518, 519 (1888). And see *Agha Ghofan Husein v Sassoon Bom Gaz*, 26th Jan. 1897, *Badrudin v Karimbhai*, 1898, Bom P J 29, cited in *Hulm Chand*, C P C 286.

(4) *Girdhar Damodar v Kassarig*, 17 B 66, 605 (1893) which was a decision on the Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), and *Mutlaja Chetti v Allan* 1 M 209 (1880), *Kessowji Damodar v Khimji* 12 B 507, 521 (1888) decisions on the Letters Patent. In

Annamalai Chetty v Murugasa, 26 M 514 (1903), it was held that the manager of a joint family was not an agent. As to agency in insolvency law see *In re Dhunput Singh*, 20 C 771 (1893), diss from *In re Huruck Chand Golecha*, 5 C 603 (1880).

(5) In *Kessowji Damodar v Khimji*, 12 B 507 (1888), it was held that there was no jurisdiction. In *Girdhar v Kassarig*, 17 B 662 (1893), it was held that there was jurisdiction, the word defendant having the same meaning in all cases. In *Annamalai Chetty v Murugasa*, 26 M 514 (1903), the Privy Council left the point open, s.c., 5 Bom L R 194, 7 C W N 754, and in lower Court, 23 M 459. There will be jurisdiction in such cases if the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction. *Bayah Meah v Khajee Meah* 4 M H C R 218 (1860).

(6) *Viraragava v Krishnasami*, 6 M 314 319 (1882). See *Ismail Peer Ambalam v Neelamagam*, 8 M L J R 38.

(7) *Bibaji v Lakshmidhar*, 9 B 206 (1884).

The rule contained in clause (b) is based on the now generally recognized principle of the connection of the cause of action, (1) but there is nothing corresponding to it in the Letters Patent. It was held under the last Code (2) that the proviso following clause (c) in that Code applied only to that clause and not to clauses (a) and (b). The reconstruction of the section, as also the addition of the words "in such case," makes this clear.

In the case of clause 12 of the Letters Patent it has been held that the word "defendant" in that clause means all the defendants, if there are several defendants to a suit. It is not sufficient that one of the defendants should dwell or carry on business within the jurisdiction (3).

"Actually"—The residence is required to be actual, both to exclude what is merely colourable and collusive, and therefore no residence at all, and to emphasize what has been a growing tendency viz to substitute for mere domicile or constructive residence the actual state of affairs at the institution of the suit. This does not mean that the defendant must be personally present within the jurisdiction at the date of the suit. Although a defendant may be temporarily absent from his dwelling yet if he retains it and intends to return to it he will be held to dwell there (4). Actual residence does not of course, require a continual actual presence every day and every hour in the place of residence or exclude temporary absence from the locality in which it lies (5). What is required is that the place should be the actual residence of the defendant when the suit is instituted. So a person who had dwelt and carried on business in Bombay for twenty years and had only occasionally visited Ahmadabad where was the family home was held to be actually residing in Bombay (6). And where a person is in service at any place, whether of the Government (7) or of a private person (8) he has been held not to dwell at another place where he has a family house in which his father lived and which he occasionally visited, even though the service be of a domestic character (9). The decision in the last cited case proceeded on the ground that the word "dwell" must be used in the sense of actual residence, and the place where a servant is in service of a domestic character cannot be looked upon as a lodging for a temporary purpose only but as a dwelling place, although he may have the intention of returning at some future time to another dwelling where his family resides.

(1) *Hukm Chand*, C. P. C. 325

(2) *Zamiran v. Fatch Ali*, 32 C. 146 150 (1904)

(3) *Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee Mahomed* 13 B. L. R. 91 (1874). In *Bhukandas v. Lal Lubhai*, 17 B. 562 (1892), the liability being both joint and several, the suit was decreed against the defendant resident in Bombay and dismissed as against the rest, who were subsequently sued elsewhere there being it was held *no res judicata* as against them.

(4) *Madho Dass v. Sita Ram* 3 N. W. 1 121 (1871). Dwelling or residence means that place where a person has his fixed permanent

home to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. *Fatima Sakina* A. 51, 52 (1875).

(5) *Hukm Chand* C. P. C. 312 citing *Narainjan Das v. Ramkissen* 1879 P. I. C. 91.

(6) *Ugarchan v. Sirajmull* 2 Bom. L. R. 605 (1900).

(7) *Dwarkanath v. Sirdar* 1 S. D. A. C. at p. 410 (1810).

(8) *Celina v. Govind* 10 B. H. C. I. 409 (1873).

(9) *Pargash Paray v. Hachum* 7 W. R. 417 (1867).

"Voluntarily."—Under the Code of 1859 a person was held to reside for the purpose of jurisdiction even where he was lawfully confined (1) It is, however, a general principle that a person's compulsory residence at any place is not deemed sufficient to give jurisdiction over him to the Courts of that place, and the word "voluntarily" appears to have been used to give legislative sanction to that view

"Resides"—The corresponding expression used in the Code of 1859 and in the Small Cause Court Act was "dwell," the word which still exists in clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Presidency High Courts (2) The first point to be determined is whether there is any difference between the meaning of the two expressions and secondly, what the meaning is In an early case, (3) Levinge J, said "I consider that the word 'dwell' has a more extended signification than the word 'reside,' and means a permanent, as opposed to a mere temporary, residence A traveller putting up at an hotel may be said in one sense to reside there, but a man can only be said to dwell, in the sense in which that term is used as giving jurisdiction, in the place where he ordinarily and permanently resides" It has, however, been said that little or no distinction can be drawn between the two words and the meaning implied in them and that, if any distinction can be drawn, it would appear that "dwell" has a more extended signification than "reside" (4) In other cases it has been said that the terms are synonymous and express the same thing the only difference being that they are perhaps in ordinary usage applied to different classes of society, (5) and that "dwell" is of Saxon and "reside" of Latin origin (6) In a legal sense, neither term has any meaning which can be precisely defined In the first place, the word need not necessarily have the same meaning in different enactments, nor even in different sections of the same enactment The terms must be construed according to what may be supposed to have been the intention of the Legislature in using it (7)

(1) See cases cited in notes to s 16 of O'Keefe's C P C, and Hukm Chand, C P C 314, 315

(2) The Supreme Courts had jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the Presidency towns, the word *inhabitant* for the purpose of jurisdiction meaning *resident* Ram Narain Fanker v Chederaulah Narsiah, 1 Mor 371 (1837) As to the length of time necessary, see Madoo v Bulloo, 1 Mor 370, Panchanand Bose v Davison, 1 Mor 371

(3) Farnitoll v Kidd, 2 Hyde, 117 (1861) To dwell in a place is to have one's permanent abode there Madho Dass v Sita Ram, 3 N W P 121 (1871)

(4) Everett v Freer, 8 M. 205, 206 (1885)

(5) Mahomed Shuffli v Laldin Abduls B 227, 229 (1878)

(6) Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanji 14 B 541, 547 (1890) and see Encyclopedia Dictionary in which 'reside' is defined "to

dwell permanently or for a length of time, to have one's home or settled abode, to abide continuously or for a lengthened period" Synonymous meanings are given also in Webster's and Latham's Dictionaries cited at pp 548, 549 And see Pargash Paray v Hachim, 7 W R 417 (1867), in which it was pointed out that the term "dwell" is ambiguous and in it was interpreted as meaning actual and usual place of residence The expressions are elastic Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanji, 14 B at p 548 The words dwelling or residence are synonymous with domicile or home Fatima v Sakina, 1 A 52 (1875) As to the meaning of condition of residence in a will see Tagore v Tagore, 11 B L R 60 (1874)

(7) Ramchandra v Keshav, 6 B 100, 101 (1891), Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanji, 14 B at p 542 (1891)

According to this supposed intention the terms may receive a larger or more restricted meaning (1) It is necessary to consider, in determining this intention what the object of the enactment was So it has been held that sect 382 of the former Code (corresponding with O XXV r 1 of this Code) shows the intention of the Legislature to have been that "residence" should be residence under such circumstances as will afford reasonable probability that the plaintiff will be forthcoming when the suit is decided (2) And it has been held that under O V r 9 the place where a defendant "resides" is the place where he eats, drinks and sleeps or where his family and servants eat, drink and sleep (3) Bare residence has been considered sufficient under sect 648 of the former Code (corresponding with sect 136 of this Code), so as to render a party liable to arrest, presumably because such an interpretation will best give effect to the intentions of the Legislature (4) The term non resident in sect 37 of the last Code (or O III r 2 of this) should be construed broadly and favourably to the enforcement of legal rights so as not to prevent a creditor from enforcing

nothing to show that the residence contemplated by sect 5 of that Act (11 & 12 Vict c 21) must necessarily be a permanent residence The term is used to distinguish the position of such persons from that of one who merely comes in and uses his presence within the jurisdiction as the means of obtaining the benefit of the Act, and it also has the effect of excluding persons merely in the position of visitors (6) As to jurisdiction in the case of infants, see below (7)

As regards the construction of these terms, as used in reference to jurisdiction, it has been variously said that when they are used to give jurisdiction they must be taken to be used in their strictest sense, (8) that they are to be construed broadly, so as to prevent a debtor from evading the claims of his creditors, the intention of the Legislature being favourable to the enforcement of legal rights, (9) and that they are to be used in their usual and ordinary acceptation, neither strained to amplify the jurisdiction of the Court nor narrowed to minimize it (10) It is, however, submitted that in consulting the

(1) *Nahomed Shuffi v Laidin*, 3 B 227, 229 (1878)

(2) *Id*

(3) *Kumud v Jotindra* 38 C 334 (1911), 13 C L J 221

(4) *Everet v Frere*, 8 M. 205 (1835), in which case an officer proceeding from Burmah to England on leave resided a few days in Madras on the way and the residence was held sufficient

(5) *Ramchandra v Keshav*, 6 B 100, 102 (1831)

(6) In the matter of *De Momet*, 21 C. 634 (1834), dist., *In re Tithins*, 1 B L 1, O C 51 (1808), in which the insolvent had a

permanent residence outside the jurisdiction and in the matter of *Ram Paul Singh*, 8 C L R 14 (1831), where the insolvent merely came to Calcutta to file his petition and his family residence was at Bhagalpore

(7) *In re Meakin*, 21 B 137 (1896), and see *Nusserwanjee Pestonjee Wadia v Eleonora Pestonjee*, 38 B 125 (1913)

(8) *Emmell v Kidd*, 2 Hyde, 117, 118 (1864)

(9) *Ramchandra v Keshav*, 6 B 100, 102 (1831)

(10) *Shri Goawami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 11 B 541, 543 (1899)

grounds upon which jurisdiction is given on account of residence a guide will be found to the true interpretation of the term, and the grounds upon which such jurisdiction is given are the convenience not of the plaintiff but of the defendant and his witnesses and the advantage which may accrue to the former by enforcing the judgment of the Court within its own jurisdiction (1). These connote a residence of a more or less permanent character.

Nextly, even in the case of the same enactment and the "true portion" of it there can be no fixed rule for all cases. Each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances (2).

It is necessary in the first place, that the residence be actual and *bona fide*, and not merely colourable or collusive, for in such case there is no residence at all. Assuming this, it cannot, however, be laid down with precision how long a person must stay in a place, and in what way, so as to be deemed to reside there. A very short period of actual living has been held sufficient in some cases (3). Firstly may be considered the cases where a man has no permanent residence. Great stress is laid in the cases on the fact as to whether or not the person said to reside within the jurisdiction had at the time any other residence elsewhere (4). When a man has no permanent residence he must be taken to dwell where he is actually staying (5). So in such cases a stay of a month was held sufficient in the case of a man who had no other residence (6) the stay of a ship's captain in port (7) and even ten days (8).

The other case is that in which a person has a permanent residence elsewhere. A person may, however, dwell or reside at more places than one (9). But in order to afford foundation for jurisdiction the residences must be of a permanent character and be visited from time to time (10). When the defendant has a fixed and permanent residence elsewhere, to give jurisdiction on the ground of residence, something more than a temporary stay within the local limits of the Court is required (11). So a temporary residence of ten days (12) a residence for the temporary purpose of attending a trial of a suit in which the party was a defendant, (13) staying in a place with a definite object

(1) *Emritloil v. Kadd* 2 Hyd 117 119 (1864)

(2) *Ib.* at p. 119, *Mahomed Shuffi v. Laldin* 3 B 227, 229 (1878)

(3) In the matter of *De Momot* 21 C 631, 638 (1891)

(4) *Ib.*

(5) *Shri Goswami v. Shri Govardhanlalji*, 14 B at p. 519 (1890)

(6) *Morris v. Baumgarten Coryton*, 152 (1865) *Id.* *Mayhew v. Tulloch* 4 N W P 25 (1872). The decision would probably have been the other way if the defendant had had a permanent dwelling elsewhere. *Shri Goswami v. Shri Govardhanlalji* 14 B at p. 519 (1890)

(7) The Judges of the Small Cause Court 2 Tayl. & Bell 4 ref. *Emritloil v. Kadd* 2 Hyd, 117, 118 (1864)

(8) In the matter of *De Momot*, 21 C 631 (1891) a case under the Insolvent Act

(9) *Orde v. Skinner*, 3 A 91 (1880), *Latima v. Sakina* 1 A 51, 52 (1875), in *Aishadney Dossai v. Kally Kristo Ghose, Coryton* 24 (1864) jurisdiction was upheld, as Calcutta was the usual residence for part of the year

(10) *Shri Goswami v. Shri Govardhanlalji*, 18 B 290 293 (1891)

(11) *Ib.* at 14 B p. 550 (1890), *Zalem Tewarree v. Golandgeer Goswami* 1 Ind. Jur 85 (1862)

(12) *Gowasjee Framjee v. Wallace*, 1 B H C R 113 (1863)

(13) *Emritloil v. Kadd* 2 Hyd 117 (1864), see *Samantatha v. Vareru*, 2 M. H. C. P. 301 (1865)

or fixed purpose for a short and limited period (1) will not, in the case of a man who has a *bonâ fide* and permanent abode elsewhere, give jurisdiction. So where an officer attached to a regiment at Vellore went on medical leave to Madras, where he resided in a rented house and finally returned to Vellore, the latter was held to be the place where he dwelt (2).

In conclusion, it may be said that while neither "dwell" nor "reside" necessarily implies a permanent state of things, (3) yet when it is desired to speak of residence for a limited time a limiting adjective is applied, and when there is no such qualifying adjective permanent residence is understood (4). The residence contemplated by the Letters Patent, (5) and (subject to Explanation I) the Code, must be of a more or less permanent character, of such a nature as to show that the Court in which a defendant is sued is his natural forum (6). The Court will not snatch a jurisdiction which was not intended to be conferred (7). As regards Explanation I, *vide post*. Sect 265 of the Contract Act is permissive and does not prohibit a suit elsewhere than at the place where the partnership was carried on, if a sufficient ground of jurisdiction exists (8).

Explanation I—The term residence is here applied to the temporary residence of a defendant in respect of a cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence. That is an enlarging explanation for a limited purpose, and not an interpretation or definition of the word as usually understood (9). The Explanation is identical with Explanation (a) to sect 8 of the Small Cause Courts Act, XI of 1865 (10). In respect of any cause of action arising at the place of permanent dwelling, he must be sued there (11). The change in the Explanation appears to be of a verbal character.

(1) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 14 B at p 550 (1890). So the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction in the case of a person having daily employment in Calcutta but residing outside it. *Goculchund Banerjee v Camdeb Mookerjee* 1 Mor 371, but not when he often slept in Calcutta. *Haberley v Bason*, 1 Mor 371, or outside when the sole purpose was to avoid jurisdiction. *Martindell v Loman* 1 Mor 371, *Bhano v Hossem Ali*, 1 Mor 371.

(2) *Kissun Sing v Sturt*, 5 M H C R 471 (1870).

(3) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 14 B at p 549 (1890), *Mahomed Shuffli v Laldin*, 3 B 227 (1879).

(4) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, *supra*.

(5) 1b, at p 552.

(6) 1b. It was not the intention of the Letters Patent to give jurisdiction in cases of temporary residence only. *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 18 B at p 22 (1891).

jurisdiction is given on the score of residence when that residence is substantially the ordinary residence or dwelling of the defendant. *Emritoll v Kadd*, 2 Hyde, at p 119 (1801); and see *Nusserwanjee Pestonjee Wadia v Eleonora Pestonjee*, 38 B 125 (1913).

(7) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 14 B at p 551 (1890).

(8) *Ramasami v Thiruvengadasami*, 1 M 310 (1877).

(9) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 11 B at p 549 (1890), the purpose is to avoid the rule (see *Macdougall v Paterson* 11 C B 755) that a person having a permanent residence at a place cannot be said to reside at any other place where he is as a *tenant* for a temporary purpose only, or, in other words of the present text, at a residence.

(10) See *Ugachai v ...*, 11 C B 605 606 (1890).

(11) See *Largach v ...*, 11 C B 417 (1867).

Explanation II—This is in general conformity with the English decisions, though under the Indian rule the carrying on of business is not only a circumstance for determining the residence of a company, but an independent ground of jurisdiction also (1) The Secretary of State in Council is not a body corporate though he may be used as such (2) Foreign corporations or companies have their domicile in the country where they are incorporated, and thus come into existence. But they may also be deemed to reside in the country in which they have their seat and principal place of business (3)

"Carries on business"—This phrase is of varying import, and must be interpreted according to the context and the apparent purpose of the Legislature (4) In the first place this expression here connotes more than being busy or doing business merely, and more than mere service employment, or occupation. A man who busies himself about science or politics, though he may have a great deal of business to transact in respect of these matters, does not "*carry on business*". nor does a domestic servant, a clerk, or assistant in a trading or mercantile concern. The words mean the carrying on of business by the person whose business it is and mean to describe a person managing or conducting his own and not somebody else's business. He must either manage or conduct a business of his own or the business which is managed or conducted for him must be his own. The servant or employee is not carrying on his own business but his master's. A person carries on business when he controls or directs it (5)

The term "*business*" is not limited to commercial business. So where a person was in daily attendance on his patients as surgeon, apothecary, and couchour within a certain district, he was held to be carrying on business there (6) It has, however, been held that zemindary business is not within the rule (7) nor the receipts of presents or offerings (8) There is a conflict of opinion as to whether the Government can (9) or cannot (10) be said to carry on business

(1) See the English cases which will be found cited in *Hukm Chand C P C* 315, 324 where it is also pointed out that the Explanation settles a number of points upon which there is a conflict of opinion in the English Courts

(2) *Doya Naram Tewary v Secretary of State* 14 C 256 271 (1886)

(3) See *Hukm Chand, C P C* 317 where the question is discussed.

(4) *Gouldas v Ganesh Lal* 1 B 416 422 (1880)

(5) *Graham v Lewis*, 22 Q B D 5

(6) *Mitchell v Hender*, 23 L J Q B 273

(7) Anonymous 23 W R 223 (1875) See *Nobin Chunder v Buroda Kant Shah* 19 W R 341 (1873)

(8) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 11 B 541, 552 (1890), s.c., in appeal, 16 B 300 (1891)

(9) *Bipradas Dey v Secretary of State*, 11 C 262 n (1885), *Subbaraya v Government*, 1 M. H. C. R. 286 (1862) It is also pointed out in *Hukm Chand C P C* p 321, that several suits have been decided in the High Courts and Presidency Small Cause Courts in which the cause of action did not accrue within the local limits of their jurisdiction and these Courts could have jurisdiction only if the Government could be held to carry on business within those limits. See *Posa Johnston v Secretary of State*, 2 Hyde, 153 (1864), *P & O S N Co v Secretary of State*, 5 B H. C. R. App 1 (1861), *Brito v Secretary of State*, 6 B 251 (1881), *Hari Bhanji v Secretary of State* 4 M 344 (1879)

(10) *Rundle v Secretary of State*, 1 Hyde, 37 (1863), in which it was said that Government should be sued where the cause of

In the under mentioned case (1) the Court of first instance whose judgment was reversed on appeal (2) held that the carrying on of business must involve pretty much the same element of permanency as is necessary to convert a mere "staying" into "dwelling". But it does not seem to be necessary that the business should be carried on permanently, and each case must be decided on its own facts (3). Thus a person who had no regular office, but went once or twice a week from the Mofussil to a friend's house in Calcutta and saw people there on business, and contracted there with some man for the hire of cargo boats was held to carry on business or personally work for gain at Calcutta (4).

The business need not be one carried on personally (5). This is shown by the omission of the term "personally" before the words "carry on business," and its introduction before the words "work for gain". The defendant must, however, carry on some independent regular business in person or at an office or other fixed place of business, either personally or by clerks or servants employed by the defendant and conducting the business under his control, and in his individual or partnership name (6). So in the last mentioned case it was held that the defendant had no place of business in Madras, the sales being effected by another person X, in his independent business or trade of a general broker for a commission received from the purchasers. In such case it was X and not the defendant, who was carrying on business in Madras.

A person may carry on business at the same time at several places by means of different agents as is often really the case. The employment, however, of a person as one's commission agent, or simply consigning goods to a commission (7) or general (8) agent for sale by him in the exercise of his own calling, does not constitute carrying on business at the place where that person or agent may be residing or carrying on his own business or

action arises. *Doya Narain Tewary v Secretary of State*, 14 C 256 (1886) [the words "carry on business or personally work for gain" are inapplicable to the Secretary of State].

(1) *Haydan Das v Bhajwan Das* 7 B L R 102, 112 (1871)

(2) 7 B L R 535

(3) In Bill No. 2 of the Code of 1877 an Explanation was added to provide that the business contemplated must be carried on at a fixed place for at least a certain time, but the Explanation was omitted from Bill No. 3.

(4) *Grish Chunder v Collins*, 2 Hyde, 79 (1802), and so does a captain of a foreign ship trading to this port. *R v Judges of Small Cause Court* 2 Tail. & Bell 7 (18.1)

(5) *Muthaya Chetti v Allan* 4 M. 209 (1880), *Kessowji v Khump* 12 B 507, 521 (1888), *Cirdharr Kassigar* 17 B 662 (1893)

Chinnammal v Tulu Kannattammal 3 M. H. C. R. 146 (1860), in which Scotland, C. J., modified his opinion to the contrary in *Subbaraya v Government* 1 M. H. C. R. 286 (1862), which last case was followed as regards the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court in *Chundee Churn Dutt v Edaljee Cowasjee*, 8 C. 678 (1882). In addition to actual inhabitancy the Supreme Court has jurisdiction by constructive inhabitancy on the ground of trading. As to factors, however, see *Sunker Doss v Manickram*, Fulten 334 (1843).

(6) *Chinnammal v Tulu Kannattammal*, 3 M. H. C. R. 146 (1866)

(7) *Khamjee v Forbes* 8 B. H. C. R., O. C. 102 (1871), *Gopee Mohun v Protali Chunder* 11 W. R. 530 (1879)

(8) *Chinnammal v Tulu Kannattammal* 3 M. H. C. R. 146 (1866).

doing or selling what he may have been employed to do or sell. In the under-mentioned case (1) it was held that a defendant does not carry on business at a place, though he may have an agent there for certain purposes connected with his business where that which is the essential ingredient in his business does not take place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. In delivering judgment Saks, C J said "To determine whether a defendant is carrying on business, it must first be ascertained what his particular trade, calling, or occupation is, and then we can examine whether the facts proved amount to a carrying on of that particular trade, calling, or occupation within the jurisdiction. The present defendant is admittedly a retail vendor in European goods and obtains his livelihood by the profit which he makes upon his sales, without 'sale' he could not make profit, or, in other words he could not carry on business for the purpose of gaining a livelihood. 'Sale' is an essential ingredient in carrying on this defendant's business, and in the present case, to give this Court cognizance of suit upon that ground it must be shown that 'sale' by the defendant in the way of a retail dealer has taken place within our territorial limit. The place of sale, in the present case, is the true place of the defendant's carrying on business."

As to the question whether jurisdiction in regard to foreigners is limited to those who personally carry on business, *vide ante*, p 171

"Personally works for gain"—These words were inserted to give the Courts jurisdiction over persons who, though dwelling out of the local limits, personally worked for gain within them (2). So a person residing at Ghosery, outside Cileutta, who habitually and constantly came to Cileutta for the purpose of making contracts as part of his business as a contractor, was held to carry on business and work for gain in Cileutta (3). An advocate of the High Court residing out of the local limits, but who holds himself out as ready to practise in the High Court and who goes whenever he is engaged to appear, personally works for gain within the local limits (4). In order that jurisdiction should attach on the ground of working for gain such working should be habitual (5). Further, to constitute work there must be some mental or physical effort. To take advantage of an innate holiness as a reason for accepting presents or offerings as your natural due is not work, nor is the blessing which the defendant invokes upon the dwellings which he visits (6). As to whether Government can be said to personally work for gain, *vide ante*, p 180

"Cause of action"—The meaning of this term has been the subject of considerable controversy, which, however, so far as this section is concerned, is now settled, and it is not proposed to do more than to give the references to the somewhat numerous decisions in which the question was discussed prior

(1) *Framjee v Hormasji*, 1 B H C R, O C J, 220 (1865)

(2) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 14 B 541, 553 (1890)

(3) *Greeschunder Bonnerjee v Collins*, 2 Hyde 79 (1862)

(4) *Rai Narain Das v Newton*, 6 N W P 43 (1873)

(5) *Shri Goswami v Shri Govardhanlalji*, 14 B 541, 553 (1890)

(6) *Ib* at p 574, as cited in appeal, 18 B 290 (1894)

to the amendment of the section in 1833. Sometimes these words have been given the restricted sense of immediate occasion of the action which itself means the right to have recourse to the Courts, in other and perhaps the greater number of cases, the wider sense of necessary conditions of its maintenance. In the former sense it is the mere matter of fact, the failure of the defendant to do, or forbear from doing, to give or make good, that which the plaintiff's right entitles him to insist upon—in other words, the infraction of the right, as, in the case of a contract, its breach. In the latter sense it is this matter of fact *plus* the right resident in the plaintiff, or, to take the example chosen both the making of the contract and its breach (1). In this last sense, "cause of action" therefore means every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, (2) and everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action, (3) though the term does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved (4). In this view of the case the cause of action (which must exist at the date of the action (5)) is composed of several parts, which must, of course, necessarily include as one of such parts the infraction (6) of the right claimed.

The next question is, whether in order to give jurisdiction the whole cause of action should have arisen within the jurisdiction or whether it is sufficient that a part of such cause of action should have so arisen. As regards the Presidency High Courts, it is well settled that the term "cause of action," as used in clause 12 of the Charters (which, and not this section, governs such Courts), means the whole cause of action and not a material part of it (7).

(1) See the learned judgment of Holloway, J., in *Do Souza v Coles*, 3 M H C R 381, 406 (1868), as also the judgments in *Gopi Krishna Gossami v Nilcomal Bannerjee*, 13 B L R 461 (1874) and *Kahdhnn Chuttapadhyaya v Shiba Nath Chuttapadhyaya*, 8 C. at p 488 (1882), in which the English cases will be found collected. Whatever meaning be attached to the term it does not depend upon the relief claimed. *Thakur Shankar v Dya Shankar*, 15 I A 66 (1887) and has no relation whatever to the defence, but refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint, or, in other words, to the *media* upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. *Mt Chand Kour v Partab Singh*, 15 I A 177 (1887).

(2) *Coole v Gill* 8 C. P 107. So in a suit for a legacy against an administrator, the grant of administration (*Fuller v Mackey*, 2 E & B 573) for a reward for apprehension and conviction of a thief, the conviction (*Herniman v Smith* 10 Ex 670)

on a life policy the death of the assured (*Cailland v Champion* 7 T R 290) are parts of the respective causes of action. The fact must be both necessary and material to be proved. If not it is no part of the cause of action. *London Bombay and Mediteranean Bank v Badee Beebee* 5 B 42 (1880).

(3) *Read v Brown* 22 Q B D 128.

(4) *Ib* at p. 132. See *Pragdas v Doulatram*, 11 R 257 (1880).

(5) *Gulzar Singh v Kalyan Chand*, 15 A 399 (1893) in which case though the plaintiff was not entitled at the commencement of the suit to possession it was held that if the suit had been brought a fortnight later the other party would have been without a defence.

(6) *Nardin v Alavudin* 12 M 134 (1888).

(7) *Do Souza v Coles* 3 M H C R 381 (1868), *Methoor Mohun Poyr v Jadoomoney Dossee* 10 B L R 122 (1872), *Hills v Clark*, 11 B L R 367, 369 (1874), *Jam moonah Pura v Zaibunnissa* 5 C L R at p. 278 (1879), *Mul hand v Suganchan* 1, 1 R

though if a part of the cause of action shall have arisen within the jurisdiction a suit will lie in the High Court if leave have been previously obtained. For the purposes of the Letters Patent, the expression "cause of action" means the bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in his suit. It does not include irrelevant or immaterial facts but embraces material facts without which the plaintiff must fail. If any of these material facts have taken place within the jurisdiction of the Court then leave can be given under clause 12. But if no such material facts have taken place within the jurisdiction, and leave is given there, then it is open to the defendant to contend at the hearing that the Court has no jurisdiction (1).

Prior to the amendment of the corresponding section of the last Code, in 1888 it was held that the words therein used did not mean the whole cause of action but any material portion of the nature stated in Explanation III to that section which was added in the year mentioned. And therefore the Courts governed by the Code were held to have jurisdiction if such a material portion of the cause of action arose within their jurisdiction (2). Sect 7, Act VII of 1888 gave effect to these decisions by adding the third Explanation to the former section which rendered further discussion in the case of suits arising out of contract unnecessary (*vide post*). The rule, moreover, has been reaffirmed recently to be of general application in all suits (3). And now the section expressly gives jurisdiction where the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. No leave is required in the latter case.

Under the Code, British Courts are empowered to pass judgment against a non resident foreigner, provided that the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court pronouncing the judgment (4). The Court in whose local jurisdiction the funds of an endowment, received from a foreign

23 (1875) *Dhunjeshia v Fforde*, 11 B 619 (1887), *Kalidhun v Shubanath* 8 C at p 493 (1882), *Rampurab v Premsookh* 15 B 93 (1890), *Doya Narain Tewary v Secretary of State*, 14 C 256 (1886). In *Muhammad Abdul Kadar v E I Railway*, 1 M 375 (1878), where it was admitted that 'cause of action' meant the whole cause of action it was held that the breach of the contract constituted the whole cause—a view which has been dissented from by the Calcutta High Court, *Doya Narain Tewary v Secretary of State*, 14 C at p 270 (1886), and the Bombay High Court *Rampurab v Premsookh*, 15 B at p 102 (1890).

(1) *Motilal v Surajmull* 6 Bom. L. R 1038 (1904).

(2) *Gopi Krishna Gossami v Nilcomul Banerjee*, 13 B L. R 461 (1874), *Hills v Clark*, 14 B L. R 367 (1874), *Llewellyn v Channu Lal* 4 A 423 (1882), *Bishunath v Ilahi Baksh*, 5 A 277 (1883) *Kalidhun v Shub*

nath, 8 C 495 (1882) *Laljee Lal v Hurday Narain* 9 C. 105 (1882), which also dealt with the effect to be given to the Illustrations the first of which is taken from *Winter v May*, 1 M H. C. P. 200 (1863) and the second from *De Souza v Coles* 3 M H. C. R. at p 397 (1868). *Contra*, *Jummoonah Persad v Zarbunessa* 5 C L. R 268 (1879).

(3) *Banke Behari Lal v Pokhe Ram* 25 A 48 (1902), which was a suit asking that a compromise and decree founded thereon might be declared void, and for an injunction restraining execution.

(4) *Rambhat v Shankar Baywant* 25 B 528 (1901), s. c., 3 Bom. L. R 82. So also under the Charters *Barah Mesh Saib v Khajee Mesh*, 4 M H. C. R. 218 (1869), *contra* *Kessowji v Khumji*, 12 B 507 (1889) which was dissented from in *Gudhar v Kassgar* 17 B 602 (1893); *de post* p 187.

territory, are expended by the parties residing there has full power to determine questions as to the management of the funds quite apart from the title to the grant, which may not be in dispute (1) As to residence etc. giving jurisdiction in case of foreigners, see *post*, and as to cases in which the cause of action arises below low water mark and within three miles of it the case under mentioned (2)

Whatever the cause of action may be the jurisdiction created at the place of its accrual is not affected by the death of the person originally liable, and it is a general principle that the representative of a deceased person may be sued in that Court within the jurisdiction of which the cause of action with the deceased person arose (3) The accrual of a cause of action within the local limits of a Court's jurisdiction will not give the Court jurisdiction over a suit in which any other cause of action arising out of those limits is joined, it being in fact a pre-requisite of the right to join in one suit more than one cause of action against a defendant that the Court to which the plaint is presented should have jurisdiction over all the causes of action (4)

The term "*cause of action*" as used in the Code applies to torts as well as contracts (5) Reading clauses (a), (b), and (c) with the words "*every suit*," it appears that all suits of whatever nature, subject to the limitations in the preceding sections, are referred to. Sect. 19 contains special provisions with regard to suits for compensation for wrong done, but suits on tort not within the words of that section will fall under this. In India, the cause of action has been always held to furnish the forum not only of suits in contracts, but in its broader sense to apply also to suits on torts.

As already stated, the words "*cause of action*" in this section do not mean necessarily the whole cause of action but a suit to which the section applies may be instituted where some portion of the cause of action arises (6) So in a suit praying that a fraudulent compromise and decree founded thereon might be declared void, and for an injunction restraining execution thereof it was held that though the decree was made and compromise entered into in Calcutta (where in respect of them the cause of action arose) yet a part of the cause of action namely, the infringement of the plaintiff's right by executing the decree, having taken place in Cawnpore, the suit lay in that district (7)

Though a special provision as to jurisdiction over suits on title has been made in sect. 19, there is nothing in the general words of the section to exclude them from its operation. The Courts will therefore have jurisdiction in

(1) *Kashinath v. Anant* 2 Bom. L. R. 47 (1899)

(2) *Baban Mayacha v. Nagu*, 2 B. 19 (1876)

(3) *Ladd v. Parbutty*, 2 H. J. 18 (1862) *Hargopal v. Abdul Khan* 9 B. H. C. R. 429 (1872)

(4) *Khumsu Jivragu v. Parushojam* 7 M. 171 (1883) And if the main relief cannot be granted a right which is only ancillary to the principal right cannot be enforced

Trimbak v. Lalshman, 21 J. 1 (1895) (5) *Kalden Chutta*, 1 M. 1 (1871) 8 C. at p. 491 (1842)

(6) *Banko Behari Lal v. P. S. J. S.* 43 (1902) Under the law of England regards suits arising out of contract as a matter was made in the case of *Banko Behari Lal* and now clause (c) of the section applies to all cases

(7) *Id.*

when the cause of action arises within their jurisdiction or the defendants reside, etc., there. And it is not necessary that both the constituents of jurisdiction should exist in British India (1). The provisions of this section are independent of the general principles of international law, but there is nothing even in these principles to restrict the jurisdiction of the Courts of any country to cases in which the cause of action should have arisen in that country. In England it is settled that an action will lie there against a defendant there upon a transaction in a place in another country (2). Explanation III to the former section had no reference to torts. But the term "*cause of action*" was, under the last Code independently of that explanation, construed to mean not the whole cause of action—if such cause of action involves more than the mere commission of the delict—in suits to which the Code applies (3). Probably, the cause of action will usually be construed in a restricted sense, so as not to involve the right violated but to denote only the violation or the breach of a duty which entitles the plaintiff to relief (4). In any case, a large number of cases in tort will come within the special provisions of the preceding section. In a recent English case dealing with the effect of a judgment in the Calcutta High Court in divorce proceedings condemning in damages a defendant, a British subject, who though formerly resident in India, had left this country before the petition was issued and was now domiciled in England, it was argued on his behalf that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction over him, but it was held that the power to give damages was ancillary to the judgment on status concerning the marriage which judgment, being *in rem* would bind the world (5).

A Court may entertain a suit to set aside a decree on the ground of fraud, provided that the requirements of this section or of the Charter, as the case may be, are satisfied (6). In the case of a libel, the suit will lie where it has been published (7). In a suit to set aside a release executed in Calcutta of the plaintiff's interest in certain property in Bombay, it was held that the cause of action included the effect of the release on the property in Bombay, and did not wholly arise in Calcutta (8). This section, in the case of suits between

(1) See *Baban Mayacha v. Nagu Shrivachha* 2 B. 19 (1876).

(2) *Hukm Chand, C. P. C.* 310, *Machado v. Fontes*, 1897, 2 Q. B. 235.

(3) *Id.* p. 184.

(4) See *Hukm Chand, C. P. C.* 311, *Laljee Lal v. Hardey Naram* 9 C. 105 (1882), *Gopi Krishna v. Nilcomal*, 13 B. 1 R. 461 (1874), *Hills v. Clark*, 14 B. L. P. 367 (1874), *Llewellyn v. Chunni Lal* 4 A. 423 (1882), *Bahannath v. Ilahi Baksh*, 5 A. 277 (1883), *Ram Pertab Singh v. Bholabutti*, 9 W. P. 486 (1868). See as to different parts of cause of action in suits on torts *Kartie Churn v. Gopal Kisto*, 3 C. 264 (1877) [*Pledge v. Frau I.*], *Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee Mahomed*, 13 B. L. P. 391 (1874) [*Fraudulent representations, suit to set aside release*]. *Iuddy*

v. Johnston, 6 B. L. P. 141 (1870) [*Malicious prosecution*]. The matter is not of practical importance so far as suits in the High Courts are concerned, as in all cases of doubt leave is usually asked for and given, and as to other Courts, see now clause (c).

(5) *Phillips v. Batho*, 17 C. W. N. 461.
(6) *Nistarni Dassi v. Nundo Lal Bose*, 30 C. 369 (1902), s. c., 7 C. W. N. 353. A suit to set aside a consent decree of the High Court on the ground of fraud may be brought without previous leave to sue having been obtained, though all the defendants dwell without the jurisdiction. *Bibee Solomon v. Abdul Aziz*, 4 C. L. R. 366 (1879).

(7) *Gelfert v. Ruckchand*, 13 B. 178 (1888).

(8) *Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee Mahomed* 13 B. J. R. 91 (1874).

landlord and tenant, is controlled by sect 141 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (1) In cases instituted under Act IX of 1861, the Court is to be guided by the Code and where there is an objection to jurisdiction this section will be considered (2) As regards Probate jurisdiction, see Act V of 1881 (3)

Explanation III of former section—This has been omitted as its relation was considered unnecessary owing to the addition made to sub clause (c) of the words "*wholly or in part*" in reference to the cause of action. Though omitted the Explanation gave a correct statement of what is still the law (4) and is therefore here dealt with. This Explanation settled the signification of the term "*cause of action*" in the case of suits arising out of contract. Its language was wide enough to include all cases of contract, though not obligations in the nature of *quasi* contracts, (5) though it is said (6) that the corresponding rule of *locus solutionis* in other countries does not apply to contracts already executed or creating personal status. Certain relations, such as those of marriage and adoption, though originally based on contract, are not themselves sources of rights and duties on account of the grounds of contract (7). While a suit may be arising out of contract within the meaning of the Explanation, it does not follow that all the clauses of that section will be applicable to it, as in the case of a suit arising out of contract claiming a sum payable not in performance of the contract, but as damages for its breach (8). It may be a question whether the language of the Explanation is explicit enough to include suits for the cancellation of contract, the *forum contractus* in Roman law being generally held to apply to actions arising out of the natural development of the obligation, and therefore, leading to its fulfilment. A suit for the cancellation of a contract must, however, always be for some cause, and the nature of the cause and the place of its accrual, and not necessarily the place of the contract, will furnish the forum for such suits (9). But whether it does or not the suit will be within the section.

In suits arising out of contract the cause of action is deemed to arise, according to the omitted Explanation, at three places —

(a) *The place where the contract was made*. The determination of this question belongs to the law of contracts. This will be the place of meeting where there is a personal meeting of the parties—except, perhaps, where the validity of a contract is made to depend upon the observance of a particular form in which case the place at which that form is completed is the true place of the contract, because until such completion no party is bound. (10)

(1) Fazlur Rahim v Dwarika Nath 30 C 473 456 (1903), s c, 7 C. W. N 402

(2) Sarat Chandra Chakrabarti v Forman, 12 A 213 (1890) [removal of minor from plaintiff's custody]

(3) And see Bhanrao v Lakshmi Bai, 20 B 100 (1897)

(5) See Hukm Chand, C. P. C. 298-309

(6) *Ib.*, 298.

(7) As to the cause of action in suits for restitution of conjugal right, see *ib.*, p. 299. Lalitgar v Bai Sura 18 B. 316 (1893). A suit for the recovery of dower is a suit on a contract. Shankar Dial v Muhammad Mujtaba, 18 A 400 (1896).

(8) Ramsett v Katha 27 M 355 (1903).

(9) See Hukm Chand C. P. C. 299

(10) *Ib.*

In the case of contract by correspondence it has been held that the contract is considered made where the letter of acceptance is posted and not where it is received by the proposer (1). Where a balance was struck and an agreement to repay the balance was drawn out at Cawnpore, it was held that the Cawnpore Court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit on the agreement and its jurisdiction was not affected by the fact of the transaction, in respect of which the agreement was given having happened elsewhere (2). Where the suit was brought upon the defendant's breach to deliver in the terms of the contract and it did not appear where the contract, if any, was made, it was held that the mere fact that an advance on account of the contract was made within the local jurisdiction of a Court would not give the Court jurisdiction in such suit (3). In the under mentioned case it was held that assuming that in the account for the balance of which the plaintiff sued there were some items which if they could be separated from the suit would give a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court at B, it was never the intention that the transactions should be disconnected so as to give separate causes of action, but that the items should be joined together so as to form the subject of one demand and that the suit had been brought in the wrong Court (4). As to the making endorsement and acceptance of negotiable instruments see the cases below (5).

(b) *The place where the contract was to be performed or performance completed* or (c) *where in performance any money to which the suit relates was expressly or impliedly payable*. The determination of this question is also part of the law of contracts and the rules for their interpretation. The rule of the *forum loci solutionis* as it is called is applicable only where a particular place for performance can be fixed and not therefore where the contract may be performed anywhere (6). In some cases the place of performance is expressly fixed by the contract in others by the nature of the act to be done in performance, as for example where the obligation is to build a house, or to do other work on real property (7). Thus also in a suit to have a mortgage deed registered the cause of action was held to accrue at the place where the deed had to be registered under the law. From the nature of the act to be performed this was the place of the fulfilment of the obligation (8). In some cases provisions of

(1) Muhammad Shafi v. Karamat Ali 1896, P. R. No 76. Kamsett v. Katha 27 M. 325 (1903).

(2) Haim Raj v. Ram Dutt 1 Agra 115 (1866).

(3) Ajoodhya Proshad v. Gobind Pann 2 Agra, 188 (1867).

(4) Atmakuri v. Selli 3 M. H. C. R. 222 (1866).

(5) Ramgopal v. Blacquire 1 B. L. P. O. C. 30 (1867). Joan Mull v. Munmoo Lall 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 219 (1866). Dhanraj v. Gobindaram 1 B. L. R., O. C. 76 (1863). Issur Chunder Sen v. Cruz, 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 23 (1866). Winter v. Pound 1 M. H. C. P.

202 (1867). Mothoormohun Roy v. Jadoo money Dossee, 10 B. L. R. 122 (1872). Haydan Das v. Bhagwan Das, 7 B. L. R. 102 (1871) s. c., on appeal at p. 533. Pragdas v. Dowlatram, 11 B. 257 (1886). Rampurtab v. Premvukh, 15 B. 93 (1890). Vulechand v. Suganchand, 1 B. 23 (1875). Rampurtab v. Fookibai, 20 B. 774 (1896).

(6) Rajendra Rau v. Sama Rau 1 M. H. C. R. 436 (1863).

(7) See the subject more fully treated in Hukm Chand, C. P. C. 300 309.

(8) Sami v. Gopal 7 M. H. C. R. 176 (1873).

positive law must be consulted (1) Where no place for the performance is prescribed in the agreement or exacted by the necessities of the case, or fixed by or in accordance with statutory law, the place where it should appear that the parties intended that the contract should be fulfilled ought to supply the forum (2) In most such cases the course of the business to which the contract relates, or in which anything will have to be done or any money to be paid, will determine the place of performance or payment (3) In some cases, where no actual intention can be inferred, recourse may be had to presumptions—such as that under which performance is deemed to have been intended at the place where business was carried on by the person entitled under the contract, (4) or where neither party has a fixed place of business, wherever (at any rate, in the case of contracts for payment of money) the creditor happens to be (5) In the absence of any special promise as to delivery, goods sold are to be delivered at the place at which they are at the time of sale, and goods contracted to be sold are to be delivered at the place at which they are at the time of the contract for sale or if not then in existence, at the place at which they are produced (6) The place of accrual of cause of action in suits for an account and balance due from an agent must be determined by a reference to the circumstances under which the situation of agency is contracted, and the promise to pay at a particular place must be implied where not expressly

(1) See Contract Act, ss. 48-49

(2) See *Hukm Chand, C P C 303* and see *Sheriff v Manners, C W N 912 (1903)*, *Nirban Singh v Humla Sahoy, 17 W R 345 (1872)*, *Deokee Nundun v Oomrao Singh, 2 Agra 248 (1867)*, *Chumilal v Mahapatrav, 5 B H C R, A C 33 (1868)*, *Dadabhai v Diogo 18 B 43 (1892)*, *Dhunjisha v Ffordo, 11 B 649 (1887)*, *Dobson v Bengal S & W Railway, 21 B 133 (1896)*, *A T Bhatia Charya v Cawnpur Woollen Mills, 16 C W N 325 (1911)*

(3) See *Hukm Chand, C P C 304*, and see *Llewellyn v Chunnalal 4 A 423 (1882)*, see *Orde v Skinner, 3 A 91 (1880)* In a suit for salary which had always been paid at Surat, the latter Court was held to have jurisdiction *Beg Mahomed v Kavasji, 2 Bom L R 524 (1900)*, see next note On a somewhat similar principle the endorser of a hundi is liable to pay at place of endorsement and not where the hundi is payable *Suganchand v Mulechand, 9 B H C R 270 (1872)*

(4) 1b The forum arising from course of business is held to apply generally to partner ships See *Lucknow Chand v Zorawar Mull, 8 M L A 291 (1860)*, foll in *Jagna v Camla Mal 1857 P I N C 2*, dist *Barah Meah Saib v Khajee Meah Saib 4 M H C L.*

218 (1869), *De Souza v Coles, 3 M H C J 384 (1868)* In *Beg Mahomed v Kavasji, 2 Bom L R 514 (1900)*, the salary sued for was held to be impliedly payable at the place where the plaintiff worked and resided *Darragh v Purshotam, 4 M 372 (1881)*

(5) The ordinary rule is that the obligor is bound to seek the obligee *Gopi Krishna v Nidomal 13 B L R 461 (1874)*, *Hills v Clark, 11 B L R 367 (1874)* The Elder, L R 1893, P D 119 In *Sheriff v Manners, 7 C W N 912 (1903)* it was held that the price of the goods sold was payable at the residence of the plaintiff In the case of a suit for a legacy the cause of action was held to arise where the heir and not the legatee resided *Ashootosh Bose v Hurro Churn Nag 16 W R 305 (1871)*

(6) Act IX. of 1872, s 91 See as to goods sold, *Winter v Wav, 1 M H C R 200 (1863)*, *De Souza v Coles 3 M H C R 384, 403, 406 (1868)*, *Chumilal v Mahapatrav, 5 B H C R, A C, 33 (1868)* *Pam Lal Shaw v Ohoy Kumar, 2 C W N 61 (note)* If the suit is for balance of account for goods sold the mere circumstance that some payment was made by a hundi would not alter the locality of the cause *Parjapat v Sah, 15 B 100 (1879)*

stipulated for, according to the terms of the agency (1) The words "the contract" do not mean the whole of the contract but only the part of the contract which is the subject-matter of the obligation. (2) The cause of the explanation was that the amount claimed was payable not in performance of the contract but as damages for the breach (3)

21 No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

Objections to jurisdiction—See notes to sect. 9, ante

22 Where a suit may be instituted in any one of two or more Courts and is instituted in one of such Courts, any defendant, after notice to the other parties, may, at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, apply to have the suit transferred to another Court, and the Court to which such application is made, after considering the objections of the other parties (if any), shall determine in which of the several Courts having jurisdiction the suit shall proceed.

23 (1) Where the several Courts having jurisdiction are subordinate to the same Appellate Court, an application under section 22 shall be made to the Appellate Court.

(1) *Hukm Chand C P C 307* *Khamru Jivraj v Purushotam* 7 M. 171 (1903)

(2) *1903 (1003)* In *Hadjee Ismail v Hadjee Mahomed* 13 B. L. P. 91 (1874) the Court observed that the proper place for taking the account would certainly be where the property was situated. In a suit against a commission agent who delays to send goods ordered the cause of action for the recovery of the money advanced for

the articles will have arisen at the place of business of the commission agent. *Muham-mad Shaffi v Karamat Ali* 1896 P. P. No. 76. Where the suit is for damages and the contract was accepted by letter, the cause of action arises at place of acceptance. *Kamiseti v Katha* 27 M. 355 (1903), and see also *Sitarum Marwari v Thompson* 32 C. 881 889 890 (1905).

(2) See *Rein v Stein* (1892) 1 Q. B. 753; *Hukm Chand C P C 301*

(3) *Kamiseti v Katha* 27 M. 355 (1903)

(-) Where such Courts are subordinate to different Appellate Courts but to the same High Court, the application shall be made

“the local Courts, the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Court in which the suit is brought is situate

Power to stay and transfer.—Sect 20 of the last Code referring to stay of proceedings has been omitted (1) The last paragraph of sect 20 of the last Code had special application, if to any section, to sect 20 (b) (2) But there appeared to be no reason or authority for restricting the general words of this section to sect 17 of the last Code (corresponding with sect 20 of this), or to any particular clause of it The words “the defendant” would have had no meaning if the corresponding section of the Code of 1882 applied only to sect 17, clause (c) of that Code, and, if it were so, the option of making the application would have been vested only in “any defendant not residing, carrying on business, or working for gain within the local limits of the Court’s jurisdiction” The section, it was rightly said, appeared to be very comprehensive and to refer to all the preceding sections which provide for an alternative jurisdiction over suits (3) The jurisdiction given by this sect 20 was of an exceptional character, and should, it was held, be cautiously exercised and only upon very clear cause shown there being no mention of mere convenience or expediency (4) The section contemplated applications by different defendants but it was hardly possible that after the rejection of an application by one defendant another application might be presented by another defendant on the same ground (5) The present sections remodel and embody the provisions of sects. 22-24 of the last Code Several difficulties have been removed by the altered phrasing Thus sect 22 omitted to qualify the words “another Court” by the words “having jurisdiction,” which appeared in sects 23

(1) See Broughton’s Commentary on the Code of 1877, O’Kinealy’s Civ. Pr. Code, where, however, it is also said citing Haggard v. Pelcier, A. C. (1892) 61, that possibly it does not limit the inherent right of every Court to protect itself from an abuse of its own procedure by staying or dismissing actions which it holds to be vexatious.

(2) Viragavayyengar v. Khrubnasami, 6 M. 344 (1883), the reference to a 17 (b), appears to be a clerical error. Ismail Peer Ambalam v. Neelamegam, S. M. L. J. R. 38.

(3) Hukm Chand C. P. C. 333, 334. The decision in Meekjee v. Rasowjee, 4 C. L. P. 232 (1879) appears to show that the Court’s power to stay proceedings is very extensive, applying to different suits covering similar ground, and that on an application by a

party to a suit, a cross suit may be stayed. Nothing, however, in the Code enables a Court to stay proceedings because costs in a previous litigation in a foreign Court have not been paid. Bowles v. Bowles, 8 B. 571 (1884).

(4) Kheta v. Ganga Ram, 1894, P. I. No. 8, following, 1897 All W. N. 63, Goffart v. Puckchand, 13 B. 178 (1885). In the first mentioned case it was held that the circumstance that the points for decision in the case were analogous to those in a suit pending in a Court in another district was not sufficient reason for holding that justice was more likely to be done by compelling the plaintiff to sue in that district.

(5) O’Kinealy’s Civ. Pr. Code, note to s. 20, Hukm Chand, C. P. C. 334.

and 21. Again, it was not clear why the words "may determine" were used in sect 23, and "shall determine" in sects 22 and 21. Another difficulty was as to the nature of the application under sect 21 of the last Code, as to which, see *post*.

"After notice"—The section does not provide for any requisites of the notice. But a Court may in order to give effect to the manifest intention of the section adjourn the hearing of an application and direct that proper notice should be served. Notice must be given to the "other parties"—i.e. not only parties on the opposite, but those on the same side—so that if one defendant only applies he must serve the other defendants with notice. In the under mentioned case (1) application was made in the presence of the other parties and was assumed to be with sufficient notice.

"Apply"—*Prima facie* the plaintiff as the *arbitrator litis* has a right to bring his suit in any Court which the law allows, and these sections are only intended to provide for those cases where, on the ground of expense or convenience or some other good reason, the Court thinks that the place of trial ought to be changed. Parties who desire to have a case transferred from one *forum* to another ought clearly to explain to the Court by petition and affidavit what is the nature of the claim and defence and what the issues are, they should state what evidence will be required, and then satisfy the Court that either on the ground of expense or convenience or otherwise the place of trial ought to be changed. (2) There was no indication in sect 21 of the last Code of the nature of the application to be made to the High Court, the words "to transfer," etc. occurring in sects 22 and 23 of that Code being omitted. On this ground it was held that the section must be construed as intending something short of transfer, but only a suit, to stay proceedings, sections which apply to all the cases mentioned in sects 22-24 of the last Code remove any difficulty on this head.

"Objections"—If these are not put in on the first day, as they ought to be, a certain fixed time may be given for putting them in (4).

"Shall determine"—The determination of the Appellate Court under sect 23, clause (1), and of the High Court under clauses (2) (3), may be arrived at, not only on the grounds urged by the parties, but also on any grounds which may occur to the Court itself which under those clauses would appear to have a discretion much like what it had under sect 24 of the last Code (5). The ground that the portion of the property in the local jurisdiction of another Court is of larger value has been considered not a sufficient ground for transfer to it (6).

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) <i>Purungote v Deon Panday</i> , 2 C L R 352 (1878) | 241 247 (1870) 6 I A 126 |
| (2) <i>Khatija Bibi v Taruk Chunder Dutt</i> 9 C 980 (1883) | (4) <i>Purungote v Deon Panday</i> , 2 C L R 352 (1878) |
| (3) <i>Tula Ram v Harjivan Das</i> , 5 A 60 (1883) | (5) <i>Hakim Chand</i> C P C 337 |
| See remarks of P C as to absence of power of transfer in <i>Skinner v Orde</i> 2 A | (6) <i>Purungote v Deon Panday</i> - C L R. 352 (1878) |

"Appellate Court —Sect 23 clause (1) shows that subordination for administrative purposes is immaterial the sole test for the determination of the Court to which the application must be made will be that of appeals lying to it from the decisions of the Court in which the suit may have been instituted

In some cases appeals lie from the decisions of a Court in different classes of suits to different Courts and the Appellate Court in such cases will be the Court to which an appeal would lie in the class to which the suit instituted belongs (1)

24 (1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage—

General power of transfer and withdrawal

(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or

(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and

(i) try or dispose of the same, or

(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or

(iii) retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn

(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn under sub-section (1), the Court which thereafter tries such suit may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn

(3) For the purposes of this section, Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court

(4) The Court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn under this section from a Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of such suit, be deemed to be a Court of Small Causes

"On the application —A separate application is required for the transfer of each suit (2) In the case of a minor a next friend may apply where no guardian ad litem has been appointed (3)

(1) *Hukm Chand* C 1 C 336

(3) *Jotendronath Mitter v Raj Krishna*

(2) *Kishore Lal v Luckhmi Devi* A 1 Mitter 10 C 771 (1859).

W P H C F 14- (15-0)

"Of any of the parties"—A person who has received a notice of an application made by a judgment debtor to be declared an insolvent, and whose name is on the record as an opposing creditor, is a party in whose application a transfer may be made under this section (1). The section permits transfer upon the application of parties as well as of the Court's own motion without such application (2).

"Notice"—The present section unlike the two previous sections, requires notice to be given by the Court and not by the party. Where the order was made without notice having been given to the plaintiffs it was set aside (3). The provision as to notice is one of procedure and practice, and the requirements as to notice may be waived (4).

"At any stage"—These words have been added to the first paragraph to remove the difficulty created by the view that a suit cannot be transferred after the hearing has once commenced, as to which there was a conflict of decision. See note *post* 'Pending'.

Power of High Court to transfer—Besides the powers conferred by this section the High Court, under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, has power to transfer to itself only when it thinks proper to do so, either on the agreement of the parties to that effect or for purposes of justice, the reasons for doing so being recorded in the proceedings of the High Court. No statement of the grounds on which the Court will act can be exhaustive. Transfers have been granted on the following grounds: That the parties and witnesses reside in Calcutta, that it would be cheaper to try the suit there; that all parties desired a transfer, (5) that $\frac{1}{2}$ of the property claimed was in Calcutta, and that it was undesirable that an *amin* of a Mofussil Court should partition such property, that the suit might be tried more cheaply and expeditiously in Calcutta, (6) that difficult questions of law were involved, and the conduct of the Judge towards the plaintiff made it impossible that he should be able to deal with the suit with impartiality or freedom from prejudice, (7) that the questions involved were of importance or difficulty, the balance of convenience or cheapness of trial, the residence of parties really interested and witnesses either in Calcutta or its immediate neighbourhood, the advance of money and presence of books in Calcutta, the defendant's want of means to go herself or take her

(1) *Nassarvanji v Kharsedji*, 22 B 778 (1897)

(2) *Id* at p 783 (1897)

(3) *Janardhan v Dabha Vallabh* 1899 P J 11

(4) *Sankumani v Ikoran* 13 M 211 (1889)

(5) *Payn v Administrator General*, 5 C 766 (1880), 6 C L R 221

(6) *Jotendronanath v Raj Krato*, 16 C 771 (1889)

(7) *Kapilnauth Sahar v Government* 10 B L R 168 (1872) *Courjon v Courjon*, 9

B L R App 10 (1872) proceeded on the ground that there was no reason to suppose that any very specially difficult questions of law would arise in that case. In *Doncett v Wise* 1 Ind Jur N S 94 transfer was granted on the ground that difficult points of law arose, and it generally appeared that the case should not be tried in the Mofussil provided that the interests of the applicant will be prejudiced if there be no transfer. *Borrodale v Gregory Bourke* Part II Ex O C J 1 (1885)

witnesses to a Mofussil Court, the refusal to transfer placing difficulties in the way of the defence, and that the prayers for injunction and receiver rendered the case eminently one to be tried in the High Court (1) It has also been held that the mere fact that it would be less expensive to try the case in the High Court was not sufficient of itself for the Court to act upon and order the case to be transferred, and that to justify transfer it must be shown that the trial in the Court in which the suit had been instituted would be unsatisfactory (2)

The application should be made to a Judge sitting on the original side of the Court (3) The substantive law applicable to the case will be the law of the Court from which it has been transferred (4) The words "*to remove and try and determine*" in the Letters Patent have a wide signification They are not limited to any particular period or stage of the suit, considered as a regular series of steps in procedure After the commencement of a suit between parties, as long as the proceedings in the Court of first instance are in such a condition that the party is entitled to ask that Court to raise and judicially determine any question material to the final result of the suit as between himself and the other party, so long is the suit in existence in the first Court, and capable of being removed under clause 13 in order that such questions may be determined in the High Court (5)

District Court—In the Punjab, Central Provinces, and Burmah, the Courts of the Divisional Judge and Commissioner are by the Courts Acts of those provinces given the powers conferred on the District Court by this section, which has not been drafted with reference to the system of judicial administration prevailing in the provinces mentioned (6) An order of transfer made by a District Court under this section, transferring a suit in which an appeal would lie from a decree made therein, was held not subject to revision (7) And the principle was considered to apply where a District Judge had transferred a suit from a Subordinate Court to his own file, and before his hearing it an application was made to the High Court for its transfer to some other Court (8) The High Court refused in its extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere, except under circumstances of a very special nature, with the discretion of a Judge who had transferred, under the provisions of the last Code, execution proceedings under a decree from one Subordinate Court to another (9) It was held, under the Code of 1859 that where a District Court had jurisdiction to try a suit and the defendant made no application to the Judge or communication

(1) *Harendra Lal v. Sarvamangala Debce*, 24 C 183, 186 (1896), 1 C W N 109

(2) *Ojooderam v. Nobinmoney Dossee*, 1 Ind Jur N S 396 (1866)

(3) *Doucett v. Wise*, 4 W P Misc 7 (1865)

(4) *Grose v. Amritamayi Dossee*, 4 B L R, O C J, 1 (1869)

(5) In the matter of the Decree Suits in the Court of the Munsif of Dibrugarh, 7 B L R 308, 312 (1871)

(6) As to the Punjab see ss. 34, 37, 38 Act XVIII of 1884 As to Village Munsifs in Madras see *Lakshmalika v. Babi*, 8 M L 500 (1885) Ajmere and Marwar, ss. 2 and 2, Reg I of 1877

(7) *Fazil Ahmad v. Dulari Bibi*, 6 A. 233 (1884)

(8) *Muhammad Safdar Husen v. Furan Chand*, 20 A. 395 (1895), s. c., 1898, A W N 89

(9) *Krishna v. Bhau*, 18 B. 61 (1903)

to the plaintiff with a view to its being tried in a different district, the case was not one for the exercise of any special power by the High Court for that purpose (1)

"Transfer or withdraw"—This section, which corresponds with sect 25 of the last Code, is clearly worded to show that it applies both to the transfer and withdrawal of suits, covering also transfers to a Court newly established. There is no restriction as to the grounds on which a transfer or withdrawal may be ordered under this section, which applies to the High Court, whose powers under the Letters Patent have already been considered. A usual ground is personal disqualification on account of pecuniary or other personal interest of the presiding Judge (2). A transfer has been ordered on the ground that serious questions of law were likely to arise in connection with winding up proceedings, which it would be difficult to discuss in the absence of the necessary authorities, and that the proceedings were such that they would ultimately go before the High Court in a variety of appeals from orders, (3) also of execution proceedings "in order to do equity between the judgment creditors according to the spirit of the Civil Procedure Code", (4) also on the ground that the transfer would tend to the convenience of both parties, and more especially to the applicant (5). The fact however, that the Judge of the Court was not sufficiently acquainted with the character in which the disputed signatures were written was held not to be sufficient ground as in such a case it would be open to the parties to call experts (6).

The section does not make it obligatory on a Court to record the reasons for its order, and though it is desirable that the reasons should be recorded, yet a failure to do so will not vitiate the order or the subsequent proceedings (7). Nor is the transfer invalid if the order has been made under a misconception of facts (8). As to the presumption where there is no order on the face of the proceedings see note, (9) as to jurisdiction in transfer, see note, "*Pending*" post.

"Suit, appeal, or other proceeding"—The term "suit" in the earlier Code should, it was held, be construed in its broadest sense (10). The section itself shows that it is applicable to appeals, a power which was not given to the High Courts by the Letters Patent, (11) or appeals. The case law under the Code of 1882 was as follows.—As regards miscellaneous proceedings, thus

(1) *Kristo Das Koondoo v Issur Chunder Chowdhry*, 11 W R 189 (1809)

(2) *Loburi v Assam P & T Co*, 10 C 915 (1884), in which case the transfer was refused only on the ground that the Judge had meantime been replaced by another officer, and in which the principles on which transfers on this ground are made are discussed

(3) *In the matter of The West Hopetown Tea Co, Ltd*, 9 A 180, 184 (1886)

(4) *Krishna Velji v Mansaram*, 18 B 61 (1893)

(5) *Kadambari v Madan*, 3 C W N 247,

248 (1898)

(6) *Muhammad v Puran Chand*, 20 A 395 (1898)

(7) *Tarucknath v Gource Churn*, 3 W R 147 (1865)

(8) *Rambur v Girdharidall*, 2 Agra, 178 (1867)

(9) *Sheo Prasad Singh v Hastura Kuar*, 10 A 119 (1887)

(10) *In the matter of The West Hopetown Tea Co*, 9 A at p 182 (1886)

(11) As to Bengal Civil Courts, see s 22, Art XII of 1857

section taken with sect 617 (corresponding with sect 141) was held to authorize the transfer of a claim under sect 331, (1) and of winding up proceedings under the Indian Companies Act 1882, by the High Court from a District Court to itself, the Act providing for their transfer from one District Court to another (2). There was a conflict of opinion whether the word "suit" in the section which this replaces included execution proceedings or not. The Allahabad (3) and Bombay (4) High Courts held that it did. It is to be observed that sect 223 of the former Code related to transfer of applications for execution. The Madras High Court appears to have been of opinion that the word "suit" in this section in the last Code was used in its restricted sense of proceedings before decree, but that even assuming that it included execution proceedings, the limitation as to jurisdiction contained in the section which authorized the transfer to a Subordinate Court competent to try the suit, could only be imported into sect 223 of the Code of 1882 so far as it was consistent with that section (5). The Calcutta High Court held both under the corresponding provisions in the Code of 1859, (6) as also under the Code of 1882 (7) that there was no power under this section of that Code to transfer execution proceedings. The present section extends the Courts' power over miscellaneous proceedings other than suits or appeals.

"Pending"—The word used in the corresponding section of the Code of 1859 was "instituted". It was accordingly held that the transfer could take place only on the institution of the suit, and that it was not intended that a case in progress of trial might be transferred (8). The substitution of the word

(1) *Sithalakshmi v Vythilinga*, 8 M 548 (1884).

(2) *In re West Hopetown Tea Co*, 9 A 180 (1896).

(3) *Gaya Parshad v Bhup Singh*, 1 A 180 F B (1876) a decision under the Code of 1859.

(4) *Balaji v Ranchoddas*, 5 B 680 (1881). *Krishna Velji v Bhau Mansaram*, 18 B 61. *Nassarwanji v Kharsedji*, 22 B 778 (1897) in which this section was held to apply to the transfer of an application to be declared an insolvent as such an application was a proceeding in execution, and therefore a suit.

(5) *Shanmuga v Ramanathan*, 17 M 309 (1893). The preceding decision *Muttalagiri v Muttayar*, 6 M 357 (1883) appears to favour the other view. See *Nassarwanji v Kharsedji*, 22 B at p 782 (1897).

(6) *Kelarnath v Bungshee*, 17 W R 45 (1871). *Shaikh Hamidooddeen v Bhadse*, 18 W R 315 (1872). *Abdool Hye v Macrae*, 23 W P 1 (1874). cf *Anunl Mohun v Gria Kant*, 13 W R 222 (1870) [s. 20, Act VI. of 1862]. *Chowdhry v Nutreconissa*, 15 W R 774 (1871) [s. 19 Act VII of 1862]. It is to be observed, however, that s. 6 of the

Code of 1859 has been considerably modified by the present Code. See *Hukm Chanl* C P C 343.

(7) *Kishori Mohun Sett v Gul Mahomed Shaha*, 15 C 177 (1897), in which, however adherence was given to previous decision chiefly as a rule of practice and in which no reference was made to the substitution of the word "pending" for "instituted".

(8) *Ram Nath v Gowhar*, 2 N W P H C R 230 (1870). *Yakoob Ali v Luchmun Das*, 6 N W P 80 (1874). *Asmedh Koonwar v Taylor*, 1864 W R 14. *Dumree Sahoo v Jugdharee*, 13 W R 398 (1870). *Soorendro Pershad Dubey v Nundun Misser*, 21 W J 196 (1874). but see *Tarucknath Mookerjee v Gourree Churn Mookerjee*, 3 W R 147 (1871) in which it was held that when a Judge transfers a case to his own file he has liberty to amend the issues framed, and to frame additional issues, and to try the whole case except upon which there has been a verdict. And as to remand see *Zahoor v Thakoor*, 4 N W P 451 (1870).

"pending" bars any such construction in future, a construction which is further prohibited by the insertion of the words "at any stage" So it has been held that the High Court had jurisdiction under this section to make a transfer to a Subordinate Judge though the case was in part heard (1) Even now, however the section will not authorize a transfer affecting any special exclusive jurisdiction conferred by law (2) So as the Court which pronounced the judgment is the only Court which can review its proceedings on an application for a review of a Court's decision cannot be transferred to another Court (3) Nor may a District Court exercise its powers to transfer so as to oust any Court of a jurisdiction over any particular suit which may have been referred to it by order of a High Court or other Supreme Court (4) Thus, it has been held that the terms of the section are inapplicable to a suit which the Subordinate Court had received by an order of remand from a Court to which the District Court was itself subordinate (5)

The word "pending" denotes it is and duly pending. The suit, therefore, to be transferred must, it has been held, be pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction and an order made under this section will have no effect if the Court in which the suit is pending has no jurisdiction over it (6)

Subordinate — A transfer may be made only from or to a Court to which the Code applies. In the under mentioned case (7) Hutchins J, considered that the District Judge would have the power of transferring a case pending before one village munsif to another, not under this section, which he considered questionable, but under general principles as some one must have the power and it would be best vested in the munsif's official superior, the District Judge. The subordination contemplated is apparently not that

(1) *Palanisami v Thondama* 26 M. 595 (1902). See *Bandhu Naik v Lakshmi Kuar* 7 A 342 (1885) though as to the decision that if a case is part heard and transferred it can not be determined on the evidence taken in the first Court, see O XVIII r 15 cl 2 post. See also cases in paragraph on the term 'Suit, ante'. The observations in *Kashori Mohun v Gul Mahomed*, 15 C 177, which decided that the section did not apply to execution proceedings overlooked the change which has been effected in the section, and are, it is submitted, neither binding nor good law.

(2) See *Hukm Chand*, C P C 344.

(3) *Ram Nath v Gowhur*, 2 N W P 230 (1870).

(4) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 344.

(5) *Mahomed Zahoor v Thakoorance Rutta* 2 N W P 481 (1870). As pointed out in *Hukm Chand*, C P C 344 the decision in *Hamedoollah v Muteecoonissa*, 15 W R 574 (1874) also turned to some extent on the same principle, stress having been laid in it

on the circumstance that a transfer made in such a case might be inconsistent with the order of remand and change the Court to which the appeal from the final order would lie in the case. But see also *Tarucknath Mookerjee v Gourree Churn Mookerjee*, 3 W R 147 (1865). In *Sita Ram v Nannul Dularaj* 21 A 230 (1899), it was considered that s 25 was not applicable to a case remanded under s 562 of the last Code.

(6) *Peary Lal v Homal Kishore* 6 C 30 (1881), *Motilal v Jannadas* 2 B H C R, A C 40 (1865), *Jagjivan v Magdum* 7 B 487 at p 489 (1883), *Ledgard v Bull*, 9 A 191 (1887), s c, 13 I A 134, *R v Mangal Tekchand* 10 B 274 (1886), *Pachsoni Awasthi v Habi Bulash* 4 A 478 (1882), *Ram Narain v Parmeswar Narain* 25 C 39 (1897). Waiver will not avail where the Court has no inherent jurisdiction, otherwise in cases of mere irregularity *Sankumani v Iloran* 13 M. 211, 213 (1889).

(7) *Lakshmakka v Bali*, 8 M 500 (1885). See *Hukm Chand* C P C 348.

for the purposes of appeal as in sect 23 clause (1) *ante* but of an administrative character (1) It has formerly held that once a Court withdrew a suit and transferred it to its own files for trial, it exhausted all its powers under this section and it is not competent to retransfer it again to a Subordinate Court (2) The section however [see (1) (b) (iv)] now authorizes a Court after withdrawing a case to retransfer it for trial or disposal The Subordinate Court must be competent to try the suit—that is, must have jurisdiction (3) A District Judge can transfer a probate case for trial to a Subordinate Judge under clause (d), sub sect (2), sect 23 Act XII of 1887 (4) Where in a recent case a suit was filed as a Small Cause Court suit in the Court of a Subordinate Judge who had both Small Cause and regular jurisdiction, and he transferred it to the file tried by him as ordinary Judge, and passed a decree deciding a question of title to immoveable property, it was held that there was no substantial irregularity, and that the decree was not final, but appealable, since it could not have been passed by a Small Cause Court (5) As to the power of District Judges under the Bombay Civil Courts Act, to refer to Assistant Judges applications under special Acts for disposal see note (6)

“Try or dispose of”—The word “*trial*” includes every recognized method of procedure laid down in the Code and it is not necessary for the transfer that the Court transferring should not contemplate a reference of the case to arbitration (7) The present section adds the words “*dispose of*,” which will often be applicable in the case of the miscellaneous proceedings to which the section is extended

“Court of Small Causes”—The expression “*a Court of Small Causes*” in the last clause of this section means a Court properly and strictly so called, and does not include a Court invested with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes (8) The High Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the power to transfer a suit from the Calcutta Court of Small Causes to any other Court having equal or superior jurisdiction (9) The Court to which a suit is transferred will not become a Small Cause Court, but only the suit transferred

(1) See *Hukm Chand, C P C 349*

(2) *Amir Begum v Prahlad Das, 21 A 304* (1902), *Fatima Bibi v Abdul Majid, 14 A 531* (1892), *Sukharam v Gangaram, 13 B 654* (1889), *Sita Ram v Nanni Dolary, 21 A 230* (1899) [remand], *Nandan Prasad v Kenney, 24 A 356* (1902) [transfer of pauper suit] The first and third cases were distinguished with reference to the provisions of Act XII of 1887 [Bengal Civil Courts] in *Gappu Lal v Mathura Das, 25 A 183* (1902)

(3) *Nilhi Lal v Mazhar Husam, 7 A 239* (1881), *Haji Umar v Goostidji, 34 B 411* (1910)

(4) *Kunj Behari Goswami v Hem Chandra Lahiri, 25 C 340* (1899).

(5) *Hari Balu Gaskawad v Ganpatrao Lakshurao Gaskawad, 33 B 190* (1913)

(6) *First Assistant Collector v Ardevur Framji, 16 B 277* (1891)

(7) *Hukm Chand, C P C. 349* citing *Banarsi Das v Pam Krishan, 1889, P P. No 107*

(8) *Ramchandra v Ganosh, 23 B 332* (1895), diss. from *Mangal Sen v Rup Chand, 13 A 321* which was also dissented from in *Dulal Chandra Deb v Ram Narain Deb, 31 C. 1007* (1904)

(9) *Kadambini Baiji v Madan Mohan Basack, 7 C. W. N. 217* (1898) See as to this case, *Shamsher Munlal v Ganendra Narain Mitter, 29 C. 493, 500* (1902).

will be tried as a Small Cause Court suit (1) In the case under mentioned (2) a Small Cause Court suit was instituted before a Judge invested with jurisdiction to try it He retired from office, and the District Judge directed his successor, who had no Small Cause Court jurisdiction, to try it, it was held that the order must be considered as passed under this section, and no appeal lay from the decision to the District Court

Power of Governor General in Council to transfer suits
 25 (1) Where any party to a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in a High Court presided over by a single Judge objects to its being heard by him and the Judge is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, he shall make a report to the Governor General in Council, who may, by notification in the Gazette of India, transfer such suit, appeal or proceeding to any other High Court

(2) The law applicable to any suit, appeal or proceeding so transferred shall be the law which the Court in which the suit, appeal or proceeding was originally instituted ought to have applied to such case

INSTITUTION OF SUITS

481

26 Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed.
Institution of suits

"Plaint"—A plaint means a private memorial tendered to a Court in which the person sets forth his cause of action, the exhibition of an action in writing (3) It answers to the "statement of claim" in England In India a plaintiff may present a written statement also O VII rr 1-6 prescribe the contents of the plaint which is the document with which every suit is instituted in this country its object being to invoke the Court's assistance for the declaration, preservation, or enforcement of the plaintiff's right A suit, according to this section must commence with a plaint, and a proceeding which is capable of terminating in a decree or an order having the force of a decree cannot, on that ground alone, be deemed to be a suit within the meaning of the Code, if it has not commenced with a plaint Such a proceeding is, in strictness only a proceeding in a suit (4)

Presentation (a) Time—The only question which arises as to this is whether a plaint may be presented on a Sunday or holiday, or out of Court hours It has been enjoined that, without the consent of parties and in the

(1) Krishna Velu v Mausaram, 18 B 61 (1893)

(3) Assan v Pathamma 22 M at p 502

(4) Venkata Chandrappa v Venkata Ramu

(2) Kauleshwar Rai v Dost Mahomed 22 M 276 (1893)
 Khan, 5 A 274 (1893)

absence of urgent necessity no civil trial should proceed on Sundays or gazetted holidays (1) In India however, Sunday is not a *dies non* (2) and the holding of a judicial proceeding on a close holiday, though it may be an irregularity which if prejudicial be shown would entitle a party to have the proceedings set aside is such an irregularity as can be waived (3) It has been expressly provided in the Bengal, N W P, and Assam Civil Courts Act, and the same will probably be held on general principles, to be the case that a judicial act done on a close holiday is not invalid by reason only of its having been done on that day (4) A plaint may be received and admitted on a Sunday (5) or other holiday (6) There is, however no necessity to do so, for under the Limitation Act, if the period expires when the Courts are closed the suit may be admitted on the day that the Court re opens and so may any application (7)

(b) To whom.—The former section required that the plaint should be presented to the Court or such officer who was specially appointed in that behalf This will be so now though the words have been omitted Ordinarily, the plaint is presented to the Court A delivery to the clerk of a Small Cause Court has been held sufficient, (8) but not to a *nazir* (9) or *moonserim* (10) A plaint under Act X of 1859 presented to an Assistant Collector and not to the Collector was held not to be properly filed (11)

(c) Place.—Ordinarily, the plaint is presented in open Court The placing of a petition of appeal on a table when the officer is not present is not a presentation to him (12) The Allahabad High Court held that the presentation of a plaint at the private residence of the Munsif was not a sufficient institution (13) But in Bengal a plaint delivered at the private residence of a clerk of a Small Cause Court has been held to have been properly filed (14) Where a plaint sent by post was accepted the institution was considered

(1) C H C Gen Rules No 2

(2) *Aliter* in England 29 Car II c 5 s 6 but other holidays are periods of vacation only and proceedings are not suspended Petersdorff's Abridgment, 2nd ed vol 7, p 50 n (1) The term appears not to have been used in its strict sense by Davies J in Sambasiva v Ramasami 22 M at p 181 (1898)

(3) Ram Das v Official Liquidator, 9 A 300 (1887)

(4) Act XII of 1887 s 15 (3) A sale of property in execution on a close holiday has been held not to be illegal Rasm v Sahib un nisa 3 A 333 (1880) A local inquiry on Sunday was however, set aside chiefly because the defendant's vakil stated he could not attend and no other notice was given Jinnabhai v Jooda 17 W P 230 (1872)

(5) Uninto v Protal 16 W R 230 (1871)

(6) Ib Colml v Harigopal 3 B L R 72 (1869) in the latter case however

the holiday was in accordance with a circular which had no legal force

(7) Peary Mohun v Ananda Charan 18 C 631 (1891) Sambasiva v Ramasami 29 M 179 (1898)

(8) Mudden Mohun v Fakcer Biswas Sath S C C Rep 36

(9) Raj Chunder v Joogul, 18 W R 172 (1872)

(10) Taj Uldeen v Chafoor ul nissa 3 A H C R 341 (1871)

(11) Musumst Roopa v Sheikh Anwar 4 A H C R 35 (1871) but the proceedings are voidable only at the instance of the defendant Mackintosh v Kasher Nath 21 W R 450 (1874)

(12) Taj Uldeen v Chafoor ul nissa 3 A H C R 341 (1871)

(13) Jai Kuar v Heera Lal 7 A H C L R 1874

(14) Mudden Mohun v Fakcer Biswas Sath S. C. C. Rep. 36.

sufficient by the Madras High Court (1) Where a plaintiff presented a plaint to the District Court the Subordinate Judge's Court in which he ought to have presented it being then temporarily closed, it was held that the District Court could not be considered a Court of first instance competent to receive the plaint (2)

Date—The Code does not provide that the plaint should be dated, but it is generally provided by rules framed by the High Courts that the actual date of presentation should be endorsed on the plaint by the officer receiving it Where a plaint was presented on the 29th and the endorsement stated that it was accepted on the 31st the former and not the latter date was held to be the date of institution (3) Where two suits are filed on the same day it must be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that they were presented and admitted in the order in which the numbers appear in the Register of Civil Suits (4) The Code does not ordain or imply that, in the absence of a sufficient stamp there can be no presentation, nor does the Limitation Act There is no warrant for inferring that a plaint means a plaint duly stamped So where a plaint was presented on the 14th September with an insufficient stamp but the deficient stamp duty was paid on the 18th September, it was held that the suit was instituted on the 14th September (5) The date of institution should be reckoned from the date of presentation, and not from that on which the requisite court fees are subsequently put in so as to make it admissible as a plaint (6)

Registration—Sect 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) does not apply to proper judicial proceedings, whether consisting of pleadings filed by the parties or orders made by the Court (7)

SUMMONS AND DISCOVERY.

27 *Where a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and may be served in manner prescribed*

Summons—See notes to O V r 1

(1) *Sankaranarayana v Kunjappa* 8 M 411 (1885) approving *Mopart v Vappala*, 6 M H C R 136 (1871), but had it not been accepted the presentation would not have been considered valid.

(2) *Ramaya v Muhamadbhai*, 10 B H C R 495 (1873) *Motilal v Jannadas* 2 B C R 40 (1865)

(3) *Young v MacCorkindale*, 19 W R 159 (1873)

(4) *Murti v Bhole Ram*, 16 A 165 (1893)

(5) *Dhondiram v Taba Saradan*, 27 B 330 (1902) in which it was stated that this view was in accord with the decisions of the Calcutta High Court cited in the report and

with the judgment of Subramania Ayyar J. in *Assan v Pathamma* 22 M 494 (1899) (who dissented from the decision *Venkata nayya v Krishnayya* 20 M 319 (1897) which was approved and distinguished by Davies J) though not with the decisions of the Allahabad High Court cited in the first mentioned case

(6) *Moti Sahu v Chhatra Das* 19 C 20 (1892) The case of *Yakut un nissa Kishoree* 19 C 747 (1891) was distinguished and explained in *Surendra Kumar v Behary*, 27 C. 814 (1900)

(7) *Bhadesi Naik v Ganga Saran* 171 (1897) = c, L R 22 I A 4

28 (1) *A summons may be sent for service in another province to such Court and in such manner as may be prescribed by rules in force in that province* [s 8]

Service of summons
where defendant resides
in another province

(2) The Court to which such summons is sent shall, upon receipt thereof, proceed as if it had been issued by such Court in the summons to the Court of issue together (any) of its proceedings with regard thereto

her province '—See notes to O V rr 21, 23 post.

es issued by any Civil or Revenue Court [s
situate beyond the limits of British India
may be sent to the Courts in British India
had been issued by such Courts.

the Courts issuing such summonses have been
continued by the authority of the Governor
or that the Governor General in Council
in the Gazette of India, declared the provisions
apply to such Courts

ons —The words "or continued" were inserted by sect 62,
or Courts in Gwalior, Indore, Bundelkhand Bhopal Mulwa,
Jopawar Agencies, see the "Gazette of India" March 1st,
19-352

to such conditions and limitations as may be
prescribed, the Court may, at any time, either
of its own motion or on the application of any

such orders as may be necessary or reasonable in all
cases relating to the delivery and answering of
interrogatories, the admission of documents and facts,
the discovery, inspection, production, impounding
return of documents or other material objects
admissible as evidence,

summonses to persons whose attendance is required
or to give evidence or to produce documents or such
objects as aforesaid;
any fact to be proved by affidavit.

See Orders XI XII XIII XVI, XIX, and notes thereto

The section is new

31. *The provisions in sections 27, 28 and 29 shall apply to summonses to give evidence or to produce documents or other material objects.*
Summons to witness

32. *The Court may compel the attendance of any person to whom a summons has been issued under section 30 and for that purpose may—*
Penalty for default

- (a) *issue a warrant for his arrest ;*
- (b) *attach and sell his property ;*
- (c) *impose a fine upon him not exceeding five hundred rupees ;*
- (d) *order him to furnish security for his appearance and in default commit him to the civil prison.*

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

33. *The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow.*
Judgment and decree

Judgment and decree —See notes to O XX, post

INTEREST.

34. (1) *Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit*
Interest.

(2) *Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefor shall not lie*

Interest —Act XXIII of 1861, sect 10 The words "*when a decree is for the payment of money,*" and the second paragraph of sect 209 of the last Code which the present section replaces were introduced by sect 20, Act VII of 1888 It only deals with interest after suit As regards interest up to the

date of suit, this is a question of substantive law (1) Ordinarily and subject to the exceptions recognized by that law the rate agreed upon must be awarded up to the date of suit (2) Interest after date of suit is according to the opinion of the Calcutta (3) though not of the Madras High Court, (4) in the discretion of the Court notwithstanding that a fixed rate of interest is mentioned as payable "up to realization" No additional Court fee is required on account of the claim for interest from the date of institution of suit till payment (5) There is no analogy between interest awarded under this section and mesne profits under O XX r 12, *post* (6)

Sect 86 of the Transfer of Property Act (now O XXXIV r 2) excludes the discretion given by this section and binds the Court to decree the rate of interest provided by the mortgage if not illegal down to the date fixed by the Court according to the terms of the second paragraph of the section (7) After this period, interest will run at the Court rate up to date of payment according to the practice and rules of the Calcutta High Court (8) This section relates to a decree for money, and a mortgage decree, until it reaches the stage shown by sect 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, cannot be so termed (9)

(1) Some decisions on the Interest Act (XXII of 1839) and others relating to the question of interest such as the doctrine of penalties (see Contract Act s 74 as amended by Act VI of 1899) which does not apply to stipulations in consent decrees (*Shree Kuli Timappa v Mahalinga*, 10 B 435 (1896) *contra* *Nagappa v Venkatas* 24 M 205 (1900) *ref* to *Pai Balkrishen Das v Raja Run Bahadoor Singh* 10 C 305 (1893) and see *Run Bahadoor Singh v Poy Narain Dass* 7 C L R 82 (1890)] the rule of *dampnat* [as to which also see *post*], payment of interest after due date and interest payable according to mercantile usage and other cases will be found in the notes to O Kincaly s Civ Pro Code A recent decision is *Rani Sundar Koor v Rai Sham Krishen* 31 I A 9 (1906) For payments of interest by instalments and limitation, see *Abdul Ahad v Mahtab Bibi* 35 A 378 (1913) distinguishing *Kalla v Halki*, 18 A 295 (1896) and *Anwar Hussain v Lalmai Khan* 20 A 167 (1907)

(2) See O Kincaly s Civ Pro Code The matter is not here dealt with as being beyond the scope of the Commentary

(3) *Mangram Marwari v Dhowlaji* 10 J 12 C 569 I B (1886) and the same was held in *Boulby and v the Code of 1899* *Curall v Nurbibi* 3 B 202 (1879) But it has recently been held in Calcutta that the Court is bound to award interest from the date of suit to date fixed for redemption unless the rate is penal. *Kali Prosonno v Pratab* 17 C W N 221, 226 (1912)

(4) *Ramachandra Devu* 12 M 485 (1889)

(5) *Vithal Hari v Govind Vasudeo* 17 B 41 (1892), it stands on the same footing as *futuro mesne profits* ib

(6) *Dwarka Nath Biswas v Dechendra Nath Tagore* 33 C 1232 (1906)

(7) *Surya Narain Singh v Jogendra Narain Roy* 20 C 360 (1892), *Subbaraya Ravutha munda v Ponnusami Naddar*, 21 M 764 (1897), *Chaturbhaj Karsan v Harbhamji*, 20 B 744 (1895) See in this connection the distinction drawn in *Umes Chunder Sircar v Zahar Fatima* 18 C 164 (1890) *Kali Prosonno v Pratab* 17 C W N 221 (1912) and for case where no interest is stipulated for in a mortgage bond, see *Makbul Ali v Ali Ahmed* 40 C 514 (A C) (1913) (none is recoverable for being a charge in the nature of a mortgage, it should have been in writing and registered), following *Kutti umma v Madhava Menon* 11 M L J 186 (1901) distinguishing *Imdad Hasam Khan v Badri Prasad* 20 A 401 *Lajwanta Kunwar v Shyam Narain Singh* 36 A 220 (1914), *Rameswar Koor v Mahomed M hdi* 26 C 33 (1898) *Maharaja of Barpur v Hani Kanu*, 23 A 181 (1900), *Lakar Rajad v L hit Narain Singh* 21 A 361 (1897)

(8) *Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya v Abraham* 6 C W N 70 (1897) See also cases cited in this.

(9) *Hargovan Das v Rajaram v Anand* 20 M L J 186 (1901) *Mahabubhai v Bom* L J 22 (1897) See *Girva v Subbaraya* 2 A 1 (1897)

The Court has also a discretion to award interest after decree. The contract becomes merged in the decree and the plaintiff recovers only such interest as, according to the course and practice of the Court is allowed on debts for which the creditor has the security of its decree (1). Interest if not given in the decree is taken to have been refused (2) but a party may by his conduct be estopped from objecting that execution cannot issue for a higher rate than that provided in the decree (3). If a decree holder gives up a portion of his claim and verbally agrees to receive the remainder by instalments, he does not thereby give up interest to which he is entitled under the decree (4). The rule of *damdapat* exists only so long as the contractual relation of debtor and creditor exists but not when that relation has come to an end by reason of a decree (5). Thus where a decree has been passed on a mortgage the rule does not apply to the interest accruing after the date fixed for redemption (6). The rule of *damdapat* is not applicable if it was not applicable at the time when the decree became final and binding (7). The discretionary powers conferred by this section may be exercised without reference to the law of *damdapat* (8).

"In the decree — The Court is not empowered by this section merely to embody in a decree interest which has been adjudged payable in the suit for it is said that such a reading of the section would make it surplussage, as it does not require a rule of procedure to enable a Court to decree a relief which it has adjudged in its judgment (9). It has therefore been held that the Court may in the decree order payment of interest from the date of the suit onwards although the judgment awards interest for the period prior to the institution of the suit only (10). But where a Judge in adjudging a specific sum, principal and interest in terms dismissed "the rest of the claim" it was held that as the claim for interest after the institution of the suit was part of "the rest of the claim" and with it stood dismissed the Court could not give interest by way of amendment of its decree (11). Where a district Judge gave no interest from the date of the suit and there was nothing to show that this was an over

(1) *Bishessur Surmah v. Hakeemnath Surmah* 11 W. R. 455 (1869) the consolidated sum bears interest from and after decree but this is not compound interest but interest on a fixed sum declared to be due by the decree *Jodoonath Roy v. Dwarka Nath Chatterjee* 1 W. R. Misc. 15 (1864) and see *Juleshar Rai v. Anrut Pasi* 35 A. 302 (1913).

(2) See *Kalleoram Baboo v. Doornanath Taloorkar* 10 W. R. 175 (1863). In *Madhub Lal Khan v. Noyan Ghose* 6 C. L. P. 231 (1880) the decree gave interest but did not specify the rate and the usual Court rate was allowed.

(3) *Sheo Golam Lall v. Bani Prasad* 4 C. L. R. 23 (1879) s. c., 5 C. 27.

(4) *Mohammed Mojoomdar v. Purbab Chunder Singh* 6 W. P. Misc. 121 (1860).

(5) *In re Hari Lal Mullick*, 10 C. W. N. 884 (1906).

(6) *Nanda Lal Poy v. Dharendra Nath Chakravarti* 40 C. 710 (1913) following *In re Hari Lal Mullick*, *supra* not following *Ram Bankya Audhicary v. Cally Churn Dey* 21 C. 840.

(7) *Lall Behary Dutt v. Thacomoney Dassce* 23 C. 899 (1896).

(8) *Dhondhet v. Pajji* 22 B. 86 (1896).

(9) *Hasan Shah v. Sheo Prasad*, 15 A. 121 122 (1893).

(10) *Kolai Ram v. Pali Ram* 7 A. 705 (1855) in which it was held that there was no variance between the judgment and decree.

(11) *Hasan Shah v. Sheo Prasad* *supra*.

for any future stage of the proceedings " When costs of an interlocutory proceeding have been disposed of, the award of general costs of the suit does not interfere with that interlocutory order (1) A Court finally determining a suit is bound to decide by which of the parties before it the costs shall be borne, it is not at liberty to declare that the costs shall be borne by the unsuccessful party in a suit to be hereafter brought (2) A decree drawn strictly in accordance with the provisions of sect 83, of the Transfer of Property Act, directs the costs to be recovered out of the mortgaged property (3) An omission to award costs cannot be considered a mere clerical error, but must be rectified by way of review within the prescribed time (4)

Parties paying or receiving costs—The person who receives the costs must, of course, be a party to the suit As regards the person who may be ordered to pay, the general rule in English Courts has been said to be, (5) that Courts have no power except over parties to the record, though an exception has been made where the party before the Court is a mere puppet in the hands of a stranger to the suit The Courts here have, in some cases, ordered persons not party to the record to pay costs (6) But under the last Code only parties could be made liable This appeared from the words, "any other party to the suit" in sect 102 of that Code (7) Where, however, there has been a contempt of Court, as where strangers were the real though hidden plaintiffs, and had executed a false lease in favour of the nominal plaintiff, who had brought the suit on the strength of such false lease, it was held that though the Code gave no power, yet that the High Court, inheriting the powers of the Supreme Court could order such strangers to pay the costs of the suit (8) Persons interested, on behalf of whom a suit is brought under O I r 8 (formerly sect 30), but not joining or joined as parties, should not be made to pay costs (9) Where

(1) *Radhapersad Singh v Ram Parmar* Singh, 9 C 797 (1882), S C 10 I A 113

(2) *Kashee Chunder v Bungshee Buddun*, 23 W R 89 (1874)

(3) *Maqbul Fatima v Lalita Prasad*, 20 A 523 (1898) in which a direction in the decree was held to be merely formal compliance with the Code and was not intended to make the costs recoverable personally from the judgment debtor As to mortgagor's personal liability, see *Rutnessur Sen v Jusoda*, 14 C 185 (1886), *ref Damodar Das v Budh Kumar*, 10 A 179 (1888)

(4) *Ram Sahoy Singh v Rookhoo Singh*, 15 W R 414 (1871) The Court has refused to interfere where the applicant has delayed too long *Oodoy Tara v Syud Jonab* 17 W R 358 (1872), or the judgment has been appealed against and a final decree passed by the Superior Court *Bilas Singh v Salig Ram*, S D N W (1861) p 466

(5) *Bevis v Turner*, 7 B 484, 486 (1883),

but as to whether the Supreme Court, whose powers are inherited by the High Court, would have been bound by *Hayward v Gifford*, 4 M & W 194, see judgment of *Peacock, C J*, in *Jointee Chunder Sen v Anundo Lal Doss*, 14 W R 1 (1865) (appeals from original jurisdiction)

(6) See cases cited in *Goolam Hoosein v Fatmabai*, 8 B 391, at p 392 (1884), though in *Watson v Hurgobind Sookul*, 22 W R 35 (1874), it was held that persons who, without their consent, had been made parties, could not be made liable for costs simply because they had encouraged the plaintiff to bring the suit and provided him with funds

(7) *Bevis v Turner*, 7 B 484, 486 (1883), *Jointee Chunder v Anundo Lal Doss*, 14 W R 1, A O J (1865)

(8) *Jointee Chunder Sen v Anundo Lal Doss*, 14 W R 1, A O J (1865)

(9) *Syedur Raj v Baidya Nath Deb* 1 C N W 6, (1896)

a party is made defendant without cause of action his co defendant of course should not be made to pay his costs which should be paid by the plaintiff (1) But the Court may in a proper case order one defendant to pay the costs of another defendant (2) So where a defendant has colluded with the plaintiff and induced him to bring the suit he may not only be made to pay his co defendant's costs but refused his own (3) And in a suit brought against several parties some of whom admitted the debt and partnership and others denied them, the defendants who disputed the claim were made to pay the costs of those who admitted it (4)

Sec 219 of the last Code provided that "the judgment shall direct by whom the costs of each party are to be paid whether by himself or by any other party to the suit, and whether in whole or in what part or proportion"

As to the liability of minors next friends and guardians *ad litem* for costs see notes to O XXXII If the Official Assignee defends a suit he is liable, in the event of failure to be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs in the same way as any other defendant and if the estate be insufficient to pay the costs, he will have to bear them personally (5) As regards executors (6) administrators, (7) trustees (8) and mortgagees (9) the English O 65 r 1 provides that nothing in it shall be held to deprive any of these persons who has not unreasonably

(1) Ram Chunder t Kisto Kamnee 10 W R. 194 (1868)

(2) Rudow v Great Britain etc., Assurance Society, 17 C D 608. Sanderson t Blyth Theatre Co., (1902) 2 K B. 533 [The costs of a successful defendant sued in the alternative may be ordered to be paid by the unsuccessful co defendant] As to suits for contribution for costs paid under a joint decree, see Kisto Coomar t Anund Moyee, 7 W R 300 (1867)

(3) Bhyroo Basot t Anoorodeb Deo, Marsh 608 (1864)

(4) Juggat Chunder Ray t Roop Chaml Shaw, 6 C 811 (1881)

(5) Beris t Turner, 7 B 484 (1883)

(6) In the goods of Taramoni Dass, 21 C 553 (1898) [executor of will obtained probate, subsequent will, application by another executor]. Dayabhai Tapidas t Damodar Das Tapidas, 21 B 75 (1896) [fund liable for costs of obtaining probate] Trustees, executors, and administrators are entitled to costs out of estate except in cases of vexatious conduct or where by neglect or misconduct they have occasioned institution of suit Simpson t Bathurst 5 Ch. App. 193, *In re* Chennell, 8 C. D 492, *Ex parte* Wainwright 19 C. D 140 In suits for construction of wills, where reasonable doubt exists costs usually come out of the estate, see *Kristomoney t*

Norendra Krishna, 161 A 29, 43 (1888), 16 C 383, Terachurn Chatterjee t Suresh Chunder Mookerjee, 161 A 166, 174 (1889), 17 C 123, not so where the construction of the will was not so difficult as to have required the assistance of the Court Nara yani Doss t Administrator General, 21 C. 683 (1894), or where plaintiff sued to oust a person from possession of property, resting his title upon construction of a will Lala Ramjewan Lal t Del Koer, 24 C 406, 412 (1897) Where the estate was not before the Court, an agreement as to costs could not be carried out Malchur t Broughton, 13 C 193 (1886)

(7) See last note and Ford t Chesterfield, 21 B 426 [estate or fund administered, costs of all necessary parties first charge], Sharp t Lush, 10 C. D 468 [cost of appearing in chambers in administration suit], as to costs of administrator general, see Amir Jan t Rivett Carnac, 10 B 350 (1886)

(8) See last note but one *only*, and as to right of dissenting trustee to have bill of costs taxed even after payment, see *Jijiboy t Byramji*, 18 B 189 (1893)

(9) Maqbul Fatima t Lalit Prasad 20 A 523 (1895), Rupnassur Sein t Junda 14 C. 183 (1886), Damodar Das t Buthi Das 10 A. 179 (1885). As to attorney and costs see *Olthor Churn Sen t Debendro Sen* Mullck, 8 C. L. P. 437 (1881)

instituted or carried on or resisted proceedings of any right to costs out of a particular estate or fund to which he would be entitled under the Chancery practice And this will be so here

As to costs in matrimonial causes, (1) and in guardianship proceedings, (2) see cases cited as also as to costs and taxation of costs of the Government solicitor, (3) costs in case of excessive bail in salvage actions, (4) and cases of set off (5)

The Court has refused a witness his costs of appearing by counsel (6)

Power of Court as to costs—Sect 220 of the last Code provided as follows '(1) The Court shall have full power to give and apportion costs of every application and suit in any manner it thinks fit, and the fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case is no bar to the exercise of such power Provided that if the Court directs that the costs of any application or suit shall not follow the event, the Court shall state its reason in writing (2) Every order relating to costs made under this Code and not forming part of a decree may be executed as if it were a decree for money'

The discretion to award costs was subject to other provisions, and was thus limited in the case of certain suits instituted in the High Court, but cognizable by the Presidency Small Cause Courts (7) Where A demanded a particular sum as due to him from B, and the latter tendered a less amount, saying that that was all he owed it was held in an action brought in the High Court that A was entitled to full costs, not being under any obligation to accept the lesser sum and sue for the balance in the Small Cause Court (8) For sections of the Code affecting the discretion, see O XI r 3 and O XXI r 72 The power, however, given though a full power was subject to the control of the Court of Appeal (9) The discretion as to the award of costs which a Court has is not taken away by the fact that a party to a suit is protected under the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act (10)

As regards apportionment, the general rule is that if a plaintiff recovers a less amount than he claimed in his plaint, his costs should be apportioned

(1) *Fowler v Fowler* 4 C 260 (1878) *Proby v Proby*, 5 C 357 (1879) [dist *Natal v Natal* 9 M 12 (1885)], *Thomson v Thomson*, 14 C 580 (1887), *Mayhew v Mayhew*, 10 B 293 (1891), *A v B*, 21 B 77 (1896)

(2) *In re Fakaruddin Mahomed Chowdhry*, 26 C. 133 (1898)

(3) *Azimullah Saheb v Secretary of State*, 15 M 405 (1892), *Mahammed Alum Oollah v Secretary of State*, 17 M 162 (1893)

(4) In the matter of the ship *Champion*, 17 C 84, 114 (1889)

(5) Notes to O VIII r 6 and *Brimmath Dass v Juggernath Dass* 4 C 742 (1879) [set off of costs against mortgage money], and as to pre-emption suits see notes to Rule 130

(6) *In re Brown & Co*, 14 C. 219 (1886)

(7) Secs 22 of Act XV of 1882, amended by s 11 of Act I of 1890. *Ismail Ariff v*

Leshe, 24 C 399 (1896), 1 C W N 188, dissented from in *Yonosuko v Oohcrda* 21 B 779 (1897), *Sabapati Mudaliyar v Narayanaswami Mudaliyar*, 1 M L C R 115 (1892) [clause 37 of Letters Patent does not give the High Court an uncontrolled discretion as to costs] The section has, of course, no application where the suit is not within the jurisdiction of the S C C. *Virtunjoy Dutt v Kameenes Dassoo*, 1 Ind Jur N 8 95 (1867)

(8) *Chunder Kant Mookerjee v Judoo Nath Khan*, 1 C L R 470 (1877)

(9) *Tara Prasunno v Satish Chandra* 4 C W N 90 (1896), *Pratap Chandra v Kesh Bhanjan* 4 C W N 600 (1900)

(10) *Ganesh Mahadev v Narayan Balshet*, 4 Bom L R 109 (1902)

"Follow the event"—This means the result of the decision (8) The second paragraph of the section indicates that costs must follow the event, unless there be good cause to the contrary If a plaintiff succeeds he is ordinarily entitled to his costs (9) If a defendant succeeds he is ordinarily entitled to his costs (10) A plaintiff thus cannot get costs against a person against whom he has no cause of action (11) And a successful defendant cannot be made to pay the costs of the plaintiff (12) If a party substantially succeeds and proves his case against the defendant he is entitled to his costs, although he has not got the precise form of relief which he wanted (13) The mistakes of the opposite party are no reason for departing from the general

- (9) Chanashamu Nilkant e Miroba Ram

(13) Ghanasham Nulkant r. Moroba Ram-
chandra, *sejva*

instituted or carried on or resisted proceedings of any right to costs out of a particular estate or fund to which he would be entitled under the Chancery practice. And this will be so here.

As to costs in matrimonial causes, (1) and in guardianship proceedings, (2) see cases cited. As also as to costs and taxation of costs of the Government solicitor, (3) costs in case of excessive bail in salvage actions, (4) and cases of set off (5).

The Court has refused to award costs of appearing by counsel (6).

Power of Court as to costs—Sect. 220 of the last Code provided as follows:—“(1) The Court shall have full power to give and apportion costs of every application and suit in any manner it thinks fit, and the fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case is no bar to the exercise of such power: Provided that if the Court directs that the costs of any application or suit shall not follow the event, the Court shall state its reason in writing. (2) Every order relating to costs made under this Code and not forming part of a decree may be executed as if it were a decree for money.”

The discretion to award costs was subject to other provisions, and was thus limited in the case of certain suits instituted in the High Court, but cognizable by the Presidency Small Cause Courts (7). Where A demanded a particular sum as due to him from B, and the latter tendered a less amount, saying that that was all he owed. It was held in an action brought in the High Court that A was entitled to full costs, not being under any obligation to accept the lesser sum and sue for the balance in the Small Cause Court (8). For sections of the Code affecting the discretion, see O XI r 3 and O XXI r 72. The power, however, given though a full power was subject to the control of the Court of Appeal (9). The discretion as to the award of costs which a Court has is not taken away by the fact that a party to a suit is protected under the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act (10).

As regards apportionment, the general rule is that if a plaintiff recovers a less amount than he claimed in his plaint, his costs should be apportioned

(1) *Fowles v Fowles*, 4 C 260 (1878), *Proby v Proby*, 5 C 357 (1879) [*dist Natal v Natal*, 9 M 12 (1885)], *Thomson v Thomson*, 14 C 580 (1887), *Mayhew v Mayhew*, 10 B 293 (1891), *A v B*, 21 B 77 (1896).

(2) *In re Fakaruddin Mahomed Chowdhry*, 26 C. 133 (1898).

(3) *Azimullah Sahab v Secretary of State*, 15 M. 405 (1892), *Mahammed Abul Oollah v Secretary of State*, 17 M. 162 (1893).

(4) *In the matter of the ship Champion*, 17 C. 84, 114 (1889).

(5) *Notes to O VIII r 6 and Brijnath Dass v Juggernath Das*, 4 C 742 (1879) [set off of costs against mortgage money], and as to pre-emption suits, see notes to Rule 130.

(6) *In re Brown & Co.*, 14 C 219 (1886).

(7) *Secs 22 of Act XV of 1882, amended by s. 11 of Act I of 1895*. *Ismail Agha v*

Leslie, 24 C 399 (1896), 1 C W N 183, discredited from *in Yonosuke v Ookerda*, 21 B 779 (1897), *Sabapati Mudaliyar v Narayanaswami Mudaliyar*, 1 M H. C R 115 (1892) [clause 37 of Letters Patent does not give the High Court an uncontrolled discretion as to costs]. The section has, of course, no application where the suit is not within the jurisdiction of the S. C. C. *Virtunjoy Dutt v Kamence Dassee*, 1 Ind Jur N S 95 (1867).

(8) *Chander Kant Mookerjee v Jadoo Nath Khan*, 1 C L R 470 (1877).

(9) *Tara Prasunno v Satish Chandra*, 4 C W N 90 (1896), *Pratap Chandra v Kali Bhanjan*, 4 C W N 600 (1900).

(10) *Ganesh Mahadev v Narayan Balshet*, 4 Bom L R 103 (1902).

according to the amount recovered and not to the sum claimed (1) Costs thus follow the result of the case unless there are reasons to the contrary so that where the plaintiff has failed in part and succeeded in part, the costs are apportioned so as to give each party the costs applicable to the matter upon which he has succeeded (2) It is however, not correct to say that costs must be invariably awarded in proportion to the amount decreed and dismissed The Court has a discretion, and if a plaintiff has an honest claim in which he mainly succeeds he may be allowed full costs (3) As to costs of particular issues, see *post*, "Follow the event" The Court is given a wide discretion, but that discretion must be exercised on legal principles It is a power to be exercised according to law and not according to mere caprice (4) The law as to the award of costs has been laid down by Jessel M R, in *Cooper v Whittingham*, (5) in a passage which has been cited and adopted by the Madras High Court (6) An Appellate Court will not interfere with an exercise of discretion by the lower Court unless it has proceeded upon a manifestly wrong ground (7) See *post*

"Follow the event"—This means the result of the decision (8) The second paragraph of the section indicates that costs must follow the event, unless there be good cause to the contrary If a plaintiff succeeds he is ordinarily entitled to his costs (9) If a defendant succeeds he is ordinarily entitled to his costs (10) A plaintiff thus cannot get costs against a person against whom he has no cause of action (11) And a successful defendant cannot be made to pay the costs of the plaintiff (12) If a party substantially succeeds and proves his case against the defendant he is entitled to his costs, although he has not got the precise form of relief which he wanted (13) The mistakes of the opposite party are no reason for departing from the general

(1) *Mudhun Mohun Doss v Gokul Doss*, 10 M I A 563 (1866), *Velu Pillai v Ghose Mahomed*, 17 M 293, 296 (1893)

(2) *Tarachand Mookerjee v Jadoonath, Marsh*, 79 (1864)

(3) *Sheo Dyal Tewarie v Jadoonath Tewarie*, 9 W R 61 (1865) On the other hand, costs have been disallowed to a special appellant who failed on certain points, even though the decree was modified in appeal *Heera Ram v Ashraf Ali*, 9 W R 103 (1868)

(4) *Gridhari Lal Roy v Sundar Riba*, B L R. Sup Vol F B 496 497 (1866), *Sri Dantuluri v Surappa Razu*, 3 M H C R 113 (1866)

(5) 15 Ch. D 501 504

(6) *Kuppuswami Chetty v Zamindar of Kalaharti*, 27 M 341 (1903)

(7) *Parshram v Doraji*, 2 Bom. L R 254, 255 (1900)

(8) See Ann. Pr 1905, O 65, r 1, p. 943

(9) *Ghanasham Ndkant v Moroba Ram*

chandra 18 B 474 (1894)

(10) *Monohur Doss v Romanauth Law*, 3 C. 473, 484 (1878) So also a person who shows that he has been wrongly made a party, *Rushen Dayal v Rank of Upper India*, 13 A 290, 295 (1890), or respondent, *Sheo Pershad v Laljee*, S D N W, July, 1863, p. 1 *Kashernath Sein v Chunder Monee*, 9 W R 288 (1868) *Collector of Dacca v Kamala Lant*, 2 W R. 33 (1865), *Collector of 24 Pergannahs v Wilkinson*, 12 W R 444 (1869), *Government v Sanoola*, 3 W P 23 (1865); *Shunt Buksh v Lalla Nund*, 11 W R. 48 (1869)

(11) *Bunwarre Lal v Chowdhry Drup Singh*, 19 C. 179 (1885)

(12) *Sri Dantuluri v Surappa Razu*, 3 M. H. C. R. 113 (1866), *Moehingan v Mozari Sajad*, 12 C. 271 (1885)

(13) *Ghanasham Ndkant v Moroba Ram-chandra supra*

rule of law that a successful party is entitled to his costs (1). The word "event" may however be read distributively, and where there are distinct causes of action the general costs of the cause follow the judgment but the costs of the particular issues should be taxed in favour of the party who has succeeded on them (2). And the same rule is commonly applied in all cases where several issues are raised and the party fails as to some and is successful as to others.

The same general principles apply in the case of appeals (3) though the cost of an appeal may be severable from the general costs of the suit (4). It is a general but not a universal rule that the discretion of the Court below as to costs is not altered when there is no substantial alteration made in the decree itself (5). The respondent will not be deprived of costs on the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the appellant had no previous notice of the preliminary objection which has prevailed (6). In his appeal from the Judge's order passed in favour of the plaintiff and disallowing his own claim for costs a defendant unnecessarily made a co defendant a respondent. As this respondent could not be injured in any way in the appeal it was held by Sir Barnes Peacock (Viceroy, dissenting) that although the appeal was dismissed the co defendant was not entitled to costs simply because he had been present watching the case (7). When an Appellate Court decrees an appeal and gives costs of its own Court, the costs of the first Court should be included in the decree (8). A decree for "usual costs and interest" means all costs which the successful party has incurred from the commencement of the suit until the date of the final decree with interest at (now) 6 per cent from the date of the decree (9). A direction in a decree that "the respondent should pay to the appellants the costs incurred by them in the Lower Court" means the costs specified in the decree appealed against as the costs incurred by the appellants (10). Where a decree under which costs have been recovered is set aside in appeal, an express order is not needed for a refund of the costs with interest (11).

The same principles are applied in appeals to the Privy Council where

(1) *Bishen Dayal v Bank of Upper India* 13 A 290 295 (1890)

(2) *Myers v Defries* 5 Ex D 180, *Elbs v De Silva* 6 Q B D 521, *Goutard v Carr* 13 Q B D 598 n. *Lund v Campbell*, 14 Q B D 821 *Hawke v Brearley*, 841

(3) See *Mohendro Chandra v Ashutosh Ganguli*, 20 C 762 (1893) *Parmanandas v Venayekrao* 7 B 19, 33 (1878), *Monohur Dass v Romanauth Law*, 3 C 473, 484 (1878) *Ghanasham Nilkant v Moroba Ramchandra* 18 B 474 (1894) In *Ramji Moraji v Standard Oil Co* 20 B 167 (1895) it was held that the assignee of a decree who was made respondent in an appeal from it but had taken no steps actively to support it ought not to be ordered to pay costs

(4) *Mohendro Chandra v Ashutosh Ganguli supra*

(5) *Parmanandas v Venayekrao, supra*

(6) *Imtiaz Bano v Latafat un nissa* 11 A 328 (1889)

(7) *Collector of 24 Pergunnahs v Wilkinson* 12 W R 444 (1869)

(8) *Shaukh Mahomed v Ram Kant Chowdhry* 16 W R 266 (1871)

(9) *Broughton v Perblad Sein* 19 W R 152 (1873), see *Madhublal Khan v Noyan ghose* 6 C L R 231 (1880)

(10) *Ram Chunder Sen v Durga Nath Poy*, 1 Shome 143

(11) *Dorab Ally Khan v Abdul Azeez* 4 C 229 (1878) *Watkins v Zohooroo Ideen* 1 C W N 500 (1897)

the successful appellant is, as a rule, entitled to his costs (1) But where an appeal was affirmed upon wholly different grounds from those relied upon by the Court below, the dismissal was ordered to be without costs (2) And where a partial alteration was made by the Appellate Court in the decree of the Court below, as to the rate of interest awarded, but in other respects the decree was affirmed, both parties were directed to pay their own costs of appeal (3) No costs have been given where the parties maintained pleas far in excess of their respective legal rights, (4) or where the appellant has failed as to part of his appeal, (5) or where the appellant has used forged documents (6) Costs occasioned by the introduction of unnecessary and irrelevant matter into the record have been disallowed (7)

A Court may, however, direct that costs shall not follow the event, but if it does, it must be for good cause, and its reasons must be stated in writing, a provision enacted both to secure a proper exercise of discretion and in order that the Court of Appeal may be in a position to control the order. It is not possible to define what is good cause. The rule laid down in *Cooper v Whittingham* (8) that "where a plaintiff comes to enforce a legal right, and there has been no misconduct on his part, the Court cannot take away his right to costs," has been adopted in this country (9) and by the Court of Appeal in England. But the same Court has held (10) that misconduct was not necessary to constitute good cause for depriving a successful plaintiff of costs. "Everything which increases the litigation and the costs, and which places upon the defendant a burden which he ought not to bear in the course of that litigation, is perfectly 'good cause' for depriving the plaintiff of his costs" (11). The Court may consider not merely the conduct of the party in the actual litigation, but may take into consideration matters which led up to it (12). Where a defendant has by his misstatements made under circumstances imposing an obligation on him to be truthful brought litigation on himself, and rendered an action against him reasonable, there is good cause for depriving him of his costs (13). If the action is frivolous or vexatious, the

(1) *Kali Krishna Tagore v Secretary of State*, 15 I A 186, 194 (1888)

(2) *Fischer v Kamala Naicker*, 8 M L A 170 (1860), a c, 3 W R P C 33

(3) *Mirtunjoy Chuckerbutty v Cochrane*, 10 M L A 229 (1865)

(4) *Ramcoomar Ghose v Kali Krishna Tagore*, 13 I A 116, 122 (1886), a c, 14 C 99

(5) *Maharani Rajroop Koer v Syed Abul Hossein*, 7 I A 240, 249 (1880), a c, 6 C 391

(6) *Coomari Rodeshwar v Manroop Koer*, 13 I A 20, 21 (1885), similarly a respondent guilty of fraud got no costs. *Blubaneswar Deb v Nilkomul Lahiri*, 12 I A 137, 141 (1885), s c, 12 C 18

(7) *Bishenmun Singh v Land Mortgage Bank*, 12 I A 7 (1884), a c, 11 C 244,

Rajah of Pittapur v Rajah Row Buchi, 12 I A 16, 22 (1884)

(8) 15 C D 501

(9) *Kuppaswami Chetty v Zamindar of Kalahasti*, 27 M 341, 342 (1903), where the passage, which explains the meaning of misconduct, will be found cited.

(10) *Forster v Farquhar*, 1893, 1 Q B 564

(11) *Huxley v West London Extension Ry Co*, 14 App Cas 32, per Halsbury, LC. See also judgment of Lord Watson at p 33

(12) *Per Lord Russell, CJ, Bostock v Ramsay Urban District Council*, 1900, 1 Q B 360, 1900, 2 Q B 616

(13) *Per Fry, LJ, Butcliffe v Smith*, 2 Fines P 831

plaintiff may be deprived of costs (1) If the Court thinks that the suit is a vexatious one and that no real damage has been sustained, it may give nominal damages to the plaintiff and award costs to the defendant, as in substance in such a case the defendant succeeds (2) Costs have been disallowed where a party acted with malice and malevolence (3) as distinguished from mere hardness, in exercising a civil right, (4) and where the defence was found to be false and unscrupulous (5) A party has been refused costs where he induced plaintiff to sue him; (6) or did not raise the plea of jurisdiction on which he succeeded until special appeal (7) It has been held that the fact that a defendant has, previously to a suit being filed, admitted that the money sued for was due was not a ground for depriving plaintiff of his costs (8) This would be so if, though making an admission, a defendant was unwilling or refused to pay But if not so, *aliter*, for the Court may deprive a plaintiff of costs where his suit is needlessly launched (9) See also cases cited ante in connection with appeals to the Courts of this country, or the Privy Council It is not possible to formulate any precise rules As has been well said, 'We can get no nearer to a perfect test than the enquiry whether it would be more fair as between the parties that some exception should be made in the special instance to the rule that the costs should follow upon success' (10)

Separate Costs—Where the interests of the parties are separate and distinct and they have different defences, separate costs should be allowed to each (11) as where the defendants are *zemindar* and *patnidar*, whose defences were not necessarily identical, (12) or where, in a suit to recover possession of land, one of the defendants pleaded successfully that he had nothing to do with the land, and the other defendants claimed title, and also succeeded in their

(1) *Macgregor v Clay*, 4 Times R 715

(2) *Futeek Paroojee v Mohender Nath Mozoomdar* 1 C 385-388 (1876) In England the fact that only a farthing's damages is given though not conclusive is *prima facie* good cause, *Moore v Gill* 4 Times Rep 738, *Myers v Financial News*, 5 Times Rep 42, *O'Connor v Star Newspaper*, 18 L T 146 Similarly as to smallness of damage and recovery of small sum upon a large claim, *Wood v Cox*, 5 Times R 272, *Forster v Farquhar* (1893) 1 Q B 561 In *Mt Bibee Moseehun v Mt Bibee Munoorun*, 21 W R 69 (1879), a plaintiff who secured nominal damages was given his costs

(3) *Kalee Pershad v Ram Pershad*, 18 W R 14 (1872), *sed quia* the defendant having been found entitled to do what he did.

(4) *Muddun v Alopcedeen*, S D N W 1861, p 569, cited in O'Keefe, C P C notes to a 220

(5) *Ram Gopal v Bhobun Mohun Cory* 126 (1861-2)

(6) *Bhugwan Doss v Syed Akbar*, 1 Ind Jur N S 390 (1867)

(7) *Nobeen Kishen v Shib Pershad* 7 W R 490 (1867)

(8) *Kuppuswami Chetty v Zamindar of Kalahasti*, 27 M 341 (1903)

(9) *Parshram v Dorsaji*, 2 Bom L R 254, 256 (1900), where without contest a plaintiff obtained a declaratory decree, but was ordered to pay the defendant's costs

(10) *Per Bowen, L J*, in *Forster v Farquhar* (1893), 1 Q B 569

(11) As appears to have been the case in *Konella Koer v Behari Patuck*, 12 W R 70 (1869), and see *Choonoo Lal v Gopal Chunder*, S D N W (1859), p 1, where the defendants represented separate interests and lived so far from each other that it could not be expected that they should employ the same pleader

(12) *Gobindnath Roy Bahadur v Luck mee Koomaree* 11 W P 36 (1869)

defence, (1) or where the defendants were charged with falsely misappropriating property and some of them might have failed in their defence and others succeeded (2) But where the interests of the defendants are the same, as is ordinarily the case with joint holders, (3) or several representatives of the same original mortgagees, (4) or persons are sued for damages on a cause of action common to all, (5) in short, where the defences are common and identical and not separate, or from any cause defendants file separate defences unnecessarily (6) only one set of costs should be awarded

Calculation of Costs—In the High Courts, rules exist under which there is a regular scale of costs and the parties' costs are taxed according to this scale. Pleadings' fees must also be calculated according to the rules governing them. (7) The scale on which costs should be awarded to a defendant depends on what the plaintiff claims against him, (8) and so where in a suit for partition two widows who had a claim for maintenance only were made parties their pleadings were held entitled to percentage only on the amount claimed by them for maintenance (9) When a suit contains several distinct claims against separate defendants the amount of costs to be allowed to each depends on the claims against him. (10) Where co-sharers were made defendants in order to plaintiff obtaining a complete decree, the plaintiff must pay costs sufficient to cover expenses of appearance (11) As against his own clients, in the absence of any rule or express agreement a pleader is only entitled to reasonable remuneration for his work and labour (12) Costs in an application for revocation of probate have been assessed as in a miscellaneous proceeding (13) The costs which a defeated plaintiff should be required to pay are those necessarily incurred by the successful party in the defence in the suit. Costs cannot be deemed necessary if by reasonable diligence on the part of the defendant or his pleader the expenditure of them could be avoided (14) Among items which have been allowed are salary of accountant (15) expenses in

(1) *Ram Chunder Gossain v Mutty Lal Bagchee*, 11 W R. 19 (1869)

(2) *Vilkanth Sarmah v Soosela Debta*, 6 W R. 324 (1866)

(3) *Brindaban Chunder v Ram Coomar Chowdhry*, 1 W R. 139 (1864)

(4) *Shah Makhun Lal v Sree Kissen Singh* 12 M L A. 157, 201 (1868)

(5) *Kasee Nath Roy v Hulloodhar Poy*, 2 W R. 60 (1864)

(6) *Francisco de Assis v Anjos* 17 W R. 185 (18 2), *Juggu Lal v Beharee Lal S D* W., 1859 p 349 *Bhup Sing v Zam ul Abidin*, 9 A. 205 at p 210 (1856).

(7) *Amritnath Jha v Poghoonath Pershad*, 6 W R Misc 35 (1866) [irrespective of any private arrangement between pleader and client]

(8) *Hasheenath Sen v Chunder Monee*, 9 W R. 233 (1863)

(9) *Ramechandra Parsharam v Bhagabai*, 21 B 42 (1895)

(10) *Rajah Roodur Narain v Coomar Narain Patnaik*, 13 W R 320 (18 0)

(11) *Ramputtay Koor v Halee Churn Singh*, 14 W R. 94 (18 0)

(12) *Mt Ameeboonissa v Chapman*, 6 W R. 103 (1866) [pleader employed by several defendants in same interest not entitled to separate fee from each].

(13) *Pratap Chandra Shaha v Kali Bhanjan Shaha*, 4 C W R 600 (1900), *Garabini Dasi v Pratap Chandra Shaha*, 4 C W R 602 (1900)

(14) *Seeta Patta v Suryudamma* 18 M L 123 (1894), so it was held that plaintiff should not be saddled with the costs of three pleaders if two were sufficient *Sukeena Bibee v Usud Ali*, S. D N. W., 1861, p 333.

(15) *Macnair v Hogg* 2 Hyde 59 (1564)

plaintiff may be deprived of costs (1) If the Court thinks that the suit is a vexatious one and that no real damage has been sustained, it may give nominal damages to the plaintiff and award costs to the defendant, as in substance in such a case the defendant succeeds (2) Costs have been disallowed where a party acted with malice and malevolence, (3) as distinguished from mere hardness in exercising a civil right, (4) and where the defence was found to be false and unscrupulous (5) A party has been refused costs where he induced plaintiff to sue him; (6) or did not raise the plea of jurisdiction on which he succeeded until special appeal (7) It has been held that the fact that a defendant has, previously to a suit being filed, admitted that the money sued for was due was not a ground for depriving plaintiff of his costs (8) This would be so if, though making an admission, a defendant was unwilling or refused to pay But if not so, *aliter*, for the Court may deprive a plaintiff of costs where his suit is needlessly launched. (9) See also cases cited *ante* in connection with appeals to the Courts of this country, or the Privy Council It is not possible to formulate any precise rules As has been well said, 'We can get no nearer to a perfect test than the enquiry whether it would be more fair as between the parties that some exception should be made in the special instance to the rule that the costs should follow upon success' (10)

Separate Costs—Where the interests of the parties are separate and distinct and they have different defences, separate costs should be allowed to each (11), as where the defendants are *zamindar* and *patnidar*, whose defences were not necessarily identical, (12) or where in a suit to recover possession of land one of the defendants pleaded successfully that he had nothing to do with the land, and the other defendants claimed title, and also succeeded in their

(1) *Macgregor v Clay*, 4 Times R 715

(2) *Futeek Parooee v Mohender Nath Mozoomdar* 1 C 385-388 (1876) In England the fact that only a farthing's damages is given, though not conclusive, is *prima facie* good cause, *Moore v Gill*, 4 Times Rep 738. *Myers v Financial News*, 5 Times Rep 42. *O Connor v Star Newspaper*, 68 L T 146 Similarly as to smallness of damage and recovery of small sum upon a large claim, *Wood v Cox*, 5 Times R 272. *Forster v Farquhar* (1893), 1 Q B 604 In *Mt Bibee Moseehun v Mt Bibee Munoorun*, 24 W R 69 (1879), a plaintiff who secured nominal damages was given his costs

(3) *Kalee Pershad v Ram Pershad*, 18 W R 14 (1872), *sed quia* the defendant having been found entitled to do what he did.

(4) *Muddin v Alopeddeen*, S D N W 1861, p 569, cited in *O'Harely*, C P C notes to s 220

(5) *Ram Gopal v Bhobun Mohun Cory* 12 W R 126 (1864-5)

(6) *Bhugwan Doss v Syed Akbar*, 1 Ind. Jur N S 390 (1867)

(7) *Nobeen Kushen v Shub Pershad* 7 W R 490 (1867)

(8) *Kuppuswami Chetty v Zamindar of Kalahasti*, 27 M 311 (1903)

(9) *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom. L R 254, 256 (1900), where without contest a plaintiff obtained a declaratory decree, but was ordered to pay the defendant's costs

(10) *Per Bowen L J in Forster v Farquhar* (1893) 1 Q B 569

(11) As appears to have been the case in *Konella Koer v Behari Patuck*, 12 W R 70 (1869), and see *Choonoo Lal v Gopal Chander*, S D N W (1859) p 1, where the defendants represented separate interests and lived so far from each other that it could not be expected that they should employ the same pleader

(12) *Gobindnath Poy Bahadoor v Luck mee Koomarce*, 11 W P 36 (1862)

defence, (1) or where the defendants were charged with falsely misappropriating property and some of them might have failed in their defence and others succeeded (2) But where the interests of the defendants are the same, as is ordinarily the case with joint holders, (3) or several representatives of the same original mortgagees, (4) or persons are sued for damages on a cause of action common to all, (5) in short, where the defences are common and identical and not separate, or from any cause defendants file separate defences unnecessarily, (6) only one set of costs should be awarded.

Calculation of Costs.—In the High Courts rules exist under which there is a regular scale of costs and the parties' costs are taxed according to this scale. Pleaders' fees must also be calculated according to the rules governing them (7). The scale on which costs should be awarded to a defendant depends on what the plaintiff claims against him, (8) and so where in a suit for partition two widows who had a claim for maintenance only were made parties, their pleaders were held entitled to percentage only on the amount claimed by them for maintenance (9). When a suit contains several distinct claims against separate defendants the amount of costs to be allowed to each depends on the claims against him (10). Where co-sharers were made defendants in order to plaintiff obtaining a complete decree the plaintiff must, it was held, pay costs sufficient to cover expenses of appearance (11). As against his own clients, in the absence of any rule or express agreement, a pleader is only entitled to reasonable remuneration for his work and labour (12). Costs in an application for revocation of probate have been assessed as in a miscellaneous proceeding (13). The costs which a defeated plaintiff should be required to pay are those necessarily incurred by the successful party in the defence in the suit. Costs cannot be deemed necessary if by reasonable diligence on the part of the defendant or his pleader the expenditure of them could be avoided (14). Among items which have been allowed are salary of accountant, (15) expenses in

(1) Ram Chunder Gossain v. Mutty Lall Bagechee 11 W. R. 19 (1869)

(2) Nilkanth Surmah v. Soos La Dubia, 6 W. R. 321 (1866)

(3) Brindaban Chunder v. Ram Coomar Chowdhry, 1 W. R. 133 (1864)

(4) Shah Mahbun Lall v. Sree Hassan Singh, 12 M. L. A. 157 201 (1893)

(5) Haseo Nauth Roy v. Mulloobur Roy, 2 W. R. 60 (1864)

(6) Francisco de Assis v. Auyos 17 W. R. 188 (1872), Juggu Lall v. Beharoo Lall, S. D. N. W. 1869, p. 349. Bhup Singh v. Zala ul Abidin 9 A. 205 at p. 210 (1886)

(7) Anurtonath Jha v. Boghoonath Pershad, 6 W. N. Misc. 35 (1866) [irrespective of any private arrangement between pleader and client]

(8) Kashcenath Sam v. Chunder Monee, 9 W. R. 288 (1868)

(9) Ramchandra Parsharam v. Bhingabil, 21 B. 42 (1895)

(10) Rajah Roelur Narain v. Coomra Naram Patnaik, 13 W. R. 320 (1870)

(11) Ramputty Koor v. Kalso Churn Singh, 14 W. R. 91 (1870)

(12) Mt. Amceeroonissa v. Chapman 6 W. R. 108 (1866) [pleader employed by several defendants in same interest not entitled to separate fee from each]

(13) Pratap Chandra Shaha v. Kali Bhanjan Shaha, 1 C. W. N. 600 (1900); Garabini Dasi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha, 4 C. W. N. 602 (1900)

(14) Seta Patra v. Suryulamma, 18 M. 123 (1831), as it was held that plaintiff should not be saddled with the costs of three pleadings if two were sufficient, Sukeena Dileo v. Usud Ali, S. D. N. W., 1861, p. 333

(15) Macnair v. Hogg, 2 Hydr. 63 (1861)

plaintiff may be deprived of costs (1) If the Court thinks that the suit is a vexatious one and that no real damage has been sustained, it may give nominal damages to the plaintiff and award costs to the defendant, as in substance in such a case the defendant succeeds (2) Costs have been disallowed where a party acted with malice and malevolence (3) as distinguished from mere hardness, in exercising a civil right, (4) and where the defence was found to be false and unscrupulous (5) A party has been refused costs where he induced plaintiff to sue him, (6) or did not raise the plea of jurisdiction on which he succeeded until special appeal (7) It has been held that the fact that a defendant has, previously to a suit being filed, admitted that the money sued for was due was not a ground for depriving plaintiff of his costs (8) This would be so if, though making an admission, a defendant was unwilling or refused to pay But if not so, *aliter*, for the Court may deprive a plaintiff of costs where his suit is needlessly launched (9) See also cases cited *ante* in connection with appeals to the Courts of this country, or the Privy Council It is not possible to formulate any precise rules As has been well said, "We can get no nearer to a perfect test than the enquiry whether it would be more fair as between the parties that some exception should be made in the special instance to the rule that the costs should follow upon success" (10)

Separate Costs—Where the interests of the parties are separate and distinct and they have different defences, separate costs should be allowed to each (11), as where the defendants are *zemindar* and *patnidar*, whose defences were not necessarily identical, (12) or where, in a suit to recover possession of land, one of the defendants pleaded successfully that he had nothing to do with the land, and the other defendants claimed title, and also succeeded in their

(1) *Macgregor v Clay*, 4 Times R 715

(2) *Futeek Parooee v Mohender Nath Mozoomdar*, 1 C 385-388 (1876) In England the fact that only a farthings damages is given though not conclusive, is *prima facie* good cause, *Moore v Gill* 4 Times Rep 738, *Myers v Financial News*, 5 Times Rep 42, *O'Connor v Star Newspaper*, 68 L. T. 146 Similarly as to smallness of damage and recovery of small sum upon a large claim, *Wood v Cox*, 5 Times R 272, *Forster v Farquhar* (1893) 1 Q B 564. In *Mt Bibee Moseehun v Mt Bibee Munoorun* 24 W R 69 (1879), a plaintiff who secured nominal damages was given his costs

(3) *Kalee Pershad v Ram Pershad* 18 W R 14 (1842) *sed quia* the defendant having been found entitled to do what he did

(4) *Muddun v Alopeedeen* S D N W 1861, p 569, cited in O'Keefe, C P C notes to s 200

(5) *Ram Gopal v Bhobun Mohun Cory*, *meu koomaree*, 11 W P 36 (1843) ton, 126 (1864 5)

(6) *Bhugwan Doss v Syed Akbar*, 1 Ind. Jur N S 390 (1867)

(7) *Nobeen Lashen v Shab Pershad*, 7 W R 490 (1867)

(8) *Kuppuswami Chetty v Zamindar of Kalahasti*, 27 M 341 (1903)

(9) *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom. L R 254, 256 (1900), where without contest a plaintiff obtained a declaratory decree, but was ordered to pay the defendant's costs

(10) *Per Bowen*, L J, in *Forster v Farquhar* (1893) 1 Q B 569

(11) As appears to have been the case in *Konella Koer v Behari Patuck*, 12 W R 70 (1869), and see *Choonce Lal v Gopal Chunder*, S D N W (1859), p 1 where the defendants represented separate interests and lived so far from each other that it could not be expected that they should employ the same pleader

(12) *Gobindnath Roy Bahadoor v Luch*

defence, (1) or where the defendants were charged with falsely misappropriating property and some of them might have failed in their defence and others succeeded (2) But where the interests of the defendants are the same as is ordinarily the case with joint holders, (3) or several representatives of the same original mortgagees, (4) or persons are sued for damages on a cause of action common to all, (5) in short, where the defences are common and identical and not separate, or from any cause defendants file separate defences unnecessarily, (6) only one set of costs should be awarded

Calculation of Costs—In the High Courts rules exist under which there is a regular scale of costs and the parties' costs are taxed according to this scale. Pleaders' fees must also be calculated according to the rules governing them (7) The scale on which costs should be awarded to a defendant depends on what the plaintiff claims against him, (8) and so where in a suit for partition two widows who had a claim for maintenance only were made parties, their pleaders were held entitled to percentage only on the amount claimed by them for maintenance (9) When a suit contains several distinct claims against separate defendants the amount of costs to be allowed to each depends on the claims against him (10) Where co sharers were made defendants in order to plaintiff obtaining a complete decree the plaintiff must it was held pay costs sufficient to cover expenses of appearance (11) As against his own clients, in the absence of any rule or express agreement a pleader is only entitled to reasonable remuneration for his work and labour (12) Costs in an application for revocation of probate have been assessed as in a miscellaneous proceeding (13) The costs which a defeated plaintiff should be required to pay are those necessarily incurred by the successful party in the defence in the suit. Costs cannot be deemed necessary if by reasonable diligence on the part of the defendant or his pleader the expenditure of them could be avoided (14) Among items which have been allowed are salary of accountant (15) expenses in

(1) *Ram Chunder Gossain v Mutty Lal Bagehee*, 11 W R 19 (1869)

(2) *Nilkantth Surmah v Soosela Debis* 6 W R 324 (1866)

(3) *Brindaban Chatter v Ram Coomar Chowdhry* 1 W R 139 (1864)

(4) *Shah Makhun Lal v Sree Kissen Singh* 12 M L A 157, 201 (1868)

(5) *Kasee Nauth Roy v Hullochur Roy*, 2 W R 60 (1864)

(6) *Francisco de Ass v Anjos* 17 W R 188 (1872), *Juggu Lal v Beharee Lal* S D N W 1859 p 349 *Bhup Sing v Zam ul Abidin* 9 A 205 at p 210 (1886)

(7) *Amritnath Jha v Boghoonath Pershad*, 6 W N Misc 35 (1866) [irrespective of any private arrangement between pleader and client]

(8) *Kasheenath Seem v Chunder Monce*, 9 W R 288 (1868)

(9) *Ramchandra Parsharam v Bhagabai* 21 B 42 (1893)

(10) *Rajah Roodur Narain v Coomar Narain Patnaik*, 13 W R 320 (1870)

(11) *Ramputtty Koor v Kasee Churn Singh* 14 W R 94 (1870)

(12) *Mt Ameroonissa v Chapman*, 6 W R 108 (1866) [pleader employed by several defendants in same interest not entitled to separate fee from each]

(13) *Pratap Chandra Shaha v Kali Bhanjan Shaha*, 4 C W N 600 (1900), *Garabini Das v Pratap Chandra Shaha* 4 C W N 602 (1900)

(14) *Seta Patta v Suryudamma*, 18 M 128 (1894), so it was held that plaintiff should not be saddled with the costs of three pl if two were sufficient *Sukena Bibee v T Ah*, S D N W, 1861, p 333

(15) *Macnair v Hogg* 2 Hyde 89

connection with attachment of defendant's property when suit is dismissed (1) and stamp for plaint (2)

Execution for Costs—The portion of sect 220 as relating to execution is omitted. See now sect 36. If the order for costs forms part of a decree, such decree is executed in the ordinary way. Where, in a partition suit, the plaintiff, after decree, took no steps, but the estate was partitioned at the instance of one of the defendants, it was held that he must first obtain an order for payment, and if payment be not obtained then apply for execution (3). If the order does not form part of the decree it may be executed as if it were a decree for the payment of money. But such an order is not a decree (4). A *namlatdar* has the same power to levy costs decreed by the High Court as he has regarding costs decreed in his own court (5). No separate suit lies for the recovery of costs awardable under the Code, a remedy in execution being given (6). But where a Court is not entitled to order costs and costs are incurred, they may be made the subject of consideration in a subsequent suit (7). If it can order costs and does not do so, no separate suit will lie (8). An objection as to costs is a matter which should be raised in the shape of an application to amend or review the original decree, and failing that, by way of regular appeal against the decree, but no objection can be raised in execution of it (9). A summary remedy for payment of costs against his client has been given to solicitors, but they cannot under the rule of Court so giving it enforce payment against the client's representatives (10).

Set off of costs—O XX r 6 enacts that "*The Court may direct that the costs payable to one party by the other shall be set off against the sum which is admitted or found to be due from the former to the latter*". This rule, which is a re-enactment of sect 221 of the last Code, is one of those sections in which the general equitable principle of set off is recognized. See notes to O VIII r 6, *post*. A mortgagor is entitled to set off or deduct the amount of costs payable to him under the decree against or from the mortgage debt payable by him (11). The section has been applied by analogy to the

(1) *Sewa Ram v Tandy*, S D N W 1856, p 514

(2) *Madhub Chunder v Ram Lochnu*, 14 W R 143 (1870). It does not, however, appear why the plaintiff was required to pay this amount in.

(3) *Brojo Lal Sen v Mohendro Nath Sen* 18 C 199 (1891)

(4) *Shankar Secretary of State*, 12 M 120, 122 (1889), *Rama Kiscoor Doss v Suranga Charlu*, 21 M 421 (1893)

(5) *Nemara v Devandrappa*, 16 B 233 (1891)

(6) *Mahram Das v Ajudha* 8 A 45^o, 461 (1886) and cases there cited. As to limitations in the case of an order for costs, see *Murbunsall v Shoo Narain*, 21 W R 331

(1874)

(7) *Ib*, and see *Venkata Vigaya v Tim mayva Pantulu*, 22 M 314 (1893). [Suit to recover money advanced to guardian *ad litem* for costs.]

(8) *Referred case*, 3 M H C R 341 (1867)

(9) *Hareenath Banerjee v Doybo Chunder Banerjee*, 5 W R Misc 4 (1866)

(10) *Assur Purshotam v Ruttonbai*, 16 B 152 (1891), the order may be executed under the execution provisions of the Code. *In re Premji Trikumdas* 17 B 514 (1892). As to solicitor's lien for costs, see *Devlabai v Jefferson* 10 B 248 (1886)

(11) *Sila v Bali*, 17 B 32 (1897)

deduction of costs from the purchase money in pre-emption suits (1) A set-off cannot be allowed for costs not actually awarded and a decree which is incapable of being enforced cannot be set off against a decree which is alive (2)

Interest on costs—Interest cannot be allowed on costs where the decree itself is silent on the point, unless submission is made by the parties to the discretion of the Court (3) The view once taken that sect 222 and sect 209 of the last Code did not affect the special provisions as to allowance of interest in the Transfer of Property Act (1) has been dissented from and overruled (5)

Appeal as to costs.—It was proposed to enact in sect 96, *post*, that .
"No appeal shall lie on a matter of costs only where by law such costs are left to the discretion of the Court, except by leave of the Appellate Court, obtained on an application accompanied by a memorandum of appeal" As, however, objection was taken the clause has been omitted with the result that the matter is still regulated by the previous case law Under the Code of 1859 it was held that a regular appeal would lie on a mere question of costs, although as the lower Court had a discretion in the matter, any interference with its order ought also to be exercised with discretion Though, however, an improper exercise of discretion might be matter of regular appeal, no special appeal would lie unless the award of costs was contrary to law (6) A similar rule was laid down (7) under the Code of 1877 Under the last Code first appeals were given not merely from decrees but also from any part of the decrees, (8)

(1) *Ishri v Gopal Saran*, 6 A 351 (1884), see notes to Rule 130

(2) *Huro Pershad v Foolkashore*, 16 W. R 308 (1871) [As where (in regard to the first point) a decree of the High Court gave the successful appellant costs of that Court and of the lower Appellate Court, but omitted to award the costs of the first Court]

(3) *Bhoza Rughbur v Bhoza Raj*, 3 A H. C. R 319 (1871), *Forster v Secretary of State*, 41 A 137 (1877), s. c., 3 C. 161

(4) *Amolak Ram v Lachmi Narain*, 19 A 175 (1896)

(5) *Achalabala Bux v Surendro Nath Dey*, 24 C 766 (1897), *Subbaraya v Ponnusami*, 21 M 361 (1897), *Maharajah of Bhartpur v Ram Kanno*, 23 A 181, 191 (1900) P. C.

(6) *Gridhari Lal Roy v Sundar Bibi*, B. L. R. Sup., vol. F B 496 (1866) [for earlier cases, see *Doucett v Wise*, 1 W. R 322 (1864), *Collector of Dacca v Kamalant*, 2 W. R 33, 34 (1865), *Choonce Lal v Patroo*, 6 W. R 19 (1866)], *Futeek*

Sri Dantuluri v Surappa Razu, 3 M H. C. R 113 (1866) the Court interfered in a second appeal as a question of principle was involved, as the lower Court made a defendant pay costs to a plaintiff whose suit was dismissed for want of cause of action. In *Shant Buhsh v Lalla Nund*, 11 W. R 48 (1864), the Court interfered as a person, unnecessarily made a party, had been deprived of his costs, and in *Ram Chunder Gossain v Mutty Lal Bagchee*, 11 W. R 19 (1869), where the lower Court disallowed separate costs to the defendants. As to early cases on second appeals, see *Khoda Bux v Mowla Bux*, 14 W. R 255, 766 (1870), *Ooma Churn v Gurish* 25 W. R 22 (1875), *Achumbat v Kanhaya Lal*, 7 W. R 208 (1867), *Beer Pershad v Doorga Pershad*, W. R 215 (1864), *Amir Saheb v Jamshedji*, 4 Bom. H. C. R. A. C. J 941 (1867), *Mt Bibee Moscehun v Mt Bibee Munoorn*, 25 W. R 69

(7) *Balkissen Das v Lutchmeeput Singh*, 8 C. 91, at p. 94 (1881)

(8) Therefore, that part which relates to costs is appealable if the decree is appealable See *Vasudev v Bhavan*, 16 B 241 (1891), *Balkissen Das v Lutchmeeput Singh*, 8 C. 91, 91 (1881)

A. C. J. So the P. C. refused to interfere on a matter of discretion. *Mt. Ismeem v Luchman Das*, 5 W. R. P. C. 59 (1837) In

and necessarily therefore against the part of the decree awarding costs. But such an award was then, as before, a matter of discretion, and the Court of Appeal would generally only interfere where a matter of principle was involved, (1) whether in first appeal from a decree (2) or order, (3) or in second appeal (4). The Court has also held its interference justifiable in first appeal where, though strictly speaking no question of principle is involved, there has either been misapprehension as to facts or no real exercise of discretion at all (5).

The Bombay High Court, (6) citing certain English decisions, has held that the principle to be deduced from them is that Appeal Courts should interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower Courts as to costs when there has been any violation of any established principle, (7) misapprehension of facts, (8) or where there has been no real exercise of discretion at all (9). These principles will be of general application in first appeals and appeals from orders. In the case of second appeals it must be shown that the order complained of comes within the provisions of sect 100.

(1) *Secretary of State v Marjum Hossein Khan*, 11 C 359 (1885), *Amrui Hossein t Kharunnessa*, 28 C 567 (1901), *Moshingan t Mozari Sayad*, 12 C. 271 (1885) [where successful defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff's costs], *Bunwari Lall v Chowdhry Drup Nath Singh*, 12 C 179 (1885) [where the plaintiff had no cause of action against appellant and sought no relief against him and therefore could not receive costs], *Ranchordas Vithaldas v Bai Kasi*, 16 B 676 682 (1892), *Kushal Sadashiv v Punamchand Jusrupji*, 22 B 164 (1897), *Bishen Dayal v Bank of Upper India*, 13 A 290, 295 (1890) [where a successful party was with out cause deprived of his costs], *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom L R 254 255 (1900), *Pratap Chandra v Kali Bhanjan*, 4 C W N 600 (1900) [costs whether allowable as for suit or miscellaneous proceeding], in *Tara Prosunno v Satish Chandra*, 4 C W N 90 (1896), the question does not appear to have been one of principle but of the propriety of the order, see *Kamat v Kamat*, 8 B 369 (1884).

(2) *Secretary of State v Marjum Hossein Khan*, *supra*.

(3) *Moshingan v Mozari Sayad*, *supra* that is appealable orders, an appeal lying from that part of the order relating to costs *Balkissen Das v Luchmepoot Singh* 8 G 91 (1881), but where no appeal lay from the order there was no appeal as to the direction as to costs which was ancillary to it *Rama Lussoor Dossji t Siranga Charlu*, 21 M. 421

(1893). The Court can hear an appeal as to costs although that portion of the appeal not relating to costs has been abandoned at the hearing *Vasudev Ramchandra t Bhavan Sviraj* 16 B 241 (1891).

(4) *Bunwari Lall v Chowdhry Drup Nath Singh*, *supra*.

(5) *Ranchordas Vithaldas v Bai Kasi*, 16 B 676 at p 682 (1892), foll. *Kushal Sadashiv t Punamchand Jusrupji*, 22 B 164 (1897), *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom L R 254, 255 (1900).

(6) *Ranchordas Vithaldas t Bai Kasi*, 16 B 676 at p 682 (1902) foll. *Kushal Sadashiv v Punamchand Jusrupji* 22 B 164 (1897).

(7) The English cases are numerous, see *Morgan and Wurtzburg's Costs*, 266 *Ann Practice*, Notes, O 65, r 1, p 963, vol. II p 467, *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom. L R 254, 255 (1900).

(8) *In re Gilbert*, 28 C D 549, *Robertson t Robertson*, 6 P D 110, *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom. L R 254, 255 (1900).

(9) As where costs have been awarded arbitrarily *Daulat Ram t Durga Prasad*, 15 A 333 (1893). Though the Court will assume that the Judge has exercised his discretion, unless satisfied that he has not done so *Bew v Bew* (1899), 2 Ch 467, foll. in *Parshram v Dorabji*, 2 Bom L R 254, 260 (1900), *Re Hunt*, W N (1901) 144 C A, *Civil Service, etc, Society v G S Navigation Co*, (1903) 2 K B 766, where the Judge decided on grounds not open to him, see *Ann. Pr. II.* p 467.

PART II.

EXECUTION.

GENERAL.

36 *The provisions of this Code relating to the execution of decrees shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders.*
Application to orders

Orders—This section replaces and supersedes the first paragraph of sect 619 of the last Code, the second paragraph being incorporated in the next section. By virtue of sect 617 (now 141) and sect 649 of the Code of 1882, it was held that an order obtained from a Judge in Chambers by an attorney against his client for payment of costs might be executed under Chapter XIX of the Code of 1882, corresponding with the present Part (1). By virtue of sect 619 of the last Code, execution might have been had of a judgment entered up under sect 86 of the Insolvent Act (2).

Execution—Execution is the enforcement by process of Court of its decrees and orders. The words “execution of decrees” at the head of the Chapter in the last Code was held to mean the enforcement of the decrees of Courts by process of execution only, viz the different kind of execution dealt with in the Chapter for compelling the judgment debtor to obey the order of the Court (3). Process in execution must always be granted by the direct act of the Court itself. And as parties cannot invoke the process *de novo* either by agreement or by their conduct, so neither can they extend the relief which the Court has chosen to award (4). *Prima facie* it is the right of every litigant to call on the Courts to take such action as may be requisite to secure the execution of a decree containing a direction in his favour, and the Court of execution cannot impose terms which are not in the decree (5). Procedure in execution

(1) *In re Premji Trikumdas*, 17 B 514 (1893)

(2) *In re Bhagwandas Hurjivan*, 8 B 511 (1894)

(3) *Sreenath Roy v Radhanath Mookerjee*, 9 C. 773, 776 (1882) [as regards the question decided, an order directing an account is now a decree. See s 2, *ante*]

(4) *Eckowrie Singh v Bijoy Nath Chatterjee*, 13 W. R. 11 (1870). As to decrees

“ ” “ ”

“ ” “ ”

“ ” “ ”

“ ” “ ”

(5) *Nawal Mir Badrudin v Nurudin*, 29 B 73 (1891)

ought not to be conducted in a slipshod and slovenly fashion as if it were an unimportant branch of the work they have to do in the administration of justice but it ought to be conducted with as much care as the procedure in suits because of the difficulties which so frequently arise. The Courts are bound to look to the Code for the procedure they should follow in these execution proceedings (1)

"Provisions of this Code"—This Part, together with O XXI, replaces Chapter XIX of the Code of 1882. The provisions relating to execution have been divided into two portions, viz those contained in the present Part, and those contained in the Rules of O XXI, which must be read with it. These Rules refer to minor points of procedure. The arrangement and numbering of this Part has been very materially altered and sections appearing in it have been taken from other portions of the old Code. Further, the sections of the Code reproduced have been added to, and made the subject of important amendments which, for the most part, embody or have been suggested by previous case law. A considerable number of the sections or portions of the sections are entirely new.

The general scheme of this Part is as follows —

Firstly, the Code is declared applicable to decrees and orders, and a definition given of the term "Court which passed the decree" (sects 36-37) [transfers of decrees to the Collectors for execution are dealt with in sects 68-72 and the Third Schedule]. Then follow provisions relating to the Courts by which decrees may be executed and the jurisdiction of such Courts (sects 38-46), thirdly, the questions to be determined by those Courts (sect 47, formerly 244), fourthly, the limit of time for execution (sect 48), fifthly and sixthly, transferees, legal representatives and procedure in execution respectively (sects 49-54), seventhly, the mode of execution, whether by arrest, attachment, or sale (sects 55-72), eighthly, payment and distribution of assets (sect 75), and lastly, the resistance to execution (sect 74). Other provisions concerning these matters are contained in the 103 rules of O XXI.

The main alterations to be noted in the sections are as follows: the introduction of precepts (sect 46) and of sects 53-61 and amendments of sect 244 (now sect 47) and of the sections corresponding with sects 51, 55 (1) (2), 62, 64, 73. As regards sects 68 *et seq.*, dealing with execution by Collectors, the provisions as they deal with a special matter and are not of general application, have been placed in the Third Schedule.

The alterations in the rules are cited under O XXI.

The chief omissions in the sections are of clauses (a) and (b) of the former sect 244 (see notes to sect 47) and of sect 238 of the last Code which it was considered might be omitted, having regard to the provisions of Act XVIII of 1850. Sect 257A of the last Code has also been omitted. It was first enacted by Act XII of 1879, with a view to protect the interests of judgment debtors against undue pressure by decree holders. The Select Committee stated that the section had given rise to conflicting decisions and as interpreted by the majority of the High Courts was found in practice to be of little service to judgment debtors. Moreover sect 16 of the Indian

(1) Thakur Pershad & Sheikh Fakirullah, 22 I A 44 at pp 45-46 (1891)

Contract Act as amended was considered to afford adequate protection when it is required. As however the section remains in force until the coming into operation of the present Code and some cases decided under it have a relation to sect. 278 (now O. XXI r. 2) the following notes on the section are given.

Object of section 257A of last Code, now omitted—The Legislature considered that the power of executing a decree placed the holder of it in a position to exercise undue pressure over the judgment debtor and enabled him to obtain terms too favourable to himself from the latter whose interests needed protection at the hands of the Court which passed the decree (1). The object is to avoid inconvenience and delay in executing the decree and its long hold in *terrorem* over the debtor and to afford protection against unfair arrangements, which protection is insured by the necessity for sanction (2).

"The Court."—It was held under the last Code that the Court to which a decree had been transferred for execution could not pass an order under this section and that sanction could be given only by the Court which passed the decree (3).

"Shall be void" Under the last Code an agreement of the nature stated was declared to be void and a question arose whether it was void *in toto* and for all purposes or for the purposes of execution proceedings only, and was enforceable by a fresh suit (4) It is not easy to reconcile all the decisions on the point There is no absolute prohibition against such an agreement The section, however forbids the enforcement of an agreement entered into in contravention of the section, while a decree is subsisting and enforceable If that be so then the decree must be enforced by execution and not by separate suit, and in such execution an unsanctioned agreement will not be recognized If, however, an agreement is such that it adjusts and puts an end to the decree which thus ceases to be enforceable, no question of or in execution arises and the substituted agreement may be made the subject of a fresh suit (5)

"Every agreement"—The agreement referred to to give time is an agreement to pay the judgment debt with a stipulation that it shall not be

(1) Heera Nema : Pestonji 22 B 697, 697, 698 (1898) See as to this and see 258, now O XXI r 2, G C Whitworth & Co. Decrees in Bar of Contracts

(2) *Bank of Bengal v Vyabhoj Gangul*, 16 B 618, 625 (1891) where it was also held that an unsanctioned agreement could be enforced where it formed part of the consideration of a bond and had been enjoyed by the obligee. *Govind & Sakharan*, 28 B 383, 391 (1904), *Venkata Subramania Ayyar & Kanan Kannan Ahmed*, 26 M 10 24, 26 (1902).

(3) *Gandharaj Singh v Sheodaran Singh* 12 A 571 (1890), *Paramansund Das v Mahabir Doss* 20 M 378 (1896)

(4) Lalji Singh : Gaya Singh, 25 A 717, 320 (1907), and cases there cited, Venkata Subramania Ayyar : Koran Kannan Ahmed, 28 M 10, 26 (1902), Gopalakrish : Brij Kishore Perakad, 32 C 017 (1901)

(5) See cases cited in last note. In Govind Krishna v. Saktharam, 28 B 393 (1904) these cases were not referred to. In Venkata

... there was no agreement by the judgment creditor to surrender his rights under the decree, and that being so, the case was, upon the principle above stated wrongly decided.

payable at the time when under the decree it became payable. An agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment implies *ex vi termini* that there has been no actual satisfaction but merely a stipulation for future satisfaction. Therefore an agreement under which there is an actual and present satisfaction of the judgment replacing it and putting an end to the decree is not within the section. In other words, the agreement to which the section relates is one which suspends and does not destroy the rights of execution consequent on the decree (1). The last clause presupposes the existence of a judgment debt, for the sum paid cannot be applied in satisfaction unless there is a subsisting judgment to which it can be applied. Where the judgment-debt is extinguished in whole or in part by the substitution for it of a contract, such a contract cannot be regarded as an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment debt, since the latter, to the extent to which it has been extinguished, is no longer in existence. The agreement in such a case is only an adjustment of the decree under O XXI r 2, which, if not certified, will not prevent execution (2). An agreement may be good in one part and bad as regards another (3) and what is valid will be upheld provided that the stipulations are not part and parcel of one and the same agreement and can be separated one from the other (4). The section did not apply to agreements by persons who are not parties to the suit in which the original decree was made (5). Persons who have nothing to do with a decree cannot fall within the mischief struck at by the section. But the same consideration cannot apply where a person is substantially bound by the decree though not *pro forma* a party to it (6). It was held that an agreement was none the less void because one of the parties to it, who was the legal representative of one of the judgment debtors had not been one of the parties to the suit in which the decree was obtained (7).

Enforceable—It was held under the last Code that the section must be deemed to relate to judgment debts which are still enforceable (8).

(1) *Fukaram v. Anantbhat* 25 B 252 (1900), s c 2 Bom L R 1012 in which the previous decisions are reviewed. *Venkata Subramania Ayyar v. Koran Kannan Ahmed* 26 M 19 (1902) where however the operation of the decree was only suspended not extinguished, *Gopal Sahu v. Brij Kishore Pershad* 32 C 917 (1905) [ref to *Hur Kissen Das Serowji v. Nibaran Chander Banerjee* 6 C W N 27 (1901) as a case in which the judgment debt was extinguished] *Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh* 25 A 317, 326 (1903), diss from *Dhauram Ragho v. Ganpat Sadashir* 27 B 96 (1902) s c, 4 Bom L R 872 which practically refused to follow the case first mentioned.

(2) *Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh* 25 A 317 at p 328. See *Ram Doyal Bannerjee v. Ram Hari Pal* 30 C 312 (1892).

(3) *Bhagchand v. Radha Kisan*, 28 B 62 (1903), s c 5 Bom L R 672 foll *Raichand v. Naran* 28 B 310 (1904).

(4) *Govind v. Sakhamam*, 28 B 383 386 (1904), *Davlat Singh v. Pandu* 9 B 176 (1884), *Vishnu Vishwanath v. Hur Patil*, 12 B 499 (1888), *Chatru v. Kondaji Vithal*, 38 B 219 (1913).

(5) *Ramji Pandu v. Mahomed Walli*, 13 B 671 (1889). *Yella Chetti v. Munisami Reddi* 6 M 101 (1882), *Hur Kissen Das Serowjee v. Nibaran Chandra Banerjee* 6 C W N 27, 30 (1901).

(6) *Govind Krishna v. Sakhamam* 28 B 383 391 (1904).

(7) *Venkata Subramania Ayyar v. Koran Kannan Ahmed* 26 M 19 (1902).

(8) *Shripatrao v. Govind Narayan*, 14 B 390 (1889).

"Sanction."—Where no formal sanction had been recorded it was held that under the circumstances sufficient had been done to satisfy the requirements of the section (1). As regards time for sanction see below (2) and as to the effect of want of sanction see *ante*. The new agreement when sanctioned, became part of the decree and could be executed as the decree in the case (3). The parties could not rescind from the agreement so sanctioned and if there was irregularity in the sanction not amounting to want of jurisdiction, the compromise must take effect until the order sanctioning it is set aside (4). An order passed under this section being one relating to the execution of the decree was appealable (5).

"Decree Order"—For the meaning of these terms, see note to sect 2, *ante*.

What decree may be executed—The rule may shortly be stated to be—the decree of the Court of first instance until appeal, and after that the decree of the Court of last instance. Whether the decree of the appellate Court is for reversing or for affirming the decree against which the appeal is preferred, it is, in either case, the final decree in the cause, and, as such, the only decree which is capable of being enforced by execution after it is once pronounced. If the decree of the lower Court is reversed it is absolutely dead and gone, if it is affirmed or modified it is equally so, though in a different way, namely, by being merged in the decree of the superior Court, which takes its place for all intents and purposes (6). If it is altered by the Court of first instance execution cannot issue (7). But where the appellate decree is not complete in itself, reference

(1) *Krishna v Vasudev*, 21 B 808 (1896), and see *Lakshman v Sankya Bai*, 7 M 400 (1884).

(2) *Nam Kolo v Chuma Bhosle*, 13 B 54 (1888).

(3) *Sita Ram v Dasrathi Das*, 5 A 492 (1883), *Sham Kanan v Piar*, 5 A 596 (1883), *Champat Rai v Pitambar Das*, 6 A 16 (1883), *Makund Pam v Makund Ram*, 6 A 228 (1884), *Muhammad Sulaiman v Jhukki Lal*, 11 A 228, 232 (1888), *Thakoor Dyal Singh v Sarju Pershad Misur*, 20 C 22 (1892), but see *Ramlakhan Rai v Bakhtaur Rai*, 6 A 623 (1884). Prior to the enactment of this section the only decree which could be executed was the original, *Ram Runjun v Jowhurujeumah*, 23 W R 129 (1874), *Madhub Chunder v Madhub Lal*, 15 W R 542 (1871), and see also *Ameerunissa Khatoon v Meer Mahomed*, 2 C. L. R 143 (1878), *Debi Rai v Gokul Prasad*, 3 A 585 (1881), *Khrdoo v Kalce Sahoo*, 12 W R 71 (1869), *Dinonath Sen v Gooroo Churn Pal*, 21 W R 310 (1874), *Pillai v Pillai*, 21 A 219 (1875), *Bishto*

Chunder v Woomanath Roy, 15 W P 459 (1871).

(4) *Muhammad Sulaiman v Jhukki Lal*, 11 A 228 (1888).

(5) *Rangji v Bhauri*, 11 B 57 (1886).

(6) *Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v Muhammad Yar Khan*, 11 A 267 (1888) T B, *Ram Charan Bysak v Lakhi Kant Bannerji*, 7 B L R 701 (T B) at pp 709, 714 (1871); *Nourang Rai v Latif Choudhuri*, 13 A 34 (1891), *Shohrat Singh v Brudgman*, 4 A 328 (1882), *Mana Vikraman v Unnicappan*, 15 M 170, 171 (1891). So though an order of the P. C. may confirm a decree of the lower Court which must be executed *see ante*, *Kishun Persad*, 8 C. 218 (1892) *view from those above explained*, *Mir Apmuddin v Mathura Das*, 13 B L R at p 215 (1874). As regards decrees which come before the Court of first instance, see notes to O XX of 3rd ed of 1874.

(7) *Muhammad Sulaiman v Jhukki Lal*, 11 A 314 (1889).

may be made to the prior decree (1) The decree, however, which is executed is the appellate decree Where a decree was compromised by agreement made by the parties and communicated to the Court which passed the decree, held that the effect of the decree was extinguished by the agreement, which could only be enforced by a fresh suit and not by an application for execution of the former decree (2) When a decree contains a direction for payment and creates a charge and default is made, the decree cannot be at once executed, the proper course for its enforcement is not to apply for execution, but to apply for either an order for an account and sale or to institute a suit for enforcing the charge (3)

From which Court execution may be had—See the notes to sects 37, 38, 68-72, and Third Schedule The general jurisdiction of such Courts is dealt with *post* Sects 43, 44, 45 deal with execution of decrees passed by British Courts either in places to which this Part does not extend, such as those scheduled districts to which the Code or this portion of it has not been extended, execution of decrees passed by Courts of Native States, and issue of precepts to certain British Courts in foreign territory The Courts, therefore, by which execution may be given, are Courts in British India executing either their own decrees or the decrees of other Courts in British India, or Courts in British India executing the decrees of British Courts in foreign territory (sect 43), or Native Courts of such territory (sect 44) There remains the question of execution of decrees of British Indian Courts out of British Indian territory As regards this, the general principle is that Courts of British India have no authority to send their decrees for execution to Courts not in British India (4) An exception to this rule exists (sect 45) in the case of British Courts in foreign territory, provided that such execution is authorized under the notification of the Governor-general (5)

Jurisdiction of Court executing decree—The following section was proposed as regards this matter—

“(1) *Save for the purpose of rateably distributing assets realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree by a Court of competent jurisdiction, no Court shall execute a decree which, by reason of the value or the nature of the suit at the time of its institution, it would have been incompetent to pass.*

(2) *The Court which passed a decree for the enforcement of*

(1) Gobardhan Das v Gopal Ram 7 A 366

51, 54 (1887) See further as to decree of simple affirmance incorporating mandatory part of original decree, Noor Ali v Koni Meah, 13 C 13 (1886) See notes to O XX. r 6 and sect 149

(2) Hari Raghnath v Krishnapu Anant Joshi, 19 B 546 (1894)

(3) Chundra Moni v Muttu Lall Mullick, 2 C W N 33 (1897) *sed quæ* as to first of the two alternatives See Aubhoyessuree Dabee v Gouri Sunkur Panday, 22 C 859 (1895), Matangini Dassce v Chooneymoney Dassce, 22 C 903 (1895)

(4) Kastur Chand Gujar v Parsha Mahar, 12 B 230 (1887)

(5) Ratan Mahanti v Khaloo Sahoo, 29 C 400 (1902)

a mortgage or charge against immovable property included therein or subject thereto, shall have power to order the sale of any such immovable property wherever the same may be situate.

(3) Where, after the passing of a decree in a suit for the enforcement of a mortgage or charge, the whole of the immovable property included therein or subject thereto falls, by transfer of jurisdiction, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the decree may be executed either by the Court which passed the decree, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property falls by such transfer.

(4) Save as provided by this section and section 158 [dealing with attachment of salary] no Court shall have power to execute a decree in which the subject matter of the suit or application for execution is property situate entirely outside the local limits of its jurisdiction.

(5) Where immovable property attached in execution of a decree for the payment of money forms one estate comprised within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Courts, any one of such Courts may order the sale of the entire estate upon such conditions as it may consider reasonable and necessary for the prevention of conflict of orders.

Explanation—For the purposes of this section, a Court, which would have been competent to pass the decree, shall not be deemed to be incompetent to execute it merely because, by reason of the amount of rent or mesne profits ascertained for a period subsequent to the institution of the suit, the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of such Court are exceeded.”

This section would have cleared up several points which have been the subject of judicial decision. The Court executing the decree referred to 14, as appears from sect 38 either the Court which passed the decree or the Court to which it is sent for execution. Clause (5) with some modifications has been embodied in O XXI r 3. The other clauses have not been enacted, as however, they have reference to preceding case law they are here reproduced and commented upon.

Clause (1)—There has been a conflict of decision on the question whether the Court executing a transferred decree was restricted to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction (1). An application for the execution of a decree however is an application in the suit in which the decree was obtained, and questions arising in the execution of decrees are frequently as important as the

(1) See, in the affirmative, *Gokul Krishna Chunder v Aukhil Chunder Chatterjee*, 16 C. 457 (1889). *Durga Charan Mojumdar v Umatare Gupta*, 16 C. 465-467 (1889), cf *Shiv Sideshwar v Shri Hanhar*, 12 B 155

(1887) and in the negative *Narasayya v Venkata Krishnayya* 7 M 397 (1884), *Shanmuga Pillai v Ramanathan Chetti* 17 M 309 (1893), cf *Kelu v Vikrishna*, 15 M 345, 347 (1891).

questions in issue in the suit. The proposed clause adopted the principle of those decisions which held that a Court had no jurisdiction to execute a decree sent to it when the decree had been passed in a suit, the value or subject-matter of which was in excess of the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction, and that the power to send a decree to "another Court" meant another Court having jurisdiction, and competent to execute that decree having regard to the amount or value of the subject-matter of its ordinary jurisdiction. The words "*at the time of its institution*" were introduced to declare beyond doubt that a Court having jurisdiction to grant a decree has also authority to execute it, even though the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction may be subsequently exceeded by the operation of incidental causes, such as a rise in the value of property or the gradual accumulation of interest (1). With this Clause should be read the *Explanation*, which was intended to give effect to the undermentioned decision (2). This *Explanation* was confined to cases of rent or mesne profits, but, as stated, the principle is one of general application, and has been applied in cases of interest also.

Clauses (2) and (3)—These both refer to suits on mortgages and charges, and form an exception to the general principle enacted in the fourth Clause of the proposed section. They embody the result of the decisions noted (3), in which it was held that it would be impossible to apply the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act relating to sales in accordance with the decree passed in a suit on a mortgage if it were necessary to apply to different Courts to obtain realization of the mortgaged debt by sale of the properties hypothecated. It was, however, pointed out that the Court passing the decree is not alone competent, for in some cases it might be more convenient that sales of various lots mortgaged should be held in the Districts in which they are situate (4). Moreover, a sale under a mortgage decree is not in its proper sense a sale in execution, being a sale directed by the decree itself (5).

Clause (4)—If at the time a suit is brought a Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter, then it has no jurisdiction to execute such decree. Sect 16 indicates that the object of the Code is to limit the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in regard to the property they are entitled to deal with, and as execution is only a continuation of the suit, a Court in the later stages of a suit has no greater powers than it possessed at its institution. Moreover (and this applies to all cases whether the decree is that of the Court

(1) *Shamray Pandey v Niloy Ramaji*, 10 I 200 (1885)

(2) *Rameswar Mahton v Difu Mahton*, 21 C 550 (1894)

(3) *Maseyk v Steel*, 14 C 661 (1887) [in which the earlier decision, *Shuroop Chunder v Amcerunnessa Khatoon*, 8 C 703 (1882), is referred to], *Kartuk Nath Pandey v Dilkhadar Lall*, 15 C 667 (1888) [transfer of jurisdiction], *Gopi Mohan Roy v Doybaki Nundun*, 19 C 13 (1891), *Tincouri Debya v*

Shib Chandra Pal, 21 C 639 (1894), *Jagernath Sahai v Dip Rani Koer*, 22 C 871, 876 (1895), *Jahar v Kamini Devi*, 28 C 238 (1900), 5 C. W. N. 150 [it being held that the provisions of s 649 (now 108) were permissive]

(4) *Jagernath Sahai v Dip Rani Koer*, *supra*

(5) See *Maseyk v Steel*, 16 C 661 at pp 664, 668 (1887)

executing it or not), territorial jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a Court executing a decree (1)

Clause (5) — This is a provision inserted for convenience it being obviously undesirable in many cases and in others not practicable that an entire estate should be sold otherwise than as a whole (2). An estate forming one revenue-paying unit but extending over more than one District may be regarded as situate in the District where the whole revenue is paid or where the Court holding the sale has jurisdiction. This clause therefore forms another exception to the general principle upon which the fourth clause is based, in so far as authority is given to sell beyond local limits in execution of a simple money decree, (3) which authority may be exercised upon reasonable conditions by any Court of competent pecuniary jurisdiction within which any portion of the estate is situated. With some verbal alterations and the omission of the words "attached in execution of a decree for the payment of money" this clause has been retained and appears as O XXI r 3.

Who may apply for execution — A decree-holder or his representative, a joint decree holder or his representative (O XXI r 15), and the transferee of either of such decree holders where the transfer is by an assignment in writing or by operation of law (sect 49 O XXI r 16) only, for the position of an assignee of a decree under an oral assignment is not recognized (4). The application may be in person or by recognized agent or pleader (O III r 1) (5). Under O I r 12 each of several plaintiffs or defendants may authorize any other to appear and act for him (6). In the case of execution by a representative of a deceased decree holder see sect 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) (7).

Against whom execution may be had — The judgment debtor, his legal representative (sects 50, 52), and sureties for the performance of the decree or the other matters referred to in sect 145, *post*.

Questions to be determined in execution — See notes to sect 47, *post*.

Nature of execution — See notes to sects 51 *et seq*, *post*, and O XXI

(1) *Prem Chand Dey v Mokhoda Debi*, 17 C 699, 703 (1890), and see *Obhoy Churn Goondoo v Golam Ali*, 7 C 410 (1881), 9 G L R 361, *Dakhina Churn Chattopadhyay v Bilash Chunder Roy* 18 C 528 (1891) and so the High Court must execute its decrees through the intervention of the Mofussil Courts 1 Hyde, 136 (1862).

(2) See *Gunga Narain Gupta v Annanda Moyee*, 12 C L R 404 (1883) where shares in a single entire estate were sold, and *Unnecool Chunder Chowdhry v Hurry Nath Goondoo*, 2 C L R 334 (1877) [sale of portion of *taluk* outside jurisdiction void], *Ram Lall Montra v Bama Sundari Debia*, 12 G (1885), *dist* last case.

(3) That is only when the property attached

forms one estate. See *Maseyk v Steel*, 14 C 661 at pp 668-669, where the distinction is pointed out between mortgage (1 *ante*, clauses (2) and (3)) and money decrees.

(4) *Dakhina Mohun Roy v Sm Basumaty Debi*, 4 G W N 474 (1900), *Parvata v Digambar*, 15 B 307 (1890).

(5) As to applications under a defective power, see *Mitra v Limitation Act*, 4th ed 1159.

(6) See *Ambaram v Humatsingh*, 2 B H G R 103 (1865).

" " — " " " "

" " — " " " "

" " — " " " "

" " — " " " "

" " — " " " "

" " — " " " "

37. The expression "Court which passed a decree," or words to that effect, shall, *in relation to the execution of decrees*, unless there is anything repugnant in the *subject or context*, be deemed to include,—

- (a) where the decree to be executed *has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction*, the Court of *first instance*, and
- (b) where the Court of *first instance* has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed *was* instituted at the time of making *the* application for *the* execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit.

"Include"—This section corresponds with the second paragraph of sect 649 of the last Code as amended by Act XII of 1879, which explained the meaning of the expression the "Court which passed the decree" This does not exclude the Court which originally passed the decree as being a Court in which an application for execution should be made, but merely includes another Court (1) In clause (a) the expression "Court of first instance" has been substituted for "Court which passed the decree from which the appeal was preferred," the reason being that, as a matter of practice, the Court of intermediate appeal never executes a decree passed on second appeal The meaning of the words "ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it" are explained in the under-mentioned cases (2) The terms of clause (b) are general and draw no distinction as to the nature of the cause which puts an end to the jurisdiction (3) It was held under the last Code that the Court to which a decree was transferred for execution, if it had ceased to have territorial jurisdiction, might either of its own motion, or when applied to under sect 223 of that Code, transfer it for execution to the Court which had territorial jurisdiction, (4) and that a comparison of that section with the last paragraph of section 649, corresponding with this section, indicated that territorial jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a Court executing a decree (5) This is so now

(1) *Latchman Pandeh v Maddan Bhojun* 6 C 513 (1880), *Kartick Nath v Tilukhdari Lal*, 15 C 667, 669 (1888), *Sheik Jafar t Kamaluni Debi* 5 C W N 150, 152 (1900), s c, 28 C 238, but see *Zamindar of Vallur v Adinarayuda*, 19 M 445 (1896)

(2) *Latchman Pandeh v Maddan Mohun*, 6 C. 513 (1880), in particular see judgment of Field, J., *Hurro Proshad t Bhupendro Narain*, 6 C 201 (1880), *Vishnu v Krishna Rao*, 11 B 153 (1887) In *Kale Podo v Dino Nath*, 25 C 315 (1897) it was held that

the Court had not ceased to exist, or to have jurisdiction referred to in *Sheikh Jafar t Kamaluni*, 5 C W N 150, *Panduranga t Vythalinga*, 30 M 537 (1907), s c, 17 M L J 417.

(3) *Gauskha v Abdul Ropkha* 17 B 162 (1892)

(4) *Garendro Chunder t Jarawa Kunari*, 20 C 193 (1891)

(5) *Prem Chand v Mokhoda Debi*, 17 C at p 703 (1890)

COURTS BY WHICH DECREES MAY BE EXECUTED

38 A decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution

Court by which decree passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution
may be executed

Courts of Execution—Under sect 223 of the last Code also a decree might have been executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it was transferred for execution under the circumstances mentioned in that section by the former Court. According to this procedure the Court which passed the decree was after transfer virtually deprived of control until the decree was returned and to all intents and purposes execution was everywhere in suspense except in the particular Court which happened to have the decree on its file. The Court to which the decree was transferred had seizure of the execution proceedings and carried them on until as far as possible execution was obtained. The decree might then have been transferred to another Court and the process repeated until full execution was had. Though the legality of concurrent execution has been recognized (1) both under the Codes of 1859 and 1877 as well as that of 1882, in practice it was not generally carried out. The Court to which the decree was transferred could not after executing it as far as it could transfer it directly to a third Court. It had to send it back to the Court which passed the decree which might then transfer it to a third Court a procedure which was cumbersome and caused delay (2). It was at first considered in Committee that the results of the transfer system which seriously affected the chances of realization and added greatly to the expenses eventually to be borne by the judgment debtor, were not justified by any compensating advantage. Excess in realization which the former system was primarily introduced to prevent could they considered be quite as effectively obviated by reserving the power of ordering attachment or sale to the Court which passed the decree and which would not issue a precept for either of these purposes unless looking to the amount of assets obtained from all sources it considered such action to be necessary. Special limitations were later placed on this power. It was proposed that the Court which passed a decree should be responsible throughout for seeing it enforced and the Court to which the precept was issued should have jurisdiction only to entertain objections not affecting the legality or propriety of the precept or the right to execute the decree. It was thus proposed to effect an important simplification of procedure by substituting execution by precept for the former procedure by transfer of the decree. This would have involved two results viz firstly concurrent execution as opposed to the former practice under which there was only one Court at one time carrying out the execution of a decree and secondly execution by one Court (that to which the precept is given) under the direction of another Court (or that which passed the decree).

(1) *Saroda Road v. Luchmeeput* S. A. 14 C. L. J. 315 (1906).
M. I. A. 599 538 539 (1872) 17 W. R. 299. (2) See *Dhnaput v. Niglat Wau* S. A. 11
H. R. to Kishore Dutt v. Rooplal Das S. C. 637. 11 W. R. 337 (1874). *Sh. v. N. S. S. S.*
(1882) *Bajmath Gocula v. Holloway* 1 Bep. N. Behary Bazar S. C. 1.

opposed to the former practice under which the Court in which the execution proceedings were pending had control of them. The Court passing the decree might thus have executed the decree itself, and might at the same time have issued precepts to another Court or to two or more Courts directing simultaneous execution of the decree. The conduct of the execution would have remained in the hands of the Court passing the decree which might from time to time give such directions as it thought fit regarding the execution to the Court to which the precept is issued whose powers were stated and limited. The adoption of the precept system would of necessity have abolished the elaborate conditions of transfer embodied in sect 223 of the last Code. The Select Committee which, however, considered the Draft Bill immediately prior to its introduction considered that the difficulties in the existing system arose not so much from the machinery of execution itself as from the defective manner in which it was worked. They therefore stated that they were unable to accept the proposal of the Committee of 1902 in relation to the execution of decrees by precept. They were however, so far in accord with the view expressed by that Committee as to have been able to insert sect 46 *post* enabling the Court which passed the decree to issue a precept to any other Court to attach property of the judgment debtor pending execution in the ordinary course. Beyond this they stated they felt they could not safely go. With this exception therefore the general system of execution viz by the Court passing the decree or by transfer has been maintained.

The section provides that a decree may be executed by the Court which passed it and it was held that where a Court passed a decree for sale of property and the place where such property was situate was transferred to the jurisdiction of another Court the former Court might still execute the decree (1). It has been held that the provisions of this section read with those of the next section plainly indicate that as a general rule (to which there are sundry exceptions) no Court can execute a decree in which the subject matter of the suit or of the application for execution is property entirely outside its local jurisdiction (2).

23] **39** (1) *The Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree holder, send it for execution to another Court,—*
 Transfer of decree

- (a) if the person against whom the decree is passed actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or
- (b) if such person has not property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree, sufficient to satisfy such decree and has property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or

(1) Pand ranga v Vythilinga 30 M 537 (1907)

(2) Begg Dunlop v Jagannath 14 C L J 223 (1911) See notes to sect 17

(c) if the decree directs the sale or delivery of immovable property situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it, or

(d) if the Court which passed the decree considers for any other reason, which it shall record in writing, that the decree should be executed by such other Court.

(2) The Court which passed a decree may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction.

40. *Where a decree is sent for execution in another province, it shall be sent to such Court and executed in such manner as may be prescribed by rules in force in that province.*

Transfer of decree to Court in another province,

41. The Court to which a decree is sent for execution shall certify to the Court which passed it the fact of such execution, or where the former Court fails to execute the same the circumstances attending such failure.

Result of execution proceedings to be certified,

Transfer of decree—As sect 38 embodies the first paragraph of sect 223 of the last Code, sect 39 embodies the second and third paragraphs, sect 41 the fourth paragraph, and O XXI rr 4 and 5 the fifth and concluding paragraphs of that section. See notes to sects 36-38, *ante*, and to the last-mentioned rules in O XXI, *post*. To make the provisions relating to the transmission of decrees applicable, it is necessary that the provisions of the Code should regulate the procedure of both the Courts (1) Where a decree has been transferred by a Court which passed it to another Court for execution, the original Court, it has been held, does not thereby completely lose all jurisdiction in respect of execution thereof (2) As to orders sending certificates for execution under the Public Demands Recovery Act, see case cited (3) Where in different districts different modes of execution are prescribed, and where the question is how a decree passed in one, but of which execution is sought in another of such districts, is to be executed, the executing Court must be guided by the rules in force in its own district (4) It has been held under sect 233 of the last Code that an application for transfer of decree is an application to take a step in aid of execution within the meaning of Art 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908 (5)

(1) *Prabhu Narain Singh v Saligram Singh*, 34 C. 576 (1907), 11 C W N 622

(2) *Baij Nath Goenka v Holloway*, 1 C L J 315 (1903)

(3) *Girish Chandra Changdar v Golam Karim*, 33 C 451 (1906)

(4) *Martand Trimbak Oarde v Vinayak Khasgavale*, 31 B 5 (1906)

(5) *Todar Mal v Phola Kunwar*, 35 A 339 (1913), following *Chundra Nath Gossami*

v Gurroo Prasunno Ghose, 22 C 375 (1895)

28.]

42. The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it has been passed by itself. All persons disobeying or obstructing the execution of the decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree. And its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself.

Limitation of Powers—The powers of a Court are subject to other sections of the Code, which may affect them. So the section corresponding to this in the Code of 1882 was held subject to the special provisions of the section corresponding to O XXI r 16, *post* (1). Under the Code of 1882, the Court to which the decree was sent was, by virtue of the provisions of sect 225 (now O XXI r 7), held entitled to enquire into the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree (2). And if the Court to which the decree was sent held that there was no jurisdiction, then its hands were stayed and the parties had to go back to the Court which passed the decree, the Court to which the decree was sent having declined to become the executing Court within the meaning of sect 228 of that Code, corresponding with the present section (3). Under the Code of 1882 it was also held that where a decree was transferred, the Court to which the decree was sent was competent to determine whether execution of the decree was barred by limitation or not, (4) but not where a Court made an order for execution of the decree and then transmitted it (5). It has been held that an order for the transmission of a decree for execution to another Court is not an order for the execution of the decree, nor is the application for the transmission an application for execution (6).

As illustrations of the limitation on its powers, the following decisions under the earlier Codes may be referred to as being in force under this Code. The executing Court cannot question the validity of the decree or any portion of it. Its duty is to enforce it and not to determine whether it was illegal

(1) *Amar Ghundra Banerjee v Guru* 378 (1904)
Prosunno Mukerjee, 27 C 488 (1900)

(2) *Bhagwantappa v Vishwanath*, 23 B 379 (1904). see *Mohah Ishwar v Haku Rifa*, 4 B 638 (1880), *Haji Musa v Purmanand Nursey*, 16 B 216 (1890), at p 219 [but this was a case of a foreign judgment, and fraud was alleged], *Imdad Ali v Jagan Lal*, 17 A 478, 482 (1895) [Execution Court can enquire into jurisdiction unless the decree itself precludes that question], *contra*, *Choga Lal v Trucman*, 7 B 481 (1893), where, however, it was held that the executing Court might stay proceedings to enable an application to be made to the Court passing the decree]

(3) *Bhagwantappa v Vishwanath*, 23 B

(4) *Leake v Dunn*, B L R F. B 970 (1868), *Choti Lal v Manick Chand* 7 A H C R 115 (1875), *Nursing Doyal v Hurreyhur Saha*, 5 C 897 (1880), *Srihary Mandal v Murari Chowdhry*, 13 C 257 (1886), *Chotay Lal v Purna Mull*, 23 C 39 (1895) [dissenting from *Soomat Dass v Bhoobun Lal*, 21 W R 292 (1874)], *Lootfullah v Keerut Chand*, 21 W R 330 (1874), *Ranno Rai v Dayal Singh*, 16 A 390 (1891)

(5) *Husein Ahmad v Sajju Mahamad*, 16 B 28 (1890), distinguished in *Jeevandas v Ranchoddas*, 35 B 103, 109 (1910)

(6) *Jeevandas v Ranchoddas*, 35 B 103, 109 (1910)

or not, (1) or wrong or defective (2) And it cannot go behind it but must execute it as it stands (3) nor can it question the propriety or correctness of the order directing execution (4) So it should not refuse execution on the ground that the plaintiff had been improperly allowed to maintain suit, (5) or that the decree had been obtained by fraud, (6) or that questions are raised between the parties that cannot be properly dealt with in execution, (7) or that property directed to be sold by the decree is unsaleable (8) Nor can it entertain any question of the right of a transferee, whose name is on the record, (9) nor of the right of the person asking for execution (10) The executing Court cannot alter or add to the terms of the decree or extend its scope, (11) or go behind it for the purpose of entertaining equitable considerations which appear to render further enforcement of it unfair or improper (12) or correct errors (13) or execute before the period fixed in the decree, (14) or allow instalments not directed by the decree (15) or enquire whether the balance certified to be due on the decree is correct (16) Its duty is to execute it according to its terms (17) But if a decree is improperly altered behind the judgment-debtor's back, the

(1) *Ambaram Hativallab Das v Himat Singh Kalanji*, 2 B H C R 103 (1860) [where the executing Court held that the award of interest in the decree after its date was illegal], *Becharadas Thobun Das v Gokula Bhagla Bom P J* (1882) p 379 cited in 8 B at p 186 [held Court executing decree ordering sale of mortgaged property could not raise question whether property could be sold], *Arunachellam v Murugappa* 12 M 503 (1889) [objection that compromise entered into without leave of Court not binding on minor], *Chintaman Vithoba v Chintaman Bajaji*, 22 B 475 (1896)

(2) *Rajerav Chandrarao v Nandrav Krishna*, 11 B 528, 532 (1887)

(3) *Appa Rao v Krishna Ayyangar*, 25 M 537 (1901), or question its validity, *Chhoti Narain v Rameshwar Koer*, 6 C W N 796 (1902)

(4) *Ram Lal v Reelchoy Lal* 7 A 330 (1885) or transferring the decree for execution, *Mulla Abdul v Sakinaboo*, 21 B 456 (1896)

(5) *Subramanian v Panjamma*, 4 M 324 (1881), though the Court added that if fraud was discovered it would be competent to stay proceedings to enable aggrieved party to apply for review or to set aside decree As to fraud, see *Haji Musav Furman and Nursey*, 15 B 216 at p 219 (1880) [foreign judgment, fraud]

(6) *Parvata v Digambar*, 15 B 307 (1890) See last note

(7) *Rajerav Chandrarao v Nandrav*

Krishna, 11 B 528 (1887)

(8) *Sadashiv Lalit v Jayantibai*, 8 B 185 (1893)

(9) *Ram Chunder v Mohendro Nath Bose*, 21 W R 141 (1874)

(10) *Mt Dhunesh Koore v Oolfat Hossein*, 21 W R 219 (1874)

(11) *Hurro Durga Chowdhuran v Sarut Soondari Debi* 9 I A. (1881) 8 C 332, *Rao Oomrao v Jutun Lal*, 1 A H C R 168 (1869) *Forester v Secretary of State*, 3 C 161 (1877), 41 A 137, *Sadasiva Pillai v Ramalinga Pillai*, 2 I A 219 (1875), *Muttia v Varammal*, 10 M 283 (1886), *Mahant Ishwargar v Chudasama Manabhai* 13 B 106 (1888) [extension of period of redemption], *Suhana v Krishna*, 15 B 644 (1891) [the same], *Sheo Pershad v Shiva Ram*, 2 A H C R 59 (1870)

(12) *Rampal Rai v Ram Baran Rai*, 5 A 53 (1882)

(13) *Nilkamal Roy v Rohinee Dossia*, 13 W R 330 (1870) [a decree wrongly drawn up must be corrected by the Court passing it], *Rao Oomdao v Jutun Lal*, 1 A. H C R 168 (1869)

(14) *Har Dayal v Chadani Lal*, 7 A 194 (1884)

(15) *Sheo Pershad v Shiva Ram* 2 A. H C R 59 (1870)

(16) *Keshub Chunder v Khelat Chunder*, 9 W R 361 (1868)

(17) *Krishto Kishore Dutt v Rooplal Dass*, L C 687 (1882)

latter may object that the decree sought to be executed is not the decree of the Court to be executed (1)

"Same powers"—While the functions of an executing Court are confined to effecting execution, and to matters arising out of the proceedings in execution (2) and are subject to the limitations above mentioned they are yet judicial and not merely ministerial functions (3). So a Court to which a decree has been sent has power to make orders in execution of the decree, to deal with obstruction to execution, to investigate claims of third parties to attached property, and the like. It may generally be stated that the Court to which a decree is sent has the same power as those which were possessed by a Court to which a decree was transferred for execution under the Code of 1882.

229]

43 Any decree passed by a Civil Court established in any part of British India to which the provisions relating to execution do not extend, or by any Court established or continued by the authority of the Governor General in Council in the territories of any foreign Prince or State, may, if it cannot be executed within the jurisdiction of the Court by which it was passed, be executed in manner herein provided within the jurisdiction of any Court in British India.

Execution of decrees passed by British Courts in places to which this Part does not extend or in foreign territory

Decrees of British Courts where provisions do not extend—The first part of this section was enacted because formerly a decree obtained in a scheduled District to which the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of 1882 had not been extended, could not be executed under the Code (4). It was determined therefore to revert to the provisions of sect 284 of the Code of 1859, which placed such decrees on a footing as regards execution with those obtained in a foreign Court.

Or in foreign territory—The words "or continued" were introduced into the Code of 1882, by sect 23 of Act VII of 1888. Applicants under this section must show that the Court passing the decree is one or other of the Courts referred to in this section (5).

229 B]

44 The Governor General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare that the decrees of any Civil or Revenue Courts situate in the territories of any Native Prince or State in alliance with his Majesty and not established or continued by

Execution of decrees passed by Courts of Native States

(1) *Abdul Hayat Khan v Chuma Khar* 8 A 377 (1886) *Muhammed Sulaiman v Iatima*, 11 A 314 318 (1889)

(2) *Jadu Roy v Farrell*, 6 B L R app 66 (1871)

(3) *Covind Hari Walekar v Shudram*

Shadmurti 7 B H C R 37 (1870)

(4) *Kashu Mohun Borwa v Bishnoo Pira* 15 C 365 (1883)

(5) See *Jadab Chandra v Dinanath Das*, 4 B L R 134 (1870)

the authority of the Governor General in Council, or any class of such decrees, may be executed in British India as if they had been passed by the Courts of British India

"May be executed"—This section it was held, did not remove the decree of a Native State falling within its purview from the category of foreign judgments. A Court in British India, though it may, is not bound to, execute the foreign decree, and will not do so if it is shown to have been without jurisdiction or obtained by fraud (1). The judgment of a foreign Court on a decree obtained in British India is no bar to the execution of the original decree (2). As to foreign judgments generally, see sects 11-13, *ante*, proof (3) and execution (4) of foreign decrees cases cited

45 So much of the foregoing sections of this Part as empowers a Court to send a decree for execution to another Court shall be construed as empowering a Court in British India to send a decree for execution to any Court established or continued by the authority of the Governor General in Council in the territories of any foreign Prince or State to which the Governor General in Council has, by notification in the Gazette of India, declared this section to apply.

Execution of decrees in foreign territory—This section was inserted in the Code of 1882 by sect 24, Act VII of 1888. The tributary *Mahals* of Orissa do not form part of British India, and therefore in the absence of a prior notification in the India Gazette as specified in this section it was held that no decree by a Court in British India could be sent for execution into a territory such as Mayoorbhunj which is a tributary Mahal (5). An instance of a Court "established or continued" within the meaning of this section is the Court of the Political Agent at Sikkim (6).

46 (1) Upon the application of the decree-holder the Court which passed the decree may, whenever it thinks fit, issue a precept to any other Court which would be competent to execute such decree to attach any property belonging to the judgment debtor and specified in the precept
(2) The Court to which a precept is sent shall proceed to attach

(1) *Haji Musa v Parmanand Nursey*, 15 B 216 (1890)

(2) *Fukuruddeen Mohamed Assan v Official Trustee*, 7 C. 82 (1891)

(3) *Ganco Mahomed Sarkar v Tarini Charan Chuckerbutty*, 14 C 546 (1887)

(4) *Bandasami Pillai v Mordin*, 2 M 337 (1880). *Hukum Chand Aswal v Gyanender*

Chunder Lahiri, 14 C 570 (1887). In *Prabhu Narain Singh v Saligram Singh*, 34 C 576 (1907), the section was held inapplicable [family domains of Maharajah of Benares]

(5) *Ratan Mahanti v Khatoo Sahoo*, 29 C 400 (1902)

(6) *Zamil Ahmed v Maharaja of Sikkim* 38 C. 632 (1911), 15 C W N 992.

latter may object that the decree sought to be executed is not the decree of the Court to be executed (1)

"Same powers"—While the functions of an executing Court are confined to effecting execution and to matters arising out of the proceedings in execution (2) and are subject to the limitations above mentioned they are yet judicial and not merely ministerial functions (3) So a Court to which a decree has been sent has power to make orders in execution of the decree to deal with obstruction to execution, to investigate claims of third parties to attached property, and the like It may generally be stated that the Court to which a decree is sent has the same powers as those which were possessed by a Court to which a decree was transferred for execution under the Code of 1882

[s 229] **43** *Any decree passed by a Civil Court established in any part of British India to which the provisions relating to execution do not extend, or by any Court established or continued by the authority of the Governor General in Council in the territories of any foreign Prince or State, may, if it cannot be executed within the jurisdiction of the Court by which it was passed, be executed in manner herein provided within the jurisdiction of any Court in British India*

Execution of decrees passed by British Courts in places to which this Part does not extend or in foreign territory

Decrees of British Courts where provisions do not extend—The first part of this section was enacted because formerly a decree obtained in a scheduled District to which the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of 1882 had not been extended could not be executed under the Code (4) It was determined therefore to revert to the provisions of sect 284 of the Code of 1859, which placed such decrees on a footing as regards execution with those obtained in a foreign Court

Or in foreign territory—The words "*or continued*" were introduced into the Code of 1882, by sect 23 of Act VII of 1888 Applicants under this section must show that the Court passing the decree is one or other of the Courts referred to in this section (5)

[s 229B] **44** *The Governor General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare that the decrees of any Civil or Revenue Courts situate in the territories of any Native Prince or State in alliance with his Majesty and not established or continued by*

Execution of decrees passed by Courts of Native States

(1) *Abdul Hayat Khan v Chuma Kuar*, 8 A 377 (1886) *Muhammed Salaiman v Fatma*, 11 A. 314 318 (1889)

(2) *Jadu Roy v Farrell* 6 B L R app 66 (1871)

(3) *Govind Hari Walekar v Shudram*

Shudmurti, 7 B H C. P 37 (1870)

(4) *Kashi Mohun Borwa v Bishnoo Pira*, 15 C 365 (1888)

(5) See *Jadab Chandra v Dinanath Das* 4 B L R 134 (1870)

the authority of the Governor General in Council or any class of such decrees, may be executed in British India as if they had been passed by the Courts of British India

' May be executed. — This section it was held did not remove the decree of a Native State falling within its purview from the category of foreign judgments. A Court in British India though it may is not bound to execute the foreign decree and will not do so if it is shown to have been without jurisdiction or obtained by fraud (1). The judgment of a foreign Court on a decree obtained in British India is no bar to the execution of the original decree (2). As to foreign judgments generally see sects 11-13 *ante*, proof (3) and execution (4) of foreign decrees cases cited

45 So much of the foregoing sections of this Part [s 229] as empowers a Court to send a decree for execution to another Court shall be construed as empowering a Court in British India to send a decree for execution to any Court established or continued by the authority of the Governor General in Council in the territories of any foreign Prince or State to which the Governor General in Council has, by notification in the Gazette of India, declared this section to apply

Execution of decrees in foreign territory — This section was inserted in the Code of 1882 by sect 24 Act VII of 1888. The tributary *Mahals* of Orissa do not form part of British India and therefore in the absence of a prior notification in the India Gazette as specified in this section it was held that no decree by a Court in British India could be sent for execution into a territory such as Mayoorbhunj which is a tributary *Mahal* (5). An instance of a Court 'established or continued' within the meaning of this section is the Court of the Political Agent at Sikkim (6).

46 (1) Upon the application of the decree holder the Court which passed the decree may, whenever it thinks fit, issue a precept to any other Court which would be competent to execute such decree to attach any property belonging to the judgment debtor and specified in the precept
(2) The Court to which a precept is sent shall proceed to attach

(1) *Haji Musa v Purmandand Nursey* 15 B 216 (1890)

(2) *Fukuruddeen Malomed Assan v Official Trustee* 7 C. 82 (1881)

(3) *Ganee Mahomed Sarhar v Tarini Charan Chuckerbutty* 14 C 546 (1887)

(4) *Kandasami Pillai v Moudun* 2 M 337 (1880). *Hukum Chand Aswal v Gyanender*

Chunder Lahiri 14 C 570 (188) In *Prabhu Narain Singh v Saligram Singh* 34 C 576

(1907) the section was held inapplicable [family domains of Maharajah of Benares]

(5) *Ratan Mahanti v Khatoo Sahoo* 29 C 490 (1902)

(6) *Zamal Ahmed v Maharaja of Sikkim* 38 C 803 (1911) 15 C W N 992.

the property in the manner prescribed in regard to the attachment of property in execution of a decree

Provided that no attachment under a precept shall continue for more than two months unless the period of attachment is extended by an order of the Court which passed the decree or unless before the determination of such attachment the decree has been transferred to the Court by which the attachment has been made and the decree holder has applied for an order for the sale of such property.

Precepts—See as to this section the notes to sect 38, *ante*. As regards this section the Report of the Select Committee states —“Though a system of execution based on precepts is, in the opinion of the Committee, open to grave objection, they think the idea may be utilized for the purpose of enabling a decree holder to obtain an interim attachment when there is ground to apprehend that he may otherwise be deprived of the fruits of his decree. They have for this purpose introduced clause 46 into the Bill. They think it expedient to fix a time limit for the continuance of this interim attachment, but at the same time they have empowered the Court to extend the period to meet the exigencies of particular cases. After careful consideration they have come to the conclusion that notwithstanding attachment under a precept, re attachment on the ordinary application for execution will still be necessary. Though at first sight it may appear a better course to provide that re attachment shall not be necessary when the issue of a precept is followed by the ordinary application for execution after careful consideration they have come to the conclusion that it will be safer to require re attachment, having regard to the agency by which execution is carried into effect. The section, therefore, originally contained a third clause as follows —“Notwithstanding anything contained in this section it shall be incumbent on the decree holder to apply for execution as though no precept had been issued.” This however was later in Council struck out.

Appendix L No 1 gives form of certificate of result of proceedings in precepts

QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED BY COURT EXECUTING DECREE

[s 244]

47. (1) *All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their questions to be determined by the Court executing decree to the execution of the decree, shall be determined by the Court and not by a separate suit.*

(2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional court fees.

(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is

not the representative of a party, such question shall for the purposes of this section be determined by the Court

Explanation—For the purposes of this section a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed, are parties to the suit

History and Scope of Section—The provisions of this important [s 2] section are designed to prevent multiplicity of suits and to secure that all matters which can be decided in the suit should be so decided. The subject matter has been repeatedly considered both by the Legislature since it was first statutorily dealt with in sect 11 Act XXIII of 1861 amending the Code of 1859, as also by the Courts which have given numerous and often conflicting decisions on points which have arisen with reference to it. The tendency both of the Legislature and on the whole of the Courts has been to enlarge as much as possible the scope of the proceedings before Courts charged with the execution of the decree. With this view the statutory law has been amended from time to time. Sect 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 which referred expressly only to parties and not representatives and not to discharge satisfaction or stay ran as follows—

“All questions regarding the amount of any mesne profits which by the terms of the decree may have been reserved for adjustment in the execution of the decree or of any mesne profits or interest which may be payable in respect of the subject matter of a suit between the date of the institution of the suit and execution of the decree as well as questions relating to sums alleged to have been paid in discharge or satisfaction of the decree or the like and any other questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution of the decree shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and not by separate suit and the order passed by the Court shall be open to appeal

This enactment was followed by the Code of 1877 (Act X). This Code expressly referred to representatives and was in its terms the same as those of the Code of 1882 as the latter was first published except that the words ‘discharge and ‘satisfaction appeared for the first time in the Code of 1882 (Act XIV). The latter Code was amended by Act VII of 1888. Sect 2C of that amending Act substituted a new clause (c) for that which appeared in sect 244 of that Code prior to this amendment. The amended clause (c) included cases of stay of execution as to which there had been some difference of opinion whether as suspending execution it was a matter relating to execution. Act VII of 1888 also added the last clause of sect 244 of the former Code which corresponds with subsection (3) of the present Code though the latter has been amended

It will be observed that the present Code effects several amendments. In the first place clause (a) of sect 244 of the last Code has not been re-enacted. That clause ran (a) ‘*questions regarding the amount of any mesne profits as to which the decree has directed inquiry*. All reference to mesne profits has now been omitted. This omission is due to the recognition of the principle that inquiries into the amount of mesne profits are properly not a matter for the execution department but should be treated as an integral

part of the suit for the duties of execution do not properly arise until the amount of mesne profits has been ascertained and the successful party is in a position to apply to the Court with all the necessary formalities in order to realize the sum as though it were the subject of a decree for the payment of money Under the former Code the Court might under sect 212 of that Code have passed a decree for the property and directed an inquiry into the amount of mesne profits accrued due prior to the suit which under clause (a) of sect 244 might have been determined by the Court executing the decree, and under clause (b) of that section the Court of execution might also determine questions regarding the amount of mesne profits accruing after the institution of the suit as allowed by sect 211 Now the ascertainment of the mesne profits no longer forms part of the proceedings in execution, but is a part of the suit itself Under O XX r 12 of the present Code the Court, in the case of mesne profits accruing before the suit may either determine the amount in the decree or pass a preliminary decree for possession only In the case of mesne profits accruing after the suit it may pass such a preliminary decree Whenever it passes a preliminary decree the Court must then, in continuation of the suit, inquire as to mesne profits and dispose of the same by a final decree which is then capable of execution

On the same principle, viz that questions regarding the amount of both mesne profits and interest should be determined by the decree and not in execution clause (b) of the former section has been omitted

The reference to stay of execution has been omitted, but this is a matter clearly coming within the words "*all questions*" etc

The third sub section has been redrafted and the Legislature has made it compulsory on the Court to determine questions arising as to representation of parties It was considered inexpedient that separate suits should be instituted for the decision of such questions, as the delay and expense were often very great and resulted in the needless protraction of litigation

The second sub section and the explanation are new The first sanctions an existing practice and the latter is intended to end a conflict of judicial decisions See as to these *post*

There are several other matters which have been the subject of conflicting judicial decisions but these have not been dealt with and are commented upon, *post*

The object of this section is that the Court having the parties before it in the suit it is proper that all questions between them relating to the execution of the decree should be determined and there should not be the expense of separate suits to determine such questions The most liberal interpretation therefore, ought to be given to the provisions of this section in order to carry out what was the design of the Legislature (1) The section has been framed so as to prohibit in a separate suit any relief being granted which shall interfere with the conduct of the execution proceedings by the Court executing the decree (2) The Privy Council speaking of sect 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 said, "This enactment was undoubtedly passed for the beneficial purpose of checking

(1) *Oscemumunary Khatoon v Amceeroon*
n 343 Khatoon 20 W R 162 (1873)

(2) *Lal Das v Kishor Das*, 22 B 463 466
(1896) citing *Azizan v Matuklal*, 21 C 437

neeless litigation and their Lordships do not desire to limit its operation' (1). And again under the last Code the Judicial Committee stated that it was of the utmost importance that all objections to execution should be disposed of as cheaply and as speedily as possible and that they were glad to find that the Courts in India had not placed any narrow construction on the language of sect 244 of that Code (2) and in accordance with that decision it has been repeatedly held that a wide and liberal construction should be placed on the section so as not to drive parties to an independent suit unless the case be clearly outside the scope and purview of the section so that all questions which can possibly be determined in the execution proceedings should be so determined (3). It has been recently held that the expression 'parties to the suit' imports "between parties opposed to each other in the suit, but does not necessarily mean between parties who are plaintiff and defendant respectively in a partition suit parties who are co-defendants are often opposed to each other (4).

The provisions of this section relate not only to proceedings initiated by the decree holder, but also to applications made by the judgment debtors (5). The section does not apply as a bar to an adjudication of a question raised by a party not seeking such adjudication as a plaintiff, but resisting the plaintiff's claim as a defendant (6). When a Court passes an order under this section it is not necessary to draw up a decree (7). This section does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but only prescribes the form of procedure (8).

As to the applicability of this section in cases under the Public Demands Recovery Act, a matter which appears to be in an unsettled state and to Agency Tracts in Madras (9) see cases noted below (10).

A party may be estopped from raising an objection that the section is a bar (11).

(1) Chowdhry Wahed Ali v Mt Jumaco, 11 B L R 149, A C, p 155 (1872)

(2) Prasanno Kumar Sanyal v Kali Das Sanyal, 19 C 683, at p 689 (1892)

(3) Sett Umedmal v Srinath Roy, 27 C 810, 813 (1900), Jogemoya Dassi v Thac Komant Dassi, 24 C 473 492 (1896), Pun Chanan Bundopadhyay v Rabia Bibi, 17 C 711, 718 (1890), Gobardhan Roy v Bishan Prasad, 23 A 116, 118 (1900), Adhar Singh v Sheo Prasad, 21 A 209, 210, 211 (1898), Appa Rao v Venkataru Manayamma, 23 M 65 (1899), Ghazidin v Fakir Buksh, 7 A 33 (1884), Muttuvelu Pillai v Vythilinga Pillai, 5 M H C R 185, 188 (1870); Jammam Nath Roy v Dharma Das Sur, 33 C 857, 860 (1906)

(4) Mangayya v Sriramulu, 24 M L J 977 (1913)

(5) Erusappa Mudaliar v Commercial, etc Bank, 23 M 377 (1899)

(6) Durga Charan Agrawal v Karama Khan, 7 C W N 607, at p 608 (1903)

(7) Kherode Sundari Devi v Jnanendra Nath Pal 6 C W N 283 (1901) dict, Gopal

Chandra v Preonath Dutt, 32 C 175 (1904)

(8) Venkata Krishnamia v Krishna Rao, 32 M 423 (1909)

(9) Maharajah of Vijayanagram v Somasekara 17 M L J 147 (1906)

(1907), Janki Dassi v Ram Golam Sahu, 28 C 813 (1901) s c, 6 C W N 331, Hazra v Dilwar Ali, 5 C W N 521 (1901); Ramrup Sahay v Khushal Visser, 6 C W N 830 (1902); Barhamdeo Narayani Singh v Dilli Rasul Bandh, 1 C L J 300, s c, 32 C 601 (1905), Umedali Dhuya v Rajalakshmi Debba 33 C 841 1 C L J 538 (1905);

973 (1912), Prag Narain v Kamakhia Singh, P C, 31 A 651 (1909)

(11) Hara Dhan Kalia v Purna Chandra Mondal, 11 C W N 145 (1906)

part of the suit for the duties of execution do not properly arise until the amount of mesne profits has been ascertained and the successful party is in a position to apply to the Court with all the necessary formalities in order to realize the sum as though it were the subject of a decree for the payment of money. Under the former Code the Court might under sect 212 of that Code have passed a decree for the property and directed an inquiry into the amount of mesne profits accrued due prior to the suit which under clause (a) of sect 214 might have been determined by the Court executing the decree, and under clause (b) of that section the Court of execution might also determine questions regarding the amount of mesne profits accruing after the institution of the suit as allowed by sect 211. Now the ascertainment of the mesne profits no longer forms part of the proceedings in execution but is a part of the suit itself. Under O X r 12 of the present Code the Court in the case of mesne profits accruing before the suit may either determine the amount in the decree or pass a preliminary decree for possession only. In the case of mesne profits accruing after the suit it may pass such a preliminary decree. Whenever it passes a preliminary decree the Court must then *in continuation of the suit*, inquire as to mesne profits and dispose of the same by a final decree which is then capable of execution.

On the same principle, viz that questions regarding the amount of both mesne profits and interest should be determined by the decree and not in execution clause (b) of the former section has been omitted.

The reference to stay of execution has been omitted but this is a matter clearly coming within the words "*all questions*" etc.

The third sub section has been redrafted and the Legislature has made it compulsory on the Court to determine questions arising as to representation of parties. It was considered inexpedient that separate suits should be instituted for the decision of such questions as the delay and expense were often very great and resulted in the needless protraction of litigation.

The second sub section and the explanation are new. The first sanctions an existing practice and the latter is intended to end a conflict of judicial decisions. See as to these *post*.

There are several other matters which have been the subject of conflicting judicial decisions but these have not been dealt with and are commented upon *post*.

The object of this section is that the Court having the parties before it in the suit it is proper that all questions between them relating to the execution of the decree should be determined and there should not be the expense of separate suits to determine such questions. The most liberal interpretation therefore ought to be given to the provisions of this section in order to carry out what was the design of the Legislature (1). The section has been framed so as to prohibit in a separate suit any relief being granted which shall interfere with the conduct of the execution proceedings by the Court executing the decree (2). The Privy Council speaking of sect 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 said "This enactment was undoubtedly passed for the beneficial purpose of checking

(1) Oosamm misa Khatoon v Ameroon
nasa Khatoon 20 W R 107 (1873)

(2) Lal Das v Lal or Das 22 B 463 466
(1896) citing Az zam v Matalal 21 C 437

within the scope of this section depends upon its nature and contents if it decides a question relating to the execution, satisfaction, or discharge of the decree, and if the decision has been given between parties to the suit or their representatives in interest, the order of the Court falls within the scope of this section and is a decree within the meaning of section 2 (1)

The three forms in which the question under discussion generally arises are as to the competency of the Court of execution to entertain the application, whether an appeal lies from an order passed by the executing Court, and whether, if a separate suit has been brought it is barred

The following matters have been held to be within the section —

All matters relating to the attachment or sale of property such as an order for attachment and sale in execution, (2) refusing to confirm a sale, (3) seeking to obtain execution of the decree against some property other than that actually mortgaged, (4) impugning under sect 294 (now O XXI r 71), purchase by holder of decree in execution of which property was sold, (5) seeking to have a sale set aside, (6) suit for property wrongly taken in execution of a decree (7) Where a claim is made against defendant as holding possession of an estate said to be liable for the claim, any question whether the defendant, in fact, held such estate, and any question as to the right to execute against property belonging to the defendant, (8) the question whether a person alleged to be a representative of a deceased party is such representative, and whether property against which execution is sought in the hands of the representative was, in fact, the property of such

(1) Roghubar t Jadu Nandan, 15 C L J 89 (1911), 10 C W N 736, following Joytara t Pran Krishna, 13 C L J 257 (1910), and see Srinivas v Kesko Prosad, 14 C L J 499 (1911)

(2) Polokdhari Pat t Radha Pershad Singh, 8 C. 28 (1881), 8 I A. 165 [order appealable]

(3) Doyamoyi Dasi t Sarat Chunder Mozumdar, 23 C 175 (1897), 1 C W N 656 [order appealable]

(4) Jogamaya Dassi t Thackomoni Dassi, 21 C. 473, 492 (1896) [suit not maintainable]

(5) Chintamanrav Natu t Vithabal II B 588 (1887) [suit not maintainable]

(6) Prosunno Kumar Sanyal t Kali Das Sanyal, 19 C. 683 (1892), P C [suit not maintainable], Sri Maharani Beni t Lokhi Rai, 3 C. W N 6 (1898) [sale in execution of *ex parte* decree subsequently set aside competency of execution Court to go into question] Krishnan t Arunachellam, 16 M. 417, 449 (1892) [competency of Court, if the proceeding sought to be set aside relates to execution the specific ground on which the proceeding is impeached is immaterial],

Munshi Prag Narain t Thakur Kamakhia, 14 C W N 55 (1900)

(7) Biru Mahata t Shyama Churn Khawas 22 C 483 (1895) [separate suit not maintainable], Muttuvolu Pillai t Vythilinga Pillai, 5 M. H. C. R. 185 (1870) [same], Rama Katama t Bothagurusami Tevar, 6 M. H. C. R. 293, 297 (1871) [same], Jogendra Narain t Raneesurno Moyee, 14 W R 33 (1870) [suit barred], Prannath Roy Chowdhry t Preonath Roy Chowdhry, 8 W R 398 (1867) [order appealable], but where the Act was unauthorized and therefore not done in execution, a separate suit was held to lie Rash Beharee Lal t Beebee Wajan, 11 W R 516 (1869), Imdad Ali t Jagan Lal, 17 A. 478 (1895) [competency of Court to restore possession].

(8) Oseemunnissa Khatoon t Ameeroon issa Khatoon, 20 W R 162 (1873) [suit not maintainable], and see as to questions relating to liability of private property of a representative, Chowdhry Wahed Ali t Ali Jumace II B L R 119 (1872), P C. [same], Seth Chand Mal t Durga Dei, 12 A. 313 (1855) See notes, *post*

deceased party and not the separate property of the representative (1) Question regarding the appointment or removal of a receiver appointed by decree in an administration suit; (2) the appointment of a person as head of a religious endowment in execution of a decree, (3) an order declaring party entitled to *khaj* possession, (4) an order holding that a party was not entitled to a greater quantity of land than that sued for, though given by a consent decree, (5) a question as to propriety of execution of a rent decree by sale, and as to suppression of sale proclamation, (6) or as to sale of an occupancy holding not transferable by custom in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by a co sharer landlord, (7) objection by a person dispossessed under compromise decree to which compromise she was not a party, (8) the question whether the defendant is entitled to a right of occupancy or non saleable tenure, (9) all questions regarding liability to attachment and sale, whether arising under the Code or other Act being within the section (10) An order requiring the decree holder to give security, (11) a question as to the amount of security required in granting stay of execution, (12) an order relating to the stay of execution, (13) an inquiry into a disputed question as to

(1) *Bani Prosad Kunwar v Lakhna Kunwar*, 21 A 323 (1899) [suit not maintainable], *Upendra Bhatta v Ranganatha Bhatta*, 17 M 393 (1893) [competency of Court] See notes to 'Arising'

(2) *Mithai v Lami Nowroji*, 5 B 45 (1860) [the management of the estate being in this case a matter relating to the execution of the decree, order appealable]

(3) *Gnana Sambanda v Visvaliga*, 13 M 338 (1890) [order appealable], *Ponnambala Iamhuran v Sivagnana Desika*, 17 M 313 (1894), P C [same], 21 I A 71

(4) *Najhan v Mahomed Taki Khan*, 9 C 872 (1883) [suit not maintainable], as to whether delivery of formal possession gives cause of action for fresh suit, see *Shama Charan Chatterji v Madhub Chander Mukherji*, 11 C 93 (1884)

(5) *Mohibullah v Imaam*, 9 A 229 (1887) [suit barred]

(6) *Jagan Nath Gorai v Watson*, 19 C 341 (1892) [suit barred]

(7) *Durga Charan Mandal v Kali Prasanna Sarkar*, 26 C 727 (1899), 3 C W N 586 [competency of execution Court to entertain application]

(8) *Sankaravadivammal v Kumara samya*, 8 M 473 (1885) [order appealable]

(9) *Ram Gopal v Khali Ram*, 6 A 418 (1884) [suit barred], *Janki Singh v Abulakh Singh*, 6 A 393 (1884) [same objection on ground that land not liable to sale], *Basti*

Ram v Fattu, 8 A 146 (1886) [suit barred] *In Bardeo Prasad v Juthan Ram*, 27 A 684 (1905), the Court held that the plea whether the property was saleable should have been raised in the original suit

(10) *Basti Ram v Fattu*, *supra*, at p 148 [coll. *Sheikh Nurullah v Sheikh Burullah*, 9 C W N 972 (1903)], *Krishnan v Aruna chellam*, 16 M 447 (1892)

(11) *Lutchmeput Singh v Sita Nath Does*, 8 C 477 (1882) [under s 646 of Code of 1877; order appealable]

(12) *Mahant Ishwargar v Chudusama Mānathar*, 12 B 39 (1887) [order appealable] But see *Saraswati Barmania v Golap Das Barman*, 41 C 160 (1913) [order for security in stay of execution not appealable]

(13) Clause (b), *Hoti Lal Hardeo*, 5 A 212 (1882) [order appealable], *Ghazidin v Fakir Baksh*, 7 A 73 (1884) [same], *Kassa Mal v Gopi*, 10 A 389 (1888) [same], *Kristomolmy Dossco v Bama Churn Nag* 7 C 733 (1881), *Mussaji Abdulla v Damodardas*, 12 B 279 (1888) [same], *Steel Ichamoye Chowdhram*, 13 C 111 (1886) [same] *contra* *Nihal Chand v Rameshwar Dasgac*, 9 C 214 (1882), in so far as it held that the matter does not relate to execution is no longer law, the section having been amended in this respect in 1883, though the question whether there is an appeal is another matter depending on whether the order is a decree, [held no appeal]

the transfer of a decree, (1) a claim for refund of proceeds of execution sale on ground that decree satisfied, (2) a suit for the purpose of having it determined that execution is barred, (3) the adjustment of a decree the question being one relating to its satisfaction (4) An application for restitution of amount which had in execution been realized in excess (5) An order under sect 87 of the Transfer of Property Act (6) or under sect 89 of the same Act, (7) the setting aside of a sale as being in contravention of sect 99 of the same Act, (8) a suit to recover possession after failure to execute decree for possession, (9) a statement of amount received under a decree for possession on an usufructuary mortgage (10) A suit to set aside sale on ground that defendant had purchased without permission of Court, (11) an agreement before decree by the decree holder not to recover costs which the decree might award, (12) an order for payment of surplus sale proceeds, (13) a suit to restrain a decree holder from executing his decree when the decree has been satisfied by an agreement out of Court and such satisfaction has not been certified, (14) the question whether the decree is capable of execution, (15) or whether there

(1) *Dwar Buxh Sircar v Fatah Jali*, 20 C 250 (1898) [competency of Court to entertain application]

(2) *Syud Velayet Hossein v Syad Walee Ahmed*, 23 W R 207 (1875) [competency of execution Court]

(3) *Nojabut Ali v Shukh Moha*, 11 B L R 42 (1873) See *Zameer Sirdar v Asseo mooddeen Sirdar*, 23 W R 257 (1875)

(4) *Rangji v Bhanji*, 11 B 57 (1896)

(5) *Harnam Chandar v Muhammad Yar Khan*, 27 A 485 (1903)

(6) *Kedar Nath v Lalji Sahai*, 12 A 61 (1889), 1 B [order appealable] *Bansidhar v Gaya Prasad*, 24 A 179, 183 (1901) [s 74 of same Act Suit barred dist in *Tufail Fatma v Bitola*, 27 A 400 (1904)]

(7) *Oudh Behari Lal v Nagabhar Lal*, 13 A 278 (1896) [competency of execution Court], *Mallikarjunadu v Langamurti*, 25 M 214 (1900) [order appealable], *contra* *Ajudhia Pershad v Baldeo Singh*, 21 C 818 (1894) [application not one for execution], followed in *Jehangir Cowasji v The Hope Mills, Ltd*, 34 B 273 (1905)

(8) *Mayan Pathuli v Pakuran*, 22 M 317 (1898) [suit barred], *Sonu Singh v Behari Singh*, 33 C 253 (1900) The first case was dist in *Muthu v Karpuran*, 30 M 313 (1907), 17 M L J 163, *Ashutosh Sikdar v Behari Lal Kutumba*, 11 C W N 1011 (1907); s c, 35 C 61 I B, and see *Sihadu Manaji v Dulja Jaba*, 14 Bom. L. R 265 (1911)

(9) *Ranganasary v Shappani*, 5 M H C. I.

375 (1870) [suit barred], *Kisan Nandram v Anandram Bachaji*, 10 B H C R 433 (1873) [same], *Fakirapa v Pandurangapa*, 6 B 7 (1881) [same], when a decree was declaratory and also gave consequential relief, it was held that though execution for this might be barred, it did not follow that plaintiff's declared title could not be enforced by a suit *Jagan Nath v Balgobind*, 1 A H C R 154 (1869), but a decree which is not declaratory only can be enforced in execution *Madhav rao v Ramrao*, 22 B 267 (1896)

(10) *Golam Rasul v Kishen Mohun*, 23 W R 156 (1875) [competency of execution Court]

(11) *Vararaghava v Venkata*, 16 M 287 (1892) [suit barred, at p 286 'The Court which did the erroneous act, that is, which put the defendant into possession, must undo it, and that is the Court executing the decree']

(12) *Laldas Navandave Kishordas Devidas*, 22 B 463 (1896), F B [competency of Court], *sed qu* Diss from in *Hassan Ali v Gauzi Ali Mir*, 31 C 179 (1893)

(13) *Hardwar Singh v Bhawan Pershad*, 2 C W N 429 (1897)

(14) *Arizan v Matuk Lal Sahu*, 21 C 437 (1893) [suit barred], *Banerjee, J.*, diss., ob serving at p. 460, on the case of *Mukund Harshet v Haridas Khemji*, 17 B 23 (1892), Dist. in *Iswar Chandra Dutt v Haris Chandra Dutt*, 25 C 718 (1898), 2 C W N 247

(15) *Imdai Ali v Jagan Lal*, 18 A 478, at p. 482 (1895)

is anything due on it, (1) questions as to part satisfaction of a decree (2) Suit by judgment debtor against auction purchaser to recover property sold in execution, on the ground that being a tenant's right it is not saleable (3) When a prior mortgagee has been made a party in a puisne mortgagee's suit, and the puisne mortgagee has obtained a decree for sale on his mortgage, the prior mortgagee can have his rights settled in execution proceedings by an application under this section (4)

What a decree means is a question relating to execution, and a suit therefore which asks the Court to construe a decree and ascertain plaintiff's rights is barred notwithstanding that other parties against whom no relief is claimed are added (5) So also is an objection to a partition made by a Collector, (6) an order refusing a representative of a deceased decree holder his claim to continue the execution proceedings, (7) an order declining to enlarge the time fixed for redemption (8)

It is to be observed (and this is not always understood) that an order may be none the less, an order under this section because it is also passed under some other of the sections of the Code relating to the execution of decrees. So orders under the following sections of the last Code have been held to be also orders under sect. 224 of that Code corresponding with the present section —sects. 318 and 334, (9) sect. 310A, (10) sect. 287, clause (8), (11) sect. 294, clause (2), (12) sect. 294 last clause, (13) sect. 243, (14) sects. 232, 234 (15) In such cases the matter is one ordinarily and from the nature of the case relating to execution within the meaning of this section. If it is further one between the parties

(1) Shoo Narain v Chunn Lal, 22 A 243, at p. 247 (1900)

(2) Kristo Mohunoo Dossee v Kaliprosomo Ghose, 8 C 405 (1882)

(3) Basti Ram v Fattu, 8 A 146 (1886) [suit barred]

(4) Bhojo Hari v Gajendra, 14 C W N 672 (1909)

(5) Nawrojee Nusservanji v Bajaji Doyabhai, 5 Bom L R 1036 (1903) [consent decree declaring defendant owner, option to plaintiff to purchase failure of plaintiff, suit by latter to have determined his rights under decree]

(6) Krishnaji Narayan v Damodar Parashram, 5 Bom L R 648 (1903) [under s. 265 of last Code, suit barred]

(7) Jesubankar Mancharam v Pandya Fulia, 2 Bom L R 887 (1900) [order appealable and therefore no revision]

(8) Rango v Bomshetti, 3 Bom L R 554 (1901) [orders appealable]

(9) Kasunatha Ayyar v Uthamasua Pothan, 25 M 529 (1901), Sandhu Taraganar v Hussain Sahib, 8 M 87 (1904), Pita v Chinnai, 31 B 207 (1906)

(10) Manikka Odayan v Rajagopala Pillai,

30 M 507 (1907) but see Mahomed Moaraf v Habil Mia, 6 C L J 749 (1904), Phul Chand Ram v Narsingh Pershad Misser, 28 C 73 (1899), Kripa Nath Pal v Ram Lakshmi Dasya, 1 C W N 703 (1897), Murlidhar v Anand Rao, 25 B 418 (1900) [at p. 421 where the dispute did not fall within the terms of s. 244 (c) no appeal would lie], Pandurang Govind Porandare v Krishnabai, 1 Bom L R 74 (1899), Murlidhar v Anand Rao, 3 Bom L R 100 (1900), Kedar Nath Sen v Uma Charan, 6 C W N 57 (1900), Imtiaz Begam v Dhumai Begam, 29 A 275 (1907) in Amir Rai v Basdeo Singh, 5 C L J 204 (1906), the auction purchaser was a third party

(11) Gangi Prasad v Raj Coomar Singh, 30 C 617 (1903)

(12) Makka v Sri Ram, 24 A 108 (1901)

(13) Durga Kunwar v Balwant Singh, 23 A 478 (1901)

(14) Steel v Ichamoy Chowdhrai, 13 C 111 (1886), Lingum Krishnaabhipati v Kandula Swaramayya, 20 M 366 (1896)

(15) Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das, 10 A 185 at p. 490 (1894)

or their representatives within the meaning of this section then the order also falls within it and there is an appeal otherwise not

The following have been held to be within the section —

An order disallowing objection that the value of property specified in sale proclamation was inadequate (1) an order determining whether an alleged transferee from a decree holder or his legal representative is the representative of the decree holder, (2) or refusing to stay sale for under valuation (3) or refusing to enforce execution on the ground that applicant is not transferee or representative or on ground of limitation, (4) or refusing delivery of possession of jewels retained by Court in course of execution though not subject matter of decree, (5) a suit to set aside sale on grounds that property not legally saleable and that the real purchaser was the decree holder who had not obtained leave to bid (6) An order refusing to set aside a sale to a decree holder purchaser, the decree in which suit has been set aside (7) a suit for recovery of lands taken by decree holder in excess of terms of his decree, (8) a suit by decree holder to recover purchase money, (9) an application for mesne profits by way of restitution (10) or on the same grounds to recover possession of property, (11) an order refusing to determine the question whether an occupancy holding is transferable according to custom or usage and is therefore saleable, (12) or erroneously holding that the same can be attached and sold, (13) or an order refusing to set aside on appeal an order dismissing objections for default of

scribed in a decree for redemption, (17) an application for restitution of

(1) Ganga Prasad v Rajcoomar Ghose 30 C. 617 (1903) [order appealable]

(2) Ganga Das Seal v Yakub Ali Dobashi, 27 C. 670 (1900)

(3) Sivasami Naicker v Ratnasami 23 M 568 (1900) [order appealable] *contra* Sivasami Achi v Subrahmanya, 27 M 209 (1903)

(4) Balraj Varun v Jaikishore 16 A 483 (1894)

(5) Appa Rao v Venkataramanayamma, 23 M 55 (1899)

(6) Daulat Singh v Jugal Kishore, 22 A 108 (1893) and in Sitanath Chatterjee v Atmaram Kar 4 C W N 571, 572 (1900) [objection on ground that property not liable to attachment and sale], Gohar Khalifa Bipari v Kasimuddin Jamadar, 4 C. W N 577 (1899) 27 C. 415 [question of sale ability of occupancy holding]

(7) Umedmal v Srinath Roy 27 C. 810, s c, 4 C. W N 692 (1903)

(8) Biru Mahata v Sityama Chinn Khawas 22 C. 481 (1899)

(9) Ralimulun v Raim Lal 27 A 155 (1901)

(10) Collector of Meerut v Halka Prasad, 218 A 665 (1900)

(11) Sheodehal Sahu v Bhawani, 29 A 348 (1907)

(12) Majid Hossein v Raghubar Chowdhry 27 C 187 (1899), Gohar Khalifa Bipari v Kasimuddin Jamadar, 27 C 415 (1899), s c, 4 C. W N 557

(13) Sitanath Chatterjee v Atmaram 4 C W N 571 (1900)

(14) Lalnarain Singh v Mahomed Rafi uddin 23 C 81 (1900)

(15) Monmohini Dossee v Lakhinarain Chandra, 28 C. 116 (no second appeal lies as none of the questions under s 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was decided), Sadho Chaudhri v Abhenandan Prasad 26 A 801 (1903) and see notes on Fraud

(16) Collector of Jaunpur v Bithal Das 24 A 291 (1902), in which it was generally held down that the section applies as well to a dispute arising after decree has been executed as it does to a dispute arising previous to execution.

(17) Rangor Blomfield 26 I 121 (1901)

money realised in execution of an *ex parte* decree in a suit in which decree set aside and which is subsequently dismissed, (1) or an order made on an application arising out of purchase by mortgagee holding decree for sale of portion of mortgaged property subject to mortgage, (2) a suit for a declaration that a decree has been satisfied and for an injunction restraining decree holder from executing it, (3) or an order refusing delivery of possession of properties sold to a decree holder in execution of his decree (4) or an order declaring the amount due under a mortgage decree under sect 88 of the Transfer of Property Act (5) or an order refusing an application by judgment debtor for recovery of the amount paid in excess of the decretal amount (6) or an order setting aside a sale or refusing to set aside a sale (7) or dealing with a question relating to discharge or satisfaction although no formal application for execution may have been made, (8) a suit to set aside a sale in execution of a decree on the grounds that the real purchasers were the decree holders who had not obtained leave to bid (9) or on the ground that a compromise alleged to have been entered into whereby the sale was confirmed after judgment debtor's objection was invalid (10) Proceedings for delivery of possession to auction purchaser after sale as where the legal representative of the judgment debtor resisted application for possession by the auction purchaser alleging that portions of the properties belonged to him and not to the judgment debtor (11) A suit by a decree holder at whose instance a receiver has been appointed to realize and pay off the decretal amount for a declaration that a lease alleged to have been executed by judgment debtors after the appointment of the receiver was invalid, (12) and a suit for recovering of possession of properties by a person in whose presence a decree was made although he was a minor his remedy if he could object to the sale under the decree being by an application under this section, (13) the question whether there was an agreement before decree by the decree holder not to recover costs which the decree might award, (14) an objection by the judgment debtor to auction purchaser's application to be put into possession on ground that

(1) *Saran v Bhagwan* 25 A 441 at p 412 (1903)

(2) *Erasappa v Commercial L. M. Bank* 23 M 37* (1899)

(3) *Deno Bundhu Nundy v Hari Mali Dasce* 31 C 480 (1904) s.c. 8 C.W.N. 39

(4) *Kail Nath Ayyar v Uthermana* 25 M 709 (1901) *Kattiyal Pathumay v Paman Menon* 26 M 740 (1902) *Sheo Narayan v Nur Muhammad* 30 A 72 (1907)

(5) *Aryan Bank v Kamna Venkata* 27 M 23* (1901)

(6) *Dhan Kunwar v Mahtab Singh* 22 A 70 (1900) *Saran v Bhagwan* 25 A 441 412 (1903)

(7) *Makha v Sriram* 24 A 108 (1901)

(8) *Ram Kamlewar v S Khan Singh* 27 C.W.N. 17* (1901)

(9) *Durga Kunwar v Balwant Singh* 23 A 478 (1901)

(10) *Adhar Singh v Sico Prasad* 24 A 709 (1899)

(11) *Madhusudan v Gobinda Prasad Chowdhury* 27 C 34 s.c. 4 C.W.N. 41*

(1899) *Sadasay v Narayan* 30 B 452 (1911) dissenting from *Bhagwati v Binwari* 31 A 87 (F.B.) (1908)

(12) *Mathewson v Gobardhan Tribble* 28 C 499 (1900)

(13) *Param Chandra Pannierjee v Ranjit Singh* 2 C 71* s.c. 4 C.W.N. 40* (1899)

(14) *Laldas Narandas v Khordas* 20 B 403 (1896) dissent in *Benode Lal Pakrashi v Tejendra Kumar Saha* 29 C 810 at p 812 (1902)

sale was invalid, (1) an application to allow execution proceedings to be reopened, (2) a suit by surety for declaration of non liability as to portion of decree (3)

A case is not within the section if it is a question which does not relate to, and is not directly connected with, the execution of the decree even though between the same parties (4) that is if it is not a question in respect to the furtherance of or hindrance to or the manner of carrying out the execution of the decree, (5) or does not arise between the parties to the suit in which the order was passed, (6) or is a question which cannot be properly determined in execution, (7) or if it is an order not in execution, such as an interlocutory order pending suit appointing a commission to make partition subsequently to a preliminary decree (8) or if it indirectly and remotely relates to the execution of the decree, (9) or the decree has been satisfied, (10) or if an order is made not in execution of decree but after execution and when such proceedings have come to an end, (11) or the question is one not under but outside the decree, such as assessment of damages for excessive execution, (12) or for damages for injury to property after it had vested in him on the confirmation of the sale (13)

The section does not apply where the decree has passed beyond the stage of execution and the Court is *functus officio*. So it does not apply to a suit by one of two judgment-debtors who has been compelled to satisfy the decree against the other judgment debtor for contribution, (14) nor where a person

Chatterji, 5 C W N 627 (1901)

(3) Linga Reddy v Hussain Peddy, 28 M 117 (1904)

(4) Ray Nundolal Bose v Mir Abu Syed, 5 C L R 43 (1876) Hashee Kishori Roy Chowdhry v Noor Khan, 7 W R. (Civ R.) 45 (1867) [claim for damages in respect of injury sustained by goods while under attachment in execution of a decree which was afterwards set aside], Sita Pam v Mahipal 3

(suit on unsatisfied order of insolvent Court)

(5) Haragobind Das Kolbata v Isuri Das, 15 C 187 (1887)

(6) Kethilamma v Kelappan 12 M 228, 230 (1887)

(7) Gopi Narain Khauna v Bansidhar, 27 A 325 (1905)

(8) Jogodishury Deba v Kailash Chandra Ishari, 24 Cal 725 (1897)

(9) Berham Deo Prasad v Tara Chani, 4 C W N 889 891 (1905)

(10) Raja Padmanund Singh Baba loor v Doorga Perahad Deohoy, 4 C W N 30 (1899) [execution case dismissed for non payment of process fee—not appealable]

(11) Har Prasad v Sheo Ram 20 A 500, 508 509 (1898), Ram Adhar v Narain Das, 24 A 519 (1902), Bujha Roy v Ramkumar Pershad 26 C 529, a c, 3 C W N 374 (1899) [amending sale certificate], Saddo Kunwar v Bansil Dhar, 23 A 476 (1901) [ib], Jotindra Mohan Tagore v Mahomed Basir Chowdhry, 32 C 332 (1904) [right of auction purchaser to refund of purchase money when auction sale set aside], Bhimal Das v Mt Ganeshia Koer, 1 C W N 658 (1897) Ghulam Shabbir v Dwarka Prasad, 18 A 36 (1895) [an order directing delivery of possession to an auction purchaser, not appealable] Contra Mutia v Appasami, 13 M 504 (1890)

(12) Dero Nath Banikya v Ram Kumar Chuckerbutty, 6 C L J 527 (1904)

(13) Kolintarita v Kolintarita, 17 W L J 513 (1907), a c, 31 M 3

(14) Ramsaran Fande v Janki Pandey, 18 A 106 (1895)

cannot as transferee execute the decree, in which case of necessity he must sue (1) Where a decree is executed by delivery of formal possession a cause of action exists against a defendant who remains in occupation of the premises (2) A question relating to execution pre-supposes a person against whom execution is sought and cannot arise between decree holder and a complete stranger (3) And the section does not apply when the question is not between parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, but between parties who both claim to be representatives of one of such parties, (4) or the question is one which forms no subject of enquiry in the suit and could not form the subject of enquiry in execution of decree (5) A dispute between two judgment debtors as to the right to property sold in execution is not within the section (6) The question whether the decree itself is valid is not one relating to execution (7) The section does not apply when a previous suit is compromised and dismissed defendant agreeing to do something and on his failure plaintiff sues to enforce it, there being no direction in this respect in the former decree (8) A question as to whether there has been an adjustment of the decree which has not been certified cannot be raised under this section (9) A charge for maintenance created by a decree is not enforceable in execution (10) An application by purchaser to set aside sale of immoveable property sold by the sheriff in execution of a decree or for compensation on the ground of deficiency in the area of the land sold is not within the section, (11) nor is the question of the right of an auction purchaser to a refund where the sale has been set aside (12) A suit has been allowed to recover properties not included in a mortgage though inadvertently mentioned in the plaint and the decree (13) Any questions that arise as to an order absolute for sale or foreclosure of mortgaged property are not within the section (14) Nor is an order in proceedings

(1) Parupathy Ayyar : Kothanda, 28 M. 64 (1904)

(2) Hassan Raja Chaudry : Kailash Chandra Singha, 8 C W N 59 (1903), following Shama Charan Chatterji : Madhab Chandra Mookerjee, 11 C 93 (1884) *Contra* Madhu Sudan Das v Gobinda Priya 27 C 36, s c, 4 C W N 419 (1899)

(3) Nagamuthu : Savaramuthu 15 M 326 (1891)

(4) Gour Mohun Couli : Dina Nath Karmakar, 25 C 49, s c, 2 C W N 76 (1897)

(5) Hanmant v Surabhat, 23 B 394, 396 (1898) And it does not apply to an order that the plaintiff may be allowed to execute the decree if he fulfilled certain conditions at different stages of the proceeding *Srinivas v Kesha* (1911) 14 C. I. J 489

(6) Kastura Kunwar : Gaya Prasad 29 A 207 (1906)

(7) Arunachalam : Murugappa, 12 M 403 (1899) (application to set aside a decree passed with the consent of the minor

guardian but without the sanction of the Court rejected—no appeal lies), *Dhanram Mahta v Luchmeswar Singh*, 23 C 639 (1896) [objection that the person who was said to have consented to the decree had no authority to consent]

(8) Chumal Dutt : Hiralal Dutt 7 C W N 158 (1902)

(9) Ramdoyal Banerjee : Ram Hari Pal, 20 C. 32 (1892), but see as to separate suit, *Deno Bondhu Nundy v Harimati Dassee*, 31 C 480 at p 485 (1903)

(10) Matangines Dassee v Chooney Money Dassee, 22 C. 903 (1895) see also *Arunachala v Zamindar of Sivagiri*, 7 M 328 (1883) [decree charging impartible Zamindari]

(11) Ram Narain : Dwarka Nath Khattri, 1 C W N 13 (1899)

(12) Jotindra Mohun Tagore : Mahomed Baur Chowdhry, 32 C 332 (1904)

(13) Ram Chanler : Kondo 22 A 442 (1900)

(14) Alakunnesa Bibee : Rooplal Das 27 C 133 (1897) [dissenting from *Kedar Nath*

before Courts of Revenue under Act XII of 1881, (1) or an order passed in exercise of inherent powers to punish for contempt, (2) or cases arising under Act X of 1859 (Landlord and Tenant Act) (3) Where formal possession has been given under a final foreclosure decree but the mortgagor has continued in actual possession, the remedy is by suit (4) An application under sect 396 of the last Code for an appointment of a Commissioner is not within the section (5)

Fraud.—It was well settled law under sect 244 of the last Code that when circumstances affecting the validity of a sale in execution had been brought about by the fraud of one of the parties to the suit or the auction-purchaser and gave rise to a question between these parties such as, apart from fraud, would be within the provisions of that section a suit would not lie to impeach the validity of the sale on the ground of such fraud (6)

r. Lalji Sahai, 12 A. 61 (1890), *Ondh Bihari Lal v. Nageshwar Lal*, 13 A. 278 (1891)], *Tarapada Ghoso v. Kamini Dassee*, 29 C. 644 (1901); *Hatem Ali Khundkar v. Abdul Guffar*, 8 C. W. N. 102 (1903)

(1) *Masik ulla Khan v. Majdunnissa*, 26 A. 149 (1903) [application for refund in consequence of the reversal or modification in appeal of a decree under above Act, separate suit lies]

(2) *Godu Ram v. Suraj Mal*, 27 A. 390 (1904) [such an order not a decree and no appeal] But where there is a genuine dispute between the parties as to execution, it should be dealt with under this section, and not on a motion for contempt. *Jamsetji v. Sorabjee*, 9 Bom. L. R. 1301 (1907) It has been also said that an executing Court has no inherent power to commit for contempt. *Sankaralinga Reddi v. Kandasami Teran*, 17 M. L. J. 334 (1907), citing *Kochappa v. Sachu Devi*, 26 M. 494

(3) *Damoodar v. Jawar*, 16 C. W. N. 78 (1910)

(4) *Jagan Nath v. Mharp Chand*, 28 A. 722 (1906), *Wilayat Begam v. Nand Kishore*, 30 A. 231 (1908)

(5) *Jatlar Madepalli*, 17 M. L. J. 144 (1906)

(6) *Mohendro Narnan Chaturaj v. Gopal*

Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal, 16 C. 683 (1892) P. C. The Allahabad High

High Courts. See *Saroda Churn Chuckerbutty v. Mahomed Isuf Meah*, 11 C. 376, 378 (1885), *Balladeb v. Anadi*, 10 C. 410 (1884) [in this case the matter had been dealt with in execution], *Siva Porshad Marty v. Nundo*

Chandra Bairagi, 26 C. 326 (1896), *Hira Lal Ghoso v. Chundra Kanto Ghoso*, 26 C. 639 (1899) [in this case application was under s. 244], s. c., 3 C. W. N. 403, *Brojo Gopal Sarkar v. Dasmunissa Bibi*, 15 C. 170 (1887) [in this case it was held a suit would lie because s. 244 of the Code had no application to proceedings in execution of a decree under Act X of 1859], *Viraraghava v. Venkata charyar*, 5 M. 217 (1882) [referred to with approval in *Krishnan v. Arunachellam*, 16 M. 411 (1900)]

Kanade, 6 B. 148 (1882), *Sakharam v. Damodar*, 9 B. 468 (1885), *Adhar Monce Das v. Monmotha Nath Bose*, 6 C. W. N. 279 (1901), *Mathura Das v. Lachman Ram*, 24 A. 239 (1902), *Kokil Singh v. Edal Singh*, 31 C. 385 (1904) As to what constitutes fraud vitiating the sale, see *Sim Sarat Kumari v. Nema Charn Dey*, 5 C. W. N. 265 (1900), *Rojoni Kant Bagchi v. Hossain Uddin Ahmed*, 4 C. W. N. 538 (1899); *Gaya Prasad Muz v. Randhur Singh*, 28 A. 661 (1906), and see *Asaban Banu v. Ananias*, 14 C. W. N. 822 (1909) [effect where there is compromise and no sale], *Alhal Pradhan v. Marjona*, 18 C. L. J. 116 (1913)

This rule was, of course, subject to this, that the other conditions of the section existed, viz, that the question was one arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives. So it was held that as between a party to the suit and a stranger, the provisions of sect 312 of the former Code did not debar the person aggrieved from instituting a suit, if he could establish that a material error in the sale had its origin not in mere irregularity but in fraud (1). So also in the under mentioned case, (2) while the suit was held to be barred as regards those plaintiffs who were parties to the suit the sale in which was sought to be set aside, it was held to be at the instance of the other plaintiffs who had been no parties to such suit.

It was held that when a decree or purchase was made *benami*, sect 244 did not apply, and a suit would lie, as the section could not be applied on the footing that the persons really interested were parties to the proceeding (3) and that the auction purchaser could not be regarded as a party to the suit (4). Though this case was not referred to, it must be taken on this latter point to have been overruled (5) by the decision of the Privy Council, that when a question relating to execution has arisen between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, the fact that the purchaser, who is not party to the suit, is interested in the result is not a bar to the application of the section (6). A judgment debtor was held entitled by an application under sect 244 to have an execution sale of his properties set aside if he alleged and proved fraud on the part of the decree holder, though no fraud was alleged or proved against the auction purchaser, who was a stranger to the suit. The auction purchaser was of course entitled to have the purchase money paid by him refunded by the decree holder. When during the pendency of an application under sect 244 to set aside a sale the sale is confirmed, such confirmation was held to be no bar to the maintenance of the application even though the auction purchaser was a stranger to the suit (7).

(1) Viraraghava v Venkatacharyar, 5 M 17, 219 (1882)

(2) Jagan Nath Gorai v Watson & Co, 19 C 341 (1892)

(3) Mohendra Narain Chaturaj v Gopal Mondal 17 C 769 777 (1890), in which case it was held that the question did not arise between "parties"

(4) *Ib* at p 778

(5) Bhubun Mohun Pal v Nundo Lal Dey, 26 C 321 (1899) [see Moti Lal Chakraborty v Purnick Chandra Bairagi, 26 C 320 (1899), Durga Kunwar v Bilwant Singh, 23 A 479 (1901), Kherodo Sundari Debi v Jnanendra Nath Pal Chaudhuri, 6 G W N 253 (1901)] which dealt with the objection that the auction purchaser was not a party. Whether such purchaser is real or nominal makes no difference. *Quære* whether the case of a *benami* decree holder, which was also dealt with by the F. B. decision is still open.

(6) Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v Kali Das

Sanyal, 19 C 683 689 (1892), followed in cases cited in last note and in Hira Lal Ghose v Chandra Kanto Ghose 26 C 539 (1899), in which it was also held that an appeal would lie at the instance of the auction purchaser. Nemas Chand Kanji v Deyo Nath Kanji, 2 C W N 691 (1899), Bhubun Mohun Pal v Rya Peary Mohun Mukerjee 3 C W N LXXV. (1899), Doyamoni Das v Sarat Chandra Mojumdar, 25 C 175 177 (1897)

(7) Kherodo Sundari Debi v Jnanendra Nath Pal 6 C W N 283 (1901), Hungsha Majidya v Tincour Das Karmakar, 8 C W N 230 (1903) dist. Mohesh Chandra Bagchi v Dwarka Nath Mitra 24 W R 260 (1875) [in which it was held that however fraudulent the conduct of a plaintiff in a suit may be, if the purchaser is not implicated in the fraud the validity of the sale is not affected, but pointing out that the different rule holds good where not only the decree but the auction proceedings are fraudulent]

An application to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud may be made even after the sale has been confirmed (1)

Where a judgment debtor applied to have an execution sale set aside and to fraud on was held to come under sect. 211, something more being alleged than a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale within the meaning of sect. 311 of the last Code (2). But a mere allegation of fraud without any attempt to substantiate it was insufficient (3).

In order, however, to determine whether a case in which fraud is alleged comes within this section or may be made the subject of a separate suit, it is necessary, apart from any other conditions annexed to the section, to ascertain whether it is the decree or the execution proceedings under the decree which are alleged to be fraudulent. Proceedings under this section presuppose the existence of a valid and binding decree (4). The section was held not to apply to a case where the judgment debtor tried to set aside the effect of a decree, but it referred to proceedings in execution based on the decree as if it were perfectly good and valid (5). Under this section the questions to be decided in execution are questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. A question whether the decree itself was obtained by fraud or collusion was held not to be one which relates to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, but which affects its very subsistence and validity (6). The question whether the decree sought to be executed was obtained by fraud

(1) *Wahid un Nissa v. Girdhari*, 27 A 702 (1905), and cases there cited.

(2) *Nemai Chand Kanji v. Dano Nath Kanji*, 2 C W N 601 (1898); *Bhubun Mohun Pal v. Raja Peary Mohun Mookerjee* 3 C W N LXXA (1899). As to these two sections, see judgment of Ghose, J., in *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v. Gopal Mondul* 17 C 769 (1890) in which the learned Judge was of opinion that an application to set aside a sale for fraud was not provided for in the Code either in s. 211 or 311, that the executing Court had, however, inherent power to set aside a sale before confirmation but that after confirmation the Court of execution was *functus officio*, and that the matter could only be dealt with by separate suit. At one time it was not clearly understood that after a decree had been fully

the F. B. case cited. See also *Gulam Ahad Chowdhry v. Judhustir Chandra Saha*, 7 C W N 305 (1902), s. c. 30 C. 142.

(3) *Umskanta Roy v. Dano Nath Sanval*, 28 C 4 (1900).

(4) *Ram Narain Tewari v. Shew Bhujan Roy* 27 C. 197, 200 (1899), the terms valid and binding were here cited with reference to fraud. It has been held that where there was no subsisting decree the matter was yet within s. 211. *Doyamoyi Dasi v. Sarat Chunder Mojmndar*, 25 C. 175 (1897), also when the decree did not warrant a sale at all but provided for satisfaction out of money in Court. *Jagan Nath Gorai v. Watson & Co.* 19 C. 311, 314 (1892), also where it was contended in a mortgage suit that there had been no decree absolute directing the sale. *Siva Pershad Maity v. Nundo Lal Kar Mahapatra*, 18 C. 139 (1890); *Hanhar Kanta v. Rama Panda*, 33 B. 695 (1900).

(5) *Khetra Pal Singh Roy v. Shyama Prosad Barman*, 32 C. 265 (1904).

(6) *Sahindra v. Bhudan*, 9 M. 80, 83 (1885); *Dhanram Mahta v. Luchmeswar Singh*, 23 C. 639, 641 (1896).

as stated in the text that an application lay under s. 211 whether before or after confirmation of the sale, see *Jagan Nath Gorai v. Watson & Co.* 19 C. 311 at p. 314 (1892) and

was thus held not to be within the scope of sect 244 (1) and could only be raised by a separate suit (2) When, therefore, both the decree and in consequence the sale thereunder were impeached on the ground of fraud, the remedy lay by separate suit (3) But, as already stated, if the decree was not impeached for fraud but only the execution proceedings thereunder, the question had to be raised in those proceedings and a separate suit would not lie An objection, therefore, to a sale of property in execution of a decree on the ground of fraud is a question to be determined exclusively under this section, even though the purchaser was no party to the decree

"Court executing the decree"—That is, either the Court which passed the decree or the Court to which the decree has been transferred. The provisions of this section govern the procedure of both such Courts (4) The words must be interpreted to mean the Court executing the decree at the time when the application is made, and they do not include the Court which has executed the decree and has thereby become *functus officio* (5) The section is limited to Courts executing the decree, and therefore an order refusing to stay execution by a Court which is not executing the decree is not appealable (6)

"And not by separate suit"—A separate suit ought not to be instituted unless all questions between the parties or their representatives cannot be decided in the original suit, (7) and all questions which can possibly be determined in the execution proceedings should be so determined (8) The existence, however, of a decree cannot bar a fresh suit between the parties in respect of rights which cannot be worked out without additions to the decree which the Court of execution has no power to make (9)

It has been held that this section does not absolutely bar a suit, but prohibits in a separate suit between the same parties to a decree, any relief being

(1) *Moti Lal Chakerbutty v Russick Chandra Bairagi*, 26 C 326, 328, 332 (1896), *Tallapragada v Boorngapalli*, 28 M 402 (1907), *Debendra Nath Bhattacharjee v Prasanna Kumar Chakravarti*, 5 C L J 328 (1907)

(2) *Sudindra v Bhudan*, 9 M 80, 83 (1885)

(3) *Abdul Mazumdar v Mahomed Cazi Chowdhry*, 21 C 605 (1894) [dist in *Keshab v Durga*, 1 C W N ex], in which the decree had already been set aside but not on the ground of fraud], *Ram Narain Tewari v Shew Bhunjun Roy*, 27 C 197 (1899) [in this case the decree, which was *ex parte*, had already been set aside and not on the ground of fraud, which, however, the plaintiff by his suit desired to go into], *Moti Lal Chakerbutty v Russick Chandra Bairagi*, *supra*, *Sudindra v Bhudan*, *supra*, *Preo Nath Roy v Mohesh Chandra Moitra*, 24 C 546 (1897), *Kedar Nath Mukerjee v Prasanna Kumar Chatterjee*, 5 C W N 559 (1901) See

question of fraud and liability for fraud discussed in *Chitambar v Krishnappa*, 26 B 543, 547 (1902), *Debendra Nath Bhatta charye v Prasanna Kumar Chakravarti*, 5 C L J 328 (1907)

(4) *Ghazidin v Fakir Buksh*, 7 A 73 (1884), *Gudh Bohari Lal v Nageshwar Lal*, 13 A. 278 (1890)

(5) *Fakrudin Mohamed v Official Trustee*, 10 C 538 at p 540 (1884)

(6) *Ramchandra v Balmukund*, 29 B 71 (1904), discussed in *Srinivas v Kesho Prosad* 14 C L J 489 496 (1911)

(7) *Jogemoya Dassi v Thakoman Dassi* 24 C 473 at p 487 (1896) In *Chaudri Ahmad Baksh v Seth Raghubar Dayal*, 28 A 1 (1905) the P. C. held that the suit was not barred.

(8) *Jogemoya Dassi v Thakoman Dassi*, at p 493

(9) *Gopi Narain Khanna v Babu Ban adhar*, 9 C W N 577 (1905)

granted which interferes with the conduct of the execution proceedings of the Court executing a decree (1) In considering whether the scope of any suit comes within the section regard must be had both to the cause of action and the relief claimed Thus the question of an uncertified adjustment may be a matter relating to execution, and no suit is permissible which has as its object to restrain the execution of the decree on this ground, but it may be that a suit would lie for other relief which had as its subject matter such uncertified adjustment (2) Further, this section differs from sect 11 which bars the trial of an issue This section bars a suit brought for the determination of certain questions specified therein, but does not bar the trial of any issue involved in those questions if the issue is raised at the instance of a defendant in a suit brought against him (3) Where the execution proceedings are closed a separate suit will lie as the section is then no longer applicable (4)

“Arising” —It has been said (5) that this word should be read as “directly arising,” otherwise the most remote enquiries would be possible in the execution department Probably, however, it is best not to import words into the section and to determine in each case whether a question does arise which is dealt with by this section

The following considerations establish that for the purposes of this section an objection made by a party to the decree or his representative against whom execution is applied for to the effect that property is held by him by a right or title not rendering it liable to attachment in execution of such decree, is a question arising between the parties The provision formerly in force corresponding to sect 244, namely sect 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, was limited in its operation to questions arising between parties to the suit, and the question arose whether the term “parties” applied to persons who had not been made parties before decree but against whom execution was sought as heirs of the judgment debtor upon his death after decree In the last Code the words “or their representatives” were added and applied to persons against whom or against the property in whose hands, execution was sought, on the ground that they were the heirs of a judgment debtor who has died after decree As regards the kind of questions intended in sect 244 of that Code the matter was fairly clear from the provisions of sect 234 Under that section (now 50) the representative could have been made liable “to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of” So that two kinds of property could be attached First, property of the ancestor found in the hands of the heir, second the property of the heir, from whatever source derived to the extent to which he had wasted the assets that had descended

(1) *Azizan v. Matuk Lal Saha* 21 C. 456 (1893)

(2) *Ib.*, at 456-459

(3) *Bluram Ali Shaik v. Cope Kanth Shaha* 24 C. 355 (1897), *follo. in Nil Kamal Mukerjee v. Jahnabi Chowdhuram* 26 C. 916 (1899)

(4) *Ismail Khan v. the Kumarijauji* 11 M. H. C. R. 304 (1871), *Fakaruddin*

Mohamed v. Official Trustee, 10 C. 538 (1884), *Rash Behary Mondal v. Rakhal Churn Mondal* 1 C. W. N. 708 (1897) See *Haragobind Dass Kothurto v. Isuri Dass* 15 C. 187 at p. 194 (1889), *Girdhari Lal v. Khushali Pam* 31 A. 364 (1909)

(5) *Per Duthet v. Pam Gulam v. Daarka* 1 at 7 A. 170 at 174 (1884)

to him without satisfying the debts of the deceased. Where property is said to be hable to execution in the hands of heirs as assets inherited from their ancestor, in such a case the question that ordinarily arises is whether the property has so descended or not. That is a question in which the parties interested are the judgment creditor on one side and the alleged heir himself on the other. The persons interested would be the same if the property against which execution was sought were the property of the heir himself which it was sought to charge on the ground of his having wasted the inherited assets. The provision in the former sect 234 for taking an account made this plain.

An examination of the decisions led to the same result. The cases fell into two classes. The first class consisted of cases in which a person is originally made a party in a representative capacity, or is subsequently made a party in consequence of the death of an original party before decree. In this case it was clearly settled that such a person was a party to the suit within the meaning of sect 244, and that a question between him and the decree holder, as to whether property had come to him as the representative of the judgment debtor, and so was hable to be taken in execution of the decree against him as such representative, or on the other hand belonged to himself alone and not in such representative character, was one that must be decided in the execution proceedings, and not by suit. The governing authority on the subject was the decision of the Privy Council in *Chowdry Wahed Ali v Jumace*, (1) and it was followed and applied in the sense indicated in several subsequent cases in this country (2). The second class of cases consisted of those in which the representatives had not been made parties to the suit before decree, but in which, in consequence of the death of the judgment debtor after decree, a question arose as to the rights of the decree holder to execute the decree against the representatives or the property said to have descended to them. Under Act XXIII of 1861, it was held, both by the Madras (3) and Calcutta (4) High Courts that representatives proceeded against in execution of a decree against the person they represented were parties to the suit within the meaning of the section corresponding to sect 244 of the last Code. That question no longer arose under the Code of 1882, because in sect 244 of that Code the representatives were expressly mentioned. In both of those cases and in a series of subsequent cases it was held in accordance with the analogy of the other class of decisions already mentioned, that questions arising between a decree holder and the representatives of the judgment debtor as to whether property had come to the representatives as such, and so was hable to be taken in execution, or was their own property derived from any other source, and therefore not so hable must be decided in the execution proceeding and not by suit (5). There were other cases in which

(1) 11 B L R 149 (1872), *Osceemunnissa Khatoon v Amceerunnissa Khatoon*, 20 W R 162 (1873), *Arundadhi Ammyar v Natesha Ayyar*, 5 M 391 (1882).

(2) *Nimba Harishet v Sitaram Laraji* 9 B 459 (1885).

(3) *Buddu Ramaiya v Venkaiya*, 3 M H C I 103 (1866).

(4) *Amceerunnissa Khatoon v Mozuffer Hossein Chowdhry*, 12 B L R 65 (1873).

(5) *Kuriyali v Mayan*, 7 M 255 (1883), *Ram Ghulam v Hazaro Kuar*, 7 A 547 (1885), *Sita Ram v Bhagwan Das*, 7 A 733 (1885).

the decisions turned upon considerations which did not apply to the case mentioned. They were cases in which it was held that a claim either by the judgment debtor or by his representatives to property attached in execution made not in his own right but as a trustee (1) did not fall within sect 244 of the last Code (2)

Two propositions were then established under the previous case law firstly, that where in execution of a decree for a debt due by a deceased person, property in the hands of his representative was attached a claim by the representative to have the property released on the ground that it was his own private property fell not within sect 278 of the last Code but within the section corresponding to this (3). Secondly, however, if the judgment debtor objected to attachment not on the ground that the property was his private property but set up a *jus tertii*, namely, the right of third parties not before the Court as parties to the suit or their representatives then the matter fell within sect 278 of the last Code and not this section (4). Thus where the judgment debtor alleged that he was in possession only as *shebait* of a deity to whom the property had been dedicated, it was held that the case fell within sect 278 read with sect 280 of the last Code, and not within sect 244 of that Code, now represented by this section (5).

Questions arising between whom—Questions may possibly arise between a party on one side and a party on the other side or between a party on one side and the representative (i.e. heir, executor, administrator or transferee within the meaning of the term hereafter stated) of a party on the other side, or between representatives on both sides, or between a party or his representative

(1) *Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar*, 2 A 752 (1880), *Nath Mal Das v. Tajammul Husain* 7 A 36 (1885). The case of *Bahori Lal v. Gauri Sahai* 8 A 626 (1886) in which the facts were very peculiar, was decided by one at least of the Judges before whom it came on the ground that it fell within the same principle, *vide post*.

(2) *Rajrup Singh v. Ramgolam Poy*, 16 C 1 (1888).

(3) *Ib.*, *Punchanun Bandopadhyay v. Rabia Bibi* 17 C 711 (1890) F B, *Seth Chand Mal v. Durga Dei*, 12 A 313 (1889) [*foli. Kali Charan v. Jewat Dubey*, 24 A 51 (1905)], *Mungeshwar Kuar v. Jarnoon Prashad* 15 C 603 (1889), *Beni Prasad Kunwar v. Lukhwa Kunwar*, 21 A 323 (1899), *Vengapayyan v. Mahalinga Bhat*, 26 M 501 (1902) [question raised as to whether improvements attached in execution were property of deceased judgment-debtor or of his representatives in their own right].

(4) *Shankar Dial v. Amir*, 2 A 752 (1880) [objection by judgment-debtor that he held on account of an endowment], *Nath Mal*

Das v. Tajammul Husain 7 A 36 (1885) [objection by same that he was in possession as *Mutwalli*], *Roop Lal Dass v. Bekani Meah* 15 C 437 (1888) [same] *foli. in Mungeya v. Hayat Sahib*, 23 B 237 (1893), *Bhajahari Pasi v. Ram Lal Das*, 6 C W N 62 (1901) [objection that property *debutur*], *Ramanathan Chettiar v. Levvai Marakayar*, 23 M 195 (1898) F B [claim to hold as trustee where it was held that the claims of third parties whether put forward by themselves or by a party to the suit must be dealt with under ss 278 283 and not under s 244 of the last Code]. The decision in *Bag Paj Marwari v. Kundali Debya*, 8 C W N 353 (1902) and a dictum in *Upendra Bhatta v. Ranganatha Bhatta* 17 M 399 at p 400 (1893) appear to be against this view. In *Rani Indomati v. Jageshar*, 28 A 614 (1906), it was held that there was nothing to compel an objection under s 278, *Badrudeen v. Abdul Rahim*, 31 M 125 (1905).

(5) *Kartick v. Ashutosh* 33 C 298 (1911), 16 C W N 26, F B *Cf. Jogendra v. Colinda*, 3 C 361 (1905).

on one side and the auction purchaser or his representative on the other. It has been held that the section does not cover a question between a party to a suit and his representative (1)

Parties—This means parties to the suit and on the record (2). It means parties who have properly been made parties in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Thus where a Mahomedan infant was represented by his father's brother (who has disqualified because his interest was adverse) it was held that the minor had never been a party (3). Where a decree is passed against one who represents others, all persons whom he represents are parties, as in the case of *1 karnatan* and members of the *tarwad* (4). If the question arises between parties the section cannot be evaded by adding an unnecessary party to the suit (5). A decree-holder does not cease to be a party by becoming a purchaser (6). In a suit for partition a compromise was entered into by all the parties except S and a decree obtained in the terms thereof. In execution S was dispossessed, and presented a petition to the Court objecting that the decree was not binding on her. It was held that she was a party and entitled to appeal (7). Defendants not joining in compromise on which decree was passed were held not to be judgment-debtors (8). It was held that where a decree or purchase was made *benami* sect 244 did not apply, it being said that it was not necessary to apply that section on the footing that the persons really interested were parties (9). But this case, in so far as it held that the matter did not come within the section as far as the auction purchaser was concerned, must be taken to have been overruled by the Privy Council (10). It was held that the Collector, and, in proceedings relating to the enforcement of an order under sect 412 of

(1) *Magan Lal Mulji v Doshi Mulji*, 25 B. 631, 635 (1901)

(2) See *Dutto v Gonesh*, 5 Bom. L. R. 952 (1903), in which the section was held inapplicable as the plaintiff was not a party to the previous suit. In *Bishen Dyal Singh v Sagar Singh*, 2 C. W. N. 311 (1896), a person obstructing the decree holder at the instigation of the judgment debtor was held not a party. *Ameer Ali, J., dubit*. And so in *Sankaralinga Reddi v Kandasami Teran*, 17 M. L. J. 334 (1907), it was held that the section was not applicable where the person violating the rights of the attaching decree holder was not a party to the original suit, and consequently a suit for damages will lie against him.

(3) *Rashid un Nisa v Muhammad Isma Khan*, 36 I. A. 168, 175 (1909), s. c., 13 C. W. N. 1182, *Narsingh v Jehri*, 15 C. L. J. 3 (1911), *Purno Chandra v Bejoy Chand*, 18 C. L. J. 18 (1913), *Kunwar Partab Singh v Bhabuti Singh*, 18 C. L. J. 384 (1913)

(4) *Marivittil v Pathram*, 30 M. 215 (1906), and consequently an objection to attachment was held to fall under s. 278, *Mathu v Paramaswaran*, 17 M. L. J. 377 (1906)

(5) *Kristo Mohun v Dossce v Kalprosonno Ghose*, 8 C. 402 (1881), and see *Nowrojee Nusservanjee v Bapuji Dossabhai*, 5 Bom. L. R. 1036 (1903)

(6) *Muttin v Appasami*, 13 M. 501, 507 (1890), *Kasinatha Ayyar v Uthumansa Rowthan*, 25 M. 529, 532 (1901), *Sadashiv v Narayan*, 35 B. 402 (1911), dissenting from *Bhagwati v Banwari*, 31 A. 83, F. B. (1903)

(7) *Sankaravadiammal v Kumaramya*, 8 M. 473 (1885)

(8) *Jathavedan v Kunchu*, 30 M. 72 (1906)

(9) *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v Gopal Mondal*, 17 C. 769, 777 (1890)

(10) *Bhubun Mohun Pal v Nundo Lal Dey*, 26 C. 321 (1899)

the said Code against a next friend the latter was not a party (1). If the rights of parties are transferred before decree and if the transferee is made a party to the suit before decree then he comes within the words 'parties to the suit' (2). A person who is sued in one suit in his personal capacity is in law a different person when suing in a subsequent suit in the capacity of *shebast* or trustee (3). In a recent case it was held that where a judgment debtor claimed property not in his personal capacity but as a *mutwalli* who was not a party to the suit, the case did not come under this section (4).

The words "*parties to the suit*" are not now limited to judgment creditors and judgment debtors (5). The case of rival decree-holders has been held not to be within the section (6) nor a third party objecting to the sale of attached property, (7) nor is a person who becomes a surety for the appearance of a party himself a party to the suit (8). In an order made under an application under O XXXIII r 12 for payment under O XXXIII r 10 or 11, Government is deemed to be a party to the suit and such an order is therefore under this section and appealable (9).

The Official Assignee is the representative of an insolvent debtor within the meaning of this section (10). A Court has no jurisdiction in execution to reopen the question as to whether certain persons brought on the record as representatives of the deceased plaintiff and as such made respondents in an appeal, had been properly joined as parties to the suit (11).

"Representative"—This refers to all persons by or against whom the decree may be executed (see as to this notes to sect 36, *ante*). The term used is not 'legal representative' but "*representative*" The former term means

(1) Collector of Trichinopoly v Suarama Krishna, 23 M. 73 (1899) (no appeal). Similarly as regards Collectors see Collector of Pathanamatti v B. B. 590 (1882) [no appeal]. Collectors seeking Court Fees under sect 412 of Code of 1877. Collector of Kanara v Hedge, 15 P. 77 (1890) [same revision] *contra* Janki v Collector of Allahabad 9 A. 64 (1886), Secretary of State v Bhagwanti Lal, 13 A. 326 (1891).

(2) Kameshwar Pershad v Pura Bahadur Singh, 12 C. 453 463 (1886).

(3) Ram Krishna Mahapatra v Mohunt Padma Charan 6 C. W. N. 663 (1902).

(4) Kali Prasanna Ghose v Gulam Rahman 17 C. W. N. 221 (1913), Kartick Chandra v Ashutosh Dhara 16 C. W. N. 25.

(5) Ramaswami Sastrulu v Kameswaramma 23 M. 361 at p. 365 (1899).

(6) Hari Chunder v Harman, 11 C. W. N. 433 (1900), Afzal-un-Nissa Begum v Parbutty Koonwar, 2 W. R. Misc. 41 (1865) [dispute in respect of proceeds of property sold: no appeal], Mierce Kowur v Lakh Singh March 52ⁿ (1864) [dispute as to debt: no

of assets] Deen Dyal Sahoo v Radha Muddan, 9 W. R. 223, 227 (1868), Sanjivi v Ramasami 8 M. 494 (1883) [incompetency of Execution Court], see Lakshmi Ammah v Ponnassa Menon 17 M. 394 (1883) [no contest between the decree holders, order under sect 231 of last Code is one relating to execution and appealable].

(7) Luckmeeput Singh v Lekraj Poy, 2 W. R. Misc. 56 (1866), see Raghu Nath Das v Badri Prasad, 6 A. 21 (1883), Sevu v Mutiasami 10 M. 53 54 (1886).

(8) Skooram Agurwallah v Komolokant D-v, 2 W. R. 6 (1865), as to surety's right of appeal see Sheikh Suleman v Shurram Bhikaji 12 B. 71 (1887), Ghoree Lal Jha v Sheo Narain Singh, 8 W. R. 21 (1867).

(9) Secretary of State v Narayan, 35 I. 448, 450 (1911).

(10) Miller v Lakhmani Debi, 25 C. 419 (1901), a.c., 5 C. W. N. 761, *contra* Kashi Prasad v Miller, 7 A. 752 (1883).

(11) Venkataswala Reddi v Venkataswami Reddi, 20 M. 665 (1901).

an heir, devisee, executor, or administrator of a party, or more strictly the last two persons only (1) But a person it was held might be representative within the meaning of this section who is not a legal representative in the sense stated (2) The Courts in India did not confine the term to its primary meaning of executor or administrator, but have included heirs, executors before probate, persons in possession of property of the deceased (3) and persons taking joint property by survivorship (4) A further extension was given to the term so as to include representatives in interest such as assignees from a mortgagor of mortgaged property in proceedings for the execution of a decree against the mortgagor for sale of the mortgaged property (5) It was held in an early case (6) under the Code of 1882 that the word "representative" meant only persons who succeeded to the rights of any of the parties to the suit after the decree was passed In this case it was held that Run Bahadur was (a) not a legal representative as he inherited not from Ranee Asmedh Koer but from her husband, (7) (b) that he was not a representative under sect 244 because the transfer to him was not after decree, (c) that he was not a party as the suit was dismissed as against him This latter ground would not now be sustainable by reason of the Explanation As regards the second ground, it is to be observed that the *Ekrarnama* referred to was not merely before decree but before the suit It is, however, incorrect now to say that only those who take the interests of parties after decree are representatives A person who is a transferee within the meaning of the cases cited is equally such whether the transfer took place pending the suit before decree or after decree (8) There is no distinction between the position of legal representatives added to the suit before and those added after decree (9) A person attaching decree is representative of decree-holder (10)

For the purposes of this section, the word "representative" when used in relation to a party includes the transferee of any interest who so far

(1) *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v Beni Madhab Sirkar*, 24 C 62, 71 (1896), distinguished in *Kali v Misrijan*, 15 C W N 711 (1911), *Badri Narain v Kishen Das* 16 A 483 487 (1894), in *Famandro Deb Raikut v Ram Jugudishwar*, 14 C 316 (1886), F B, the heir was held not to be the legal representative of the executors on the will being set aside

(2) *Madho Das v I amji Patak*, 16 A 286 at p 291 (1894)

(3) *Badri Narain v Kishen Das supra*

(4) *Peary Lal Sinha v Chandu Charan Sinha*, 11 C W N 163 (1900)

(5) *Badri Narain v Kishen Das supra*

(6) *Kameshwar Pershad v Pun Bahadur Singh*, 12 C 458 (1886) In this case as in *I ashbehary Mookhopadya v Moharani Surnomoyee*, 7 C 403 (1881) the assignment was before suit

(7) See as to this notes to sect 50

(8) See *Sheo Narain v Channu Lal*, 22 A 243, 246 (1900) and notes, *post* In *Purna nanddas v Vallabdas*, 11 B 506 (1887) *Ramchandra Kolathar v Mahadaji Kolathar*, 9 B 141 (1891) [diss from in *Behari Lal v Ganpat Rai*, 10 A 1 (1897)] the assignments were pending suit, and see also *Azgar Ali v Asaboddin Kazi*, 9 C W N 134 (1901), *Gopi Nath Chattopadhyay v Sajani Kanta Singh*, 10 C W N 210 (1905)

(9) *Seth Chand Mal v Durga Dei*, 12 A 313 (1889), *Shivram v Sukharam* 33 I 33 (1909)

(10) *Peary Mohun Chowdhry v I omesh Chunder Nundy* 15 C 371 (1888), *Sah Man Mall v Kanagasabapathi* 16 M 20 (1893), *Krishnan v Venkatapathi*, 29 M 318 (1900)

as such interest is concerned is bound by the decree (1) The following have been held to be such transferees— an execution purchaser of the judgment-debtor's interest provided that he is affected by the decree such as the purchaser at an auction sale of the equity of redemption in mortgaged premises, (2) a lessee of the judgment debtor of attached property (3) a mortgagee of the judgment debtor, (4) a second mortgagee taking his mortgage during the pendency of a suit on the first mortgage, (5) any person who at the time of the execution of a decree is a transferee of the same within the meaning of sect. 232 of the last Code (now O XXI r 16), the term "representative" in the former section being held to include both subsequent transferees as well as those who purchased directly from the person who obtained the decree (6) the purchaser of plaintiff's interest in property in suit, (7) the purchaser of property which was at the time of the purchase under attachment in execution of the decree, (8) the assignee of decree of Appellate Court (9) The transferee must, however, be bound by the decree, and on this ground the purchaser of the interest of a tenure from the judgment debtor was held

(1) Ishan Chunder Sirkar v Benimadhub Sirkar, 24 C 62 (1893) [competency of Execution Court] followed in Umeskanda v Mahandra 14 C L J 337 (1911), Ganga Das Seal v Yakub Ali Dobashi, 27 C 670 (1893) [order appealable], Dwar Buxah Sirkar v Fatik Jali, 26 C 250 (1893) [competency of Execution Court], Badri Narain v Jadhushen Das, 16 A 483 (1891) [order appealable] Mathewson v Gobardhan Tribedi, 28 C 492 (1900) [suit barred], Paramananda Das v Mahabur Dossaj, 20 M 378 (1896), Munakshi Achi v Chinnappa Udayan, 24 M 689, 692 (1901) [competency of Execution Court], Sheo Narain v Chunnal Lal 22 A 213 (1900) [suit barred], Kasinatha Ayyar v Uthumana Rauthan, 25 M 529 (1901) [order appealable] See cases cited in Gulzari Lal v Madho Ram, 26 A 447 (1904) Madho Das v Ramji Patak, 16 A 286, 291 (1894), distinguishing case of simple money decree [in which case suit maintainable] See as to this case, Gur Prasad v Ram Lal, 21 A 20 (1898) a purchaser pendente lite is as much bound as a purchaser after decree, Sheo Narain v Chunnal Lal 22 A 213 at p 216 (1900), Radha Kishun Marwari v Hem Chandra Bose, 11 C W N 495 (1907), Pearl Lal Singh v Chandhi Charan Singh, 5 C L J 80 (1906), s c, 11 C W N 164 As to transferees of partial interests see Pasupathy v Kothanda, 23 M 64 (1901), Haradhan v Ciroh, 13 C W N 98 (1908)

(2) Ishan Chunder Sirkar v Benimadhub Sirkar, 24 C 62 (1893)

Swaram v Somasunlara 28 M 110 (1901)
(3) Mathewson v Gobardhan Tribedi, 28 C 492, s c, 5 C W N 654 (1900)

(4) Paramananda Das v Mahabur Dossaj, 20 M 378 (1896)

(5) Sheo Narain v Chunnal Lal 22 A 213 (1900) [suit barred], and Vendee of Mortgage, Janki Prasad v Ullat Ali, 16 A 284 (1891), and see Tara Prasanna Bose v Nilmoni Khan, 41 C 118 (1913) distinguishing Kommineni Appaya v Mangala Rangayya, 31 M 419 (1908)

(6) Ganga Das Seal v Yakub Ali Dobashi, 27 C 670 (1893), Dwar Buxah Sirkar v Fatik Jali, 26 C 250 (1893), Badri Narain v Jadhushen Das, 16 A 483 (1891)

(7) Monakshi Achi v Chinnappa Udayan, 24 M 689, 692 (1901); the report says, "plaintiff's interest sold etc.", judgment debtor The plaintiff was seeking to attach the property, and the petitioner was claiming that it was subject to attachment The report does not state by whom the property was sold Gulzari Lal v Madho Ram, 26 A 447, at p 453 (1904)

(8) Gur Prasad v Ram Lal 21 A 20 (1898); foil. Lalji Mal v Nani Kashore, 19 A 332 (1896), Kujipana v Humara, 31 M 150 (1910)

(9) And claiming restitution Jamini Nath Roy v Dharma Das Sur, 28 C 857 (1900)

not to be a representative of the judgment-debtor (1) Where property was purchased subject to an attachment, but the decree under which the attachment was levied was subsequently set aside, it was held that the purchaser was not the representative of the judgment debtor within the meaning of sect 244 of the last Code (2) A person who has purchased a *putni* holding at a sale in execution of a money decree, but has not had his name registered in the landlord's register, is bound by a subsequent decree for arrears of rent obtained by the landlord against the registered *putnidar* and by the sale in execution of that decree, and is therefore a "representative" within the meaning of the section; (3) as is also a person to whom a transferable occupancy holding was mortgaged before its sale in execution of a rent decree, (4) as is also (where the landlord of an occupancy-holding obtains a decree for rent against his recorded tenant) an unregistered transferee of the tenant into whose hands a portion of the holding had previously passed, (5) and a mortgagee from the judgment debtor after attachment (6)

Auction purchaser—A distinction must be kept between the case of an auction-purchaser who, purchasing property affected by the decree, such as the purchase of the equity of the redemption in a mortgage suit, is a representative of the party whose interest is so purchased, within the meaning of the cases cited in the last paragraph and other cases, such as the auction-purchaser in execution of a simple money decree. The position of the latter was the subject of some conflict of opinion under the preceding Code. It was in some cases held that such an auction-purchaser was not a party nor the representative of a party to the suit (7) On the other hand it was held

(1) *Kalu Saha v Bhagabati Debi*, 6 C W N 127 (1901) *See qu* whether it made any difference that the purchase was prior to decree. See also *Ram Narain v Dwarka Nath Khettry*, 27 C 264 (1899) where distinguishing sales by sheriff from sales by the Registrar of the H. C., the Court pointed out that the purchase was not of an interest affected by the decree, and further the applicant did not represent the judgment debtor because their interests were adverse.

(2) *Ghafur ud din v Hamid Husain*, 32 A 129 (1909) For right of possession of purchaser at a *putni* sale, see *Srimati Krishna Promoda Dassi v Dwarka Nath Sen*, 17 C W N 1002 (1913)

(3) *Surendra Narain Singh v Gopi Sundari Dasi*, 32 C 1031 (1905)

(4) *Sm Nissa Bibi v Radha Kishore*, 11 C W N 312 (1906)

(5) *Gopi Nath Chattopadhyaya v Sajani Kanta Singh*, 10 C W N 240 (1905), *Azgar Ali v Asabodin Kazi*, 9 C W N 134 (1901)

(6) *Narasanyawmu v Dushippariyer*, 17 M L J 321 (1907)

(7) *Vishvanath Chardu Naik v Subraya Shivappa*, 15 B 290 (1890), *Hira Lal Chatterji v Gourmoni Debi*, 13 C 326 (1886), *Shivram Chintaman v Jiva*, 13 B 34, 37 (1888), *Gour Sundar Lahiri v Hem Chander Chowdhury*, 16 C 355, 360 (1889), *Sabhajit v Sri Gopal*, 17 A 222, 224 (1894) [otherwise if he was a transferee within the meaning of] sect 232 (now 122). See, however, *contra*, *Gulzar Mal v Madho Ram*, 26 A 447 (1904)], distinguished in *Wilayat Begam v Nand Kishore*, 30 A 231 (1908), *Mahabir Prasad v Partab Chand*, 22 A 450, 451 (1900) [in this case the parties to the suit were parties to the proceedings, added to them was the purchaser, not as a representative of one of the parties, but as a looker on interested in the result], *Gobardhan Rai v Bishan Prasad*, 23 A 116, 117 (1900) [distinguishing between private sale and Court sale]. In *Magan Lal v Doshi Mulji*, 25 B 631, 635 (1901), it was said that the auction purchaser was certainly not the representative of the decree holder, and it was doubtful whether he was a representative of the judgment debtor. In *Narain Achary*

that when a question arose within this section the fact that the purchaser who was no party to the suit was interested in the result was no bar to the application of the section (1). This decision of the Privy Council was sometimes understood as living down that the auction purchaser was a party or a representative. But this was not so, all that was held was that his interest in the result did not prevent the question being one between the parties (2). It was also held that the provisions of sect. 211 prohibited a suit by a party or his representative against an auction purchaser the object of which was to determine a question which properly arose between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution of the decree (3).

An auction purchaser therefore (other than one coming within the meaning of the cases cited in the last paragraph) is not a party or a representative of a party.

The purchaser of an undivided share must sue for partition by separate suit (4). An unrecorded co-sharer in a tenancy is not a representative in interest of the recorded tenant within the meaning of this section (5).

Sub section (2)—This is a very just provision intended to remedy mere technical defects. Where a suit is instituted in the same Court as has jurisdiction to execute the decree, the fact that the question has been made the subject of a separate suit in that Court instead of being determined by an order under this section is not a matter affecting jurisdiction but of procedure only (6) and an objection on this account has been held not to be ground of appeal (7). The

Chowdhry v Gregory, 8 W R 394 (1867), *Mahabir Singh v Ram Bhagwan Chowbay* 11 C 150 (1884) the sale appears to have been under another decree than that under which the question arose. In *Anand v Ajudhia* 30 A 379 (1908) it was held that an auction purchaser is the representative of the judgment debtor, not of the decree holder (see *Bhagwati v Banwari*, 31 A 82 (1908)). In *Mahadeo v Darsan*, 51 C W N 542 (1911) it was held that an auction purchaser who sets up an antagonistic title is not a representative of the judgment debtor.

(1) *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v Bahadur*

1902 B C 1002

1902 B C 1002

1902 B C 1002

1902 B C 1002

1902 B C 1002

Odayan v Rajagopala Pillai, 30 M 507, 503 (1907) the proposition appears to be laid down in such general terms. This case was disented from in *Na lamuni v Veerabhadra*, 31 M 507 (1910). See also *Narayan v*

Unbar, 35 P 275 (1911), and *Krishna Satapathi v Saravathu*, 31 M 177 (1908).

(3) *Balsi Ram v Fattu*, 8 A 146 (1886) F B, *Dhani Ram v Chaturbhuj*, 22 A 86 (1899), *Daulat Singh v Jugal Kishore*, 22 A 103 (1899), *Surendra Mohini v Amarash Chandra*, 39 C 637 (1912).

(4) *Yelumalai v Srinivasa*, 29 M 294 (1906).

(5) *Joytara v Pran Krishna*, 13 C L J 257 (1910), 15 C W N 512.

(6) *Purmessure Pershad v Jankee Koer*, 19 W R 90 (1873), *Azizuddin Hossein v Ramanugra Roy*, 14 C 603 (1882), *Buru Mahata v Shyama Churn Khawas*, 23 C 483 (1895), *Ram Saran Pande v Janki Pande*, 18 A 106, 107 (1895), cf. as to distinction between competency and irregularity in execution proceedings, *Vishnu Sakharani v Krishnarao Malhar*, 11 B 153 (1886), *Kethi Ram v Kelappan*, 12 M 228 (1887).

(7) *Purmessure Pershad v Jankee Koer*, *supra*, *Azizuddin Hossein v Ramanugra Roy*, *supra*, see also *Khodai Bur v Sal*, 14 C L J 620 (1910).

Court has therefore considered and treated a plaint under the circumstances stated as an application in execution (1) The Legislature has now sanctioned this practice both as regards suits which should have been applications, as also in the converse case

Where an appeal was erroneously presented to the High Court as a first appeal from an order it refused to convert it into a first appeal from a decree under this section in the old Code read with sect 2 of that Code (2) Where a suit was barred under the provisions of this section but the order of the Court executing the decree was erroneous, the High Court suggested that the latter Court should review its order (3)

Sub section (3) — This sub section corresponds, with amendments, with the last clause of sect 244 of the Code of 1882, which was added to that Code by Act VII of 1888 The Court executing a decree can go into the disputed question of the transfer of the decree (4) Indeed, the question whether a person is a representative must be decided under this section and not by separate suit (5) The sub section refers to a case where there is a dispute between two or more persons as to which of these is the representative of a person who had been a party to the suit It does not include a case in which there could be no representative as there was no party to be represented (6) Nor can an application by the assignee of an auction purchaser to be placed on the record be dealt with under this section, as the expression "*representative*" does not mean the representative of a party to the execution proceedings, but of a party to the suit (7) It was held by the Madras High Court that the amendment noted did not take away the right of suit at the instance of an assignee of a decree for a declaration as to the validity of his assignment, it being said to be unreasonable to construe the phrase "*and not by a separate suit*" as applicable to the question referred to in the amendment (8) The sub section has been amended so as to make it compulsory on the Court to determine the question of representation See *ante*, "History and scope of section"

(1) *Azizuddin Hossain v Ramanujra Roy*, 14 C 605 (1882) at p 609, *Bera Mahata v Shyama Churn Khawas* 22 C 483 (1895), *Jhannan Lal v Kewal Ram*, 22 A 121 (1899), *Lalman Das v Jagan Nath Singh*, 22 A 376 (1900) [the Court refused to interfere in second appeal as the lower Court had not been asked to do so], *Mayan Pathuti v Pakuran*, 22 M 347, 349 (1894) *Jotindra Mohan Tagore v Mahomed Basir Chowdhry*, 32 C 332, 335 (1904), *Pasupathy Ayyar v Kothanli Rama Ayyar* 23 M 64 (1904), see *Nowrojee v Bapuji*, 5 Bom L R 1036 1041 (1903) the Court refused to do so as it would not be the proper Court to execute the decree, and similarly in *Gur Prasad v Ram Lal*, 21 A 20, at p 22 (1898) In *Elcodihal Sattu v Bhawan* 29 A 349

(1907) it was held that the Court should have done so

(2) *Kedar Nath v Lalji Sahai* 12 A 61 (1889)

(3) *Mohibullah v Imami* 9 A 229 231 (1887)

(4) *Dwar Bakh Sircar v Fatih Jali*, 26 C 250 253 (1898)

(5) *Beni Prasad Kunwar v Lukhha Kunwar*, 21 A 323 (1899), in however, *Vakulabharana v Rangayan Chetty*, 28 M 357 (1905) it was held not to be obligatory on the Court to proceed under this section where the right to apply was already *sub judice*

(6) *Beni Prasad Kunwar v Mukhtesar Rao*, 21 A 316, at pp 319, 320 (1899)

(7) *Sree Nath Ghose v Rama Nath Santra* 3 C W N 276 (1898)

(8) *Bommanapati Veerappa v Chinta Kunta Srinivasa* 26 M 264 (1902)

An appeal lies even in a case in which the question is not between the parties to the suit or their representatives but only between the decree holder and a person claiming as his assignee (1). The effect of this sub section is to give the right of appeal against an order determining whether a party applying for execution is or is not the representative of the decree holder (2).

A Judge who stayed execution proceedings pending a suit in which an issue had been raised as to the validity of a will under which the applicant for execution claimed, was held entitled to act upon his determination of that issue in the execution proceedings (3).

The Code contains no provisions under which a representative of a deceased decree holder can have his name entered on the record when nothing remains to be done under the decree beyond its execution nor is there any necessity for any such entry as proceedings in execution do not abate on the judgment creditor's death and his representatives are entitled to continue them (4).

Explanation—This Explanation has been added to remove a conflict of decisions under the last Code. It was held by the Calcutta (5) and Allahabad (6) High Courts that persons who were exempted from the operation of a decree, by the dismissal, as respects them of the suit, were thenceforth strangers and not parties to the suit and therefore no longer subject to the section. It was considered that as between the party exonerated and the decree holder, no question relating to execution could arise, because as against him there was no decree to be executed. The Madras (7) and Bombay (8) High Courts, however, held on the contrary that a person was a party to an action although he might have ceased to have any connection with the suit before the decree was passed and would still come under that clause. The Legislature by this Explanation has now adopted the latter view.

(1) *Bornmanapati Veerappa v Chinta Kunta Srinivasa*, 26 M 264 (1902).

(2) *Krishnama Charar v Appasami Mudaliar*, 25 M 545 (1901), and see *Ganga Das Seal v Yakub Ali Dobashi*, 27 C 670 (1899).

(3) *Bhawanishanker v Naranshanker*, 1 Bom L R 36, s c, 23 Bom 536 (1899).

(4) *Jeshankar Mancharam v Pondya Fulia*, 2 Bom L R 887 (1900).

(5) *Ram Pershad v Jagannath Ram*, 30 C 131, s c, 6 C W N 10 (1902). *Rahimuddin Sirkar v Loll Meah* 29 C 696, s c, 6 C W N 726 (1902). *Kameshwar Pershad v Run Bahadur Singh* 12 C 453 (1896). *Gour Kishore Chowdhry v Mahomed Hossein* 10 W R 191 (1868) but when an intervenor had been made a defendant and exempted from the operation of the decree, but directed by the Appellate Court to pay costs he was held to be a party to the suit. *Mureo Kishore v Kalee Kishore*, 8 W R 114 (1867).

(6) *Jangi Nath v Phundo* 11 A 74 (1893). *Mukorrah Huvai v Hurmat un nissa*, 18 A 62 (1895). *Kalka Prasad v Basant Ram*, 23 A 316 (1901) [party against whom no decree passed] followed in *Sheo Pargash v Nawab Singh* (1910) 32 A 321.

(7) *Ramaswami Sastrula v Kameswarama*, 23 M 361 (1899) [dissenting from *Naga Mutha v Kameswarama* 15 M 226 (1891), foll in *Vavudera Upadhyaya v Tiriharam*, 19 M 331 (1893), where the part of the decree which was being executed was not against the person in question]. *Sankaradivammal v Kumara Samya* 8 M 473 (1895). *contra*, *Gadecherla v Gadecherla* 21 M 45 (1897), though it was held that a person against whom the plaintiff had abandoned the claim, not being able to serve him with notice was not a party to the suit. *Venkatapathi Naidu v Subraya Mudali*, 17 M L J 416 (1907).

(8) *Gouri v Yigueswar*, 17 B 49 (1892) [party to suit though not to appeal].

Appeal—The object of the section being that the Court having the parties (and other persons interested) before it, should decide all questions relating to execution arising between them, in place of allowing one or the other of them to put his adversary to the delay and cost of a separate suit in cases in which, but for this section, it might be possible for him to do so, in order to effect this object completely, without injustice to the parties, an order under this section has been included within the definition of decree in sect 2 of the Code (1)

In order to determine whether an appeal lies, it must be first ascertained whether the case is one which falls within the section. In the first place, the order complained of must be one made by a Court executing a decree (2). If so, the question determined by it must be one relating to execution. If it is not then unless an appeal is elsewhere expressly given, there is none (3). In the first place, there is a distinction between acts done in pursuance of a decree and acts done in execution of it. So an order passed in a suit for partition subsequent to the decree appointing a commission to make the partition is not an order in execution (4).

There is no appeal from an order not relating to the enforcement of a decree, such as an order of a Judge confirming the report of the commissioner for taking accounts refusing to require the defendants to give inspection of certain books for such an order is not within the contemplation of the section (5). Nor is an order appealable which is a mere ministerial act, such as a direction to a subordinate officer to receive money, there being no question in controversy finally determined (6). There is no appeal if the matter is one indirectly and remotely relating to the execution of the decree (7). But though the property may not be the subject of the decree if it has been interfered with in execution the matter relates to execution (8). Where an order absolute for sale or foreclosure of mortgaged property has been made, any question that arises as to that order has been held not to relate to execution of the decree (9). Nor is there an appeal against an order made when no question arises in execution of decree, the decree

(1) *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v Gopal Mondal*, 17 C 769 773 (1890) As to orders under the Agra Tenancy Act see *Kharag Singh v Pola Ram* 27 A 31 (1904) overruled in *Zohhra v Mangu Lal*, 28 A 723 (1906)

(2) *Ramchandra v Balmukund G Bom* 1, R 780 (1904)

(3) *Nihal Chand v Chutto Lal*, 9 C 214 (1882)

(4) *Jogodishury v Karilash Chandra* 24 C 725 F B (1897)

(5) *Rustomji Burjorji v Keesowji*, 8 B 287 (1884)

(6) *Hulas Rai v Parthi Singh*, 9 A 500 (1887), as to the distinction between administrative and judicial proceedings, see *Sivagami Achi v Sibrabmanu*, 27 M 259 (1903)

(7) *Raja Pudmanund Singh Bahadoor v Doorga Pershad Doobey* 4 C W N 39 (1899) [execution case dismissed for non payment of process fee]

(8) *Appa Rao v Venkataramanayamma* 23 M 55 (1899)

(9) *Alakunnissa Bibee v Rooplal Das* 25 C 133 (1897) [objection by the representative that she was entitled to a share in the mortgaged property. Separate suit lies to determine the question] *Tarapado Ghose v Kamini Dassee*, 20 C 644 (1901) [objection that no notice was given before order absolute for foreclosure was made], *Hatini Ali Khunhar v Abdul Gaffar Khan* 8 C W N 102 (1903) [adjustment of decree payment before decree absolute]

having been already executed (1) A question whether the decree itself is executory is not one relating to execution (2) Further, the question must be between the parties or representatives (3) and not between a party and his representative (4) or between co-decree holders (5) See notes on the terms "Representatives" and "Auction Purchaser," *ante*. App. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

(1) *Rajha Roy v. Ramkumar Parshad*, 26 C. 529, A. C. 3 C. W. N. 374 (1899) [amending a sale-certificate to correct boundaries]; *Saddo Kunwar v. Bansī Dhar*, 23 A. 476 (1901) [order refusing to amend a sale certificate]; *Bhimlal Das v. Mt. Ganesha Koer*, 1 C. W. N. 658 (1897)

(2) *Arunachallam v. Murugappa*, 12 M. 503 (1899) [decree impeached on the ground that though the minor's guardian consented, sanction of the Court had not been obtained], and see notes to Explanation IV

(3) *Saddo Kunwar v. Bansī Dhar*, 23 A. 476 (1901); *Rashbehary Mookerjee v. Maharanī Surnomoyee*, 7 C. 403 (1881) [applicants, assignees from judgment debtors before rent-decree, which was being executed], *Mammoth v. Locke*, 20 M. 487 (1897) [dispute between judgment debtor and purchaser only] as regards auction purchaser, see now clause (6), *Ishri Dutt v. Mewalal*, 26 A. 136 (1903) [order refusing to entertain the objection of the mortgagor, judgment debtor to the sale of the mortgage decree in execution of a money-decree against the mortgagee]; *Ramathar v. Narain Das*, 24 A. 519 (1903) [order disallowing an objection by the judgment debtor that more had been delivered to the auction purchaser than was included in the sale-certificate] *Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prosad*, 18 A. 36 (1897) [order directing delivery of possession under ss. 318 or 319 of the last C. P. Code to an

auction purchaser]; *as for the sale of the property of the auction purchaser, see notes to clause (6) of the last C. P. Code*; *Bansī Dhar*, 23 A. 476 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *Appal Bhima Das v. Mt. Ganesha Koer*, 1 C. W. N. 658 (1897) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *Appasami*, 13 M. 114 (1897) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *Hayat Fakih*, 23 B. 241 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *on behalf of third party*; *Explanation III*

(4) *Mapurhal Dutt v. Dutt*, 671 (1901)

(5) *Gyanmurti v. Dutt*, 671 (1901)

(6) *Nihal Chandra Dutt v. Dutt*, 1882) P. 114 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]

(7) *Jayachandrasekhar v. Dutt*, 21 C. 525 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *Lahiry*, 21 C. 525 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *in Mukhtar Ali v. Dutt*, 31 A. 579 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *Maru Dutt v. Dutt*, 21 C. 525 (1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]

(8) *Bharyani v. Dutt*, 18 C. 479 (1897) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *question whether the sale is valid*; *promised*; *fraud of the judgment debtor*; *on its merits*; *v. Bansī Dhar*

(9) *Asmita v. Dutt*, 1901) [an application to amend a sale certificate]

(10) *Bharyani v. Dutt*, 18 C. 479 (1897) [an application to amend a sale certificate]; *Bharyani v. Dutt*, 18 C. 479 (1897) [an application to amend a sale certificate]

the case of an order in execution of a decree for possession under sect 9 of the Specific Relief Act (1)

The following orders have been held to be appealable An order refusing to allow representative to take out execution until certificate granted under Act XXVII of 1860 (2) An order relating to the fitness of a member of a religious institution to be appointed under a decree (3) an order under sect 87 of the Transfer of Property Act extending the time for payment of the mortgage decree (4) or refusing to enlarge time in a decree for redemption (5) An order refusing to grant reasonable extension of time to the mortgagor judgment debtor to pay in the decretal amount (6) or declaring the amount due under a mortgage decree under sect 88 of the Transfer of Property Act (7) or an order passed upon an application made under sect 89 of that Act (8) or an order on an application by a mortgagor that the mortgagee judgment creditor having purchased a portion of the mortgaged property subject to his mortgage in execution of a simple money decree by a third party, was bound to discharge his mortgage debt, (9) or an order setting aside a sale or refusing to set aside a sale (10) or refusing to enforce execution upon the application of a transferee on the ground that he is not a transferee or representative or on the ground of limitation (11) or refusing to determine whether an occupancy holding is transferable according to custom or usage and is therefore saleable, (12) or erroneously holding that the same can be attached and sold (13) or an order refusing to set aside on appeal an order dismissing objections to the execution of a decree for default (14) or refusing an application of the judgment debtor for recovery of the amount paid in excess of the decretal amount (15) or an order disallowing the objection of a person who has been brought on the record of the execution proceedings as a *representative* and who sets up a title of his own to the attached property, (16) or orders in proceedings for the delivery of possession to the auction purchaser after sale in execution of the decree (17) or an order refusing

(1) *Souza v Gulam Moid n* 26 M 438 (1912)

(2) *Hotalal v Hardeo* 5 A 212 (1882)

(3) *Ponnambala v Sivagnana* 17 M 343 s c 21 I A 71 (1894)

(4) *Rahima v Nepal Rai* 14 A 520 (1892)

(5) *Rungo v Bhomsetti* 26 B 121 (1901)

(6) *Note to Hulas Rai v Parthi Singh* 9 A 500 at p 503 (1887)

(7) *Aryan Bank v Kamma Venkata* 26 M 237 (1902)

(8) *Mallikarjunadu v Lingamurti* 25 M 244 (1902) [order refusing to pass an order absolute for sale] In, however *Pramatha v Khetra*, 29 C 631 (1902) it was held that the order was not in execution but in proceedings in continuation of the original suit

(9) *Prussappa Mudaliar v Commercial Land Mortgage Bank* 23 M 377 (1899)

(10) *Makha v Srinam* 21 A 103 (1901)

(11) *Badri Narain v Jaikishen* 16 A 483 (1894)

(12) *Majed Hossein v Raghbar* 27 C 187

(1899) *Gabar Khalifa B pari v Kasimuddin Jamadar* 27 C 415 s c 4 C W N 537 (1899)

(13) *Satanath Chatterjee v Atmaram* 4 C W N 571 (1900)

(14) *Lalnaram Singh v Mahomed Rafi* add n 28 C 81 (1900)

(15) *Dhan Kunwar v Mahtaf Singh*, 22 A 79 (1899)

(16) *Shankar Dutt v Harman* 17 A 245 (1895) following *Panchann Banopadhyay v Robia Bibee* 17 C 711 (1890) *Madhusudan Das v Gobinda Prsa* 27 Cal 34 s c 4 C W N 417 (1899) [representative refusing delivery of possession] *Towendra v Gobinda* 35 C 364 (1908)

(17) *Mithusudan Das v Golmali Das supra*

to set aside a sale to a decree holder purchaser the decree in which suit had been set aside (1) An order setting aside a sale under sect 310A of the last Code (now represented by O XXI r 89) when the dispute is between the decreeholder and the judgment debtor (2) or an order refusing to set aside such sale when the dispute relates to execution (3) or an order determining whether a party applying for execution is or is not the representative of the decree holder, (4) or an order disallowing objection that the value of the property specified in the sale proclamation was grossly inadequate (5) or an order directing delivery of possession of property sold under a mortgage decree though purporting to be under sect 335 of the last Code (6) or refusing delivery of possession of properties sold to a decree holder mortgagee or a decree holder in execution of his decree, (7) or an order refusing delivery of possession of jewels not subject-matter of decree returned in Court (8) or an order refusing to stay sale for under-valuation (9) All orders staying execution of decrees whether passed by the Court which made the decree or by the Court to which it is sent for execution (10) An order directing stay of execution of a decree on security being furnished by the judgment debtor is appealable by the judgment debtor on the ground that the security ordered is excessive (11) So is an order in the execution proceedings whereby the right of a defendant against whom no decree has been passed is invaded (12) Or where the judgment debtor alleges fraud in execution proceedings

(1) *Umedmal v Srinath Roy*, 27 C 810, s c, 4 C W N 692 (1900)

(2) *Kripanath Pal v Ram Lakshmi Dasya*, 1 C W N 703 (1897) *Phul Chand v Narsingh Pershad* 24 C 73 (1899), but see *Asimudli v Pran* 15 C W N 811 (1911)

(3) *Murlidhar v Annila Rao*, 25 B 418 (1900) *Contra Maganlal v Doshi Mulji*, 25 B 631 (1901) when a question arises between a party and his representative

(4) *Krishnama Chariar v Appasami Mudaliar*, 25 M 545 (1891) [application for execution by successors of a trustee decree holder who was alleged to have been suspended], *Badri Narain v Jaikishen Das*, 16 A 483 (1894), *Gunga Das Seal v Jakub Ali*, 27 C 670 (1899)

(5) *Cunga Prosad v Rajcoomar Ghose* 30 C 617 (1903)

(6) *Ram Narain Sahoo v Bandi Pershad*, 31 C 737 (1901) [in order to see under what section case comes, Court must look into true nature of application not merely to the statement of the party] followed in *Mangayya v Srinimulu* 24 M L J 477 (1913)

(7) *Kasi Nath Ayyar v Uthumansa* 25 M

529 (1901), see *Kattayat Pathumary v Raman Menon*, 26 M 740 (1902), in which it was held suit was barred

(8) *Appa Rao v Venkataramanayamma* 23 M 65 (1899) [on the ground that though the jewels were not subject matter of the decree the property had been interfered with in course of execution]

(9) *Sivasami Nairkar v Ratnasami Nairkar*, 23 M 568 (1900) *Contra*, *Sivagani Achi v Subrahmanya*, 27 M 259 (1903)

[10] *Ghazidin v Takir Bakhsh*, 7 A 73 (1884), *Musaj Abdulla v Damodar Das*, 12 B 279 (1893) [order under s 545], *Mahant Ishwargar v Chudasama*, 12 B 30 (1887) [under s. 545] Provided that the order is by the Court of execution *Ramechandra v Palmukund*, 6 Bom L R 780 (1904)

(11) *Udayadeta Deb v Cregson*, 12 C 624 (1896)

(12) *Vibbudapriya v Vidiamohi*, 22 M 131 (1899) [appeal dismissed as no invasion had taken place], *Ramaswami Sastralu v Kameswaramma*, 23 M 361 (1899) F B Dissented from at p. 364, Appd p 366 Dissented from *Kalka Prasad v Basant Ram*, 23 A 346 (1901) See subject discussed in notes to Explanation ante

on the part of the decree holder or auction purchaser (1) An appeal lies in an application to set aside a sale under sect 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and 311 of last Code where the auction purchaser is the *benamidar* of the judgment debtor (2) and from an order upon an application to deposit landlord's fee under the Bengal Tenancy Act and for confirmation of the sale and grant of sale-certificate (3) and an order allowing the judgment debtor's objection to delivery of possession to the auction purchaser on the ground that the sale was invalid as the landlord's fee in the manner required by the Bengal Tenancy Act was not paid and the sale could not be confirmed (4) But an order under sect 174 of that Act was held not within the section (5) Where a Small Cause Court decree was sent for execution to the regular Court of the District and an order was passed under sect 244 by that Court (Subordinate Judge), held that an appeal lay to the District Judge (6)

The Court can require an appellant from an order made under this section in execution of a decree to give security for the costs of the appeal and of the original suit (7)

LIMIT OF TIME FOR EXECUTION.

48 (1) Where an application to execute a decree *not being* *Execution barred in a decree granting an injunction has been made, certain cases* no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from—

- (a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or,
- (b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree

(1) *Nemi Chand Kanji v Dink Nath* 2 C W N 691 (1898) [ss 244 and 311, and second appeal lies at the instance of auction purchaser], *Hiralal Ghosh v Chunder Kant*, 3 C. W. N 403, 2 C. 539 (1899), but no second

28 C 116 (1900), *Parashram v Bulmukund* 32 B 572 (1903) See cases cited in notes "Fraud"

(2) *Chandmonee v Santomonee*, 24 C 707 s c, 1 C W N 534 (1897) [second appeal], in *Poghu Singh v Misri Singh* 21 C 825 (1894) there was no appeal as appellant

was not a party to the suit ref to Hara bandhu v Harish Chandra, 3 C W N 184 (1893)

(3) *Krishna Chunder Dutt v Anukul Chunder*, 6 C. W. N 190 (1901)

(4) *Mohun Chandra Bhattacharjee v Ram Lochan Dey*, 7 C. W. N 591 (1903) [second appeal]

(5) *Kishori Mohun v Sarodaman* 1 C W N 30 (1890), foll. *Sulh Nara n v Goroke Persad*, 3 C W N 344 (1898)

(6) *Peary Lal Singh v Radha Nath Singh*, 11 C. W. N 861 (1907)

(7) *Diglu v Chandrabhan*, 24 B 314. s c, 1 Bom L. R. 87 (1899)

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed

(a) to preclude the Court from ordering the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the judgment debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within twelve years immediately before the date of the application, or

(b) to limit or otherwise affect the operation of article 180 of the second schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. (1)

"Where an application to execute a decree"—This was held to mean any application to execute a decree, and was not confined to the last application preceding the expiry of 12 years from either of the points of time mentioned (2). The former section referred only to decrees for the payment of money (3) or delivery of other property. A decree for the sale of mortgaged property was held not to be a decree for the payment of money, even though the judgment-debtor was personally liable for the deficiency (4). The application of the provision has apparently been extended to all decrees with the exception stated.

The words "and granted" have been omitted. "Granted" has been held to mean "admitted" (5) as stated in O XXI r 17, and in addition there has been issue of process in execution (6). "Any fresh application" has been substituted for "subsequent application," (7) with a view to rendering it clearer that ancillary applications merely to complete arrested execution are not obnoxious to the bar (8). It has been held that since the right to enforce a

(1) Art 183 of Act IX. of 1908

(2) Tuleshar Rai v Parbati, 15 A. 193 (1893)

(3) Bal Chand v Raghunath Das, 4 A. 155 (1881), Pahlwan Singh v Narain, 22 A. 401 (1900), dicta in Maharajah of Benares v Lajp Singh, 24 A. 636 (1912)

(4) Fazil Howladar v Krishna Bundhoo Roy, 25 C. 580 (1897), Ram Charan Bhagat v Sheoborast Rai, 16 A. 418 (1891), Kartick Nath Pandey v Juggernath Ram Marwari, 27 C. 285 (1899) dissented from in Abdullsh Sahib v Oosman Sahib, post, and Chauri Charan Roy v Ambika Charan Dutt, 11 A. 792 (1904), diss. from Jadu Nath Prasad v Jagmohan Das, 25 A. 541 (1903); Lalulau Singh v Narain, 22 A. 401 (1900); Al Lilla Sahib v Doctor Oosman Sahib, 24 A. 221 (1904), Vaidhinasamy Ayyar v Namasundram Pillai, 28 M. 173 (1904)

(5) Dewan Ali v Soroshubul Dula, 8 C. 237 (1881)

(6) Nilmoney Singh Deo v Huseaur

Banerjee, 16 C. 744 (1889), Chengaya v Appasami, 6 M. 172 (1892), Paraga Kuar v Bhagwan Din, 8 A. 301 (1896), Pamadhar v Ram Dayal, 8 A. 536 (1896), Pama Dewaz v Ram Charan, 18 A. 49 at p. 51 (1895), but see Motchand v Krishnarav Canesh, 11 B. 521 (1897)

(7) As to this term which assumed that the previous application to execute had been made under the Code itself [Anaji Appaji v Ramji Jivaji, 10 B. 348 (1889), Ashoo Kesh Dutt v Jharpa Churn Chatterjee, 6 C. 401 (1889)] see Ghandharap Singh v Sheo-darshan Singh, 12 A. 571 (1890), Rahim Ali Khan v Jhul Chand, 18 A. 482 (1896), Virarama v Anasari, 6 M. 359 (1893), Sreenath

(8) Kamolla v Ishri Singh, 32 A. 499 (1910) but this has been dissented from in Bidaiwar v Jasoda, 17 C. W. N. 622 (1913)

decree is a substantive right and not matter of procedure, this section cannot bar the execution of decrees which were alive when the present Code came into force

"Execution"—See note as to bar to future execution (1) Where a second application was made at a time when it was barred a third was held barred though presented within three years of the second (2)

"Twelve years"—A decree for payment of money was modified on appeal, held that the decree to be executed being the decree made on appeal the 12 years mentioned in this section ran from the date of the appellate decree (3) The period of limitation under this section is absolute, and will not be extended on the ground of the minority of the decree holder (4) It cannot be extended by an agreement between a decree holder and a judgment debtor (5)

"At a certain date, or at recurring periods"—The former section referred only to orders for payment or delivery at a certain date (6) and occasion has been taken to embody rulings (7) declaring that decrees directing periodical payments are within the meaning of the section

"Fraud or force"—Fraud or force on the part of a judgment debtor gives a new starting point for the period of limitation and an application for the execution of a decree may be granted at any time within 12 years after the date in which a judgment debtor has by fraud or force prevented execution of a decree (8) In order to obtain the benefit of the proviso it is not necessary

(1) *Mungul Pershad Dicit t. Gria Kant Lahiri*, 8 C 51 (1881), *Ram Kirpal t. Rup Kuar*, 6 A. 269 (1883), *Kanji Mal v. Kanha Lal* 7 A 373 (1885), *Dinkar Ballal t. Hari Shridhar Apte*, 14 B 206 (1889), *Gourmoni Dabee v. Jagat Chandra Audihari*, 17 C 57, 63 (1889), *Nanchand v. Vithu*, 19 B 258 (1894), *Kuppu Ammal v. Samnatha Ayyar*, 18 M 482 (1894), *Venkatanarasimha v. Papammah*, 19 M 54 (1895), *Fotteh Narain Chowdry v. Chundrabati Chowdrain*, 20 C 551 (1892), *Bandey Karim v. Romesh Chunder Bundopadhyay*, 9 C. 65 (1882), *Bhobona v. Jibraji Singh*, 11 C L R 277 (1882), *Dalchand Bhudar t. Bai Shivkar*, 15 B 242 (1890) [*fol. Nepal Chandra Sadookhan v. Amrita Lal Sadhookhan*, 26 C 888 (1899)], *Manjunath Badrabhat v. Venkatesh Govind*, 6 B 51 (1881), *Harro secondary Dassee t. Jugobundhoo Dutt*, 6 C 203 (1880), *Narhar t. Krishnaji*, 36 B 368 (1912), 14 Bom L R 381

(2) *Bhagwan Jethram t. Dhondi*, 22 B (1896)

(3) *Mahomed Mehdi Bell t. Mohini Chowdhry* 31 C 274 (1907), *Muhammad I. aziz Karbidai Bibi* 32 A 136 (1909)

(4) *Ramana v. Babu* 24 M L J 96 (1912), 37 M 186, but see *Midnapur Zemindary v. Nares*, 16 C W N 109 (1911) In the former case it was held that whether a decree is complete or not must be decided by the law in force when the decree was made

(5) *Raghunath t. Kashi Prosad*, 15 C L J 678 (1911), and see *Bhagwant Ram Chandra v. Haji Mahamad*, 36 B 498 (1912), and *Juraj v. Babaji*, 20 B 68 (1904) period cannot be extended

(6) See *Yusuf Khan t. Sirdar Khan*, 7 M 83 (1883), *Sabhanatha Dikshatar t. Subba Lakshmi*, 7 M 80 (1883), *Kaveri t. Nenamma* 14 M 396 (1890), *Jogobundhoo Dass v. Huri Rawoot* 16 C 16 (1888), *Bal Chand t. Paghunath Dass*, 4 A 155 (1881), *Jhota Sahu v. Bhubun Sir*, 11 C 143 (1884)

(7) *Lakshminarayan Bapuji t. Madhavrai Bapuji* 12 B 65 (1887), *Ashutosh Bannerjee t. Lukhimon Debbya* 19 C 130 (1891)

(8) *Venkayya v. Raghava Charlu* 22 M 320 (1890); *Mohsin Ali t. Masum Ali*, 34 A 20 (1911)

that a judgment creditor should prove that the fraud of the judgment debtor continued so as to prevent execution of the decree at any time (1). The action of a judgment debtor who knowing that a warrant of attachment has issued against his moveable property locks up his house and so prevents the moveable property therein from being attached amounts to fraud, (2) as also a frivolous application to set aside the decree made for the purpose of delay (3) and preventing (4) or evading (5) arrest or attachment (6). The word "fraud" here has a wider sense than that in which it is generally used in English law (7).

Article 180, Limitation Act—The former section which prescribed an absolute period of limitation and was apparently rendered applicable to a High Court by sect 63S, was in conflict with article 180 of the Limitation Act, which permits a revival in the case of decrees of High Courts and orders of His Majesty in Council. Statutory authority has therefore been given to the rulings which declare that article to be independent of the section (8). This is art 183 of Act IX of 1908.

TRANSFEREES AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

49 Every transferee of a decree shall hold the same [s] subject to the equities (if any) which the judgment debtor might have enforced against the original decree-holder

Transfer subject to equities—See as to the application of this well known principle, first enacted by the Code of 1877, cases cited (9). H, the holder of a usufructuary mortgage over the property of B, obtained against the latter a simple money decree which had nothing whatever to do with the mortgage or the debt secured thereby. H transferred this simple money decree to M. Held that there was nothing to prevent M from bringing to sale in execution of this decree the property mortgaged by B to H (10). A

(1) Venkayya v. Baghaya Charlu 22 M 320 (1899), Mohsin Ali v. Masum Ali, 34 A 20 (1911)

(2) Ib

(3) Abdul Khadir v. Shaiva Javuthar, 35 M 670 (1911), 22 M L J 35, Nathuram v. Krishna 24 M L J 270 (1913), Ras Sham Hassan v. Damar Kumari Debi 11 C. W. N. 440 (1900)

(4) Bhagu Jetha v. Bawasaleb 9 B 318 (1885)

(5) Pattakara Annamalai v. Rangasami Chetti 6 M 365 (1893)

(6) Visolathi Ammal v. Sivazankara Jaker, 4 M 202 (1881)

(7) Raghunath v. Kashi Prosad 15 C. L. J 678 (1911)

(8) See Mayabhai Prembhai v. Tribhu vandas, 6 B 258 (1881), Ganapathi v. Balasundara 7 M 540 (1884), Futtah Narain Chowdhry v. Chundrabati Chowdhram 20 C 551 (1897), Sreekrishna Doss v. Alumbi Ammal, 36 M 10 (1911)

(9) Sattu Pandaram v. Santhoji Row, 26 M 428 (1902), Kristo Ramani Dassee v. Kedar Nath Chakravarti 16 C 619 (1889), Gresh Chunder Sen v. Obhoy Churn Mullick, 6 C L. R. 493 (1880), Kaim Ali Jawardar v. Lakhikant Chuckerbutty, 1 B L. R. 23 F B (1858), Ram Chunder v. Mohendro Nath Bose, 21 W. R. 141 (1874)

(10) Banh Bai v. Manni Lal, 27 A 450 (1905)

transferee was held prohibited from selling mortgaged property in execution of the decree transferred to him by sect 232 of the last Code if not also by the present section (1)

50 (1) *Where* a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully *satisfied*, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.

(2) *Where the decree is executed against* such legal representative, he shall be liable only to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of; and, for the purpose of ascertaining such liability, the Court executing the decree may, of its own motion or on the application of the decree holder, compel such legal representative to produce such accounts as it thinks fit.

"Where a judgment debtor dies"—The section contemplates the case of a person who, being alive when a decree is passed against him, dies before execution is fully had of that decree. Where, therefore, a party to a suit was dead before even the plaint was filed, and a decree was given against him, it was held incapable of enforcement (2). Where, however, after the trial is concluded, judgment is reserved, and after that a party dies, then on the principle *actus curiæ nemini facit injuriam*, judgment may be entered up *nunc pro tunc* and the decree is a valid decree (3). An attachment, (4) and execution proceedings generally, (5) do not abate, and the section does not apply to cases where the judgment debtor dies after attachment but before sale (6). Nor does it apply to a decree holder seeking possession, if the order for it was passed prior to the death of the judgment debtor, (7) nor does the Code contemplate the representatives of the judgment decree has been passed (8) life of a judgment debtor,

"Holder of the decree"—That is the person whose name appears on the record as the person in whose favour the decree was made, or some person whom the Court by order has recognized as the decree holder from the original plaintiff or his representatives (10)

(1) Jwarathnam Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Mudaliar, 17 M. L. J. 503 (1907), 31 M. 33

(2) In re Girendronath Tagore, 14 B. L. R. L. C. 334 (1875)

(3) Chetan Charan Das v. Balbhadra Das, 21 A. 314 (1899), and cases there cited

(4) Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal, 12 A. 440 (1889)

(5) Gulabdas v. Lakshman Narhar, 3 B. 221 (1879)

(6) Sheo Prasad v. Hira Lal, 12 A. 440

(1889), diss. from Romasami v. Bagurathi, 6 M. 180 (1883)

(7) Bryakka v. Fakira, 12 M. 211 (1889)

(8) Hira Chand Harjivandas v. Kasturchand Hasidas, 18 B. 221 (1893), diss. in Peru shotam v. Rajbai, 34 B. 142, 150 (1903)

(9) Narendra v. Gopal, 17 C. L. J. 634 (1912)

(10) Panpayiah v. Narasannah, 2 M. 216 (1890)

"May apply to the Court"—It was held under the last Code by the Calcutta High Court that an application to execute a decree against the legal representative might also be made to the Court to which a decree was transferred for execution (1). More recently a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that where a decree of one Court had been transferred to another Court for execution, an application by the decree holder under this section to execute the decree against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment debtor must be made to the Court which passed the decree and not to the Court executing the same (2). But the same Court has held that an order made by the executing Court is not wholly void and that an objection on this ground may be waived (3).

"To execute the same"—The substantive application should be in the words of the section one for execution of the decree. But an application for substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased judgment debtor has been considered in substance an application for execution (4).

Liability of representative—This section provides that the Court executing the decree is to ascertain the liability that is to inquire whether any particular property in the hands of the representative or which came to his hands was the property of the deceased debtor and if it has been disposed of whether it has been duly applied. The question whether property is available for execution is a question relating to execution under sect. 47 and must when it arises between the persons mentioned in that section be determined thereunder and not by separate suit (5). *He shall be liable only to the extent etc.* indicate that two kinds of property can be attached first property of the debtor found in the hands of the representative and secondly property of the representative from whatever source derived to the extent to which he has wasted the assets descended to him without satisfying the debts of the deceased (6). The representative is however liable summarily only in respect of the property actually

(1) *Sham Lal Pal v. Modhu Sudan Sircar* 22 C 558 (1890).

(2) *Swaminatha Ayyar v. Vandyanatha Sastri* 28 M 466 (1905) and see *Hirachand Harjivan Das v. Kasturchand Kasidas* 18 B 224 (1893).

(3) *Thamboo Pillai v. Saramulu Naidu* 17 M L J 300 (1907).

(4) *Jogendra Nath Roy v. Rasik Chandra Banerjee*, 2 C L J 544 (1905).

(5) *Kuriyal v. Mayan* 7 M 250 257 258 (1883). *Punchanan Bundopadhyay v. Rabha Bibi* 17 C 711 (1890). *Rajrup Singh v. Ram*

v. Mohesh Chandra Banerjee 23 C 454 (1896). See other cases and notes to sect. 47 ante. *Seth Chand Mal v. Durga Devi* 12 A 313 (1889). *Gokulsingh v. Kisan Singh* 34 B 546 552 (1910).

(6) *Rajrup Singh v. Ramgopal Roy* 16 C 1 at p. 5 (1888). *Chintamoney Dutt v. Mohesh Chandra Banerjee* 23 C 454 (1896). As to whether creditors can sue and can follow property into the hands of third parties see *Bazayet Hossain v. Dooli Chand* 4 C 409 (1878). s. c. 1 A 211. *Greender Chunder Ghose v. Mackintosh* 4 C 89 (1879). *Nar Singh Das v. Najmooddin Hossain* 8 C 20 (1881). *Murza Mahomed v. Widow of Balma Kund* 3 I A 241 245 (1886). *Oriental Bank v. Gobindoli Seal* 10 C 713 (1884). *Mt. Wahiddunn v. Mt. Shubratton* 6 B I P 54 (1891).

605 (1887). *Ravunth Menon v. Kunju Nayar*, 10 M L J 117 (1886). *Chintamoney Dutt*

received by him or taken into his disposition (1) When an appeal is made under this section the Court should, under O XXI r 21, issue notice on the person named calling upon him to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him as such representative. If he denies that he is so the Court which passes a decree decides whether the person against whom execution is sought is the legal representative, though it is for the Court executing the decree to decide to what extent such person is liable (2) The decree holder should show that property of the deceased has come into the possession of his representative and it is then on the latter to show that he has properly applied the property (3) The heirs are liable in respect of assets even though it may be pleaded that the debtor was a *benamidar* (4) The right of the decree holder to have his debt paid out of the assets of the deceased in the hands of the legal representative is not affected by the provisions of sect 104 of the Probate and Administration Act (5)

Legal representative—The last Code did not contain any definition of the term "legal representative." The framers of the former section in using this term must either have understood it in some defined sense or have intended thereby merely to refer to such persons as under the law applicable to the particular case might be held to be the legal representatives of a deceased person. The first supposition was negatived by the fact that the Legislature omitted to declare what were the characteristics of a legal representative for the purposes of this section (6). It might have been said that such a definition was unnecessary, as the term has a well known technical meaning. In their strictest and most ordinary sense the words "legal representatives" are understood to mean executors and administrators only (7).

Though the decisions upon the construction of wills which hold it to be a flexible term and have given it another sense such as next of kin or descendants do not control its legal meaning in that they proceed upon the principle that if the Court finds that a testator attached to particular words a different meaning from that which is their proper legal sense, the Court is bound so to construe and give effect to the will not in its strict legal sense but in the way in which the testator himself used the words (8) the term is yet one which is naturally capable of a more extended sense than that in which it is ordinarily and strictly employed. Had the Legislature therefore, intended to confine it to particular persons only, viz, executors or administrators it would have expressly named these persons and would not have used a term which though in its most strict sense denoting executor or administrator only, is yet capable

(1) *Khashrobhai v. Hormazsha* 11 B 727 (1887), see *Ram Colam Dohy v. Ayma Begum* 12 W R 177 (1869)

(2) *Seth Shapurji v. Shankar Das Dube* 17 A 431 (1895), as to successful objector see *Bishen Davul v. Bank of Upper India* 13 A 290 (1890)

(3) See *Pajah Roodro Narain v. Nittyanun* 1 Doss 8 W R 19 (1867) *Ascomoonussa v. Amerconna* 15 W R 28 (1871)

(4) *Doorga Soon lura v. Soorja Monee* 8 W R 101 (1867)

(5) *Venkatarangayan Chetti v. Krishnasami Ayyangar* 22 M 191 (1898)

(6) *Dinamoni Chandhurani v. Elahadut Khan* 8 C W N 843 855 (1904) in which the subject will be found fully discussed

(7) *Ib.*, Price v. Strange 6 Madd 17

(8) *Fagleton v. Horner* 37 Ch D 703, 711

of a wider meaning. Where there is an executor or administrator they alone are the legal representatives of a deceased judgment debtor (1). But the section is also commonly applied, both in the case of heirs (2) as well as in that of executors and administrators and the term 'legal representative' has been defined to ordinarily mean all these classes of persons (3).

When there is no executor or administrator but succession by heirship as in cases governed by the Bengal School of Hindu Law or in cases of separate and self acquired property under Mitakshara Law the decree must be executed against the heir as the legal representative within the meaning of this section (4). The section has however been applied to cases where the succession is otherwise than by heirship to the last holder of an estate as also to cases where the estate accrues to the present holder by survivorship (5). In these cases where a decree is passed against a judgment debtor not in his or her personal capacity, but in a representative capacity the decree may be executed against the person who, though not an heir of the judgment debtor the last holder of the estate, is entitled thereto after his or her death whether as reversioner or surviving co-parcener (6). So inasmuch as a decree properly obtained against a Hindu widow in her representative capacity is binding upon her husband's reversioner, (7) where a suit has been instituted or defended by a Hindu widow in her representative capacity, the reversioners, though they do not claim through her but as heirs of her husband, have yet been held to be her legal representatives in respect of the estate held by her as such Hindu widow (8). Again in the case of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara,

(1) *Dinamoni Chaudhuran v Elahadut Khan*, 8 C W N 843, 856 (1904) see sect 179, Act X of 1863, *Pogose v Catchick*, 3 C 708 (1878), *Sukh Nandan v Rennick*, 4 A 192 (1882), *Shahkh Moosa v Shahkh Esaa*, 8 B 241 (1884), *Mancharam v Kahlia* 19 B 821, 827 (1894).

(2) *Greender Chunder Ghose v Mackintosh*, 4 C 897, 908 (1879). In *Ram Kannu*

And where a purely personal decree was given against a partner execution it was held, could only go against the heiress and not against an undivided brother. *Veerappa Chettiar v Rama Swami Aiyar*, 27 M 106 (1903), *Gyanundra v Rani Nihalo*, 32 A 404 (1910).

(3) *Jahan Chunder Sirkar v Beni Madhub Sirkar*, 24 C. 62, 71 (1896).

(4) *Dinamoni Chaudhuran v Elahadut Khan*, 8 C W N 843, 856 (1904).

(5) *Id*. For succession by Shebait, see *Mohan Lalji v Gordhan Lalji Maharaj P C*, 35 A 283 (1913).

(6) *Dinamoni Chaudhuran v Elahadut Khan supra*, in which case the principle of representation which exists by law in the case of decrees against Hindu widows and co-parceners was extended to cases of agreement and conveyance between parties (*Woodroffe, J. dissent*).

(7) *Tribhuwan Sunder Kuar v Sri Narain Singh*, 20 A 341 (1898).

(8) *Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v Kally Kanto Chuckerbutty*, 6 C 479 (1880), *Prem Moya Chowdhuran v Prem Nath Dhur* 23 C 636 (1896), *Tribhuwan Sunder Kuar v Sri Narain Singh*, 20 A. 341 (1898), *Musala Reddi v Ramayya*, 23 M 123, 133 (1899), see also *Hari Saran Moltra v Bhubaneswari Devi*, 16 C 40 (1888) [decree against widow representing estate enforced against minor adopted son], but the heir of the last full owner is not in regard to a mere personal money decree against the widow her representative, *Pulhar Rai v Sheo Pujan*, 33 A 13 (1910), *Kameshwar Pershad v Run Bahadur Singh* 12 C 458 (1886), *Mun geswar Kuar v Jamoona Prashad*, 16 C. 603 (1889).

though it has been held by the Madras and Allahabad, and formerly by the Calcutta (1) High Courts, that in the case of a personal decree for money obtained against the father the interest of the latter in the joint ancestral properties is not assets in the hand of the son when he dies, and consequently, notwithstanding his obligation to pay his father's debt, proceedings cannot be taken against him under this section as the legal representative of his father, the contrary view has been adopted by the Bombay High Court in that the obligation of a son to satisfy his father's debt is within the scope of the decree against the father whether on the ground of representation of the sons by their father, (2) or on the ground that the creditor has the power to attach and sell the entire interest in the property in execution proceedings against the father; (3) and the Calcutta High Court has recently held that the liability may be determined in the execution proceedings if the legal representative has been properly brought on the record under this section (4). This question is now settled by sect 53, *post*. Where moreover, the interest of the father has been attached during his lifetime (5) or a decree directing a sale of hypothecated property has been passed in the lifetime of the judgment debtor, (6) or the judgment debtor has been expressly sued as representing the undivided family, (7) or the decree charges the family property, (8) in all these cases the decree, it has been held, may be executed against those who in succession, in time, take by the legal title of survivorship and not by that of heirship.

The principle under consideration has been still further extended to the case of a person who, without title as administrator, executor, heir, reversioner or surviving coparcener, is the *de facto* possessor of the estate of a deceased Hindu it having been held that he must be treated for some purposes as his representative, and that a judgment obtained against such a representative is not a mere nullity (9). The first of these cases proceeds upon the assumption

(1) See *Juga Lal Chaudhuri v. Andh Behari Prasad Singh*, 6 C W N 223 (1900) and cases there relied on, and *Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar*, 27 M 243, 248 (1903), *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami*, 16 M 99, 101, 103 (1892), *Anabudra v. Dorasami*, 11 M 413 (1888).

(2) *Jagabhai v. Vijbhukandas*, 11 B 37 (1886).

(3) *Umed Hathi Singh v. Ghoman Bhaio*, 20 B 385 (1895), followed in *Chander Pershad v. Sham Koer*, 33 C 676 (1905), *Shivram v. Sakharam*, 33 B 39 (1905).

(4) *Amar Chandra Kundu v. Sebak Chand Chowdhury*, 34 C 612 (1907), *F B*, s c, 11 C W N 593, *Chander Pershad v. Sham Koer*, 33 C 676 (1905), but a question which raises the validity of the decree cannot, *Hira Lal Sahu v. Parmeshwar Rai*, 21 A 36 (1899).

(5) *Lachmi Narain v. Kunji Lal*, 16 A 455, 456 (1894), *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Prasad*

Singh, 5 C 148 (1879), *Kamatika v. Andu Kari*, 5 M 232, 233 (1882), see as to attachment during lifetime of judgment debtor, *Abdur Rahman v. Shankar Dat Dube*, 17 A 162 (1895).

(6) *Sivaguri Zemundar v. Tiruvengadu*, 7 M 339 (1884).

(7) *Mettia v. Virammal*, 10 M 286, 288 (1886), *Karpa Kambal v. Subbayyan*, 5 M 234 (1882).

(8) *Mettia v. Virammal*, *supra*.

(9) *Prosanno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chaitunno Pal*, 4 C 312. This case, which was followed in *Janaki v. Dhanu Lal*, 14 M 454 (1891) and *Chuni Lal Bose v. Osmond Beeby*, 30 C 1044, 1057 (1903), has been described as a peculiar one. *Pam Chandra Vookherjee v. Raja Ranjit Singh*, 4 C W N 405, 413 (1893), *Crava v. Subramappa*, 21 B 421 (1897).

that under the law as it existed prior to 1891 the executor did not represent the deceased until he had obtained probate and the hardship in the particular case which led the Court to take the view it did no longer exists. The Madras High Court has more recently held that there is no authority for holding that the words "legal representative" include any person who has taken possession of the property of a deceased judgment debtor and that a stranger in possession of property who was not a party to the decree ought not to be proceeded against in execution or otherwise than by a regular suit, and that the words "legal representative" cannot be taken to include any person who does not in law represent the estate of the deceased (1). And though in the two former cases the question arose with reference to a suit brought by the creditor against the representative, and not with reference to proceedings taken in execution of a decree, the Calcutta High Court has expressed an opinion that the principle underlying the observations in these cases are equally applicable to proceedings in execution as to proceedings by regular suit (2).

From this review of the authorities it will appear that judicial decisions prior to this Code extended the sense of the term "legal representative" beyond that of its ordinary meaning of "administrator, executor and heir" and though such extension has been attended with doubt and has in some cases been the subject of conflicting decisions, it was too late to endeavour however convenient it might have been to secure for the term that which is perhaps its strict and legitimate sense. The term was therefore not limited to administrators, executors and heirs and must have been held to include any person who in law represented the estate of a deceased judgment debtor (3). And the term has now been so defined in sect. 2, clause (11).

A decree passed against the *Valiya Rajah* of a *Kovilagam* is *prima facie* binding on his successor and his *Kovilagam* (4). The successor to an unsettled *polliem* is not liable for the debts of the person whose heir he is as respects that *polliem*. The *polliem* reverts absolutely to the Government and by the fresh grant to the successor a newly created estate for life becomes vested in him (5). In the undermentioned case an impartible *Raj* in the possession of the respondent was held not to be assets of the deceased nor was he the legal representative of the deceased, (6) and a decree against a limited company was held unenforceable against another company (7). A decree containing an injunction can be enforced against a legal representative under this section (8).

(1) *Chathakelan v Govinda Karumar*, 17 M 180 (1893)

(2) *Chuni Lal Bosc t Osmond Reoby* 30 C 1044, 1058 1059 (1903)

(3) *Dinamoni Chaudhurani t Elahadut Khan*, 8 C W N 843 (1904)

(4) *Kerala Varma v Shangaram* 16 M 422 (1892)

(5) *Arbuthnot v Oolagappa Chetty* 5 M II C R 303 (1890)

(6) *Kali Krishna Sarkar t Raghunath Deb*

31 C 224 (1903), *dist in Zamindar of Karvetnagar v Trustees of Tirumala* 32 M 429 430 (1909)

(7) *Harish Chandra Jewary t Chandpore Co., Ltd* 30 C. 961 (1903), *Arbuthnot's Industrials Ltd t Muthu Chettiar* 31 M 464, (1908)

(8) *Sakaral Jaswantrao v Ba Parvatibai* 26 B 283 (1901), s c, 4 Bom. L. 114

Execution has been allowed under this section against the legal representative of the legal representative (1)

There may be an estoppel. Thus though ordinarily a Court has no power to put a debtor's vendee on the record (2) where a person filed a petition in a suit saying that all the property of the judgment debtor had passed to him and for several years opposed execution it was held that though his name was not on the record he had yet made himself liable as a defendant (3). The legal representative binds all property in his possession and where an adult legal representative was in possession a sale was held good and not affected by the non appointment of a guardian *ad litem* (4).

The Code of 1859 gave power to execute a decree against the estate of a deceased judgment debtor. A proposal to revive this provision having been excepted to the criticisms were met by a further proposal to give a remedy against the person in possession of the estate. As already stated in the last paragraph it was formerly a question whether the term legal representative in sect. 239 of the last Code included a stranger who not being a party to the decree was in possession of the property of the deceased. It was held (5) under the Code of 1859 and this appears to be law now, that if no other legal representative can be found the decree-holder may then proceed against persons in possession of the estate belonging to the deceased. The definition in sect. 2 clause (11) includes a person intermeddling with the estate.

It was proposed to enact that the death of a judgment debtor before the decree had been fully executed should not be deemed to affect the validity as against such legal representative of any proceeding lawfully taken during his lifetime. Where property has actually been sold by order of the Court executing the decree probably no difficulty arises. This clause was however thought at one time to be necessary to meet the case of a judgment debtor dying before the sale is effected (6). It has not however been introduced.

PROCEDURE IN EXECUTION

- 51 Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed the Court may, on the application of the decree holder, order execution of the decree—
- Powers of Court to enforce execution*
- (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed,
 - (b) by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property,
 - (c) by arrest and detention in prison of any person,
 - (d) by appointing a receiver, or
 - (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require

(1) *Jafri Begam v. Sura Bibi* 23 A 367 (1900)
 (2) *Dhorani Dhar Sen v. Agra Bank* 3 C. L. J. 421 (1888) as to estoppel in execution see *Trimbak v. Hari Laxman* 31 B 575 (1910)

(3) *Lalla Poorat Lal v. Mt. Sabaran*, W. R. 368 (1867)

(4) *Kunl ramad v. Kuttli* 12 M. 90 (1888)

(5) *Syed Nadir Hossain v. Bisson* 7 and *Bassarat* 3 C. L. R. 437 (1878)

(6) See *Stowell v. Ajudha Nath* 6 A. 200 (1884), but see *Krishnaaya v. Unnissa Begam*, 15 M. 309 (1901)

Powers in execution—See following section up to sect 71 and O XXI with notes thereon. Sects 51-54 deal with procedure in execution generally; 55-59 with arrest; 60-61 with attachment, 65-67 with sale, and various rules in the Order mentioned deal with the same subjects. See notes to O XXI post.

52 (1) *Where a decree is passed against a party as the legal representative of a deceased person, and the decree is for the payment of money out of the property of the deceased, it may be executed by the attachment and sale of any such property.*

(2) *Where no such property remains in the possession of the judgment-debtor and he fails to satisfy the Court that he has duly applied such property of the deceased as is proved to have come into his possession, the decree may be executed against the judgment debtor to the extent of the property in respect of which he has failed so to satisfy the Court in the same manner as if the decree had been against him personally.*

Decrees against legal representatives—This section corresponds with sect 203 of Act VIII of 1859 save for some slight verbal alterations and the substitution of the words "*remains in the possession of the judgment debtor and he*" by s 252, Act VIII of 1859. The Code of 1859 also had a section (211) providing the same procedure where the decree was ordered to be executed against the legal representative of the Court."

Previously appearing. The Code of 1859 also had a section (211) providing the same procedure where the decree was ordered to be executed against the legal representative

"Where a decree is passed"—A decree passed against a person already dead, cannot however, be executed against his legal representatives (1)

"Legal representative of the deceased"—This includes persons who are parties to proceedings, (2) and the heir of the estate of a deceased Hindu leaving a will may be treated as the legal representative until Probate is taken, (4) and the widow of a Hindu insolvent may be his legal representative notwithstanding order vesting his estate in the Official Assignee, (5) but a person is not the legal representative where another has obtained grant of administration (6) nor if he does not represent the estate of the deceased (7)

(1) In matter of Gurendronath Tagore, 14 B. L. R. 334, note (1868)

(2) Jafur Hossein v. Hingun Jan 8 W. R. 161 (1867)

(3) Greendee Chunder Ghose v. Mackin tosh, 4 C. L. R. 210 (1878)

(4) Prosunno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chaitunoo, 4 C. 342 (1878)

(5) Chandmull v. Soondery Dossee, 22 C. 259 (1894), Grey v. Hazari Lal, 30 A. 486 (1908)

(6) Sukh Nandan v. Rennick, 4 A. 192 (1882)

(7) Subbanna v. Venkatakrishnan, 11 M. 408 (1888), Kallappan v. Varadarajulu, 33 M. 75 (1909)

Where a Hindu widow is sued as such and as guardian of her son and a decree obtained against her as her husband's representative, the sale in execution of property includes the son's interest therein, (1) as also where the son was an adopted son, (2) but where the widow in the plaint was described as the widow of A deceased and the mother of D and B minors, and the decree (on a bond due by her husband) was against her personally it was held the sale of the minors property was invalid (3) So also where a Hindu defendant died leaving a widow and a minor son and the suit was continued against the widow not as guardian of her son, and after the widow's death, against the sister of the deceased though not appointed guardian *ad litem* of the minor or administrator of his estate, the minor son was not bound (4) So where a widow borrowed not as administrator and without pledging any specific property of the estate, it was held to be her personal debt, (5) that is so where the debt is for rent, (6) but not where it was for necessary repairs (7) Where, however, the mother of the deceased obtained a personal decree against her widow for maintenance payable after his death, only the widow's interest in the estate of the deceased could be sold in execution (8) The test as to whether a decree against a Hindu widow binds the reversioners is whether the cause of action was one personal to her or one affecting the estate of the reversioner, (9) and the question must be decided from the decree and the execution record (10)

As to Mahomedans, a decree against one of the heirs cannot bind the other heirs (11) and a decree by consent against some of the heirs for a debt due by the deceased only binds those who are parties (12) [This is not so in the case of Hindus (13)] A sale under a decree against a Mahomedan daughter, who though sued as representative, did not represent the whole estate, there being a widow and another daughter, carried only the share of the judgment debtor, (14) so also a Mahomedan daughter is not bound by a decree made against the widow of her father in respect of his debts or by a subsequent sale by the widows to the judgment creditor, but could only recover her share of the property on payment of her share of her father's debts, (15) Mahomedan

(1) Court of Wards v Ramaput Sing 10 B L R. 294 (1872), 17 W R 459, 14 M I A 605

(2) Norendro Nath Pahari v Bhupendra Narain, 23 C. 375 (1895)

(3) Alukmonee v Ban Madhub, 3 C L R 473 (1878)

(4) Jatha Naik v Venkata, 5 B 14 (1880)

(5) Gadgeppa v Apaji, 3 B 237 (1879), Ramasami v Sellattammal, 4 M 375 (1881)

(6) Kristo Gobin v Hem Chunder, 16 C 511 (1889)

(7) Hurry Mohun v Gonesh Chunder, 10 C 823 (1881)

(8) Bajjun Doobey v Brij Bhokun, 1 C 133 (1875), 2 J A 275

(9) Jotendro Mohun v Jugul Kishore 7 C 37 (1841), Narana Maity v Vastava, 17 M

208 (1893), Gadgeppa v Apaji, 3 B 237 (1879)

(10) Radha Mohun v Soshi Bhoosun 3 C L R 530 (1878)

(11) Sitnath v Poy Luchmiput, 11 C L R 263 (1882)

(12) Assamathen v Luchmeput, 4 C 143 (1878)

(13) Jutadhari v Rughoobeer, 9 C 508 (1883)

(14) Hendry v Mutty Lal Dhur, 2 C 395 (1876)

(15) Hamir Singh v Zalim, 1 A 57 (1875) See also Jafri v Amir Muhammed 7 A 822 (1885), Muhammad Awais v Har Bahai, 7 A 716 (1885), Datta Ma v Hari Das, 23 A 263 (1901)

heirs who are not parties to a suit not being bound by a sale in execution but cannot recover their shares without paying their share of the debts, (1) as the purchaser does not acquire the whole estate but acquires it subject to all legal and equitable rights of inheritance (2) Thus in a mortgage sale the heirs of the mortgagor who were not parties to the suit were given an opportunity to redeem (3) The Bombay High Court, however held that a daughter though not a party was bound by the sale (4) When however an heir in possession is sued and a decree made against the assets of the deceased the decree binds the other heirs (5)

"Decree is for the payment of money"—A decree for accounts within a specified period which the defendant survived without proceedings being taken against him cannot, after his death, be executed against his widow and representative (6)

"Out of the property of the deceased"—The legal representative can set up an answer that the property in her possession is her own and does not belong to the deceased's estate (7) A decree obtained against the remainderman, a brother of the deceased, will not enable the creditor to touch the estate in the hands of the widow, (8) but in execution of a decree against a joint family property bought by a member of the family with joint funds may be taken in execution (9) The Court in execution proceedings will look at the substance of the transaction (10) See also sect 53

"May be executed"—The legal representative is not entitled in the execution stage to reopen the whole case and to inquire into the nature of the debt, (11) but can bring a suit (12) Sect 282 of the Indian Succession Act, where applicable, does not prevent a decree holder having the whole of his decree satisfied out of the assets of the deceased so far as they go to the exclusion of other creditors whose claims are admitted but who have not obtained decrees (13) Where successive applications have been made for years against a party merely as representative of a deceased defendant, execution cannot be taken out against him personally as one of the original defendants, even if he were liable in both capacities (14)

(1) *Hamir Singh v Zakia*, 1 A 57 (1875)
(2) *Sham Coomarr v Juttun Bibee*, 14 W R 448 (1870), see also *Raj Kristo Singh v Bungshee*, 14 W R 448, note (1868)
(3) *Shah Abdulla v Haji Abdulla*, 5 B 8 (1884)
(4) *Khurshet Bibi v Heso*, 12 B 101 (1887), see also *Nuzeerun v Ameerooddeen* 24 W R 3 (1875)
(5) *Motijan v Mirijan*, 10 C L R 346 (1882), *Muttyjan v Ahmed Ally*, 8 C 370 (1882) [followed in *Amir Dulhan v Baij Nath* 21 C 311], *Davalava v Bhumah*, 20 B 338 (1895)
(6) *Bidhou Mookhee v Bhojoy Heshul*, 12 W R 495 (1869)

(7) *Ameeroodnessa v Meer Mahomed*, 20 W R 280 (1873)
(8) *Natha Hari v Jamna*, 8 B H C A J 37
(9) *Bussessur Lall v Luchmessur*, 6 I A. 233
(10) *Ib*, *Sheo Persaud v Sabeel Lal*, 20 C 453 (1892)
(11) *Sheo Sahoy v Ram Bhunjun*, 23 W R 127 (1874)
(12) *Rustoo v Ram Furmessur*, 24 W R 361 (1875)
(13) *Nal Komul v Reed*, 17 W R 513 (1872)
(14) *Prem Lall v Hosseemoddeen*, 13 W R 36 (1870)

"Any such property."—Under a decree on a bond against the widow of the deceased obligor, a Hindu, the property of the debtor, described as the property of the widow, was sold, and it was held that the sale was good against the son and heir of the deceased, (1) so, where property is described at the time of the execution sale as the property of the judgment debtors, who were sued as mere representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor, *prima facie* what is sold is the property of the deceased debtor, and even if the decree is in terms as if it were a personal decree yet it must be construed as if it was for the debt of the deceased (2) But in a case where in the judgment, though not in the decree, the widow (who was only entitled to maintenance) was described as the representative of her deceased husband, the suit being for the husband's debt, the sale of her interest did not affect the deceased's estate (3) To ascertain what was sold under the right title and interest of the widow the Court is at liberty to look at the judgment. If the judgment bound the reversionary heir, the purchaser took the estate absolutely (4) Under a decree against a widow as representative of her deceased husband, a member of a joint Mitakshara family, property of the deceased, passing by survivorship to the other members, cannot be sold (5) This confines the procedure to property remaining in the possession of the legal representative, leaving the creditor to follow property improperly aliened by the legal representative by a separate suit (6) The onus of proving the legal necessity of a sale by a Hindu widow is on the purchaser, and recitals in mortgages or sale deeds are not sufficient evidence (7) A Hindu widow can, with the consent of the next reversioners, transfer her inherited estate *inter vivos*, (8) though not by bequest (9)

"If no such property remains"—The decree holder must satisfy the Court as to this before the Court will proceed under the second clause of this section (10) If the legal representative has sold such property to a third party, the former is personally liable for the debt to the extent of the assets he has received (11)

"Has duly applied"—This should be proved by filing and proving an inventory, (12) and unless he proves that he has duly applied, his property is liable, (13) whether the debt became due before or after the death of the debtor (14) He has only to account up to the full value of the assets he received

(1) Ishan Chunder v. Buksh Ali, 1 Marsh 614 (1863), see also Jairam Bajabashch v. Joma, 11 B. 361 (1886)

(2) Lalla Seeta v. Ram Buksh, 24 W. R. 383 (1875)

(3) Ramasami Chetti v. Siluchai, 8 M. II C. 186 (1875)

(4) Jugol Kishore v. Jotendro Mohun Tagore, 11 I. A. 66 (1884)

(5) Sadabart Prasad v. Foolbush, 3 B. L. R. (F. B.) 31 (1869)

(6) Greender Chunder Ghose v. Mackintosh, 4 C. L. R. 210 (1878)

(7) Lala Brij Lal v. Inda Kunwar, P. C., 19 C. L. J. 469 (1914)

(8) Bajrangi Singh v. Manokarnika Baksh Singh, P. C., 35 I. A. 1, 30 All. 1 (1907)

(9) Durga Sundari v. Ramkrishna Poddar, 18 C. L. J. 163 (1913)

(10) Indro Narain v. Kristo Chunder, 14 W. R. 363 (1870)

(11) Unnopoorna v. Gunga Narain, 2 W. R. 296 (1865)

(12) Joogul Kishore v. Kalco Churn, 23 W. R. 224 (1876)

(13) Mooktakashto v. Woona Churn, 12 W. R. 233 (1869)

(14) Ib

as legal representative and if he has properly done so the decree can no longer be executed even though he may still hold property which originally belonged to the deceased judgment debtor. If the decree be against him as representative, it is a legal and reasonable presumption until the contrary is proved that payments made by him were as representative alone (1).

'Such property of the deceased'—The question whether the entire estate in a zemindari (and not merely the zemindar's life interest) was sold in execution and bought by a purchaser is a question of mixed law and fact to be determined according to the circumstances of each case (2) and the state of the law as understood at the time of the sale is to be considered in such determination (3). *Glathrahi* lands in Birlbhoom are not liable to be seized in the hands of the son in execution of a decree against the deceased father, (4) the surplus proceeds of such tenure collected during the lifetime of the judgment-debtor are liable (5) but not those accrued after his death (6). A *shikmi ghathrahi* tenure is not liable, (7) but *ghathrahi* tenures in Kharukpore are (8).

'Proved to have come into his possession'—The onus is on the decree holder to do this, (9) he has to show that some assets came to the legal representative, and the onus is then shifted to the latter to prove how much came and how it has been applied (10). The legal representative may admit receipt of assets by implication, e.g. by asking time to pay the amount of the decree (11).

"In the same manner"—This may be by detention in the civil jail (12).

Appeal—Under sect 11 of Act XXII of 1861 an appeal lay from orders passed against a representative under sect 203 of Act VIII of 1859, corresponding with the first clause of the present section (13). See now sects 104 and 47.

(1) *Ram Golani v. Ayma Begum* 12 W. R. 177 (1860).

(2) *Alaguraya Gounder v. Ramanuja Naidu* 37 M. 22 (A. C.) (1914), and see *Veeraabadra Aiyar v. Marudaga Nachiar* 34 M. 188 (1911), *Veera Soorappa Nayan v. Errappa Naidu* 29 M. 484 (1906), *Avalaja Nacker v. Murugappa Chettiar*, 30 M. 373 (1912).

(3) *Abdul Aziz Khan v. Vijayasami Nacker* 1 C. 27 M. 131 (1904).

(4) *Nilmoti Singh v. Bukronath* 5 C. 359 (1878-9), 91 A. 104 (1882).

(5) *Kustoor v. Binoderam*, 4 W. R. 5 (1865), *Rajkeshwar v. Bunsudhur*, 23 C. 573 (1896).

(6) *Bindo Ram v. Dy. Collector Santhal*

Parg. 6 W. R. 129 (1866), s. c., 7 W. R. 178 (1867).

(7) *Bally Dobey v. Ganci* Dec. 9 C. 388 (1882).

(8) *Anundo Rai v. Kali Prasad*, 10 C. 677 (1884), *Kali Pershad v. Anand Roy*, 15 C. 471 (1887 P. C.).

(9) *Sharfun v. Collector of Sarun*, 10 W. R. 199 (1863).

(10) *Joogul Kishore v. Kalso Churn*, 25 W. R. 274 (1876).

(11) *Chotta Shayee v. Gour Monce*, 21 W. R. 117 (1873).

(12) *Mahatab Chunder v. Munmohunee*, 12 W. R. 517 (1869).

(13) *Ameeroonnessa v. Meer Mahomed*, 20 W. R. 290 (1873).

53 *For the purposes of section 50 and section 52, property in the hands of a son or other descendant which is liable under Hindu law for the payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor, in respect of which a decree has been passed, shall be deemed to be property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the son or other descendant as his legal representative*

Ancestral property—See as to this sect 50, *ante*, “Legal representative” This section which is new, has been added in order to set at rest a question on which the High Courts are divided in opinion (1) It is true that where a son or grandson takes any ancestral property by survivorship, he is bound to pay out of such property all debts of his ancestors not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes, but whether the creditor can follow the property in the hands of the son or grandson in execution is a debatable point under the Code The question is merely one of procedure, and the Legislature has come to the conclusion that any controversy between the parties with regard to the liability of the son or grandson to pay the debts of his ancestor should be determined in execution it being open to them to raise any objection or defence in such proceedings which they might have raised in a separate suit instituted by the creditor the section not imposing upon them a greater liability than that imposed by the Hindu law

In execution of a decree on mortgage, executed by a Mitakshara father as manager of and for the benefit of the family, a son's share is saleable (2) But a member of a Mitakshara joint family cannot alienate any particular share as his own (3)

For the meaning of “the property of the deceased” see note on the last section

54 *Where the decree is for the partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government, or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate, the partition of the estate or the separation of the share shall be made by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf, in accordance with the law (if any) for the time being in force relating to the partition, or the separate possession of shares, of such estates.*

Decrees for partition—This section corresponds with sect 225 of Act VIII of 1859, that section, however, provided that the division made by the Collector should be “under the orders of the Court according to the rules in

(1) See *Amar Chandra Kundu v Lalak Chand Chowdhury*, 31 C. 642 (1907) F. B., and cases there cited

(2) *Deva Singh v Pam Manchar*, 2 A 746

(1833), see also *Jumona v Dig Narain*, 10 C 1 (1883)

(3) *Sherkh Abdul v Jalunandan*, 18 L J 341 (1913)

free for the partition of an estate paying revenue to Government. These words were repealed by sec. 267 Act X of 1877 and the words "and according to the law of any part of the time being in force for the partition or the separate possession of shares of such estates" inserted by Act XIV of 1882. The words in italics were added by the present Code, the words "assessed to the payment of undivided" being substituted for "paying."

"The decree is for the partition"—A decree for partition being a joint declaration of the rights of persons interested in the property an application for execution by one party may be continued by another (1). Such a decree does not operate as a severance so long as it remains under appeal (2). If the decree be simply for possession of certain definite land this section does not empower the Collector to partition property amongst the co-sharers (3).

"Estate"—The word must be read in its ordinary signification and not in the limited and defective sense in which it is used in Act VIII of 1876 (4). It does not include *raiyat wari* tenures in Madras, but includes permanently settled estates, (5) but formerly that did not apply to Bombay (6). It does not include a plot of land which falls short of being the share of a co-sharer of a *mahal* (7).

"Shall be made"—A Court cannot depart from a decree for partition by allowing certain property, directed to be partitioned to remain joint unless all the co-parceners consent (8).

"By the Collector"—It must be made solely by the Collector (9) including the delivery of the shares to their respective allottees, (10) and the execution is entirely in his hands, (11) the Court cannot interfere with him, (11) nor examine his work or direct him to make a fresh partition (12). The Collector cannot however, refuse to partition according to the decree, (13) and the Court is not deprived of its judicial power to hear and decide objections to the division of the estate made by the Collector (14). The partition must, it was held, be made by the Collector only in cases where the partition sought includes the partition of revenue so as to convert the estate into several

(1) *Khoorshid v Nubbee Fatma* 3 C 501 (1878) [doubted in *Hikmat v Wali unnessa*, 12 A 506 (1899)], *Mohun Chunder v Mohesh Chunder*, 9 C 568 (1893)

(2) *Sakharam v Hari Krishna* 6 B 113 (1881)

(3) *Narayan v Vithu*, 8 B 539 (1884)

(4) *Secretary of State v Nundun Lal* 10 C 430 (1884)

(5) *Muttuvayyangan v Kudalalagayyangan*, 6 M. 97 (1882) *Muttuchidambaram v Karup pa* 7 M 352 (1884)

(6) *Dattatraya v Mahadji* 16 B 528 (1891)

(7) *Ram Dayal v Megu Lal* C A 452 (1884)

(8) *Rajcoomaroo v Gopal Chunder*, 3 C 514 (1878)

(9) *Ramjoy Chose v Ram Ranjun* 9 C. L. R 367 (1881)

(10) *Parbhudas v Shankarbai*, 11 B 660 (1886)

(11) *Dev Gopal v Vasudev*, 12 B 371 (1887)

(12) *Shrinivas v Curunath*, 15 B 527 (1890)

(13) *Ganaji Utekar v Dhonda* 14 B 450 (1890)

(14) *Chunna Setaiyya v Krishnavanamma* 19 M 435 (1896)

revenue paying estates (1) Later, however, it was held that partition of lands in a revenue paying estate could only be made by a Collector (2) This, however, was overruled by a Full Bench decision holding that a Civil Court could partition revenue paying estates save when the partition sought a separate allotment of revenue (3) Under sect 107 of the U I Land Revenue Act, the partition cannot be made by the Collector until the decree-holder's name is recorded in the revenue papers (4) Where a person was entitled in pursuance of an order to be put into possession of a particular village, and in execution of this order the Collector put him in possession, under this section, of a wrong village, it was held that the order of the Collector was a mere nullity, and that such person was entitled to sue for possession of the village he was rightfully entitled to (5)

ARREST AND DETENTION.

36] 55 (1) A judgment-debtor may be arrested in execution of a decree at any hour and on any day, and shall, as soon as practicable, be brought before the Court, and his *detention* may be in the civil prison of the district in which the Court ordering the *detention* is situate, or, where such civil prison does not afford suitable accommodation, in any other place which the Local Government may appoint for the *detention* of persons ordered by the Courts of such district to be *detained* :

Provided, *firstly*, that, for the purpose of making an arrest under this section, no dwelling-house shall be entered after sunset and before sunrise :

Provided, secondly, that no outer door of a dwelling-house shall be broken open unless such dwelling-house is in the occupancy of the judgment debtor and he refuses or in any way prevents access thereto, but when the officer authorized to make the arrest has duly gained access to any dwelling-house, he may break open the door of any room in which he has reason to believe the judgment-debtor to be found :

Provided, thirdly, that, if the room is in the actual occupancy of a woman who is not the judgment-debtor and who according to the customs of the country does not appear in public, the officer authorized to make the arrest, shall give notice to her that

(1) Dabi Singh v Sheo Lal Singh, 16 C 203 (1899) ; Zarlun v Gowri Sunkar, 15 C. 193 (1898)

(2) Meherban Rawoot v Behari Lal, 23 C. 679 (1896)

(3) Jogobishury v. Kailash Chundra, 21 C

725 (1897) ; 1 C W N 374

(4) Tulsi Das v Sheo Narain, 28 A 376 (1906) ; 3 A L J 336

(5) Maharajah of Vijayanagram v Soma sekara, 17 M L J 147 (1906)

she is at liberty to withdraw, and, after allowing a reasonable time for her to withdraw and giving her reasonable facility for withdrawing may enter the room for the purpose of making the arrest.

Provided, fourthly, that, where the decree in execution of which a judgment debtor is arrested, is a decree for the payment of money and the judgment debtor pays the amount of the decree and the costs of the arrest to the officer arresting him, such officer shall at once release him.

(2) *The Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, declare that any person or class of persons whose arrest might be attended with danger or inconvenience to the public shall not be liable to arrest in execution of a decree otherwise than in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed by the Local Government on this behalf.*

(3) *Where a judgment-debtor is arrested in execution of a decree for the payment of money and brought before the Court, the Court shall inform him that he may apply to be declared an insolvent, and that he will be discharged if he has not committed any act of bad faith regarding the subject of the application and if he complies with the provisions of the law of insolvency for the time being in force.*

(4) *Where a judgment debtor expresses his intention to apply to be declared an insolvent and furnishes security, to the satisfaction of the Court, that he will within one month so apply, and that he will appear, when called upon, in any proceeding upon the application or upon the decree in execution of which he was arrested, the Court shall release him from arrest, and, if he fails so to apply and to appear, the Court may either direct the security to be realized or commit him to the civil prison in execution of the decree.*

Arrest—This section corresponds with sect 336 of Act X of 1877 save that the 2nd and 3rd provisos did not then appear. These provisos as also the words "*In the case of a surety such security may be realized in manner provided by sect 253,*" were added by sect 336 of Act XIV of 1882. In such Code the words in the first sub clause "*detention*" "*civil prison,*" and "*detained,*" were expressed by "*imprisonment,*" "*civil jail,*" or "*jail*" and "*imprisoned*" The second proviso then commenced "*no outer door of a dwelling house shall be broken open, but*" This has now been altered as indicated in italics by the present Code, which substitutes "*break*" for "*unfasten and*" The words in italics in the 3rd and 4th proviso and in the 2nd and 4th sub clauses have been added by the present Code the words "*furnishes security to the satisfaction of the Court*" being substituted for "*furnish sufficient security*" The third sub clause in the Codes of 1877 and 1882 was prefaced by "*The Local Government may by*"

notification published in the official Gazette, direct that whenever" instead of "If here," and ended with the words "*places all his property in possession of a receiver appointed by the Court*" instead of the words in italics it also provided that the application to be declared an insolvent was to be "*under Chapter XX*" See now Provisional Insolvency Act III of 1907 The provision as to the method of realizing the security has been omitted, as it comes within the provisions of sect 145

"A judgment-debtor may be arrested"—A purdanasheen lady was not exempt from arrest (1) but see sect 56 which was introduced into the Code in 1888

"May be arrested"—The officer arresting a judgment debtor must have the warrant of arrest in his possession at the time of making the apprehension, otherwise it is illegal (2) A decree against the hypothecated property and against the defendants personally, and containing no condition for execution first against the property, may be enforced against the person or the property of the judgment debtor, whichever the decree holder thinks best, (3) but a decree merely against mortgaged property and making no personal order for payment, cannot be executed against the person of the judgment-debtor (4)

"On any day"—An arrest may be made on Sunday under process of a Mofussil Court (5)

"In any other place"—A list of such places has been notified for Burma (6) and also for Madras (7)

Sub clause (1), second proviso—Under the former Code an outer door could not be broken open It was proposed to enact that if the judgment debtor or any person in whose dwelling house the officer authorized to make the arrest had reason to believe the judgment debtor was to be found, refused access to his house, such officer might remove or open any lock or bolt and might break open any outer door The amendments in this proviso were suggested to prevent vexatious forms of resistance to execution which constantly obstruct decree holders in the execution of their decrees Afterwards, however, the amendment took its present form, the Select Committee stating that they had carefully considered the provisions as to breaking open dwelling houses, and that they had come to the conclusion that it should be limited to dwelling houses in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor

"Who is not the judgment debtor"—It was formerly held that no order was necessary to enter a zenana of a purdanasheen judgment debtor, (8) but that decision was before sect 56 was included in the Code

(1) Maharani of Burdwan v Barada Sen
dasi, 1 B L R 31 (1868)

(2) Empress v Amar Nath, 5 A 318
(1883)

(3) Joharimal v Sant Lal, 9 A 484 (1897)

(4) Bhan v Ramchandra 11 B 517
(1897).

(5) 1 M L C Lxx (1869)

(6) Notification No 217, Burma Gazette
1897, Pt I, p 256

(7) Port St George Gazette, 1904 Pt I,
p 646

(8) Kadumbine v Koyashkam nee 7 C
19 (1891)

Sub-clause (2)—This sub clause is intended to cover the cases of certain persons or classes of persons whose summary arrest might as in the case of railway servants be attended with danger or inconvenience to the public

Sub clause (3)—Under the Codes of 1877 and 1882 this provision only extended to such provinces as were notified by the Local Governments. Such notifications were published as to Assam (1) Bengal (2) Bombay (3) Burma (4) Central Provinces (5) Madras (6) N W P and Oudh (7) and the Punjab (8). As to the Provincial Insolvency law see now Act III of 1907 which takes the place of Chapter XX of the former Code

"Apply to be declared"—Under the Codes of 1877 and 1882 this provision ran *apply under Chapter XX to be declared*. That Chapter did not apply to the towns of Calcutta Madras or Bombay (9). In such Presidency towns the judgment debtor might have applied under the Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors 11 & 12 Viet c 21 (10)

"Expresses his intention to apply"—If he does not and is committed to jail he might from jail apply under Chapter XX of the previous Code (but now the Provincial Insolvency Act 1907) and may be released under its provisions (11). This section only applies to judgment debtors who are under arrest and not already committed to jail. When a debtor is imprisoned he can only be discharged under sect 58 (12). See also O XXI r 40

"Furnishes security"—The surety was under the Code of 1882 discharged on the judgment debtor filing his petition in insolvency, (13) but under the present section apparently the surety would not be discharged until the judgment debtor had appeared also (14). A surety is discharged by the death of the judgment debtor before expiration of the time specified in the security bond, (15) or if the proceedings taken in execution of the decree wherein the security was furnished comes to an end or are struck off, (16) or if security is

(1) Assam Manual of Local Rules and Orders ed. 1893 p 191

(2) Bengal Local Statutory Rules and Orders 1903 vol. II p 70

(3) Bombay List of Local Rules and Orders ed 1896 vol. I p 406

(4) Lower Burma Courts Manual 1907 para. 602

(5) No. 351, dated 28th Sept 1877,

— Civil Circular 1-13

(12) *In re Quarrie*, 8 M 503 (1880)

(13) *Koylash Chandra v Christopoland* 17 C 171 (1887) *Ramzan v Gerard* 1 A 104 (1890)

Darakadas v Isabella 13 J 21

(1894) *Banna Wali Jauha Da* 17 J 10

Imbchunnee Lalji 21 M 560 (1881)

Naayar v Krishnasamy, 26 M 60 (

Langut Baijnath 28 A 30 (1877)

L J 143

(14) *In Ashiq Ali v* 10

(1907) the *affidavit* was

accordance with the

(15) *Krishnasamy* 31

ref. *Ashiq Ali v* 10

and see *Nalin* 10

Barack 41 C 50 (1)

which occurs in

either party

tract)

(16) *Lalji* 21

deposited on conditions and the judgment debtor dies before an order is made on his application to be declared an insolvent (1) Where the judgment debtor has applied for declaration of insolvency, and proceedings in insolvency are pending on his application, no application for execution can be made against the judgment debtor's surety (2)

"Shall release him from arrest"—A judgment debtor expressing his intention to file a petition and schedule under 11 & 12 Vict c 21 and complying with the conditions of this section, is entitled to be discharged from custody, (3) but he will be liable, though he has taken the benefit of the insolvency sections and while yet undischarged, to arrest in execution in respect of an unscheduled debt (4) A judgment debtor, who being arrested and released on furnishing security under this section, but who failed to apply to be declared an insolvent within the prescribed time, is liable to arrest, but not being arrested may apply to be declared an insolvent at a subsequent date (5)

"Security to be realized"—A transferee decree holder whose transfer has been recognized is entitled to execute against the surety (6) Where the surety by his bond undertook to pay the amount of the decree if the judgment debtor did not do so within a specified time and agreed that execution might issue under the bond without suit, it was held that though the bond was somewhat outside the scope of this section as it was then worded, summary execution could be taken out (7) But where the bond, besides the usual covenants contained further stipulations as to what should happen if the judgment-debtor's application in insolvency were refused, it was held that the latter stipulations did not come within the purview of this section as it was then worded (8) The enforcement of the liabilities of sureties is now governed by sect 145 See notes thereto (9)

Revision—An order refusing a surety's discharge not being appealable, is open to revision under sect 115 (10)

A 1 56 Notwithstanding anything in this Part, the Court shall not order the arrest or detention in the civil prison of a woman in execution of a decree for the payment of money.

Prohibition of arrest or detention of women in execution of decree for money

- (1) Ashiq Ali v Moti Lal, 29 A 466
- (2) Larga Pande v Baijnath Pande, 28 A 397 (1906)
- (3) Ex parte Pinsent, 8 M 276 (1885)
- (4) Panna Lal v Kanhaiya, 16 C 85 (1888)
- (5) Alagappa v Satathambal 25 M 724 (1902)
- (6) Chathoth v Saudindavila 26 M 258 (1902)

- (7) Kamezuli v Fauzdar, 4 C L J 311 (1900), 10 C W N 830
- (8) Janki Das v Ram Partap 16 A 37 (1893)
- (9) And as to waiver by sureties of right to have suit brought against them Kamezuli v Fauzdar, 10 C W N 830 (1900)
- (10) Banna Mal v Janna Das, 15 A 187 (1893)

Arrest of women—This section was inserted in the last Code by sect. 2 Act VI of 1888

57 The Local Government may fix scales, graduated according to rank, race and nationality, of Subsistence-allowance monthly allowances payable for the subsistence of judgment-debtors

Subsistence allowances—For notifications (1) by the Local Government of Madras see Madras List of Local Rules and Orders ed 1898, vol 1, p 195, see Burmah Rules Manual ed 1897 p 115 and for N W P see North Western Provinces and Oudh List of Local Rules and Orders ed 1891 p 113 Sects 339 and 340 are now O XVI r 39 *post*

58 (1) Every person detained in the civil prison in execution of a decree shall be so detained,—
Detention and release (a) where the decree is for the payment of a sum of money exceeding fifty rupees, for a period of six months, and,
 (b) in any other case, for a period of six weeks
Provided that he shall be released from such detention before the expiration of the said period of six months or six weeks, as the case may be,—

- (i) on the amount mentioned in the warrant for his detention being paid to the officer in charge of the civil prison, or
- (ii) on the decree against him being otherwise fully satisfied, or
- (iii) on the request of the person on whose apprehension he has been so detained, or
- (iv) on the omission by the person, on whose application he has been so detained, to pay subsistence allowance

Provided, also, that he shall not be released from such detention under clause (ii) or clause (iii), without the order of the Court

(2) A judgment debtor released from detention under this section shall not merely by reason of his release be discharged from his debt, but he shall not be liable to be re-arrested under the decree in execution of which he was detained in the civil prison

Duration of imprisonment—The first portion of the section down to the *Provido* corresponds with sect. 278 of Act VIII of 1859 and sect. 342 of the last Code, though the form of the section has been remodelled (*vide post*)

The section after the Proviso corresponds (with verbal alterations) to sect 311 of the last Code omitting clause (f) of that section which is no longer necessary owing to the remodelled form of the former sect 312. A prisoner once discharged for want of deposit of subsistence money should not be retaken (1) Where a person is imprisoned under sect 481 (now O XXXVIII r 4) *post*, imprisonment suffered after decree must be taken into consideration in calculating the six months (2) On the expiration of the period the prisoner is entitled to his discharge whether the imprisonment has been continuous or only at intervals (3) The imprisonment is not a satisfaction of the decree, and the debtor can be adjudicated an insolvent for it, (4) or his personal property may be taken in execution under the same decree (5) This section does not empower a Judge to fix a term of imprisonment at his discretion within the maximum. If one of the conditions mentioned in the proviso are fulfilled before the expiry of six months or six weeks as the case may be the judgment debtor remains in jail the full time (6) The language of clause (1) has thus been recast to show that this provision does not confer on the Court a discretion to fix shorter periods of imprisonment than those prescribed. This section does not apply to cases of imprisonment for contempt of Court (7)

59 (1) At any time after a warrant for the arrest of a
Release on ground of judgment debtor has been issued the Court
illness may cancel it on the ground of his serious
illness

(2) Where a judgment debtor has been arrested, the Court may release him if, in its opinion, he is not in a fit state of health to be detained in the civil prison

3) (3) Where a judgment-debtor has been committed to the
civil prison, he may be released therefrom—

(a) by the Local Government, on the ground of the existence of any infectious or contagious disease, or

(b) by the committing Court, or any Court to which that Court is subordinate, on the ground of his suffering from any serious illness

(4) A judgment-debtor released under this section may be re-arrested, but the period of his detention in the civil prison shall not in the aggregate exceed that prescribed by section 58

(1) *In re D varkalall Mitter Bourke & Nep*
I p 109, *Janaki Singh Roy v Kaloo Mundal*
B L R F B 889 (1868)

(2) *Ghanashamdas v Johari Mull* 7 B
431 (1883)

(3) *Khoda Bukh v Shukroolah* 5 All
H C 220 (1873)

(4) In the matter of *Nagubhai Nam*
chandra 6 Bom H C 86 (1869)

(5) *Janaki Singh Roy v Kaloo Mundal*

B I R F B 889 (1868)

(6) *Subudhi v Surji* 13 M 141 (1889)
foli Surjan Bhai Sagai Mandal 5 C W N
145 (1900)

(7) *Martin v Lawrence* 4 C 655 (189)
An interim discharge in Insolvency proceed
ings is not a discharge within the meaning
of this section *Suraj Din v Mahal* r 33 A
29 23* (1910)

Illness of judgment debtor—This section corresponds with sect 653 of the last Code. Sect 653 was added to that Code by sect 8 of Act VI of 1888.

ATTACHMENT

60. (1) The following property is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree, namely, Property liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree lands, houses or other buildings goods, money banknotes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis promissory notes Government securities, bonds or other securities for money debts shares in a corporation and, *sale* is hereinafter mentioned all other saleable property, moveable or immovable belonging to the judgment debtor, or over which, or the profits of which he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit whether the same be held in the name of the judgment debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf.

Provided that the following particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale, namely —

- (a) the necessary wearing apparel, *cooking vessels, beds and bedding of the judgment debtor, his wife and children, and such personal ornaments as, in accordance with religious usage, cannot be parted with by any woman,*
- (b) tools of artisans and where the judgment debtor is an agriculturist his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed grain as may, in the opinion of the Court, be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such, *and such portion of agricultural produce or of any class of agricultural produce as may have been declared to be free from liability under the provisions of the next following section,*
- (c) houses and other buildings *(with the materials and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment)* belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him,
- (d) books of account,
- (e) a mere right to sue for damages,
- (f) any right of personal service,
- (g) stipends and gratuities allowed to pensioners of the Government, *or payable out of any service family pension fund notified in the Gazette of India by the Governor General in Council in this behalf, and political pensions,*

- (h) *allowances (being less than salary) of any public officer or of any servant of a railway company or local authority while absent from duty,*
- (i) *the salary or allowances equal to salary of any such public officer or servant as is referred to in clause (h), while on duty, to the extent of—*
- (i) *the whole of the salary, where the salary does not exceed twenty rupees monthly,*
 - (ii) *twenty rupees monthly, where the salary exceeds twenty rupees and does not exceed forty rupees monthly, and*
 - (iii) *one moiety of the salary in any other case,*
- (j) *the pay and allowances of persons to whom the Indian Articles of War apply,*
- (k) *all compulsory deposits and other sums in or derived from any fund to which the Provident Funds Act, 1897, for the time being applies in so far as they are declared by the said Act not to be liable to attachment,*
- (l) *the wages of labourers and domestic servants whether payable in money or in kind,*
- (m) *an expectancy of succession by survivorship or other merely contingent or possible right or interest;*
- (n) *a right to future maintenance,*
- (o) *any allowance declared by any law passed under the Indian Councils Acts, 1861 and 1892, to be exempt from liability to attachment or sale in execution of a decree, and,*
- (p) *where the judgment-debtor is a person liable for the payment of land revenue, any moveable property which, under any law for the time being applicable to him, is exempt from sale for the recovery of an arrear of such revenue*

Explanation—The particulars mentioned in clauses (g), (h), (i), (j), (l) and (o) are exempt from attachment or sale whether before or after they are actually payable

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed—

- (a) *to exempt houses and other buildings (with the materials and the sites thereof and the lands immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment) from attachment or sale in execution of decrees for rent of any such house, building, site or land, or*
- (b) *to affect the provisions of the Army Act or of any similar law for the time being in force*

Property attachable—The first sub clause of this section corresponds with sect. 205 of Act VIII of 1859 save that the words "*or other buildings,*" "*saleable*" and "*or over which, or the profits of which he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit*" were added by sect. 266 of Act X of 1877, while the words "*the capital or joint stock of any railway, banking or other public Company or*" after the words "*shares in*" have been omitted by the present Code. Act X of 1877 added the provisos. According to that Act (i) ran "*one moiety of the salary of a public officer or of the servant of a Railway Company*" and the final proviso (b) "*to affect the Statute for the time being in force for punishing mutiny and desertion and for the better payment of the Army and their quarters*" The final proviso (b) was given its present form, save for the words in italics, by Act XIV of 1882 which also altered the wording of the first proviso (b) and added the words "*and gratuities*" to proviso (g). Act VII of 1888 gave "*allowances*" visos (o) and "*and grain*" in proviso (b), and "*and (o)*" in the Explanation. The word "*Indian*" in proviso (j) was substituted for "*Native*" by Act XII of 1891. The portions appearing in italics were added by the present Code. Besides the additions thus noted proviso (c) has been extended, its form under the Code of 1882 being "*the materials of houses and other buildings belonging to and occupied by agriculturists,*" and proviso (h) has been added.

In Ajmere certain further properties are exempt from attachment (1)

"Goods"—Spears and daggers are goods (2)

"Money"—Money paid into Court as the pre-emptive price by the holder of a decree for pre-emption is not attachable by a creditor of such decree-holder, (3) nor is compensation money payable to a mortgagor in the hands of a Collector attachable in execution of a mortgage decree, as the mortgagee should himself have applied for compensation (4)

"Debts"—A debt must be a perfected and absolute debt, not merely a sum of money which may or may not become payable at some future time, or the payment of which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen, it must at least be an existing debt, though it may be payable on a future date, (5) it must be specific, existing and definite (6). Debts are payable at present or in the future, and in England are called "*debts owing and accruing,*" and there, not only can an order be made attaching an accruing debt, but also an order for payment of such debt when it becomes payable (7). A mere claim for unliquidated damages cannot be attached; (8) nor can liquidated damages

(1) Ajmere Reg. I of 1877, s. 30

(2) Wala Harnji v. Hira Pat I, P. H. 618 (1885)

(3) Abdul Salam v. Wilayat, 10 A. 230 (1897)

(4) Basa Mal v. Tajammul 10 A. 78 (1891)

(5) Harihar v. Ramola 27 C. 54 (1899); 4 C. W. N. 87; 1 P. H. Mahabadi (Harnaji Harnaji)

Balabham Kishan Das v. C. W. N. 703 (1905)

(6) Puthier v. Rughnath, 14 M. J. A. 43 (1871); 7 P. H. R. 180. See last case in last note

(7) Lapp v. J. N. L. R., 10 Q. B. 531 (1873)

(8) Hanball v. Harnaji, 12 Q. R. H. 225 (1891)

on a verdict until judgment has been signed (1) Money in the hands of a garnishee which he is bound to pay is a debt (2) so is rent that is due, (3) but claims over which no Court in British India has jurisdiction are not debts liable to be attached but the mere circumstance that the garnishee is at the time of the application for execution beyond the limits of British India would not of itself render the debt not liable to be attached (4) A gratuity sanctioned by a Railway Company, the money being in the hands of its paymaster is not a debt and cannot be attached as the gift is not complete, (5) but a monthly allowance given in payment of an antecedent debt is attachable and an attachment may be made of half the monthly allowance when 3 weeks have expired inasmuch as 3 weeks of the allowance had become an existing debt though payable on a future date (6) Money due by an agent or a vendee to his principal or vendor is a debt and may be attached and it is not necessary that the exact amount due should be ascertained prior to attachment (7) but a vendor's right or interest in the balance of purchase money of immovable property payable on execution of a conveyance is not a debt so long as the conveyance remains unsigned (8) The salary of a private person is not attachable until it becomes due and is an existing debt (9) It was questionable whether arrears of interest due on Government Promissory Notes was attachable (10) A decree can be attached (11) but a decree for money though a judgment debt is not liable to sale in execution and sect 273 of the former Code (corresponding with O XXI r 53 of the present Code) provide the procedure in execution (12)

"Government securities — Money or other security deposited by the judgment debtor with a Railway Company as security for the performance of his duties is attachable subject to the lien of the Railway Company, but not saleable until the deposit is at the disposal of the judgment debtor freed from such lien (13)

'All other saleable property — As regards partnership property, it was held that it could not be attached and removed from the possession of the partners in execution of a decree against only one of the partners (14) nor

(1) Jones v Thompson 27 L J R N S 234 (1858)

(2) Booth v Frail (1883) 12 Q B D 8

(3) Mitchell v Lee L R (1867) 2 Q B 259

(4) Ghamshamial v Bhansali 5 B 249 (1881)

(5) Janki Das v East Indian Railway 6 A 634 (1884)

(6) Dambar Kocer v Rai Sham Kassen 9 C W N 703 (1905)

(7) Madho Das v Ramji Patak 16 A 286 (1894)

(8) Ahmad ul d n v Majlis Ra 3 A 12 (1880)

(9) Ayyavayyar v Virasami 21 M 333 (1891)

(10) Devi Prasad v A H Lewis 31 A

309 (1909) It has been held that the non payment of a loan does not constitute a debt which can be attached under this section Phul Chand v Chand Mal 30 A 252 (1908)

(10) Boustubchurn v Battye 1 Tay & Bell 313 (1850)

(11) Golam Mahomed v Indro Chand 15 W R 34 (1871)

(12) Sultan Kuar v Gulzari Lal 2 A 290 (1879) Truvengada v Vythilinga 6 M 418 (1883)

(13) Karathan v Subramanya 9 M 203 (1885)

(14) Karimbhai v Conservator of Forests 4 Bom 222 (1879)

could one partner attach the interest of another partner in the partnership business in the hands of a Receiver (1) and debts due from one partner to another were not attachable (2) The share of a partner in the partnership in the hands of another partner might be attached which should be done by prohibitory order, (3) and even the sale in execution of the interest of one partner, in a partnership dissolved by the death of his father and co partner was good, (4) but where the interest attached and sold was in a subsisting partnership, the purchaser could sue for dissolution and accounts (5) The effect of these decisions have been partially codified in O XXI r 49 The interest of an undivided father, a member of a Mitakshara family, can be attached and sold This is the law in Bengal Madras, Allahabad and Bombay But the purchaser merely acquires the right to compel a partition as against the other co sharers of the judgment debtor (6) The interest of a son, (7) and of any other member of the joint family, is in the same position, (8) even that of a grandson in the lifetime of his father and grandfather (9) And property in the hands of a son or other descendant which is liable under Hindu law for the payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor in respect of which a decree has been passed shall be deemed to be the property of the deceased (10) The equity of redemption in mortgaged property can be attached and sold in execution of a decree against the mortgagor, (11) but not if the person applying for attachment and sale is also the mortgagee (12) Mortgaged property may be attached but cannot be sold without a suit by the mortgagee under sect 67 of the Transfer of Property Act (13) Property is attachable even though it cannot be brought to sale without suit (14) A tenant's hereditary and beneficial interest in property can be attached and sold, (15) but an interest in an occupancy tenure, which is not transferable by custom or usage, is not saleable in execution save for rent under the Bengal Tenancy Act (16) A judgment debtor has a saleable interest in land upon which he was permitted to erect a mud house and occupy it for forty years without any reservation by the landlord that he could be ousted, but for which he paid rent (17) The right to get back from the donee certain lands reserved to the judgment debtor

(1) *Abbot v Abbott* 5 B L R 382 (1870)

(2) *Dwarka Mohun v Luckhimon*, 14 C 384 (1887)

(3) *Thama Sing v Kallias* 5 B L R 386 (1870)

(4) *Parvatheesam v Bapanna*, 13 M 447 (1890)

(5) *Jagat Chunder v Iswar Chunder* 20 C 693 (1893), see also *In re Bainbridge*, 8 C D 218, p 224

(6) *Deendyal v Jugdeep* 3 C 198 (1877 P C), 4 I A 247

(7) *Jalldar v Ram Lal* 4 C 723 (1878)

(8) *Rai Narain v Nowrut*, 4 C 809 (1879)

(9) *Jogul Kishore v Shib Sahai*, 5 A 430 (1883)

(10) Sect 53

(11) *Saraswati v Nabsdwip* 5 B L R 380 (1870), *Gossain Munraj v Deen Dyal* 20 W R 20 (1873)

(12) *Kamini v Ramlochan*, 5 B L R 450 (1870), *Bhuggobutty v Shamachurn* 1 C 337 (1876)

(13) *Chundra Nath v Burroda*, 22 C 813 (1895)

(14) *Gouri Sunkur v Aubhoyessury*, 1 C W N, xlv (1896)

(15) *Rameswar Nath v Golamee Sahoo*, 24 W R 309 (1875).

(16) *Bharam v Gopi Kanth*, 21 C 355 (1897), 1 C W N 396, *Durga Charan v Kah Prasanna*, 26 C 727 (1899), 3 C W N 596

(17) *Doorga Prasad v Brindaban*, 15 W R 274 (1871), 7 B L R 159.

payable to an auctioneer by purchasers of goods entrusted to him for auction, except as to such amount as the judgment debtor had a disposing power exercisable for his own benefit (1) When the judgment debtor contracted to lay down a pavement for B and deposited materials for the work and received in advance from B equal to the value, the materials vested in B and could not be attached (2) The corpus of trust property in the hands of a trustee cannot be attached, (3) nor an insolvent's property vested in the Official Assignee, (4) nor land assigned to a widow by way of maintenance with a proviso against alienation, (5) nor land assigned in lieu of maintenance without any mention of such proviso, as coming under clause (n) of this section, (6) but land let under a lease prohibiting the lessee assigning the property either by sale or gift is attachable (7) so is a donee's share in property given with a proviso that it should be held impartible (8) Joint family property is attachable in execution of a decree against the father so as to affect the interests of his sons unless the sons can show that their shares were not answerable for the decree (9) In Madras the attachment of the interest of an undivided member in a joint property in execution of a decree on a personal debt against him, constitutes a valid charge in favour of the judgment creditor and prevents the accrual to the other coparceners of the right of survivorship on the death of the judgment debtor pending attachment (10) The income of property subject to a restraint upon anticipation accruing due after the date of the judgment cannot be attached in execution of a decree against the separate property of a married woman (11)

"Necessary wearing apparel"—This was the effect of a Bombay High Court decision in 1872 (12) A *mangalsutra* or necklace worn by a married woman during the lifetime of her husband and never removed is exempt (13) (and see now amendment), so are the clothes equipment and arms of a person subject to the Indian Marine Act, (14) so is the *stridhan* property of a Hindu wife when execution is sought of a decree against her husband (15) Property in zenanas is not exempt from attachment (16)

"May, in the opinion of the Court, be necessary"—Beasts used in agriculture are not privileged until the Court has declared them to be so (17)

(1) Smith v Allahabad Bank 23 A 135 (1901)

(2) S C C Reference 2 N W P H C R 337 (1870)

(3) Moheput v Lihari Chowdhry, 19 W R 226 (1873) Bishen Chand v Nadir Hossein 15 C. 329 (1887 P C), 15 I A 1

(4) Denobundhoo v Shushi Mohun 12 C L R 60 (1882)

(5) Dewali v Apaji 10 B 342 (1886)

(6) Gulab v Bansidhar, 15 A 371 (1893), see also Bansidhar v Gulab, 16 A 443 (1894)

(7) Golak Nath v Mathura, 20 C 23 (1871)

(8) Narayanan v Kannan, 7 M. 315 (1884)

(9) Jagabhai v Bhukandas 11 B 37 (1886)

(10) Badur Krishnu v Lakshmana 4 M 302 (1881)

(11) Goudon v Venkatesa Moodelly, 17 M L J 363 (1907) As to question when a Policy of Insurance is attachable, see Shankar v Umabai 15 Bom L R 320 326 (1913)

(12) Gangaram v Parbhu, 9 B IL C 2 2 (1872)

(13) Appana v Tangamma 9 B 106 (1884)

(14) Act XIV of 1887 s 81

(15) Tularam v Gunaji 8 B H C 1 J 129 (1871)

(16) Doorga Churn v Huree Mohun 17 W R 86 (1872)

(17) Bakhar v Doorga Churn, 10 C. 39 (1883), 13 C L P 200

"Houses and other buildings"—Previous to the present Code, this proviso only referred to the material of houses and other buildings, but it was held to extend to any house in the physical occupation of an agriculturist, or his representatives after his death, for the purposes of his agricultural calling, (1) but "agriculturist" must be construed in its strictest sense (2) The privilege refers to a house occupied by an agriculturist as an agriculturist, not to his town residence (3) If the agriculturist does not raise the question that a house is exempt from attachment when it was attached and sold he cannot raise it in a suit for possession by the purchaser (4) If sold in execution of a decree for rent, other judgment creditors are not entitled to rateable distribution of the proceeds under sect 73 (5) This exemption does not prohibit their sale in execution of a mortgage decree if specifically mortgaged (6) The superstructure of a house belonging to a *bhag* in a *bhagdari* village is exempt from attachment under the provisions of the Bhagdari Act (Bom Act V of 1862) (7) Where a judgment debtor, whose house had been attached, claimed the benefit of clause (c) and it was found that he was both an agriculturist and a zemindar it was held that it was incumbent on him to prove that the house in question was occupied by him as an agriculturist (8)

"Books of account"—This was introduced as the effect of a decision of the Bombay High Court in 1866 (9) The Court may however direct their production in Court to prevent the judgment debtor making away with them (10)

"Mere right to sue for damages"—This is the effect of the decisions of the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts (11) The right to bring a suit to set aside a sale is not attachable, (12) nor the right to sue for mesne profits, (13) but if a decree has been passed it may be attached (14) The right to appeal is not attachable (15)

"Any right of personal service"—The right of worship of a Hindn idol cannot be sold in execution, (16) nor the right to the surplus profits of shebaitship, (17) nor a priestly office with emoluments, (18) but where a

(1) Radhakisan : Balvant 7 B 530 (1883)

(2) Jivan Bhaga : Hira Bhaty, 12 B 363 (1887)

(3) Manecklal v Manilal, 7 B L R 685 (1905)

(4) Pandurang v Krishnaji, 28 B 125 (1903), Narayan v Gowbar, 15 Bom L R 278 (1912)

(5) Venulal v Lalha, 4 B 429 (1880)

(6) Bhagvandas v Hathibhar, 4 B 25 (1879), but see Ram Dial : Narpal, 33 A 136 (1909), Bhola Nath : Mt Vashori, 34 A 25 (1912)

(7) Collector of Broach : Venulal, 21 B 588 (1896)

(8) Jamna Prasad Raut v Raghunath Prasad, 35 A 307 (1913)

(9) *In re Patonji*, 3 B H L 42 (1866)

(10) Adjoodyha : Middleton, 3 N W P H C R 334 (1871)

(11) Tuffuzzool : Raghunath, 7 B L R 186 (1871), 14 Moo I A 40, Mahomed : Sheo Sevuk, 6 N W P H C R 95 (1874)

(12) Carapet : Panna Lal, 14 W R 152 (1870)

(13) Shyam Chand v Land Mortgage Bank, 9 C 695 (1883), 12 C L R 440

(14) Golam Mahomed : Indro Chand, 15 W R 31 (1871), 7 B L R 318

(15) Bipro Protap v Deo Narain, 3 W R 115 (1865)

(16) Dubo Myster v Srimbas, 5 B L R 617 (1870), Kalee Churn : Bungshee, 15 W R 339 (1871), 6 B L R 727

(17) Juggurnath : Kishen Pershad, 7 W R 266 (1867)

(18) Mallika v Ratannani, 1 G W N 493

property was bequeathed to an idol with directions that the surplus income was to go to the family of the deceased the interest in such surplus of a member of the family could be attached and sold (1) but the vendee would not be entitled to enter on the land (2) If the surplus profits of shebaitship be sold to the next shebait his right to succeed to the management would be quite unaffected by execution proceedings during the lifetime of the former shebait (3) The interest of a servant of a temple in land which he held as remuneration for his service can be attached (4) A *Birth Moha Brahminy* or right to officiate at funeral ceremonies being intangible and impalpable, cannot be attached (5) so also a *upadhikpana uruti* (a hereditary priestly office) on the Godavari at Nisik is being a right of personal service, (6) so is a *gotushi uruti*, (7) and a *uruti* cannot be sold in execution though its private alienation is not absolutely prohibited (8) but it may be sold in execution if expressly ordered by the decree (9)

"Stipends"—This includes all pensions of a political nature payable directly by the Government, (10) also stipends allowed by Government to the members of the Mysore family (11) The stipend of a Carnatic Stipendiary is not attachable (12)

"Gratuities"—This is not confined to those payable to pensioners but includes gratuities granted in consideration of past services (13) A bonus

into force, the application for execution was not barred for want of a certificate under sect 4 of that Act (16) A *Zora qarar lak* is not a pension and is not privileged (17)

"Pensions"—A private pension though not privileged is not attachable save as to arrears accrued due (18) Arrears of Yeomiah pension accidentally accumulated are not liable to attachment (19) Land granted by Government but not revenue free as reward for services rendered is

(1) *Ashutosh v Doorga Churn* 6 I A 182 (1879 P C)

(2) *Sil chunder v Sibkissen* 1 Boulv 4, 73 (1874)

(3) *Fimbak v Narayan* 7 B 188 (1882)

(4) *Lothkar v Wagle*, 6 B 596 (1882)

(5) *Jhummon v Dinooonath* 16 W B 171 (1871)

(6) *Ganesh Ramchandra v Shankar Ramchandra* 10 B 395 (1886)

(7) *Govind v Ramkrishna* 12 B 366 (1887)

(8) *Rajaram v Ganesh* 23 B 131 (1898)

(9) *Sadashiv v Jayantibai* 8 B 185 (1883)

(10) *Bishambar v Imdad Ali* 18 Cal. 216 (1890 P C), L R 17 I A 181, *Mithunams v Alag* 20 M 423 (1902)

(11) *Mohamed Kuzulbash v Mohamed Buseeroodeen* 7 W R 169 (1867)

(12) *Mahomed Ali lut v Comander* 4 M H C 277 (1869)

(13) *Bawan Das v Mul Chandi* 6 A 173 (1884)

(14) *Muhammed Khasim v Carher*, 5 M 272 (1882)

(15) *Vally Transburatti v Anjani* 20 M 69 (1902)

(16) *Dharamdas v Hafasp* 19 R. 240 (1891)

(17) *Secretary of State v Khemchand* 4 B 432 (1880)

(18) *Bhoynub Chun lerr Malhub Chun lerr*, 6 C. L. R. 11 (1880)

(19) *Referred Case*, 5 M H C. 371 (1870).

"Houses and other buildings"—Previous to the present Code, this proviso only referred to the material of houses and other buildings, but it was held to extend to any house in the physical occupation of an agriculturist, or his representatives after his death for the purposes of his agricultural calling, (1) but "agriculturist" must be construed in its strictest sense (2) The privilege refers to a house occupied by an agriculturist as an agriculturist, not to his town residence (3) If the agriculturist does not raise the question that a house is exempt from attachment when it was attached and sold he cannot raise it in a suit for possession by the purchaser (4) If sold in execution of a decree for rent other judgment creditors are not entitled to rateable distribution of the proceeds under sect 73 (5) This exemption does not prohibit their sale in execution of a mortgage decree if specifically mortgaged (6) The superstructure of a house belonging to a *bhag* in a *bhagdari* village is exempt from attachment under the provisions of the Bhagdari Act (Bom Act V of 1862) (7) Where a judgment debtor, whose house had been attached, claimed the benefit of clause (c) and it was found that he was both an agriculturist and a zemindar, it was held that it was incumbent on him to prove that the house in question was occupied by him as an agriculturist (8)

"Books of account"—This was introduced as the effect of a decision of the Bombay High Court in 1866 (9) The Court may however direct their production in Court to prevent the judgment debtor making away with them (10)

"Mere right to sue for damages"—This is the effect of the decisions of the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts (11) The right to bring a suit to set aside a sale is not attachable, (12) nor the right to sue for mesne profits, (13) but if a decree has been passed it may be attached (14) The right to appeal is not attachable (15)

"Any right of personal service"—The right of worship of a Hindu idol cannot be sold in execution, (16) nor the right to the surplus profits of shebaitship, (17) nor a priestly office with emoluments, (18) but where a

(1) Radhakisan v Balvant 7 B 530 (1883)

(2) Jivan Bhaga v Hira Bhau, 12 B 363 (1887)

(3) Maneckdal v Manulal 7 B L R 685 (1905)

(4) Pandurang v Krishnaji, 28 B 125 (1903), Narayan v Gowhai, 15 Bom L R 278 (1912)

(5) Vendal v Lakha, 4 B 423 (1880)

(6) Bhagvandas v Hathubhai, 4 B 25 (1879), but see Ram Dial v Narpal, 33 A 136 (1909), Bhola Nath v Mt Vashori 34 A 25 (1912)

(7) Collector of Broach v Venmal, 21 B 588 (1896)

(8) Jamna Prasad Raut v Raghunath Prasad 35 A 307 (1913)

(9) *In re Pestonji* 3 B H C 42 (1866)

(10) Adjoodya v Middleton 3 N W P H C R 334 (1871)

(11) Tuffuzzool v Raghunath, 7 B L R 186 (1871), 14 Moo L A 40, Mahomed v Sheo Seruk 6 N W P H C R 95 (1874)

(12) Carapet v Panna Lall 14 W R 152 (1870)

(13) Shyam Chand v Land Mortgage Bank, 9 C 695 (1883), 12 C L R 440

(14) Golam Mahomed v Indro Chand, 15 W R 31 (1871), 7 B L R 318

(15) Bipro Protap v Deo Narain 3 W 1 vls 16 (1865)

(16) Dubo Misser v Srimbas, 5 B L R 617 (1870), Kallee Churn v Bungshee, 15 W P 339 (1871), 6 B L R 727

(17) Juggurnath v Kishen Pershad 7 W R 206 (1867)

(18) Mallika v Pataumani 1 C W N 493

property was bequeathed to an idol with directions that the surplus income was to go to the family of the deceased the interest in such surplus of a member of the family could be attached and sold (1) but the vendee would not be entitled to enter on the land (2) If the surplus profits of shebaitship be sold to the next shebait his right to succeed to the management would be quite unaffected by execution proceedings during the lifetime of the former shebait (3) The interest of a servant of a temple in land which he held as remuneration for his service can be attached (4) A *Birth Moha Brahminy* or right to officiate at funeral ceremonies being intangible and impalpable, cannot be attached, (5) so also a *upadhyaya vrutti* (a hereditary priestly office) on the Godavari at Nashik is being a right of personal service, (6) so is a *gotchi vrutti*, (7) and a *vrutti* cannot be sold in execution though its private alienation is not absolutely prohibited (8) but it may be sold in execution if expressly ordered by the decree (9)

"Stipends"—This includes all pensions of a political nature payable directly by the Government, (10) also stipends allowed by Government to the members of the Mysore family (11) The stipend of a Carnatic Stipendiary is not attachable (12)

"Gratuities"—This is not confined to those payable to pensioners, but includes gratuities granted in consideration of past services (13) A bonus granted in addition to a pension is also privileged, (14) so is the balance of pension unpaid at the time of the pensioner's death (15) When the decree sought to be attached was passed before the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) came into force, the application for execution was not barred for want of a certificate under sect 4 of that Act (16) A *Zora garas lak* is not a pension and is not privileged (17)

"Pensions"—A private pension though not privileged is not attachable save as to arrears accrued due (18) Arrears of Yeomiah pension accidentally accumulated are not liable to attachment (19) Land granted by Government but not revenue free, as reward for services rendered is

(1) *Ashutosh v. Doorja Churn* 6 I A 182 (1873 P. C.)

(2) *Sitohunder v. Sibkissen*, 1 Bould. 71 (1874)

(3) *Frimbak v. Narayan*, 7 B 188 (1882)

(4) *Lotlikar v. Wagle*, 6 B 596 (1882)

(5) *Thummon v. Dinooath* 16 W. R. 171 (1871)

(6) *Ganesh Ramechantra v. Shankar Ramchandra* 10 B 395 (1886)

(7) *Govind v. Ramkrishna*, 12 B 366 (1887)

(8) *Rajaram v. Ganesh* 23 B 131 (1898)

(9) *Sadasiv v. Jayantibai*, 8 B 185 (1883)

(10) *Bishambar v. Imla* 1 All. 18 Cal. 216 (1890 P. C.), 1 L. R. 171 A. 181; *Muthusami v. Alagia* 26 M. 423 (1902)

(11) *Mohamed Kuzuliah v. Mohamed Huseenodeen* 7 W. R. 160 (1867)

(12) *Mahomed Albul v. Comanlar* 4 M. H. C. 277 (1869)

(13) *Bawan Das v. Mal Chaul* 6 A. 173 (1881)

(14) *Muhammed Khasim v. Carter*, 5 M. 272 (1882)

(15) *Valla Framlraiti v. Aniljani*, 26 M. 69 (1902)

(16) *Bharanias v. Hafas*, 19 B. 240 (1894)

(17) *Secretary of State v. Khemchand* 4 B. 432 (1880)

(18) *Bhoyrub Chund Lere Ma Thub Chund Lere*, 11 C. L. R. 19 (1880)

(19) *Referred Case*, 5 M. H. C. 371 (1880)

not a pension and is attachable, (1) similarly the grant of an annual sum made by Government as compensation for loss sustained by the grantee on account of improper resumption by Government of rent free lands (2) In England, superannuation allowance already accrued due to a retired police constable is attachable, (3) and pensions solely in respect of past services are liable to sequestration though half pay, being to some extent for future services, is not (4) A zemindari granted (not revenue free) by Government as a reward for services rendered is not a pension (5) Pensions were exempted by Act XXIII of 1871 In clause (g) the words "military or civil" have been omitted as being of no value The word "pensioners" of itself covers every class of pensioner

"Salary of any public officer"—Under sect 236 of Act VIII of 1859, salaries of Railway servants had to be actually due before they could be attached, (6) similarly the salary of a Telegraph Officer, (7) but now the unprivileged portion can be attached in advance (8) The Calcutta High Court has held that while the pay of an Indian Staff Corps officer, as being of a public officer, comes within the meaning of this section that of an officer of the Regular Forces not being of a public officer does not, (9) and the Allahabad High Court has also held that an officer of the Regular forces is not a public officer and that his pay cannot be attached (10) but in Madras it has been held that he is a public officer and his pay is attachable (11) Half the pay of persons subject to military law other than soldiers of the regular forces is liable to attachment (12) An attachment upon the salary of a Railway servant ceases to be operative after he has filed his petition in Insolvency, and should be withdrawn on notice being received of the making of the vesting order (13) For definition of "public officer" see sect 2 (17) Under the Code of 1859 the whole of the salary of a peon in the service of a *Mamladar* under Government could be attached if it had become due (14) The remuneration of a *Watan*dar cannot be attached while in the hands of the Collector or other disbursing officer but otherwise if in the hands of the *Watan*dar himself (15) A *khote* is not a public officer and the percentage on collections received by him is not salary and is attachable (16) The salary of a private person cannot be attached until it becomes due and a debt

-
- | | |
|--|--|
| (1) <i>Lachmi Naram v Makund Singh</i> , 26 A 617 (1904) | 6 C L R 19 (1880) |
| (2) <i>Jiban Krishna t Sripati Charan</i> 8 C W N 665 (1904) | (9) <i>Calcutta Trades Association t Ryland</i> 24 C 102 (1896), <i>Vecheand t Bouchier</i> 37 B 26 (1912), 14 Bom 777 |
| (3) <i>Booth v Trail</i> 12 Q B D 8 (1883) | (10) <i>Lecky t Bank of Upper Burma</i> 33 A 529 (1911) |
| (4) <i>Dent v Dent</i> L R 1 P & D 366 (1867), <i>Willcock v Terrell</i> L R 3 Ex D 323 (1878) | (11) <i>Watson v Lloyd</i> 25 M 402 (1901) |
| (5) <i>Lachmi Naram v Makund Singh</i> 26 A. 617 (1904), <i>Amna Bibi v Najnum Nissa</i> 31 A 382 (1909) | (12) 44 & 45 Viet c 58 s 151 |
| (6) <i>In matter of Hollick</i> 10 W R 447 (1868) 2 B L R 108 | (13) <i>In matter of Donoghue</i> 19 B 232 (1891) |
| (7) <i>Hussen Bhamjee v Hicks</i> 18 W P 124 (1872) | (14) <i>Tejram v Kusalp</i> , 7 B H C A J 110 (1870) |
| (8) <i>Bhojrub Chunder v Madhub Chunder</i> , | (15) <i>Ganpatlal v Sampatram</i> 10 B H C 400 (1873) |
| | (16) <i>Ravp v Sayajirao</i> 13 W R 673 (1839) |

"An expectancy of succession"—This includes the right of a reversioner to succeed on the death of a Hindu widow if he happen to survive her (9) Also the life interest in the residue of the property of a testator ascertainable after full administration, (10) or a son's interest in his father's estate which was bequeathed to his mother for life, (11) or the life interest which a judgment debtor would be entitled to in an estate after the payment of certain charges, cannot be sold in execution (12) Where however a Mahomedan by deed granted property to his wife on condition that if she had no child by him the grant should be a perpetual *mokurruri* and if no child then a life *mokurruri* with remainder to the settlor's two sons the interest of one of such sons was attachable, (13) so is the interest of a person who makes a gift of land to a Hindu widow for her maintenance such interest being a vested interest in the land (14)

- (14) Kachwain v Sarup Chand, 10 A 402 (1888)

"Other merely contingent or possible right or interest"—As, for instance a vendor's right in the balance of purchase-money payable on the execution of a conveyance, so long as the conveyance is not executed, (1) or a claim under a future award of arbitration, (2) the interest in pre-empted property of a successful pre-emptor who has not yet paid the pre-emptive price fixed by his decree, (3) but property the subject of an existing suit is attachable, though the Court would order its sale at the fittest and most proper time (4) A vested remainder in a house is attachable (5) A mere right to receive profits which are not yet due is not attachable (6)

"Right to future maintenance"—The mere right to future maintenance cannot be attached (7) This includes land assigned to a widow in lieu of maintenance (8) but without any right of alienation (9) The right of a Hindu widow to reside in her husband's family house is a purely personal right and cannot be attached under this section (10) Formerly, the Court might order the party chargeable with the payment of an instalment of maintenance about to become due not to pay and the judgment debtor not to receive, so that it be paid either to such person as the Court should direct or that an arrangement under sect 368 (O XXI r 46) for its collection or administration be made (11) This, however, has not been the practice since (12) An annuity given by will, not by any right of maintenance, but out of the testator's bounty, is attachable, (13) so are arrears of maintenance already accrued due (14) The income of a fund in hands of trustees payable half yearly to the judgment debtor cannot be attached after the last payment has been made and before the next is payable there being no debt "owing or accruing," (15) but under the Code of 1859, an annuity charged on an estate could be attached at the instance of the person by whom it was then payable he having inherited the estate from the grantor of the annuity (16) so can maintenance charged by deed on the grantor's property and recoverable by suit on non payment, (17) also, in execution of a mortgage decree, the right to receive an allowance assigned to the judgment debtor's deceased wife in lieu of her share of landed property and inherited by him from

(1) Ahmad ul din v. Majlis Rai 3 A 12 (1880)

(2) Tuffazool v. Pughosnath 14 Moo I A 40 (1871), 7 L L R 186

(3) Gorakh Singh v. Sidh Gopal 3 A I J 183 (1906) 28 A 383

(4) Ram Chunder v. Nund Lal, 19 W P 132 (1873)

(5) Annaji v. Chandrabai 17 P 503 (1892)

(6) Sher Singh v. Sri Ram, 30 A 246 (1908)

(7) Duloon v. Sungun 7 W R 311 (1867) Monessur v. Kishen 23 W R 427 (1875)

(8) Gulab Kuar v. Bansidhar 15 A 371 (1893)

(9) Manusami v. Ammani 15 M L J 7

(10) Salakshi v. Takshimaya, 31 M 500 (1908)

(11) Monessur v. Beer Protap, 15 W R 188 (1871), B L R 646, Chulowrie v. Numoodah, 24 W R 5 (1875)

(12) Haridas v. Baroda Kisl ore 2 C 38 (1899), 4 C W N 87

(13) Gopal Lal Seal v. Maraden 10 C W N 1102 (1906)

(14) Kasheeshuree v. Greesh Chunder, 6 W R 64 (1866), Hoyinobutty v. Koroona 8 W R 41 (1867)

(15) Webb v. Stenton 11 Q B D 518 (1883)

(16) Dheraj Mahtub v. Dhun Coomaree, 17 W R 254 (1871)

(17) Enact Hosain v. Nujeeboonessa, 11 W R 133 (1869)

her and mortgaged by him (1) So where a person sells property in consideration of a payment down and an annuity the annuity is attachable even where the purchaser is the Court of Wards (2) But the income of property belonging to a married woman, subject to a restraint on anticipation accruing due after the date of a decree against such married woman's separate property under sect 8 of the Married Woman's Property Act is not liable to attachment in execution of such decree (3) An hereditary grant of an allowance of paddy out of the *melicaram* of certain land is not a right to future maintenance (4) It has been recently held that this exemption of a right to future maintenance does not affect property or an interest in property which was granted for maintenance, and that thus the crop standing on land allotted to a widow for maintenance can be attached (5) A distinction has been recognized between a right to receive money for purposes of maintenance properly so called and a right or interest in property which forms a fund or estate out of which an annuity is paid to the grantee—the former is a personal right and inalienable, the latter can be alienated Where an appellant conveyed his estate to his son, but retained a right to receive from him a certain sum annually it was held that this was not a right to future maintenance but a valuable interest in the property (6)

61 *The Local Government, with the previous sanction of Partial exemption of the Governor General in Council, may, by agricultural produce general or special order published in the local official Gazette, declare that such portion of agricultural produce, or of any class of agricultural produce, as may appear to the Local Government to be necessary for the purpose of providing until the next harvest for the due cultivation of the land and for the support of the judgment debtor and his family shall, in the case of all agriculturists or of any class of agriculturists, be exempted from liability to attachment or sale in execution of a decree*

Attachment of agricultural produce"—See O XXI rr 44 and 45 These provisions which in the original Bill affected "growing crops" only, have been extended to all "agricultural produce" While it has been considered that the Court should attach such produce, which will now in all cases be treated as moveable property, by taking it into its possession and custody at the same time the procedure relating to the "actual seizure" of moveables crop, and having regard to the with respect to the sale of "agricultural produce" has been deemed to exist against allowing such produce to be ordinarily removed on attachment In these

(1) *Salamat Hossain v. Luckhu Ram* 10 C. 521 (1884)

(2) *Har Shankar v. Bagnath Das*, 23 L. 164 (1901)

(3) *Goudon v. Venkatesh* 30 M. L. J. 378 (1907)

(4) *Vardyanath v. Legis* 30 M. L. J. 279 (1907)

s. c., 17 M. L. J. 373

(5) *Gobinda v. Meenatchi* 22 M. L. J. 204 (1911)

(6) *Padmanund v. Rama Proshad*, 16 C. L. J. 354 (1912), 17 C. L. J. 662, *Asad v. Haider*, 33 C. L. J. 13 (1910), 12 C. L. J. 130, *Tara Sundari v. Saroda* 12 C. L. J. 116 (1910).

(1) No person executing any process of seizure of property in Code directing or authorizing the sheriff to enter any dwelling house shall enter at any time after sunset and before sunrise.

(2) No outer door of a dwelling house shall be broken open unless such dwelling house is in the occupancy of the debtor and he refuses or in any way prevents access. When the person executing any such process has duly gone to any dwelling house, he may break open the door of the room in which he has reason to believe any such property is.

(3) Where a room in a dwelling house is in the occupancy of a woman who according to the custom of the country, does not appear in public, the person exe-

process shall give notice to such person to withdraw, and, after allowing him to withdraw and giving her reasonable time, she may enter such room for the purpose of using at the same time every precaution and provisions, to prevent its clandestine removal.

Seizure of property—This section corresponds with sect 271 of Act X of 1877 with the words "house or other building" were used. The first sentence was added by Act XIV of 1882 sub clause (2) commenced with the words "or shall break open of a dwelling house" instead of the words in italics "Provided that if the room be a dwelling house while the word "break" in sub clause (2) is unfused and. The second sub clause has been added line with sect 55, ante.

"Any outer door"—It was formerly held that the door of a shop, (1) or remove locks on the door of a shop for safe custody (2). Under the earlier Codes, which provided for the opening of any outer door of a dwelling house it was held that

break open any outer door, that is, any outer door of the dwelling house of the defendant but not of the house of a stranger.

"Break open"—A person executing a process for attachment of moveables having gained access to the lock from the door of a room in moveable property was lodged (person in execution of a decree against the judgment debtor) if it turns out that the person or goods of the debtor are not in the house.

"Actual occupancy of a woman"—This provision does not apply to the arrest of a purdinasheen woman (6). As to arrest, see sects 55 and 132.

63. (1) Where property not in the custody of any Court is under attachment in execution of decrees of more Courts than one, the Court which shall receive or realize such property and

Property attached in execution of decrees of several Courts

(1) Damodar Parsotam v. Ishwar Jetha, 3 Bom 89 (1878)

(4) Kondasawmy v. Krishnasawmy, 6 M H C. 189 (1870)

(5) Peg v. Gazi, 7 L. H. C. Cr. (1870)

(6) Kadurabai v. Koylasikam, 19 (1881)

determine any claim thereto and any objection to the attachment thereof shall be the Court of highest grade, or, where there is no difference in grade between such Courts, the Court under whose decree the property was first attached.

(2) *Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a Court executing one of such decrees.*

Attachment under several decrees—This section is the same as sect 285 of Act X of 1877 save that the words "is under attachment" have been substituted for "has been attached" and sub clause (2) added by the present Code. It only applies to cases of attachment and not to sales (1). It is doubtful if it applies to immovable property, (2) but the Madras High Court has held that it does (3). It only applies where the Courts are all either Civil Courts or Revenue Courts and not to cases of conflict between Civil and Revenue Courts (4).

"Decrees of more Courts than one"—This section does not apply where there is not more than one existing attachment. Thus where in execution of a mortgage decree of the first mortgagee the Munsif attached, and then the Subordinate Judge attached and sold in execution of a decree of the second mortgagee the subsequent sale by the Munsif was valid (5).

"The Court which shall receive or realize such property and shall determine"—This includes the sale of the attached property, (6) also the power of deciding objections to the attachment, of determining claims made to the property, of ordering the sale thereof and receiving the sale proceeds, and of providing for their distribution under sect 73 (7). It has been held that the words "claim thereto and any objection to the attachment" refer to claims and objections of a sort which can be summarily decided in execution proceedings (8).

"Shall be the Court of highest grade"—It was held under the former Code that this does not take away the jurisdiction of the inferior Court and its proceedings in contravention would be vitiated only where there had been notice of the proceedings in the superior Court, (9) but if there were notice, a sale by the inferior Court would be bad (10). Thus where sales were held by the Subordinate Judge and the Small Cause Court (the latter having notice of the former's attachment) on the same day, it was held that the purchaser at the Subordinate Judge's sale had the better title (10).

- | | |
|--|--|
| (1) Chundi Lal : Debi Prasad, 3 A 356 (1896) | (2) Badri Prasad : Sarun Lal 4 A. 359 (1882). |
| (2) Obhoy Churn : Golam Ali, 7 C 110 (1891) | Bhagwan Chandra Kribhatna : Chandra Mala Gupta, 1 C L J 97 (1902). |
| (3) Muttukaruppan : Mutturamalinga 7 M 47 (1883) | (8) Ramjas : Guru Charan, 14 C. W. N 396 (1909) |
| (4) Raghubar : Banke Lal 23 A 182 (1900) | (9) Kunhayan : Ithukutti, 22 M 295 (1898), Hykant Nath : Rajendro, 12 C 333 (1895) |
| (5) Stowell : Ajudhia Nath, 8 A 255 (1884) | (10) Abdul Karim : Thakordas, 22 L 88 (1896) |
| (6) Abdul Karim : Bhakordas, 22 B 85 | |

So where a house attached by a Subordinate Judge was attached and sold by a Munsif and subsequently sold by the Subordinate Judge the Munsif's sale was invalid (1) but where property is sold by an inferior Court by mistake (due to its not having received notice of the proceedings in the superior Court) the sale should not be set aside but the superior Court should adopt the sale and distribute the assets (2) The Calcutta High Court, following this last case and dissenting from the two Allahabad and the Madras cases just referred to (but apparently overlooking the question of notice) held that where the first Munsif's Court attached property and thereafter the second Munsif's Court attached and sold the same property the sale was valid though the two Courts were of the same grade (3) The Bombay High Court then held (the question of notice not being mentioned) that where the second Subordinate Judge attached and sold property which, however, was attached by the first Subordinate Judge before the sale the sale was valid (4) So where the Munsif attached and sold while an attachment subsisted of the Subordinate Judge the Calcutta High Court held the sale was valid, this section being merely one for procedure to prevent different claims arising out of attachment and sale by different Courts (5) Where the same property has been attached by two Courts of different grades, a sale by the Court of lower grade is not less invalid because it was ignorant of the attachment by the Court of higher grade, all the rulings of the Allahabad High Court being this way, though opposed to the rulings of Madras and Bombay (6) The Calcutta High Court has recently held that where the same property is under attachment by two Courts of different grades a sale effected by the Court of a lower grade is not a nullity (7) The fact that prior to the attachment by the superior Court, proceedings subsequent to attachment had been taken by the inferior Court, was held not to affect the operation of this section (8) Again, where a Subordinate Judge made an order for attachment before judgment, which became operative on a decree being subsequently obtained after attachment, but the day before sale by a Munsif, and thereupon the Subordinate

was raised in the second clause (9)

In the N W P the Court of a Munsif must for the purposes of this section

(1) Muttukaruppan v Mutturamalinga 7 M 47 (1883) Aghore Nath v Shama Sundari, 5 A 615 (1883) Radri Prasad v Saran Lal, 4 A 359 (1882)

(2) Bykant Nath v Rajendra 12 C 333 (1885)

(3) Dwarka Nath v Banku Behari 19 C 651 (1891)

(4) Patel Naranyi v Haridas 14 B 458 (1893), Turmuklal v Kafirias 19 B 127 (1894)

(*) Pam Narain v Mina Korry 25 C 46

(1897), Gopi Chand Bothra v Kasemuntassu 31 C 836 (1907)

(6) Churanji Lal v Jawahir Mal, 26 A 148 (1904), Ioll Har Prasad v Jagan Lal, 27 A 56 (1904), Durpati Biba v Pamrach Lal 15 A 527 (1909)

(7) Gopi Chand Bothra v Kasemuntassu Khatoon, 31 C 836, s.c., 6 C. L. J 120 (1897)

(8) Ballabhen v Narain Das 18 A 246 (1896)

(9) Bhagwan Chandra v Chandra Mal 1 C. L. J 97 (1892).

be regarded as of a higher grade than a Court of Small Causes (1) Where there is a conflict between a Civil Court and a Revenue Court, this section does not apply and whichever Court first sells conveys a good title (2) Sect 73 does not require the transfer of a decree to the Court where the process of realization is taking place as a condition precedent to an application under this section (3)

64. Where an attachment has been made, any private *transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein* and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment.

Explanation—For the purposes of this section, claims enforceable under an attachment include claims for the rateable distribution of assets

Alienation after attachment—This section corresponds with sect 240 of Act VIII of 1859, save that the words “as against all claims enforceable under the attachment” were added by sect 276 of Act X of 1877, and that the wording of the earlier portion of that section which ran, “When an attachment has been made by actual seizure or by written order duly intimated and made known in manner aforesaid, any private alienation of the property attached, whether by sale, gift, mortgage or otherwise,” has been replaced by the words (except those italicized) down to “interest therein” in this section. The words italicized and the Explanation are new. As to the latter see last paragraph, post

“Where an attachment has been made”—The attachment must be effectual (4) An attachment does not create any charge or interest upon property in favour of the attaching creditor as against other creditors, (5) it only prevents alienation and does not confer title, (6) but under a mortgage decree an attachment supplemented by an order for sale created a valid charge on the share of a Mitakshara co parcener who died thereafter (7) It has been held that this section includes an attachment before judgment in a suit which is subsequently decreed (8) But in a recent case in the Bombay High Court where attachment before judgment had been obtained against a Mitakshara co parcener and he died before execution, it was held that execution could not

(1) *Balla Pann v Raghubar Dial* 16 A 11 (1893)

(2) *Raghubar Dayal v Banke Lal*, 22 A 182 (1900)

(3) *Har Bhagat v Anandaram* 2 C W N 120 (1897)

(4) *Satya Charan Mukerji v Madhub Chunder Karmakar*, 9 C W N 693 (1905)

(5) *Soobal Chunder v Russell Lal* 15 C 202 (1888)

(6) *Moti Lal v Karrabuddin*, 21 I A 170, 25 C 179 (P C 1897), 1 C W N 639, *Peacock v Madan Gopal*, 6 C W N 57 (1902), *Krishnasawmy v Offi Assignee* 26 M 673 (1903)

(7) *Saraj Bansi v Sheo Persad*, 5 C 148, p 171 (P C 1879)

(8) *Chann Singh v Jangti Lal* 24 C 531 (1899)

“Private Transfer”—These are alienations which, if permitted, would defeat claims legally enforceable under the attachment (11) and so far as they prejudice the execution creditor they are void (12). They include a *zar i peshgi* lease and also an ordinary agricultural lease, (13) and a sale after attachment to the mortgagee under a mortgage executed before attachment (14) as also an assignment of a Hindu widow's life interest in the profits of immovable property left her by her husband's will, (15) but the consent of a Mahomedan heir to a bequest by a Mahomedan of more than one third of his estate is not an alienation under this section, (16) nor the vesting of an insolvent's estate in

- (1) *Subra Mangesh Chandavarkar v Mahadevi, lom Manjibhatta, 38 B 105* (1913), *dist Suraj Buns; v Sheo Persad, supra*, and *citing Moti Lal v Karrabaldin, 25 C 179* (1897)
- (2) *Sahoo Chund v Geetam Singh, 2 N W P H C R 206* (1867)
- (3) *Stephenson v Baungartner, 3 Agra, 104* (1868)
- (4) *Rameswar v Ramtanu, 4 B L R A J 24* (1869)
- (5) *Satya Charan v Madhub Chunder, 9 C W N 693* (1905)
- (6) *Nur Ahmad v Altaf Ali, 2 A 58* (1878)
- (7) *Gumant v Hardwar, 3 A 698* (1881)
- (8) *Dwarkanath v Ram Chunder, 13 W R 136* (1870)
- (9) *Ramakrishna v Surfunniswa, 6 C 129* (1880 P C)
- (10) *Kunhu Moossa v Makka, 23 M 478, 482* (1899), *Vibhuthapuja v Suthaswami, 28 M 380* (1905)
- (11) *Abdul Rashid v Cappo Lal, 20 A 421* (1898)
- (12) *Dunobundhu v Jogmaya, 29 I A 9* (1901), *29 C 154, 6 C W N 209*
- (13) *Debi Prasad v Paldeo, 18 A 123* (1895)
- (14) *Annavundavan v Iyasawmy, 6 M H C 65* (1871)
- (15) *Natha Kerra v Dhunbaji, 23 B 1* (1898)
- (16) *Deulstram v Abdul Kavum, 26 B 497* (1902)

the Official Assignee under a vesting order,(1) nor the renewal of a mortgage, originally made before attachment, which does not enhance the charge,(2) nor the execution of a conveyance directed by a decree made after attachment in terms of an award of arbitrators made before attachment,(3) nor an alienation made in compliance with the conditions of O XXI r 83 (4) The law in the Mofussil as to alienations by debtors is the *lex rei sitæ* (5) Even a mortgage after a grant of a certificate under O XXI r 83 will not affect the judgment-creditor's lien under this section unless it be in strict conformity with the provisions of O XXI r 83 (6) A mortgage to pay off an incumbrancer prior to the attaching creditor whose rights are not prejudiced thereby, is not one within this section (7)

"Contrary to such attachment"—The former words were "during the continuance of the attachment" A lease prior to the attachment is good, (8) so is a *bond fide* sale even when the purchaser knew that the decree-holder was seeking to attach the property,(9) and notwithstanding that it may defeat the anticipated execution (10) Prior to attachment a debtor may give priority to one creditor over another, notwithstanding judgment has been obtained against him (11) A conveyance executed by the judgment debtor after one attachment has been permanently struck off and before a new attachment is issued is valid (12) but the striking off of execution proceedings does not necessarily withdraw an attachment so as to make an alienation valid, (13) though where the first execution proceeding was stayed by mutual agreement and a subsequent attachment was considered necessary and was made, a mortgage executed prior to the second attachment was valid, (14) but if a subsequent attachment were superfluous it does not neutralize the attachment already subsisting (15) Where after the property was by an order released from attachment, a mortgage is valid though on appeal from the order an order for partial attachment was made by consent, (16) but it is doubtful whether a conveyance executed during the continuance of an attachment becomes valid or ceases to be void as against the judg-

(1) Sarkies v Bundho, 1 N W P H C R 99 (1869), Sadayappa v Ponnappa, 8 M 551 (1885)

(2) Mahadevappa v Srinivasa, 4 M 417 (1881), see also Dinobundhu v Jogmaya 20 I A 9 (1901), 29 C 154, 6 C W N 209

(3) Qurban v Ashraf 4 A 219 (1882)

(4) Shrivangappa v Channasappa 30 B 337 (1905), 8 Bom L R 16

(5) Gopeo Chunder v Ram Kumul W R 1864, 179

(6) Gurusami v Venkatasami, 14 M 277 (1890)

(7) Abdul Rashid v Gappo Lal, 21 A 431 (1895)

(8) Fegredo v Mahomed Mudessur, 15 W P 75 (1871)

(9) Ram Barun v Jankee Sahoo, 22 W R 473 (1874), Rajan Harji v Ardeskar, 4 B 70

(1879)

(10) Stephenson v Baumgartner, 3 Agra 101 (1869)

(11) Doorga Tewaree v Naipal, 2 N W P H. C R 224 (1870)

(12) Puddomonee v Roy Muthoor, 20 W R 133 (1873), 12 B L R 411, Indurjeet v Luchman, 21 W R 56 (1875)

(13) Jugobundhu v Bhugwan 17 W R 15 (1871) Soondur v Pithoori, 24 W R 36 (1876)

(14) Matongmy v Chowdhry, 25 W R 513 (1870), Zaibunnessa v Jauram, 1 A 616 (1878), Gungagottiv Ram Sunder, 8 C L R 157 (1881)

(15) Mookhesur v Ramphul, 5 N W P H C R 70 (1873)

(16) Keshary Mohun v Mahomed Mujaffer, 18 C. 188 (1890)

ment-creditor, and those claiming under him. In reason of the attachment being subsequently struck off (1) but the sale has been set aside (2). If the decree in execution of which the attachment was made be set aside the attachment is invalid and an alienation during its continuance is valid (3) but on the other hand where an attachment was released and thereupon the judgment-debtor mortgaged the property and thereafter the order releasing the attachment was set aside the mortgage was invalid (4). Where however the judgment-debtor sold a part of the attached property and partly paid the attaching creditor, who withdrew the attachment the sale was valid, (5) similarly where a mortgage was executed to pay off an attachment the decree being satisfied before the mortgage was executed but the attachment withdrawn after the mortgage (6). Under the Code of 1859 it was held an alienation made pending attachment was not made valid by the subsequent removal of the attachment (7). A sale in pursuance of an attachment being set aside does not displace the attachment (8) nor does the death of the judgment-debtor, (9) even though he be a Mitakshara co-partner and his interest in the property attached passed to the surviving co-partners (10). But it has been recently held that when the attachment is made out before judgment it may be displaced by the death of a Mitakshara co-partner (11). An attachment nine years old in execution of a decree twelve years old in the absence of other information must be assumed to have been removed (12). A purchase in execution under a decree by a landlord under the Rent Recovery Act of property previously attached is subject to such attachment, (13) so also where the Collector attached under the Madras Abkari Act I of 1886 a subsequent attachment and sale under a civil decree was subject to the Collector's attachment (14). A mortgagee whose mortgage was prior to the attachment privately purchased subsequently to attachment and whose purchase was void as against an auction purchaser, could fall back on his mortgage (15).

"All claims enforceable under the attachment"—An alienation is void only to the extent of all claims enforceable under the attachment (16).

(1) Puddomonee v Roy Muthoora 20 W R 133 (1873), 12 B L R 411

(2) Gobind Singh v Zalim Singh 6 A 33 (1883), Kunhi v Makki 23 M 478 (1899)

(3) Juggut Narain v Toolsee, 10 W R 99 (1868), 1 B L R, A J 71

(4) Bonomali v Prosunno 23 C 829 (1896) Ali Ahmad v Bhansi Dhar, 31 A 367 (1909)

(5) Prannath v Shumboo, 7 W R 430 (1867)

(6) Buldeo v Kanaha 1 N W P H. C. R 25 (1869)

(7) Ram Churn v Jhubboo 14 W R 25 (1870) Mahatab v Surno Moyee 15 W R 222 (1871), 12 B L R 414 note

(8) Gossain Munraj v Deen Dyal 20 W R 20 (1873)

(9) Sheo Prasad v Hira Lal 12 A 440 (1890)

(10) Bom Pershad v Parlati 20 C 635 (1892)

(11) Subra Mangesh Chai Inavkar v Mahadeva Lom Manjilatta 34 B 105 (1913)

(12) Goonjessar v Tuchmee 20 W R 418 (1873)

(13) Subramanya v Rajaram 8 M 173 (1885)

(14) Sarangapani v Secretary of State 10 M 479 (1893)

(15) Gopal Sahoo v Gunga Lal et al 30 C 530 (1892)

(16) Shrivengappa v Channasappa 70 J 337 (1905), 8 Bom L R 18

that is, only against the execution creditor and persons claiming under him, (1) and only so far as may be necessary to secure the execution of the decree, (2) and not as against all persons who at any future time may possibly obtain executions (3) So where the sale was held at the instance of the second attaching creditor and the judgment-creditor had incumbered the property after the first attachment, but before the second, the sale was subject to the incumbrance, even though the first attaching creditor was paid out of the sale proceeds (4) Where the private alienation in no way interferes with the rights secured by his decree to the attaching creditor it is not void, (5) and if the decree were paid off the attachment ceased and the rights acquired pending that attachment became valid, (6) and this would be so although the attachment were not formally withdrawn, (7) and even if the attachment were wrongly continued to secure payment of subsequent instalments under the decree not then payable, the instalment in respect of which the attachment was made having been paid off (7)

"All claims" means all legal claims (8) "All claims enforceable under the attachment" is not synonymous with "the claim of the attaching creditor" as used in the interpretation of sect 240 of Act VIII of 1859, (9) but means all claims enforceable under attachments which have actually been made and are perfected (10) This section is for the benefit of the attaching creditor and of those claiming under him.

did not amount to such attachments (10) The Bombay High Court held that claims under sect 73 are claims enforceable under the attachment, and an assignment of monies subsequently realized in execution, pending attachment, is void as against persons coming in subsequently and claiming distribution under sect 73 (12) This question has been set at rest by the Explanation to this clause (13) It was however, held that if the "monies realized" are the proceeds of a private alienation brought into Court, in payment of the

ment must, however, be a subsisting one, if it is removed the alienation made

(1) Puddomonce v Roy Muthoora, 20 W R 133 (1873), 12 B L R 411

(2) Dinendranath v Ramkumar, 7 C 107, p 118 (1881), 10 C L R 281, 8 I A 65

(3) Anund Lal v Jullodhur, 17 W R 313 (1872), 10 B L R 134, 14 Mooro I A 543, Bal Mokund v Ramhit, 13 W R 134 (1869)

(4) Guru Prosad v Binda Bibi, 9 B L R 180 (1872)

(5) Abdul Rashid v Gappo Lal, 20 A 421 (1898)

(6) Umesh Chunder v Raj Bulbub, 8 C 278 (1882), 10 C L R 204, Khushalchand

v Nandram, 35 B 516 (1911)

(7) Pamdhun v Koylash, 12 W R 457

(1869), 4 B L R, A J 20

(8) Abdoel Rashid v Gappo Lal, 20 A 421 (1898)

(9) Sorabji v Govind Ramji, 16 B 91, p 106 (1891)

(10) Gauga Din v Khushah, 7 A 702 (1835)

(11) Babaji v Gajanan, 11 B H C. 169 (1874)

(12) Sorabji v Govind Ramji, 16 B 91 (1891)

(13) Veleband v Musson, 14 Bom I P 633 (1912)

(14) Vibredhapriya v Yusuf Sahib, 28 M 380 (1905), 15 M L J 202

during its pendency is valid against a subsequent attaching creditor, who, if the attachment had continued and the money were realized, might have claimed distribution under sect 295 (now 73) (1) Where there has been an attachment, followed first by a private alienation and then by petitions for rateable distribution by other creditors and the attachment is then removed, the subsequent claims to rateable distribution go with it, because they are merely claims enforceable under the attachment if it results in the realization of assets which the Court can distribute (2) The Bombay High Court held under the Code of 1882, that, notwithstanding sect 276 (sect 61 of the present Act), a private alienation becomes absolute even against all claims enforceable under the attachment on compliance with the conditions of sect 305 (r 83 O XXI), which is an enabling section and qualifies the prohibition contained in sect 276 (3)

A purchaser in execution acquires the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor freed from all alienations and incumbrances affected by him after the attachment, (4) but if he bought the attached property privately he would get no better title than the vendor had (4) Such a private sale would not, however, be had as being made pending attachment if it were accepted by the decree holder in satisfaction of his decree and thereafter sanctioned by the Court (5) There is no inconsistency between this Explanation and O XXI r 48 cl (2) (6)

Explanation—See last note

SALE

65. *Where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the purchaser's title property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute*

Purchaser's title—The Code of 1859 (sect 259) provided for the grant of a certificate on a sale becoming absolute (that is confirmed) to the purchaser

of the certificate Sect 316 of the Code of 1877 (Act X) as published ran: "when a sale of immovable property has become absolute in a manner aforesaid the Court shall grant a certificate stating the name of the person, who at the time of sale, is declared to be the purchaser and the date of such sale" There the section

(1) Kunbi v Makli, 23 M. 478 (1899)

(2) Jetha Bhuma & Co v Lady Janlai, 11 Bom. L. R. (1912), 37 B. 138

(3) Shrivlingappa v Channabasappa, 30 P. 337 (1903), 8 Bom. L. R. 16

(4) Dinendranath v Pamkumar, 7 C. 107 (1880 P. C.), 10 C. L. R. 281, 8 J. A. 65,

Ganesh v Purshottam, 33 B. 311, 316 (1903)

(5) Annayunadavan v Iyasawmy, 6 M. H. C. 65 (1871)

(6) Velchand v Masson, 14 Bom. L. R. 633 (1912)

(7) See as to this Balvant v Bhachan, 27 B. 334 at p. 339 (1903)

ended Sect 49 of Act XII of 1879, amending the Code of 1877, substituted for sect 316 of that Code another section which was in the same terms as sect 316 of the Code of 1882. Under that Code a certificate was to be granted on the sale becoming absolute (that is under sect 314 confirmed) stating the property sold and the name of the purchaser. It then provided "*such certificate shall bear the date of the confirmation of the sale, and so far as regards the parties to the suit and persons claiming through or under them the title to the property sold shall vest in the purchaser from the date of such certificate and not before*". All these Codes agreed in this that confirmation was necessary to make a sale absolute, and that when a sale became thus absolute a certificate was to be granted to the purchaser.

Questions of difficulty formerly arose as to the following points, viz., whether it was the sale or certificate which conferred title, the date when such title vested and the necessity for the production of a certificate as evidence of such title. It is not easy to reconcile all the decisions on the points mentioned.

Under the Code of 1859 it was sometimes thought, (1) upon a construction of the concluding words of sect 239 of that Code, that it was the sale certificate which transferred the title. The Privy Council, however, pointed out that that section did no more than create statutory *evidence* of transfer in place of the old mode of transfer by Bill of sale, (2) and the Code of 1877 omitted the words which afforded the ground for the contention that it was the certificate which created the interest (3). The title became complete upon payment and confirmation (4). It was in reality in both cases the sale itself, perfected by payment of the purchase money and the order of confirmation, which passed the title, (5) and in many cases it was held that before the grant of the certificate the purchaser had an interest which was sometimes described as equitable or inchoate, (6)

(1) *Srinivasa Sastri v Seshayangar*, 3 M 37 (1891) [ref to in *Velam v Kumara Sami*, 11 M 296 (1887) at p 298], *Padu Malhari v Rakhmai* 10 B H C R 435 (1873), at p 439. It is this view which is the ground of the reasoning in *Harkisandas Narandas v Bai Ichha*, 4 B 155 (1879), where it was held that the plaintiff had no right of action because he had no certificate. His right of action was based on the sale, though it might, in one view, be that his suit might fail by reason of want of the necessary evidence of that right.

B 444 (1886) [a sale before the amending Act of 1879].

(5) *Doorga Narain Sen v Baney Madhub Mozoomdar*, 7 C 199, 207 (1891) ["We do not think that these words contemplate that nothing would pass to a purchaser unless a certificate was issued, the order approving the sale would pass title, certificate is merely evidence that property so passed"], *Tara Prasad Mytee v Nund Kishore Guri*, 9 C 842 (1883), *Velam v Kumarasami*, 11 M 296, 300 (1887), *Jagan Nath v Baldeo*, 5 A 305 (1883) v B.

(6) *Khushal Panachand v Bhimabai*, 12 B 589, 591 (1886), *Shivram Narayan v Ravi Sakharam* 7 B 251, 256 (1882), *Nayar Timapa v Bhaskar Parmaya*, 10 B 444 (1886), *Yeshvant Babarav v Govind Shankar*, 10 B 453 (1886), *Chintamanrao Natu v Yethabai*, 11 B 588 (1887), *Nanjundappa v Hemapa* 9 B 10 (1884), *Krishaji Ravi v Ganesh Papuji* C P 179 (1891).

B at p 593 (1886).

(2) *Mt Buhuns Kower v Lalla Bihooroo Lall*, 14 M I A. 496 (1872), at p 523.

(3) *Srinivasa Sastri v Seshayangar*, 3 M 37, at p 41 (1881), *Prakash Chunder Das v Tarachand Dass*, 9 C 82, 87 (1882).

(4) *Nayar Timapa v Bhaskar Parmaya* 10

and on confirmation the title related back to, and the property vested at, the date of sale (1)

Assuming, however, that the certificate was only evidence of and was not necessary to pass title, the question arose under the Code of 1859, or at a period when the influence of the practice of that Code had force, whether it was the only evidence and whether a party whose title by purchase was confirmed could uphold it without the production of a sale certificate. The case-law was conflicting. It was held by the Bombay High Court that for suits on a legal title, as in ejectment against a stranger, a certificate was necessary, (2) but not in suits of an equitable character (3). It was also held that where the sale was admitted (4) or the question arose between judgment debtor and purchaser (5) or persons bound by the decree, (6) and apparently in other cases (7) a certificate was not necessary. A lax practice existed under the Code of 1859, under which possession was often given before issue of the sale certificate. Under the Code of 1877, and subsequently, an order for delivery of possession only issued after the grant of a certificate, (8) and with greater regularity of practice in this respect, the importance of the question discussed appears to have gradually diminished.

The Code of 1877 was amended in 1879 and the certificate was required to bear the date of confirmation and "so far as regards the parties to the suit, and persons claiming through or under them," the title to the property vested in the purchaser from the date of the certificate, that is the date of confirmation, and not the date of sale (9). This provision also gave rise to considerable difficulty, a question naturally arising as to the state of the title between the date of sale and the date of confirmation, which might be and often was a considerable period (10). It was, therefore, held that when sect 316 of the last Code referred to the title to the property sold, it meant the full perfected title, which did not vest in the purchaser till confirmation. But this was not inconsistent with an equitable interest arising from the sale. After sale and before

(1) Bhyrub Chunder Bundopadhyaya v Soudamini Dabee, 2 C 141, 145 (1876) F B, Chatraput Singh v Grindra Chunder Roy, 6 C 389, 391, 392 (1880) [title held to accrue from date of sale]

(2) Khushal Panachand v Bhimabai, 12 B 589 (1886), at p. 593

(3) Id. v. Krishnaji Ravji v Ganesh Bapuji, 6 B 139, 142 (1881)

(4) Sadagopa v Jamuna Bhai, 5 M. 51, 60 (1882), Tara Prasad Mytee v Nund Kishore Guri, 9 C. 842, 843 (1883), Nayar Timapa v Bhaskar Parmaya, 10 B 444 (1886), Doorga Narain Sen v Baney Madhub Mozoomdar, 7 C 199, at p. 207 (1881), Velan v Kumarsami, 11 M. 296, at p. 300 (1887)

(5) Benode Lal Ghose v Tanizud Din v C. L. B. 115, 116 (1880), Khushal Pana-

chand v Bhimabai, 12 B 589, 591 (1886)

(6) Shivram Narayan v Ravji Sakharani, 7 B 251 (1882)

(7) Jagan Nath v Baldeo, 5 A 305 (1883), ref to in Velan v Kumarsami, 11 M 296 (1887), where it was held that assuming a certificate should be registered, the plaintiff was not bound to rely on the certificate to prove his title. In this case the sale was denied

(8) Basapa v Marya, 3 B 433 (1879), Khushal Panachand v Bhimabai, 12 B, at p. 591 (1886)

(9) Prem Chand Pal v Purnima Dassee, 15 C 516, 551, 552 (1882), Shyam Lal v Natho Lal, 33 A 63 (1910)

(10) See Adhur Chunder Banerjee v Agshore Nath Aroo, 2 C W N 559, 590 (1898)

confirmation, the purchaser had an inchoate title contingent on subsequent confirmation (1)

From the date of sale the purchaser had a good equitable or inchoate title to the property sold, and when the certificate was actually granted it made the title absolute and made that title relate back to the date of the sale (2) Further, the provision of the section was not general and did not apply to third parties (3) The certificate was as before, only evidence. The Court in granting it had not to determine what property was to pass by the sale, but merely to record an already accomplished fact, and to state what had been sold. Of this the certificate was evidence, but it was not conclusive (4)

The amended sect 316 (O XXI r 94 of the present Code) does not deal with this point, but the present section does. According to O XXII r. 92 a sale becomes absolute after the expiry of the period for an application for setting it aside or if such application is made when it is disallowed and upon confirmation. And under this section when the sale has become absolute the property is deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the date of sale and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute.

Though therefore, the certificate bears date the day when the sale became absolute, the title in such case is deemed to have accrued before then, viz, when the sale took place. Where a mortgagee obtained a decree and had the mortgaged property, which was part of a revenue paying estate, sold in execution, and purchased it himself, but the sale was not confirmed till a month later, during which time the revenue fell in arrears and the whole of the estate was sold for arrears of revenue, it was held that he became owner of the mortgaged property from

(1) *Dagdu v Panchamsing Gangaram*, 18 B 375 (1892), *appd. in Chudde v Pearl Lal*, 19 A 188 (1896), *Banko Lal v Jagat Narain*, 22 A 168, 174 (1900), *see Prangour Mozoomdar v Hemanta Kumari Debys*, 12 C 597, 601 (1886)

(2) *Adhur Chunder Banerjee v Aghore Nath Aroo*, 2 C W N 589, 590 (1898)

(3) *Id.*, *Dagdu v Panchamsing Gangaram*, 17 B 375 (1892), and *see Hasan Ali v Nian Jan*, 33 A 63 (1910). *Contra Prem Chand Pal v Purnima Das*, 15 C 546, 551, 552 (1882)

(4) *Balyant v Hira Chand*, 27 B 334, 339 (1903), *Rama Chandra Joshi v Hazi Hussien*, 10 M. 207 (1892), nor exclusive, for in order to determine what was sold, the whole execution proceedings might be looked at, *Rai Babu Mahabir Pershad v Rai Markunda Sahai*, 171 A. 11, at p 14 (1889), and *see Baluji Dass v Nimaye Chunder Sircar*, 17 W R 511 (1872), *Mt Maleebun v Mt Ladecha*, 25 W R 401 (1876), *Ram*

Gopal Barick v Sheo Pershad Sircar, 12 W R 483 (1869), *General Manager Raj Darbungah v Coomar Ramaput Singh*, 17 W R 459 (1872), *Manson v Golam Kebria*, 15 W R 490 (1871). In some early cases the Court refused to go behind the sale certificate. *Lalla Bissessar Dyal v Doolar Chand*, 22 W R. 181 (1874), *Shankh Kulce mooddeen v Ashruf Ali Khan*, 19 W R. 276 (1873), *Mookhya Huruckraj v Ram Lall Gomastha*, 14 W R 435 (1870). Though in *Baroda Kanta Bose v Chunder Kanta Ghose*, 29 C 682, 686 (1902), the sale certificate was still spelt on of as conferring title. In a recent case, *Barhaandeo v Ram Narain*, 19 G L J 183 (1913), it was held that while evidence could not be given to contradict a sale certificate granted in 1907, evidence is admissible to explain ambiguous terms in it, and the Court may then determine the question with reference to the whole proceeding. *See also Abdul Aziz Khan v Appayasami Naicker*, P C, 31 I A 1 (1903)

the date of his purchase and was responsible for the revenue payable on it (1). In a recent case it has been held that a Court has an inherent jurisdiction to amend a certificate in which the property sold was wrongly described (2).

The amended Order No. 94 (corresponding with sect. 316 of the last Code), omits the last paragraph of sect. 316 of that Code (3). Under the present Code (sec. 92) a sale becomes absolute on confirmation (4). The sale is not complete until such order is made and it is only after such order that a sale certificate should issue. The result therefore is that though if a decree is reversed after issue of certificate (and therefore, after confirmation) the title of the purchaser is not affected by the reversal of the decree if however the decree is reversed, and therefore ceases to be a subsisting decree before the sale is complete, that is before confirmation and issue of certificate the executing Court has no jurisdiction to proceed further in execution by the confirmation of a sale and issue of a certificate held under a decree no longer in force (5). In short, the Court cannot proceed to complete execution of a decree which has itself ceased to exist. When a decree is set aside all processes in execution are avoided to the extent to which it has been set aside. If no sale has taken place the attachment if any, goes. If there has been a sale and the decree is set aside before it has become absolute it would seem that the sale also must fall. It has been recently held that the title of an auction purchaser at a sale held in execution of a decree did not become absolute if the decree under which the sale took place is reversed at any time before a certificate of sale is granted to the purchaser (6). If however, the sale has become absolute, then the purchaser is entitled to a certificate, and unless the purchaser is himself the decree holder (in which case he is bound by the ultimate result of the litigation) the sale is not avoided by the reversal of the decree. For the setting aside of a decree does not avoid a sale made to a *bonâ fide* purchaser for value unless such purchaser is the decree holder himself.

The section merely deals with the date of the vesting of the title. But the question of defect of title and what passes by a sale may be here conveniently alluded to. There is no implied warranty at an execution sale that the title is good. All that is guaranteed is that the purchaser shall have the right and interest whatever they may be of the judgment debtor, in other words that the judgment debtor shall not recover back the lands (7). And a purchaser

(1) *Musst Bhawanji v. Mathura Prasad* 16 C. W. N. 985 (P. C. 1912), and see *Shyam Lal v. Nathu Lal*, 33 A. 63 (1910), *Hasan Ali v. Mian Jan*, 33 A. 45 (1910).

(2) *Nasiruddin v. Savudur Rahman*, 19 C. L. J. 209 (1913).

(3) "Provided that the decree under which the sale took place was still subsisting at that date." As to the meaning of "subsisting" see *Mahomed Hussain v. Joki Singh*, 7 C. 91, 95 (1881). *Saroda Churn Chuckerlity v. Mahomed Isuf M. Ali* 11 C. 170 (1885).

(4) See notes to that order.

(5) *Rasappa bin Malappa v. Durlaya bin Shivlingaya*, 2 B. 510 (1878). *Mul Chandra v. Mukta Prasad* 10 A. 83 (1887); *Jayam v. Dada v. Hardt* (Civil) 31 June 1875 C. 175 (1877); *Alurra v. Basappa v. Kanneen v. Nallur*, 3 W. R. A. 115 (1875).

(6) *Ram Dutt v. Ram Bahadur* 20 A. 531 (1907).

(7) *Dad Ali Khan v. Abdul Chaudhary* 1 A. 116, note 3 (1875) list between cases where the title is within jurisdiction, or *ultra vires* of judicial authority. *Pratt v. Pratt*, 4 B. 111 (1871).

under the decree gets a good title against all persons whom the suit binds (1) The quantity and nature of right and interest existing in the debtor at the time of attachment and advertisement for sale, alone pass by the sale (2) But in mortgage suits the right, title, and interest, both of mortgagor and the mortgagee, is passed the right of the mortgagor as it stood when he made the mortgage, and not merely as it stood at the time of the Court sale (3) An auction purchaser is bound to satisfy himself of the value, quantity, and title of the thing sold, just as much as if he were purchasing the same under private contract (4) Where the sale is not vitiated by fraud, the only extent to which the purchaser can claim relief is that indicated by sect 316 (now r 93, *post*) (5) In the case of Registrar's sales in the High Court, compensation is also allowable for errors and misstatements as to particulars or description of the property (6)

Ordinarily the purchaser buys merely the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor with all its defects (7) This was expressly stated in the certificate under the Code of 1859 and is in fact, ordinarily the case now, though what could have been and what was sold is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined on the whole of the proceedings and the facts of the particular case (8) As stated ordinarily the personal right, title, and interest of the debtor passes. In certain cases the estate passes as in the case of a Hindu widow where the proceeding though nominally against the heirs, is really against her as representing the estate, (9) or in those cases under the rent law where a sale passes not merely the right, title, and interest of the tenant but the tenure itself (10) Leaving out of consideration this latter case, which is subject to certain statutory rules the purchaser simply gets what the debtor, whether

13 15 (1869), *Sundara Gopalan v Venkata Varada Ayyangar*, 17 M 228 (1893), *Hira Lal v Karim un nissa*, 2 A 780 783 (1880), *Pam Narain Singh v Mahtab Bibi* 2 A 828 829 (1880), *Krishnapa v Panchapa* 6 B H C R 258 (1869), *Dhondu v Ramji* 4 B H C R, 4 C J 114 (1867) [as to fraud, how over, see at p 116], as to express warranty, see *Mahomed Phakar v Navroji Balabhai*, 10 B 214 (1885), as to decree holder knowing of charge selling without mention of it see *Douglas v Collector of Benares*, 5 M L A 271 (1857)

(1) *Umes Chunder Sircar v Zahir Fatma*, 18 C 164, 178 (1890)

(2) *Ram Onoogroho Singh v Mt Montorun*, 6 W R 223 (1866), *Sundara Gopalan v Venkata Varada*, 17 M 228 230 (1893), *Soojant Ali Khan v Khoosal Chand*, 5 S D, N W 561 (1861)

(3) *Shahk Abdulla v Haji Abdulla* 5 B 8 (1880)

(4) *Jummal Ali v Ierbheo Lal Das*, 12

W R 41 (1869), *Sheikh Mahomed Basirulla v Sheikh Abdulla* 4 B L R App 35 (1870)

(5) *Sundara Gopalan v Venkata Varada Ayyangar*, 17 M 228 (1893)

(6) *Ram Narain v Dwarka Nath Khettry*, 4 C W N 13 (1899), *Kishori Mohan Pat v Kali Charan Ghosh*, 1 C W N 106 (1896)

(7) *Dorab Ally v Abdul Azeez*, 5 I A 125, s c, 3 C 806 (1878), *Deendyal v Jugdeep Narain*, 3 C 198, 4 I A 247 (1877), *Ram Fuhul Singh v Bissesswar Lal Saboo*, 2 I A 131 (1875), *Ali Saheb v Haji Ahmed* 16 B 197 (1891) *Sundara Gopalan v Venkata Varada Ayyangar* 17 M 228 (1893)

(8) *Barhamdeo v Pam Narain* 13 C L J 182 (1913)

(9) See *Mayne v Hindu Law*, 7th ed., s 642

(10) *Doolkar Chand v Lalla Chabeel*, 6 L A 17 (1878), *Nikadri v Dichturanand*, 37 C. 823 (1910)

personally or representatively, had (1) subject to the same bars, such as limitation (2) and to all equities (3) liens, mortgages and leases (4) *palm rent*, (5) revenue and cesses (6) His liability may be affected by estoppel. So if a person sells property covered by a mortgage, but, suppressing that fact, obtains the value of the property unencumbered he may be estopped from saying that the purchaser took it subject to the lien (7)

Though the possession of an auction purchaser differs in some points (8) from that of a purchaser at a private sale, yet a purchaser at an ordinary execution sale is in privity with and the representative in interest of, the judgment debtor so as to be affected by the latter's admissions affecting the property taken and estoppels binding on him (9) An auction purchaser's conduct in buying is only some evidence of an admission of title in the judgment debtor, which he can explain or rebut. He is not estopped from setting up a title independent of that based on his purchase (10)

The purchaser takes the property subject to that which affects what he has purchased, viz, the property. Mere personal obligations not affecting the land do not pass. So it has been held that without notice he is not bound

(1) See as to crops *Matoola Sirdar v Dwarka Nath Mottry*, 4 C 814 (1879), *Land Mortgage Bank v Vishnu Govind Patanlar*, 2 B 670 (1878), *Ramalinga v Sarmappa*, 13 M. 15 (1880), *uncovered trees* *Faqueer Sonar v Khuderun* 2 A H C R 251 (1870), *buildings* *Abu Husan v Ramzan Ali*, 4 A 381 (1882), *Mookta Sundureo v Muthooru Nath* 22 W R 209 (1874), *Right to easements* *Hureo Madhub v Hem Chunder*, 22 W R 522 (1874)

(2) *Shridhur Vinayak v Balaji* 6 B H C R 220 (1869), *Rajah Enayet Hossein v Gurdharoo Lall*, 12 M. I. 1 306, 11 W R P C 29 (1869), *per contra* the purchaser can add his possession to that of the debtor for the purpose of pleading limitation, *Ali Sahib v Haji Ahmad*, 16 B 197 (1891)

(3) *Ram Lochun v Pam Narain*, 1 C L R 290 (1877), *Yeshwant Babarav v Govind Shankar*, 10 B 453 455 (1886)

(4) *Oojagur Roy v Ram Khelawan*, 10 W. R. 381 (1869), *Mathura Das v Kalia* 7 B H C R 24, at p. 26 (1870), *Balal Bapuji v Satya Chamabhai*, 6 B 490 (1892), *Sobhag Chand v Bhai Chand* 6 B 193 (1882), *Kishen Lal v Ganga Ram* 13 A. 28 (1890), *Land Mortgage Bank v Ram Ruttun Neogy*, 21 W R. 270 (1874), *Shyama Churn Bhot tacherjee v Ananda Chandra Das*, 3 C. W. N. 323 (1880), the rights of a judgment creditor to be enforceable must be reserved or there must be notice, *Doolee Chand v*

Oomda Begum 21 W R 263 (1875), *Nursing Narain v Raghoobur*, 10 C 609, 611 (1884)

(5) *Obhoy Chunder v Nilambur Mookerjee*, 1864, W R 72, *Sheikh Khoda Bukah v Bigumburee Dassee*, W R 1864, 207

(6) *Chatraput Singh v Gindra Chunder Roy*, 6 C 389 (1880)

(7) *Douglas v Collector of Benares*, 5 M. I. A 271 (1857), *Dullab Sirkar v Krishna Bakshi*, 3 B L R 407 (1869) *McConnell v Mayer*, 2 A. H. C. R. 315 (1872), *Baldeo Singh v Kirhan Lall*, 9 A 113 (1887), *Bunwari Das v Muhammad Mashiat*, 9 A. 690 (1887), and as to decree holder not disclosing his own charges, see note, p. 308, *ante*, and as to Estoppel generally, *Authors' Evidence Act*, and notes to s. 115

(8) See e.g. *Alukmonce Dabee v Banco Madhub Chuckerbutty*, 4 C 677 (1878), where the doctrine that a party selling property of which he is not the owner is bound to make good the sale out of a subsequently acquired interest, was held inapplicable to an auction sale. And as to limitations, *Kali Das Moullick v Kanhya Lal Pandit*, 11 I. A. 218, at p. 229 (1884), and see *Authors' Evidence Act*

(9) See the subject discussed in *Authors' Evidence Act*

(10) *Pandit Hanuman Dat v Mufti Assad ulah*, 7 A H C R. 145 (1875)

by an agreement to mortgage made by the judgment debtor (1) And similarly where A, as surety of B for a loan, sued C, an auction purchaser of the rights and interests of B in a bond pledged for the debt, on the ground that he had purchased the bond with all its liabilities, and amongst them was the amount due to A by B it was held that C, not being a party to the loan transaction, was not liable (2) He is not affected by a custom binding purchasers by private sale only, (3) nor by a notice of foreclosure issued, after his purchase, on his predecessor (4)

If between the time of attachment and time of sale the interest of the judgment debtor is accelerated or enlarged the increment passes (5) Under the last Code it was held that the purchaser's title to mesne profit or possession did not accrue till confirmation (6) The title now accrues under this section at the date of sale Where there has been attachment of decree after sale, but before confirmation, the attaching creditor has a right to have the sale confirmed (7)

As to whether a purchaser is a party or representative within the meaning of sect 244 (now 47), (8) see latter section and notes thereto

66

(1) No suit shall be maintained against any person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court in such manner as may be prescribed on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of some one through whom the plaintiff claims.

(2) Nothing in this section shall bar a suit to obtain a declaration that the name of any purchaser certified as aforesaid was inserted in the certificate fraudulently or without the consent of the real purchaser, or interfere with the right of a third person to proceed against that property, though ostensibly sold to the certified purchaser, on the ground that it is liable to satisfy a claim of such third person against the real owner

Suit against certified purchaser—It has been said that the object of the section was to prevent judgment debtors from purchasing their own property at auction in the name of another (9) The first sub clause of this section

(1) Bhuggobutty Dasseo v Shama Churn Bosc, 1 C 337 (1876)

(2) Shibjoy Ghakur v Pogose S D 22 Aug 1860, p 144

(3) Kahan Das v Bhagerathi, 6 A. 47 (1883)

(4) Mohun Lal Sookool v Goluck Chunder Dutt, 10 M I A 1 (1863), Nameshwar v Juggut Mewar, 11 C 341 (1885)

(5) Umes Chunder Sircar v Zahoor Fatima, 18 C. 164, 17 L A. 201 (1889)

(b) Amir Razim v Darbari Mal 21 A 475 (1902)

(7) Boharia Rudraji Koer v Ram Pertap Mulla, 11 C W N 158 (1906)

(8) Vishvanath Charlu Naik v Subraya Shivappa Shetti, 15 B 290 (1890)

(9) Kishan Lal v Garuruddhwaja Prasad Singh, 21 A., at p 243 (1899) See Achhaibar Dube v Tapasi Dube, 29 A 557, 559 (1907), Khuda Baksh v Aziz Alam 27 A. 104 (1904), Hari Singh v Sher Singh 31 A. 282 (1909)

corresponds with a portion of sect 260 of Act VI of 1852. There was "the purchase was made on behalf of the purchaser, though by agreement the name of the certificate was altered to 'the purchase was made on behalf of some one through whom such other person claims' and the same Act added the second sub clause excepted. The present Code in the first sub clause has substituted 'title under a purchase certified by the Court' (which will include the purchaser and his successor in title) for 'the certified purchaser' in italics in the second sub clause. It had been previously an expression 'certified purchaser' included the person standing in the Court purchaser (1).

It only applies to certified purchasers at sales under the revenue sale purchasers (2). It is not applicable to a case under the Demands Recovery Act (I of 1895 B.C.) (3).

"No suit — That is a suit between a benamidar and the owner (4) even where the beneficial owner has had previous notice. But where the certified purchaser does not defend the suit against the owner the corresponding section in the earlier Code did not bar the defence could not be taken by a defendant who was not the certified purchaser (6) so where the purchaser admitted the plaintiff's claim and he had made over the certificate to him (7). Prior to the amendments made by the present Code there was a diversity of opinion as to whether this section included a suit by a judgment creditor against the certified purchaser who purchased benamiee for the judgment debtor, the Calcutta High Court held that such a suit was not barred by this section as it stood prior to this Code and the Madras High Court and the Allahabad High Court holding otherwise (8) and the additions now made to the second sub clause affirm the latter decision. The section does not preclude a suit by A, whose property was sold against the certified purchaser who after the sale agreed to sell the property to A (9). Nor does it preclude a suit by one joint holder of a decree on a mortgage for a declaration that the property purchased by his co decree holder at the auction sale was the joint property of himself and the actual purchaser (10).

(1) Hari Govind v. Ramchandra 31 B. 61 (1906), Manji v. Hoorbas 35 B. 312 347 (1911) (the mortgagee of the certified purchaser).

(2) Fazal Rahman v. Imamu Ali 11 C. 583 (1887), Brij Beharee v. Shah Wajed, 14 W. R. 32 (1870).

(3) Ambica v. Gopal Buxsh, 1 C. L. J. 650 (1901).

(4) Shectanath v. Masfub Naram 1 W. I. 329 (1864).

(5) Bykunt Chunder v. Kier a. Morco Debia 9 W. R. 360 (1868).

(6) Ramakrishnapa v. Adinarayana, 8 M. 511 (1855).

(7) Hazi Arjun v. Farutulla 9 C. L. R. 210 (1891).

(8) Kanizak v. Monohur Das 12 C. 294 (1885), Subha v. Hara Lal 21 C. 519 (1891).

and Nandan Lal v. Garuruddhwaja 21 A. 238 (1899) holding the opposite view.

(9) Mer Joshi v. Muhammad Ibrahim 16 B. H. C. 1 J. 311 (1873), Kumara v. Senu 11 M. 213 (1857).

(10) Acharbar Dule v. Tapas Dule 29 A. 55 (1905).

"Against"—Where A in execution sold the share of B the judgment debtor, in a house and it was purchased by C, the son of B, and subsequently A attached and sold the same share in execution, D being the purchaser, a suit for possession by D against C was dismissed as being within this section (1) This section is not intended to interfere with *benamée* transactions generally, and a suit by a certified purchaser who purchased *benamée*, for the property purchased against the real purchaser who was honestly in possession failed, (2) and in such a suit the real owner might set up a defence that the certified purchaser was the apparent owner only and a mere trustee (3) So where the assignee of the certified purchaser sued for possession against a third party, the latter could show that the sale was *benamée* and in fraud of creditors, (4) and a person in possession of the purchased property, when sued for rents and profits by the certified purchaser may set up a defence that the certified purchaser was only a *benamedar* on his behalf, (5) even a decree-holder may sue the certified purchaser for the properties purchased by him *benamée* for the judgment debtor and of which the judgment debtor was in possession (6) When the certified purchaser purchased *benamée* for A and then conveyed the property to B for A's benefit the property could, it was held, be taken in execution by the creditors of A but it was doubted whether they could have done so if it had not been conveyed to B, (7) but that doubt has been set at rest by the additions made to sub clause (2), and the creditors could proceed against the property even if it remained in the hands of the certified purchaser The section does not preclude a person purchasing *benamée* from setting up his title against a person who is not the certified purchaser and does not claim through him (8)

"Purchase certified"—The section does not bar a suit where the certified purchaser does not defend the suit against the beneficial owner, and the defence cannot be taken by a defendant who is not the certified purchaser, (9) likewise where the certified purchaser admits the plaintiff's claim and states he has made over the certificate to him, (10) nor under the wording of the previous Codes did it preclude a suit against a person who derived his title from the certified purchaser (11) such as his mortgagee or his heir (12) The Bombay High Court dissented from this holding that "certified purchaser"

(1) *Ahuda Bakhsh v. Aziz Alam*, 27 A 194 (1904)

(2) *Bahuns Moonwur v. Lalla Buhoree* 18 W R 157 (1872 P C), 14 Moo I A 496 10 B L R 159

(3) *Lokhee Naram v. Kallypudde* 23 W R 353 (P C 1875), L R 2 I A 154, *Mut hoora v. Raiekomul* 24 W R 278 (1875), *Jan Muhammad v. Hahu Bakh* 1 A 290 (1876)

(4) *Mirza Khyrat v. Mirza Syfoodlah* 8 W R 130 (1867)

(5) *Ghazi ul din v. Bishan Dial* 27 A 443 (1905), 2 A L J 111

(6) *Behun Lall v. Lala Gy v. Icrshad* 6

N W P H G R 265 (1874)

(7) *Satapa v. Karbasapa* 7 B H C A J 21 (1870)

(8) *Shorosutty Dassie v. Gopeesoodery*, 1 Marsh. 423 (1863)

(9) *Ramakrishnappa v. Adinarayana*, 8 M 511 (1835)

(10) *Hazi Irjun v. Farutulla* 9 C L R 290 (1831)

(11) *Theyyavelan v. Kochin* 21 M 7 (1897), *Sibta Kunwar v. Bhagob*, 21 A 196 (1899)

(12) *Dukhada v. Sremonto* 26 C 950 (1899) J C W N 657, *Nokori v. Saruf Chun ler*, 5 C W N 311 (1900)

includes the person standing in the shoes of the Court purchaser,(1) and the amendments made to the first sub clause by the present Code affirm such last decision

Where the property was bought for an inadequate sum by a pleader of a party in the name of his mohurer a suit against the pleader and his mohurer was maintainable (2) It is also maintainable where the purchase is made by a member of a joint Hindu family with joint funds, (3) also where, in a suit for partition by a Hindu son an outsider purchases *benamtee* for the plaintiff's father with family funds (4) It is not necessary that the certificate should have been actually granted to the certified purchaser, provided he obtains it pending the suit to impugn his purchase (5)

"On the ground"—A *benamtee* purchase is not illegal, but if the *benamtee* nature of the purchase is the sole ground the suit is not maintainable, but otherwise if the purchaser acknowledges that his purchase is *benamtee* and gives up possession or waives his right or restores the property to the real owner, (6) or where he was the manager of the real owner, a minor, and never asserted his right to the property purchased (7) or where he purchased while the paid agent of, and with moneys of the real owner, who was the usufructuary mortgagee in possession of the property, and agreed to execute a conveyance and gave the real owner the sale certificate and delivery order (8) Similarly where the plaintiff, having been in possession for eleven years sued on a title acquired by long possession against the assignee of the certified purchaser,(9) or against the certified purchaser, on the ground of an existing possession which had continued eight years from the time of the sale, the suit was maintainable, (10) but the suit must not be based on the ground of the purchase being *benamtee* but on some other independent ground So a suit by the alleged real owner, who was in possession against the certified purchaser for a declaration of title is not maintainable, (11) nor where the certified purchaser acknowledged that he had bought a portion of the property on behalf of the plaintiff's predecessor in title unless that acknowledgment were accompanied by some act which would operate as a valid transfer of the property So where the certified purchaser by a consent decree admitted that his mother was entitled to a share of his father's estate, and then purchased in execution of a decree

(1) Hari v Ramchandra 31 B Gl, 8 Bom L. R. 873 (1906)

(2) Aghore Nath v Ram Churn 23 C. 803 (1896)

(3) Bodh Sing v Cuneschunder, 19 W. R. 356 (1873), 12 B. L. R. P. C. 317 The principle of this case which related to a joint Hindu family, was held applicable to partnership Achhaibar Dube v Tapasi Dube, 23 A 557, 561 (1907)

(4) Natesa Ayyar v Venkatramayyan, 6 M 135 (1882) Minakshi v Kalanarama, 20 M 719 (1897)

(5) Bunla Ali v Bilee Amcerun 25 W 1 471 (1894), Allwell v Bahu Lakhsh 5 A

478 (1893)

(6) Mornappa v Surappa 11 M 231, Para Soonlarce v Oojul Wonee 14 W. R. 111 (1870)

(7) Sankunna v Narayanan, 17 M 282 (1893)

(8) Kumbhalinga v Ariaputra 18 M 436 (1893)

(9) Karamuddin v Niamut, 19 C. 109 (1891)

(10) Sasti Churn v Annopurna, 23 C. 699 (1896)

(11) Behan Dial v Chazi ud-din, 23 A 175 (1901)

property mortgaged to his father, the representatives of the mother were debarred under this section from recovering a portion of the property (1)

"Purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff"—The former words were "on behalf of any other person". This does not include an agreement by the purchaser to sell after his purchase, (2) but it does include a case where the defendant as the alleged agent of the decree holders, who had been refused permission to purchase, purchased the property, and the decree holders, hearing of the purchase, supplied the purchase money, ratified the purchase and agreed to take a conveyance after confirmation of the sale (3). It does not apply to a case of a purchase made by a member of a joint Hindu family with joint funds, (4) nor in a suit for partition by a Hindu son to a purchase by an outsider *benamtee* for his tho plaintiff's father with family funds (5). Nor does it apply to a case where the person setting up the *benamtee* character of the purchaser does not claim under the certified purchaser or the alleged real purchaser. So the purchaser in execution of a mortgage decree may prove that the certified purchaser of the interest of one of the mortgagors in a sale in execution made subject to the mortgage was *benamtee* for the mortgagor, (6) and a decree holder may sue the certified purchaser for sale of the properties purchased by him *benamtee* for the judgment debtor and of which the judgment debtor is in possession (7). But the Allahabad High Court held otherwise, holding that the question of who the plaintiff might be was not material, and that all suits against the certified purchaser were within the section (8). The second sub clause now provides an exception to this decision. It certainly covers suits by the beneficial owner or the successors in title of the beneficial owner (9). This section contemplates a suit by a person claiming to be the beneficial owner against the certified purchaser and not a suit where a third party asserts the certified purchaser is not the beneficial owner, in a suit by the certified purchaser, (10) nor a suit by a creditor of the real owner (11).

"Fraudulently or without the consent," etc.—Of course where a case comes under the second paragraph the claim cannot be barred by the first (12). The earlier portion of the second sub clause of this section embodies

(1) Durga : Bhagwan Das 23 A 34 (1900)

(2) Kumara v Srinivasa 11 M. 213 (1887)
Mor Joshi : Muhammad Ibrahim 10 B H C, A J 314 (1873)

(3) Ganga Bakshi : Rudar Singh 22 A 434 (1900)

(4) Bodh Sing : Guneschunder, 19 W R 376 (1873), 12 B L R P C 317

(5) Natesa Ayyar : Venkatramayyan 6 M 135 (1892) Minakshi : Kallanarama 20 M 349 (1897)

(6) Kollantarida : Tiruvall 20 M 362 (1897)

(7) Solun Lall : Lala Gya Pershad, 6

N W P H C R. 265 (1874)

(8) Kushan Lal : Gararuddhwaja 21 A 238 (1899)

(9) Ram Narain v Mohanan 26 A. 82 (1903), Sarju v Bindeshri 33 A 382 (1911), Naram Dey v Durga Dei 35 A 138 142 (1913)

(10) Uncovenanted Service Bank : Abdul Bari 18 A 481 (1896), Delhi and London Bank : Chaudhri Partab 21 A 49 (1898)

(11) Kanizak : Monohur Das 12 C 20 (1885)

(12) Ambika Prasad : Gopal Bakshi 1 C L J 550 (1901)

the decision in the cases noted (1) Unless fraud or absence of consent is shown, the suit is not maintainable against the certified purchaser (2)

67. The Local Government, with the *previous* sanction (3) of the Governor General in Council, may, by notification in the local official Gazette, make rules for any local area imposing conditions in respect of the sale of any class of interests in land in execution of decrees for the payment of money, where such interests are so uncertain or undetermined as, in the opinion of the Local Government, to make it impossible to fix their value.

Sales of land—This section was introduced into the Code by sect 327 of Act X of 1877. The present section only re-enacts the first clause of that section, omitting the words "from time to time" after "may" and adding the words in italics. The remainder of the section formerly ran, "and if, when this Code comes into operation in any local area, any special rules as to sale of land in execution of decrees are in force therein, the Local Government may continue such rules in force, or may, from time to time, with the sanction of the Governor General in Council, modify the same. All rules so made or continued, and all such modifications of the same, shall be published in the local official Gazette, and shall thereupon have the force of law."

Rules have been published as regards Bengal, (3) Punjab, (4) and Coorg (5)

DELEGATION TO COLLECTOR OF POWER TO EXECUTE DECREES AGAINST IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY.

68. The Local Government may, with the *previous* (3) sanction of the Governor General in Council, declare, by notification in the local official Gazette, that in any local area the execution of decrees in cases in which a Court has ordered any immoveable property to be sold, or the execution of any particular kind of such decrees, or the execution of decrees ordering the sale of any particular kind of, or interest in, immoveable property, shall be transferred to the Collector.

(1) Sheetanath v. Madhub Narain, 1 W. R. 329 (1864), Koombar v. Tufazzul, 13 W. R. 85 (1870); Sharma Keshoo v. Raj Narain, 14 W. R. 179 (1870), Goomiah v. Taffazzul, 4 B. L. R. App. 32 (1870).

(2) Ganca Baksh v. Rudar Singh, 22 A. 431 (1900)

(3) Calcutta Gazette, July 10th, 1878, Pt. I, p. 736, and Jan. 7th, 1880, Pt. I, p. 3

(4) Punjab Notification, No. 3559, dated Oct. 3rd, 1877

(5) Mysore Gazette, June 14th, 1879, Pt. I, p. 200

69 *The provisions set forth in the Third Schedule shall apply to all cases in which the execution of a decree has been transferred under the last preceding section*

[s 320,
second
and third
paras]

70 (1) The Local Government may make rules consistent with the aforesaid provisions—

(a) for the transmission of the decree from the Court to the Collector, and for regulating the procedure of the Collector and his subordinates in executing the same, and for retransmitting the decree from the Collector to the Court,

(b) conferring upon the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector all or any of the powers which the Court might exercise in the execution of the decree if the execution thereof had not been transferred to the Collector,

(c) providing for orders made by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector, or orders made on appeal with respect to such orders, being subject to appeal to, and revision by, superior revenue-authorities as nearly as may be as the orders made by the Court, or orders made on appeal with respect to such orders, would be subject to appeal to, and revision by, appellate or revisional Courts under this Code or other law for the time being in force if the decree had not been transferred to the Collector

[s 320
fourth
para]

(2) A power conferred by rules made under sub section (1) upon the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector, or upon any appellate or revisional authority, shall not be exercisable by the Court or by any Court in exercise of any appellate or revisional jurisdiction which it has with respect to decrees or orders of the Court

71 In executing a decree transferred to the Collector under section 68 the Collector and his subordinates shall be deemed to be acting judicially

Transfer to Collector—This subject is dealt with in these sections in the next section and in the third schedule to which the other sections of the last Code have been transferred. The provisions except in one particular are with some verbal alterations the same as those of the last Code. The exception referred to is the necessity for the record of reasons for an adjournment under clause 10 of the schedule. The words “and record or modify

any such declaration,' which appeared in section 320 of the last Code, have been omitted. The last three paragraphs of sect 320 of the last Code were added to that Code by sect 30 of Act VII of 1888 (1). The section provides that the Local Government may frame rules for regulating the procedure of the Collector and his subordinates in execution of decrees transferred to him (2). The general provisions of the Code do not apply to proceedings held by the Collector for the execution of such decrees (3). When a notification has been made, the Civil Courts cease to have jurisdiction to execute the decree (4). It has been held that a Judge can recall a case sent to the Collector (5). But this has also apparently been held to be not so, (6) or at least doubtful (7).

The Collector may cancel his own order of postponement of the sale (8). As to power to set aside sale (9) application for payment by instalments under Dekhan Agriculturists' Relief Act in case of decree previously transferred to Collector, (10) disabilities of proprietor of property taken under management by the Collector, (11) see cases cited. The power of the local Government to make rules providing for claims not passed into decrees, (12) reference to the District Court (13). In Allahabad it is held that where the Civil Court is satisfied that the land which is ordered to be sold or any portion of it is ancestral, it should transfer the decree for execution to the Collector so far as regards ancestral land only (14).

Preclusion of Civil Court's powers—It was proposed to insert the following clause which, however, has not been done—*'The Court shall be precluded from exercising any jurisdiction with respect to any matter relating to the exercise, by the Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector, of all or any of*

(1) In Ganpat Ram Moti Ram v Isaac Adamji, 15 B 322 (1890) the rules were held not to be retrospective, and see Hahan Moti v Pathubhai, 17 B 289 (1892).

(2) The following notifications prescribing rules are cited in O'Keefe's Bombay, Bombay list of Local Rules and Orders, ed 1896, Vol I, pp 398-400, Burmah, Burmah Rules Manual, ed 1897, pp 110-111, V H P & Oudh N W F and Oudh list of Local Rules and Orders, ed 1894, pp 111-112, Central Provinces, Central Provinces Gazette, 1904 Pt III, p 218. The Government has power to prescribe rules providing for appeals from the Collector's Orders, Tahaddas Fatima v Balloo Das, 12 A 764 (1890).

(3) Sheo Prasad v Muhammad Mohsin Khan, 25 A 167 (1902) [in which a 310a of the last Code was held to have no application], Madha Prasad v Hansa Kuar, 5 A 314 (1883) [s. 241], Keshab Das v Radha Prasad, 11 A 94 (1888) [s. 311], Natiu Mal v Lachmi Narain 9 A 43 (1886) Pagho

v Hanmati, 15 Bom. L. P. 389 (1913), 77 B 488.

(4) Sukhdeo Rai v Sheo Gulam, 4 A 392 (1882), and as to ancestral property there dealt with, see Ram Prasad v Radha Prasad, 7 A 402 (1885).

(5) Mahadaji Karandikar v Hari Chikn, 7 B 332 (1883).

(6) See Madho Prasad v Hansa Kuar, 5 A 143 (1883).

(7) Hargovan Parbhudas v Hira Hanthial, 8 B 301 (1884).

(8) Wazir Ali v Janki Prasad, 28 A 671 (1906).

(9) Peta v Chunnilal 31 B 207, 216 (1906).

(10) Mancherji v Thakoras 31 B 129 (1906).

(11) Ganga Prasad v Ganga Lalali, 2 A, 415 (1907).

(12) Regulation Collector v Ramaswami Chetti, 28 M 489 (1906).

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ahmad Ghasia Khan v Jalal Hussain, 28 A 631 (1906).

the powers vested in him in regard to any decree transferred under this section, but it shall not be precluded from exercising, in any other matter, all or any of the powers vested in it notwithstanding that the decree has been so transferred, and a civil suit shall lie with respect to any act done or order made by the Collector or by any gazetted subordinate of the Collector with respect to which, if it had been done or made by the Court acting within its jurisdiction, a civil suit would have been maintainable. The proper principle has been enacted to be that the Civil Court should be precluded from interfering in any matter declared to be within the Collector's jurisdiction (1) but that it is not divested of its ordinary jurisdiction in regard to any other matters merely because the decree has been transferred to the Collector, and that a Civil suit will lie (2) with respect to every order of the Collector upon which, if it had been made by the Court acting within its jurisdiction an action could have been maintained.

[s 326] 72 (1) Where in any local area in which no declaration under section 68 is in force the property attached consists of land or of a share in land, and the Collector represents to the Court that the public sale of the land or share is objectionable and that satisfaction of the decree may be made within a reasonable period by a temporary alienation of the land or share, the Court may authorize the Collector to provide for such satisfaction in the manner recommended by him instead of proceeding to a sale of the land or share.

(2) In every such case the provisions of sections 69 to 71 and of any rules made in pursuance thereof shall apply so far as they are applicable.

Stay of Sale—This section corresponds with sect 244 of Act VIII of 1859. The section then commenced 'When in any district where land paying revenue to Government is ordinarily sold by the Collector as provided in sect 243 the property attached consists' etc and proceeded to provide that 'the Court may authorize the Collector on security for the amount of the decree or for the value of such land or share being given to make provision for such satisfaction' etc. The present wording of first sub clause was adopted by sect 326 of Act X of 1877, which also eliminated the proviso as to security. The second sub-clause was added by sect 326 of Act XIV of 1882. The present Code has omitted the

(1) As to the Collector's duties and powers in execution see *Lallu Trikan v Bhavla Motihia* 11 B 478 (1887), *Ganpatram Motiram v Isaac Adamaj* 15 B 322 (1890), *Sunder Das v Manja Ram*, 7 A 407 (1884), *Tapesri Lal v Devissendan Rai*, 16 A 1

Lachmi Narain 9 A. 43 (1886) *Ragho v Hanmati* 37 B 488 (1913) 15 Bom. L.R. 339

(2) See *Shib Singh v Mukat Singh*, 18 A 437 (1896), *Sadho Chaudhri v Abhenanan dan Prasad* 26 A 101 (1903) [where s 244 of last Code was considered] *Sunder Das v Manja Ram supra* *Mathura Das v Panha Lal supra* *Bando Bibi v Kalka* 9 A 602 (1887) *Sham Behari Lal v Pup Kishore*, 20 A 379 (1898)

Payag Sahu 16 A. 298 (1894), *Nathu Mal*

words 'or management' after the words 'temporary alienation' and substituted "69 to 71 and of any rules made in pursuance thereof" for "320 paragraph 2 to 325 (both inclusive)".

The section does not apply to a decree which directs the sale of land or of a share of land in pursuance of a contract specifically affecting the same (1).

"The Court"—That is, the Court executing the decree. That Court should deal with it itself and not in deference to the opinion of a superior Judge who forwards the recommendation of the Collector (2).

"May authorize"—It is discretionary with the Court to authorize or not as it thinks fit. It is bound to hear any objections made by the decree holder and any evidence adduced by him (3). The only indulgence the Court may sanction is to allow the judgment debtor a reasonable period for satisfying the decree by the temporary alienation of his property. A Court executing a decree cannot vary its terms by authorizing payment by instalments (4) while the property remains in the possession of the judgment debtor (5).

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS

73 (1) *Where assets are held by a Court and more than one persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realization, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons*

Proceeds of execution sale to be rateably distributed among decree holders

Provided as follows —

- (a) *where any property is sold subject to a mortgage or charge, the mortgagee or incumbrancer shall not be entitled to share in any surplus arising from such sale,*
- (b) *where any property liable to be sold in execution of a decree is subject to a mortgage or charge, the Court*

(1) Bhagwand Prasad v. Sheo Sahai 2 A. S. 6 (1880).

(2) Muttra Pershad v. Pam Pershad 6 N. W. P. H. C. R. 39 (1873).

(3) Huro Prasad v. Kali Prasad 9 C. 290 (1882).

(4) Sheo Pershad v. Shiva Nam, 2 N. W. P. H. C. R. 59 (1870).

(5) Kashoo Lall v. Ameer Jan 2 N. W. P. H. C. R. 347 (1870), Muttra Pershad v. Ram Pershad 6 N. W. P. H. C. R. 39 (1873).

(6) Girdhar Das v. Har Shankar 20 A. 383 (1895).

(7) Seth Jaldoyal v. Pam Sahai, 17 C. 422 (1889).

the powers vested in him in regard to any decree transferred under this section, but it shall not be precluded from exercising, in any other matter, all or any of the powers vested in it notwithstanding that the decree has been so transferred, and a civil suit shall lie with respect to any act done or order made by the Collector or by any gazetted subordinate of the Collector with respect to which, if it had been done or made by the Court acting within its jurisdiction, a civil suit would have been maintainable. The proper principle has been enacted to be that the Civil Court should be precluded from interfering in any matter declared to be within the Collector's jurisdiction (1) but that it is not divested of its ordinary jurisdiction in regard to any other matters merely because the decree has been transferred to the Collector and that a Civil suit will lie (2) with respect to every order of the Collector upon which if it had been made by the Court acting within its jurisdiction an action could have been maintained.

[s 326] 72 (1) Where in any local area in which no declaration under section 68 is in force the property attached consists of land or of a share in land, and the Collector represents to the Court that the public sale of the land or share is objectionable and that satisfaction of the decree may be made within a reasonable period by a temporary alienation of the land or share, the Court may authorize the Collector to provide for such satisfaction in the manner recommended by him instead of proceeding to a sale of the land or share.

(2) In every such case the provisions of sections 69 to 71 and of any rules made in pursuance thereof shall apply so far as they are applicable.

Stay of Sale—This section corresponds with sect 214 of Act VIII of 1859. The section then commenced: *When in any district where land paying revenue to Government is ordinarily sold by the Collector as provided in sect 248 the property attached consists* etc and proceeded to provide that *“the Court may authorize the Collector on security for the amount of the decree or for the value of such land or share being given to make provision for such satisfaction”* etc. The present wording of first sub clause was adopted by sect 326 of Act X of 1877, which also eliminated the proviso as to security. The second sub clause was added by sect 326 of Act XIV of 1882. The present Code has omitted the

(1) As to the Collector's duties and powers in execution see *Lalla Trikan v Bhavla Motha* 11 B 478 (1887), *Ganpatram Motiram v Isaac Adams* 15 B 322 (1890), *Sunder Das v Mausa Pam* 7 A 407 (1884), *Tapasri Lal v Devlensendan Rai* 16 A 1 (1893), *Onlan Singh v Mohan Kuar* 20 A 498 (1898), *Mathura Das v Panha Lal* 19 B 216 (1894), *Muhammad Said Khan v Layag Sahu* 16 A 298 (1894), *Nathu Mai*

v Lachmi Narain 9 A 43 (1886), *Ragho v Hanmati* 37 B 488 (1913), 15 Bom L.R. 389.

(2) See *Shib Singh v Mukat Singh* 18 A 437 (1896), *Sadho Chaudhri v Abhenanan dan Prasad* 26 A 101 (1903) [where s 244 of last Code was considered], *Sunder Das v Mausa Ram* *supra*, *Mathura Das v Panha Lal* *supra*, *Bande Bibi v Kalka* 9 A 602 (1887), *Sham Behari Lal v Rup Kishore* 90 A 370 (1898).

words "or management" after the words "temporary alienation" and substituted "69 to 71 and of any rules made in pursuance thereof" for "320, paragraph 2 to 325 (both inclusive)"

The section does not apply to a decree which directs the sale of land or of a share of land in pursuance of a contract specifically affecting the same (1)

"The Court"—That is, the Court executing the decree. That Court should deal with it itself and not in deference to the opinion of a superior Judge who forwards the recommendation of the Collector (2)

"May authorize"—It is discretionary with the Court to authorize or not as it thinks fit. It is bound to hear any objections made by the decree-holder and any evidence adduced by him (3). The only indulgence the Court may sanction is to allow the judgment debtor a reasonable period for satisfying the decree by the temporary alienation of his property. A Court executing a decree cannot vary its terms by authorizing payment by instalments, (4) while the property remains in the possession of the judgment-debtor (5).

For form of authorization see the First Schedule, App E, Form No 25

"Collector to provide"—Execution cannot be taken out against property under the management of the Collector. As against such property, the time it is under such management shall be excluded in reckoning limitation (6). Possession cannot be given to an alienee of the judgment debtor of property under such management, but damages can be awarded (7).

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS

73 (1) *Where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realization, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons:*

Proceeds of execution-sale to be rateably distributed among decree-holders

Provided as follows:—

- (a) *where any property is sold subject to a mortgage or charge, the mortgagee or incumbrancer shall not be entitled to share in any surplus arising from such sale;*
- (b) *where any property liable to be sold in execution of a decree is subject to a mortgage or charge, the Court*

(1) *Bhagwand Prasad v Sheo Sahai*, 2 A. 456 (1880)

(2) *Muttra Pershad v Pam Pershad*, 6 N W P H. C. R. 39 (1873)

(3) *Huro Prasad v Kali Prasad* 9 C. 290 (1882)

(4) *Sheo Pershad v Shiva Ram*, 2 N W P H. C. R. 59 (1870)

(5) *Kashce Lall v Ameer Jan*, 2 N W P H. C. R. 347 (1870), *Muttra Pershad v Ram Pershad*, 6 N W P H. C. R. 39 (1873)

(6) *Girdhar Das v Har Shankar*, 20 A 383 (1893)

(7) *Seth Jaidayal v Ram Sahas*, 17 C. 432 (1889)

may, with the *consent* of the mortgagee or incumbrancer, order that the property be sold free from the mortgage or charge, giving to the mortgagee or incumbrancer the same *interest* in the proceeds of the sale as he had in the property sold ;

- (e) *where any immovable property is sold in execution of a decree ordering its sale for the discharge of an incumbrance thereon, the proceeds of sale shall be applied—*
first, in defraying the expenses of the sale ;
secondly, in discharging the amount due under the decree,
thirdly, in discharging the interest and principal monies due on subsequent incumbrances (if any), and,
fourthly, rateably among the holders of decrees for the payment of money against the judgment-debtor, who have, prior to the sale of the property, applied to the Court which passed the decree ordering such sale for execution of such decrees, and have not obtained satisfaction thereof

(2) *Where all or any of the assets liable to be rateably distributed under this section are paid to a person not entitled to receive the same, any person so entitled may sue such person to compel him to refund the assets*

(3) Nothing in this section affects any right of the Government.

Object and scope of section—Under the Code of 1859 the attaching creditor was entitled to be first paid out of the proceeds of the property attached and sold, the surplus only being liable to distribution rateably among subsequent attaching creditors whereas under the Code of 1877 and subsequent and present Code it is immaterial at whose instance an attachment is placed Every creditor who has applied is entitled to a rateable distribution (1) The present provisions prevent multiplicity of procedure and that scramble by several judgment debtors which used to take place under the Code of 1859 (2) The section draws a sharp distinction between attachment and realization (3) and an attaching creditor is entitled to no priority over other creditors until a sale at his instance has actually taken place

The object of the section is two fold Firstly, to prevent unnecessary multiplicity of execution proceedings, to obviate in a case where there are many decree holders, each competent to execute his decree by attachment and sale of a particular property the necessity of each and every one separately attaching and separately selling that property The other object is to secure

(1) *Vishvanath Maheshwar v Virendra Panachand* 6 B 16 (1881), *Peacock v Madan Oopal* C C W N 577, 580 (1902) The principle was applied to a case not falling within the Code in *Sewdoot Poy v Sree Canto Manty* 33 C 639 (1907) *Butler*

Khan v Goman Singh, 13 C. W. N 1177 (1909)

(2) *Rithal Das v Nandkishore*, 23 A 106, 113 (1900)

(3) *Saobul Chundler Law v Pusack Lal Mitter* 15 C 202 209 (1888)

an equitable administration of the property by placing all the decree holders upon the same footing and making the property rateably divisible among them instead of allowing one to exclude all the others merely because he happened to be the first who had attached and sold the property (1)

Where it was contended on behalf of the defendants that, having regard to the terms of the action an attachment made by the plaintiffs enured for the benefit of all persons holding decrees for money against the same judgment debtor, and who complied with the conditions specified in the section, that is to say that, provided the defendants have, prior to the realization, applied to the Court holding the assets for execution of decrees for money against the same judgment-debtor, and have not obtained satisfaction thereof they are, without any attachment of their own, entitled to share rateably with the plaintiffs in the proceeds of the sale, although in the absence of the plaintiff's attachment they could not themselves, after the judgment-debtor's death, have enforced execution against this property, it was held that argument was to some extent favoured by the language of the section, but that it was clear that this section cannot be read absolutely literally. If it were to be read literally, without any because the tion for exec

spective altogether of the result of such applications or any objections to them however well founded. But it has been held, and it could not otherwise have been held, that an application for execution which was barred by limitation,(2) or an application which had for any reason been rejected, would not entitle the applicant to share rateably under this section, and therefore it is clear that one must give the section a common sense construction, and see what sort of case it really provides for. The object of the section being as above stated, it was not desired to enlarge in any way the rights of decree holders or place at their disposal the proceeds of property which they could not have themselves attached. It entitled to share in the proceeds only those decree holders who could have themselves attached and sold the property. It was not meant to enable a decree holder to indirectly get the benefits of an execution which he could not himself have enforced directly. Where the decree holders are persons who could have themselves attached and sold the property, then, but only then, an attachment and sale by one is correctly described as enuring for the benefit of all (3)

The provisions of this section show that when property is sold in execution of a decree it is sold not only for the realization of the money due under that particular decree, but of all other decrees the holders of which have applied for execution. When property is sold in execution of a decree it cannot be sold again at the instance of another decree holder, who may have attached it before the attachment effected by the decree-holder, under whose decree it is actually sold, and when a judicial sale takes place all previous attachments effected upon the property sold fall to the ground (4)

(1) *Bithal Das v Nand Kishore*, 23 A. 106, 110 (1900), *Funk v Maharaj Bahadur Singh*, 1 C. W. N. 27, 30 (1899)

(2) See *Radha Gobin v Shaikh Omer*, 15 W. R. 219 (1871)

(3) *Bithal Das v Nand Kishore*, 23 A. 106, 109-111 (1900)

(4) *Kartie Nath Roy v Surbansid Shaha*, 12 C. 317 (1855)

Where in execution of two decrees certain properties were sold the proceeds of which were sufficient to pay the decree holders, it was held that on the interposition of a creditor who had not attached, the Court was right in selling a third property, as such creditor would be entitled to share, with the result that it could not be said that by the amount realized from the first sale the decrees under execution were satisfied (1)

The section relates to procedure only, and was intended to afford an additional facility to decree-holders. It does not interfere with substantive rights or the maintenance of a suit, notwithstanding that a party may not have availed himself of its facilities (2) On the other hand, failure to participate does not prevent a creditor executing his decree in any other manner (3)

Permission granted to a judgment creditor to set off the amount of the purchase money payable for the property sold against the debt due to him under his decree must be taken to be granted subject to the provisions of this section (4)

The former section was held not to apply to a deposit made by a judgment-debtor under sect 310A (now O XXI r 89) of the former Code (5)

An order under this section affects only interests existing at the time. The insolvency of the debtor introduces a new state of things from the date of the insolvency, but as regards sums accrued due prior to the date of the insolvency, the order under this section creates rights which are not affected by the insolvency (6)

It has been held that sect 490 (now O XXXVIII r 12) did not empower a decree holder to share in the distribution of property he has attached, and that though there was no necessity to re-attach, an application for execution was imperative (7)

Under the last Code it was in some cases held that when a person desired to share in the assets realized by a sale in execution he must apply to the Court in which those assets were for the execution of his decree and if it were found that property attached by an inferior Court was already or thereafter became subject to an attachment issued from a superior Court, the decree holder must have applied to transfer his application to the higher Court, if he desired to secure the application of the attached property and its proceeds to the satisfaction of his decree (8) A contrary view was adopted in the Calcutta High Court, where it was held that this section did not require the transfer of the decree to the Court where the process of realization took place as a condition

(1) *Mohunt Megh Lall v Shub Pershad*, 7 C 34 (1881)

(2) *Janoky Bullubh Sen v Johiruddin Mahomed*, 10 C 567, 576 (1884)

(3) *Syad Nadir Hossein v Thovildarmee*, 19 W R 255 (1873)

(4) *Madden v Chappani*, 11 M. 356 (1887), and cases there cited, *dist in Sree Krishna Chandook Chand*, 32 M. 334 (1903)

(5) *Roshun Lall v Ram Lall Mullick*, 30 C 263 (1903), s c, 7 C W N 341, *Bahari Lall Paul v Gopal Lall Seal*, 1 C W N 695 (1897)

(6) *Howatson v Durrant* 27 C. 351 (1900), s c, 4 C W N 610. Insolvency after attachment has no effect, see *Viraraghava v Parasumara* 15 M. 372 (1891)

(7) *Pattanj Shapurji v Jordan*, 12 B 400 (1898), but see *Bhugwan Chunder Kuriratna v Chandra Mala Gupta*, 29 C 773, 777 (1902)

(8) *Muttalagiri Nayak v Muttayyar*, 6 M. 357 (1883), *Raghubar Dyal v Banke Lal*, 22 A 182, 186 (1900) [Decree of Revenue Court] *Nimbaji Talsuram v Vadia Venkati* 16 B 683, 686 (1892) *Andanapa v Blumrao*

precedent to an application under sect 285 (now 63) of the former Code (1) And this view has been recently adopted in the Madras High Court (2)

It has been held that a claim or an order under this section did not amount to an attachment (3) but if a debt was attached no equitable assignment of who subsequently obtained an order under s not therefore operate as a substantive r was the case, when the original attachment terminates

It is nowhere provided either that an application for distribution cannot

of necessity be given to the other decree holders (5) After an order for distribution has been made and before the funds have been actually distributed it is open to one of the decree holders to maintain a suit for a declaration that the decree of a next decree holder is collusive and that he is not entitled to share in the sale proceeds (6)

Assets held—That is available for distribution in execution of a decree The words of the last Code were assets "*realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree*" Assets meant the proceeds of the sale of the property sold in execution (7) Moneys paid into Court by sale or otherwise were assets from the moment of their payment into Court (8) "Realized" meant that property had been converted into or obtained in cash or some other form available for immediate distribution There is nothing in the word itself which required that the process should take place as the result of any ulterior proceeding in the course of execution (9) Assets were realized when the whole of the proceeds were paid into Court (10) But the word "realized" was however followed by words which showed that the realization must have

Janba, 37 B 133 (1912)

(5) Chunni Lal v Jugal Kishore, 27 A 132 (1904)

(6) Trailakya Nath Adhya v Pulin Behari Basal, 3 C L J 355 (1904)

(7) Pamanathan Chettiar v Subramania Sastrial, 26 M 179 181 (1902)

(8) Vishvanath Maheshwar v Virchand Panchand, 6 B 16 (1881), Srinivasa Ayyangar v Seetharamayyar, 19 M 72 71 (1895), that is when the property became available for distribution Sew Bux Bogla v Shib Chunder Sen, 13 C 225 (1886), Veerayya v Annamala Chetty, 31 M 502 (1906)

(9) Mandal Umedram v Nanabhai Manik Lal 25 B 264, 274 (1903)

(10) Pamanathan Chettiar v Subramania Sastrial, 26 M 179 (1902), in which it was also held that the words did not apply to the 25 per cent deposit. Ref. to Hafez Mahmud v Damodar Pramanick, 18 C 212 at 214

Shankar v Chanira Shankar, 6 B 193 (1890), Dattatraya v Rahimulla, 15 B 456 (1893), Himalaya Bank v Hurel, 3 A 710 (1881) [as to this case and S C C, see Bhagvan v Bala 8 B 230 (1883), Malhar v Naro 9 B 174 (1884), Krishna v Mansaram, 18 B 61 (1893), Kela v Vikrishna 15 M 315 (1891)]

(1) Har Bhagat Das v Anandaram Marwar 2 C W N 126 (1897), Clark v Alexander, 21 C 200 (1893)

(2) Arimuthu v Vyapuripandaram, 35 M 588 (1911)

(3) Ganga Das v Kuchali, 7 A 702 (1885) Durga Charan Rai Chowdry v Monmohini Das, 15 C 771 (1886)

(4) Sorabji Efulji v Govind Ram 16 B 91 (1891), but cf. Jetha Bhuma v Lady

taken place in a particular way, viz in execution (1) from the property of the judgment debtor, (2) the proceeds being "assets" even before the sale becomes absolute (3) Where therefore assets were realized but not in process of execution the section did not apply, as where moneys were paid by a judgment debtor under arrest (4) or paid into Court (5) voluntarily, though no doubt under pressure of the decrees, or were realized by private sale of properties attached, the assets being realized under the section not by the attachment but by the sale (6)

Although this section is wider than sect 293 of the last Code yet the effect of sects 275 and 310A of the last Code (now represented by O XXI r 55 and O XXI r 89) remains unaltered, and therefore sums paid into Court for a particular purpose under O XXI r 55 are not assets under this section, (7) neither are sums paid into Court under O XXI r 89 (8)

The object of the provision should be to expedite and cheapen the execution of decrees against the same person by adjusting the claims of rival decree-holders without the necessity for separate proceedings. If, however, the property is not sufficient to satisfy all the claimants, the wording of the last Code as judicially interpreted held out an inducement to the attaching creditors to settle out of Court with the judgment debtor at the expense of the other decree holders (9). The language of the section has been altered and widened by referring to assets held available for distribution rather than to assets 'realized in execution'. It is necessary of course that assets in order to be "held" must be realized. It is not however necessary now that the realization must have been in execution as that phrase was interpreted under the former Code. It is sufficient that having been realized (and probably that will be held to be when the entire amount due from a purchaser has been paid into Court) they are available for distribution in execution. The creditors

(1891), *Arimuthu v Vyapuripandaram* 35 M 588 (1911), *Maharaja of Burdwan v Apurba*, 15 C W N 872 (1911), 14 C L J 50

(1) *Manlal Umedram v Nanabhai Maniklal*, 28 B 264, 274 (1903), *Sew Bux Bogla v Shub Chunder Sen*, 13 C 225 (1886), *Bishen Chunder v Monmohinee S W R* 501 (1867). The realization was held to be by

Govind Ramji, 16 B 91 (1891) [debt attached and paid into hands of Sheriff]

(2) *Purshotam Das v Mahanant Surajbharthi*, 6 B 588 (1882), *Gopaldas v Chunnilal*, 8 A 67 (1885)

(3) *Vishvanath Maheshwar v Virchand Pana Chand*, 6 B 16 (1881)

(4) *Purshotam Das v Mahanant Surajbharthi*, 6 B 588 (1882)

(5) *Gopaldas v Chunnilal*, 8 A 67 (1885), *Sew Bux Bogla v Shub Chunder Sen*, 13 C

225 (1886), *Prosonomoyee Dassee v Sreenath Roy*, 21 C 809 (1894), *Vibredhapriya Tuthasami v Yusuf Sahib*, 28 M 380 (1905)

(6) *Vibredhapriya v Yusuf Sahib*, *supra*, and the section does not apply where the judgment debtor has paid money out of Court to one of the decree holders who had taken steps to execute the decree and who then intimated to the Court that his claim had been satisfied, *Gowri Dutt v Amarchand* C L J 49 (1911)

(7) *Sorabji Coovary v Kala Raghunath*, 36 B 156 (1911)

(8) *Haras Saha v Fazlur Rahman*, 40 C 619 (1913)

(9) See *Purshotam Das v Mahanant Surajbharthi*, 6 B 588, at p 590 (1882) ["The arresting creditor may avail himself of the arrest to enter into any arrangement he thinks proper with the debtor behind the back, and independently of other creditors who may have applied for execution"]

should exclude persons who are not so, (1) and the Court is competent to determine the question of *bonâ fides* (2)

"The same judgment debtor" — If A holds a decree against two persons X and Y, and B holds a decree against only one of them, X, in so far as the decrees are both decrees against X they are decrees against the same judgment-debtor (3) Where property belonging to A has been attached under a decree, and other decree holders than the attaching creditor have applied before realization of assets to participate in the sale proceeds, and amongst them a creditor who has obtained a decree against A and B, such latter creditor is entitled under this section to share in the proceeds of the sale of A's property (4) The following decrees have been held not to be against the same judgment-debtor: A decree against B and a decree against B's representative, (5) a decree against Y as representative of a party's deceased husband and a decree against Y in his personal capacity (6)

All will share equally in the surplus after deducting the costs of realization, there being no priority except perhaps in the case of Crown debts, (7) as to which also see third sub clause or, it has been held (8) in the case of rent realized by the sale of the house or building for which it was due. It is only the unsatisfied portion of the decree that ought to be taken into account in a question of saleable distribution there being no reason why any amount should be set apart in favour of a decree holder in proportion to any sum covered by his decree which has already been realized (9)

Sale subject to a mortgage — Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso refer only to sales in execution of simple money decrees and declare the incompetence of a mortgagee as such to any share of the surplus proceeds when the property is sold subject to his mortgage, otherwise, if he consents to sell the property free of lien, clause (c) refers to sales under mortgage decrees, but in such a case, as appears from that clause prior incumbrances are not taken into account, the sale proceeds being distributed in discharge of subsequent incumbrances

(1) *In re Sunder Das* 11 C 42 (1884),
Chaganlal v Fazarali 13 B 154 (1888)

(2) *Puran Chand v Purendra Naram* 17
C W N 326 328 (1912) *Perry Lal Das v*
Perry Lal Dawn, 18 C L J 646 (1913)

(3) *Gonesh Das Bagria v Shiva Lakshman*
Bhakat, 30 C 583 (1903), s c, 7 C W N
414, overruling *Deboka Nundun Sen v Hart*,
12 C. 294 (1885) [explained in *Ambaji*
Tulsiram v Vadia Venkati, 16 B 683 (1892)],
foll. *Gatti Lal v Bir Bahadur Sahai*, 27 A
158 (1904), *Chotalal v Nabibhai*, 29 B 528
(1904)

(4) *Shumbhoo Nath Paddar v Luckynath*
Dey, 9 C 920 (1883), foll. *Delhi and London*
Bank v Uncovenanted Service Bank, 10 A
35, 38 (1887)

(5) *Govind Abaji v Mohomiraj Vinayak*, 25
B 491 (1901), s c 3 Bom L R 407 (1901)

In this case there was no decree against the
father and one against the son, but the case
has been distinguished where there was one
decree against the father, and another
against father and son, *Ramanathan*
Chettiar v Subramania Sastri 26 M 179,
182 (1902), and see *Grant v Subrymanian*,
22 M. 241 (1898), *Srinivasa v Kanthumathi*
33 M 465 (1910)

(6) *Bhola Nath v Vagbulun nissa* 26 A
28, 34 (1903), but see *Hart v Tara Prosonno*
Mukherjee, 11 C 718, 723 (1885)

(7) As to which see Secretary of State v
Bombay Landings etc Co, 5 B H C R O,
C J 23 (1863)

(8) *Maniklal Vandal v Lakha*, 4 B 429
(1890)

(9) *Sarat Chandra Kundu v Doyal Chund*
Seal 3 C W N 363 (1899)

only (1) The section refers to cases in which property is sold subject to a mortgage, and not to cases where property subject to an undisclosed mortgage is sold in execution (2) The Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of the alleged mortgage (3)

Sale under mortgage decree—See notes to "Sale subject to mortgage" This provision applies where the decree orders the property to be sold, and not to the case where the property sold was not the encumbered property but other property of the judgment debtor (4) It was held that the term "*incumbrance*" could not be read as "an incumbrance or incumbrances" so as to apply a principle to the distribution of proceeds which would give priority to a subsequent incumbrance (5)

"Amount due"—The words of the former section were "*in discharging the interest (6) and principal money due on the incumbrance*"

"Subsequent incumbrances"—The sale proceeds are to be applied to satisfaction of incumbrances according to their priority (7)

Suit for refund of assets, clause (2)—The scheme of the section is to enable the Judge as a matter of administration (8) to distribute the proceeds according to what seems at the time to be the rights of the parties. But this distribution does not import a conclusive adjudication on the rights which may be subsequently readjusted in a suit under this clause. The suit is to recover the assets not to set aside the order for distribution, and the order for the reasons stated stand in the way of the suit (9) If a creditor aggrieved is entitled to bring a regular suit to compel the successful judgment creditor in execution to refund (10) The cause of action arises only when the money is paid (11) And all parties to the distribution should be parties to the suit (12) Though an order under this section is not appealable.

may be open to revision (1) as well as to attack by suit. It has been held that a Small Cause Court cannot try a suit for refund of assets paid under this section, (2) but this has been dissented from (3).

Sale proceeds—When surplus sale proceeds are in Court the Judge should pay them out only to the party in whose name they stand, or his agent (4). It has been held that the Court may allow a decree holder to take out the purchase money before confirmation of Sale (5). Where property was sold under one decree and the proceeds were sufficient to satisfy both the decrees of two creditors, the property should not be resold but the other decree should have been satisfied out of the assets realized by the first sale (6). If a mortgagee receives any money out of the surplus sale proceeds of a share in the property mortgaged to him, sold in execution of a decree on a prior mortgage from some of the mortgagors to whom the share belonged and against whom the decree was obtained, he is bound to apply the money to the satisfaction of his mortgage debt, only in case he receives it by virtue of his security and not otherwise, although the payment might be made to him by the said mortgagors in satisfaction of other debts due to him from them (7).

RESISTANCE TO EXECUTION.

330.1 **74** *Where the Court is satisfied that the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or that the purchaser of immovable property sold in execution of a decree has been resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession of the property by the judgment-debtor or some person on his behalf and that such resistance or obstruction was without any just cause, the Court may, at the instance of the decree-holder or purchaser, order the judgment-debtor or such other person to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days and may further direct that the decree holder or purchaser be put into possession of the property.*

Resistance—See notes to O XXI rr 97–103, *post* which deal with resistance to delivery of possession either to decree holder or purchaser

(1) *Druchittambala v Seshayyengar*, 4 M 383 (1891), *Sew Dux Bogla v Shib Chunder Sen*, 13 C. 225 (1886), *Viraraghava v Para Sumatra*, 15 M. 372 (1891) *In Venkataraman v Mahabirgayyan*, 9 M. 508 (1886), the Court refused to interfere

(2) *Shahi Ram v Shib Lal*, 7 A 378 (1880)

(3) *Harihara v Subramanya*, 9 M 250 (1895)

(4) *In re Pulidabatty Dassie*, 12 W R

352 (1869)

(5) *Jogendra Nath Sircar v Gobind Chunder Addi*, 12 C 202 (1885), *Vishvanath Maheshvar v Virchand Pana Chand*, 6 B 16 (1881), but see *Hafez Mahomed v Damodar Pramanick*, 18 C 242 245 (1891)

(6) *Rati Ram v Churanji Lal* 3 A 579 (1881)

(7) *Ganga Ram Marwari v Jaibullap Naram Singh*, 30 C 953 (1903)

PART III.

INCIDENTAL PROCEEDINGS.

COMMISSIONS.

75. *Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may issue a commission—*
Power of Court to issue commissions (a) to examine any person,
 (b) to make a local investigation,
 (c) to examine or adjust accounts, or
 (d) to make a partition

The power of a Court to issue a commission is defined in this section. But the Court cannot delegate its judicial functions under it. And see O XXVI. r 9 (1)

76. (1) *A commission for the examination of any person* (s.
Commission to another Court may be issued to any Court (not being a High Court) situate in a province other than the province in which the Court of issue is situate and having jurisdiction in the place in which the person to be examined resides.

(2) Every Court receiving a commission for the examination (s.
 of any person under sub-section (1) shall examine him or cause him to be examined pursuant thereto, and the commission, when it has been duly executed, shall be returned together (s.
 with the evidence taken under it to the Court from which it was issued, unless the order for issuing the commission has otherwise directed, in which case the commission shall be returned in terms of such order.

77. *In lieu of issuing a commission the Court may issue a letter of request to examine a witness residing at any place not within British India.*
Letter of request

(1) *Ram Narain v Oindra Nath*, 17 C. W. N 369 (1911), 15 C. L. J 17, and *Raj Kishori v Kumodini*, 15 C. L. J 135 (1910).

may be open to revision (1) as well as to attack by suit. It has been held that a Small Cause Court cannot try a suit for refund of assets paid under this section (2) but this has been dissented from (3).

Sale proceeds—When surplus sale proceeds are in Court the Judge should pay them out only to the party in whose name they stand, or his agent (4). It has been held that the Court may allow a decree holder to take out the purchase money before confirmation of Sale (5). Where property was sold under one decree and the proceeds were sufficient to satisfy both the decrees of two creditors, the property should not be resold but the other decree should have been satisfied out of the assets realized by the first sale (6). If a mortgagee receives any money out of the surplus sale proceeds of a share in the property mortgaged to him, sold in execution of a decree on a prior mortgage from some of the mortgagors to whom the share belonged and against whom the decree was obtained, he is bound to apply the money to the satisfaction of his mortgage debt, only in case he receives it by virtue of his security and not otherwise, although the payment might be made to him by the said mortgagors in satisfaction of other debts due to him from them (7).

RESISTANCE TO EXECUTION

330] 74 Where the Court is satisfied that the holder of a decree *Resistance to execu for the possession of immoveable property or*
tion that the purchaser of immoveable property sold
in execution of a decree has been resisted or obstructed in obtain-
ing possession of the property by the judgment-debtor or some
person on his behalf and that such resistance or obstruction was
without any just cause, the Court may, at the instance of the
decree-holder or purchaser, order the judgment-debtor or such
other person to be detained in the civil prison for a term which
may extend to thirty days and may further direct that the decree-
holder or purchaser be put into possession of the property.

Resistance—See notes to O XXI rr 97-103, *post* which deal with resistance to delivery of possession either to decree holder or purchaser

(1) Tiruchittambala v Seshayangar, 4 M 383 (1881), Sew Bux Begla v Shub Chunder Sen, 13 C. 225 (1886), Viraraghava v Para Sumatra, 15 M. 372 (1891). In Venkataraman v Mahabrigayyan, 9 M. 508 (1886), the Court refused to interfere.

(2) Shahu Ram v Shib Lal 7 A 378 (1885).

(3) Harihara v Subramanya, 9 M 250 (1885).

(4) *In re Puddabatty Daswe*, 12 W R

352 (1869).

(5) Jogendra Nath Sircar v Gobind Chunder Adai, 12 C 252 (1885), Vishvanath Malleshwar v Virchand Pana Chand, 6 B 16 (1881), but see Hafez Mahomed v Damodar Pramanick, 18 C 242, 245 (1891).

(6) Rati Ram v Chiranj Lal, 7 A 579 (1881).

(7) Ganga Ram Marwari v Jaidullap Narsin Singh, 30 C. 953 (1903).

PART III

INCIDENTAL PROCEEDINGS.

COMMISSIONS

75 Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may issue a commission—
Power of Court to issue commissions
 (a) to examine any person,
 (b) to make a local investigation,
 (c) to examine or adjust accounts, or
 (d) to make a partition.

The power of a Court to issue a commission is defined in this section. But the Court cannot delegate its judicial functions under it. And see O XVI r 9 (1).

76 (1) A commission for the examination of any person is
Commission to another Court may be issued to any Court (not being a High Court) situate in a province other than the province in which the Court of issue is situate and having jurisdiction in the place in which the person to be examined resides.
 (2) Every Court receiving a commission for the examination of any person under sub-section (1) shall examine him or cause him to be examined pursuant thereto, and the commission, when it has been duly executed, shall be returned together with the evidence taken under it to the Court from which it was issued, unless the order for issuing the commission has otherwise directed, in which case the commission shall be returned in terms of such order.

77 In lieu of issuing a commission the Court may issue a letter of request to examine a witness residing at any place not within British India.

(1) Ram Narayan v. Chandra Nath, 12 Ind App 187 (1911) 15 C L J 139; L. W. N. 30 (1911) 15 C L J 139 and (1910).

78. The provisions as to the execution and return of commissions issued by foreign Courts. *missions for the examination of witnesses* shall apply to commissions issued by—

- (a) Courts situate beyond the limits of British India and established *or continued* by the authority of *His* Majesty or of the Governor General in Council, or
- (b) Courts situate in any part of the British Empire other than British India, or
- (c) Courts of any foreign country for the time being in alliance with *His* Majesty.

Commissions.—This subject is further dealt with in O XXVI and the notes thereto, to which refer As to forms of letter of request, see First Schedule, Appendix H, No 8, and as to the same O XXVI r 5, *post*.

PART IV

SUITS IN PARTICULAR CASES

SUITS BY OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY

79 (1) Suits by or against the Government shall be instituted by or against the Secretary of State for India in Council

(2) *Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any information exhibited by the Advocate General in exercise of the power declared by section 111 of the East India Company Act 1813.*

Suits—This is sect 416 of the last Code. Sects 417-421 are now rr 2-6 of O XXVII the first rule of that Order dealing with pleadings, being new. Sect 422 is now r 27 of O V. Sect 423 is r 7 of O XXVII. Sects 424 and 425 are now sects 80, 81. Sects 426 and 427 are r 8 of O XXVII. Sects 428 and 429 are now sects 81 and 82.

The liability of the Secretary of State for India in Council to be sued depends on the statute 21 & 22 Vict c 106 for the better government of India, and turns principally upon the construction of sect 65 of that Statute (1). Whether a suit will lie at the instance of Government is a matter of substantive law. As regards the Court in which such a suit, assuming it to lie, should be brought, reference should be made in the case of the High Courts to their Letters Patent, in other cases to the various Indian Civil Courts Acts and to sects 16-20 of this Code (2). Whether and when a suit will lie against a public officer is a question

(1) See for a recent decision in which the earlier cases are cited *Jehangir v Secretary of State*, 27 B 189 (1902) and others cited in O'Keefe & C P C., notes to s. 416.

(2) I do not refer to those sections and in particular as regards suits against Government, see those in which the question has arisen whether the Government may (1) sue or (2) be sued by the Secretary of State 14 C. 222 n. (1881).

Subbaraya v Government, 1 M 205 (1882) or may not be said to carry on business (3) *Under v Secretary of State*, 1 H 16, 37 (1862-63), *Deva Narayan v Secretary of State*, 14 C. 256 (1887). Several cases have been decided in which the cause of action arose within the local limits and in which therefore those Courts could have had jurisdiction if the Government were to be sued.

. 391.] 78. The provisions as to the execution and return of commissions issued by foreign Courts. *missions for the examination of witnesses* shall apply to commissions issued by—

- (a) Courts situate beyond the limits of British India and established *or continued* by the authority of *His Majesty* or of the Governor General in Council, or
- (b) Courts situate in any part of the British Empire other than British India, or
- (c) Courts of any foreign country for the time being in alliance with *His Majesty*.

Commissions.—This subject is further dealt with in O. XXVI. and the notes thereto, to which refer. As to forms of letter of request, see First Schedule, Appendix H, No. 8, and as to the same O XXVI r. 5, *post*.

PART IV

SUITS IN PARTICULAR CASES

SUITS BY OR AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY

79 (1) Suits by or against the Government shall be instituted by or against the Secretary of State for India in Council.

Suits by or against Government.

(2) *Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any information exhibited by the Advocate General in exercise of the power declared by section 111 of the East India Company Act, 1813.*

Suits—This is sect 416 of the last Code. Sects 417-421 are now rr 2-6 of O XXVII, the first rule of that Order, dealing with pleadings, being new. Sect 422 is now r 27 of O V. Sect 423 is r 7 of O XXVII. Sects 424 and 425 are now sects 80, 81. Sects 426 and 427 are r 8 of O XXVII. Sects 428 and 429 are now sects 81 and 82.

The liability of the Secretary of State for India in Council to be sued depends on the statute 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, for the better government of India, and turns principally upon the construction of sect 65 of that Statute (1) Whether a suit will lie at the instance of Government is a matter of substantive law. As regards the Court in which such a suit, assuming it to be, should be brought, reference should be made in the case of the High Courts to their Letters Patent, in other cases to the various Indian Civil Courts Acts, and to sects 16-20 of this Code (2). Whether and when a suit will lie against a public officer is a question

(1) See for a recent decision, in which the earlier cases are cited *Jehangir v. Secretary of State* 27 B. 189 (1902) and others cited in O'Kinealy & C. P. C., notes to s. 416.

(2) *Ide ante*, in test to those sections and in particular as regards suits against Government, see those in which the question has arisen whether the Government may [reproduce] *De v. Secretary of State*, 14 C. 262 n. (1881).

Subbaraya v. Government, 1 M. 280 (1892)] or may not be said to carry on business [*Pundit v. Secretary of State*, 1 Hyde, 37 (1872-73)], *Dora Narain v. Secretary of State*, 14 C. 256 (1887)]. Several suits have been decided in which the cause of action did not accrue within the local limits, and in which therefore those Courts could have had jurisdiction only if the Government could be liable

of substantive law. Judicial officers are protected by Act XVIII of 1850 but no such general protection is granted to executive officers (1). None of these matters are relevant to these provisions, which deal with the subject of procedure in a case properly instituted. The statute first cited provides that the Secretary of State for India in Council may be sued as a body corporate, and this section provides that suits shall be so entitled (2). Where, however, a suit was wrongly brought against a Magistrate the High Court, on appeal, allowed the name of the Magistrate to be struck out, and that of the Secretary of State for India in Council to be inserted (3).

Informations—The power of the Advocate General to exhibit informations in the nature of actions at law or Bills in Equity was expressly declared by sect. 111 of the East India Company Act 1813 (53 Geo. 3 c. 155), and kept alive by sect. 2 of the Government of India Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85), and again by sect. 1 of the Government of India Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 95) now merged in the statute of 1858 already mentioned (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106). The Governor General in Council is precluded by sect. 22 of the Indian Councils Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 67) from legislative interference with the provisions of any of the enactments above quoted. The question was considered whether sect. 416 of the last Code appeared to exclude informations exhibited by the Advocate General, and whether it was therefore desirable to add a proviso saving such information. And this has been done.

424] **80** No suit shall be instituted against the Secretary of State for India in Council, or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Secretary of State in Council, delivered to, or left at the office of, a Secretary to the Local Government or the Collector of the district, and, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, *description* and place of *residence* of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.

"No suit"—The words "no suit" under the last Code were held to mean what they say, that is no suit of any kind and the section was not confined to a particular class of suit such as suits founded on tort and claiming damages.

to carry on business in those limits. See *Hukm Chand v. P. C. 321*. *Doss Johnson v. Secretary of State*, 2 Hyde 153 (1864), *P. & O. S. N. Co. v. Secretary of State* 5 B. H. C. R. App. 1 (1861), *Brito v. Secretary of State*, 6 B. 201 (1881), *Hari Bhanji v. Secretary of State* 4 M. 314 (1879) see also as to jurisdiction, *Hearsey v. Secretary of State* 6 A. H.

C. R. 47 (1873)

(1) Some cases will be found collected in *O'Meara's C. P. C.*, notes to s. 422.

(2) *Nobin Chunder v. Secretary of State* 1 C. 11, 14 (1876).

(3) *Nilkanthappa v. Magistrate*, 6 L. 170 (1882), *Bilaram v. Magistrate*, 6 B. 673 (1883).

And it has been held under the present Code that this section applies to suits of every kind (1). The object of notice is to give the defendant breathing time so as to enable him to determine whether reparation ought to be made, and the principle is applicable to any class of suit (2). The substitution of the words "any act" for "an act" points in the same direction. Notice has in consequence, been deemed necessary even when the remedy sought was an injunction, and though delay involved in the giving of notice might involve the commission of the wrong complained of before the suit was filed (3). But the objection for want of notice can only be taken by the Secretary of State, and where no relief is claimed against him it has been held that no notice is necessary (4).

"Shall be instituted"—That is, commenced. The section says that no suit shall be instituted, not that it shall not be proceeded with or maintained. The language of the section is imperative, and absolutely debar a Court from entertaining a suit instituted without compliance with the provisions of the section. A Court cannot under such circumstances stay proceedings and allow time to the plaintiff to serve the requisite notice, but his only course is to reject the plaint (5). It has, however, been held that there is nothing in the law to show that in case of any amendment of the plaint, necessitated by the alleged discovery of facts previously unknown to the plaintiff, the Secretary of State should have a further notice of two months, when the relief asked for is not altered by such amendment, and it only embodies certain further material in support of the plaintiff's contention (6). And where in an action already instituted against the Secretary of State a public servant was also afterwards joined as defendant, who, however, was not sued for any act done by him independently of Government, and no separate relief was asked for against him, no notice was held to be required in his case (7). Further, there is nothing to prevent the defendant from waiving the notice or from being estopped by his conduct from pleading the want of it at the trial (8). Though the Secretary of State is not a necessary party to a suit to set aside a revenue sale, yet the Government has such an

(1) *Secretary of State v. Gajanan*, 20 L. J. 262 (1911), *Sakkaram Laxman v. Secretary of State*, 14 L. L. J. 263 (1912), *Secretary of State v. Hakkhan*, 37 M. 112 (1914).

(2) *Secretary of State v. Pabji Lal*, 25 C. 239, 243, 244 (1905), *cf. v. Yashwantrao Chaudhari v. Secretary of State*, 31 L. J. 118, 157 (1906), *contra, Chakrabarty Chakrabarti Legum v. Government*, 3 C. 451 (1901) where it appears to have been considered that notice was required only in suits in respect of Government property. It may, however, be a question whether there was an act done in official capacity in the above case. See *Secretary of State v. Gajanan*, 20 L. J. 262, 42 (1911), and see *Legum v. Government*, 3 C. 451 (1901), where it was held

that these words did not apply where the suit was one *ex contractu*. 31 L. J. 263 (1912) *cf. v. Gajanan*, 20 L. J. 262 (1911).

(3) *Hare v. Secretary of State*, 27 P. 424 (1905), *cf. v. P. Lal*, 431; see *Secretary of State v. Pabji Lal*, 25 C. at p. 244 (1905).

(4) *Patel v. Secretary of State*, 25 C. 112 (1905), *cf. v. P. Lal*, 432, *cf. v. The General Manager*, 11 L. J. 111 (1912), 27 L. 215.

(5) *Secretary of State v. Gajanan*, 20 L. J. 262 (1911).

(6) *Secretary of State v. Gajanan*, 20 L. J. 262 (1911), *cf. v. P. Lal*, 432.

(7) *Legum v. Government*, 3 C. 451 (1901), *cf. v. Pabji Lal*, 25 C. 112 (1905).

interest in the suit as would justify the Court in adding the Secretary of State as a party,(1) and this section, it has been held, does not prevent that being done (2)

Public officer—See as to the definition of this term, sect 2, *ante*. The Official Trustee, (3) Official Assignee, (4) Administrator General, (5) a Collector acting as agent of the Court of Wards, and as such illegally seizing property, (6) and a Talukdar Settlement Officer, when acting as manager under Act XXI of 1881,(7) or under sect 79A of Bombay Land Revenue Code (Bom Act V of 1879),(8) have been held to be public officers

"In respect of any act"—The words "in respect of an act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity" were introduced by Act XII of 1879 into sect 424 of the last Code under which it was held that the qualifications "in respect of an act, etc.," do not relate to the Secretary of State. They did not apply to the case of the Secretary of State in Council (9). This is now made clear by the introduction of the words "*by such public officer*". The defendant must not only be a public officer, but the act must be done in his official capacity (10). If not,(11) then the section does not apply. There must, however, be a distinct act by the public officer which is complained of to entitle him to notice, and so it has been held unnecessary where a Collector was made a party not in respect of any alleged illegal act by him but on the application of the minor's personal guardians in order to protect the minor's title, (12) and where a Collector was merely guardian *ad litem*. In such a case the suit is not against him at all, and he defends on behalf of the minor only (13). To take a case out of this

(1) *Bal Mokoond v Jirudhwa Roy*, 9 C 271, 276, 277 (1882), *Balkishen Das v Simpson*, 2 C W N 513 (1893), *s c*, 25 C 833 foll in *Bhola Nath v Secretary of State for India*, 17 C W N 64 (1912), 40 C 503 (A. C.) (1912)

(2) *Bal Mokoond v Jirudhwa Roy*, 9 C 271, *supra*

(3) *Shahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v Fergusson*, 7 C 499 (1881)

(4) *Josub Hajji Kemp*, 26 B 809 (1902), *s c*, 4 B L R 929

(5) *Bholaram Chowdhury v Administrator General*, 8 C W N 013 (1904), *Antono v Administrator General*, 28 B 529 532 (1904)

(6) *Collector of Bijoor v Manuvar*, 3 A 20 (1880)

(7) *Sardarsingji v Campatsingji*, 14 B 395, 402 (1889)

(8) *Talukdari Settlement Officer v Bhaipubhai*, 14 Bom. L. R 577 (1912), *Chhaganlal v The Collector of Kaira*, 35 B 42 (1910), *Secretary of State v Gajanan*, 35 B 362 (1911), 13 Bom. L. R 273, *Cecil Gray v Cantonment Committee of Poona*, 31 B 583

(1010)

(9) *Secretary of State v Pajlucki Debt*, 25 C 239, 242 (1897)

(10) See *Jogendra Nath v Price*, 24 C 584 (1894) [dist in *Muhammad Saddiq v Panna Lal*, 26 A 220 222 (1903)], *Secretary of State v Rajlucki Debt*, 25 C 239 (1897), *Antono v Administrator General*, 28 B 529 (1904), and cf. *Swamirayacharya v Collector of Dharwar*, 15 B 441 (1890), *Balhtwar Mal v Abdul Lalif*, 29 A 567 (1907) in which the acts were held to have been done in official capacity, *Chhaganlal v The Collector of Kaira*, *supra*

(11) *Muhammad Saddiq v Panna Lal*, 26 A 220 (1903), and two following notes. A public officer sued in respect of an act done in bad faith is not entitled to notice. *Peary v Weston*, 16 C W N 145, 214 (1911)

(12) *Bhau Dalapa v Nana*, 13 B 343, 347 (1883)

(13) *Anantharaman v Ramasamu*, 11 M 317 (1888) [explaining *Narsingrav v Luxumanrav*, 1 B 318 (1876)], cf. *Jalaw Mulji v Chhagan Ranchand*, 5 B 306 (1881)

section it must be proved that there was something in the conduct of the Secretary of State which prevented the plaintiff from complying with its provisions (1)

Notice—The three requisites to be stated are (a) cause of action, (b) name and residence, (c) relief sought

The object of the section being merely to inform the defendant substantially of the ground of complaint, the words "stating the cause of action" should not be construed too strictly or narrowly (2) In considering the sufficiency of a notice on this point it should not be read with the strictness with which a plaint should be read (3) A notice is sufficient if it substantially fulfils its object in informing the parties concerned generally of the nature of the suit intended to be filed (4)

The name of the intending plaintiff must be stated A notice given by a party who dies before suit does not enure it has been held for the benefit of his representative, and enable the latter to maintain the suit without giving a fresh notice, as the notice in such place does not give the name of the actual plaintiff (5) Further, the abode of the intending plaintiff must be stated (6) The amended section adds description of plaintiff And this applies to all plaintiffs if there are more than one

Lastly, the relief claimed should be stated Generally, and as regards all these matters, it may be said (to adopt the language of Pollock, C.B.) (7) it is, on the question of sufficiency necessary "to impart a little common sense into notices of this kind," and to ascertain whether the object of the Legislature has been substantially and effectively carried out If no notice has been given or it is held to be insufficient the proper course, it has been held is not to dismiss the suit, but to reject the plaint, and give an opportunity to serve a fresh notice (8)

"Plaint shall contain a statement"—The portion of this section relating to the plaint, containing a statement that such notice has been left or delivered in the manner prescribed by it, is separate from the earlier portion which deals with the delivery of the notice two months before suit It is only when notice is not given that the suit is liable to be dismissed (or the plaint rejected) The suit, however may be proceeded with, if notice has been given in the manner prescribed and subsequently the plaint is amended in order to state that fact (9)

(1) *Sakharam v Secretary of State*, 14 Bom. L. R. 303 (1911), *Secretary of State v Gajanan* 35 B. 362 (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 273

(2) *Bholaram Chowdhury v Administrator General* 8 C. W. N. 913 (1904), *Secretary of State v Perumal Pillai* 24 M. 279, 282 (1900), *Bachchu Singh v Secretary of State*, 25 A. 187, 191 (1902)

(3) *Parbatti Churn v Nobin Chunder*, 13 C. L. R. 195 (1883)

(4) *Jehangir Cursetjee v Secretary of State* 27 B. 189, s. c., 5 Bom. L. R. 30, *McInerney v Secretary of State for India*, 38 C. 707 (1911), plaint cannot be amended as to nature of suit after the notice

(5) *Bachchu Singh v Secretary of State*, 25 A. 187, *Bhola Nath v Secretary of State for India in Council* 17 C. W. N. 64 (1912), 40 C. 503, notice must give names etc., of all plaintiffs

(6) *Ib.*, at p. 191, *Bholaram Chowdhury v Administrator General*, 8 C. W. N. 913, 916 (1904)

(7) *Jones v Nicholls* 13 M. & W. 363, cited in *Eales v Municipal Commissioners of Malaya* 14 M. 386, 390 (1890)

(8) *Bachchu Singh v Secretary of State*, *supra* at pp. 190, 193.

(9) *Bholaram Chowdhury v Administrator General*, 8 C. W. N. 913 (1904).

[ss 425, 428] 81 In a suit instituted against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity—
Exemption from arrest and personal appearance

(a) the defendant shall not be liable to arrest nor his property to attachment otherwise than in execution of a decree, and,

(b) where the Court is satisfied that the defendant cannot absent himself from his duty without detriment to the public service, it shall exempt him from appearing in person

Arrest—A public officer could not be arrested under sect 425 of the last Code without the consent of the District Judge. “Where the Court is satisfied,” this expression has been substituted for “he satisfies the Court” in sect 428 of the last Code to remove the misapprehension that the officer is bound personally to satisfy the Court of his inability to attend

[s 429] 82 (1) Where the decree is against the Secretary of State for India in Council or against a public officer in respect of any such act as aforesaid, a time shall be specified in the decree within which it shall be satisfied, and, if the decree is not satisfied within the time so specified, the Court shall report the case for the orders of the Local Government

(2) Execution shall not be issued on any such decree unless it remains unsatisfied for the period of three months computed from the date of such report

SUITS BY ALIENS AND BY OR AGAINST FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS

[s 430] 83 (1) Alien enemies residing in British India with the permission of the Governor General in Council, and alien friends, may sue in the Courts of British India, as if they were subjects of His Majesty.

(2) No alien enemy residing in British India without such permission, or residing in a foreign country, shall sue in any of such Courts

Explanation—Every person residing in a foreign country the Government of which is at war with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and carrying on business in that country without a license in that behalf under the hand of one of His Majesty's Secretaries of State or of a Secretary to the

Government of India, shall, for the purpose of *sub section (2)* be deemed to be an alien enemy residing in a foreign country

Aliens—This section deals with the subjects of Foreign States as the following sections deal with such States or Sovereign Princes and Ruling Chiefs as those terms are understood in sects 85, 86. As to the position of aliens, see cases cited (1). Alien friends stand on the same footing as subjects of His Majesty. But permission is a condition precedent in the case of alien enemies.

84 (1) A foreign State may sue in any Court of British India

When foreign States may sue

Provided that such State has been recognized by His Majesty or by the Governor General in Council

Provided, also, that the object of the suit is to enforce a private right vested in the head of such State or in any officer of such State in his public capacity.

(2) Every Court shall take judicial notice of the fact that a foreign State has or has not been recognized by His Majesty or by the Governor General in Council

Foreign State plaintiff—A Foreign State may sue subject to the fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned in the provisos. As regards the first, if the Foreign State has been recognized, the recognition is conclusive of the right to sue (2). The State sues by the name by which it has been recognized by His Majesty. In the case of a monarchy, the public rights and interests are represented by the monarch, and the suit is entitled, "The Emperor of — v A," or "The King of — v B" as the case may be. In the case of a republic the name of the State is used, as "The United States of America v W" (3). Sovereign Princes and Ruling Chiefs, as those terms are understood in the following sections, may sue and must be sued in the name of their States, as "Maharajah of — v K" (4).

Nextly, a suit by a Foreign State is limited to the objects stated in the second proviso. It cannot sue for anything else. The infringement of its prerogative right does not constitute a cause of action (5). The "public right" spoken of does not mean individual rights as opposed to those of the body politic or State, but those private rights of the State which must be enforced in a Court of Justice, as distinguished from its political or territorial rights, which must, from their very nature be made the subject of settlement between one State and another. They are rights which

(1) *Mugrove v Chun Teong* App Cas (1891) 272, authorities cited *arg*

(2) *Emperor of Austria v Day*, 2 Giff 623

(3) *United States of America v Wagner*, 2 Ch. App 592

(4) S. 87, *jud* *Bharatpore v Kailash*

(5) *Emperor v Ashoka* rule laid down in *of that which is* *Manick v Joubert*

by a Foreign State against private individuals as distinguished from rights which one State in its political capacity, may have as against another State in its political capacity (1) The second proviso takes the place of clause (b) of sect 431 of the last Code It was thought that the language of that clause

ment of a private right vested in the head of the State or in an officer of the State as such and the language has been modified accordingly A Foreign State can only obtain relief subject to the rules and pursuant to the practice of the Court in which it sues and one of the conditions is that like an individual, it will give discovery (2)

432] 85 (1) Persons specially appointed by order of the Government at the request of any Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief, whether in subordinate alliance with the British Government or otherwise, and whether residing within or without British India, or at the request of any person competent, in the opinion of the Government, to act on behalf of such Prince or Chief, to prosecute or defend any suit on his behalf, shall be deemed to be the recognized agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made or done on behalf of such Prince or Chief

(2) An appointment under this section may be made for the purpose of a specified suit or of several specified suits, or for the purpose of all such suits as it may from time to time be necessary to prosecute or defend on behalf of the Prince or Chief

(3) A person appointed under this section may authorize or appoint persons to make appearances and applications and do acts in any such suit or suits as if he were himself a party thereto

Persons appointed to prosecute or defend—As regards the meaning of the words "Sovereign Prince" or "Ruling Chief," see notes to next section

This section was not intended to limit the scope of O III r 2, corresponding with sect 37 of the last Code and does not prevent the institution of a suit by an independent Prince in his own name and through a recognized agent other than one appointed under this section (3) The section applies to suits filed in a Court of Revenue under the provisions of Act XII of 1881 Where

(1) *Hajon Manick v. Har Singh* 11 C. 17 (1881), *full Girdhar Singh v. Raja of Faridkot* 22 C. at p 229 (1897) at p 228 It was doubted whether the suit fell within the scope of the section.

(2) *United States of America v. Wagner* 2

Ch App 599, Republic of Peru v. Wegelin, L. P. 29 Eq 140

(3) *Maharaja of Bhartipore v. Hachern*, 19 A 510 (1907); following *Deer Chund v. Ishan Chund* 10 C 136 (1883)

by a Foreign State against private individuals, as distinguished from rights which one State in its political capacity, may have as against another State in its political capacity (1) The second proviso takes the place of clause (b) of sect 431 of the last Code It was thought that the language of that clause required restriction inasmuch as it appeared to confer on the head of a Foreign State a general power to litigate in respect of the private rights of its subjects It was considered however, that the object of such litigation must be the enforcement of a private right vested in the head of the State or in an officer of the State as such and the language has been modified accordingly A Foreign State can only obtain relief subject to the rules and pursuant to the practice of the Court in which it sues and one of the conditions is that, like an individual, it will give discovery (2)

432] 85 (1) Persons specially appointed by order of the Government at the request of any Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief, whether in subordinate alliance with the British Government or otherwise, and whether residing within or without British India, or at the request of any person competent, in the opinion of the Government, to act on behalf of such Prince or Chief, to prosecute or defend any suit on his behalf, shall be deemed to be the recognized agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made or done on behalf of such Prince or Chief

(2) An appointment under this section may be made for the purpose of a specified suit or of several specified suits, or for the purpose of all such suits as it may from time to time be necessary to prosecute or defend on behalf of the Prince or Chief

(3) A person appointed under this section may authorize or appoint persons to make appearances and applications and do acts in any such suit or suits as if he were himself a party thereto

Persons appointed to prosecute or defend—As regards the meaning of the words "Sovereign Prince" or "Ruling Chief," see notes to next section

This section was not intended to limit the scope of O III r 2 corresponding with sect 37 of the last Code and does not prevent the institution of a suit by an independent other than one appointed filed in a Court of Revenue

(1) *Major Manick v Bur Singh* 11 C. 17 (1884) *Jell Girdhial Singh v Paja of Faridkot* 22 C. at p 229 (1897) at p 228 it was doubted whether the suit fell within the scope of the section

(2) *United States of America v Wagner* 2

Ch. App 590; *Republic of Peru v Wagnel* 1 L. R. 29 Tq 130

(3) *Maharaja of Bhartpur v Kachera* 19 A. 510 (1897), following *Peer Chander v John Chander* 10 C. 136 (1883)

INTERPLEADER

88 Where two or more persons claim adversely to one another the same debt sum of money or other property moveable or immovable from another person, who claims no interest therein other than for charges or costs and who is ready to pay or deliver it to the rightful claimant, such other person may institute a suit of interpleader against all the claimants for the purpose of obtaining a decision as to the person to whom the payment or delivery shall be made and of obtaining indemnity for himself

Provided that where any suit is pending in which the rights of all parties can properly be decided no such suit of interpleader shall be instituted

Interpleader—See O XXXI and notes thereto post

suits to be brought in respect of such property without consent, unless the plaintiff claims to hold (under the fifth clause) as tenant from such Prince (1) In some cases, where consent to a suit is required it is obvious that such consent must be obtained at the outset, as in sect 2 of Act XIII of 1868 which provided that suits brought against the King of Oudh could not be "commenced or prosecuted" without consent (2) It has been held also under this section that a consent given after the commencement of a suit against a Ruling Chief—a consent not to the suit being instituted but to its being proceeded with—is not a sufficient consent. If the consent has not been obtained before the commencement of the suit the Court should dismiss the suit, or allow the plaintiff to withdraw it with liberty to bring a fresh suit under O XXIII r 1. Where an insufficient consent has been obtained by the plaintiff the defendant may, by his conduct waive the defect, so that, notwithstanding the absence of a valid consent under the section the suit can be heard and determined on its merits (3) A suit for maintenance which seeks to have the maintenance made a charge on immoveable property is not a suit for immoveable property within the meaning of clause (c), nor is it a suit for "benefits to arise out of the land" within the meaning of the definition of the words "immoveable property" contained in Act I of 1868, sect 2 clause 5. A claim for maintenance is not a charge upon immoveable property (4) Where consent to a suit for declaration of title to land had been obtained and the plaint had afterwards been amended by adding a prayer for recovery of possession, it was held on revision that the plaintiff having obtained a fresh sanction for a suit for recovery of possession should apply for leave to withdraw the plaint with liberty to bring a fresh suit (5).

The object of these provisions is of a political character, and therefore the exercise of delegated authority is subject to control and a consent once given or refused even under a delegated authority, does not exhaust the power conferred. For the Notification under this clause which came into force after April 1st, 1912, see the Calcutta Gazette, April 3rd, 1912, Part IA, pp 203-205.

87 A Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief may sue, and shall be sued, in the name of his State
Style of Princes and Chiefs as parties to suits
Provided that in giving the consent referred to in the foregoing section the Governor General in Council or the Local Government, as the case may be, may direct that any such Prince or Chief shall be sued in the name of an agent or in any other name

(1) Maharajah Radha Kishore v Chakravarti, 2 C. L. J. 163 (1901), in which it was held that the plaintiff was not claiming as tenant but adversely.

(2) Chaudh Lall v Awad Sultan, 21 B. L. J. at p. 363, see Begum Bibee v King, 11 W. P. 116 (1869).

Chaudh Lall v Awad Sultan 21 B. 351

(1896)

(4) Peer Chunder v Raj Coomar Nobodceep, 9 C. 535 (1893), cf Mahalakshamma v Venkataratnamma, 6 M. 83 at p. 87 (1883).

(5) Maharajah of Cooch Behar v Maharajah Manindra Chandra, 17 C. W. N. 1947 (1913).

PART V

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

ARBITRATION

89 (1) *Save in so far as is otherwise provided by the Indian Arbitration Act 1917 or by any other law for the time being in force all references to arbitration whether by an order in a suit or otherwise and all proceedings thereunder, shall be governed by the provisions contained in the Second Schedule*

(2) *The provisions of the Second Schedule shall not affect any arbitration pending at the commencement of this Code, but shall apply to any arbitration after that date under any agreement or reference made before the commencement of this Code*

Arbitration—The provisions of the former Code have as a temporary measure been removed to Schedule II post which see as also Preface. It has been held that one effect of the saving clause at the beginning of this rule is to make the Second Schedule inapplicable to references outside a suit and to leave them to be governed by O XVIII r 3 (1).

SPECIAL CASE

90 *Where any persons agree in writing to state a case for the opinion of the Court, then the Court shall try and determine the same in the manner prescribed*

Special case—See O XXXVI and notes thereto post

SUITS RELATING TO PUBLIC MATTERS

91 (1) *In the case of a public nuisance the Advocate General, or two or more persons having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General, may institute a suit, though no special damage has been caused, for*

Act (XX of 1863) it was merely permissive and enabling (1) In the latter view if the suit was one which came within the scope of the section then provided that such a suit was independently of the section maintainable under the substantive law either an individual or all persons jointly interested or some on behalf of the rest under O I r 8 might sue or if they so elect two or more persons might sue without joining the others interested with sanction under the provisions of this section. In these cases and as regards parties the section was only enabling in this sense that two persons might sue where it would have been necessary that all should sue or that some should obtain leave to sue on behalf of the rest under sect 30 (now O I r 8) (2) If an individual could sue before it was held that he could do so after the enactment of the section (3) If all persons interested joined they were it was held always competent to maintain a suit for the removal of a trustee (4) and when all parties interested joined in suing or sanction was obtained under sect 30 (now O I r 8) the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts as to the removal of trustees still existed (5) As regards certain persons it was enabling in the sense that it conferred a new right of suit on persons who had previously none namely the Collector or such other officer as the Government may appoint as in Allahabad the Legal Remembrancer. In the Presidency towns it was always competent to the Advocate General to initiate proceedings in matters of public trust but in the Mofussil there was previously no public official who could take action (6)

Then leaving the question as to who might sue and dealing with the nature of the relief which might have been given the equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over charities and of the High Court its successor the Supreme Court was complete and no amendment of the law in this respect was required (7) but the extent and nature of the jurisdiction of the Mofussil Courts was doubtful. In their character as Courts of Equity they gave relief in matters of public trust. Thus the removal of a trustee from the management of charitable trusts on the ground of malversation was a remedy always available in these Courts (8) and it is not correct to say that the former section created in this respect a new and special jurisdiction (9) But there were

(1) *Budree Das Mukim v Choon Lal Johurry* 33 C. 789 (1906) 10 C. W. N. 789 in which the scope of the section will be found fully discussed and the earlier cases cited. *Sathappayar v Perasam* 14 M. 1 15 (1890) *Thackersey v Hurbhum* S.B. 43 401 402 (1893) *Subbayya v Krishna* 14 M. 186 (1890) at pp 200 203 206 *per Muttasami Ayyar J* at p 204 *per Best J* who stated the section to be merely an exception to the rule that either all interested should sue or leave should be obtained under a 30. *Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun* 24 C. 418 420 (189)

(2) *Subbayya v Krishna* *supra* at p 209. *Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun* *supra* at p 419. *Budree Das Mukim v Choon Lal Johurry* 33 C. 789 (1906)

(3) *Budree Das Mukim v Choon Lal Johurry* 33 C. 789 (1906)

(4) *Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun* *supra*

(5) *Subbayya v Krishna* *supra* at p. 209

(6) *Rangasami v Varadappa* 17 M. at pp 460 466 (1891)

() *Subbayya v Krishna* 14 M. at p. 200 (1890) *Pangasami v Varadappa* 17 M. at p. 46 (1893) [As to jurisdiction of Supreme Courts see *Attorney General v Brodie* 4 M. L. A. 190 (1846) *Wardens of Nossah Siora v Hartmann Perry v Oriental Cases* 338 *Doe d. Howard v P. Stonor* ib. 530 *Attorney General v Damothar* ib. 526]

(8) *Ib.* 199 466

(9) *Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun* 24 C. at p 425 (189)

other matters in which their jurisdiction was doubtful. It was generally necessary that breach of trust should be alleged (1) whereas under this section jurisdiction may be exercised whenever the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust notwithstanding that there may have been no breach of trust (2). So again it was doubtful whether the Mofussil Courts could award under the law some of the reliefs mentioned in the section, such as a scheme (3) and whether worshippers were entitled to ask for the appointment of new managers when there was a mere case of vacancy (4). Other relief, however, in matters of public charities were commonly granted. So numerous cases established the right of a founder of an endowment or his heirs to sue to set aside alienation by the trustee to recover the trust property for the trust to enforce the due performance and to rectify abuses of the trust to remove the old and to appoint a new trustee (5). In one of such cases also the Court directed the framing of a scheme (6).

Similarly it has been held though the question was not free of conflict that Hindu or Mahomedan worshippers in a temple or mosque might apart from suits to enforce some purely individual right such as that of free access for worship (1) sue to rectify maladministration of the trust by re-training a breach of trust restoring possession to the trust seeking an account, removing old and appointing new trustees. Every Mahomedan it has been said (2)

(1) See *Kalee Churn v. Golab* 10 C. L. F. 188 131 (1885).

(2) *Ra. Suba. Dial v. Kesho Ramanuj* 11 A. F. 22 (1885).

(3) *Subbaraya v. Krishna* 14 M. at p. 100 (1890).

(4) *Ib.* 189-201.

(5) See *Iyer op. cit.* column 460. *Prosunno Mowee v. Koonjo Beharee* 104 W. P. C. R. 15. *Baldia Soonduree v. Doorgannud Chatterjee* 22 W. R. 9 (1884). *Ram Narain v. Jangon Parry* 27 W. R. 16

(1890) cf. *Srud. Asheerooddeen v. Sree Doolo Mowee* 20 W. R. 20 (1886) but see *Plata Sahib v. Damodar Premj* 3 B. 64 (1889) as regards Mahomedan trusts.

(6) *Gajapati Arvan v. Savithri* 21 M. 10 at p. 15 (1892).

(7) See *Anandray v. Shankar* B. 323 (1883). *Venkatachalapatti v. Subbarayudu* 13 M. 203 (1890). *Kabdas Jiram v. Gov. Parjaram* 10 B. 309 (1891). *Vengamuthu v. Pandayavara* 6 M. 101 (1883). *Subbarayudu v. Anandhi Shetty* 23 M. 100 M. (1892).

a representative one, (b) by the persons mentioned, (c) against trustees, (d) in respect of the trusts mentioned, (e) in cases where either there has been a breach of trust or, if none, where the directions of the Court are necessary, (f) or relief of the kind mentioned in the section. If the suit is one to which the section does not apply, then the only question is whether a right of suit exists independently of it. If a right of suit exists and this is a question of substantive law, then the ordinary procedure prescribed for suits by the Code applies.

1 Representative suit—In the first place it is to be observed that the section relates only to charities in which the public are interested. The suit may be instituted by certain public officers, namely the Advocate General, the Collector, or by such other officer as the Government may appoint, such as, according to the N W P and Oudh Rules, the Legal Remembrancer. It is obvious that such plaintiffs can and do sue only as representing the public, and if instead of these public officers two or more persons having an interest in the trust sue with their consent, they so sue under a warrant to represent the public as the objects of the trust (1). The dispute must be, it has been said, (and will necessarily be if the terms of the section are followed), of such a public nature that the intervention of the Advocate General or other public officer is necessary to decide if, and by whom, a suit should be brought to establish public rights (2). It follows from this, that where a person or persons sue, not to establish the general rights of the public of which they are members, but to remedy a particular infringement of their own individual right, though they may possess that right in common with others, a suit will lie independently of the section. The suit contemplated is a representative one, and of necessity, therefore, other persons than those permitted to sue will be affected by it. Under it two or more persons may sue for the benefit of themselves and the rest of the public interested. An objection therefore that a plaintiff was suing to enforce rights common to himself and the class to which he belonged, and that this section did not apply, was, of course, overruled. When sanction is obtained under this section, no leave is required under sect 30 (now O I r 8). In fact, the section is enabling in this sense that it dispenses with leave under that rule, when but for this section it might be necessary (3).

In certain cases connected with public trusts there is no question but that a right of suit exists, and has always existed, independently of this section. Where there is a particular injury to an individual, or number of individuals, which is not suffered by other members of the class or public interested in the trust, where these individuals, interested apart from others, sue to establish their own right which has been infringed, and to remedy only the particular grievance of which they complain, then a suit may be under the general law, either by the particular person whose right

has been infringed, or where there are numerous parties having the same interest, by one or more on behalf of the others similarly interested under the provisions of O I r 8. So if there be a trust intended for a class of the public, such as Hindus or Mahomedans, or for a portion of such class, such as a sect, each member of that class or sect is entitled, as of a personal or individual right, (1) to free access to the temple or mosque for the purposes of worship, (2) and to present the usual offerings if any to the Deity and to perform other usual acts of worship (3). If a trustee, manager, or any other person interferes with such a right, the individual whose right has been so infringed may institute an ordinary suit in the ordinary Civil Courts for a declaration of his right, injunction, and damages. It may be that several persons are similarly situated and interested. But the interest of a worshipper, though it may be a right enjoyed in common with others, is not a joint right vested in the whole body of worshippers and not vested in the individual (4). The latter's interest is generally an individual one. When this is so he is entitled to sue alone to assert that individual right, and is not obliged to proceed either under this section or O I r 8, or Act XX of 1863 (5). If the infringement of the right and the relief claimed are the same, several plaintiffs may join in suing under O I r 1, (6) or if the conditions of r 8 of that Order are fulfilled, he or some may sue thereunder on behalf of himself and others similarly interested (7). Should, however, the right in any case be a joint and not a separate right, then either all jointly interested must sue, (8) or one or more must sue under r 8 on behalf of the rest (9). There is no doubt about the procedure applicable in the case of infringement of a purely

(1) *Jawahra t Akbar Hussain*, 7 A 178 (1884), *Anandray v Shankar*, 7 B 323 (1882), *Ram Chandra v Ali Muhammad*, 35 A 197 (1913).

(2) *Ib*, *Venkataschalapati v Sabbarayadu*, 13 M 293 (1889), *Kalidas Jivram v Gor Parjaram*, 15 B 309 (1890).

(3) *Vengamuthu t Pandarawasa*, 6 M 151 (1882).

(4) *Baija Lal v Bulak Lal*, 24 C 385, 390 (1897).

(5) *Jawahra v Akbar Hussain*, 7 A. 178 (1884), *Baija Lal t Bulak Lal*, *supra*, *Subbaraya lu v Asanali* 23 M 100 n (1899). In *Tutufunnessa v Nazirun*, 11 C. 33, 37 (1884), the suit was held to fall within s 539 and as regards the applicability of s 30, it seems to have been thought that the cause of action was not a several one as also apparently in *Jah Ali v Ram Nath*, 8 C. 32 (1881). If, however, a right is a several individual one and the suit is brought to assert that right, it is not correct to say that a plaintiff must

sue either under s 30, s 539, or s 14, Act XX of 1863.

(6) *Kalidas Jivram v Gor Parjaram*, 15 B 309, 310 (1890).

(7) See *Dhunput Singh v Pareah Nath*, 21 C. 180 (1893) [where five persons sued on behalf of the Jain Situmbary Society, or sect], *Fernandez v Rodrigues*, 21 B 784 (1897) [where churchwardens sued on behalf of themselves and all other parishioners against the vicar], *Ganapati Ayyan v Savithri Ammal* 21 M 10 (1897) [where two Brahmans sued on behalf of the Brahman community]; *Monmotho Nath Das v Harish Chandra Das*, 33 C. 905 (1906) [where certain persons sued on behalf of the Tatchan community of Chatra]. See other cases in notes to sect 30, *ante*.

(8) *Jawahra v Akbar Hussain*, 7 A. 178 (1884), *Baija Lal v Bulak Lal*, 24 C 385 (1897).

(9) *Ib*

a representative one, (b) by the persons mentioned, (c) against trustees, (d) in respect of the trusts mentioned, (e) in cases where either there has been a breach of trust or, if none, where the directions of the Court are necessary, (f) or relief of the kind mentioned in the section. If the suit is one to which the section does not apply, then the only question is whether a right of suit exists independently of it. If a right of suit exists, and this is a question of substantive law, then the ordinary procedure prescribed for suits by the Code applies.

1 Representative suit.—In the first place it is to be observed that the section relates only to charities in which the public are interested. The suit may be instituted by certain public officers, namely the Advocate General, the Collector, or by such other officer as the Government may appoint, such as, according to the N W P and Oudh Rules, the Legal Remembrancer. It is obvious that such plaintiffs can and do sue only as representing the public, and if instead of these public officers two or more persons having an interest in the trust sue with their consent, they so sue under a warrant to represent the public as the objects of the trust (1). The dispute must be, it has been said, (and will necessarily be if the terms of the section are followed), of such a public nature that the intervention of the Advocate-General or other public officer is necessary to decide if, and by whom, a suit should be brought to establish public rights (2). It follows from this that where a person or persons sue, not to establish the general rights of the public of which they are members, but to remedy a particular infringement of their own individual right, though they may possess that right in common with others, a suit will lie independently of the section. The suit contemplated is a representative one, and of necessity, therefore, other persons than those permitted to sue will be affected by it. Under it two or more persons may sue for the benefit of themselves and the rest of the public interested. An objection therefore that a plaintiff was suing to enforce rights common to himself and the class to which he belonged, and that this section did not apply, was, of course, overruled. When sanction is obtained under this section, no leave is required under sect 30 (now O I r 8). In fact, the section is enabling in this sense that it dispenses with leave under that rule, when but for this section it might be necessary (3).

In certain cases connected with public trusts there is no question but that a right of suit exists, and has always existed, independently of this section. Where there is a particular injury to an individual, or number of individuals, which is not suffered by other members of the class or public interested in the trust, where these individuals, interested apart from others, sue to establish their own right which has been infringed, and to remedy only the particular grievance of which they complain, then a suit may lie under the general law, either by the particular person whose right

(1) Lakshman Das v. Jugun, 22 B. C. 273 (1904)
216, 220 (1896)

(2) Manjib Fiben v. Khad, 11 Hossein 12 594 (1905)

(3) MacMochu v. Lee Chun, 9 O. W. N.

private right. It may be that the infringement of the individual right is caused by a breach of trust, as where in the case of an institution for public worship the right, to such worship is obstructed or denied to a person interested in the religious trust. But the right infringed in such cases is an individual right. For instance though others may have similar and common rights, these may not have been infringed, in which case the individual is interested apart from all others of his class, and the relief to which he is entitled is particular relief designed to meet the necessities of his individual case. Instances such as these do not come within the purview of this section at all (1). Ordinarily the nature of the suit and the specific relief claimed exclude any difficulty but this might arise if the relief sought was not merely the remedying of a particular grievance by damages or injunction, but general administration of the trust. Such relief would not ordinarily be necessary but should that be the case, it would be necessary to determine whether a suit based on an individual and separate cause of action might claim such relief independently of the provisions of this section, that is whether a general administration could be obtained in aid of the individual right alleged. Probably such a case could hardly occur, as in most cases where such relief was sought it would be found that the case was one where a public right had been infringed but if it did it would seem on principle that such a suit would not come within the section. Other instances of the enforcement of personal and individual rights will be found in the class of cases to which reference will be made, where the suit is brought to enforce the personal claim of the plaintiff to be a trustee or to be co trustee, or to vindicate the right of management in the case of obstruction offered to one vested with and actually exercising the right of management at the date of suit. Where, however a party is not interested otherwise than in connection with others for whom as well as for him the trust is intended, where the suit is brought in the interest of the public, no special injury distinct from that suffered by the general public having been suffered by the plaintiff, and where the same relief is sought under the same circumstances as those mentioned in this section,—in such cases only is it that the question arose whether the section was or was not mandatory that is, whether suits of the character mentioned in the section could only be brought with leave in accordance with its provisions and not otherwise a matter which has already been dealt with.

2 Persons who may sue—These are either particular public officials, viz, the Advocate General, the Collector, or such other person (as in the N W P the Legal Remembrancer) as are appointed by Government to exercise the powers conferred by this section.

(a) **Advocate General or other public officer**—The Advocate-General in the Presidency towns corresponds with the Attorney General

(1) Ramdoss v Hanumanth Rao 36 a suit regarding the hereditary trusteeship
N 364 (1911), this section does not apply to of a private family

in England (1) So far as the trusts are concerned he only represents the public, (2) and is bound by all acts and omissions of the manager which are not in themselves fraudulent (3) The *de jure* managers and trustees of a public charity losing their right by limitation to oust the *de facto* trustee does not confer on the latter immunity from suit on the part of the Advocate General (4) He may, in the Presidency towns, maintain a suit in his own name, or some relators may in such towns with his sanction sue (5) And since the Code of 1877, this section has expressly enacted that the Advocate General may sue (6) A Bill filed by one Advocate General does not abate by the fact that the latter leaves the country (7) Though the Advocate General may sue, it is not necessary that he should be made a party either as a plaintiff (8) or as a defendant although if he be made a party defendant and appears by counsel he will be entitled to costs (9) He is at liberty to intervene at any stage of the litigation (10) and is entitled to be heard (11) There was however, no public officer in the Mofussil entitled to bring suits which the Advocate General could and can now institute in the Presidency towns (12) But where the Advocate General was made a party in a suit brought at the instance of a person and instituted in the Mofussil and the Advocate General employed counsel, he was held entitled to get the costs of such counsel and other expenses of the suit (13) Where a suit by the Advocate General at the instance of relators was dismissed and the Advocate General did not appeal the relators who were not parties to the suit were held incompetent to appeal on their own account (14)

(h) **Other persons may sue**—Two or more persons interested in the trust may, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General Collector or

(1) Advocate General of Bombay: *Adamji* 30 B 474 (1905) As to the office of Advocate General see Articles in 7 Madras Law Journal pp 91 91 and Iyer's Hindu Endowments cccxv

(2) Advocate General: *Bai Punjabai* 18 B 551 561 (1894)

(3) *Ib* [former suit by trustees, subsequent suit by Advocate General barred]

(4) *Lakshmandas v Jugul Kishore* 22 B 216 (1896)

(5) See Attorney General v *Brodie* 4 M I A 190 (1866), see also *Dhuncowverbhai v Advocate General* 1 Bom. L. R 743 (1899) *Srinivasa v Raghava* 23 M 28 30 (1897)

(6) *Shri Ganesh v Keshavray* 15 B 625 636 (1890), *Hori Das v Secretary of State* 5 C 228 (1897)

(7) *Strettel v Palmer* 2 Mor Dg 104 (1816)

(8) *Lakshmandas v Ganpatray* 8 B 36, 367 (1884)

(9) *Hori Das v Secretary of State* 5 C

228 (1879)

(10) Advocate General v *Muhammad Husseni* 4 B H C O C J 203 206, (1867) as to the bringing in of new relators and dismissal of the old see *ib* and as to death of relator *Strettel v Palmer* (1816) 2 Mor Dg 104

(11) Attorney General v *Brodie* 4 M I A 190 200 (1866)

(12) *Rangasami Naickan v Varalappa Naickan* 17 M 462 465 (1895), *Brojomohun Das v Hurro Lal* 5 C 700 (1880), *Shri Ganesh v Keshavray* 15 B 625, 636 (1890) It has been said (Iyer op cit cccxvi) that it is doubtful whether this statement is correct so far as regards the charitable institutions which were governed by Regs XIX. of 1810 and VII of 1817 and that the Collector must be regarded as such official.

(13) *Hori Das v Secretary of State* 5 C 228 (1879)

(14) *Jan Mahomed v Syed Nurudin* 9 Bom I R 996 (1907) 32 B 155

private right. It may be that the infringement of the individual right is caused by a breach of trust as where in the case of an institution for public worship the right to such worship is obstructed or denied to a person interested in the religious trust. But the right infringed in such cases is an individual right. For instance though others may have similar and common rights these may not have been infringed in which case the individual is interested apart from all others of his class and the relief to which he is entitled is particular relief designed to meet the necessities of his individual case. Instances such as these do not come within the purview of this section at all (1). Ordinarily the nature of the suit and the specific relief claimed exclude any difficulty but this might arise if the relief sought was not merely the remedying of a particular grievance by damages or injunction but general administration of the trust. Such relief would not ordinarily be necessary but should that be the case it would be necessary to determine whether a suit based on an individual and separate cause of action might claim such relief independently of the provisions of this section that is whether a general administration could be obtained in aid of the individual right alleged. Probably such a case could hardly occur, as in most cases where such relief was sought it would be found that the case was one where a public right had been infringed but if it did it would seem on principle that such a suit would not come within the section. Other instances of the enforcement of personal and individual rights will be found in the class of cases to which reference will be made where the suit is brought to enforce the personal claim of the plaintiff to be a trustee or to be co-trustee or to vindicate the right of management in the case of obstruction offered to one vested with and actually exercising the right of management at the date of suit. Where however a party is not interested otherwise than in connection with others for whom as well as for him the trust is intended where the suit is brought in from that suffered by the plaintiff and where the same relief is sought under the same circumstances as those mentioned in this section — in such cases only is it that the question arose whether the section was or was not mandatory that is whether suits of the character mentioned in the section could only be brought with leave in accordance with its provisions and not otherwise a matter which has already been dealt with.

2 Persons who may sue — These are either particular public officials viz the Advocate General the Collector or such other person (as in the N W P the Legal Remembrancer) as are appointed by Government to exercise the powers conferred by this section.

(a) Advocate General or other public officer — The Advocate-General in the Presidency towns corresponds with the Attorney General

(1) *Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao* 30 A 361 (1911) if the section does not apply to a suit regarding the proprietary trusteeship of a private family.

in England (1) So far as the trusts are concerned he only represents the public, (2) and is bound by all acts and omissions of the manager which are not in themselves fraudulent (3) The *de jure* managers and trustees of a public charity losing their right by limitation to oust the *de facto* trustee does not confer on the latter immunity from suit on the part of the Advocate-General (4) He may, in the Presidency towns, maintain a suit in his own name, or some relators may in such towns with his sanction sue (5) And since the Code of 1877, this section has expressly enacted that the Advocate-General may sue (6) A Bill filed by one Advocate-General does not abate by the fact that the latter leaves the country (7) Though the Advocate-General may sue, it is not necessary that he should be made a party either as a plaintiff (8) or as a defendant, although if he be made a party defendant and appears by counsel he will be entitled to costs (9) He is at liberty to intervene at any stage of the litigation (10) and is entitled to be heard (11) There was however, no public officer in the Mofussil entitled to bring suits which the Advocate-General could, and can now institute in the Presidency towns (12) But where the Advocate-General was made a party in a suit brought at the instance of a person, and instituted in the Mofussil and the Advocate-General employed counsel, he was held entitled to get the costs of such counsel and other expenses of the suit (13) Where a suit by the Advocate-General at the instance of relators was dismissed and the Advocate-General did not appeal, the relators who were not parties to the suit were held incompetent to appeal on their own account (14)

(b) Other persons may sue—Two or more persons interested in the trust may, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General Collector, or

(1) Advocate-General of Bombay v Adamp, 30 B 474 (1905) As to the office of Advocate-General, see Articles in 7 Madras Law Journal, pp 61, 91, and Iyer's Hindu Endowments, cccxcv

(2) Advocate-General v Bas Punjabas, 18 B 551, 561 (1894)

(3) *Ib.* [former suit by trustees, subsequent suit by Advocate-General barred]

(4) Lakshmandas v Jugul Kishore, 22 B 216 (1896)

(5) See Attorney-General v Brodie, 4 M I A. 100 (1866); see also Dhuncooverbhai v. Advocate-General, 1 Bom. L. R. 743 (1899), Srinivasa v Raghava, 23 M 28, 30 (1897)

(6) Shri Ganesh v Keshavray, 15 B 625, 636 (1890); Hori Das v Secretary of State, 5 C. 228 (1897)

(7) Strettell v Palmer, 2 Mor Dig 104 (1816)

(8) Lakshmandas v Ganpatray, 8 B 365, 367 (1884)

(9) Hori Das v Secretary of State 5 C

228 (1879)

(10) Advocate-General v Muhammad Hussain, 4 B H C, O C J 203, 206 n (1867), as to the bringing in of new relators and dismissal of the old see *ib.*, and as to death of relator, Strettell v Palmer (1816) 2 Mor Dig 104

(11) Attorney-General v Brodie, 4 M I A 100, 200 (1866)

(12) Rangasami Naickan v Varadappa Naickan 17 M 462 465 (1895), Brojomohun Dass v Hurro Lall, 5 G 700 (1880), Shri Ganesh v Keshavray, 15 B 625, 636 (1890) It has been said (Iyer, *op cit* cccxcv) that it is doubtful whether this statement is correct so far as regards the charitable institutions which were governed by Regs XIX. of 1810, and VII of 1817, and that the Collector must be regarded as such official

(13) Hori Das v Secretary of State, 5 C 228 (1897)

(14) Jan Mahomed v Syed Nurudin 9 Bom L. R 996 (1907), 32 B 155

other officer, sue When the suit is brought by such relators the suit is in their name, and not in that of the Advocate General (1) Where the suit was filed by only one plaintiff with consent, and the plaint was afterwards amended by the addition of a second plaintiff, the suit was held defective even though the Advocate General had given his consent to such amendment (2)

(c) If interested—The words “an interest” were substituted for the words “a direct interest” by sect 44, Act VII of 1888, prior to which it had been held that a worshipper at a mosque had not a direct interest, (3) nor had managers of a temple (4) The first decision was however, rightly dissented from it being pointed out that it was difficult to imagine whose interest in a mosque is direct if the interest of worshippers is not (5) The effect of the amendment has been to widen the class of persons who are entitled to maintain an action under this section (6) and it is now clear that persons having a right to worship are interested (7) But the mere possibility of an interest or the mere possibility of succession does not give a right to sue as the interest must be an existing one and not a mere contingency (8) Thus the representative of the founder or the beneficiaries under the trust may be said to have an interest in the trust so as to entitle them to call for its administration but a person cannot, it has been held, be said to have an interest in a trust merely because he is the possible successor of the present holder of the office (9) Officiating priests as also persons who act as *pandas* or guides and priests of the pilgrims, have an interest (10) and persons *ex officio* concerned in the performance of worship and entitled to maintenance from the temple funds (11)

(d) With sanction—The section requires that sanction for the institu-

(1) *Pancheowne Mull v Chumroo Lall* 3 C 563, 571 (1878), *Thackersey v Hurbhum* 8 B 432, 452 (1884), *Srinivasa v Raghava* 23 M 28 30 (1897) As to the Advocate General suing with relators for purposes of costs only, see *Strettel v Palmer* 2 W. Dig 104 (1816)

(2) *Darves Sidik v Jamudin*, 30 B 603 (1900)

(3) *Jan Ali v Ram Nath*, 8 C 32 (1881)

(4) *Narasimha v Ayyan* 12 M 157 (1888) [but see *Subbayya v Krishna* 14 M 189 (1890)] *Contra*, *Manohar v Lakshmuram*, 12 B 247 (1887), where the manager was held to have a direct interest, *s c*, in *Privy Council* 4 C W N 23 (1899)

(5) *Jawahra v Ameer Hussain*, 7 A 178 184 (1881)

(6) *Shailajananda v Umeshanunda* 2 C L J 460 470 (1905)

(7) *Rajulor Paja v Gour Mohun*, 24 C 418 427 (1897) [two of the plaintiffs had a

larger interest, for one had been performing the duties of a mohunt and another the *poojatri*], *Chintaman v Dhondo* 15 B 612 622, 623 (1888), *Manohar v Lakshmuram*, 12 B 247 (1887) [priests taking part in worship], *s c*, 24 B 50, *Jugal Kishore v Lakshmandas*, 23 B 659 (1889) [pujari and five other worshippers] *Chintaman v Dhondo*, 15 B 612 (1888) [plaintiffs worshippers and descendants of original founder], *Radhabai v Chinnaji Bin Jai*, 3 B 27 (1878)

(8) *Mohiuddin v Sayiduddin*, 20 C 810, 816 (1893), *Budh Singh v Niradbaran Roy*, 2 C L J 431, 441 (1905)

(9) *Budh Singh v Niradbaran Roy*, *supra*, and see as to descendants of founder, *Jagga moni v Nilmoni* 9 C 75 (1882)

(10) *Shailajananda v Umeshanunda*, 2 C L J 460 (1905).

(11) *Ram Churn Tenary v Protap Chandra Dutt* 2 C L J 149 (1886)

3 Against whom suit may be brought—The opening words of the section imply the existence of a trustee who is alleged to have been guilty of the breach of trust referred to (1) The plaintiff must allege that the defendant is a trustee, and if that is denied by him it must be established by the evidence. Where the plaintiff's case was that the defendant was a trustee of the *Mandir* in dispute, the *Mandir* being public charitable property and that the defendant should be removed from his possession for breach of trust and the Court's direction given as to administration of the trust it was held that the suit was within these sections (2) It has doubtless been held that where there is a claim for administration of the trust which falls within the section a claim to eject an alienee may be joined with it (3) But the latter claim does not come within the scope of the section is open to the charge of misjoinder and this decision has been dissented from (4) It is on this principle namely that the section is directed against trustees that it has been held that as against strangers it does not apply (5) such as alienees from the trustee (6) or trespassers (7) There is no doubt but that claims by trustees against persons who are strangers to the trust, and who set up a title hostile thereto such as alienees and mere trespassers holding adversely thereto are not within the section (8)

But a person who recognises the trust and has assumed though it may be without authority, the right to administer and in fact administers it by virtue of his alleged title as trustee stands on a different footing. A trustee may be such *de jure* or *de facto*. A person who without title chooses to take upon himself the character of trustee, becomes a trustee *de son tort*. He is liable to account for what he has done and received while so acting and cannot be heard to say for his own benefit that he had no right to act as trustee (9) Though a trustee *de son tort* and a trustee of a constructive trust have been used as synonymous (10) the two are not the same thing. While

(1) Subbayya v Krishna 14 M 186, 190 (1890)

(2) Girdharlal v Naranlal 14 Bom L R 1135 (1912)

(3) Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun 24 C 418 (1897)

(4) Bidd Singh v Niradharan Roy 2 C L J 411, 419 (1905), Budree Das Mukim v Chooni Lal Johurry 33 C 794 (1906)

(5) Kazi Hassan v Sagun Balkrishna, 24 B 170 (1899), Budree Das Mukim v Chooni Lal Johurry, *supra*

(6) Lakshman Das v Ganpatrav 8 B 365 (1884), Sheoratan Kunwari v Ram Pargash 18 A 227, 232 (1896), Huseni Begam v Collector of Moradabad 20 A 46, 49 (1897), Kazi Hassan v Sagun Balkrishna 24 B 170 181 (1899), s c, 1 Bom L R 619. Badh Singh v Niradharan Roy 2 C L J 431 (1907) Budree Das Mukim v Chooni Lal Johurry 33 C 794 (1906)

(7) Vishvanath Govind v Rambhat 15 B 148 (1890), Augustine v Medleycott 15 M 241, 246 (1892), Srinivasa Ayyangar v Srinivasa Swami 16 M 31 32 33 (1892), Shri Dhundiraj v Ganesh 18 B 72 73 (1893), Muhammad v Kallu 21 A 18 185 (1899), Baldeo Das Mukim v Chooni Lal Johurry *supra*

(8) But where the alienee denies that the property is a public trust for religious purposes he is a necessary party to the suit, though no relief can be given against him by ejectment. Collector of Pooné v ...

Mahar v Narsinha, 14 Bom L R 1137 (1912)

(10) Jugal Kishore v Lakshmandas 23 B at p 664

there cannot be both an express and constructive trust in respect of the same subject matter, a person may be trustee *de son tort* either of an express or constructive trust. There may be for instance, an express trust admitted by both plaintiff and defendant. Both may claim to be trustees though only one under the circumstances can in fact have title. If, in fact, the defendant be found to have no title, then he is a trustee *de son tort* of the express trust. Again, a trustee *de son tort* of an express trust may become such of a constructive trust. A suit under this section lies against a trustee of an express or constructive trust, and whether such trustee be *de jure* or *de son tort* (1). It does not, however, follow that because the defendant is a trustee a suit brought against him is necessarily within the section. Its other conditions have to be fulfilled. So where a plaintiff sues a trustee, alleging that he is a co-trustee but has been excluded from a share in, and in the profits of, the management, he does not sue on account of any such breach of trust as is contemplated by this section nor can he be said to require the direction of the Court for the administration of the trust and such a suit therefore does not come within the section, (2) nor a case of contest as to who are the lawful trustees, both claiming to be such, (3) nor a suit by a person (who has something more than a mere interest in the trust as worshipper or object of the charity) to enforce a vested right to see that certain religious and charitable endowments are managed by a person entitled to manage them as being the members of a particular religious institution or brotherhood, (4) nor a suit for the vindication of the right of management which was vested in and actually being exercised by the plaintiffs and those they represent at the date of the obstruction complained of, notwithstanding that those who caused the obstruction had been nominated as trustees (5). In all such cases it will be found that they proceed upon the ground that, though there may have been a trust and trustee, there was no breach of trust or necessity for administration, or the relief sought was not that mentioned in the section or the right sought to be enforced was of a personal and individual character. Where, on the other hand, administration is within the scope of the position of the trustee, but alleged that the trusteeship was vacant, might, it was held (6) sue under this section persons wrongfully claiming to be and acting as trustees for an order appointing new trustees. And where a suit otherwise fell within the terms of this section, a former trustee and a representative of a former trustee were allowed to be added with a view to relief granted against them (7).

(1) Budree Das Mukim v. Choom Lal
Mistry, 33 C 799 (1906)

(2) Miya Vali v. Sayed Bara, 23 B 496,
109 (1896). See Athavulla v. Gouse, 11 M.
83 (1886)

(3) Vishvanath Govind v. Rambhat 15 B
148, 152 (1890), Mamjan Bibee v. Khadem
Mossam 32 C 273 (1904)

(4) Ghyana Sambandha v. Khandu and
Tambiran 10 M. 375, 506 (1886)

(5) Navroji Manekji v. Dastur Jalil and
28 B 20, 54 (1903); a c, 61 and 11

(6) Netaji Rama v. Venka and
450 (1902)

(7) Sayad Hussain v. and
Kaira 21 B 48 (18

4. The trust must be a public one—The section presupposes the existence of a public trust and a suit for the administration, either partially or completely, of that trust (1) It enables the persons mentioned therein to sue trustees to enforce the better administration of the trust (2) Where, however, it is said that the section presupposes a trust, this does not mean that the defendant must admit the trust before the section can apply, but that the suit must proceed upon the allegation of the existence of a trust which may or may not be admitted by the defendant (3)

Private trusts concern only individuals or families for private convenience or support By public trusts may be understood such as are constituted for the benefit either of the public at large, or of some considerable portion of it answering a particular description In private trusts the beneficial interest is vested absolutely in one or more individuals who are, or within a certain time may be, definitely ascertained, and to whom therefore collectively, unless under some legal disability, it is, or within the allowed time will be, competent to control, modify, or determine the trust A public or charitable trust, on the other hand, has for its objects the members of an uncertain and fluctuating body, and the trust itself is of a permanent character (4) A trust is none the less a trust for a public purpose if its main object is the support of *salars* of a particular sect (5) The trust may be charitable such as for the relief of the poor, or the advancement of learning religion or objects of general public utility, or religious, though all religious uses are charitable uses Though, therefore, the section, as originally enacted in the Code of 1877, did not contain the words "or religious," there is little doubt but that the Legislature intended the section to embrace both charitable and religious purposes (6) It was, however, held that the corresponding section in the Code of 1877 did not apply to religious endowments, (7) and therefore in the Code of 1882 the section was altered to

(1) *Jamal ud din v. Murtaba Husain*, 25 A 631 (1903)

(2) *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Swami*, 10 M 31, 32 (1892)

(3) *Budh Singh v. Niradbaran Roy*, 2 C L J 431 (1905), *Shailajananda Dut v. Umeshananda Dut*, 2 C L J 460 (1905)

(4) *Lewin on Trusts*, 18, and see generally as to this section, P. R. Ganapathi Iyer's *Laws relating to Hindu and Mahomedan Religious Endowments* See the following cases as to whether trusts are public *Jugal Kishori v. Lakshmandas*, 23 B 639 (1899), *Manohar v. Lakshmaram*, 12 B 247 (1887) [Trust for Hindu idol and temple], *Dakhin Din v. Bahumunnissa*, 16 A 412 (1891), *Gurjanand v. Sadajanund*, 23 C 645 (1896), *Bhugobetty Prasanna v. Gooroo Prasanna*, 25 C 112 (189.), *Jagadulka Nath v. Hemanta Kumari*, 22 C 129 (1905) As to

English Equity governing the relief in respect of Hindu charitable trusts, see *Sayad Hussein miar v. Collector of Kara*, 21 B at p. 52 (1895), *Bikani Mia v. Shuk Lal*, 20 C 116, F B (1892), *Mahomed Ahsanulla v. Amar Chand*, 17 C 498 (1889), *Mahomed Israel v. Sesti Charn*, 19 C 412 (1892) See as to *destruction of idol* *Radhabai v. Chumnaji*, 3 B 27 (1878), and *Savasthan*, *Shri Ganesh v. Kesharav*, 15 B 625, 635 (1896), *Chintamon v. Dhondo*, 15 B 612 (1888), and private trust *Satnappayyar v. Periasami*, 14 M 1, 7 (1890)

(5) *Mahant Puran Atal v. Darghan Das*, 34 A 48 (1912)

(6) See *Thanga Karappa v. Arumaga*, 5 M 383 384 (1882)

(7) *Ib v. Gurjana v. Kandasami*, 10 M 375, 506 (1886), *Thackersey v. Hurbhum*, 8 B 432, 450, 451 (1883)

pressly include religious trusts in consequence of these rulings and doubts such had been entertained. The contention that while there exists the special enactment, XX of 1863 for the proper appropriation of endowments of lands relating to temples, the words 'religious purposes' should be considered as referring only to cases where the endowments do not relate to temples has been overruled (1).

The public trust may also be either express or constructive. The first of those which are raised and created by act of the parties and are declared by them either in word or writing. A constructive trust (to which this section also, though not the English Statute, applies) (2) is one arising not by the act of the party, but by operation of law where a trustee gains some personal advantage by availing himself and through the medium of his situation as trustee (3). It is imposed on such a person to prevent him from holding for his own benefit an advantage gained by reason of the fiduciary relation subsisting between him and others and for whose benefit only it is his duty to act (4). So, if a lease were the subject matter of a public trust, a constructive trust would arise if a trustee renewed the lease in his own name. He would, in such case, be deemed to be a trustee for those interested in the original term and this would be equally so if the trustee was trustee of right or trustee *de jure*. And were there a breach of such constructive trust, by making away with the renewed lease or not applying its benefits to the purposes of the trust there would be such a breach of trust as is referred to in this section (5). It has been recently held that where it is proved that certain property has been held for many generations for such purposes as the support of *palais*, and there is no evidence that the property was ever held for any other purpose the Court ought to presume the existence of a charitable or religious trust within the meaning of these sections (6).

Where it was objected that the section was limited in its action to suits relating to property and that its operation could not be extended to spiritual offices, it was held to be applicable where it is sought to remove the trustee from a religious office if as the holder of such office he is called upon to exercise business functions either as trustee or as manager of temple funds and properties and thus necessarily possesses civil rights and consequent liabilities (7).

5 There must be a breach of trust or necessity for directions —
extly, assuming that there is a trust and trustee it must be ascertained whether

(1) *Narasimha v Ayyan* 12 M. 15th 158, 59 (1888)

(2) See *Subbayya v Krishna* 14 M. 186, 102 215 (1890), *Jugal Kishore v Lakshmandas* 23 B 639 (1899) s c, 1 Bom. L. R. 18, *Manohar Ganesh v Lakshmaram Govind* 12 B 247, 265 (1887), *affd* 24 B 50

(3) *Lewin on Trusts* 196 11th ed. *Budree*

Das Mukim v Chooni Lal Johurry, 33 C. 789 at p 606 (1906)

(4) *Id.*, *Godefroi Trusts* 2nd ed. 193

(5) As to such *vide post* *Budree Das Mukim v Chooni Lal Johurry supra*

(6) *Mahant Puran Atal v Darshan Das* 31 A 468 (1912)

(7) *Shailajananda v Umeshananda*, 2 C. L. J 469 (1900)

'further or other relief' is, it has been held a decree for an account (1) This is now expressly mentioned in clause (d) Before a scheme can be settled for the management of a temple and its funds an account of the trust property must be taken Until the trust funds are ascertained it is impossible to settle a scheme (2) The Calcutta High Court has in one case held that a suit for the removal of a trustee and for the recovery of trust property from the hands of a third party to whom it has been improperly alienated by the trustee falls within the section (3) But this decision has been dissented from in the same Court (4) in which it was held that persons claiming a title purely adverse to a trust are not proper parties to a suit for the execution of the trust The Allahabad High Court has also held that the alienees are not proper parties, that a prayer for recovery of possession is not entertainable under this section, and that a suit for such purpose could be instituted only by the trustee (5)

The High Courts at Calcutta (6) Bombay (7) and Allahabad (8) have held that in a suit under this section the Court may remove a trustee hostilely for breach of trust and that the section applies both to contentious and non contentious cases Such relief was held to be involved in clause (b) of the former section or to be included in "further or other relief" The Madras High Court, however, held though at one time there was a difference of opinion on the point that a suit to remove a trustee did not lie under this section (9) A prayer for removal might however be inserted where the right of suit existed independently of and the suit was not brought under this section (10) The amended section

(1) *Tricuniddas Mulji v Khemji Vallabh* 10 B 626, 629 (1892), *Chotalal Lakhmuram v Manohar Ganesh* 24 B 50 (1899), *see*, in High Court 12 B 247 267 (1887) *See also* *Sayad Husseinmian v Collector of Kaira* 21 B 48 51 (1895)

(2) *Chotalal Lakhmuram v Manohar Ganesh* 4 C W N 23 (1899)

(3) *Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun* 24 C 18 423 (1897) *followed by* Stanley C.J. in *Ghazaffar Husain v Yawar Husain* 28 A 111 (1905)

(4) *Budh Singh v Nuradbaran Roy* 2 C 431 (1905), *Budree Das Mukim v Mohun Lal Johurry*, 33 C 789 (1906) *per* *Urktett, J.*, in *Ghazaffar Husain v Yawar Husain*, 28 A 112 (1905)

(5) *Husen Begam v Collector of Morada* 20 A 46 49, 50 (1897)

(6) *Sajedur Raja v Gour Mohun* 24 C 18 (1897) *Mohun Idin v Sayajid Hussain* 20 C 10 (1893) and *see* *Balden Chaml v Steel* 15 I A 110 (1887)

(7) *Tricuniddas Mulji v Khemji Vallabh*

das, 10 B 626 629 (1892) *Chintaman Bajaji v Dhondo Ganesh* 15 B 612 617 (1888) *Advocate General v Moulvi Abdul* 18 B 401 (1894) *Annaji Raghunath v Narayan Sitaram*, 21 B 556 (1896), *Damodar Bhatji v Bhat Bhogilal*, 22 B 493 (1896), *Damodar Bhat v Bhogilal* 24 B 45 (1899) *Sayad Husseinmian v Collector of Kaira* 21 B 48 (1895) [a suit to remove trustees must therefore be brought in the District and not Subordinate Judges Court] *Girdharlal v Narainlal* 14 Bom L R 1135 (1912)

(8) *Husen Begam v Collector of Morada* 20 A 46 (1897), *Girdhar Lal v Ram Lal* 21 A 200 (1899)

(9) *Rangasami Naicken v Varadappa Naicken* 17 M 462 (1891), *Subbayya v Krishna* 14 M 186 (1890), *per* *Muttusami Ayyar J.*, *Narasimha v Avvan Chetti*, 12 M 157 (1888) *contra per* *Best and Weir, JJ.* in *Subbayya v Krishna supra*

(10) *Truvengadah v Srinivasa* 22 M 361 (1899)

makes it now clear that it applies both to non contentious and contentious suits and clause (a) expressly mentions the removal of a trustee

As clauses (b) and (c) allow of the appointment of new trustees and the vesting of the property in new trustees it follows that the Court can take possession from the old trustee who has been removed and give it to the new trustee. Whether the Court can grant relief by taking possession of trust property from the hands of a third party, to whom it has been improperly alienated (1) has already been discussed. If there is a trustee and the suit is merely to recover property from strangers and not for the execution of the trust, it does not come within the section. If, again there is a trustee but the suit be for his removal then till he is removed the trust estate is vested in him and he alone can sue strangers for possession. When the new trustee is appointed he can sue (2). It has also been held that where there is a trustee worshippers can not sue strangers for possession (3) though they are entitled irrespective of this section or O I r 8 to maintain an action against any person improperly interfering with their rights to worship (4). If, however a suit merely for possession as against strangers is not within the scope of the section, this question does not properly arise under it. It amounts simply to this, who has title under the ordinary law to sue for possession, and need not be further discussed. Within the terms "further relief" are the appointment of a receiver (5) and the grant of an injunction both forms of relief being of a merely ancillary character and a decree for the cancellation of unauthorized leases (6). The Court in sanctioning a scheme may provide for the appointment of additional or new trustees though such appointment may not be in conformity with the original constitution of the trust or with the rules in force in respect to it and a scheme framed is liable to variation for good cause shown (7). Where a suit is maintainable under this section and the plaint seeks relief specified in that section sect 42 of the Specific Relief Act does not apply (8).

' A suit —The procedure under Revenue Act (52 Geo III c 101) was by petition and summary order whereas a regular suit is prescribed by this section (9). There is however, no ground for suggesting that a suit under

(1) See *Syedur Raja v Gour Mohun* 24 C (1891) at p 43 and cases in note (2) p 33

(2) *Budh Singh v Nuradban Poy* 2 C. L. J 431 436 438 (1900)

(3) *Kamaraju v Asanah* 23 M. 99 (1899), *Subbaraya v Asanah* 23 M. 100 n. (1899), *Husni Begum v Collector of Moradabad* 20 A 40 50 (1897), *Paghbar Dal v Kesho Ramany* 11 A 18 (1889). See however *Kazi Hassan v Syon Balkrishna* 24 B 170 171 172 (1899)

(4) *Subbaraya v Asanah* 23 M 100 n (1899)

(5) *Cyananla Asram v Kristo Chandra* 8 C W N 404 407 (1901)

(6) *Ram Churn Tewary v Protap Chandra Dutt* 2 C. L. J 448 (1886)

(7) *Pravag Dass v Tirumala* 25 M. 319 (1900). A scheme was framed by the P. C. in *Pravag v Tirumala* 9 Bom. I P 588 (1907) s c 341 478.

(8) *Netai Rama v Venkatacharulu* 26 M 450 (1902)

(9) See *Subbaraya v Krishna* 14 M 186 188 (1890).

us section has the character of a summary proceeding. It possesses all the characteristics of a suit under sect 9 of the Code (1). Where a suit which is not within the section is instituted in a District Court it has been held that the Court should not dismiss the suit, but should deal with it under sect 57, clause (a) (now O VII r 10), and return the plaint to be presented to the proper Court (2). So also where a Subordinate Judge held that this section was a bar to the suit, no consent having been obtained, it was held that he should not have proceeded to dispose of the case but should have returned the plaint to be presented to the Court having jurisdiction to try the suit (3).

"Any other Court"—With reference to the words "any other Court empowered on that behalf" it has been held that the notification empowering the Court should not be directed to a particular judge and should not purport to deal with a particular litigation which on the date of the notification was pending before another Court (4).

Execution—So far as a decree under this section orders particular acts to be performed by the defendants in the management of the trust, it may be enforced by their imprisonment or by the attachment of their property, or both (5). And in order to obtain the removal of trustees who have infringed the scheme the latter may be amended so as to include a provision for removal, and it is not necessary to file a separate suit (6). In the under-mentioned case (7) application was refused as the requirements of sects 235 (j) and 260 of the former Code had been ignored. Where an order was held not to invest a suit with a representative character a person not on the record and not a member of the community of the plaintiffs but claiming certain rights under the decree was held to have no right to apply to compel the observance of the scheme directed by the decree (8). The directions in a scheme framed may be enforced in execution on application by persons interested (9).

Settling a scheme—Settling a scheme under this section is largely a matter of discretion, and the scheme will not be interfered with in appeal unless the discretion has been improperly exercised or the Court has failed to give due consideration to matters which it was bound to consider (10).

Costs—The costs of the Advocate General as between attorney and

(1) Shailajananda v Umeshananda, 2 C.L.J. 460, 469 (1905), Rangasami v Varadappa, 17 M. at p 468 (1893)

(2) Muhammad Abdullah v Kallu 21 A 187 (1899)

(3) Jamal ud din v Muftaba, 25 A. 631, 633 (1903)

(4) Abdul Karim v Abdus Sobhan, 39 C 146 (1911) 16 C.W.N. 44

(5) Damodarbhat v Bhogilal 24 B 45 (1899) followed Prayag Does v Tirumala, 28

M 319 (1905)

(6) *Ib*

(7) Sha Karamchand v Ghelabhai, 19 B 34 (1893)

(8) Ragava v Rajaratnam 14 M 57 (1890)

(9) Prayag Does v Tirumala, 28 M 319 (1905)

(10) Kurpa Shankar v Manohar Tamlekar, 24 M.L.J. 199 (1912)

client come, as a rule, out of the trust fund (1) The Court may also make a similar order in the case of trustee defendants if there have been no improper conduct on their part But the Court has refused to disturb the decision of the Taxing Master that certain items ought not to come out of trust funds (2)

"Save as provided"—That is, the section is now mandatory See note, *ante*, "Scope of the Sections" (3)

(1) See order in *Parmanandas v Venayek*
7 B 19 (1878)

(2) *Advocate General v Moulvi Abdul* 20
B 301 (1895)

(3) *Natesa Pandara v Ramalingam* 24
M L J 658 (1912) *Venkatarama Charlu v*
Krishnama Charlu, 24 M L J 697 (1912)

PART VI

SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

94 *In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed,—*
Supplemental pro
ceedings

- (a) *issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison,*
- (b) *direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any property,*
- (c) *grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold,*
- (d) *appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property,*
- (e) *make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient*

Supplemental proceedings—This section is new. It is intended to generally define the powers of the Court in this respect, specific provision being made either by present or future rules. In this connection may be noted in the first paragraph "if it is so prescribed" in contrast with the phrase in the manner prescribed" which occurs in other sections *c. j.*, sect 90, *ante*. As regards security [clauses (a) and (b)] the former Code dealt with security for costs. This section deals also with security for personal

appearance and production of property As regards clauses (c), (d), (e), see O XXXIX rr 1-5, O XL, and O XXXIX rr 6-10 respectively, and notes thereto

491,
7.]

95 (1) *Where, in any suit in which an arrest or attachment has been effected or a temporary injunction granted under the last preceding section,—*

Compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds,

(a) it appears to the Court that such arrest, attachment or injunction was applied for on insufficient grounds, or

(b) the suit of the plaintiff fails and it appears to the Court that there was no reasonable or probable ground for instituting the same,

the defendant may apply to the Court, and the Court may, upon such application, award against the plaintiff by its order such amount, not exceeding one thousand rupees, as it deems a reasonable compensation to the defendant for the expense or injury caused to him

Provided that a Court shall not award, under this section, an amount exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction

(2) An order determining any such application shall bar any suit for compensation in respect of such arrest, attachment or injunction

Compensation—This section amalgamates sects 491 and 497 of the last Code Prior to this enactment in the Code, a suit for damages would have lain for the wrongful suing out of mesne process And such a suit will lie now But it must be shown that there was malice and want of reasonable and probable cause (1) In the case of an application under this section it must be shown that the arrest or attachment was applied for on insufficient grounds (2) or, if the suit fails, that there was no probable ground for instituting it Compensation may be awarded for excessive attachment, notwithstanding that the plaintiff may be successful (3) A defendant, however, is not bound to apply for redress under this section, and by omitting to do so, or by applying and failing to obtain an award,

(1) *Goutiro v. Pobert*, 2 A. H. C. R. 303 (1870), *Chowdhurao Sherraj v. Dwarka Dass* 4 A. H. C. R. 42 (1872), *Dhurmo Narain v. Sreenuttu Dass*, 18 W. P. 110 (1872), and of course, where there has been an offence it is not necessary first to prosecute *Chaitunoor Zameerooddee*, 18 W. R. 27 (1872) As to the

liability of a creditor who attaches goods not belonging to his debtor, see *Kissori Mohun Poy v. Harbhukh Das*, 17 C. 436 (1889)

(2) See *Syed Ali v. Adib* 15 B. 160 at p. 163 (1890)

(3) *Mahomed Rezaood Khan v. Hossein Baksh*, W. R. Misc. 24

he does not lose his right to bring a regular suit, (1) though if he applies for compensation, any award which may be passed will bar a suit (2) Compensation can only be granted by the Court which disposes of the suit (3) and on the recorded application of the defendant, and not of its own motion (4) A Provincial Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to award damages under this section to a defendant whose property has been attached on insufficient grounds (5) If a defendant is arrested, he may apply under this section although he has not been summoned (6) In a summary suit, if a defendant has been arrested before judgment and claims compensation for such arrest under this section he is entitled on that ground to apply for leave to defend the suit, and, if a *prima facie* case is made out, leave to defend should be given Under the Code, a cross claim made by a defendant against a plaintiff cannot, in ordinary cases, be set up as a defence, except when it arises out of the very transaction sued upon and is in the nature of a set off, but the special cross-claim provided for by this section, viz a claim for compensation for arrest on insufficient grounds, may under that section be taken into account in any suit, and the amount awarded as compensation be awarded in the decree and thus *pro tanto* be a defence to the plaintiff's claim in the suit (7)

It was held that there was no appeal from an order awarding compensation under this section (8) But see now sect 104, clause (f) Under sect 491 of the last Code, the Court has to award "in its decree" Now the section runs "in its order" The order may, however, under sect 36, be executed as if it were a decree As regards the amendment in clause 2 see the next paragraph

Compensation—The corresponding section of the Code of 1859 concluded with the words "an award of compensation under this section shall bar," etc., therefore an unsuccessful application by a defendant did not debar him from instituting a suit (9) And the same must have been held under the last Code, as it could not be said that where there has been a denial of compensation there has been an "award" It, however, an application had been made and granted, then a separate suit for compensation was barred The present words "order determining," etc., are ambiguous, as by themselves they may refer either to the grant or refusal of an application A person is not bound to apply under this section There may be cases where the maximum amount of Rs 1000 is an insufficient compensation Persons may sue who do not wish

(1) Goutière v Charriot 1 A II C R. 91 (1869), Daniel v Mohun Bibee, 1 Agra, 104

(2) Goburdhun Majhee v Bancee Chunder 21 W R. 375 (1874)

(3) Huro Soonduree v Bungshee Mohun 3 W R Misc 28 (1865)

(4) Ram Narain v Kuran, S D N W 176 (1863)

(5) Ibrahim v Sangaram 26 M. 504 (1902)

(6) Syed Ali v Adib 15 B 160 (1890)

(7) Roulet v Fetterle, 18 B 717 (1894)

(8) Narasinga Bhakshi v Govinda Bhakshi, 21 M. 62 (1900), Lok Nath v Amir Singh, 28 A 81 (1905), Huro Soonduree v Baboo Bungshee, 8 W R 332 (1867)

(9) Nanda Kumar Shaha v Gour Sankar, 59 B L P app 4 (1870), s.c., 13 W R 305

to take advantage of the remedy given by this section (1) The provisions of this section show that where a claim is dismissed an injunction cannot subsist pending an appeal or until the period for lodging an appeal has elapsed for if such were the case the Court would not have had authority given it to grant compensation (2)

(1) Wilson v Kanhya Sahoo 11 W R 143 (1869) as to the remedy by suit see Joy Kalso Dassie v Chand Malla 9 W R 133 135 (1868) Nanda Kumar Shaha v Gour Sanlar 5 B I R app 4 6 (1870)

(2) Shaikh Moheesooddeen v Shaikh Ahmed Hossein 14 W R 381 (1870) See Ram Chand v Pitam Mal 10 A 506 52 (1888) Yamin ud doulah v Ahmed Ali Khan 21 C 561 563 (1891)

PART VII

APPEALS

APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES

96 (1) *Save where otherwise expressly provided in the Appeals from original decrees body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court*

(2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed *ex parte*

(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court *with the consent of parties*

Appeal—An appeal is a stage in and part of the proceedings in a suit (1) There must be a suit for if there is none there can be no decree and therefore no appeal (2) It is the removal of a cause from an inferior to a superior Court for the purpose of testing the soundness of the decision of the former Court, (3) and the lodging of an appeal is thus equivalent to an allegation that the decree is wrong and that the reasons which led to it are as stated in the judgment insufficient (4) It is a hearing before another tribunal being in this distinguished from a review which is the reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge (5) The function of an Appellate Court is to determine what decree the Court below ought to have made It may affirm, reverse or vary the decree under appeal (6) The rule upon which the Privy

(1) *Re Dul Chand* 9 B. L. R. 190 196 (18 2)

(2) *Peary v Baroda* 10 C. 480 (1892) [a proceeding under sect 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and see also as to applications under sect 93 *Hussain v Mutookdhar* 14 C. 312 (188) and proceedings under sect 91 of the same Act *Dya Gazi v Ram Lal* 2 C. W. N. 351 352 (189)]

(3) *Chajpan v Mo lin Kutta* 22 M. G. S. 80

(1893)

(4) *Mt Pan Koer v Bhugwunt Koer* 6 N. W. P. H. C. R. 19 21 (1873)

(5) *Moheswar Sing v Bengal Government* 7 Moo. L. A. 283 305 (1859) though *ex necessitate* there may be cases in which a review might take place before another and different Judge

(6) *Kristo Kinkur v Baroda Count* 14 M. I. A. 450 499 (18 2)

Council has universally acted is to affirm the judgment, unless their Lordships see that the judgment is clearly wrong (1) It is a rule of practice that a Court of Appeal should not upset the judgment of the first Court on a question of fact, depending on the appreciation of evidence, unless the former Court is quite confident that the judgment is wrong But, after all, it is a rule of practice, meant for the guidance of Appellate Courts having jurisdiction to deal with questions of fact, and they are the sole judges of the question whether a judgment appealed against on facts is wrong (2) An Appellate Court, in regular appeal is bound to take notice of a positive invalidity of a document created by a Statute, even though no objection may have been raised to its admission in the Court below The Appellate Court is thus bound in regular appeal to entertain an objection that a document is invalid for want of registration, even though no objection may have been raised to its admissibility in the Court below "The bulwark against fraud," says West, J., "intended to be constituted by registration is of great public importance We think we could not consistently with the law allow it (the unregistered document) to count as a part of the materials on which we have to dispose of this case, supposing that the registration was indeed, indispensable to its validity" (3) An appellant will not be allowed to raise in the Court of Appeal a point which he did not raise in the Court below even though there is some evidence in support of it if the nature of that evidence is such that, by any possibility the respondent might have been able to rebut, if that point had been raised originally (4) If a party desires or intends to make misconduct of a Judge a ground of appeal to the High Court, he ought always to draw the Judge's attention to that matter either by presenting a petition or otherwise, so that a proper record may be at once made of the facts which he desires to establish in appeal (5) A pending appeal without annulling the judgment appealed against, leaves it subsisting as a valid adjudication governing the rights of the parties, but the further litigation and all matters connected therewith are transferred to and placed under the control of the Appellate Court During the pendency of an appeal, the power of the inferior Court in any way to deal with the litigation is completely in abeyance, except to carry out the decree which, of course, it is the duty of the Court to do, as the Code in terms provides that the execution of the decree is not stayed by the mere fact that an appeal has been preferred against it (6) It is not only competent to a Court of Appeal, but it may be its duty under certain circumstances to take notice of events which have happened since the order challenged in appeal was made The Court has inherent power to recall an

(1) *Khoorshidjee v Mehwanjee*, 1 M I A 431, 442 (1837)

(2) *Pandurang t Anant* 5 Bom. L R 95-96 (1903), *Yamuna Bai t Balshet* 5 Bom. L R 580-586 (1902)

(3) *Bāsāwā t Kalkāpa*, 2 B 480-491 (1877), see also *Pamapat t Umsana* 7 B 123, 124 (1882), *Imdad t Ta-adduk*, 6 A 335, 339 (1881), *Safdar Ali t Yachman*, 2 A 554,

559 (1879)

(4) *Ex parte Earle* 19 Ch. D 419, 123 (1881)

(5) *Ram Koomar t Sonatun*, 3 C L R 23, 24 (1878), see also *Zamindar of Tum v Bennayya*, 22 M 155 (1898)

(6) *Ramanadhan t Narayanan* 27 M 602, 604 605 607 (1904)

order improperly or fraudulently obtained. Where wrong has been done by order of Court which has been set aside on appeal the Court executing the decree without express authority is competent to put the parties in the position which they occupied before that order (1). A decree of the Appellate Court merely affirming the decree of the first Court does not give the decree holder fresh time for performing a condition imposed by the original decree (2). It has been held that the effect of a party preferring an appeal was to re-open the decree so as to render it competent to the parties to agree that the case should be remanded for the trial of fresh issues even on points not raised in the ground of appeal (3).

"Save where —As to the Court Fees Act (4) sects 5 12 see cases cited. See sect 19 Succession Certificate Act (5) (VII of 1889), sects 47, 48 Guardian and Wards Act (6) (VIII of 1890) Chota Nagpore Landlord and Tenant Act (7) (I of 1879) Lower Burmah Courts Act (8), Bengal Tenancy Act (9) N W P Revenue Act (10) (XII of 1881) Madras Act (II of 1897) in the case of suits (11) under Madras Reg VI of 1881, N W P Land Revenue Act (12) (XIX of 1873) Small Cause Courts (13) (Act VII of 1868

(1) Udit Chobey v. Rasthika Prasad 6 C L J 662 (1904)

(2) Ramasamy Kone v. Sundra Kone, 17 M L J 490 (1907)

(3) Natesa Gramani v. Venkatrama 17 M L J 518 (1907)

(4) Balkaran v. Gobind Nath 12 A 129 106 (1890) Moti v. Kaunsilla 16 A 308 (1894) Lurkhur v. Ram Bhajun 23 A W N 214 Vithal Krishna v. Pal Krishna 10 B 610 (1886) Sardar Singh v. Ganpat Singh 14 B 395 (1889) Dada v. Nagesh 23 B 486 489 490 (1898) Ajoodhya Pershad v. Gunga Pershad 6 C 249 (1880) Rajkrishna v. Bama Soondaree 23 W R 296 (1870) Gunga Moneo v. Gopal 19 W R 211 (1873) Kanaran v. Komappan 14 M L 169 (1890) Bai Anope v. Mulchand 9 B 355 (1885) Annamalai v. Cloete 4 M 201 208 (1881)

(5) Bhagwan v. Manni Lal 13 A 214 (1891) Barkatunnissa v. Tajunnissa 1 C W N 1 (1890), Rama Reddi v. Rapi Redd 19 M L 199 (1890) Alta Soondari v. Sreenath 70 C 641 (1893) Nannhumal v. Gulabo 26 A 173 (1903) Radha Ram v. Brindhan 2 C W N 59 60 (1897) s.c. 25 C 320 Ariya Pellai v. Thangammal 20 M L 442 (1896) Bai Devkori v. Lalchand 19 B 700 (1891) dist in Bai Nanil Kore v. Shri Maganlal 36 B 22 (1911) As to sufficiency of security on application for certificate of administration see Lucas v. Lucas 20 C 215 (1891)

(6) Pran Bandhu Singh v. Brahmamoyee Dasya 1 C W N 693 (1897), Mohini Chandra Biswas v. Tarini Sanher Ghose 19 C 487 (1892) Pakhwanti Dai v. Intra Nara 5 ng 23 C 201 (1890), In re Bai Haskha 20 B 667 (1890)

(7) Priag Nath Sah v. Mura Munla 24 C 219 (1896) and as to second appeal Kahu Mahto v. Budhan Mahto 27 C 508 (1900), sect 44 Act V of 1903 B C (Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act) Iswar Lal Singh v. Jagoo Sahu 33 C 378 380 (1900)

(8) XVII of 1875 repealed by Act XI of 1889 and the latter by Act VI of 1900 Golam Rahman v. Fatma Bibi 13 C 232 230 (1886) In re Mulla Alium 14 C 301 (1886)

(9) Gogan Chand v. Casperz 4 C W N 41 (1897) Goghan Mollah v. Raimanar 18 C 271 281 (1891), Lala Kirat Nara v. Lalul dhari 17 C 396 (1897) Kulkarni v. Ramon 1 C W N 30 (1890) Subh v. Goroko Prasad 3 C W N 311 (1890)

(10) Deo Churn v. Bai Jathiah 1 A 1 19 (1899) Beni Prasad Kuar v. J. Bibi 23 A 283 (1901) Choudhary 63 66 (1890) Krishna Lal 21 A 237 (1889)

(11) Sadasiva Pella v. J.

(12) Imtiaz Lano v. J. 328 (1889)

(13) Srinivasa v. J. 232 (1890) J. v. J. Karanj v. J. J.

B. C.), (1) Madras Rent Recovery Act, (2) and with regard to an appeal from an order refusing to amend clerical error in form of probate, (3) see cases cited See Registration Act, sects 72, 76 The objection that "no appeal lies" is usually taken as a preliminary objection by the pleader for the respondent But the Court will none the less consider it on learning from the appellant what the facts are (4)

"An appeal shall lie"—A right of appeal is not a natural and inherent right attaching to litigation It can only be given by Statute (5) A party can only appeal when so allowed by Statute and it is only the Court to which jurisdiction is given to entertain an appeal in a particular matter which can determine it (6) And where there is inherent incompetency in a Court, it has been held that objection can be taken at any time, and that consent cannot confer jurisdiction (7) though as regards objections taken in appeal to want of jurisdiction of Courts of first instance see now the provisions of sect 21, ante

The section does not confer a right of appeal from all adjudications which are decrees within the meaning of sect 2 but in those cases only where the right is not taken away by the Code or any other law (8) In order to sustain an appeal it must be shown (a) that the party has the right to appeal, and (b) that the Court to which he desires to prefer the appeal has the right to entertain it A distinction must be drawn between provisions which confer rights on parties and those which confer jurisdiction on Courts This section does not deal with the jurisdiction of Courts but with the rights of appeal given to parties (9)

"From every decree"—An appeal lies from the decree Where there is no decree there is no appeal As to what is a decree, see notes to sects 2 and

Hurry Das Bhukut, 24 C 455 (1896) Soon derlal v. Goor Prasad 23 B 414 (1898) The character of a suit, and therefore the right of appeal, is not altered by the mode in which a Judge invested with both or linear and Small Cause Court Jurisdiction tries a suit Shan karibhai v. Somabhai 25 B 417 (1900) Joll. in Indra Chan bra Mukerjee v. Srish Chandra Banerjee, 40 C 501 (1913)

(1) Mr Waziruddin v. Lala Dorki Nandun 6 C L J 472 (1907)

(2) Dootaraju v. Nekkialapudi 17 M L J 120 (1907)

(3) Gurindra v. Rajeshwari 27 C 5 (1899) (4) Behary Lal Pandit v. Kedarnath Mullick 18 C 469, 473 (1891)

(5) Nathnbai v. Manordas, 36 B 360 (1911), 14 Bom L R 325 331, Rangoon Botatoung Co Ltd v. Collector, Rangoon, 39 I A. 197 (1912), The Special Officer Salsette Building Sites v. Dasabhai 17 C W N 421 (1913) Prayag Naram v. Sukhdco, 17 C L J 605 (1911) (and not by mutual consent) Ram Soshi v. Gray,

18 C L J 123 (1913)

(6) Percy v. Percy, 18 A 373, 378 (1890) Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramanyam Sastri, 11 I A 160, 163, s c, 11 M 26, 34 (1887), Narayan Ballal v. Secretary of State, 20 I 803 805 (1890), Tota Ram v. Ishar Das 9 A 416 (1887), Parasuram v. Seashier, 27 M 501, 503 (1903) In re Court of Wards Estate, Raja Pertab Sing 7 W R 222 (1887) As to appeals under the Land Revenue Act, XIX of 1873, see Niaz Begum v. Abdul Karim, 14 I 500 (1882), Shubban Lal v. Tiloki Chand 2 I. 619 (1880), and under Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894 Balaram v. Sham Sunder, 3 C 526, 529, 530 (1896), Sheorattan v. Mohri, 21 A 351 (1899)

(7) See notes to sect 9 ante

(8) Balkaran v. Gobund Nath 12 A. 129, 155 (1890) An adjudication between defendants in Interpleader is a decree Maha raj Singh v. Chittar Mal 30 A 22 (1907)

(9) Golam v. Fahman 13 L. 232, 235 (1886)

47, *ante* In the first part of the section the word "decrees" and in the concluding portion of the first paragraph the word "decision" is used. But this difference of language does not involve any distinction. The appeal must be strictly from the decree, that is, the appellant must object to the decree before he can be allowed to enter upon his detailed objections to the judgment (1). The object of an appeal is to correct the decree. An appeal lies from the decree, not from the judgment. There is, therefore, no appeal to a party in whose favour a decree is passed simply because there may be some expressions in the judgment which led to the decree which may be considered prejudicial (2). An appeal will not lie from separate determinations of isolated issues of law or fact before taking evidence on the remaining issues (3). If findings have been recorded upon some issues against a party and he desires to have formal effect given to them by the decree so as to allow of his filing objections thereto or of appealing therefrom, he must take steps to have the decree properly brought into conformity with the judgment, so that there may be matter on the face of it to show that something has been decided against him. In other words, he must obtain insertion in the decree itself (which alone contains the final determination of the cause and not the judgment) of such portions of the Court's findings as he considers himself injuriously affected by, so as to place himself in the position which the statute recognizes as giving him a right to impeach the decree. If he fails to follow this course, the decree, though in general terms, will stand good as finally deciding the issues raised by the pleadings upon which the ultimate determination of the cause and the decree itself actually rested. More than these the decree cannot cover, and the findings in a judgment upon matters which subsequently turn out to be immaterial to the grounds upon which a suit is finally disposed of as to the plaintiff's right to any portion of the relief sought by him as declared by the decree amount to no more than *obiter dicta*, and do not constitute a final decision (4). When more questions than one arise in a suit according to the circumstances of the case depending upon the nature of the questions and of the decision arrived at, it may be either necessary to decide them all, or sufficient to decide only some of them for the disposal of the suit. In cases of the second class, the Court may either decide only the questions that are found necessary to decide, or it may decide all the questions raised. In the latter class of cases, again, the Court

(1) *Mt Pan Koor v Bhugwant Koor*, 6 N W P H C R 19 21 (1873)

(2) *Krishnasamu Ayyangar v Raja Gopala Ayyangar*, 18 M 73 87 (1893), *Shama Soon dree v Digumburee* 13 W R (18 0), *Mt Pan Koor v Bhugwant Koor*, 6 N W P 19 (1893), *Annusuyabai v Sakharam* 7 B 464 466 (1883). See also *Vithilinga v Vithilinga*, 15 M 111, 190 (1891), *Ghela Icharam v Sankal Chand* 18 B 59, 602 (1893), *Muttu Kumarappa v Arumuga* 7 M 145, 149 (1883). In *Run Bahadoor v Lucio Koor*, 12 I A 23, a c 11 C 301 (1884) the appeal was not against the decree but a finding in the judg-

ment. The decree was not made until it was made in spite of it. Appeal is not *res judicata*. *Nanlar B dhu* 13 C 1 (1891), *Thakur Magun v Thakur* 13 C 1 617 (1891), *Peary v Anub* 13 C 905 (1897), *Shub Chandra* 13 C 17 A 174 184 (1895)

(3) *In re petition* 13 C 17 A 174 184 (1895)

(4) *Jamartunn* 13 C 17 A 174 184 (1895)

(1883), *as above*, *Buldia*, 6 C 31 33, *Ram Lal* 13 C 17 A 174 184 (1895)

may either embody the result of its decision upon every question in the decree in the form of a declaration or otherwise, or it may not do so. Cases of this last mentioned description again, subdivide into two classes, in one of which the decree is supported by the decision upon each of the questions determined, and in the other it is in spite of the decision upon some of those questions, as, for instance where a suit fails upon the question of limitation, but the question of title is found for the plaintiff (1). The mere fact that a Court has gone on to determine a question which it could not determine so as to bind the parties does not give a right of appeal against a decision on such a question (2).

The former section allowed an appeal from any part of the decree which may also be of a provisional or preliminary character, such as a decree in a partnership or partition suit (3). Though an appeal was allowed against a portion of a decision yet there should, it was held, be a decision relating to the disposal of the entire suit (4). The words "or from any part" have been now omitted.

"Courts authorized to hear appeals"—See the various Civil Courts Acts and in Act XII of 1887, sects 20, 21, sect 55, Indian Divorce Act (IV of 1869) (5). As to Admiralty jurisdiction, see note (6).

The subject matter of an appeal should be valued (7) for the purpose of jurisdiction according to the law in force at the date of the appeal and not of the suit which led to it (8). Where a plaintiff definitely fixes a certain sum as the amount of his claim, this must be considered as the value of the original suit and the appeal will lie accordingly, but where he fixes a certain sum as the amount of his claim only approximately or tentatively, and prays that the amount of his claim may be ascertained in the course of the suit, then the amount found by the Court to be due to him must be regarded as the value of the original suit for the purpose of determining the forum of appeal (9).

Ex-parte decree (clause 2)—The clause allowing appeals from *ex parte* decrees was added by sect 45, Act VII of 1888, previous to which Act it was doubted whether on appeal was given in such cases (10).

In *Jonardan v Romdhoe*, (11) the Calcutta High Court said that "when a decree is passed *ex parte* against a defendant, a remedy by appeal is now always open to him by sect 540 of the Code as amended by Act VII of

(1) Peary Mohan v Ambica Churn, 24 C 900, 904, 905 (1897)

(2) Dya Gazi v Ram Lal 2 C. W. N 351, 352 (1897)

(3) Krishnasami Ayyangar v Raja Gopala Ayyangar, 18 M. 73 87 (1893)

(4) Raja of Venkatagiri v Mahomed Pahemutulla 3 M. 13, 14 (1881)

(5) And Percy v Percy 18 A 370, 378, 379 (1896)

(6) Ferruling Morgan v Morgan 4 A 306 (1882)

(7) In the matter of the Ship Champion 17 C 66 81 82 83 (1889)

(8) See notes to sect 5, sub voc Pecuni

ary Jurisdiction

(9) Muttamall v Chinnana, 4 M. 220 (1881)

(10) Gulab Khan v Abdul Wahab, 31 C 360, 369 s.c., 8 C W N 233 (1904), foll Iyattulla Bhuiyan v Chandra Mohan Banerji, 11 C W N 1133 (1907) s.c. 6 C L J 225 Rampt Messer v Ramador, 17 C W N 116 119 (1912)

(11) See Lal Singh v Kunjan 4 A 387 (1882), Ajudha v Balmukund 8 A 304 (1886), Karuppan v Ayyathurai, 9 M. 445 (1886)

(12) 23 C 738, 743 (1896)

1888. But such a remedy can be efficacious only in those cases, and their number must be small, in which the *ex parte* decree is either wrong in law on the face of the proceeding or is based upon evidence so weak that even though un rebutted it is insufficient to sustain the decree. In the great majority of cases in which a defendant having a good defence has had an *ex parte* decree passed against him, the disadvantage he labours under is that he has not been able to substantiate his defence by evidence before the Court. Upon the record, as it stands, the *ex parte* decree may be unavailable, but if the defendant has an opportunity (which he was prevented from having owing to some sufficient cause) of placing on the record evidence which he could have adduced to substantiate his defence, no such decree should have been passed. The remedy in such a case cannot be by way of appeal, which must ordinarily proceed upon the record as it stands. The proper remedy must be the one provided by sect. 108 of the Code." In *Sadhu Krishna Ayyar v. Kuppam* (1) however, Sir Arnold White, C.J., said that these observations were merely *obiter*, and he added "they seem to me to involve the reading into the Code of a great deal which the Legislature might have said but did not say. I think it must be taken that the Legislature by accident or design has given a right of appeal apart from the merits, against an order on the ground that the defendant was not in default in failing to appear and against an *ex parte* decree, also apart from the merits upon the same grounds. There is a power to remand a case when the Appellate Court reverses an order refusing to set aside an *ex parte* decree, and it seems to me anomalous to hold that there is no such power when the Appellate Court allows an appeal against a decree upon the ground that there ought not to have been an *ex parte* decree against the defendant" (2). In this case it was held by the Full Bench that when a suit is decided *ex parte* an Appellate Court, to which the appeal from the decree is preferred under sect. 510 of the former Code, had jurisdiction to reverse the decree of the lower Court on the ground that such Court was wrong in proceeding to decide the suit *ex parte* and remand the suit for re-hearing (3).

Appeal as to costs—See notes to sect. 35, which deals with the general power to award costs.

Consent decree (clause 3)—No appeal lies from such a decree. A consent decree cannot be set aside by appeal or by motion (4). For setting aside such a decree there are two available modes of procedure: (a) by a suit, (b) by an application for a review of the judgment sought to be set aside. But the more proper mode is by an application for review (5).

Who may appeal—In the first place, whatever may be a party's rights

(1) 30 M. 54, 59, F. B. (1906).

(2) 30 M. 54, 59.

(3) *Foll. Perumbara Nayar v. Subrahmani an Pattar*, 23 M. 445, and *Habib Baksh v. Baldeo Prasad*, 23 A. 167, 168 (1901), and dissenting from *Jonardan Dobey v. Ramdhone Singh*, 23 C. 738 (1896), *Parvatisankar v. Bai Naval*, 17 B. 733 (1892), *Caussanel v. Soures*, 23 M. 260 (1899), *Sadhu Krishna v.*

Kuppam Ayyangar, 30 M. 54.

(4) *Fatmabai v. Sonbai*, 36 B. 77 (1911).

(5) *Aushootosh v. Tara Prasanna*, 10 C. 612, 615 (1884). See also *Nistaram v. Nando Lal*, 26 G. 891, 907, s. c., 3 C. W. N. 70 (1899), *Biraj Mohini v. Chintamo* W. N. 877, 878 (1901), *Bhutna Lal*, C. C. W. N. 82, 85.

under the general law, he may forego them and debar himself, or be estopped from asserting them. If, therefore, an appellant agrees not to appeal, he cannot do so (1). A party, it has been held, may also otherwise be barred from appealing. Thus where a decree was obtained against A and others, and A not appealing, the decree was set aside and the case remanded on the appeal of the co-defendants but reaffirmed by the first Court it was held that A could not appeal from the last decree (2). In the under mentioned case, (3) however, a suit having been decided by the first Court after an intervenor had been made a party, it was remanded for trial on the appeal of the intervenor whose name was ordered to be expunged from the record. The suit was decided again in favour of the plaintiff, but the decision was reversed on appeal. It was held that the fact of the defendant having in the first instance allowed the intervenor alone to appeal, did not debar him, after the case was reopened by remand from appealing in his own person.

Chapter XLI of the last Code treated of appeals from original decrees, and Chapter XLII in the same Code of appeals from appellate decrees. It is provided that an appeal shall be from such decrees generally. It is not expressly said by whom an appeal may be preferred but it may reasonably be assumed that any party to the suit in which a decree is passed may, if dissatisfied with it, appeal from it. O. XXI r 33 refers to the judgment in appeal from original decrees, and enacts that it may be for confirming, varying or reversing the decree against which the appeal is made and applies under sect. 108 to judgments in appeal from appellate decrees. Hence, also, it is inferrible that the parties who are allowed to appeal are those who desire that a decree should be varied or reversed (4).

But a *pro forma* defendant against whom no judgment has been given has no right to appeal, even if another party has been found to be the owner of the land, inasmuch as such finding carries with it no legal consequence as against him (5). So in the under mentioned case (6) it was held that the tenant had no reason to object to a decree, which was altogether in his favour, and it was not competent to him to present an appeal from the finding on an issue. Even in the case of findings inserted in the decree itself it is not necessary to appeal

(1) Moonshee Ameer Ali v. Maharance Underjit Koer, 14 M. L. A. 203 (1871), Anant Das v. Ashburner, 1 A. 267 (1876), Protal Chunder Das v. Arathoon 8 C. 455 (1882), s. c., 10 C. L. R. 443, Bahir Das Chakravarti v. Nobin Chunder Pal, 29 C. 306 (1901), s. c. 6 C. W. N. 121, Uttam Chandra Kurthy v. Khetra Nath Chattopadhyay, 29 C. 577 (1901), in Rajmohan Gossain v. Gourmohan Gossain 8 Moo. L. A. 91 (1859), a decree of an Appellate Court obtained after compromise was held to be fraudulent and was set aside. If a person carries on an appeal contrary to his agreement a suit for damages will be Jati Pam v. Dass Ram 3 C. L. J. 574 (1879).

See also Pagohar Dyal v. East India Company, Fulton 146 (1843).

(2) Nand Kishori Singh v. Balmokund, 1 Shome 12 (1877).

(3) Becha Singh v. Mirza Mashook Ali Beg, 15 W. R. 572 (1871).

(4) Jinnah Singh v. Kamar un nissa 3 A. 152, 156, 157 (1880).

(5) Ram Dass Lushkar v. Hurechar Moo Kerjee 23 W. R. 86 (1874).

(6) Muttu Kamarappa v. Arumuga 7 M. 145, 149 (1883), as to objection to finding in Appellate Court, see Rajai v. Appaji, Bom. P. J. 1883 p. 220, cited in Bibi Ladd Begum v. Bibi Raj Begum 13 B. 652 (1888).

if the findings be on issues which are not necessary for the decision of the suit in which they are raised (1)

Assuming there is otherwise no bar the question as to who may appeal is determinable by the common sense consideration that there can be no appeal when there is nothing to appeal about. A person therefore who is no party (2) to the suit in which a decision is given can, as the decree does not affect him, have no ground to appeal therefrom. The person appealing must also have been a party when the decree was passed. Thus a person was once made a party to a suit, but the decree was set aside the suit as against him dismissed, and the case remanded for trial. From this last decision he appealed, but the Court ordered the appeal to be struck off as made by a person no longer a party to the suit (3). A party however to the suit when the decree is passed, or when they have been brought on the record by representative (4) or assignee (5) may appeal regarding their own rights invaded by the decree (6).

Ordinarily only the party against whom a decree is passed that is the person ordinarily injuriously affected by the decree, can appeal. For the same reason a person against whom a suit has been dismissed usually cannot appeal against the decree, as he is not affected otherwise than beneficially by it. But in some cases a suit may be dismissed as against a defendant and yet the latter may have a right of appeal. It is not because a suit is formally dismissed that no appeal lies, but because such dismissal is ordinarily not merely no grievance but an actual benefit to the defendant. There is nothing to complain of. If, however, a party is aggrieved (7) by a decree then notwithstanding that the suit is dismissed against him he may appeal.

(1) *Ghela Ichharam v Sankalchan Jetha*, 18 B 597 (1893).

(2) See *Caemmerer v Burch*, 1 Mad II C R 8 (1862), where, however, an objection was taken to a next friend being heard on the ground that he was no party to the suit, it was held that the Court would not entertain the objection at the instance of the party through whose fault the error occurred, viz., that the next friend only and not the minor had been made respondent to the decree appealed from. *Bhobotarun v Sreo Ram Paul* 9 C 629 (1883). An exception also exists in the case of an auction purchaser who as well as a decree holder and judgment-debtor, may appeal from an order setting aside an execution sale, though he may not have been a party to the suit. *Hiralal Ghose v Chundra Kanto Ghose*, 26 C 539 (1899). The case to the contrary reported at p 511 was uncontested and is of no authority.

(3) *Gokool Pershad Deschute v Brojo Vonce Debia*, 24 W R 259 (1875).

(4) See *Jugoo Lal v Lalla Bhikun Lal*, 5 W R 133 (1866).

(5) See *Gajadhar Prasad v Ganesh Tewari*,

7 B L R 149 (1871). In *Moheswar v Kushaba* 2 B 218 (1877) which was decided under the Code of 1859, the transfer was before the appeal took place.

provided for by O XXII r 10. See *Ahmed boy v Vallyebboy*, 8 B 323, 330 (1881), *Rajaram v Jibai*, 9 B 151, 150 (1884). The case of *Jaduputtee v Chunder Kant Bhatta charjee*, 9 W R 309 (1868), was a rule. The purchaser was not added, but substituted for the plaintiff, apparently without the latter's concurrence.

(6) *Sm Khernukree v Nilumbur Mandal*, 2 W R 227, at p 231 (1865).

(7) *Musst Pan Koor v Bhugwunt Koor*, 6 N W P 19 (1873). "It must be held that in appeal, as well as in review, the appellant must be aggrieved by the decree," per *Jardine, J*, and see also per *Pearson, J*, and *Stuart, C.J.*, at pp 23, 25, *Lachman Singh v Mohan*, 2 A 497, 499, 501, per *Stuart, C.J.* "I am now quite ready to accept the principle that an appellant must be aggrieved by the

The general question whether successful defendants in a suit can appeal from the decree in their favour has been raised in several cases, though under different circumstances. In the first of the last-mentioned cases, which was one in which the defendants had no contention *inter se*, but on the contrary a common interest against the plaintiff who was the respondent in the appeal, it was held that as the appellants had no ground of complaint, and as the appeal was against a decree wholly in their own favour, the legal meaning of which was that the plaintiff's suit altogether failed there was no appeal (1). In the under mentioned case (2) the plaintiff's suit had been dismissed. The defendant appellants did not desire that the decree dismissing the suit should be varied or reversed. The attempted appeal which was disallowed was by one defendant against another, the matter in issue being the authenticity and validity of a deed of conditional sale purporting to have been executed by one defendant as vendor in favour of the other as vendee. So again a party cannot appeal to protect a possession which he has disclaimed to hold except on behalf of another party whom he is not authorized to represent and who has not appealed (3). In such case he is not interested either on his or on such other party's behalf (4). Inasmuch as an appeal lies from the decree and not from the judgment, (5) therefore a party cannot appeal from a decree which is altogether in his favour simply because there may be findings or expressions in the judgment which may be prejudicial to him (6). In a suit for rent in which the only real issue was whether one X was or was not liable for rent and in which Y the alleged purchaser of the tenure was held to have been wrongly made a party on the application of the tenant, it was held that Y had no right to appeal against a decree given against X praying for a declaration of her (Y's) liability for rent as purchaser from the tenant (7). On the other hand an appeal has been held to be by defendants against whom specifically no decree was made, but whose defence

decree *per* Spankie J at p 504 and see pp 507, 508 *per* Oldfield J. This case dissents from Saroop Chunder Pal: *Dombal 1 W R 72* (1864) which does not appear to be correctly decided.

(1) *Musst Pan Koor v Bhugwant Koor* 6 N W P 19 (1873). See on this case *Jumna Singh v Kamar un nisa* 3 A at pp 154 155 (1880).

(2) *Jumna Singh v Kamar un nisa*, 3 A. 152 (1880).

(3) *Sheshayyar v Pappuvaradayaengar*, 6 M 185 (1882).

(4) See also *Doorga Mohaputtur v Radha Mohun Mytee*, 15 W R 586 (1871). Where a Hindu widow sued jointly with her sons her suit was dismissed she did not appeal and it was held that her sons who had no interest in the result of the suit were not

competent to prefer a second appeal.

(5) *Shama Soonduree Debia v Digumbaree Debia* 13 W R 1 (1870). *Musst Pan Koor v Bhugwant Koor*, 6 N W P 19 (1873), *Ram Dass Lushkar v Hureehar Mookherjee* 23 W R 86 (1874), *Mnttu Kumarappa v Arumuga* 7 M 145 149 (1883). *Id est ante* 'Decrees'.

(6) *Vide ante* 'Decrees'.

(7) *Musst Oognee Chowdram v Shukh Karamutoollah* 17 W R 219 (1872), *dist in* *Krishna Chandra Goldar v Mohesh Chandra Saha* 5 A Cal H.C. 2310 of 1902, in which the plaintiffs had themselves added the auction purchaser alleging that he was a mere *benamdar* for the former tenants and in which the Lower Appellate Court wrongly set aside an order which the appellant had obtained under sect. 103 of the former Code

to the suit was necessarily disposed of by the decree (1) In order to see what the decree really means the Court may look not only into the judgment but into the pleadings. If the decree although apparently, and so far as it goes, favourable to the defendants is yet imperfect and not self explanatory, and when read by the light of the record really unfavourable and may prove injurious to them, then the defendants being aggrieved by it and having every interest to appeal may do so (2) In short, any person who being party to proceedings is injuriously affected by a decree passed therein is entitled to appeal (3) And if this be shown it is immaterial that the suit may have been dismissed as against him.

Ordinarily a case is decided upon issues between the plaintiffs on the one side and the defendants on the other. Thus a defendant, whether interested or *pro forma* only, cannot appeal against a co-defendant (4) unless the Court has dealt with the case at the hearing as raising not only a question between the plaintiff and defendants but also as between the defendants, in which case one of the defendants can appeal against the decree as between himself and the other defendant (5) When the decree of the Lower Court proceeds on a ground common to all defendants the Appellate Court may, on appeal by one of the defendants against the whole decree, reverse the decree in so far as it affects the other defendants though they have not joined in the appeal (6)

97 *Where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Code does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree*

Appeal from final decree where no appeal from preliminary decree

(1) *Jamna Das v Udey Ram*, 21 A 117 (1898), and see also *Ram Golam v Sheo Tahal*, 1 A. 266 (1876), in which an appeal was held to lie on the ground that the respondent's suit should have been dismissed absolutely, and not in such a manner by negativing the defence, that the respondents were at liberty to come into Court again.

(2) *Luchman Singh v Mohan*, 2 A 497, 500 501 (1879)

(3) See *Mirhamdee v Nazerun* 6 C 19 (1880) which was a case under sect 28 of Act XI of 1858 (Guardian and Wards), which provides that all orders shall be open to appeal under the rules in force for appeals in miscellaneous cases (i.e. appeals from orders under sect 583 of the former Code). Similar language was used in that section and in ss 540 and 584 of that Code.

(4) *Gudadhur Bannerjee v Musst Mun*

Mohinee Dossia, 7 W R 366 (1867); *Ramesur Ghose v Azcem Joardar*, 17 W R 373 (1872), *Jamna Singh v Kamar un nissa*, 3 A 125 (1880), *Kashee Chunder Ray v Sm Doorga*, 11 W R 410 (1869), but if he is allowed to do so he is estopped from asking that the decision may be set aside for want of jurisdiction. A person cannot however, appeal so as to affect another's rights under the decree unless he makes that other person a respondent. *Ram Mohun Dey v Kangaleo Gopee*, 20 W R 149 (1873) as to cross appeal see Sched I, O XXI r 21, *Goondamonee Dossia v Parbutty Dassia* 10 W R 326 (1868)

(5) *Souru Padmanath v Narayanrao*, 18 B 520 (1893)

(6) *Dhutta Coor v Paidgan Tam*, 30 M 470

Preliminary decrees—A decree according to the definition in sect 2 may be either preliminary or final. And an appeal lies against a preliminary decree. It was however, a matter of debate under the former Code whether in an appeal against the final decree it was open to the appellant to question the correctness of the preliminary decree when no appeal had been preferred against it within the time allowed (1). The Legislature has now determined the question in the negative by this section. The object of this section is to prevent preliminary questions being raised in the form of an appeal after the case has been decided on its merits (2). But an aggrieved party can only appeal if a decree is extant in a formal shape (3). Although there may be a preliminary finding, yet unless a formal decree is drawn up there is no possibility of the appeal here contemplated (4). There is no provision enabling an Appellate Court to dismiss an appeal against a preliminary decree on the ground that a final decree has been passed while that appeal was pending (5).

Where in a suit for accounts the first Court recorded findings on preliminary issues and ordered accounts to be taken on their basis but drew up no preliminary decree and a Commissioner took the accounts and on his report the suit was dismissed it was held that under this section plaintiff was not barred from appealing and now objecting to the preliminary findings it was held also that no party or pleader is bound to move the Court to draw a decree and omission to do so cannot affect the right of appeal (6).

575]

98 (1) *Where an appeal is heard by a Bench of two or more Judges the appeal shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of such Judges or of the majority (if any) of such Judges*

(2) *Where there is no such majority which concurs in a judgment varying or reversing the decree appealed from, such decree shall be confirmed*

Provided that where the Bench hearing the appeal is composed of two Judges belonging to a Court consisting of more than two Judges, and the Judges composing the Bench differ in

(1) *Khadem Hossein v. Fmdal Hossein* 5 C W N 617 (1901) and cases there cited
(2) *Govind v. Vithal* 36 B 536 (1912)
14 Bom L R 560

(3) *Bai Divali v. Vishnav Manordas* 11 Bom. L R 1326 (1909) 34 B 182, *Sidhanath v. Ganesh* 14 Bom L R 916 (1912) 37 B 60

(4) *Sakharam v. Sadashiv* 13 Bom L R 382 (1913) *Krishnaji v. Marut* 12 Bom L R 762 (1910)

(5) *Kuppasamy v. Ragmah Bai* 24 M L J 190 (1912) following *Pamarru v. Veerapudam* 22 M L J 217 (1911) dissenting

from *MacKenzie v. Narasingh* 36 C 760 (1909). See also *Khirodamoni Dasi v. Adhar Chandra* 18 C L J 321 (1913) *Nistarani Deb v. Rai Mohun* 18 C L J 214 (1913)

(6) *Katuram Pichand v. Gangaram Sakharam* 38 B 331 (1913), and see also *Sakharam Vishram Surve v. Sadashiv Balabhai Lotha* 37 B 480 (1913) following *Bai Divali v. Vishnav Manordas* 34 B 182 (1909) and distinguishing *Govind Ram chandra v. Vithal* 36 B 536 (1912), and see *Ram Nath v. Basanta Narain* 18 C L J 209 (1913)

opinion on a point of law, they may state the point of law upon which they differ, and the appeal shall then be heard upon that point only by one or more of the other Judges, and such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority (if any) of the Judges who have heard the appeal, including those who first heard it

Procedure on difference of opinion—The result of this provision is as follows—Where the Judges differ, but not on any question of law, there can be no reference and the decree is affirmed (1) But there is an appeal under the Letters Patent (*vide post*) If the difference is on a point of law, then the Judges may or may not (2) refer the point of law In the case of reference the judgment on the point referred is according to the majority of the Judges who first heard the appeal and the third Judge, and in the second case (that is where there is no reference under this section) there is an appeal under the Letters Patent The effect of this section is to supersede the provision in the Letters Patent that in the case of disagreement the judgment of the senior Judge shall prevail (3) a provision which is still in force as regards Letters Patent appeals (4) but it does not take away the right of appeal Therefore when the judgment of a Lower Court has been confirmed under this section by reason of one of the Judges of the Appellate Court agreeing upon the facts with the Court below, an appeal will lie against such judgment under the Letters Patent, notwithstanding the terms of this section (5) When the Judges of a Division Bench have concurred in a final decree the fact that they differed on one point is no ground for an appeal under the Letters Patent (6) It was also held that where the Judge to whom an appeal was referred concurred with one of the differing Judges as to the decree to be passed but did not agree with him as to the reasons therefor there was no further appeal to the High Court under clause (15) of the Letters Patent (7) See now as to amendment next paragraph but one Sect 647 of the Code of 1877 was held to extend sect 575 of that Code (which on the face

(1) *Jehangir v Secretary of State* 6 Bom L R 135 206 (1903)

(2) See *Suraj Prasad v Golab Chand* 27 C 724 762 (1900) "S C 517 (1900)

(3) *Sri Gridhar ji v Purushotam Gossam* 10 C 814 816 (1884) *Appaj Bhivray v Shival Khubchand* 3 B 204 (1879) *Narayanasami Reddi v Osuru Reddi* "M 548 551 (1901) [*dist Husam Begam v Collector of Muzaffarnagar* 11 A 176 178 (1889) where it was held that the Code did not apply on the ground that there had been no hearing of the appeal the Judges having differed on the point whether the appeal was time barred]

(4) *Lachman Singh v Pam Lagan Singh*

2f A 10 (1903)

(5) *Sri Gridharji v Purushotam Gossam supra* FB Mohendro Chandra Ganguli & Ashutosh Ganguli 20 C 762 (1893) *Lala Suraj Prasad v Golab Chand* 28 C 517 (1901) *Deo Chand v Hira Chand* 13 B 449 454 458 (1889) *Keshav Pandurang v Venayak* 18 B 355 362 (1893) *Narayanasami Reddi v Osuru Redd* 25 M 548 (1901) *Raghunath Prasad v Jurawan Ra* 8 A 105 (1886) *Jadu v Hari Kar* 17 C L J 206 (1913)

(6) *In re Hurban Sahay* 10 C 108 (1883)

(7) *Jehangir v Secretary of State* 6 Bom L R 230 (1904)

of it applied to appeals only) to applications to the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction (1)

"Of the majority"—The word "majority" obviously refers to appeals heard by more than two Judges, (2) and further the section does not say that any one or all of the differing Judges should be members of the Court when the appeal is decided. The decision has to be according to the opinions of the majority of all the Judges who have heard the appeal, including those who first heard it, that is, the opinions of the two differing Judges recorded when they agreed to refer have to be taken into account in determining the majority (3)

"They may state the point of law"—Under the last Code the words were "*the appeal may be referred*". The wording of the proviso has been altered, it now deals only with the decision on the point of law referred (4). It was held that the law did not require the Judges to announce the agreement to refer in open Court. As soon as the Judges agreed to refer and informed the Chief Justice, the order of reference took effect though it might be drawn up afterwards (5). It was held that where a Bench of two Judges hearing an appeal differed in opinion but delivered judgment of the Court without any reservation, they were not competent to refer the appeal (6).

"Shall then be heard"—It was held under the last Code (in accordance with the practice of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts) that the third Judge to whom reference was made could sit and hear the appeal alone (7). This is so now the section stating that the appeal may be heard by one or more of the Judges. It was held under the last Code that when there was a reference under sect 575 the whole appeal was open for argument and not only the point of law on which the Judges had differed in opinion (8). This, however, is not so now, the section expressly stating that the appeal shall be heard upon the point of law referred only.

99 No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.

(1) *Apaji Bhivray v Shiv Lal*, 3 B 204 (1873). In the matter of petition of Balaji Ranchaddas, 5 B 680 (1881).

(2) *Jehangir v Secretary of State*, 6 Bom L R 131, 207 (1903).

(3) *Ib* at p 211.

(4) *Mahammad Mehdi v Sheoshankar*, 14 C L J 552, 566 (1911).

(5) *Jehangir v Secretary of State*, 6 Bom L R 135, 206 (1903).

(6) *Lal Singh v Ghana Sham*, 9 A 625,

643 (1897), distinguished in *Jehangir v Secretary of State*, 6 Bom L R 131 at p 206 (1903).

(7) *Jehangir v Secretary of State* 6 Bom L R 131, 207 (1903).

(8) *Seshadri v Nataraja*, 21 M 179, 214 (1897).

Cure of technicality.—This section contains one of the most salutary rules of law which the Code provides. Its obvious aim is to prevent technicalities from overcoming the ends of justice and from operating as means of circuitry of litigation which the old method of English Common Law Courts so much encouraged (1) The principle which it enacts has also been recognized in other statutes, such as the Evidence Act, (2) Stamp Act, (3) and Valuation Act (4) The section excepts two cases, viz., want of jurisdiction (5) of the Court to try the case and the affectation of the merits by irregularities committed in the exercise of an existent jurisdiction. The result is that in any other case than these, errors and irregularities form no ground for appeal, and an appeal alleging such error and irregularity only will be dismissed. The entertaining of a matter which lies out of the jurisdiction is quite a different thing from proceeding in a faulty or improper way in a matter which lies wholly within it (6) An objection to jurisdiction, the validity of which is patent on the face of the proceedings, can be taken at any stage, (7) the section being unavailable to cure the defect, and the merits in all cases must be looked to.

Whether an error or irregularity does in any particular case affect the jurisdiction must be determined with reference to the facts of that particular case. The following decisions are only referred to as illustrations of the application of the general principle which the section embodies.

See as regards summoning witnesses: (8) irregular remand, (9) granting

(1) *Sant Kumar v Deosaran*, 8 A. 305, 375 (1890)

(2) Act I of 1872 sect 169, *De Souza v Pestonji* 8 B 408 410 (1884), *Suriya Moni v Kati Kanta* 28 C. 37 52 (1901), *Katchi Kalyani v Kachivijaya*, 12 M. L. A. 495, 504 (1899), *Womesh v Chunder*, 7 C. 293, 296 (1891) [second appeal], *Palakhdari v Manjere*, 23 C 179, 185 (1895)

(3) Sect 34 (c), *Ramasami v Ramasami*, 5 M. 220 (1882), *Devachand v Harachand*, 13 B 449, 458 (1889), *Shuddappa v Irava*, 18 B 737 (1893), *Maulappa v Baswantrao*, 14 M. I. A. 24, 39 (1871)

(4) Sect 11, Act VII of 1889, *Hamudun nissa v Gopal* 24 C 661, 665 (1897)

(5) The words 'not affecting the jurisdiction mean not affecting the competency of the Court to try,' *Matra Mundal v Hari Mullick* 17 C 155, 159 (1889) institution of suit in Court of higher grade and see *Nidhalal v Mazahar* 7 A 230 234, 243 (1884), see as to the meaning of the term in this section, *Moresh v Jamaruddin* 28 C. 324, 329, 331, 332 (1900) and notes to sect 9 *ante*, see *Amar v Guru Prosunno*, 29 C. 493 (1900), *Venkatrav Raju v Madhavray*, 11 B 53 (1886) *Chedalal v Badullah* 11 A 35, 39

(1889) [the scope of this section cannot be so extensive as to bring within the scope of adjudication matters not subject to it], *Augustine v Medleycott*, 15 M 241, 240 (1892), *Goura Chundra v Vikrama Deo*, 23 M. 367, 370 (1899), *Krishnasami v Kan kashbai* 14 M 183, 185 (1890), *Rameshwar v Shoodan* 12 A 510 (1889), *Nusseerooddeen v Lalt Mahomed*, 23 W. R. 234 (1870), *Savitri v Ramji* 14 B 232 (1889)

(6) *Combe v Edward* 3 P. D. 103, 128

(7) *Nidhi Lal v Mazahar*, 7 A 230, 243 (1884) *Shri Sidheswar v Shri Harihar* 12 B 155 157 (1887), see, however, also index *sub voc* "Jurisdiction."

(8) *Bhagwat v Debi Din*, 16 A. 218 (1899)

(9) *Debendra Nath Bhattacharjee v Prasanna Kumar Chakravarti*, 5 C. L. J. 328 (1907), *Ram Gopal v Raghu Nath*, 2 C. L. J. 496 (1904), *Trailakhyia Chose v Kali Prasanna Mohini* 11 C. W. N. 380, 386 (1907) *Debendro v Prosunno* 5 C. L. J. 328 333 (1907), *Subba Sastri v Balachandra* 18 M 421 (1894), *Malikarjuna v Pathareni*, 19 M 479 (1896), *Nabin Chandra Tripati v Prankrishna De*, 41 C 108 (1913) (an order of removal improperly made is an irregularity within meaning of this section)

an application under sect 214 instead of sect 623 of the last Code, (1) refusal to grant adjournment, (2) hearing an appeal as an appeal from an order and not as an appeal from a decree, (3) defective procedure in obtaining representation of minor, (4) omission to verify inventory in application for attachment, (5) application to bring legal representative of deceased judgment debtor on record, (6) surplusage in judgment, (7) omission of application under sect 231 of last Code in proceeding under sect 248 of that Code, (8) evidence recorded by one Judge and weighed by another, (9) consent of Collector to suit under sect 539 of last Code defective in language, (10) defective signature to (11) or verification in (12) or filing (13) of plaint, reference to arbitration not in writing, (14) absence of the word "absolute" in an application for an order absolute for sale, (15) error in frame or valuation of suit, (16) recording evidence in language not that of the Court, (17) proceeding on a Sunday or other holiday, (18) refusal to issue commission, (19) an improper exercise of discretion under sect 42 of the Specific Relief Act, (20) suit wrongly framed, (21) improper representation of Chief by political agent; (22)

(1) Nilratan t Ram Rutton 5 C W N 627, 20 (1901)

(2) Suryamoni t Kalikanta, 28 C 37 52 (1900), s c, 5 C W N 195 206

(3) Pramatha t Khetra 29 C 651, 651 (1902)

(4) Wahan t Banke Behari, 30 C 1021, 1031 (1903), Munnu Lal t Ghulam Abbas P C, 32 A. 287, 295 (1910), Hari Saran t Bhubaneswar, 15 I A 195, 200 (1888) Suresh v Jagut, 14 C 204 (1896) [dist in Ganga Prosad t Umbica 14 C 754 (1897)], Hardi Narain Sahu t Rud Perakash, 10 C 626 634 (1883), Bhaba Pershad v Secretary of State, 14 C 159 163 (1886), Permeswar Das t Bela 9 A 508 (1887), Baner v Ramji, 20 A 370, 374 (1898)

(5) Nasir un nissa t Ghafur ud din, 28 A 244 (1905)

(6) Sivamunatha t Vaidya Natha 28 M 466, 472 (1905)

(7) Ram Chunder v Ram Jeebun 14 W P 141, 142 (1870)

(8) Sham Lal t Madhu Sudan 22 C 558 562 (1895) [dist in Amar t Guru Prosunno, 27 C 493 (1900)]

(9) Naranbhai t Naroshankar 4 B H C R A C J 98 100 101 (1867) This suit was under the Code of 1859, which contained no such rule as that enacted by sect 191 of the last Code Jadu Rai v Kanizak 8 A 576 605 (1886)

(10) Sajedin v Cour Mohun 24 C. 418 428 (1897)

(11) Basdeo v Smidt, 22 A. 55, 60, 64 (1899), Rakhal Chandra Tenary t Secretary of State, 10 C W N 841 (1906)

(12) Rajit Ram v Katesar, 18 A 396, 400 (1896), Moham t Bungsi 17 C 580 (1889), Ram Komal v Bank of Bengal, 5 C W N 91, 98 (1900), Rakhal t Secretary of State, 10 C W N 841, 842, 843 (1906)

(13) Rakhal t Secretary of State, *supra*

(14) Shama Sem t Abdul Latif, 4 C W N 92, 83 (1899)

(15) Mancherji t Thakor Das, 5 R L R 389 392 (1903)

(16) Param v Achel, 4 A. 289 (1882) Kalidas v Parjaram, 15 B 309, 315, Rames sur v Raj Kishore 13 W R 325 (1870)

(17) Ratan Lal t Farshu Bibi, 34 C 396, 398, 11 C W N 826, 34 C 396, 398 (1907)

(18) Sheoram t Thakur Prasad, 29 A 562, s c, A W N 163 (1907) and on appeal, 30 A 136 (1908), Unant Ram t Protab, 16 W R 230 (1871)

(19) Akikunissa t Rup Lal, 25 C 807, 816 (1898), see also Bhagwat t Debi Din, 16 A. 218, 220 (1894), Shama Sundram t Abdul Latif, 27 C 61 (1899)

(20) Sarat Kumar v Deo Saran, 8 A 365, 375 (1886), see also Muhamad Mashuk t Khanda Bnksh, 9 A. 622, 624 (1887)

(21) Nubeen t Stephenson 15 W R 534 535 (1871), see also Shivram t Bhagurthi Bai, 6 B H C R A C J 20 (1869)

(22) Venkatrao Raje t Madhabrao 11 F 53, 56 (1886)

"Save where otherwise expressly provided —The right of appeal is a substantive right of a very valuable nature and the presumption is against the taking away of a substantive right of such a nature by mere implication and where the Legislature wants to take it away it will do so expressly. The introduction of the word "expressly" gives effect to this view (1) Cf sect 19 (3) and sect 26 (3) Succession Certificate Act (2) (VII of 1889), sect 109 A Cl (3) Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) (3) sect 153 Bengal Tenancy Act. As to suits for arrears of rent under Act X of 1859 see note (4) and as to appeal against the decision of the Court to which a reference was made under sect 15 of the Land Acquisition Act (5) (X of 1870) the decision of a District Court passed on appeal from the decision of a forest settlement officer (6) the decision of the Political Agent of the Southern Maratha Country passed in regular appeal (7) the decision of a District Court on appeal from an order of a Talukdar Settlement officer under sect 16 21 of Gujrat Talukdar's Act (Bombay Act VI of 1888) (8) Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (VI of 1908 B C) sects 87 and 264 sub sect (1) cl (2) (9) see cases cited. As to special appeals against decrees on awards see second schedule

"Shall lie —As to who may appeal see notes to sect 96 *ante*. An appellant who was the respondent in the lower Court and did not appear in that Court is not debarred by reason of his non appearance in that Court from preferring an appeal to the High Court (10). In second appeals the appellant has a right to question every order of the subordinate Courts leading up to the decree objected to if it was made without the sanction of law (11). No second appeal it was held lay from the last order passed on an application for review of a former order (12). The question whether an appellant in second appeal can raise an objection to the legality of a remand order when he had not preferred any appeal against it (13) is now dealt with by the second clause of sect 100 *post*. Before the passing of Act VII of 1905 a second appeal from the appellate decision of the District Judge of Sambalpur lay to the Court of the Judicial Commissioners of the Central Provinces but now such an appeal lies to the

(1) *Kamaraju v Secretary of State* 11 M. 309 312 (F B) (1888)

(2) *Subba Rao v Palamand* 17 M. 167 (1893) *Rama Reddi v Rapi Reddi* 19 M. 190 (1893) *Monmohini v Khetter* 1 C 197 (1870) s c 24 W R 362. In the matter of petition of *Nanuk v Nittya* 6 C 40 (1880) and see *Atta Sunlari v Sriuath* 20 C 641 (1893) as to orders for security against person obtaining a certificate

(3) *Ram Bhen v Rajaram* 33 C 83 837 (1906) *Rameswar v Bhubaneswar* 33 C 837 (1906) s c 4 C L J 138

(4) *Sadar Naik v Serai Naik* 28 C 532 (1901)

(5) *Atri Bai v Arno Poarna* 9 C. 838 (1883) s c 12 C L R 409

(6) *Kamaraju v Secretary of State* 11 M.

309 310 314 (1888)

(7) *Nidwa v Fakirappa* 6 Bom. H. C R 70 (1869). A decision of a District Court under the Land Acquisition Act is not a decree. It is an award and not appealable. *Nathubai v Manordas* 36 B 360 (1911) 14 Bom. L R 3-5

(8) *Jamsang v Goyabha* 16 B 408 412

(9) *Paghubar v Sr Pratap* 39 C 241 (1911); 16 C W N 294

(10) *Kali v Dhunanjoy* 3 C 228 (1877) *Ajudha Prasad v Balmukund* 8 A 354 (1886)

(11) *Runglall v Talhun* 2 C 114 (18 6)

(12) *Modhoomutty Debba v Dhunput Singh* 13 W R 167 168 (18 0)

(13) *Mohesh v Jamiruddin* 28 C. 3 1 3 8 (1900). See cases cited in sect 100 *post*

second appeal the High Court have no power to deal with the sufficiency of evidence, they have only a right to entertain questions of law. Their duty by t
to d

which has been improperly admitted is sufficient to warrant the finding of the Court below. This question of sufficiency of evidence cannot be decided without examining in detail that other evidence and determining, as a question of fact, whether it is sufficient of itself to warrant the lower Court's finding (1)

In a special appeal, the general affirmation of a judgment below can only be on the points raised by the special appellant. By rejecting a special appeal, it does not follow that the High Court necessarily affirms all the other findings of fact or of law which the lower Appellate Court may incidentally come to (2)

If the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court contain findings, which, though immaterial to the decision of the case and unnecessary for the Judge to decide, yet, as they form part of the judgment and decree, might give rise to the application of the doctrine of *res judicata*, the High Court, on second appeal, may order that such findings shall be expunged from the record (3). There is no general rule that in every case when evidence is taken on a question of fact the parties are entitled to the decision of two Courts. Therefore when additional evidence is taken by the lower Appellate Court, the High Court cannot go into the facts as in the case of a first appeal (4)

The Code provides for the manner in which the judgments of Courts are to be revised and corrected and there is no other lawful mode by which decrees of Courts can be reviewed. Thus where a Court of Appeal directed a remand for a particular purpose, namely, to try the plea of payment, the Court of remand, it was held, should try that plea only and had no authority to try any other plea, if the Court proceeded to hear and determine the whole case over again, the decree passed by it should be revised except as to the plea referred to on remand (5). A remand order conclusively determines the points of law involved in it, and these cannot be questioned on second appeal (6). The High Court in special appeal may reverse the finding of the lower Appellate Court instead of remanding the case when it is found that the lower Appellate Court had not in any way disaffirmed the findings of the lower Court (7). If the facts found by the lower Appellate Court are sufficient to enable the High Court to apply

(1) *Womesh Ch. Chatterjee v Chunder*, 7 C 293, 296 (1881)

(2) *Shaikh Ahmed v Must Bandee*, 15 W R. 91-92 (1871)

(3) *Nanda Lal v Bonomali*, 11 C 544 (1885)

(4) *Gopal v Jhakra*, 12 C 37 (1883), *Bal Lishen v Jasoda*, 7 A. 765 (1885), *Ben Pershad v Nand Lal*, 24 C 93, 101 (1896)

(5) *Syed Voltan Ali v Shoo Buksh*

Marsh 603 (1883). As to remand by mistake, see *Mahomed Hashim v Kales Churn*, 13 W R. 91, 93 (1870)

(6) *Ramluv v Bhai v Damodhar*, 6 Bom H C R., A C J 146-148 (1868). As to decision of question of law on an appeal from an order of remand see *Gouri Shankar v Karuna Bibee*, 15 A. 413 (1893)

(7) *Protap Narain v Raghuram*, 6 C. W. N 185-189, 190 (1901)

any principle of law to the appeal before them then they may dispose of the case without any remand, (1) but it was formerly held that if the lower Appellate Court omitted to record any finding upon a material part of the case the second Appellate Court were not at liberty to draw any inference of fact from the evidence in the case, and should remand the case for retrial (2) But see the new sect 103 *post* (3)

The above observations as to the limitation on the power to deal with facts must now be read subject to the new provisions contained in sect 103, *post*

In adjudicating on issues of fact the first process is to determine as to their existence or non-existence. In order to determine such an issue inferences are necessarily drawn from other facts as to the existence or non-existence of facts in issue. Such inferences and the conclusions to which they lead are inferences and findings of fact.

An erroneous finding of fact is not an error or defect in procedure, though as hereinafter pointed out, the Court may in adjudicating on facts vitiate its conclusions by errors of law and procedure. A simple finding of fact, however erroneous or unsatisfactory it may be, is not the subject of second appeal. There is no jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. Where there is no error or defect in the procedure, the finding of the first Appellate Court upon a question of fact is final, if that Court had before it evidence proper for its consideration in support of the finding (4).

There are however, decisions which held that if the judgment is not based upon the whole evidence upon the records, and the Judge does not take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case then, there is an error in procedure, (5) as also where the Judge had erroneously assumed a fact to

(1) Dwarakadas v Adam Ali 3 Bom H. C. R., A. J. 105 (1866). Rampat Singh v Balbhaddur 6 C. W. N. 849 (P. C.) (1902).

(2) Dwarakadas v Adam Ali *supra*.

(3) And Wargankar v Wadekar 5 Bom H. C. R. A. C. J. 194 (1868).

(4) Durga v Jawahur, 17 I. A. 122 (1890), s. c., 18 C. 23 (1900), Shivabasava v Sangappa 29 B. 1, 12 (P. C.) (1904), s. c., 8 C. W. N. 875, Rummezeeddeen v Joymala 15 W. R. 303 (1871), Radha v Balkowar, 17 C. 726, F. B. (1890). Luchman v Puna 16 C. 753 (1889), Sevaji Vijaya v Chinna Nayana 10 M. I. A. 151 (1864), Fazal Karim v Moula Baksh 18 C. 448 (1891), s. c. 18 I. A. 67, Wise v Heera Lal 16 W. R. 150 (1871), Savi v Panchanna 25 W. R. 503 (1876) [omission to draw desired inference from conduct of the party]. Ram Ratan v Nanlu, 19 C. 249 (1891), s. c. 19

I. A. 1, Chamroo Singh v Tota Roy, 19 W. R. 430 (1873), Kameshwar v Amanatulla, 26 C. 53 (1893), s. c., 2 C. W. N. 649, Shrinbat v Kharsedji, 22 B. 430 (1896), Meer Mahomed v Forbes, 2 I. A. 1, 6 (1874), Luckhi Narain v Jadu Nath 21 C. 504 (1893), s. c., 21 I. A. 39, Ananda v Parbati, 4 C. L. J. 193 (1906), and see cases cited in three preceding notes. In Bal Krishna v Govind, 26 Bom. 617, 622 (1902) it seems to be suggested that the Court might interfere when the inference was wholly unreasonable.

(5) Shundabun Mohunt v Shurut Chunder, 23 W. R. 160 (1875), Bhupat Rai v Kali Rai 6 C. W. N. 307, 359 (1901), Abdul Rohoman v Bibee Sofy, 24 W. R. 293 (1875), Huro Prosad Roy v Womatare Bibee 7 C. 263 (1881), Coluck Nath v Kirti Chunder, 16 C. 645 (1889), Dena Nath Bannerjee v Hari Das 11 C. 499 (1885),

exist which does not exist—as where a Judge came to a conclusion on the assumption that a document had not been filed whereas it was on the record, (1) or believes there is no evidence of a fact when there is, (2) or proceeds upon a misconception of the facts proved, (3) or bases his judgment on evidence which is not on the record (1)

The last four cases of misconception offer no difficulty. This cannot, however, be said as to the first case. There is no doubt as to the principle, that in judging on the facts the Court must consider all of them, otherwise there is not a proper procedure in investigation. The difficulty, however, is in establishing its violation by showing in any particular case that a fact has not been considered even where it may not have been expressly mentioned in the Judgment. If the fact was present to the Judge's mind, but he has either not given it weight, or the degree of weight which it is alleged he should have done, it is sometimes loosely said that the fact has not been considered. But this case is to be distinguished from those above mentioned, and is really tantamount to an appeal as to fact. The line distinguishing the two classes of cases is not infrequently a narrow one, and has perhaps in some cases been overpassed.

In, however, the actual determination of fact there may be error of law. The High Court may consider whether the procedure adopted by the lower Appellate Court in dealing with the facts is proper or not (5). Thus its conclusion may be come to in the absence of all evidence, (6) or be based on

Kooldip Narain v Rummon Singh, 22 W R 278 (1874), Ram Das Saha v Mon Mohun Das, 7 B L R App 4 (1871), Nowah Khan v Rughoo Nath Das, 20 W R 474 (1873), Mohunt Deo v Moonshoo Mahomed 24 W R 390 (1875) [disregarding exclusively one side of the case], Kisto Churn v Dwarka Nath, 10 W R 32 (1868), Mr Roop Narain v Russal, 24 W R 110 (1875), Moizzunnessa v Mooraroo Dhur, 22 W R 314, 316 (1874), Appa Kalga v Mallu Mowna, 16 B 477 (1891), Lallah Jha v Tullebmatool, 21 W R 436 (1874) [looking merely to appearance of document and disregarding oral evidence as to it], Shiboo Soonduree v Chander Kant Ghose, 21 W R 217 (1874). In Kooldip v Rummon, 22 W R 278 (1874), Ram Das v Monmohini, 7 B L R App 4 (1871), a remand was ordered, as also in Shagur v Mohamaya, 25 W R 25 (1875), where the inquiry was held to be inadequate. In Narayana v Muni, 10 M 363, 365 (1886), the Judge overlooked a postscript in a document, and he was asked to take this fact into consideration and to submit a revised finding.

(1) Mohunt Hur Gobind v Joga Roy, 24 W R 146 (1875), Moizzunnessa v Mooraroo

Dhur 22 W R 314, 316 (1874)

(2) Heera Lal v Kalee Das, 23 W R 65, 66 (1874)

(3) Kala Prasad Tewari v Prashad Sen, 2 B L R, P C 120, 127 (1869), Goluck v Anant, 25 W R 38 (1875) [where issue was taken for granted], Kooldip v Rummon, 22 W R 278 (1874), Ram Das v Monmohini 7 B L R App 4 (1871), Nowah Khan v Rughoo Nath 20 W R 474 (1873), in which last four cases there was a remand.

(4) Mona Lal v Uma Charan, 10 C L J 541 (1914)

(5) Protap Narain v Raghuram, 6 C W N 185, 189, 190 (1901)

(6) That is, where, to use an English expression, "there is no evidence to go to the jury," because that does not raise a question of fact such as arises on the issue itself, but a question of law for the consideration of the Judge. Anangamanjari v Tripurasundari, 14 I A 101, 109, 110 (1897), s c, 14 C 740, 747, Shrivabasa v Sangappa, 29 B 1, 12, s c, 8 C W N 875 (1901), Hemanta Kumar v Brojendra, 17 I A 65, 69; s c, 17 C 876, 882 (1890) [it is an error or defect in procedure]; Beharee Lal v Sree Ram Roy,

what is not legal evidence (1) or on facts to the exclusion of other facts rejected but admissible (2) or on personal knowledge of the Judge (3) or if there be admissible evidence the Court may err in law in its mode of dealing with it. In such case if the dealing involves the misapplication of principles of law such erroneous rule vitiates the conclusion of fact which follows it (4). So the Court may decide the facts upon a wrong view as to the onus of proof (5) and deal improperly with the presumptions which the law raises (6) or may dispose of a suit on a case not raised by the parties (7) or upon irrelevant matters or issues (8) or omit to consider evidence on the ground that the fact to be proved ought to be proved by evidence of another kind

20 W. R. 292 (1873) [assumption, without evidence of identity of lands], *Libee Amee-run v. Shakh Cherag* 21 W. R. 313, 314 (1877) [main fact on which evidence given to the defendant had no existence], *f. l. in Bhupendra v. Peary*, 17 C. W. N. 37 (1912), *Damoor Daya Coomaroo* 23 W. R. 101 (1876) [decree based on plea neither admitted nor proved], *Himmus Ali v. Nyamutoolah* 23 W. R. 250 (1875) [assumption without evidence], *Peary v. Joti*

nath, 10 W. R. 32 (1864), *Mt. Pooop Narabee v. Bheal*, 24 W. R. 110 (1875); *W. J. Honath v. Russack*, 9 W. R. 274 (1864), *Puran v. Krish*, 9 W. R. 470 (1865) [in these last two cases a remand was ordered]; *Nowab Khan v. Pughoo Nath* 20 W. R. 471 (1873) [the High Court sent for documents which were not in evidence before the first Court].

(2) *Shakh Charoo v. Zobeida Khatoon* 23 W. R. 71 (1875), *Nathoor v. Ram Ruchya* 11 W. R. 452, 454 (1869); *Mohim Chandra Roy v. Kallara Dehya*, 11 C. W. N. 1028 (1907), if owing to rejection it becomes necessary to reconsider the whole case a remand may be ordered. *Shakh Charoo v. Mt. Zobeida*, 23 W. R. 51 (1875).

(3) *Sooraj Kant Acharji v. Khoddeo Narain* 22 W. P. 0 (1874), *Lakshmaya v. Sri Raja Varadaraja* 30 Mad. 168 (1913) 17 C. W. N. 1028 (but a Judge may use his general knowledge).

(4) See per Phear J., in *Mohur Matoon v. Umatum*, 18 W. R. 499, 500 (1872).

(5) *Mahadevappa v. Rasagouda*, 7 Bom. L. R. 258, 260 (1905).

(6) *Surnomoyee v. Lutchmeeput*, 6 W. R. 338, 312 (1867), *Ndatatchi v. Venkatachala*, 1 M. H. C. P. 131, 134 (1862).

(7) *Shivabasaia v. Sangappa* 29 B. 1 (1901), *Gopal v. Tincouree*, 19 W. R. 318 (1867).

pleadings of parties]

(8) *Ram Soondur v. Kalee Pershad* 19 W. R. 267 (1873), *Palamyandi Mathuami*, 2 M. H. C. R. 441 (1865), cf. *Vishnu v. Gonesh* 21 B. 325 (1895), *Palakdhari v. Mannera* 23 C. 170, 185, 186 (1895).

W. P. 50 (1875) [pronouncing against un rebutted case], *Surbessur v. Arizollah* 8 B. L. R. App. 78 (1872), *Pooroo v. Chunder*, 24 W. R. 171, 172 (1815), *Vishvanath v. Dhonduppa* 17 R. 475, 482 (1892), *Kali Prasad Tewari v. Prahlad Scin* 2 B. L. R. 120, 127 (P. C.) (1869) [substitution of speculation for proof toll in *Malomed Auzad v. Shaffi Mullah*, 8 R. I. P. 26 (1871)].

(1) *Guru Das Day v. Sambhu Nath Chuckerbutty*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. J. 258 (1869), *Chunder v. Showdamnee* 9 W. R. 517 (1868), *Shookram v. Ram Lal* 9 W. R. 218 (1867).

(1863), *Palakdhari Rai v. Mannera* 23 C. 170, 186 (1895), *Hunsa Koor v. Sheo Gobind Rawat*, 24 W. P. 431 (1875); *Rohee Lal v. Dindoyal Lal* 24 W. R. 257 (1874), *Desai Panchod Das v. Rawal Nathulbhai* 21 B. 110, 115 (1895), *Kisto Churn v. Dwarka*

than that produced, (1) or misdirect itself as to the nature of proof required by law, as for instance in regard to the elements of a custom which has the force of law, (2) or misapprehend the real issue to be determined (3) and the legal position of the parties (4)

Further, if it be assumed that no error of law has been committed in the mode of dealing with the facts that is in determining their existence or non-existence, from the facts so found inferences may be drawn as to the existence of certain matters which are the subject of legal definition. In such a case there is a legal inference from the facts found. Though the finding of fact cannot be questioned an appeal Court may accept the finding of fact and question the accuracy of the legal inferences therefrom for this is a matter of law and not of fact. The soundness of conclusions involving matter of law may be questioned (5). In such a case it is not any fact which is in question, but the soundness of the conclusions of law drawn from those facts. Thus upon the question whether there is a binding agreement a Court may find certain facts and go on to hold upon those facts that they constitute in law an acceptance of the agreement. The finding as to the facts which are the basis of the inference cannot be questioned though the inference being a legal inference on the facts found may be (6). If the legal conclusion derived from the facts found is not consistent with settled principles of law there is an error of law (7). So acquiescence is not a question of fact but of legal inference from the facts found, (8) and so is estoppel (9) and the question of the proper custody of documents (10) though whether it is credible whether documents were in a particular custody or whether the facts rebut the presumption of authenticity are questions of fact (11). Construction of a document involves both the meaning of the words and their legal effect or the effect which is to be given to them. The first is a

(1) *Huro Prosad Roy v Womatare Debee* 7 C 263, 267 (1891) see *Ram Dhun v Ram Narsin* 11 W R 311 (1899) where the suit was dismissed on the sole ground that the plaintiff did not prove his purchase by calling his vendor but see as to this judgment of Markby J

(2) *Ram Prosad Das v Razo Koer* 5 C L R 94 95 (1879) *Desai Rsnchod Das v Rawal Nathulbhai* 21 B 110 115 (1895)

(3) *Chunder Monce v Madhoo*, 23 W R 116 (1875)

(4) *Doorga Churn v Shamanund* 12 W R 376 (1879)

(5) *Ramgopal v Shama Khaton* 20 C 93 99 (1892), s c, 19 I A 228 231 so in *Rampal Singh v Balbhaddar* 6 C W N 849, 854 855 (1902) it was held that the Appellate Court did not reverse any finding of fact but merely applied the proper law to the facts found. *Nilmoni v Karta Chunder*, 20 I A 9, 97 98 s c, 20 C 847 (1893) [misappli-

cation of legal principles to facts found] *Krishna Kishore v Mir Mahomed* 3 C W N 25, 260 (1897) *Sivraj Vijaya v Chuma Nayana* 10 M I A 157, 161, *Chockdingam v Mayandi* 19 M 483 493 (1896) *Rudr Prasad v Baij Nath* 15 A 367 (1893) *Raja Ram v Ganesh Hari* 21 B 91, 94 96 (1895)

(6) A finding as to the existence of an implied contract has been held to be one of facts. *Seriparapu v Mallikarjuna* 17 M 43 (1893)

(7) *Eshan v Shama Churn* 11 M I A 7, 23 (1886)

(8) *Lala Beni Ram v Kundan Lal*, 21 A 496 504, s c 20 I A 58 65, *Ananda v Parbati* 4 C L J 198 (1906)

(9) *Narsing Das v Rahimbanbhai* 6 Bom L R 140 141 (1904)

(10) *Sharfudin v Govind*, 27 B 452 463 (1902) *Durga v Jawahar* 18 C 23 (1891)

(11) *Id.*

question of fact and the second of law (1). Misconstruction of a document which is the foundation of a suit is ground for appeal (2). The question whether possession is adverse or not is often one of simple fact, but it may also be a conclusion of law or a mixed question (3).

So again on the question of good faith a finding that certain vendors intended by a transfer to defeat their creditors and that their transferee was aware of an impending execution against them are as findings of facts conclusive. But the conclusion drawn therefrom that the purchase was not in good faith is an inference of law which is capable of correction in appeal (4). So though a Court of second appeal must accept the facts as found, the conclusion to be drawn whether assuming such facts to be true a sale did or did not bind persons is a matter with which it is free to deal (5). A notice to quit must be reasonable, and this is a question of fact, but it is a question of law whether there is evidence on which the Court can properly arrive at the conclusion of fact (6). So a conclusion from the fact of one person carrying on business and appearing to be the only partner that there could be no other partner was held erroneous as amounting to an assertion that in no case could there be a dormant partner (7). Where an Appellate Court had found that a grant of pasture land held under the special law relating to land tenure in Kumaun was inconsistent with the general wishes and well being of the village community, it was held that this was a finding of fact and not to be disturbed by second appeal (8).

Lastly, the finding may not be conclusive because of the absence of reasons for it which are required to constitute a legal judgment (9). But the Court has

(1) *Per Lindley, L.J.*, in *Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co.*, 1 Q B 79-85 (1891), and see *Lala Fateh Chand v Ram Kishan*, 39 I A 247 (1912), 31 A 679, 16 C W N 1033 (P C), 14 Bom L R 1090, construction of documents is a question of law which may be considered in second appeal, and *Barhamdeo v Ram Narain*, 14 C L J 182 (1914) construction of sale certificate.

(2) *Nowbut Singh v Chutter Dharee Singh*, 19 W R 223 (1873), and see *Canpat Marwar v Balmakund Bahara*, 18 C L J 548 (1913), *Rudr Prasad v Baj Nath*, 15 A 367, 371 (1893), *Nilmoni v Kirti Chunder*, 20 I A 95-97, 98, s c, 20 C 847 (1893), *Ramgopal v Shama Khaton*, 20 C 93 (1892), *Chockalingam v Mayandi*, 19 M 485, 493 (1896), *Mookhya Hurruckraj v Ram Lal Gomastha*, 14 W R 435 (1870) [where the effect of a sale certificate was wrongly limited] *Doorga Churn v Shamamund*, 12 W R 376 (1869), *Mt Ohedoonnissa Bibee v Bepin Behary Dutt*, 1 C W N, L C xvii. (1896), it was held that the question what properties passed under a sale certificate was not a question of law, and in

Barhamdeo v Ram Narain, 19 C L J 182 (1914) it was held that this was a mixed question of fact and law.

(3) *Luchmeswar Singh v Sheikh Manowar*, 19 I A 48, 66, s c, 19 C 253, 263 (1891), see *Raja Ram v Ganesh Hari*, 21 B 91, 91, 96 (1893).

(4) *Ishan v Dushu*, 21 C 825, 829, s c, 1 C W N 665, 669 (1897), see also *Luchmeswar v Manowar*, 19 C 253 (1891), *Ramgopal v Shama Katon*, 20 C 93 (1892).

(5) *Mafuzzul Hossain v Barid Sheikh*, 4 C J 485-489, s c, 11 C W N 71 (1906).

(6) *Bulhumukhi v Kefyutullah*, 12 C 93, 95 (1895).

(7) *Shoobul Chunder v Koylash Chunder*, 14 W R 23 (1870).

(8) *Cita Ram v Kirpa Ram*, 36 A 257 (1914).

(9) *Purnmeshwar v Brij Lal*, 17 C 257 (1889), *Kamat v Kamat*, 8 B 368 (1884), *Ningappa v Shivappa*, 19 B 323, 326 (1894), *Purshotam v Durgaji*, 14 B 452-454 (1890), *Pandurang v Anant*, 5 Bom L R 956 (1903), *Raghunath v Nitu*, 9 B 452, 454 (1883), *Sheikh Goburdhun v Sheikh Sadhoo*, 1 W R 244 (1864).

refused to interfere simply because the Judge did not remark upon every portion of the evidence that he excluded from his consideration, (1) as also where the judgment was sufficiently intelligible to enable the High Court to deal with the case (2)

Where a Judge states as a fact that an admission was made before him by one of the parties to the suit, the High Court cannot in special appeal inquire whether the Judge was right or wrong in making that statement. If he is wrong, the aggrieved party's remedy is by a review of judgment in the Court below and not by special appeal to the High Court. If the Judge erred in supposing the alleged admission to have been made, the party's proper course is at once to bring the error to the notice of the Judge and to apply for a review of his judgment. If he does not do so, the High Court cannot, it was said, assist him in special appeal (3)

"From every decree"—As to the meaning of the term "decree," see notes to sects 2, 96 and 97, *ante* (4). An order rejecting or dismissing an appeal as out of time is a decree and a second appeal lies (5)

Appeal as to costs—See notes to sects 35 and 96 *ante*

"Contrary to law"—The words of the last Code were "*some specified*" law which term was held to mean specified in the memorandum of appeal and was not limited to specified statute law. The present section omits the word "*specified*" as being redundant. And now, as heretofore, law is not to be limited in its meaning to statute law (6). This clause generally applies where the Court wrongly applies the law to facts correctly (that is without error or defect in the procedure) found (7) or fails to apply or refuses (8) to apply the law to the case, though of course there may be cases falling within more than one or all of the clauses. A pure point of law which does not depend upon evidence may be dealt with by the Court of Appeal, though no issue was raised as regards it (9). Objection as to the necessity

(1) *Devaji v. Godadbbhai*, 2 B. H. C. R. 28, 32 (1864)

(2) *Shah Jughun v. Shaikh Muksood Ali*, 6 W. R. 97 (1866). See *Dovendra Nath v. Annada Haddi*, 19 C. L. J. 545 (1914), judgment set aside on second appeal because ambiguous

(3) *Bykunt Nath v. Prasannomoyee*, 5 W. R. 196 (1866)

(4) As to sect. 372 of the Code of 1859 see *Maharani Indrajit v. Chokowri*, B. L. R. F. B. 1 (1863)

(5) *Saminath v. Venkata Subba*, 27 M. 21 (1903), s. c., 13 Mad. L. J. 309 and cases there cited, and *Phoolharce v. Bisheshwar*, 3 Agra 301 (1868), but see *Raghoonath v. Raj Mohun*, 7 W. R. 296 (1867), in which, however, *Gopinath v. Gopeenath*, 6 W. R.

Misc. 106 (1866), was not referred to

(6) *Ram Gopal v. Shama Katoon*, 20 C. 93, 99, 100, s. c., 19 I. A. 238, *Durga Chowdhurani v. Jawahar Singh*, 18 C. 23, s. c., 17 I. A. 122, 124 (1891), *Achha Mian v. Doorga Churn Law*, 25 C. 146, 151 (1897)

(7) See *Hari Mohun Misser v. Sarindra*, 11 C. W. N. 794, 800 (1907), *Ram Bahadur Pal v. Ram Shankar*, 27 A. 638 (1905), *Ajodhya Nath Chowdhury v. Keshab Chandra*, 11 C. W. N. 1127 (1907), *Hari Mohun Misser v. Surendra Narayan Singh*, 6 C. L. J. 19 (1907) s. c., 11 C. W. N. 794

(8) *Ram Bahadur v. Ram Shankar*, 27 A. 638, 691 (1905)

(9) *Bhim Singh v. Sarwan Singh*, 16 C. 33, 36 (1835), but see *Lalla Jawahar v. Court of Wards*, 27 W. R. 214 (1872)

of notice to quit may be taken in second appeal (1) There is no appeal upon the question of the credibility of witnesses when the lower Court's views are based upon inferences from the facts proved or appearing whether the reasons given be right or wrong (2) While the misconstruction of a document the foundation of a suit is a ground of appeal there is none because some portion of the evidence may be in writing and the Judge makes a mistake as to the meaning of or effect to be given to it, (3) nor is there properly such a thing as the construction of a deposition of a witness. The word as so used means what the Court thinks is proved by it, and there is no appeal on this point (4) A re-reading or misconception of the evidence is no ground for interference in second appeal (5) The *bona fides* of the parties is a question of fact (6) A special appeal does not lie because some portion of the evidence may be in writing and the Judge makes a mistake as to the meaning of it. For instance, a writing supposed to contain an admission may be put in as part of the evidence but a mistake in its meaning is not a misconstruction of a document upon which a special appeal will lie if it is connected with other evidence affecting its construction. The misconstruction of a document which is the foundation of a suit, and which is in the nature of a contract or a document of title is a ground of a second appeal (7) But to discredit witnesses merely for general reasons not affecting the particular credit of any individual deponent is to commit an error of law which can be subject of a special appeal (8) Thus where the evidence for the plaintiff was disbelieved because his witness was a relative of his there was (it was held) an error of law based upon a total misconception of the position of the plaintiff's lessor and substantially affecting the decision of the case on

(1) *Dodhu v. Madhav Rao* 18 B 110, 113 (1893), and cases there cited, see also *Krishnaji v. Antaji* 18 B 256, 259 (1893), *Ganoo v. Shri Sidheshwar*, 26 B 360, 362 (1900). But see *Ram Nuffir v. Dh. I. Goland* 1 C L P 421, 423 (1878) where tenant denied his Lord's title.

(2) *Dwarka Nath v. Mudlon* 6 W P 292 (1866), *Mt. Putrahu v. Sheo Pershad* 21 W P 61 (1875) [cf. *Juggernath v. Mahomed Mokam* 17 W 1 161 (1872)], *Sheo Dyal v. Hodgkinson* 24 W P 312 (1875) [Amiens report]. It is for the lower Appellate Court to determine the amount of credit to be attached to particular proof. *Muthira Dass v. Magh Singh* 2 A H C P 207, 208 (1870), *Munee Dutt v. Campbell* 11 W P 278, 280 (1869), *Dhoonih Bahadoor v. Prags Singh*, 12 W R 314 (1872), *Oomut Fatima v. Bluyo Gopal* 13 W R 50, 57 (1870).

(3) *Nowbut Singh v. Chutter Dhareo Singh*, 19 W R 223 (1873), *Luchman v. Kanhya Lal*, 22 I A 51, 57, s c 22 C 609

(1844) *Iukhi Narain v. Maharajah Jadu Nath* 21 I A 33, 41, 46 s c 21 C 504 (1893) *Pudr Prasa v. Raj Nath*, 16 A 367, 371 (1893) *Buzlul v. Satis* 15 C W N 752 (1911).

(4) *Hammut Ali v. Nyamutoollah* 23 W R 250 (1875).

(5) *Ananda v. Parbati* 4 C L J 108 (1906), referring to *Hassan Kuli v. Nakhshidi* 33 C 200 (1905) *Govind v. Vithal* 20 B 753 (1895), *Issur v. Satis* 30 C 207, s c, 7 C W N 126, 129 (1902).

(6) *Bhuban v. Sowdamin* 5 B L J 41 p 59, 60 (1870).

(7) *Nowbut v. Chutter Dhareo* 19 W R 222, 223 (1873). But see *Lalla Imrit Lal v. Mahomed* 18 W R 447, 449 (1872), *Buzlul v. Satis* 15 C W N 52 (1911).

(8) *Sheo Purshun v. Brun Pandey*, 24 W R 251, 252 (1875) see also *Juggernath v. Mahomed Mokeem* 17 W R 161 (1872), *Mackenzie v. Jawahar* 25 W R 137, 138 (1876).

the merits; (1) as also where a witness was disbelieved not for anything he said nor for anything deposed to in the evidence of the other witnesses, but simply because he was a *patnari* (2) or by caste a weaver, (3) or believed because he was a cultivator (4)

Discretion when used by a Court must be judicial and not arbitrary; and where a lower Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a sound and reasonable way, after a careful consideration of the facts, and not arbitrarily, the second Appellate Court has no power to interfere (5). But the discretion of a Court is liable to review on appeal where it is not judicial but arbitrary and perverse, caused by caprice or prejudice or where the discretion is exercised without any proper legal material to support it (6). It has been held that there may be the exercise of so bad a discretion as to amount to an irregularity in law, and on this ground the High Court has looked into the grounds upon which the Lower Appellate Court has admitted an appeal after the lapse of the period allowed by the Limitation Act (7). But probably the correct rule in such a case or its converse is that the High Court will not interfere if the discretion is judicially exercised, even though the course ultimately adopted be not that which the High Court itself would have taken (8).

The following have been considered matters of discretion—Refusal to summon plaintiff at instance of defendant, (9) passing further orders in regard to plaintiff who disregards Court's summons to attend, (10) refusal to add parties, (11) disallowing additional evidence, (12) or interest, (13) directing

(1) Huro Chunder v Gobind, 17 W R 255, 256 (1872)

(2) Mackenzie v Jawahur, 25 W R 137, 138 (1876)

(3) Juggurnath v Mahomed Moheem, 17 W R 161 (1871)

(4) *Id*

(5) Ram Bahadur v Ram Shankar, 27 A 668, 691 (1903), Tulsee v Gajraj, 25 A 71, 72 (1902), see *infra*, Ranchodji v Lallu, 6 B 304, 307 (1882), Parvati v Ganpati, 23 B 515, 517 (1893), Hamid Ali v Gayadin, 26 A 327 (1904).

(6) Ranchodji v Lallu, 6 B 304, 307 (1882), Ram Bahadur v Ram Shankar, *supra* Tulsee v Gajraj, *supra*

(7) Mowji Bawa v Surindra, 10 W R 178 (1868), s c, 2 B L R (A C), 184 note, Chunder v Boshoon, 8 C 251, 253 (1881)

(8) Tulsee v Gajraj, 25 A 71 (1902), Hamid Ali v Gayadin, 26 A 327 (1904), Ranchodji v Lallu, 6 B 304 (1882)

(9) Indro Lochan v Grish, 16 W R 121 (1868)

(10) Naram Das v Mahtab Chand, 10 W R 174 (1868), Kisto v Gobind, W R 133

(1864)

(11) Gyaram Seal v Isur Chunder, 2 W R 158 (1865), Poran v Shami Chand, 1 W R 220 (1864), Juggodumba v Haran Chunder, 10 W R 308, 310 (1868), s c, 6 B L R 520, see Harman v Misri Lal, 2 A 904 (1880)

(12) Ram Parri v Kallu, 23 A 121 (1900); see also Beckwith v Kushto Jeebun, Marsh 278 (1863), Goham Mukdood v Hafeczoo nissa, 7 W R 494, 490 (1867), Mohesh v Sooshee, 6 W R 196 (1866), Radhanath v Khellut, 17 W R 558 (1872), Kulpo Singh v Thakoor Singh, 15 W R 429 (1871), Bakhal v Protap, 12 W R 455 (1860), though a refusal to exercise the discretion vested would be an error of procedure. Ram Parri v Kallu, *supra*, where again the Court, though not satisfied that evidence is necessary, allows it, the High Court may interfere, Hafiz Abdul v Sri Kusen, 11 C 139, 142, 143 (1884); Durga v. Jai Narain, 33 A 379 (1911)

(13) Poreah Nath v Kisto Mohan, 3 B L R. App 105 (1869)

local investigation, (1) arranging for execution of joint decree, (2) refusal of petition to amend a plaint, (3) mode of execution, (4) dismissal of suit for specific performance for delay, (5) refusal to pass an order allowing an appeal by a father to stand as an appeal by his son who had since come of age, (6) refusal to punish a recalcitrant witness (7)

When appeals in analogous cases are pending in a Superior Appellate Court, the Inferior Court of Appeal if it decide the appeal without waiting for the decision of the Superior Appellate Court in the analogous cases does not exercise a wise discretion (8)

"Or to some usage"—Usage having the force of "law" means a local or family usage as distinguished from the general law (9) A finding upon the evidence on a question of custom is one of fact (10) The right of user is substantively a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence furnished by the litigants. If the Lower Appellate Court has not made any error of law in drawing an inference from the evidence produced to support such a right, then the High Court in second appeal will not interfere (11) A local usage or custom being in its nature such as might necessarily affect not only parties to the particular litigation and their privies but whole bodies of people, stands on a footing similar to a matter of law derived from other sources than usage. So, though this section disallows a second appeal with reference to findings of fact yet the existence or non existence of a usage having the force of law is unaffected by such disallowance. Consequently it is the duty of the High Court when it has to pronounce upon that question, to examine evidence bearing upon it, not only as to the sufficiency thereof to establish all the elements (antiquity, uniformity, etc.) required to constitute a valid usage having the force of law but also the credibility of the evidence relied on and the weight due to it (12) Whether or not a custom exists is a

(1) *Graham v Lopez* 1 W R 141 (1861),
Bykunt v Pearce, 1 W R 196 (1861)
Pooroo v Chunder Nath 1 W R 249 (1861)
Rash Beharee v Sahab Roy, 12 W R 76
(1869) [but the Court will interfere if very
strong grounds are shown]

(2) *Hera Roy v Gungadhar* 21 W R 286
(1875)

(3) *Watson v Digwar*, 10 W R 87 (1868)

(4) *Dwarkanath v Unnoda*, 8 W R 319
(1867)

(5) *Mokund v Chotay Lal*, 10 C 1061
1067 (1884)

(6) *Shama Charan Ghose v Tarak Nath
Mukhopadhyay* 3 B L R 115 (1869)

(7) *Pran Kisto v Kalce Dass* 7 W R 460
(1867)

(8) *Gobind Ramanuja v Lakshmi* 11
C W N 112, 116 (1906)

(9) *Ram Gopal v Shama Khaton* 20 G 93
at p 99 (1892)

(10) *Syed Ali v Gopal Das* 13 W R
420, 422 (1870) compare *Kakarla Abbayya
v Raja Venkata* 29 M 21 28 (1905), *Hasim
Ali v Abdul Rahman* 28 A 698 (1906) See
Durga Charan v Raghunath 18 C L J 559
(1913), evidence of a custom

(11) *Mahomed Ali v Jugal Ram* 5 B L
R Ap 81 (1870) s c 14 W R 124 see
Wuzeroodeen v Shobund 11 W R
285 286 (1869)

(12) *Kakarla Abbayya v Raja Venkata*, 29
M 24 28 (1905), see also *Hanumanthamma
v Rama Reddi* 4 M 272 (1881) *Mirabavi
v Velleyanna* 8 M 464 (1885) *Eranjoli
Vishnu v Eranjoli Krishnan* 7 M 3 (1883)
contra see *Hurechar v Judoonath*, 10
W R 153 (1868), *Syed Ali v Gopal Das*,
13 W R 420 421 (1870), *Hurry Churn v
Nunai Chand* 10 G 138 (1883), *Bai Shrin
Bai v Khorsadja* 22 B 430, 433 (1890)

question of fact. But if the Lower Appellate Court has acted upon illegal evidence or has come to a decision upon evidence as to the custom which is

High Court in second appeal is not bound to examine and consider the evidence in all cases when the existence or non existence of an alleged custom is the sole question at issue (1)

"Failed to determine some material issue"—As to failure to determine a material issue, see cases noted (2). The Lower Appellate Court, if it does not accept, must displace the findings arrived at by the first Court (3).

It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to when the Court should consider that the reasons for a particular finding by the Lower Appellate Court must be stated. There may be many cases in which the omission to state the reasons would render the judgment so unintelligible that the Court, in second appeal, could not pronounce any opinion upon whether it was right in law. In such a case a Court would no doubt require the reasons to be stated. But there may be cases in which the Court would not think it necessary to require them and the case will not be sent back. It is not the law that whenever the Judge of an Appellate Court thinks that one set of witnesses is trustworthy, he is bound to give his reasons for it (4). Where the Lower Appellate Court fully adopts the reasoning and the conclusions of the first Court, it is not bound to set out the reasons for its decision with the same fulness as if it was deciding the case in the Court of first instance or as if it was reversing the judgment below. It may supply some additional reasons but the insufficiency of these additional reasons or the absence of any would not justify a second appeal (5). When a person has put forward his defence in a general way and allowed an issue to be framed upon it which has been found against him in the Lower Appellate Court, he will not be allowed to say in special appeal, "here is a question of fact which the Courts below have not

(1) Hashim Ali v Abdul Rahman 28 A 695 (1906)

(2) Kailash v Kunja 4 C L J 86 (1906)
Ramkar Gopalji v Gangaram 16 B 545 547 (1891)
Gopal v Jekaet 8 W R 333 (1867)
Wise v Heera Lal 16 W R 150 (1871)
[where this is by mistake application may be by review], Bistoo v Lalla Byjnath 16 W R 50 (1871)
Goluck Nath v Kirti Chunder 16 C 645 651 (1885)
Krishto Gobind v Ganga Pershad 23 W R 266 (1875)
Googlee Sahoo v Premal Sahoo 7 C 148 150 (1881)
Mohorum Sheikh v Nakorn 7 B L R App 17 (1876)
Krishto Churn v Dwarkanath 10 W R 32 (1868)

(3) Protap Narain v Raghuram 6 C W N 185 189 190 (1901), Talloky Mohun Das

v Kali Prasanna Ghose 11 C W N 380 389 (1907)

(4) Shumshurooddy v Jan Mahomed, 21 W R 260 261 (1874)

(5) Shameo Mahomed v Prodhan Palee 5 W R 178 (1866) but where the Appellate Court rejects evidence accepted by the first Court or comes to a contrary conclusion it should give its reasons for differing. Sheodyal v Hodgkinson 24 W R 342 (1875)
Sahu Madhav v Venkatesh 16 B 540 546 (1891)
Abdul Rohman v Sofy 24 W R 293 (1875), though as to the omission to do so see Mukdum un nissa v Nokhy Singh 25 W R 296 (1875)
Luckhee Monee v Rajkissore 4 W R 106 (1865)

found, and therefore I am entitled to have the decree reversed," when if the question had been raised before the lower Courts there might have been a finding upon it (1)

"Error or defect in the procedure"—An error or defect in procedure may consist in the omission to settle issues, (2) improper remand, (3) dismissing a suit for false verification instead of disposing of it on the merits, (4) adjudicating in the absence of, and without notice to the respondent, (5) allowing a review of judgment without inquiring into the existence of grounds upon which a review is permissible (6) The amount of damage is a question of fact unless such amount be beyond legal limits if there be any (7) A mistake of account is not an error of law or procedure (8) though the principle on which it has been taken may be The Court has interfered where a commission returned unexecuted was not sent a second time (9) There is error where a Court which has ordered a local investigation proceeds to determine the case before its return (10) Refusal to take or record evidence (11) is an error of procedure So is the omission to state the real question to be determined and to examine evidence with reference to the right issues, (12) and to take notice of serious irregularities in the first Court and to render accurate its decree; (13) deciding a suit on a case not set up by the parties nor warranted by the evidence (14) For other cases see notes to the section *passim* It is not sufficient that there should be such error It must have been substantial and such as may possibly have affected the decision on the merits (*vide post*)

(1) *Hikunt v Dhunput*, 19 W R 101 102 (1873)

(2) See *Mt Mitna v Syul Lazl Rub*, 13 M L A 573, 540, 553 (1870) *Rewan Pershad v Jankee Pershad* 11 M L A 25, 27 (1860), *Sheo Sahoy v Ikchun Singh* 2 W R 31 (1874), *Jugobunihoo v Sree Narain*, 20 W R 188 (1873), *Gunga Mouco v Issur Chunder*, 17 W R 405 (1872), *Ram Kant v Guneshee*, 6 W R 47 (1860), *Nowcowne v Mookta*, 2 W R 181 (1865)

(3) See *Ram Kant v Guneshee*, *supra* *Nanabhai Narotamdas v Lamshet*, 6 B H C R, A C J 156, 158 (1869)

(4) *Shama Soondares v Rohumooddeen* 21 W R 71 (1875)

(5) *Balaji Rau v Sitalhoy*, 19 M 414 (1896)

(6) *Bhyrub Chunder Surmah v Madhub Ram*, 20 W R 84, 85 (1873), *Chunler Augrodany v Loodun Ram*, 25 W R 324 (1876), *Parbutty v Protap*, 23 W R 275 (1875), *Koleemooddeen v Heerun* 24 W R 886 (1875)

(7) *Jogeshwar v Dinaram* 3 C L J 140 (1898), *Danco Madhub v Bholanath* 10 W R 161 165 (1869), *Johuroodeen v Dabee Pershad*, 13 W R 22 23 (1870)

(8) *Ram Kant v Kaleo Mohun* 22 W R 310 (1874)

(9) *Jhoteo Singh v Gopal Singh* 22 W R 457 (1875)

(10) *Madho Singh v Kashi Sing* 16 A 342 313 (1891)

(11) *Monlal v Khuroda* 20 C 740 713 (1893), *Surm Pac v Ubbman Rao* 2 A H C R 209 (1870), *Ramessar v Shub Narain* 14 W R 419 420 (1870) [procedure to be followed in such cases see also *Raj Lukhee v Gokool*, 13 M L A 209 225 226 (1869)], *Mohun Singh v Jugbutty Kooer* 21 W R 297 (1875)

(12) *Chunder Mouco v Madhoo Day*, 23 W R 166 (1875) where a remand was ordered

(13) *Ram Coomar v Kaleo Coomar*, 10 W R 279 (1868) (case remanded)

(14) *Shivabasappa v Sangappa*, 23 B 1 (1904)

"Upon the merits"—This is one of several provisions in which the Legislature has indicated its intention that substantial justice and not technicality is to be looked to. An error in procedure which does not affect the decision of the case on the merits will not confer a right of second appeal (1). This is a matter which must be determined in each case according to its circumstances. In sect 372 (Act VIII of 1859) the word "possibly" did not occur. It ran as follows "*which may have produced error or defect,*" and the word "*may*" was construed not to imply "*may by some possibility*" but "*may not improbably*". It was for the High Court Judges to exercise their discretion in determining whether there was such a probability, whether there had been a fair and sufficient trial, and whether litigation had reached a stage at which it ought to cease or not. The word "*possibly*" was accordingly introduced, (2) which avoided any necessity for the consideration of the evidence.

Ex parte appellate decree—A respondent in whose absence an appeal has been heard *ex parte* and against whom judgment has been given, may prefer a second appeal from the decree under this section, and his remedy is not limited to an application under Order 2 to the Court which passed the decree to rehear the appeal (3). The objection that the first Court did not make sufficient inquiry before admitting an application for rehearing and setting aside a former *ex parte* decree in favour of the plaintiff and dismissing the plaintiff's suit should be taken in the lower Appellate Court, and if it is not taken there it can not be raised in second appeal because it would not be doing justice to restore an *ex parte* decree which the lower Courts have, on a subsequent trial on the merits, found should not be renewed. If the objection was a substantial one it should have been raised before the lower Court at the proper time (4).

Scope of appeal—The general rule on this point may be stated to be

(1) See *Jugobundhoo v. Sree Narain* 20 W R 188 (1873), *Buldeo-Pershad v. Golab Khan* 6 N W P, R C R 101, 103 (1874), *Gujraj Singh v. Bijai Singh*, 6 N W P 114, 117 (1874), *Mohama Chandra v. Atul Chandra*, 24 C 540 (1897) [misjoinder of causes of action], *Heera Lal v. Bistoo Lal*, 22 W R 288 (1874), *Mahomed Hossein v. Potnu*, 20 W R 117 (1873) [id.], *Hur Chunder v. Wooma Soonduree*, 23 W R 170 (1875) [document received without objection], *Haran v. Russick*, 20 W R 63 (1873) [want of stamp], *Jadu v. Kailash* 37 C 63 (1909), *Biswanath v. Baidyanath*, 12 C 199, 203 (1895), *Bhagvatsangji v. Pertabsangji*, 4 B H C R 105, 108 (1867), *Pran Kisto v. Kaleo Dass* 7 W R 460 (1867) [defective judgments], *Muthusami v. Nalla Kullantha*, 18 N 418 (1894), *Kisto Churn v. Dwarka Nath*, 10 W R 32 (1868), *Gowinda v.*

Karanakar, 24 M 43 (1900) [error of valuation], *Hukum un nassa v. Muchdoonam*, 1 W R 246 (1864) [hearing of appeal before sale fixed, pleaders present], *Narainbhai v. Naroshanker*, 7 B H C R, A C J 98, 102 (1867), [deposition read instead of oral examination see also *Jadu Rai v. Kanizak Husain*, 8 A 576, 591 (1886)], *Shoobul Chunder v. Koylash Chunder*, 14 W R 23 (1870) [erroneous conclusion of law], *Shaikh Lal Mahomed v. Peer Nuzun*, 18 W R 112 (1871) [depositions of witnesses not taken regularly].

(2) *Ram Chowdhury v. Kachee Mohun*, 21 W R 57, 59 (1873).

(3) *Ayudhya Prasad v. Balmukund*, 8 A 354 (1886).

(4) *Boro Khasia v. Jata Sirdar*, 8 B L R 78, 80 (1871), s c, 15 W R 315.

that it must coincide with that of the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court as the latter should be limited to the case made in the Court of first instance. Throughout the litigation the same ground of attack and (save as mentioned) of defence should be put forward. A plaintiff appellant will not be allowed to present his case in an entirely new shape and raising fresh issues to fall back upon a new and different title or cause of action from that first asserted (1).

A case is not to be decided in special appeal upon a question which was not raised or tried or considered by the lower Courts. Parties must not be allowed to come before the High Court in special appeal and raise a question or take an objection which, if raised or taken in the first Court or even in the Appellate Court, might have been met in those Courts by adopting a course which cannot be adopted when the case comes before the High Court in special appeal (2). But where there was sufficient reason for the question not having been raised in the lower Courts the case may be remanded in second appeal with a view to have that question determined (3). An appellant is not entitled to raise a question of fraud which was not alleged in the written statement and as to which no issue was raised in the original Court (4). Where a specific title has been alleged but not proved and the plaintiff endeavours to succeed in the first Court or second Court of appeal upon a title by twelve years' adverse possession he must be prepared to show that this other title by twelve years' adverse possession was raised in the Court of first instance with sufficient clearness to enable his adversary to understand that he claimed to succeed as well by twelve years' adverse possession as by the specific

(1) *Madan v. Malki*, 6 A 428, 430 (1884).
Soorja v. Gunja, 12 W R 80 (1869), *Heman ginee v. Pitambar*, 5 W R 197 (1866) [though it is a different thing to vary the relief given to a party who has proved his title. See in this connection *Tacoorden v. Nawab Syed Ali*, 1 I A 192 (1874)], *Muthu sami v. Ramkrishna*, 12 M 292 (1889), *Kripa Nath v. Saroda*, 1 W R 283 (1861), *Sheo Das v. Bhagwan Dutt*, 2 B L R App 15 (1869), *Gopal Narhar v. Hanmant*, 6 B 107, 110 (1881) [unless under very special circumstances], *Puriag Dutt v. Brojo Koon war*, 9 W R 503, 505 (1868), *Terietput Sing v. Gossain Sudersan Das*, 4 C 46, 50 (1878), *Brindaban v. Dhununjy*, 5 C 246, 250 (1879), *Joytara v. Mobaruck*, 8 C 975, 980

been held [*Judoo Nath Mullick v. Kaloo Kristo Tagore*, 22 W R 73 (1874)] that it is sufficient that the plaint should set out the facts necessary to support the plea even though

the plea itself be not expressly set forth. See *Dasee v. Ramee Lalun Monce*, 12 M I A 470, 475 (1869), *Mohummud Zahoor v. Rutta Keer*, 11 M I A 463, 485, 486 (1867), *Indur Chunder v. Radha Kishore*, 19 C 507, 512 (1892), *Ilahi Khan v. Sher Ali*, 26 A 331, 331 (1904), *Tekant Doorga Pershad v. Musat Doorga*, 13 W R 10, 11 (1870). The case of *Sankana Kalana v. Varnpakshapa*, 7 B 146, 150 (1883), was disapproved in *Perumal v. Havers*, 16 M 121, 125 (1892).

(2) *Shib Subag v. Nursingh Lal*, 22 W R 352, 351 (1874), per Couch, C.J., see also *Meer Bahadoor v. Suneo Churoo*, 6 W R 157 (1866), *Bunsee Lal v. Shaikh Auladh*, 22 W R 552, 553 (1874), *Jugdeep Narain v. Deendyal*, 20 W R 174, 176 (1873). This case went up to the Privy Council where the decree was varied on other grounds. 3 C 198, s.c., 4 I A 247 (1877).

(3) *Bonomalee v. Kylash Mojoondar*, 24 W R 72 (1875).

(4) *Prayrag Rai v. Goukaran*, 6 C W N 787, 791 (1902).

title alleged (1) The plaint has been allowed to be amended and the case remanded for retrial (2)

As regards objections by defendants, such as are based on pure points of law, may be taken in second appeal for the first time provided that they do not involve the taking of any additional evidence on matters of disputed fact, (3) that is questions arising on the findings and not affected by any facts outside those findings, (4) and capable of being determined without the consideration of any evidence other than that on the record (5) And such a point may be taken after remand though *not raised in appeal before the remand* (6) Such as want of cause of action, (7) the legal status of the plaintiff to come into Court at all, (8) limitation, (9) want of jurisdiction; (10) *res judicata* (11), want of registration, (12) the legality of a translation; (13) the

(1) Krishna Barsack v Protap Surma 7 C 569, 563 (1881), see also Shive Kumari Debi v Govind Tanti, 2 C 418, 423 (1877)

(2) Mohummud Zahoor v Thakooranee, 11 M I A 468, 485, 486 (1867), Joseph v Solano, 9 B L R 441, 453 (1872), in Krishnaji v Wamanji, 18 B 144, 146 (1893), amendment was refused

(3) Gaddappa v Gurimalappa, 19 B 331, 335 (1894), and see Ramtorak v Dhanath 7 B L R 184 185, s c, 24 W R 414 (1871), Kali Mohan v Kali Krishna, 11 W R 163, s c, 2 B L R app 39 (1869), Jan Ali v Khondkar, 14 W R 420 421 (1870) (no ground of appeal allowed when it would have to be dealt with in connection with the evidence in the cause or appears capable of explanation), Gajapathi v Vasudeva, 15 M 503, 511 (1892) [it is not possible to lay down any precise rule and it is not always easy to say what matters of fact would have to be ascertained for the proper decision of each proposition of law], Ajodhya Nath Chowdhury v Keshab Chandra Mukherjee, 11 C W N 1127 (1907)

(4) Nagesh v Guru Rao, 17 B 303, 305 (1892), Sharfudin v Govind, 27 B 452, 466 (1902) In Rachawa v Shivayogappa, 18 B 679, 683 (1893), the Court refused to allow defendant to set up a new right differing in kind and not merely in degree

(5) Fakir v Ananda, 14 C 586, 590 (1887)

(6) Darimbs v Nilmonce, 15 W R 181 (1871)

(7) Lachman v Bahadur, 2 A 884, 887, 888 (1880), Spankie, J, dissent; Jan Ali v Khondkar, 14 W R 420, 421 (1870), *contra*, Buksh Ali v Joyamut, 11 W R 248 (1869), and see *per* Markby, J, in Trilochan v Gagan,

24 W R 413 (1875)

(8) *Id.* Balaram v Mangta Das, 11 C W N 959 (1907)

(9) *Id.*, *contra* Shivappa v Dod Nagaya, 11 B 114, 119 (1886), and in Raghu Nath v Parashram, 9 C 635, 636 (1882), no objection under sect 561 of the last Code was taken As to objection after remand, see *In re Mirza Bahadoor*, B L R, F B 429, 432 (1866), Dattu v Kasai, 8 B 535 (1884) See notes to O XXI r 2

(10) *Id.*, Ramayya v Subbarayadee, 13 M 25 27 (1887), Sayad Nyamtula v Nana, 13 B 424, 427, Velsayudem v Arunachalam, 13 M 213 (1890) Nidhi Lal v Mazhar Husain, 7 A 230 (1894) In Bhikaji v Pandu, 19 B 43 (1893), Azuddin v Ramanigra, 14 C 605, 610 (1887), Biru Mishra v Shyama Churn, 23 C 483 (1895), the objection was held not to go to jurisdiction As to objections after remand, see Keshav v Vinayak, 23 B 22, 26 (1897), Timulji v Farvanji, 6 B H C R, A C J 167 (1868).

(11) Muhammad Ismail v Chutter Singh, 4 A. 69, 71 (1881), some of Strachey, J's, observations were held to be *obiter dicta* in Kanahai Lal v Sursi Kunwar, 21 A 446, 447, 448 (1899) [but not if it cannot be decided on the record and fresh issues are necessary], Ranchod v Bezanti, 20 B 86, 92 (1894) [objection to pauper suit]

(12) Oomatool Fatima v Ghunnoo, 19 W R 23 (1872), but see Joy Gopal v Thakoo monce, 11 W R 381 (1869)

(13) Kappa Guru Kal v Dorasamu, 6 M. 78, 78 (1882) In Joytara Dass v Roy Chunder, 1 W R 136 (1864), the objection as to the invalidity of the adoption was not taken in the grounds of appeal, nor in Roy

irrelevancy of evidence (1) for an erroneous omission to object to the omission of irrelevant testimony does not make it available as a ground of judgment, an objection appearing on the face of a notice (2)

An objection on the ground of misjoinder, (3) whether of parties or causes of action must now under sect 59 show that the merits have been affected

But a mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal. So an objection has been disallowed on a question of title, (4) as also that a suit was barred under sect 211 of the last Code, the objection being one not of pure law but depending upon the facts (5) and as to the competency of an agent to sue (6). And defendants will not be allowed to set up for the first time in second appeal a case which involves an inquiry into facts not ascertained in the Court below (7). A question of jurisdiction, or indeed any other question which depends upon a question of fact which has not been determined by the lower Court or admitted by both parties, will not be allowed to be raised (8). It has been recently held that the construction of a document is a question of law which Judges in second appeal are not precluded from considering by any finding of a lower Appellate Court based on such document (9).

A defendant may stop himself from setting up a defence. So a defendant

depositions taken in a former litigation cannot object in appeal that the witnesses

Goodur v Dhunnesbur, 7 C L R 117 (1880), where the question was as to the execution of aliquot portion of decree. Iachman v Bahadur, 2 A. 881 (1880), but see Bombay Burmah etc., Corp v Smith, 17 B 197, 221 (1892)

(1) Miller v Madho Das, 23 I A 106 (1896), Authors' Evidence Act, 4th ed p 32, quare therefore as to Bapukhandu v Baji Jivaji 14 B 372, 377 (1889)

(2) Ahsanulla v Hurce, 19 I A 191 192 s c, 20 C 86 (1892)

(3) See Moidin Kutti v Krishnan, 10 M 322, 329 (1887), Dhondiba v Ramechandra, 5 B 554, 561 (1881), Manla v Culzar, 16 A 130 (1893), Tarinee v Huntsman, 20 W R 240 (1873), Majahuri v Narayana, 3 M 359, 363 (1881), Ram Dyal v Ram Doolal, 11 W R 273 (1869), Tiluck v Muddun, 12 W R 504 (1869), Boydo Nath v Grish, 3 C 26, 29 (1877), Chulam v Mustakri, 18 A 109, 111 (1895) [objection under sect 89 Transfer of Property Act], Dodhu v Madhavrao, 18 B 110, 113 (1893), Dhurum Das v Shama Soondri 3 M. 1 A 229, 212

(1843)

(4) Varanjit v Lalla Akhu 9 B 285 287 (1885), Umrao Bibi v Mahomed Rojabi 27 C 205 207 (1899), s c 4 C W N 76

(5) Bru Mahata v Shyama Churn, 22 C 483 (1893)

(6) Soorendro Nath Roy v Rugheobur Dyal, 16 W R 392 (1871)

(7) Umbika v Nadir, 11 W R 133, 134 (1869)

(8) Luteefoonnissa v Poolin, W R F B 31, 32 33 (1862), see also The Court of Wards v Roop Moonjeree, 25 W R 260 (1876), Ramanund v Urnokalee, 2 W R 257 (1865), and see where there are findings Nilratan v Ram Rutton, 5 C W N 627, 629 (1901)

(9) Lala Fateh Chand v Rani Kishen, 39 I A 247 (1912), 34 A 579, 16 C W N 1033 (P C), 14 Bom L R 1010

(10) Suttayabhama Dass v Krishna Chunder Chatterjee, 6 C 55, 58, 59 (1880), see Dabee Misser v Mungur Meah, 2 C L R 208 (1878), Norendra v Bhupendra, 23 C 374, 392 (1895)

should have been called and examined (1) Parties who allow a suit to be conducted in the lower Courts as if a certain fact was admitted cannot afterwards in special appeal question it and recede from the tacit understanding (2) And if any irregularity has been committed at the instance of an appellant or with his consent he has no just ground of complaint in appeal (3)

The not taking or pressing an objection in the lower Court may not only satisfy the Court that the parties did not intend to take it as they knew there was nothing in it, (4) but may also act where facts are involved by way of estoppel. For had the objection been taken it might have been met. On the same principle an objection for the first time in appeal that the plaint did not ask for further relief has been disallowed for if taken the plaint might have been amended and may be amended in appeal (5) An objection will not be allowed which, if taken at the proper time might have been removed (6) On this principle, if secondary evidence is admitted without objection, the Court of Appeal will not entertain an objection that primary evidence should have been given (7) In the case of alleged irregularity it is a safe maxim for a Court of Appeal to be governed by that an objection which if taken might have been cured and which was not taken in the Court below shall not be taken in the Court of Appeal (8) An appellant will not be allowed to raise in the Court of Appeal a point which he did not raise in the Court below even though there is some evidence in support of it if the nature of that evidence is such that by any possibility, the respondent might have been able to rebut it if the point had been raised originally (9)

If an appellant in a second appeal was contented and by his conduct he shows that he elects to take his chance of having the decree of the first Court confirmed on appeal on the evidence before the Court he cannot be heard afterwards to complain in second appeal that there was a material irregularity in the conduct of the case, on the ground that all his evidence was not before the appeal Court which reversed the first decree. It is his business to have brought to the notice of the lower Appellate Court that all his witnesses were not examined before the first Court and not having done so, he cannot in second appeal, take the objection in order to have the chance of a second trial (10) Such objection if not raised in the Court below, and if it appears that

(1) *Lakshman v Amrit* 24 B 591 (1900), see also *Wazeer Jemadar v Noor Ali* 12 W R 33 (1869) See *Easin v Abdul* 15 C W N 10 (1910) where second appeal allowed on the ground of waiver

(2) *Dwaji v Godadbbhai* 2 B H C R 28 (1865), *Mohima Chunder v Ram Kishore* 15 B L R 142 155 (1875)

(3) *Maharajah Nitrasur v Nund Lal Singh* 8 M I A 199 220 (1860)

(4) *Soorendro Nath Roy v Pughoor* Dyal 15 W R 392 (1871)

(5) *Lamba Krishna v Rama Pimpia* 13 B 548 551 (1899) *Chomu v Urama* 14 M 46 48 (1890) Similarly in the case of an objec

tion that the case was not one in which a declaratory decree should have been made *Maganlal v Govind Lal* 15 B 697, 701 (1891)

(6) *Avudh Beharee v Ram Roy*, 18 W R 105 (1872)

(7) See Authors Evidence Act, 4th ed p 32

(8) *Dhurum Das v Shama Soondri*, 3 M I A 229 232 (1843)

(9) *Ex parte Firth*, 19 Ch D 419 429 (1891)

(10) *Gulam v Haji Badruhn* 13 B 737 737 (1899)

no application was made to have the witnesses examined the Court of second appeal will not entertain (1) And if the first Court declaring itself to be satisfied with the evidence of any one witness does not think it necessary to examine any further witnesses whom the plaintiff may have adduced, and the Lower Appellate Court, on appeal not being satisfied with the evidence of that witness, dismisses the whole suit the High Court on second appeal may send the case back for the examination of witnesses whom the Lower Appellate Court may think fit to examine The fact that the first Court did not think it necessary to examine other witnesses may be brought to the notice of the Lower Appellate Court by the party concerned, or it may appear in the judgment of the first Court (2) If the Court of first instance being satisfied that the plaintiff's case could not be established refuses to examine defendant's witnesses and dismisses the suit, but the Lower Appellate Court differing from the first Court, gives the plaintiff a decree the objection that the proceedings before the first Court were irregular should be taken before the Lower Appellate Court, and if it is not taken there the Appellate Court in second appeal will not entertain it (3)

The second Appellate Court is not the Court in which errors of procedure of the Court of first instance are to be remedied where the error has not been made the ground of complaint in the lower Court and the first Court of Appeal Thus where any real grievance or other just cause of complaint arises to a plaintiff from the first Court's refusal to examine his witnesses it is his first duty to bring the matter prominently to the notice of the Lower Appellate Court in his grounds of appeal Failing to do so he cannot be allowed to urge it as a plea in special appeal (4) If either of the lower Courts refuses to entertain any material issue suggested by the defendant it would afford him good ground of complaint against their proceedings But when he did not raise the issue in the lower Courts which he wants to raise in second appeal he will not be allowed to raise it in second appeal A party will not be allowed, on special appeal, to go behind the issues by which he was content to abide in the Court below (5)

102 No second appeal shall be in any suit of the nature [s

No second appeal in cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when certain suits. the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed five hundred rupees

Object of section—This section (6) is a reproduction of sect 27 Act XXIII of 1861 Suits triable by Courts of Small Causes are speaking broadly suits of a comparatively simple character and of small pecuniary value

(1) *Somasekhara v Subhadramani* 6 B 574 527 (1882)

(2) *Hurish v Gopal* 20 W R 203 (1873)
Bapu v Sheikh Ahmed 13 B 337 (1874)

(3) *Goordas v Puran* 12 W R 363 (1869)

(4) *Onooroop v Heera Monee*, 11 W R 419

(1869) *Osman Singh v Chummun* 15 W R 87, 88 (1871)

(5) *Shaikh Ahmed v Shaikh Sonaoollah* 8 W R 5 (1867)

(6) For the history of the section see *Soundaram Ayyar v Senna Naickan* 23 M 547-554 (1900)

If the suit is actually tried by a Small Cause Court then no appeal is allowed. There are however many suits which would be triable by a Small Cause Court if one existed with local and pecuniary jurisdiction but which are in fact tried as original suits by a District Munsif Court because there is no Small Cause Court competent to try them. In these suits a first appeal is allowed by the Code. But a second appeal is disallowed by this section as it is considered that such cases as come within it are not sufficiently important to be entitled to a second appeal (1).

“No second appeal” —The section refers to second appeals that is appeals

whether a second appeal lies in execution in a suit of a Small Cause nature the test is not the amount claimed in the execution proceedings but the amount of the subject matter of the suit (4).

“Of the nature cognizable” —The nature of a suit must be ascertained by considering all the allegations in the plaint and the prayer. In determining whether or not a second appeal is barred the Court ought to regard the suit not as it ought to have been framed but as it is in fact framed and brought unless the plaintiff has with the object of evading the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes and bringing the suit in the ordinary Courts added a claim for a relief to which he knows he is not in law entitled. (5) The Court must look to the nature of the suit as brought by the plaintiff and not to the nature of the defence to determine whether or not the Court of Small Causes has jurisdiction. It is not in the power of a defendant to oust the Court of a jurisdiction that it otherwise has by the mere raising of a plea of title. The *lona fides* of the plea can not affect the question for such a plea whether made *bona fide* or not would have to be inquired into. Where such a plea is raised the Court of Small Causes has the power to inquire into it and

(1) See Soundaram Ayyar v Senna Nae 1 an 23 M 563 (1900)

(2) Aghandh Mahto v Abulish 11 C W N 867 865 (1907) Collector of Bijnor v Jafar Al Khan 3 A 18 (1880) [order of remand] Mahadev Narasimh v Ragho Keshau 7 B 297 (1893) [dist Matluranath Chose v Nabu Chandra Kunda 24 C 24 (1897) which was followed in Jhanday Lal v Sarman Lal 21 A 291 (1899) in which it was held that no appeal lay from an order of remand when such order was itself made in an appeal under sect 588 of the last Code from an order under sect 480 of that Code] Gulam Husen v Sayad Musa 8 B 760 (1884) Chinnu Tambir Chinnanna 19 M 391 339 (1890).

(3) Sri Bullov v Baburam 11 C 169 (1885) Lala Kandha Pershad v Lala Behary Lal 25 C 872 (1895) Shyama Charan Mitter v Dendra Nath Mukerjee 27 C 484 487 (1900) Atbalav Sabhanna 12 M 116 (1883) [see at p 117 as to execution against immovable property] Harakh v Ram Sarup 12 A 579 (1890) D n Doyal v Patrakhen 18 A 481 (1896) Peary Lal Singh v Radha Nath Singh 11 C W N 861 (1907) Narayan v Nagandas 30 B 113 (1900)

(4) Mavula Ammal v Mavula Thambi 17 M I J 376 (1906) Sri Bullov Bhattachary v Baburam Cl attopa Ihy 11 C 169 (1885)

(5) Harish Chandra Narayana 24 M 508 510 511 (1901) see also Mullapud v Venkatanarasimha 19 M 399 (1896)

determine it for the purpose of the suit which it has jurisdiction to try (1) By merely asking in the alternative, for an account of the profits, the plaintiff can not convert a suit cognizable by a Court of Small Causes into one of a different nature. Where a definite sum only is to be ascertained, viz the amount of profits received by the defendant during the years in question, from which by a simple calculation what the plaintiff's share in those profits amounts to can be ascertained, there is no account within the meaning of Art 31, sect II of the Small Cause Court Act to be taken and no second appeal lies (2) Where all the relief which the plaintiff claimed in his plaint could be obtained in his suit without asking for a declaration the addition of the prayer for a declaration was held not to prevent the suit being of the nature cognizable in Courts of Small Causes (3) The value of the subject matter of the suit must be determined by reference to the value put by the plaintiff upon it in the plaint not only for fiscal purposes but also for purposes of jurisdiction (4) The terms of the section do not refer to the amount in dispute at the time the appeal is preferred, but to the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit (5) The provisions of sect 144 Bengal Tenancy Act do not override the provisions of this section. The former section determines the *venue*, but it has no bearing upon the question of the nature of the suit (6) Where a plaint is presented in a Court having both ordinary and Small Cause jurisdiction, the suit is still cognizable by a Small Cause Court (7) Where it was urged that though actually a "Small Cause" the suit having been instituted and dealt with in the ordinary Court that circumstance involved the consequence that a second appeal would lie, it was ruled that this was not so that the nature of the cause was not variable in any way according to the Court in which it was brought and that a Small Cause was such wherever instituted. The words "suit of the nature cognizable, etc.," are equally applicable whether the suit is brought in a Small Cause or any other Court (8) When a Subordinate Judge invested with Small Cause Court Jurisdiction tries a Small Cause suit under his ordinary jurisdiction, the character of the suit is not altered by the mode in

(1) *Bapuji v Kuvarji*, 15 B 400 405 (1890), see also *Rivett Carnac v Goculdas* 20 B 15, 45 (1892), *Mohesh t Sheik Piru*, 2 C 470 F B (1877), see also *Monappa t McCarthy*, 3 M 192, 199, 200 F B (1881) *Kali Krishna t Izzatunnessa* 24 C 557 560, 561 (1897), *Soundaram t Senna* 23 M 517, 557 F B (1900), *Narayan t Balaji* 21 B 248 (1892)

(2) *Narayan t Balaji* 21 B 248 250 (1895), see also *Vasudev t Damodar*, 6 Bom L R 370, 373 (1904)

(3) *Ramachendrarayar v Noorulla* 30 M 101, 103 (1906)

(4) *Hansaraj Ratni* 27 A 200 202 (1904)

(5) *Sri Bullov t Baburam* 11 C 169, 172 (1885), see also *Marula Ammal t Marula*

Maracott 30 M 212 213 (1900), *Kali t Iazlar* 15 C W N 454 (1910)

(6) *Pango t Holloway*, 26 C 842, 844 (1899), see also *4 C W N 95*

(7) *Venayak t Krishnarao* 25 B 625, 629 (1901)

(8) *Kalan Dayal v Kalan Narer* 9 B 259 265 (1894) *Lala Kandha Pershad t Behary Lal* 25 C 572 (1899) Upon the question whether a second appeal lies in a matter of jurisdiction [*Dyebuker Nundan t Mudhoo Muty* 1 C 123 (1875) diss from *Mohadeo t Budhoo Ram* 26 A 358 (1904)] the law has been altered since the passing of that decision *Suresh Chandra Moitra t Kristo Rungini Das* 21 C 249, 251 (1893)

which the Subordinate Judge exercises his jurisdiction (1) Moreover, a suit does not cease to be a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court by reason of the defendant having by way of set off made a counter claim for Rs 120, when the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the Court invested with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes was Rs 50 (2) If a suit is cognizable by a Court of Small Causes, then, notwithstanding the fact that the plaint was returned by the Small Cause Court to be filed in the Civil Court, on the ground that the suit involved a question of title this section applies if the value of the subject matter of the suit is below Rs 500 Sect 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act is only an enabling section and enables the Court at any stage of the proceedings, to return the plaint in order that it may be presented to any Court which could determine the title, but that section does not say that such suits shall not be cognizable by the Small Cause Court (3) Even if such a suit is instituted in the ordinary Court the section will apply, because its applicability depends on the nature of the suit and not on the Court in which it is instituted and it will apply even to a case in which the Court which entertained the suit had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of it (4)

The words "of a nature cognizable" seem to have reference to the subject-matter of the suit as distinguished from the amount of the claim (5) In determining whether a second appeal lies under this section the nature of the suit as it was originally framed is to be considered and not any form it may subsequently assume (6)

Each case must be decided on its own facts with reference to the provisions of the Act applicable but for the purposes of reference it may be stated that the following suits have been held to be cognizable suit for money had and received to plaintiff's use, (7) suit by widow for personal property taken from her husband in his lifetime (8) suit for recovery of certain books and money collected (9) claim on bond specially registered, (10) claim for contribution in respect of debt created by virtue of the payment

(1) *Shankarbhai v Somabhai* 25 B 417 (1900), *Balehand v Baloram*, 5 Bom L R 398, 403 (1903), *Indra Chandra Mukerjee v Srish Chandra Banerjee*, 40 C 537 (1913)

(2) *Balehand v Baloram* 5 Bom L R 398, 403 (1903)

(3) *Kali Krishna Tagore v Izzatunnissa*, 24 C 557, 560 (1897), see also *Muttu Karappan v Sellan*, 15 M 98 (1891), *Sada Sankar v Brij Mohun*, 20 A 480 (1896), *Venayak v Krishnarao*, 25 B 625, 628, 629 (1901), *Soundaram v Sennu*, 23 M 547, 557 (1900), see also *Rash Behari v Sridhar*, 6 C W N 687, 688 (1902)

(4) *Mohadeo v Budhai Ram*, 26 A 358, 360 (1904), see also *Lala Handhar v Lala Lal Behary*, 25 C 872, 873 (1898)

(5) *Soundaram Ayyar v Senna Narayan*,

23 M 517, 556 per Sir Arnold White, C J, in which case the section is fully considered *Gouri Dutt v Amar Chand* 15 C J J 49 (1911)

(6) *Lakshmandas v Anna R Lane* 32 B 356 (1904) *Cherryoni v Nhera Poyihl* 23 M L J 47 (1911)

(7) *Mubanda Begum v Abbas Ali*, 3 A 531 (1883)

(8) *Kapalee v Keshoram Koreh*, 11 W R 93, 94 (1869)

(9) *Hans Raj v Patni* 27 A 200, 203 (1904) [held suit was not one for rescission of contract as argued]

(10) *Sri Bulluv v Baburam*, 11 C 169, 171 (1885), dist *Nileomal Bannerjee v Madhusudan* 6 B L R 177, 180 (1870)

itself, (1) suit for contribution where lands assessment of which had been paid and were in exclusive enjoyment of defendant, (2) suit by co-sharer to recover share of *Khoti* profits realized by another co-sharer, (3) complaint of the act of a judicial officer, (4) suit for definite sum as income of land although defendant raised the question of title, (5) a suit for rent, (6) suit by tenant for recovery of excess payment taken by landlord in respect of rent, (7) suit for mesne profits, (8) suit for restoration of moveable property either to plaintiff or to one as agent for him, (9) suit to recover from decree holder money paid for property bought in execution on ground that debtor had no saleable interest, (10) suit for damages for cutting and carrying away of grass, (11) suit for money due on adjustment of accounts of profits of land, (12) suit for money due on contract, though it may be necessary to go into account to see whether amount claimed is due (13) a suit for arrears of *Khati* or *Karnams* emoluments, not being a charge on immoveable property, (14) suit for money on bond decided on *solcnam* whereby land was given in lieu of money, (15) cases falling within the provisions of sect 69 of the *Contract Act* (16)

The following have been held not cognizable — Suit for contribution by co-sharer in joint property, (17) suit for damages for illegal or improper arrest or attachment, (18) or otherwise sounding in damages, (19) suit for interest

bond where property pledged under bond is liable for amount of decree, (1) suit to enforce debt secured upon immoveable property, (2) a suit for *malikana* allowance, (3) suits which directly involve questions of title to immoveable property, (4) suit on bond hypothecating certain crops; (5) suit against sons of Hindu debtor on bond executed by father, (6) a suit in respect of the withholding of a rent receipt, and for recovery of money alleged to have been paid to *waradar* on account of arrears of rent, (7) or for arrears of *Chowkidari* tax payable by the *putndar* under the *putni kabuliati*, (8) suit for drainage charges under sect 42 (b) of the Bengal Drainage Act (VI of 1880, B C), (9) or for compensation for illegal distress or attachment not being for the recovery of specific property (10)

103. In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue of fact necessary for the disposal of the appeal but not determined by the lower appellate Court.

Power of High Court to determine issues of fact

Determination of question of fact.—This section is new. Notwithstanding the opinion to the contrary of Petheram, C J, (11) which the section in effect embodies it has hitherto been the practice of the division Benches of the High Courts in second appeals not to determine in any case issues of fact. This practice, however, in many instances has led to unnecessary expense and delay. Some small question of fact may have been left undetermined, and though its solution may be obvious, the Court has deemed itself precluded from dealing with the matter and bound to order a remand. The present provision, which is entirely new, is therefore a very useful one. The power to determine fact is however, a discretionary one which the Court will exercise according as it thinks proper (12)

(1) *Tripoora Sundarce v Koylash*, 15 W R 265 (1871)

(2) *Atmaram v Sadasiv*, 2 B H C R 1, 3 (1864)

(3) *Mahomed v Abdool*, 1 A H C R 205 (1869), see also *Churaman t Balli*, 9 A 591, 601 (1887)

(4) *Churaman t Balli*, *supra*

(5) *Kalka Prosad t Chandan Singh*, 10 A 20 (1887)

(6) *Narasinga t Sabha*, 12 M 139, 141 F B (1887), but see as to this case *Penarani t Sutharama*, 27 M 243 (1903), see, 14 M L J 81

(7) *Brojo t Shumbhoo*, 18 W R 25 (1872), *Shoylendra t Pato Das*, 23 W R 304, 305 (1875)

(8) *Assanulla v Furthabashun*, 22 C 680,

684 (1895), see also as regards *Dak Cess*, *Watson v Sree Kristo*, 21 C 132 (1893)

(9) *Basanta Kumar t Ram Chandra*, 17 C W N 499 (1903)

(10) *Panun Sanyasi t Zamindar of Jaya pur*, 25 M 540, 542 (1901)

(11) See *Balkishen t Jasoda Kuar*, 7 A 765 (1885), affirmed in *Deo Kishen v Banu*, 8 A 172 (1885), *Straight and Brodhurst, JJ*, dissent but overruled by the F B in *Gridhari Lall v Crawford* 9 A 147 (1896). Where a wrong issue has been framed but there is a finding on the point raised by a correct issue the Court has refused to remand. *Vishnu Ramchandra t Ganesh Appaji*, 21 B 325 (1895)

(12) *Narain Dey t Durga Dei*, 35 A 139 (1913)

APPEALS FROM ORDERS

104 (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, *Orders from which and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force from no other orders.—*

- (a) an order superseding an arbitration where the award has not been completed within the period allowed by the Court ;
 - (b) an order on an award stated in the form of a special case ;
 - (c) an order modifying or correcting an award ,
 - (d) an order filing or refusing to file an agreement to refer to arbitration ,
 - (e) an order staying or refusing to stay a suit where there is an agreement to refer to arbitration ,
 - (f) an order filing or refusing to file an award in an arbitration without the intervention of the Court ,
 - (g) an order under section 97 ;
 - (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree ,
 - (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules
- (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section

Appeal from orders—As regards these the Special Committee said
“ A comparison of clause 101 of the Bill with sect 588 of the existing Code (1)

(1) As regards that Code clause 6 referred to orders passed by the Appellate Court. *Wahidullah t Kanbaya Lal*, 25 A 174 (1902), *foli in Dalip Singh t Kundan Singh*, 30 A 58 (1913), *Chinnasami Pillai v Karuppa Udayan*, 21 M 231 (1896), *Goor Bux Sahoo v Birj Lal Benka* 3 C W N 243, 26 C 275, *Raghunath Charan Singh v Shama Koori* 31 C 344 (1903) [but not where Appellate Court returns memorandum of appeal d ss from *Kunhikutti t Achotti*, 14 M 462 (1891)] and no second appeal in *Chinnasami t Karuppa supra* but see *Joynath Roy t Lal Bahadur Singh* 8 C 12f (1881), as to power of Court to which suit is transferred to return plaint see *Pachamoni Awasthi t Habi Baksh* 4 A 478

(1882) See now O XLIII r 1 (a) Orders returning plaints for amendment have been omitted. Orders refusing amendment were not appealable *Sarauti t Kunj Behari*, 5 A 345 at p 356 (1883) *Watson and Co t Nidhoo Digwar* 10 W R 8" (1868) No second lay from order remanding case *Mathura Nath Ghose t Nobin Chandra Kundu* 24 C 74 (1897) *Jhanday Lal t Sarman Lal* 21 A 201 (1899) *Venkatapatlu v Tirumalai* 24 M 447 (1901) *Timanna t Mahabals* 19 M 167 (1895) but there was a second appeal where the order did not come within this section but sect 214 (now 47), *Doyamasi Dasu t Sarat Chunder Mojumlar* 25 C 175 (1897) As to clause 18 of former section, see *Mehdi*

would support a *prima facie* inference that the right of appeal from orders had been materially curtailed. But this inference is dispelled on looking at sub clause (h) [now (i)] which allows an appeal from any order made under Rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Rules. We have gone carefully into the question of the cases in which an appeal should be allowed from these orders and our conclusion is expressed in the Rules themselves." See O XLII r 1.

As appeared from the wording of the first clause in the last Code an appeal was given only in respect of orders "under this Code." Thus it has been held that an order under sect. 5 of the Court Fees Act was not within this section, (1) and that no appeal lay against an order directing a penalty to be enforced under the Stamp Act (2). Chapter XLIII of the last Code was not extended to suits and proceedings under the Agra Tenancy Act (3).

It has been held that on an appeal from an order of an Appellate Court, the High Court was bound to accept as in a second appeal from a decree the findings of fact arrived at by the Lower Appellate Court (4). The orders passed in appeal being final no second appeal lies (5). The right of appeal from interlocutory orders was held to cease with the disposal of the suit (6).

It has been held that sub section 1 (c) of this section does not confer an unrestricted right of appeal for when an order has been made by which an award has been modified the validity of the whole award cannot be called in question in an appeal against that order (7). And it has been pointed out that in cases under O XXI r 89 (sect. 310A of last Code) only a first appeal is now permitted.

Hasain v Sughra Begam, 25 A 206 (1902)
Balabai v Ganesh 4 Bom L R 980 (1902)
s c, 27 B 162, and as to clause 24 see
Bhagendra Narain Singh v Bhashadhar Jha
31 C 49, (1904), s c 8 C W N 605. As
regards clause 25 of former Code see
Chinnatambu v Chinnatambu 13 M 331
(1896) [right of appeal is not controlled by
sect. 586, now 310 cases there cited in
Aitholia v Subbanna, 12 M 116 (1888)].
Agandh Mashto v Abullah 11 C W N
862 (1907). Madhu Sudan Sen v Kamini
Kanta Sen 32 C 1073 (1905) as to enter-
ing into merits on the appeal from order
of remand see notes to O XXI r 23 and
Lokhu Malho v Aghoree Ajai 5 C 144
(1879), Noumollah Pramanick v Gish
Narain Moonshee 8 C 674 (1882). No
appeal and Letters Patent against order
passed under this clause. Venganayyan v
Ramasaami Ayyan 19 M 422 (1896) as
to appeals from Court of Revenue to District
Judge. Partaj Singh v Narain Das 16 A
375 (1894), and a Judication by Collector
in proceedings under Act VIII of 1865.
Vetraswamy v Manager Irtapur Estate,
4 M 518 (1902) and clause 29. See Sonaka

Chowdhram, Bhoobunjoy Shaha 5 C 311
(1879). Navirahoo v Narotamsdas 7 B 5
(1892) [contempt orders], as to this, see
next section.

(1) Balkaran Rai v Gobind Nath Tewari,
12 A 129 156 157 (1890).

(2) Sonaka Chowdhram v Bhoobunjoy
Shaha 5 C 311 (1879).

(3) Vilayat Hussain v Mahendra Chandra
Nundy, 28 A 89 (1905).

(4) Tika Ram v Shama Charan 20 A 42
(1897), and see Venganayyan v Ramasaami
Ayyan, 19 M 422 (1896).

(5) See Bhagbut Lal v Narku Roy, 21 C
789 (1894), Nana Kumar Roy v Golam
Chunder Doy, 18 C 422 (1891), Gopi Koori
v Gopi Lal 21 C 799 (1894), Aubhoya
Dass v Pudmo Lochun Mondul 22 C 802
(1895), final here refers to finality so
far as further appeal is allowed. Azam ul din
v Baldeo, 3 A 554 (1881).

(6) Madhu Sudan Sen v Kamini Kanta
Sen 32 C 1023 1029 (1905), Janaki v
Promotha 15 C W N 830 (1911). But see
Lakshmi v Maru Devi, 37 M 29 (1914).

(7) Rajbans Sahai v Soorjee Lal 17
C W N 617 (1911).

for the order is made appealable under O XIII r 1 cl (g) and consequently a second appeal is barred under sub-section 2 of this section. But that an order under sect 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not appealable under O XIII and therefore this sub-section does not bar a second appeal from such an order (1)

It has also been held that this section only relates to an appeal from an order which is not a decree, and that the exception in cl (h) of sub-section 2 has been made because provision is made elsewhere for an appeal from an order of arrest or detention in execution of a decree, such an order being made under sect 47 and being appealable under sect 96 (2)

In a recent case it was held that appeals only lie from decrees under sect 2 or orders under this section, and that an order extending time under sect 148 comes under neither heading and is therefore not appealable (3)

Whether section affects Letters Patent—The Governor General in Council may pass laws which shall have the effect of amending or altering the provisions of the Letters Patent (4). The question in each case is has this been done? This is a matter of construction of the Letters Patent and the particular section of the Code which is alleged to have modified them. By sect 117 the provisions of the Code, except as otherwise specially provided, apply to the High Courts. In the first place as regards appeals under the Letters Patent the order appealed against must be a "judgment" that is an order deciding finally any question at issue in the case or the rights of any of the parties to the suit. If it is not a "judgment" it is not appealable (5). Next, assuming that it is a judgment it may be in respect of a matter not dealt with by the Code. So an order for attachment for contempt is not an order in exercise of civil jurisdiction and therefore, does not come within sect 591 (now 105) of the Code (6). If however an order is passed in civil jurisdiction which is a "judgment" under the Letters Patent the question then arises as to how far, if at all the Letters Patent are controlled by the Code. As regards this Chapter in the last Code the earlier decisions of the Madras High Court and the decisions of the Allahabad High Court held that sect 588 of that Code, which this section replaces, modified the Letters Patent and that the right of appeal given by them was subject to the limitations on appeal prescribed by the Code (7). It was, however subsequently held and probably now is so

(1) *Asimuddin v Sundari* 38 C 339 (1911),
Raghubar v Jadunandan 16 C W N 736
(1911), *Narbat v Baldeo*, 33 A 479 (1911)

(2) *Ardeshurji Framji v Kalyan Das* 32 A 3 (1909)

(3) *Suranjan Singh v Ram Bahal Lal*, 33 A 583 (1913)

(4) *Vasudeva Upadhyaya v Visvaraja Thiruthasami* 20 M 407, 415 (1897) *Achaya v Ratnavelu*, 9 M 253 (1889)

(5) *Aubrey Churn v Shamont Lochun* 16 C 788 (1889) [Review of Judgment], *Latif Ali v Asgur Reza* 27 C 455 (1890) [order granting certificate to appeal to Privy Council]

Kishen Pershad v Tilukdhar Lal 18 C 182 (1890) [order refusing to extend time to furnish security] See notes to sect 2 ante

(6) *Narainchoo v Narotamdas* 7 B 5 (1882) See *Mohendra Lal v Anundo Coomar* 25 C 236 (1897)

(7) In *Pe Rajagopal* 9 M 447 (1886) [order under sect 592 refusing leave to appeal as pauper], *Sankaran v Paman Kutt* 20 M 152 (1896) [passing final decree instead of order of remand], *Vasudeva Upadhyaya v Visvaraja Thiruthasami* 20 M 407 (1897) [order passed on appeal from order of remand], *Banno Bibi v Mehdi Hussain* 11 A

far as the Calcutta and Madras High Courts are concerned, that the interpretation to be placed on the decision of the Privy Council (1) is that this section does not touch the right of appeal given by the Letters Patent (2). These decisions consider that of the Privy Council to be of general application, and proceed upon the construction that the scheme of the Code as to appeals is that they lie from one Court to another, and that therefore this section has no application to a case where the appeal is from one Judge of a Court to the Full Court (3). As regards other sections it has been held that sect 597 (now 111) of the Code modifies sect 39 of the Letters Patent (4) and that sect 15 of the Letters Patent is controlled by sect 629 (now O XLVII r 7) of the Code, which provides that an order of a civil Court rejecting an application for review of judgment shall be final (5).

91.1

105 (1) *Save as otherwise expressly provided*, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, *where a decree is appealed from*, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.

(2) *Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness.*

Appeal An order may or may not be a decree (see sect 2). The former are appealable as such. The latter orders may or may not be appealable under sect 104 or O XLIII r 1, which deals with what may be described as immediate appeals from orders (6). A party against whom an appealable order has been made may at once prefer his appeal. He is, however, not bound to do so. There

375 (1889) [order refusing leave to appeal as pauper, see editor's notes giving earlier cases]. *Muhammad Naun ulah v Ihsan ulah*, 14 A. 226 (1892) [order directing amendment of decree]

(1) *Hurish Chunder v Kali Sunkri*, 9 C 482, 10 I A Sc (1882)

(2) *Toolsey Money v Sudevi Dass*, 26 C 361 (1899), *Chappan v Mordin Katti*, 22 M 68 (1898); *Sabhapathi Chetti v Narayanami Chetti*, 25 M 555 (1901).

(3) See *per Sulramania Ayyar, J.*, in *Vasudera v Visvaraja*, 20 M at pp. 417, 418 (1897)

(4) *Vasudera v Visvaraja*, 20 M at p 413.

per Benson, J (1897)

(5) *Achaya v Ratnavelu*, 9 M 253 (1885), approved in *Aubhoy Churn v Shamont Lochun*, 16 C 788, 791 (1889), disapproved in *Toolsey Money v Sudevi Dass*, 26 C 361, 367 (1899), where, however, no mention is made of the fact that the first cited case referred not to sect 588, but to sect 629. The result may or may not be the same, but whatever it be, it must be arrived at on a construction of the particular section in question.

(6) See *Luchindas v Ebrahim* 2 B at p 648 (1878)

is no law in India which renders it imperative upon a suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved under the penalty, if he does not do so, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the Appellate Court (1) Formerly though no appeal had been filed from an order which was a preliminary decree within the period of limitation, that order might have been questioned on the appeal from the final decree (2) This, however, is not so now, see sect 97 In the case of orders not decrees, an order made under the Code from which an appeal is given under sect 101 may be questioned under this section in an appeal from the decree in the suit, although no appeal from such order has been preferred under sect 101 (3) The same rule applies where, though the order is not one of those mentioned in sect 101, it is a judgment within the meaning of sect 16 of the Letters Patent The order may equally, as in the other cases, be questioned under this section (4) It has been held that where a suit has been remanded on appeal, an appeal from the order after the suit has been taken up by the first Court on remand and finally disposed of will not lie and that this clause has no bearing on such cases (5)

Orders of remand have now, by the second clause, been excepted As to the previous law, see note (3), *infra*

And where an order under the group of sections relating to representatives has been made excluding a person from the record, that person must seek his or her remedy in appeal against the order, and is not entitled to appeal against the decree so long as the order stands, the reason being that the question whether

(1) *Maharajah Moheshwar Singh v Bengal Government*, 7 Moo L A at pp 302, 303 (1859), *Sheonath v Ramnath*, 10 M L A 413 (1865), *Forbes v Amceeroonessa Begum*, 10 M L A 340 (1865), *Shah Mukhan Lal v Sree Kishen Singh*, 12 M L A 157 (1868), *Savitri v Ramji*, 14 B at p 235 (1889)

(2) *Id.* [order granting review of judgment], *Biswa Nath Chaki v Beni Kanta Dutta*, 23 C 406 (1896) [order directing amounts], *Khadem Hossein v Emdad Hossein* 20 C 758 F B (1901) [preliminary decree for partition], overruling *Boloram Dey v Ram Chandra Dey*, 23 C 279 (1895), *Shah Mukhan Lal v Baboo Sree Kishen Singh*, 10 M L A at pp 184, 185 (1868) [interlocutory decree as to interest]

(3) *Sbeo Nath Singh v Ram Din Singh*, 18 A 10 F B (1895), *Forbes v Amceeroonessa Begum*, 10 M L A at p 359 (1865), *Cheda Lal v Badullah* 11 A 35 (1888), *Rameshur Singh v Sheodin Singh*, 12 A 510 (1889), *Savitri v Ramji*, 14 B 232 (1889), *Kanto Prashad Hazari v Jagat Chandra Dutta* 23 C 335 (1895), *Mohesh Chunder Das v Jahiruddin Mollah*, 5 C W N 609 (1901), these were all cases of objections in the final decree to previous orders of remand. Whether

illegal orders of remand affected the merits was a question to be determined in each case *Savitri v Ramji supra*, at pp 235, 236 *Mohesh v Jahiruddin supra* at p 515, if the order did not affect the merits, then sect 578 cured the defect, ib 510 See now clause 2 of the section. *Googleo Sahoo v Premilal Sahoo* 7 C 148 (1891) [order under sect 32], *Har Narain Singh v Kharag Singh*, 9 A 447 [order under sects. 32, 356, 367], *Goodall v Mussoorie Bank* 10 A 07 (1887) [order under sect 372], *Sheonath v Ramnath*, 10 M L A 423 (1865) [order nominating arbitrators], *Nlowree Bewa v Soorundarnath Roy*, 10 W R 178 (1868) [order admitting appeal out of time], *Joy Kishen Mookerjee v Parbutty Churn Ghosal* 22 W R 183 (1874) *Bhyrur Chunder v Madhub Ram*, 20 W R 84 (1873) [order granting review which can only be challenged on the grounds stated in sect 629] *Baroda Churn Ghose v Gobind Prashad Tewary*, 22 C 934 (1895), *Dhanara Kumara v Buk kapatnam* 31 M 228 (1910)

(4) *Jamsctji v Dadabhoy*, 24 B 302 (1900), *s. c.*, 2 Bom. L R 648.

(5) *Janoka v Promotha*, 15 C W N 830 (1911)

far as the Calcutta and Madras High Courts are concerned that the interpretation to be placed on the decision of the Privy Council (1) is that this section does not touch the right of appeal given by the Letters Patent (2). These decisions consider that of the Privy Council to be of general application and proceed upon the construction that the scheme of the Code as to appeals is that they lie from one Court to another and that therefore this section has no application to where the appeal is from one Judge of a Court to the Full Court (3) as at sect 597 (now 111) of the Code

is concluded by

an order of a civil Court rejecting an application
be final (5)

11

105 (1) *Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal*

Other orders

shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate juris-

dition, but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness

Appeal An order may or may not be a decree (see sect 2). The former are appealable as such. The latter orders may or may not be appealable under sect 104 or O XLIII r 1 which deals with what may be described as immediate appeals from orders (6). A party against whom an appealable order has been made may at once prefer his appeal. He is however not bound to do so. There

35 (1889) [order refusing leave to appeal as pauper see editor's notes giving earlier cases] *Muhammal Naum ul lah v Ihsan ullah*, 14 A 226 (1892) [order directing amendment of decree]

(1) *Hurriah Chunder v Kahi Sun levi* 9 C 482 101 A Sc (1882)

(2) *Tooley Money v Suddev Dassee* 26 C 361 (1899), *Chappan v Mohin Kuttu* 20 M 68 (1903), *Sabhapathi Chetty v Narayana Chetty* 25 M 555 (1901)

(3) See *per Sultramama Ayyar J* in *Vasudeva v Visvaraja* 20 M at pp 417-418 (1897)

(4) *Vasudeva v Visvaraja* 20 M at p 413,

per Benson J (1897).

(5) *Achaya v Ratnavelu* 9 M 253 (1885) approved in *Aubhey Churn v Shamont Lockun* 16 C 798 794 (1889), disapproved in *Tooley Money v Suddev Dassee* 26 C 361 367 (1899) where however no mention is made of the fact that the first cited case referred not to sect 588 but to sect 679. The result may or may not be the same but whatever it be it must be arrived at on a construction of the particular section in question

(6) See *Luckumdas v Ibrahim* 2 B at p 648 (1878)

is no law in India which renders it imperative upon a suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved under the penalty, if he does not do so, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the Appellate Court (1). Formerly though no appeal had been filed from an order which was a preliminary decree within the period of limitation, that order might have been questioned on the appeal from the final decree (2). Thus, however, is not so now, see sect 97. In the case of orders not decrees, an order made under the Code from which an appeal is given under sect 101 may be questioned under this section in an appeal from the decree in the suit, although no appeal from such order has been preferred under sect 101 (3). The same rule applies where, though the order is not one of those mentioned in sect 101, it is a judgment within the meaning of sect 15 of the Letters Patent. The order may equally, as in the other cases, be questioned under this section (4). It has been held that where a suit has been remanded on appeal, an appeal from the order after the suit has been taken up by the first Court on remand and finally disposed of will not lie and that this clause has no bearing on such cases (5).

Orders of remand have now, by the second clause, been excepted. As to the previous law, see note (3), *infra*.

And where an order under the group of sections relating to representatives has been made excluding a person from the record, that person must seek his or her remedy in appeal against the order, and is not entitled to appeal against the decree so long as the order stands, the reason being that the question whether

(1) *Maharajah Moheshwar Singh v. Bengal Government*, 7 Moo. L. A. at pp 302, 303 (1859), *Sheonath v. Ramnath*, 10 M. I. A. 413 (1865), *Forbes v. Amecroonnessa Begum*, 10 M. L. A. 310 (1865), *Shah Mukhan Lal v. Sree Kishen Singh*, 12 M. I. A. 157 (1868), *Savitri v. Ramji*, 14 B. at p 235 (1889).

(2) *Id.* [order granting review of judgment], *Biswa Nath Chak v. Beni Kanta Dutta*, 23 C. 400 (1890) [order directing amounts], *Khadem Hossein v. Emdad Hossein* 29 C. 754 F. B. (1901) [preliminary decree for partition], overruling *Boloram Dey v. Ram Chandra Dey*, 23 C. 279 (1895), *Shah Mukhan Lal v. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh*, 10 M. I. A. at pp 181, 185 (1868) [interlocutory decree as to interest].

(3) *Sheo Nath Singh v. Ram Dutt Singh*, 18 A. 19 F. B. (1895), *Forbes v. Amecroonnessa Begum*, 10 M. I. A. at p 359 (1865), *Cheda Lal v. Badullah*, 11 A. 35 (1888), *Rameshwar Singh v. Sheodin Singh* 12 A. 510 (1889), *Savitri v. Ramji*, 14 B. 232 (1889), *Kanto Prashad Hazari v. Jagat Chandra Dutta*, 23 C. 335 (1895), *Mohesh Chunder Das v. Jahuuddi Mollah*, 5 C. W. N. 609 (1901), these were all cases of objections in the final decree to previous orders of remand. Whether

illegal orders of remand affected the merits was a question to be determined in each case. *Savitri v. Ramji supra*, at pp 235, 236. *Mohesh v. Jahuuddi supra* at p 515, if the order did not affect the merits, then sect 578 cured the defect, *ibid* 510. See now clause 2 of the section. *Googlee Sahoo v. Premilal Sahoo* 7 C. 148 (1881) [order under sect 32], *Har Naram Singh v. Kharag Singh*, 9 A. 447 [order under sects 32, 356, 367], *Goodall v. Mussoorie Bank*, 10 A. 97 (1837) [order under sect 372], *Sheonath v. Ramnath*, 10 M. I. A. 423 (1865) [order nominating arbitrators], *Mowree Bewa v. Soorundarnath Roy*, 10 W. R. 178 (1868) [order admitting appeal out of time], *Joy Kishen Mookerjee v. Parbutty Churn Ghosal*, 22 W. R. 183 (1874), *Bhyrub Chunder v. Madhub Ram*, 20 W. R. 84 (1873) [order granting review which can only be challenged on the grounds stated in sect 629], *Baroda Churn Ghose v. Gobin I. Proshad Towary*, 22 C. 981 (1895), *Dhanaram Kumara v. Ilak kapatnam*, 31 M. 228 (1910).

(4) *Jamsetji v. Dadalal*, 21 B. 302 (1900), s. c., 2 Bom. L. R. 618.

(5) *Janaki v. Promotha*, 16 C. W. N. 870 (1911).

the order below was right or wrong goes to the very root of the question as to the party's right to be a party to the proceedings below, or to come up at all in appeal (1) If an order is non appealable, then it may be questioned under this section subject to the terms thereof. While sect 104 deals with what may be styled immediate appeals from orders, this section is in substance the grant of an ultimate appeal against any order affecting the decision of the case, but making such ultimate appeal contemporaneous with an appeal against the decree (2) It has been held that if there is an appeal against an order made under any rule, there is also an appeal against any order made under part of that rule (3)

Order must be under this Code—This section must be read with sect 104, and should be construed as if the words "*under this Code*" were inserted between the words "*by a Court*" and the words "*in the exercise of*". To hold otherwise would have the effect of abolishing many appeals given by other Acts of the Legislature, some of which were passed before the Code came into force, for example appeals from decisions in Companies cases (4) So also an order for attachment for contempt is not an order in exercise of the High Court's civil jurisdiction and therefore does not come within the provisions of this section. Contempts are in the nature of offences and therefore under sect 15 of the Letters Patent 1865, an appeal lies from an order of committal for contempt (5)

The section contemplates two things—there being a regular appeal about something else, and in that appeal the insertion in the memorandum of appeal of a ground of objection under this section (6) This section does not enable a litigant to avoid limitation by coming up under this section when the only ground of appeal is an order made under sect 562 now O XXI r 23 (7) No appeal lies where no objection is taken to the decree as regards the merits of the case, those merits having been enquired into (8) but the grounds are solely directed against an interlocutory order passed in the suit (9) Where, however,

(1) *Sankar v Marudhar* 12 A. 200 (1890) a party to the decree may formally appeal but in this case the appellant was not a party and the order complained of decided that she was not entitled to be a party, *dist Har Narain v Kharag Singh* 9 A. 447 (1887) and see *Balabai v Ganesh* 27 B. 162 (1902) in which the Lower Appellate Court had dismissed the suit on the ground that one B was not the representative of the deceased plaintiff

(2) See *Luchmadas v Ebrahim*, 2 B. at pp 618-619 (1878)

(3) *Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. v Fakiruddin* 17 C. W. N. 16 (1912), *Mohunt Anand v Ram Perhash* 14 C. W. N. 183 (1909)

(4) *Wall v Howard* 17 A. 438-440 (1870), *Umrao Chand v Bindra Chand*, 17 A. 470-477 (1890)

(5) *Navivahoo v Narotamdas Candia* 7 B. 5 (1882) In dealing with an appeal from such an order the Appellate Court will not go behind the order the disobedience to which constitutes the contempt, *ib*

(6) *Sheonath Singh v Ram Din Singh* 18 A. 19 F. B. (1895), *fol. Sher Singh v Diwar Singh*, 22 A. 366, 367 (1900)

(7) *ib*

(8) In *Krishna Chandra Gotedar v Mohesh Chandra Laha*, S. A. 2310 of 1902, Cal. H. C. 6 April 1905 the Lower Appellate Court had refused to inquire into the merits because it illegally set aside an order which had been made under sect 103 restoring the suit.

(9) *Sher Singh v Diwar Singh supra* (appeal against an order setting aside the dismissal of a suit for default)

the order of the lower Appellate Court as to abatement was embodied in the judgment and decree, it was held that objection thereto was properly taken by way of second appeal against the decree. In this case the Court was asked to set aside the decree on the ground that the trial on the merits was contrary to law, but even if the order that by reason of the death of one of the respondents the appeal against her failed were treated as an order in the suit separate from the findings upon which the decree was based (which it was held not to be) then there was an objection that the appeal ought to have abated altogether and not partially (1)

Order—The words "*prior to decree*" which appeared in sect 363 of the Code of 1859, were omitted from the Code of 1877 as from the last and present Code and thus the section is applicable to orders affecting the decision of the case whether such orders were made before or after the decree (2). The words "*affecting the decision of the case*" did not apply to "*such orders*" in the former section, but to the previous words "*error defect or irregularity*". So in an appeal from an *ex parte* decree in a summary suit upon a promissory note it was held that an appeal lay from an order made after decree under sect 531 (now O XXXVII r 4), refusing to set aside the *ex parte* decree (3). The Court also observed that if the Court made an order to set aside the decree, stay execution, and give leave to the defendant to appear and defend, it "*affects the decision*" and by refusing to do so it also "*affects the decision inasmuch as it thereby upholds the decree against the party applying to have it set aside*" (4). The word "*such*" has now been deleted. The order must be one passed under the Code. A decision under sect 5 of the Court Fees Act is not an order under this section (5).

Decree—The section only applies where there is an appeal from a 'decree'. As to the meaning of this term see notes under sect 2, *ante*. Where the order appealed from was not a decree nor an order under sect 588 of the former Code, it was held no appeal lay (6).

Error, defect, or irregularity—These words mean in this section error, defect or irregularity in procedure or in law, and not in matters of fact (7).

"Affecting the decision of the case"—These words mean "*affecting the decision of the case with reference to the merits of it*" (8). Therefore when an *ex parte* decree was set aside by an order under sect 108 (now O IX r 13) and the suit heard upon the merits and dismissed it was held that such order was not an order affecting the decision of the case under this section, it did

(1) Hem Kunwar v. Amba Prasad 22 A. 430 (1900)

(2) Luckmidas v. Ebrahim, 2 B. 644 at p. 649 (1878)

(3) *Ib.*

(4) *Ib.* at p. 648

(5) Balkaran Rai v. Gobind Nath Tewari 12 A. 129 F. B. at p. 158 (1890)

(6) Hir Shamun Jha v. Jingshoor Jha 5 C.

711 (1890)

(7) Sankar v. Murlidhar 12 A. 200 (1890)

Balabai v. Ganesh 27 B. 167 187 (1902)

(8) Chintamony Dass v. Raghoonath Sahoo, 22 C. 931 (1895), Gulab Kunwar v. Thakur Das 24 A. 464 (1902), Tasadduq Husain v. Hayat un Nissa 25 A. 280 (1903), Balabai v. Ganesh 27 B. 162, 187, 188 (1902)

not determine on the merits, but merely insured a hearing upon the merits (1) So an order readmitting an appeal which had been dismissed for default is not an order affecting the decision of the case, (2) nor is an order allowing a plaintiff to sue as a pauper (3) The orders which may be considered under this section are, in short, those by which the Judge may have been misled in deciding the case (4)

Clause (2) — See *ante*, notes, 'Appeal'

9] 106 *Where* an appeal from any order is allowed, it shall be to the Court to which an appeal would lie from the decree in the suit in which such order was made, or *where* such order is made by a Court (not being a High Court) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, then to the High Court.

Appellate Courts — The proviso to sect 569, which this section replaces, has been omitted as the Code no longer deals with insolvency proceedings

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPEALS

107 (1) *Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power—*

- (a) *to determine a case finally,*
- (b) *to remand a case,*
- (c) *to frame issues and refer them for trial,*
- (d) *to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken*

(2) *Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein*

Appellate Court's powers — An appeal is a continuation of the original suit, and therefore the powers and duties of both Courts must be to a large extent

(1) Chintamony v Raghoonath, 22 C 931 (1895), foll. Krishna Chandra Goldar v Mohesh Chandra Saha 9 C W N 584 (1905), dist Krishna v Ganesh, 26 B 201, 203, Tasadduq Hayat un Nissa 25 A 280 (1903) Kariman v Forbes 1 Cal L J 27 N (1905)
(2) Gulab Kunwar v Thakur Das 24 A 464 (1902)

(3) Mamtazin v Rasool 23 A 364 367 (1901) In an early case however, where a

Court gave leave to sue as a pauper, a previous application having been refused, the suit was dismissed on appeal Bishessur Singh v Mubessur Bakshi S D N W 1864, vol II p 189

(4) See also Sanjali v Murlidhar, 12 A 200 (1890), Balabai v Ganesh 27 B 162 187, 188 (1902), in which the order was held not to have affected the decision

the same. Thus the Appellate Court has powers as regards the amendment (1) and return (2) of the plaint and memorandum of appeal, the withdrawal (3) of the suit and addition of parties (4) to the appeal, the reference of the subject-matter of the suit and appeal to arbitration, (5) the abatement of the appeal, (6) assignment, (7) substitution of party where mistake, (8) separation and trial

(1) *Perceval v. Collector of Chittagong*, 30 C. 516, 520 (1900), *Pary Mohun v. Narendra*, 5 C. W. N. 273, 279 (1900), see also *Bai Maprabha v. Magantsi*, 19 B. 303, 307 (1891), *Shyam Chand v. Land Mortgage Bank*, 9 C. 695, 698 (1883), *Dhani Pam v. Bhagirath Shah*, 22 C. 692 (1895), *Seshamma v. Chenappa*, 20 M. 467 (1897), *Krishna v. Panchu*, 17 M. 167 (1893).

(2) *Wahidullah v. Kanhaiya Lal*, 25 A. 174, 176 F. R. (1902) (overruling *Bimlesh v. Nandu*, 3 A. 456); see also *Chinna Sami Pillai v. Karuppa Udayan*, 21 M. 231 (1896), *Pachoni v. Habi*, 4 A. 478 (1882), *Goor Bux Sahoo v. Brij Lal Benka*, 26 C. 279 (1889), *Raghunath Charan Singh v. Shamo Koeri*, 31 C. 344, 347 (1903) [dissenting from *Kunhi Kutti v. Achotti*, 14 M. 462 (1891)], *Sarala Sundari v. Siroda Prosad*, 2 C. L. J. 602, 607 (1904), *Dalip Singh v. Kunlan Singh*, 36 A. 55 (1913).

(3) *Ganga Ram v. Dala Ram* 8 A. 82, 81 (1885), but a plaintiff cannot by withdrawing of his own free will and without permission annul rights created by the decree of the first Court *Satyabhamabhai v. Ganish*, 29 B. 13, 18 (1904).

(4) *Gyanananda v. Kristo*, 8 C. W. N. 401, 406 (1901) (apart from the section the Court has inherent powers in this respect) *Bangit v. Steo Prasad*, 2 A. 487, 491 (1879), *Vasudev v. Salubai*, 10 B. 227, 229 (1885).

(5) *In re Sangaralingam*, 3 M. 78 (1880), *Bhugwan Das v. Nund Lal*, 12 C. 173, 175 (1885), *Suresh v. Ambica*, 18 C. 507, 509 (1891), see also *Rusool Rebee v. Jan Ali*, 17 W. R. 31 (1871), as regards the effect of this section on sect. 522 of the former Code, see *Shysma Charan v. Prohlad*, 8 C. W. N. 390, 393 (1904), dissenting from *Nauvarg Singh v. Sadapal Sing* 10 A. 8 (1887).

(6) *Gopal Conesh v. Ramchandra*, 26 B. 597, 606, 607 (1902) [death of appellant, held also that it by no means follows that the right to appeal against a decree partakes of the nature of the original cause of action—

defamation suit], *Paraman v. Sundarja*, 26 M. 499 (1902) [death of appellant—suit for malicious prosecution], *Rai Full v. Adesang*, 26 B. 203 (1901) [abatement only as regards certain respondents], *Chintaman v. Gungabai*, 27 B. 284 (1903) [death of one appellant, dealing with whole case on appeal of survivor], *Chandarsing v. Khumalhai*, 23 B. 718, 721 (1897) [death of one appellant cannot affect right of others to proceed with the appeal, and see *Alta Raksh v. Madharam*, 23 A. 22 (1900), *Ram Sewak v. Lambar Pande*, 25 A. 27 (1902), *Chintaman v. Gungabai*, 5 Bom. L. R. 90 (1903)], *Hun Kunwar v. Amla Prasad* 22 A. 430, 433 (1900) [right of appeal not surviving against surviving respondent, but against them and representative of deceased], and see *Raj Chunder v. Gunga Das*, 31 C. 487 (P. C.) 31, 1 A. 71, 8 C. W. N. 412, *Renga Srinivasa v. Gungaprakas*, 30 M. 67, 68 (1905), *Dharanjit v. Chandeshwar*, 11 C. W. N. 504, 506 (1907), *Joy Govind v. Manmotha*, 33 C. 580 (1900), *Susya Pillai v. Anyakanna Pillai*, 29 M. 529 (1906) [second appeals], *Muhammad Hussain v. Khushalo*, 10 A. 223, 235 (1888) [ascertainment of legal representative of deceased, inherent power], *Shysmanand v. Rajnarain*, 4 C. L. J. 563, 570 (1906) [right to appeal surviving against surviving respondents], *Upendra Kumar v. Sham Lal Mandal*, 6 C. L. J. 715 (1907), s. c., 34 C. 1020, 11 C. W. N. 1100, *Madhuban Das v. Navan Das*, 29 A. 535 (1907).

(7) *In re Durga Prasad*, 22 A. 231 (1899) [dist. Collector of Muzaffarnagore v. Hossain Begum, 18 A. 86 (1895)], *In re Sarat Chander Singh*, 18 A. 285 (1896), *Raja Ram v. Jilm* 9 B. 151, *Ramji v. Ellis*, 20 B. 167 (1895), moreover, O. XXII r. 13 has not now the qualifying words "arising out of the death, marriage, or insolvency," etc.

(8) The decision in *Dwarka Nath Biswas v. Debendra Nath Tagore*, 4 C. W. N. 58, 62 (1899) proceeded on the language of the former section, *vide post*.

of misjoined suits, (1) sending for and examining an Ameen on his report, (2) power to award costs against the estate of a deceased plaintiff, (3) power to pass an order under sect 103 of the last Code, (4) and the like. An Appellate Court has wider powers of remand than under the last Code (5).

The words of the section confer and impose upon an Appellate Court very wide powers (6) in fact, the same powers as those of the first Court as nearly as may be. It was, however, sometimes a question whether the general powers thus stated in the first part of the section were controlled by the second portion, (7) which dealt with the death, marriage and insolvency of parties. This portion has now been removed to O XXII r 13, the object of which is to obviate the necessity of repeating the provisions of the order so as to make them applicable to appeals, and that order is itself stated in wider terms, being no longer limited to proceedings arising out of the death, marriage or insolvency of parties to an appeal (8). The amended section disencumbered of the portion referred to, should now make it clear that the powers of an Appellate Court are as nearly as may be the same as those of the first Court, that is, while they are as extensive, they are subject to the same limitations (9). This principle has been held to be applicable to all cases where the Appellate Court has a plenary, and not merely a limited, jurisdiction (10). The first sub clause is new, and has been inserted because it was thought desirable to have in the body of the Code a general provision about the powers of an Appellate Court. The second sub clause is taken from the first part of sect 582 of the former Code.

87,
.]

108 The provisions of this Part relating to appeals from

Procedure in appeals from appellate decrees and orders. original decrees shall, so far as may be, apply to appeals—

(a) from appellate decrees, and

(1) Sheroop Chunder Paul & Mathoor Mohun, 4 W. R. 109 (1865) Ameerun & Waseehun, 12 W. R. 11, 13 (1869)

(2) Sheo Dyal Singh & Hodgkinson 24 W. R. 342 (1875) though a Judge should not order a Subordinate Judge whose judgment is before him on appeal to go and inspect. Roy Sultan & Laloo Koor, 17 W. R. 300 (1872)

(3) Rajmonee & Chunder, 8 C. 440 (1881) Lakshmi Bai & Balakrishna, 4 B. 654 (1880), there is now no scope for the doubt expressed in the first case

(4) Bankara Bhatta & Sulraya Bhatta, 17 M. L. J. 436 (1907), s. c., 30 M. 535

(5) Gora Chand & Basanta, 15 C. L. J. 258, 262 (1911)

(6) See Muhammad Husain & Khushalo, 10 A. 223, 233 (1883), as to the meaning of the term "powers," see Kali Krishna Chandra & Harihar Chuckerbutty, 1 B. L. R. 155 (1868)

(7) See Dwarka Nath Biswas & Debendra Nath Tagore, 4 C. W. N. 58, 62 (1899), where on this ground it was held that the earlier part of this section did not make all the pro-

visions applicable to suits applicable also to appeals

(8) Collector of Muzaffarnagar & Husain Begum, 18 A. 86, 88 (1890), though even under the last Code the power might have been found in the first part of the section, *In re Durga Prasad*, 22 A. 232 (1899), the present rule speaks of a plaintiff including "an appellant etc.," instead of "a plaintiff"

J, in Narain Das & Lagga Ram, 7 A. 693 699 (1835), and see as to the question of limitation there referred to, Mitra's Limitation, 4th edition p. 1103

(9) See in illustration cases cited *ante passim* and Durga Prasad & Khairati, 1 A. 545 (1878), where it was held that the Appellate Court should (as well as the Court of first instance) confine itself to deciding matters put in issue by the parties

(10) Tej Mal & Papayamma 22 M. L. J. 225 (1911)

(b) from orders made under this Code or under any special or local law in which a different procedure is not provided

"As far as may be"—These words mean "as far as is consistent with the principles on which appeals from appellate decrees [and orders] are admitted and determined." In second appeal the Court cannot go into the facts. So it was held that no objection could be taken under sect 567 of the last Code (1) corresponding with the present O XLI r 27. So also sect 565 now r 25 of the same Order) was held not to apply to second appeals (2). So while sects 562 and 564 of the last Code were held strictly binding on all Courts of first appeal, cases frequently occurred in which the Court in second appeal remanded cases for reasons not contemplated in the former section (3). So the appellate Court has set aside a decree where there was no proper judgment and remanded the case for a decision *de novo* (4) and has made a remand where evidence was improperly admitted, (5) and for a finding on an issue (6). Where the first Court dismissed a suit on one of the issues viz that of title, observing that it was not necessary to decide the other issues one of which was an issue as to limitation and the second Court decreed the suit by reversing the finding of the first Court on the issue of title, but omitted to record a finding on the issue of limitation, the case was remanded to the Lower Appellate Court for findings on the remaining issues (7). And though there was no section strictly authorizing a remand the Court was held under the circumstances warranted *ex debito justitiæ* in setting aside the proceedings and directing a retrial of the case (8). Sect 587 of the last Code was held to authorize an application to bring in a plaintiff respondent in second appeals and to extend to such appeals the provisions of sects 368 and 582 of that Code (now O XXII r 4 sect 107, O XXII r 11) (9). It was however, subsequently held though the Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts dissent that the reference to sect 582 in the Limitation Act did not include by implication second appeals referred to in the section corresponding to this (10). This section may be read with sect 582 now 107 *ante*, O XXII r 11 *post* (11).

(1) *Hindoo Brayan* 7 M. 52 (1883) [as to the portion of this decision dealing with the treatment of additional evidence by the Court of second appeal see *Gopal Singh v Bhakri Rai* 12 C 37 (1885)], *Sohawant Balu Nani*, 9 A 26 29 (1886) *Kelu Mulachari v Chenda* 19 M. 15* (1895)

(2) *Sheo Patan v Lajpu Kuan* 5 A 14 (1882), *Girdhari Lal v Crawford* 9 A 14 (1886) [dealing also with sect 566]

(3) *Ganesh Bhikaji v Bhikaji Krishna* 10 B 398 400 (1886), *Habib Bakhsh v Baldeo Prasad* 23 A 167 170 (1901)

(4) *Sheoambar Singh v Lallu Singh* 9 A 29 n. *Sohawant Balu Nani* 9 A 26 (1886)

(5) *Wazeer Ali v Kallee Coomar* 11 W 1 2 8 (1891)

(6) *Lalla Ram Lal v Mohurput Roy*, 21 W R 52 (1873)

(7) *Kailash Chandra Kundu v Kunja Bihari Goswami* 4 C I J 86 (1906)

(8) *Durga Dhal v Anoraji* 17 A 23 (1894) and see *Habib Bakhsh v Baldeo Prasad* 23 A 167 170 (1901)

(9) *Vakkalagadda v Vahizulla* 28 M 498 (1900)

(10) *Surya Pillai v Aryakannu Pillai* 29 M 529 (1906) dissented from in *Madhuban Das v Narain Das* 29 A 535 (1904) and *Upendra Kumar Chuckerbutty v Sham Lal Mandal* 34 C 1020 11 C W N 100 6 C L J 715 (1907)

(11) *Sarala Sunhari Das v Saroda Prasad Sur* 4 C L J 602 607 (1904)

APPEALS TO THE KING IN COUNCIL

[s. 595.] **109** Subject to such rules as may, from time to time, be made by *His Majesty in Council* regarding appeals from the Courts of British India, and to the provisions hereinafter contained, an appeal shall lie to *His Majesty in Council*—

- (a) from any decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction,
- (b) from any decree or final order passed by a High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction; and
- (c) from any decree or order, when the case, as hereinafter provided, is certified to be a fit one for appeal to *His Majesty in Council*

[s. 596.] **110** In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 109, the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance must be ten thousand rupees or upwards, and the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to *His Majesty in Council* must be the same sum or upwards, or the decree or final order must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of like amount or value,

and where the decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law

[s. 597.] **111** Notwithstanding anything contained in section 109, no appeal shall lie to *His Majesty in Council*—

Bar of certain appeals.

- (a) from the decree or order of one Judge of a High Court established under the *Indian High Courts Act, 1861*, or of one Judge of a Division Court, or of two or more Judges of such High Court, or of a Division Court constituted by two or more Judges of such High Court, where such Judges are equally divided in opinion, and do not amount in number to a majority of the whole of the Judges of the High Court at the time being; or
- (b) from any decree from which under section 102 no second appeal lies

112 (1) Nothing contained in *this Code* shall be deemed—
Savings. (a) to bar the full and unqualified exercise of *His Majesty's* pleasure in receiving

or rejecting appeals to *His Majesty* in Council, or otherwise howsoever, or

(b) to interfere with any rules made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and for the time being in force, for the presentation of appeals to *His Majesty* in Council, or their conduct before the said Judicial Committee.

(2) Nothing *herein contained* applies to any matter of criminal or admiralty or vice-admiralty jurisdiction, or to appeals from orders and decrees of Prize Courts.

Appeal to His Majesty in Council—This matter is dealt with both in the above sections and in O XLV. The provisions are substantially the same as in the last Code. Sects 613–615 of that Code have not been re-enacted, and rr 4 and 5 of O XLV are new.

In the Common Law of England must be found the origin of the jurisdiction of the Sovereign in Council but the Statute Law has recognized and affirmed such jurisdiction. In 1726, by a charter granted by George I, an appeal lay in the case of the Mayors' Courts to the Governor or President in Council and in important cases (1) to the King in Council. The appeal to the Privy Council from the Court of Sudder Dewany Adawlut (which the High Court on its appellate side represents) was granted by 21 Geo III c 70. The power to admit an appeal was first conferred upon the Sudder Dewany Adawlut by Reg XVI of 1797, sect 2 (2). In 1833 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was created (3) and by orders of Her Majesty in Council of the 10th April, 1838, passed in pursuance of 3 and 4 William IV c 41, certain restrictions were placed upon the exercise of the power of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut to admit an appeal. The practice of the Calcutta High Court in the admission of appeals has been regulated by rules of the Court made by the Sudder Dewany Adawlut on the 17th December, 1838 and by the High Court on the 30th July, 1870 (4). The Charter Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Vict c 104) substituted the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay for the Supreme Courts established under the Charters of 1774, 1800 and 1823 respectively. The Rules now in force have been issued under the powers vested in the High Court by 24 and 25 Vict c 104, sect 13, by the Letters Patent of the High Court, 1865, and by the Code of Civil Procedure. These Rules came into force from 1st July, 1891 (5). The right of appeal to the King in

(1) Ilbert's Government of India, 2nd Ed p 32

(2) In the matter of the Petition of Feda Hossein, 1 C 444 (1876)

(3) Safford and Wheeler's Privy Council Practice, 450

(4) In the matter of the Petition of Feda Hossein 1 C 444 (1876)

(5) Benchamber's Rules and Orders Appellate Side Rules Introductory Rule, also Pt I, Ch II r viii, Pt II, Ch IV etc

Council now rests on clause 39 of the Letters Patent of 1865, read with sects 109 and 110 and O XLV (1) Though appeals from the High Courts to the Privy Council possess the judgment of the judges beyond the seas, and notwithstanding the decisions of the High Courts, it has been repeatedly held that, notwithstanding the statutes which prescribe the time and mode of appealing, and the limits in point of amount, the power of the Sovereign in Council to entertain petitions for leave to appeal where the conditions imposed by the Statute have not been complied with, remains in full force. The jurisdiction was exercised in 1862 when there was no positive Statute law, Regulation 18 of 1842 of the Charter of 1858 so it is clear that the power of the Sovereign in Council to entertain petitions for leave to appeal or to stay execution or to take security for costs of an appeal, except strictly in accordance with the terms of the Statute or with any order the Privy Council may make in the particular case (3) The Judicial Committee act only as advisers to the Crown and not as a Court of Judicature (4) and "humbly recommend" their conclusions to His Majesty. But a commission appointed by the Governor General for the purpose of inquiring into the truth of an imputation against a Chief and of reporting to the Governor General in Council how far the same was true to the best of their judgment and belief was held to be a commission appointed by the Governor General himself for the information of his own mind, in order that he should not act in his political and sovereign character otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, and not in any sense a Court or if a Court not a Court from which an appeal lay to His Majesty in Council (5) Nor is there any appeal to His Majesty in Council from the Courts of Assistant Political Agents Political Agents in Kashmir or from the decision of the Governor of Bombay in Council (6) By the terms of the Charter (and also the Code) the appeal given is confined to Judicial acts, namely from decrees and orders though special leave may be

(1) *Chataprat Singh Dugar v Kharag Singh Lachmiram*, P C., 40 C 685 (1913)

(2) *Salik Ram v Azim Ali*, S W I A 270, 272, 274 (1862)

(3) *Salik Ram v Azim Ali*, S W I A 270, 272 (1862) (note) For right of appeal to the Privy Council in Criminal Case, see *Jay Kissen Mukherjee Petitioner*, I W R P C 13 (1862), *Gangadhar Lal v Queen Empress* 25 I A 1, 8 (1897), s c., 22 B

528, 532, *Ataur Singh v R*, 18 C L J 121 (1913) and *Chintamon Singh v King Emperor*, 18 C L J 119 (1903)

(4) *Safford and Wheeler v Privy Council* Practice p I

(5) *In re Maharaja Madhana Singh* 31 I A 239, 241 (1904), s c., 32 C 1, 1, 5, 8 C W N 841

(6) *Hem Chand v Azim Sakarlal*, 10 C W N 361, 420, 421 (1905)

granted by the Privy Council (1). Thus it has been held by the Privy Council that no appeal lies to it under the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1891) sect 51 since an award by the High Court under that Act is neither a decree under sect 2 of this Code nor a decree, final judgment or order within the meaning of the Letters Patent, but is the last of a series of arbitration proceedings (2). Where a matter has been referred by His Majesty to the Judicial Committee which is not strictly an appealable grievance their Lordships of the Privy Council may, under the reservations contained in 3 & 4 William IV c 41 advise His Majesty to grant the petitioner leave to appeal (3). Special leave to appeal was given in a case against an order made by the Judges of the Supreme Court of Madras dismissing the Master of that Court from his office for alleged official misconduct because the order was not made in the course of a judicial proceeding (4). But in *Ex parte Robertson* (5) it was held that the Judicial Committee have no jurisdiction to take into consideration the propriety of the dismissal of a public servant who held his office during pleasure unless the matter is expressly referred to them by the Crown. Following this case it has been held that the Privy Council have no jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court at Calcutta under sect 26 clause (2) of Beng Reg V of 1831, dismissing a Munsiff for corruption in the exercise of his functions as a Judge (6).

As stated the King in Council by virtue of the Royal Prerogative possesses an appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of all Courts of Justice established in any of the British Dominions beyond the seas and it is quite discretionary with the Judicial Committee to admit an appeal in cases far below the appealable amount mentioned in the Code and long after the period prescribed for filing a petition of appeal in India has expired (7). Thus when the High Court in India has refused the necessary certificate the aggrieved party may present a petition for the exercise of the prerogative right of the Crown to admit an appeal and the Judicial Committee in a fit case will advise His Majesty that leave to appeal should be allowed on the usual terms as to security. In a fit case their lordships will advise His Majesty to grant (8) an order staying proceedings

before special leave is petitioned from His Majesty in Council an application should be made to the High Court for a certificate that the case is nevertheless a fit one for appeal (10).

(1) *In re Minchin per* Lord Brougham, 4 M I A 220, 221 (1847)

(2) *Rangoon Botatoung Co Ltd v Collector Rangoon* P C 40 C 21 (1912) and see Special Officer Salsette Building Sites & Dossabhai Bezoni 37 B 506 (1912)

(3) *In re Minchin per* Lord Brougham 4 M I A 220 221 (1847) *Morgan v Leel* 2 M I A 428 (1841)

(4) *In re Minchin supra*

(5) 11 M P C cases 288 290 (1857-8)

(6) In the matter of Sree Mohun Chatterjee

13 M I A 313 346 (1870)

(7) *Salk Ram v Azim Ali* 8 M I A 270 272 (1869) see sect 112

(8) *Rahimabhai v Turner* 18 I A 89 (1890) s c 45 B 10 *Say v Mizlar Hossein v Badha Bibi* 17 A 112 114 (1894)

(9) *Moles v Chandra v Satesan* 27 C 1 4 (1896) s c 17 I A 281 1 C W N 34

(10) *Moti Chandra v Chandra Prasad Singh* 29 I A 40 (1901)

Special leave, by the Privy Council, when granted.—The Privy Council will not advise His Majesty to exercise this prerogative and to give special leave to appeal unless there is some substantial question of law of general interest involved (1) The petition for special leave to appeal is not by way of appeal from the decision of the Court, but it is presented for an exercise of the prerogative right of the Crown to admit on appeal. Although it is not an appeal it is perhaps a more convenient proceeding than an appeal, because the Privy Council can then grant leave on any other ground, if other ground appears for the indulgence that is sought, and if it finds that, in a case in which the appeal is claimed as of right, the Court below has refused the certificate for a reason which appears to them to be an unsound reason, then they will advise His Majesty to admit the appeal (2) The Privy Council is not bound by the provisions of the Code. Thus where in an appeal to it by one of the defendants, it set aside a decree of the High Court and restored that of the first Court and it appeared from the wording of the decree of the Privy Council that the defendants generally were entitled to have the benefit of the decree, held that the defendants generally were entitled to the benefit of the decree though there was no common ground such as is referred to in the Code (3)

Special leave without requiring further security—Where the High Court passed a separate decree on a cross appeal identical in terms with those of the decree passed on appeal in the same suit and granted leave to appeal in one and refused it in the other their lordships granted special leave without requiring further security than had already been taken by the High Court (4)

Leave to appeal, granted without authority—special leave granted—An objection that an appeal has come before the Judicial Committee without proper authority, viz that the leave to appeal should not have been given, ought to be taken at the earliest moment, for the obvious reason that the great expense of preparing for the hearing is thereby saved, which is uselessly incurred if, when the objection is ultimately taken the Privy Council feel obliged to yield to it but it is clearly competent to the Judicial Committee to hear such an objection at any stage of the appeal, and it is not unfrequently heard when the appeal is called on and before the arguments on the merits have commenced (5)

Special leave to appeal—contents of the petition—Such a petition should contain a full statement of the facts and legal grounds showing that there is a substantial case on the merits, and a point of law involved proper to be determined by the Privy Council. Thus, where the statements contained in the petition were of a too general character to enable the Privy Council to judge of the propriety of granting the special leave prayed for, their lordships

(1) *Moti Chandra v Ganga Prasad* 29 I A 40, 42 (1901), *see* 24 A 174, 60 W N 362 364, 4 Bom L R 130

(2) *Rahimabhai v Turner*, 15 B 175, 158 (1890)

(3) *Lachmeput v Khoobunnass*, 14

W R 280 (1870)

(4) *Mahammad Ikram ud din v Najibin*, 23 I A 167 (1896), *see* 19 A 95

(5) *Gajadhar Pershad v Widows of Gnan Ah Beg* 15 B L R 221, 223 (1875)

ordered that the petition should be either dismissed with liberty to present another petition or stand over to amend the petition (1) If a serious question of law is involved in the appeal special leave will be granted by the Privy Council though leave had been refused by the High Court (2) Special leave has been refused in the following cases —merely because the Judge had omitted to record any reason while granting a review, which he should have done, (3) and where the High Court dismissed an appeal as barred by limitation the Judicial Committee not being satisfied that the refusal of the High Court to admit the appeal out of time was wrong (4)

Rescission of special leave to appeal—Where there is an omission of any material facts, whether it arises from improper intention on the part of the petitioner or whether it arises from accident or negligence still the effect is just the same if the Court has been induced to make an order which if the facts were fully before it it would not or might not have been induced to make (5) So an Order in Council made upon an *ex parte* application granting special leave to appeal upon an allegation as to the value of the property in dispute was rescinded where there were omissions in the petition of proceedings in the suit which showed the true value of the property Generally an Order in Council obtained upon an *ex parte* petition which omits to state the true facts will be discharged with costs but if there has been laches in applying to discharge the order on the part of the respondent no costs will be given (6) Where special leave to appeal is granted upon a petition in which material misstatements are made objections should be taken by the respondent by a preliminary motion to rescind the leave to appeal or at any rate before the hearing of the appeal when called on has been entered on Where it is not clear that the material misstatements in the petition had been made with an intention to deceive and the objection to the appeal is taken at a late stage of the hearing the Judicial Committee may decline to dismiss the appeal but refuse the appellant the costs of the appeal But if their Lordships are satisfied that the misstatements were intentionally made to deceive them they will even at a late stage dismiss the appeal (7)

Powers of High Court after admission—The question has arisen and been answered affirmatively whether the High Court after the admission of an appeal to the Privy Council has any further authority in the suit and competence to do any judicial act relating to it Thus on the death of a party on the record of an appeal pending before the Privy Council evidence must be given in the Court from which the appeal has been preferred of the representative character of the person or persons by or against whom review is sought The

(1) Goree Monee v Juggat Indra 11 M I A (1866)

(2) Gooneshar v Conesh Das 3 C W N cccxxviii (1899)

(3) Shankar Buksh v Balwant Singh 2 I A 79 (1899) s c 4 C W N 203

(4) Ram Narain v Parenaswar 20 C 309 (1900)

(5) Mohun Lal Sookul v Bibee Doss 8 M I A 193 (1861) per Lord Kingsdown p 19; Ameena Khatoor v Badha Benode Meher 7 M I A 261 263 (1869)

(6) Ibid see also Mussoorie Bank v Raynor 4 A 500 508 (1889) s c 9 I A 70

(7) Ram Sabuk v Kam nee 14 B L R (P C) 391 406 (1874) s c 23 W R 113

Court below should give its own opinion as to who are the parties who should be substituted upon the record, and should make and send a certificate or statement on which their Lordships can act (1) When only the petition for leave to appeal has been filed and before it is allowed, the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain applications relating to the appeal (2) Further, if the appellant has taken no steps towards prosecuting the appeal, the petition of appeal may be struck off the file by the High Court (3) The Judicial Committee have no jurisdiction to entertain any application in an appeal until the petition of appeal is lodged there though the transcript has been registered in the Council office (4) If after the admission of the appeal no steps are taken by the appellant within reasonable time, the Judicial Committee, upon a certificate of the Registrar of the High Court that no further proceedings have been taken after the admission of the appeal will dismiss it (5) It was considered that an appeal to the Privy Council having once been admitted whether properly or erroneously the High Court had no further jurisdiction to review its order and declare the appeal rejected (6) But in a later case *Prinsep J* held that an order granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council was open to review (7) And an order refusing leave to appeal to the Privy Council can be reviewed by the Court which made it (8)

Rehearing of appeal by the Privy Council—It is unquestionably the strict rule and ought to be distinctly understood as such, that no cause in the Privy Council can be reheard, and that an order once made, that is a report submitted to His Majesty and adopted by being made an Order in Council, is final and cannot be altered. The same is the case of the judgments of the House of Lords that is of the Court of Parliament, or of the King in Parliament as it is sometimes expressed, the only other supreme tribunal. Whatever, therefore has been really determined in these Courts must stand, there being no power of rehearing for the purpose of changing the judgment pronounced. Nevertheless if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced these Courts possess, by Common Law the same power which the Courts of Record and Statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of the last resort where by some accident without any blame the party has not

(1) *Haider Ali v Tassadduk Rasul* 16 C 181 (1888)

(2) *Harro Soon lery v Kristonauth, Fulton* 10 (1812)

(3) *Gobardhan v Mani Bibi* 5 B L R 76 (1870), *Thakoor Kapielnath v The Government*, 1 C 142 (1876)

(4) *Gungadhar v Rathamoney*, 9 Moo P C 411 (1857)

(5) *Pabutti Dassan v Radhananth* 6 M I A 346 (1856)

(6) *Ameerunnissa v Idjurgest*, 6 W P 97

(1866)

(7) *Copinath Birbar v Goluck Chunder*, 16 C 292 (1884) [this case on the interpretation of substantial question of law appears to be overruled by the Privy Council case of *Tala Persaud Bhakt v Benayek Misser*, 23 I A 102 (1894), s c 23 C 918, *Sokal Butti v Babu Lal* 28 C 190, 193 (1900), s c, 5 C W N

(8) *Nand Kishore v Ram Golam* 79 C 1037 (1912) 1 C W N 1089

been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party has been heard. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case their Lordships recommended the restoration of the appeal dismissed *ex parte* (1). Even before report, whilst the decision of the Board is not yet *res judicata*, great caution has been observed in permitting the rehearing of appeals (2). After the respondent has had notice of a pending appeal, he is not entitled to further notice that the record has been transmitted or that the appeal is set down for hearing, and he cannot ask for a rehearing of the appeal on the ground that he had no such notice (3). The unusual indulgence of recommending a rehearing of an appeal to His Majesty ought never to be granted except under very special circumstances, and only where the *ex parte* hearing has not been occasioned by any default in the party applying for a rehearing (4). An Order in Council rescinding a previous Order in Council granting special leave to appeal may be discharged and the appeal restored (5). Also an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution (under Rule 5 of the Order in Council of 1853) has been restored on explanation of delay incurred and on conditions as to costs and security to be given in England (6).

Appeals from decision given on second appeal—In an appeal to the Privy Council from a decree of the High Court made on a second appeal the hearing before their Lordships must be based upon the materials which were open to the High Court and the findings of the Subordinate Judge on matters not involving questions of law must be taken as conclusive (7) and in such cases the findings of fact by the first Court are binding on the Judicial Committee (8).

Concurrent judgments on fact—The Judicial Committee will not interfere with concurrent judgments of the Courts below on pure matters of fact, (9) unless very definite and explicit grounds for that interference are

(1) *Rajendernarain v Bijai Govind* 1 Moo I A 117 126 134 142 (1836) *per* Lord Brougham

(2) *Venkata Narasinha v Court of Wards* 13 I A 155 158 (1886), s c, 10 M L 3 78
Varlagadda Durga v Mallikarajuna 14 M 439 (1891)

(3) *Lalta Pershad v Azzizuddin* 24 I A 49 (1896) s c, 19 A 209, *Surnomoyee v Shoshee Mokhee* 12 I A 257 (1868)

(4) *Rajender Narain v Bijai Govind* 1 Moo P C 117 (1836) *Surnomoyee v Shoshee Mokhee* 12 I A 257 (1868)

(5) *Mohann Lal v Bibee Dass* 8 Moo 1 A 492 497 (1861) *see ib.*, at p 193

(6) *Rabiabai v Mahomed Ismail* 24 I A 128 s c, 21 B 723 (1897)

(7) *Lachmeswar Singh v Manowar Hossein* 19 C 253 260 (1891), s c, 19 I A 48 53
Luchman Singh v Puna 16 C 753 755 (1899) s c 16 I A 125 *see Pestonji Modi v Queen Insurance Coy* 25 B 332, 336 (1900)

(8) *Anangamanjari v Irupura Soondari* 14 I A 101 110 (1887) s c 14 C 740 at p 748 *Munnalal v Gajraj* 17 C 216 (1889)
Durga Chowdhram v Jawahar 18 G 93 (1890)

(9) *Young Tha Hyeen v Young Pan Ayo* 27 I A 166 (1900) s c 28 C 1 4 C W N 808 *Dharam Chait Bhawani Mirani*, 20 C 189 194 (1897) s c 24 I A 183
1 C W N 697 *Bureswar v Shih Chander* 19 I A 101 (1892) s c 19 C 452 461
Ram Narain v Bhim Canjhu 3 C W N 249 (1898), *Sundaralinga Swami v Rama Swami* 26 I A 50 57 (1899) s c 22 M 515, *Hari Har v Uman Parshai* 14 I A 7 (1836) s c 14 C 296 *Krishnan v Sudevi* 12 M 112 (1889) *Ram Lal v Mehli Husain* 17 C 882 (1899) *Asghar Reza v Mehdi Hossein* 20 C 560 572 (1892), s c 20 I A 38 47 *Parbati Das v Bakumta Nath*, P C 19 C L J 129 (1913)

assigned, (1) and it is satisfied that there is miscarriage of justice or the violation of any principle of law or procedure (2) But where there are concurrent findings of facts and there is no substantial question of law in issue, their Lordships, in order to see how far the Courts have concurred in their view of the facts, will examine precisely what their findings are (3) Where the Courts in India have come to a certain conclusion on a certain issue, that is a fact which, considering the advantages the Judges in India generally possess, of forming a correct opinion of the probability of a certain transaction, and in some cases of the credit due to the witness, affords a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of their decisions, yet that circumstance does not and ought not, to relieve the Judicial Committee, the Court of last resort, from the duty of examining the whole evidence and forming for itself an opinion on the whole case (4) But the duty of a Court of ultimate appeal is to judge from the evidence and not to infer from probabilities (5) In a recent case where in a mortgage-deed a fictitious entry had been made (which if correct would have brought it within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court) and there was no evidence that there was an error, it was held by the Privy Council that concurrent findings of error were not findings of fact since a decision that there is no evidence to support a finding is a decision of law (6)

The Judicial Committee has refused to depart from the rule as to concurrent findings of fact merely because the High Court has admitted documents tendered by the appellant which the first Court had rejected (7) It cannot detract from the weight of concurrent findings of fact, that different Courts in arriving at the same result upon the same evidence, have not been influenced by precisely the same considerations A difference of opinion to that extent is only calculated to suggest that the evidence, whatever view be taken of it, must necessarily lead to one and the same inference, and there will be no interference by the Privy Council in such cases (8) Where no question of law, either as to the construction of documents or any other point, arises on the judgment of the High Court, and there are concurrent findings of the two Courts below on the oral and documentary evidence submitted to them, their Lordships will not entertain an appeal (9) When the question is not one of construction of one or more deeds, which would be a question of law, but is

(1) *Young Tha Hyeen v Young Pan Nyo*, 27 I A 106 (1900), s c, 28 C 1, 4 C W N 808

(2) *Rani Srimati v Kshajendra Narayan*, 31 I A 127, 131 (1904), s c, 31 C 871, 9 C W N 74, *Mudho Soodan v Suroop chunder* 4 M I A 431 (1819) s c 7 W R P C 73, *Mela Venkataramayya Apparow v Shri Paja Parthasarathy Apparow*, 17 C W N 1222, P C (1913)

(3) *Asghar Roza v Mehdi Hosein*, 20 C 560, 572 (1892), s c, 20 I A 38, 10

(4) *Mulho Soodan v Suroop Chunder*, 1 M I A 431, 433 (1819); *Murideo Mahomed Careem v Meerza Ally*, 1 M I A

27, 49 (1854), *Chunder Monee v Munmo hince*, 8 M I A 477, 489 (1861); *Tayammaul v Sasachalla* 10 M I A 429 (1865)

(5) *Wise v Sunduloomissa*, 11 M I A 177 (1867)

(6) *Harendra Lal v Hari Das Debi*, P C, 19 C L J 484 (1914)

(7) *Hurri Bhusan v Upendra Lal* 23 I A 97, 100 (1893), s c, 24 C 1

(8) *Nilmoni Singh v Kartichunder*, 20 C 847, 852 (1893), s c 20 I A 95

(9) *Toolsay Persaud v Benayel*, 23 I A 102, 101 (1896), s c, 23 C 918, see also *Sukulbutti v Bahulal Mandar*, 28 C 190 (1901), s c, 5 C W N 455

a question as to the effect to be given to decrees, leases and other documents as evidence of certain facts (*e.g.* that of adoption and its consequences), the concurrent findings against the *factum* of the adoption will not be disturbed merely because the evidence largely consisted of leases and other written documents (1)

The well known rule of the Judicial Committee not to disturb concurrent findings of fact by the lower Courts, unless they are shown to be erroneous, is none the less applicable, although the Courts may not have taken precisely the same view of the weight to be attached to each particular item of evidence. Thus their Lordships declined to disturb such finding where one Court relied on the oral and the other on the documentary evidence (2) In boundary cases the appellant must come prepared to show clearly where the decree appealed from is wrong, and what other course is right, it is insufficient to raise doubts as to the correctness of the decision (3)

It has been recently held that the provisions as to concurrent findings on fact would be misconstrued if the Judges in India were by implication subjected to the duty of making their narrative of circumstances minutely exhaustive, under the penalty of being presumed to have overlooked elementary considerations (4)

The Judicial Committee will not on the ground that there was some imperfection in the pleadings, set aside the decree of a High Court, when the High Court were right on the merits of the case (5) Nor will their Lordships allow any new point to be taken for the first time in the Privy Council (6)

Reversal of decree on preliminary question entry into merits — In *Fischer v. Kamala Naicker* (7) it was arranged, in the commencement of the argument, with the consent of the counsel on both sides, that if their Lordships should be of opinion that the decision of the Court below could not be sustained on the grounds on which it had been based, they should proceed to consider the whole case on its merits, and finally dispose of it. And their Lordships, being of opinion that the decision could not be sustained on the grounds on which it had been based, considered the whole case on its merits and dismissed the appeal without costs, saying that as they dismissed the appeal on wholly different grounds from those relied on by the Court below the dismissal should be without costs

Costs —When a cause is remanded by the Privy Council and the miscarriage of the suit was occasioned by the manner in which the issue was framed

(1) *Luchman Lal v. Kanhya Lal*, 22 I A 51, 58 (1891), s c, 22 C 609, 618

(2) *Anugra Narain v. Hanuman Sahai*, 30 C 303, 308 (1902), s c, 30 I A 41, 7 C W N 225

(3) *Rajcoomar Ray v. Gobind Chander*, 19 I A 140, 147 (1892), s c, 19 C 671

(4) *Mirza Sajjad v. Wazir Ali*, 39 I A 156 (1912), 16 C W N 889, 14 Bom I R 1055

(5) *Gunga Pershad v. Moharani Bili*, 12 I A 47, 51 (1884)

(6) *Sundaralinga Swami v. Ramaswami*, 26 I A 55, 57 (1899) s c 22 W 515, *Sambhunath v. Surjamon*, 24 I A 191 (1897), s c, 25 C 187, 1 C W N 649, *Imambandi v. Kamaleswari Pershad*, 21 C 1005, 1017 (1891), s c, 21 I A 118

(7) 8 W I A 170, 189 189 (1860)

by the Judge, the costs of appeal should be directed to be costs in the cause (1). In the case (2) cited their Lordships, while remanding the case, ordered that if the respondent failed to appear in the High Court, or if the appeal should be decided against him the respondent should pay the appellant's costs of the appeal in England, and the costs (if any) paid under the decree of the High Court were to be repaid to him. When an appeal is heard *ex parte* in the absence of the respondent and it is dismissed, the respondent is entitled to costs up to, and including, the lodgment of his printed case, and also to the costs of appearance for applying for the same (3).

Pauper appeal—In an early case (4) leave to appeal in *forma pauperis* was granted on an application to the High Court on an unstamped paper, but certified by counsel that there was reasonable ground of appeal. It has been recently held that the High Court cannot entertain an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council in *forma pauperis* and to be exonerated from depositing the respondent's costs and the usual fees (5). The question whether it is necessary although
Ram v Sheo Churn (6)

Appeal pending, effect on rights of owner—The pendency of an appeal to England does not put the party who subject to that appeal, is the owner of an estate under a legal disability to bring a suit in that character against third parties (7).

Decree—This term is defined in sect 2 (2), and under that definition a decree may be either preliminary or final. The distinction between the two is pointed out in the explanation to that section. Under sect 97, parties aggrieved by preliminary decrees are required to appeal therefrom. Sect 591 of the last Code ran as follows: "decree includes also judgment and order" (8). Decree now includes a final order. Clauses (a) and (b) of sect 593 of the last Code spoke of "final decrees". Sect 109 now speaks of "any decree or final order". Apparently, then, an appeal will lie from a decree which may be either final or preliminary and from an order which is final. This is in accordance with previous decisions. A final decree was always appealable. And the Privy Council held that "final" for this purpose did not mean the last

(1) *Rajah Sahab Perhlad Scin v. Run Bahadur*, 12 M I A 299 (1869).

(2) *Kaleo Pershad v. Binda Lal*, 12 M I A 343, 349 (1869).

(3) *Sambhu Nath v. Surjaman*, 24 I A 191 (1897), s c, 25 C 187 189, 1 C W N 643.

(4) *In re Jowad Ali*, 8 W R 48 (1867). This order was made on condition that the usual security for costs was to be given and the costs of translation deposited.

(5) *Jagadanand v. Rajendra*, 17 C I J 741 (1912).

(6) 4 M I A 111, 130 (1846).

(7) *Rajah Sahab Perhlad Scin v. Budhoo Singh*, 12 M I A 275, 342 (1869), s c, 2 B I R (r c) 111, 142, 2 W R (r c) 6, 20.

(8) It has been held that therefore the provision in sect 588 of the last Code did not restrict the provision in sect 590 that an appeal might be brought to the King in Council from a final order. *Krishna Prasad v. Motchand*, 40 I A 140 17 C I J 577 (1912), 17 C W N 637.

decree but a decree determining rights finally, such as a preliminary decree establishing the liability to account and directing accounts to be taken (1) In the case cited it was said that, to decide whether a decree is final or not, the Court should look at what was the real question before the Court when the decree was made. Where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was accountable to him upon several claims, and the defendant alleged that he had got legal defences to every one of those claims and that he was not accountable at all, and the Court held that the legal defences put forward were valid as to some of the claims, and as to others of the claims they were invalid and therefore the defendant must account, and passed a decree for account, such a decree directing accounts was held to be a "final" decree under the last Code (2) "It is true," said Lord Hobhouse, "that the decree that was made does not declare in terms the liability of the defendant, but it directs accounts to be taken which he was contending ought not to be taken at all and it must be held that the decree contains within itself an assertion that if a balance is found against the defendant on those accounts the defendant is bound to pay it. Therefore the form of the decree is exactly as if it affirmed the liability of the defendant to pay something on each one of these claims if only the arithmetical result of the account should be worked out against him. Now that question of liability was the sole question in dispute at the hearing of the cause and it is the cardinal point of the suits. The arithmetical result is only a consequence of the liability. The real question in issue was the liability, and that has been determined by this decree against the defendant in such a way that in this suit it is final. The Court can never go back again upon this decree so as to say that though the result of the account may be against the defendant still the defendant is not liable to pay anything. That is finally determined against him and therefore in their Lordships' view the decree is a final one within the meaning of the Code (3)

An order of remand, where the first Court has disposed of a suit on a preliminary point, is not a final, but an interlocutory decree (4). But where a remand was made under the wrong section and the order of the High Court decided a cardinal issue in the suit which could never while the decision stood, be disputed again there was held to be a final decree notwithstanding that there might be inquiries yet to be made in disposing of the suit *e.g.* where the High Court, reversing the decree of the first Court held that a valid bequest

(1) Rahimboy v. Turner 18 I. A. 6 (1890) s. c. 15 B. 155 (1890)

(2) Rahimboy v. Turner 15 B. 155 (1890) s. c. 18 I. A. 6 cf. Abu Sha v. Cassirao 6 B. 260 (1892), Ishvargar v. Caudasama 8 B. 548 (1884)

(3) Rahimboy v. Turner 18 I. A. 6 (1890) s. c. 15 B. 155. See also Sayad Muzhar Hossein v. Bodha Bibi 22 I. A. 1 (1894) s. c. 17 A. 112, 116. Hafiz Abdul v. Hari Raj 22 A. 40, 40* (1900). Shantaram v. Jamsetji, 4 B. 11 L. J. 212 (1902)

(4) Mahant Ishvargar Budhgar v. Candia sama Amarsang 8 B. 548, 551 (1884), Habib un nissa v. Munawar un nissa 25 A. 629, 630 (1903). Forbes v. Amceroonissa 10 M. I. A. 340, 349 (1866) s. c. 1 Buth I. C. 621, 627. Tirunarayana v. Gopalasami 13 M. 349 (1883). Tussuduk Rasool v. Farzan Ali Hassan 2 C. W. N. 664 (1898), Ahmadi Gobind 33 A. 391 (1911). Arshna Chandra v. Ram Nandan 18 C. L. J. 14 (1913)

was made by a will and remanded the case for the trial of other issues (1). Where

by a notification in the Government Gazette to be qualified for admission as a vakil of the High Court, but when the mistake was found out the notification was cancelled, on application for leave to appeal, *held* that Chapter XLV of the last Code had no application, and that the matter was not one in which the High Court was concerned to give or refuse leave to appeal (4). Where, after the admission of an appeal to the Privy Council, the Court below passed a judgment in review in the same case which judgment was sent up and notified to the Council, and put on record in the appeal case, it was held open to the Judicial Committee to pass judgment on the appeal, without prejudice to the subsequent judgment which was passed on review (5).

Final order—As regards orders made prior to decree which are only so many steps towards the ultimate decree, they may be styled preliminary or interlocutory, and in this sense not final. By final order is apparently meant an order which terminates the proceedings in favour of one of the parties (6). In the case cited, Markby, J., said: "I do not know any meaning to the word 'final' which can be applied to orders made subsequent to decree." *Sed quæ* Such an order cannot, it is true, possess finality in the sense in which that term is opposed to orders which are steps towards the decree, for the decree has

been held that the question of finality must be determined with reference to the precise relation in which it stands to the proceedings before the Court (8). It is not always easy to distinguish between what is a final and what is an interlocutory order. The Court of Appeal (in England) has not attempted to give an exhaustive definition, and the Legislature in the Judicature Act, 1875, sect. 12 has not given such a definition (9). Sect. 2, clause (2) Explanation, of this Code, says that a decree is final when the adjudication completely disposes of the suit. "No order, judgment, or other proceeding," says Brett, L.J., (10) "can be final

(1) Muzhar Hossein v. Badha Bibi, 17 A (P. C.) 112, 116 (1891). But see Baij Nath v. Chohan Bibi, 31 A 545 (1909).

(2) Rahimbhoy Habibbhoj v. Turner, 15 B 150 (1890), s. c., 18 I A 6, cf. Aben Shaz Cassirao, 6 B 260 (1882).

(3) See Habib un nissa v. Manwar un nissa, 20 A 629, 630 (1903).

(4) In the matter of the petition of Sukhnandan Lal, 6 A 163 (1881).

(5) Toondun Singh v. Pokhnarain, 1 I A 312 315 (1871).

(6) Jagessur Sahai v. Murachko Rocr, 1 C

L. R. 354, 353 (1877).

(7) See Ram Faruk v. Mosahebali, 6 C W N 246 (1901).

(8) Harish v. Nawab Bahadur of Moor shidabad, 13 C L J 688 (1911), 16 C W N 879, Secretary of State v. B. I. S. N. Coy., 13 C L J 90 (1911).

(9) Lewis v. Williams 31 Ch. D 623 (1886), per Chitty J., p. 627.

(10) Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange, 3 C. P. D. 67, 71 (1877), s. c., 47 L. J. C. P. 3, cf. White v. Witt, 5 Ch. D 589 (1877).

which does not at once affect the status of the parties, for whichever side the decision may be given, so that if it is given for the plaintiff it is conclusive against the defendant, and if it is given for the defendant it is conclusive against the plaintiff." "I conceive," says Fry, L.J., "that an order is final only where it is made upon an application or other proceeding which must, whether such application or other proceeding fail or succeed, determine the action. Conversely, I think that an order is 'interlocutory' where it cannot be affirmed that in either event the action will be determined." When any further step is necessary to perfect an order (1) or judgment, it is not final but interlocutory (2). A judgment may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined (3). An order dismissing a petition, presented under the Indian Companies Act (Act XII of 1895) for confirmation of the alteration in the Memorandum of Association, on the ground that no such resolution as the law requires has been passed, was held appealable under the former section (4). The order of a High Court setting aside an order of a District Judge calling on to his own file proceedings pending in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, and directing that the proceedings be remitted to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and that the application presented to that Court may be disposed of, is not a final order, (5) nor is an order refusing to appoint a Receiver in a suit (6). An order of a High Court setting aside an order of a lower Court refusing to set aside an *ex parte* decree is a purely interlocutory and not a final order, (7) and so is an order rejecting an application for stay of execution of a decree under appeal (8). An order under the Rules and Orders merely refusing to re-open a Registrar's report is not final, (9) nor is an order deciding only that the Respondent should be at liberty to sue *in forma pauperis* (10). But an order of the High Court based on the ground that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action against the defendant is a final order within the meaning of this clause, (11) and so is an order setting aside the decision of a lower Court as to the respective shares of the parties to a partnership suit and directing fresh accounts to be

(1) *Salaman v. Wadner*, 1 Q. B. 731, 736 (1891), s.c., 60 L. J. Q. B. 624, 61 L. T. 598, 39 W. R. (Eng.) 547.

(2) *Collins v. Paddington*, 5 Q. B. D. 368, 370 (1880), per Baggallay, L.J.

(3) *The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company*, 8 B. L. R. 433, 452 (1872), per Couch, C.J., and Markby, J., cf. *Rahimbhoy v. Turner*, 15 B. 155 (1890), s.c., 18 L. A. C. 15 B. 155 (1890).

(4) *Bombay Burma Trading Co. v. Dorabji*, 5 Bom. L. R. 348 (1903), s.c., 27 B. 415.

(5) *Palakdhar v. Radha Prasad*, 2 A. 65, 67 (1878).

(6) *Chandi Dutt v. Padmanand*, 22 C. 928, 930 (1890).

(7) *Rai Radha Kissen v. Collector of*

Jaunpore 6 C. W. N. 153, 157 (1900), s.c., 23 A. 230 and the mere fact that the High Court apparently on the assumption that it was such an order, have certified the sufficiency of the amount and value of the suit cannot make appealable an order which does not fulfil the statutory condition.

(8) *Srinivasa v. Kesho Prasad*, 13 C. J. 681 (1911), *Krishna Chandra v. Jagan*, 18 C. L. J. 124 (1913).

(9) *Royal Insurance Co. v. Alcock*, 6 C. W. N. 41 (1901).

(10) *Sajan Singh v. G. J. J.*, 6 C. W. N. 296 (1904).

(11) *Harish v. Nandan*, 13 C. L. J. 579.

taken (1) The dismissal of an appeal to the Privy Council for want of prosecution is not a final order within the meaning of Art 179, Sch II of the Limitation Act (2)

Appeal under Letters Patent not falling within the Code— Where, by an Order in Council, a case was remitted to the High Court with a direction to take an account between the parties on certain principles, and it was further ordered that if, on the taking of the accounts, anything should be found due to the plaintiff, a decree should be made in his favour, and if nothing should be found due to him the suit would be dismissed, and when the case came back to the High Court a Division Bench took the accounts and made a decree against the defendants *held* that sects 595, 596 of the former Code did not apply to such a case but a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council might be successfully claimed under clause 39 of the Letters Patent, the amount in dispute being over Rs 10 000, because it was a final decree of a Division Court of the High Court from which an appeal did not lie to the High Court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent The expression "a Division Court" in sect 39 (it was held) did not apply only to a Division Court sitting on the original side (3)

"Passed on appeal"—This does not mean the same thing as any order passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction So an order rejecting an application to review a judgment passed on appeal is not an order made on appeal from which an appeal lies to the Privy Council (4) Nor is an order rejecting an application to amend a decree, (5) nor is an order refusing to admit an appeal presented beyond the prescribed period (6) Two essential elements to be considered in deciding whether an order is one passed in appeal are whether the relationship of a Superior and an Inferior Court exists, and whether the Superior Court possesses the power to review, affirm or modify the decisions (7) An order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under sect 115 or its power of superintendence under sect 15 of the High Courts Act of 1851 is made or passed on appeal within the meaning of this clause (8)

"Or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction"—As, for example, from the final order of a District Judge, when there is no appeal to the High Court (9)

(1) *Dwarka v Haji Mahomed*, 15 C W N 60 (1910)

(2) *Batuk Nath v Mt Munni Devi*, P C, 19 C. L. J. 574 (1914), and see *Abdul Majid v Jawahir Lal*, P C, 19 C L J 626 (1914) (such an order in Council is not an order affirming a decree)

(3) *Guru Prasanno Lahiri v Jotindra Mohun Lahiri*, 32 C 963 (1905), s c, 9 C W N 566

(4) *Rajah Fnuet Hossein v Rowshan Jahan*, 19 W R (F B) 1 (1869), *Souda v Dasse v Mahatab Chand*, C W R

Misc 102 (1866)

(5) *Sunder Koer v Chaudahwar Prasad*, 30 C 679 (1903)

(6) *Kassondas v Gangabai*, 9 Bom L R 566 (1907), 32 B 108

(7) *Harish v Nawab Bahadur of Moor shidabad*, 13 C I J 688, 15 C W N 870 (1911)

(8) *Harish v Nawab Bahadur of Moor shidabad*, *supra*

(9) *Seadatmand Khan v Phul Kuar*, 25 I A 116 (1879), s c, 20 A 112, 116

"In the exercise of original civil jurisdiction"—There is no right of appeal from a decree made by the High Court in the exercise of original jurisdiction, if an appeal will lie to the High Court itself under clause 15, but there is a direct appeal from a decree made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by a Division Bench of two Judges. There is no appeal under clause 40 of the Letters Patent, to the Privy Council from an interlocutory judgment or order of a Judge of the High Court (e.g. an order for inspection of documents), until such judgment or order has been subjected to an appeal to the High Court, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, except in those cases, in which, by reason of the number of the Judges who have made such order, an appeal under clause 15 is given directly to the Privy Council (1). There is no appeal against the decision of a High Court passed on appeal from an award of compensation made by the Court to which a reference had been made under sect. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, for such a decision is an award (2).

"Any decree or order, when the case is certified"—The certificate is given under O. XLVI r. 3 that the case is 'otherwise a fit one for appeal'. This provision is intended to meet special cases where the point in dispute is of importance, though not measurable in money (3). In all cases below the appealable value an application should be made to the High Court for such a certificate before application is made for special leave from the Privy Council itself (4). This clause includes cases where it cannot be said that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit is Rs 10 000 or upwards or that the amount or value of the dispute on appeal is of that sum or upwards (5) where the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance is below Rs 10 000, but the amount or value of the dispute on appeal is Rs 10 000 or upwards (6) and where the matter in dispute is under the appealable value. Where the certificate of the High Court simply said "Let a certificate be granted that this is a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council and let the usual notices be issued," it was held to have been given pursuant to sect. 595 (c) and the latter alternative of sect. 600 of the former Code (7). The discretion vested in the Court by this clause should be sparingly used (8). This clause is not to be interpreted as restricted to "final orders" (9).

"Fit one"—Thus an order rejecting a petition for confirmation of an alteration in Memorandum of Association presented under the Indian Companies Act (XII of 1895) on the ground that no such resolution as required

(1) *Sonbai v. Ahmedbhai Habibbhai*, 9 Bom. H. C. R. 398, 400 (1872).

(2) Special Officer Salsette Building Sites v. Dasabhai, 17 C. W. N. 421 (1913).

(3) *Banarsi Prasad v. Hashi Krishna*, 28 I. A. 11, 13 (1900); *Srinivasa v. Kesho Prasad*, 13 C. L. J. 681, 686 (1911).

(4) *Moti Chand v. Ganga Prasad*, 29 I. A. 10, 42 (1901).

(5) *Bombay Burmah Trading Co. v. Dorsbhai*, Bom. L. R. 318 (1903). See also *Banarsi Prasad v. Hashi Krishna*, 22 I. A. 11, 13 (1900).

s. c. 23 A. 227.

(6) *Amar Chand v. Shobhu*, 31 C. 305, 306, 309 (1903); *Moti Chand v. Ganga Prasad*, 29 I. A. 40, 42 (1901); s. c., 24 I. A. 14, C. W. N. 362.

(7) *Webb v. Majhitha*, 31 C. 10, 11 (1903); s. c. 39 I. A. 238. *Amar Chand v. Shobhu*, 31 C. 305, 310 (1903). *J. J. Tassadong Barot v. Harji*, J. (1902), 30 I. A. 30.

(8) *Srinivasa v. Kesho Prasad*, J. (1902), 30 I. A. 30.

(9) *Id.*

by law had been passed, can be certified to be a fit case on the ground that the financial and commercial position of the Company may be seriously affected by the questions at issue, and also that it is of great importance to Indian Companies generally that their rights should be precisely defined on this point. The value of the question at issue between the parties, in such a case, is one to which it is impossible to give a numerical expression (1). No appeal lies from the judgment of one Judge of the High Court, or of one Judge of a Division Court, or of two or more Judges of the High Court, where they are equally divided in opinion (sect 111). But in any such case an appeal should be made in the first instance to a Division Bench of the High Court under clause 15 of the Charter, before an appeal can be preferred to His Majesty in Council (2). The question whether an applicant had established that substantial loss might result to him if execution was not stayed pending the hearing of the appeal presented to the High Court is not a question which would justify a special certificate of fitness under this clause (3). Sections 47 and 48 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907) do not interfere with any right of appeal to the Privy Council (4).

Conditions imposed on right of appeal (Sect 110).—This section requires that in order to give a right of appeal there must be in dispute either directly or indirectly an amount of Rs 10,000. If the decree affirms the Court below, another condition is affirmed, namely that the appeal must involve some substantial question of law. The presence of such a question does not give a right of appeal, when the value is below the mark. The requirement of it restricts the right when the higher decree affirms the lower (5). When it is laid down that the decree must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of Rs 10,000 in value or upwards, the reference is to suits in existence and not to suits *in gremio futuri* (6). The reason for fixing the minimum appealable value is based on the principle of not allowing the litigants, who have not succeeded in the High Courts, to be harassed by further appeals, when there is nothing at stake but small amounts of money (7). But to meet special cases, not satisfying the conditions mentioned in sect 110, such for instance as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance, an appeal may be granted under sect 109, clause (c), when the High Court certifies that the case

(1) *Bombay Burma Trading Corporation v Dorabji*, 5 Bom. L. R. 348 (1903), *per Jenkins, C.J.*, s. c., 27 B. 416.

(2) *Sri Girdhari Maharaj v Purushottam*, 10 C. 814, 817 (1881). For cases prior to sect 6 Act VI of 1874, see *In re Court of Wards*, 7 B. L. R. 730, 734 (1871), *Surnamoyee v Luchimput*, B. L. R. Sup. vol. 691 (1867), and *Leelanand Singh v Luchmessur Singh*, 13 M. I. A. 490, 493, 136 (1870) [one Judge of High Court miscarrying in giving effect to decree of Privy Council].

(3) *Srinivasa v Kesho Prasad*, 13 C. L. J. 31, 686 (1911).

(4) *Chattraput Dugar v Khara Singh*, 17 C. W. N. 762 (1913), 17 C. L. J. 547.

(5) *Banarsi Prasad v Kashi Krishna*, 28 I. A. 11, 13 (1900), s. c., 23 A. 227, 5 C. W. N. 193. See also *Radha Krishna v Rai Krishna Chand*, 5 C. W. N. 689 (1901), s. c., 23 A. 415, 28 I. A. 182, 181. *Husen bhoy v Ahmedbhoy*, 26 B. 319, 325 (1901).

(6) *Hanuman Prasad v Bhagwati Prasad*, 21 A. 236, 233 (1902), *Moofti Mohummu l Uddolla v Mootchand* 1 M. I. A. 303 (1837).

(7) *Banara Prasad v Kashi Krishna*, 23 A. 227, 232 (1900), s. c., 28 I. A. 11, *Clarke v Brajendra*, 13 C. W. N. 1127 (1909).

is fit for appeal "otherwise," that is when not meeting the conditions of sect 100 (1) The mere assent of the respondent to an appeal cannot give to the appellant a right of appeal which the Code does not allow nor can it sustain a certificate which is obviously erroneous (2) The defendant will not be allowed to make a new case based on grounds which were not urged in the Courts in India nor specified in the petition to the High Court for leave to appeal nor suggested in the reasons contained in the case for the appellant (3)

"The amount or value"—The section incorporates the provisions of the Privy Council Appeals Act of 1874 (4) This does not mean the value as estimated for the payment of stamp duty, but the real or market value The stamp duties imposed for fiscal purposes are calculated on a certain rule fixed by law, but the right of appeal depends on the value, which is a matter of fact (5) The words "The value of the subject matter in the Court of first instance" do not in any way affect the right of appeal when the real value of the subject matter is Rs 10,000 (6) The Court has only to look at the value of the question at issue in the litigation (7) As regards the Court of first instance the section speaks of the value of the subject matter of the *suit*, and as regards the appeal to the Privy Council of the matter *in dispute* There is a distinction between the two, (8) what is such matter depends on the facts of each case (9) "And" in the first clause of sect 110 means "and" and not "or" Thus where the value of the subject matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was below Rs 10,000, held by the Privy Council that this section did not apply, for the case must comply with both conditions to justify the admission of an

(1) *Banarsi Prasad v Kashi Krishna*, 23 A 231 (1900), *Moti Chand v Canga Prasad*, 24 A 174, 178 (1901), s c, 29 I A 40

(2) *Banarsi Prasad v Kashi Krishna*, 23 I A 11, 14, s c, 23 A 127, 5 C W N 193 (1900)

(3) *Soni Ram v Kanhaiya Lal* 17 C W N 605 (1913), 17 C L J 488 (P C)

(4) *Pichayee v Sivagami* 15 M 237, 239 (1890)

(5) *Mohun Lal Sookal v Bibee Das* 7 M I A 428 (1890), *Gourmoy Debbarh v Khaja Abdul Gunny*, 8 M L A 268 (1890), *Balu Lekraj Roy v Kanhaiya Singh* 11 A 317, 320 (1874) [see *Nanohar Ganesh v Bewa Ram Charan Das* 2 B 219, 229 (1877) *Daya Chand v Hem Chandra* 4 B 515 527 (1880), *Amnat Begam v Bhajan Lal* 8 A 138, 415 (1886), where the distinction between valuation for purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction respectively is pointed out] See *Harihar Prasad Singh v Shyam Lal Singh* 40 C 615 (1913) (case cannot be valued at different amounts for jurisdiction and Court fees), and *Mohendra Sundar v*

Dinabandhu, 10 C L J 15 (1913), as to valuation for Court fees, see *Harriett Ternot Kerr (in the goods of)*, 18 C L J 308 (1913)

(6) *Pichayee v Sivagami* 15 M 237, 239 (1890), *Hari Mohun Misser v Surendra Naram Singh*, 31 C 391 (1903) [suit for perpetual injunction, value fixed for Court fees may be shown to be under real value]

(7) *Ajnas Koor v Mussamat Lutseefa* 15 W R 21 (1872) [right of irrigation]

(8) See *Hikmat Ali v Wali un nissa* 12 A 506 509 (1899) *Lala Bhugwat Sahay v Pashupati Nath Bose*, 10 C W N 561 566 (1906) In *Mussamat Ameena Khatoun v Radhabenod Misser* 7 Moo I A 761 (1855) the Privy Council appear to have held that the old or her that the value of the matter of dispute in appeal related to the whole matter involved in the suit *Onorooop Chunder Mookherjee v Pertab Chunder Paul* 6 W R Misc 4 (1866)

(9) See *Husenbhoj v Ahmedbhoj*, 26 B 319 320 (1901) where the income only and not the corpus was held to be in dispute

appeal (1) To determine the value the decree is to be looked at as it affects the interests of the party prejudiced by it. Where the detriment to the party seeking relief is estimated at less than Rs 10,000, the amount of the matter in dispute in appeal is not of the prescribed value (2) In suits for partition the value is that amount of the whole estate which it is sought to partition, and not merely of the particular share which one of the parties may claim (3) The value of mesne profits subsequent to suit is to be taken into consideration in calculating the appealable value (4) In actions of tort where the damages are at large it is not easy to define the value (5) In a suit to enforce a mortgage security the value is the amount claimed if such amount falls short of the value of the mortgaged property, but it is the value of the property if this is exceeded by the amount due under the mortgage (6) Where the appeal is from the whole decree, and the decree has given an amount, including interest up to the date of the decree which exceeds Rs 10,000, it is clear that the matter which is in dispute in the appeal must exceed the sum of Rs 10,000, for the question to be tried upon the appeal must be whether the decree is or is not right or whether the decree has or has not properly ordered payment of a sum exceeding Rs 10,000. Where therefore at the date of the judgment, the sum which is recoverable is an amount (including interest) exceeding Rs 10,000, there is an appeal to the Privy Council. But interest accruing subsequent to the date of the decree cannot be added by the High Courts in estimating the appealable value and it is a question for the discretion of the Judicial Committee, whether such interest should be added or not (7) But the costs of a suit are no part of the subject matter in dispute and cannot be used for the purpose of estimating the appealable value. If they were allowed to be added to the principal sum claimed it would be in the power of every litigant,

(1) *Moti Chand v Ganga Prasad* 29 I A 40 11 (1901), s c, 6 C W N 362 364 24 1 171. But cf *Ram Kupal v Rupkuar* 3 A. 633 635 (1881)

(2) *De Silva v De Silva*, 6 Bom I R 403 (1904) [suit seeking declaration of title to property valued Rs 12,000, relief sought by establishment of title to undivided third share (value 4000) and a partition on that basis with mesne profits]

(3) *Lala Bhugwat Sahay v Pashupati Nath Bose*, 10 C W N 564 (1906), s c, 3 C L J 257, but see *De Silva v De Silva*, 6 Bom. L R 403 (1904), *Motibhai v Hari Das*, 22 B 315 (1896), and *Neelu Goundan v Kumaravelu Goundan* 20 M 283 (1896) [this last suit, however, did not involve a general partition]

(4) *Dalgleish v Damodar Naram Chowdhry* 33 C 1286 (1906), *Mohammed Hadyar v Pitchay* 1 C 193 (1893), *Gooroo Dutt v Gholam Moollah*, March 21 (1862), see

Ikramul Huq v Wilkie, 33 C 893 (1906), where damages claimed, but not ascertained, were considered in determining the appealable value

(5) See *Amrita Nath Mitter v Alhoy Chunder Ghosh*, 9 C W N 370 (1905) [ibid] where it was held that the plaintiff cannot ensure an appeal to the Privy Council by merely placing his damages at a sufficiently high figure

(6) *Benoy v Kamalapati* 13 C L J 503 (1911)

(7) *Gooroo Irood Khooni v Jugmat Chandra* (1869) s c, 3 W R P C 14, 15 8 M I A 160, 168 169, *Durga Das v Ramaswami*, 8 M I A 262 261 (1861), *Mutusalamy Jagavera v Vencataswara*, 10 M I A 313, 320 (1863), *Brindaban Dutt v Beharee*, 24 W P 142 (1875), *Nand Kashore v Ram Golam* 11 C W N 103 (1912)

by swelling the costs, to bring any suit up to the appealable value (1) If a certificate be granted or leave to appeal given by the proper Court in India in a matter in which they have no jurisdiction, the Judicial Committee will dismiss the appeal as incompetent. But if an appeal is competently made, and it appears to their Lordships after argument, or is admitted at the Bar, that the greater part of it must fail, it is the constant practice of their Lordships to give relief in respect of the portion in which the appellant succeeds, notwithstanding that the subject-matter of the appeal may be less than the prescribed limit. Thus . . . the presence of the parties that the value of . . . exceeded Rs 10,000, but the appellant's counsel, being satisfied that the appeal could not succeed as to the whole demand had by his printed case and at the Bar, confined his argument to the question of a sum below Rs 10,000, held by the Privy Council that the value of the subject-matter on appeal was not reduced below Rs 10,000 (2) It was held in the case of a large number of suits tried together and dealt with in one judgment that inasmuch as although, if each case were taken separately, the value was below Rs 10,000, yet if taken collectively the aggregate reached that amount, and the cases were all dependent upon the same judgment, leave to appeal should be given (3)

Or the decree must involve "directly or indirectly"—It is not enough that the question decided by such decree is a question of title which may possibly affect the title of persons not parties to the decree to property not the subject-matter of the suit in which the decree was passed and concerning the title to which property there is no litigation pending (4) In a recent case, however, where the value had been over Rs 10,000 in the Court of first instance, and less than that sum on appeal to the Privy Council, but the decision by the Privy Council would involve the validity of an award concerning larger sums it was held that a certificate should be granted and that it was not necessary that a dispute respecting other property to a value of more than Rs 10,000 should be pending at the time of the application (5) As to whether such a claim is or is not involved must depend on the circumstances of each case, (6) as to the consolidation of suits see O XLVI r 4

"Affirms the decision"—The question has arisen whether these words in the last clause of sect 110 are limited to a mere affirmance of the decree of

(1) Durga Dass v Ramanath 8 M. I. A. 262 264 (1860), Nilmadhab v Ishumber 13 M. I. A. 85 103 (1869), s. c. 3 B. I. P. 27

(2) Kalka Singh v Iarasaram 22 I. A. 68 73 74 (1891), s. c. 23 C. 431

(3) Dhonaram Singh v Guni Singh 31 C. 100 (1907)

(4) Hanuman Prasad v Bhagwati Prasad 24 I. A. 276, 278 (1902)

(5) Sri Kishan Lal v Kashimiro 3 A. 415 (1913), Macfarlane v Leckie 15 Moo. P. C.

181 (1882) Mt Ahman v Mt Hasiba 1 C. W. N. 93 (1897) Ananias Chanira Box v Broughton 9 B. L. R. 493 (1872)

(6) See Dalgleish v Damodar Narain Chowdhry, 33 C. 1286 1289 (1906) In re Khwaja Muhammad Yusuf 18 A. 196 (1896) Bhagwat Sahai v Pashupati Nath Bose 1 C. W. N. 561 566 (1906) (but see Dh. Silva v Dh. Silva 1 C. Bom. L. P. 403 406 (1901), Ahman v Hasiba 1 C. W. N. 18888888 (1893))

the Court below Can a "decision" be said to be affirmed when, although the "decree" is upheld, the High Court in its judgment disagrees with the findings of the fact of the Court below? There is no definition of the word "decision" in the Code, but this word means the decision of a suit by the Court, or the decree, and not the "judgment," i.e. the statement of the grounds on which the Court makes a decree Thus, when a decision is affirmed it is not necessary that the Appellate Court should not only affirm the decree made by the Court below, but should also affirm the grounds of fact upon which that judgment was passed Where an Appellate Court dismissed an appeal, but the reasons given by it in respect of some matters of fact were not the same as given by the lower Court, it was held by the Privy Council that the decree of the lower Court had been affirmed by the Appellate Court The words "decision of the Court" in this section mean the decree and not the judgment (1) A petitioner for leave to appeal claimed Rs 77,000 odd as the value of the land taken under land acquisition proceedings The Collector assessed the value at Rs 28,287, the Judge upheld the Collector's award On appeal to the High Court (valuing the appeal at Rs 49,000 and odd, i.e. the difference between the Collector's award and the amount claimed) the High Court allowed the petitioner an additional sum of Rs 7000 On an application for leave to appeal it was held that the decree was a decree of affirmance of the first Court, and, as the question was a question of law, leave was refused

doubt, in one sense it may be said

of the Court below But we must look to the substance of the case What is the decree from which the present applicant now desires to appeal to the Privy Council? He desires to appeal only against the decision of this Court so far as it affirmed the decision of the Court below, nothing else This seems to be, in substance, as far as the subject matter of appeal goes, a decree of affirmance If the decree of this Court had been properly drawn, it would have dismissed the appeal except to the extent that the additional sum was given (2)

"Substantial question of law"—In the first place it must appear that the question is one of law (3) It does not follow that because it would be such a question in England it is so here Thus according to English law it is for the Judge and not for the jury to determine what is reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution The jury finds the facts,

(1) *Tasadduq Pasal Khan v. Kashu Ram*, 30 I A 35, 39 (1902), s.c., 25 A 109, 114 7 C W N 177, 5 Bom. L. R. 100 practically overruling *Ashghar Peza v. Hyder Reza*, 10 C. 287, 299 (1889) See also *Thompson v. Calcutta Tramways Co.*, 21 C 523 525 (1891), *Bem Rait Ram Lakkhan*, 20 A 367 (1899) *In re Vishwanabhar*, 20 B 699 (1895), *Sunarbibi v. Braheshwar*, 9 A 93 (1886) *In Banko Lall v. Jagat Narain*, 23 A 94, 97 (1900) this question

was raised, but it was not necessary to decide it *Banga v. Pukal* 13 C I 1701 (1910)

(2) *Saro Nath Ray v. Secretary of State for India*, S C W N 291 (1904)

(3) See as to this limitation *In re Feda Hossein* 1 C 431 (1876) which was held not *ultra vires* of the Indian legislature as a curtailment of clause 39 of the Letters Patent

the Judge draws the proper inference from the findings of the jury. In that sense the question is a question of law. But where the case is tried without a jury there is really nothing but a question of fact, and a question of fact to be determined by one and the same person. Where the Courts in India come to the same finding about the existence or non-existence of reasonable and probable cause there is a concurrent finding on a question of fact, and no certificate, under sect. 600 certifying that the appeal involves a substantial question of law, should be given (1). Where no question of law, either as to construction of documents or any other point, arises on the judgment of the High Court, and there are concurrent findings on the oral and documentary evidence, no appeal will be entertained (2). Where the order allowing leave to appeal ran, "There seems to be a point of law which, however does not appear to have been argued here" the appeal was dismissed as the leave was granted contrary to the provisions of the Code (3). The question of law involved must be a "substantial" (4) one, which in the case cited was suggested to mean a question of great public or private importance (5). Whether however the question is "substantial" or not must depend upon the circumstances of each case, and the reported decisions are of value only as illustrations of the application of the general principle. The construction of a deed of *Uchbanama* was held to be such a question (6). But the rejection of an application for admission of additional evidence in the Appellate Court is not (7). The High Court has refused an appeal upon a mere question of practice such as an order for inspection of documents (8). Lastly, if there is a point of law which is also "substantial" it must be "involved" in the appeal. The word "involve" implies a considerable degree of necessity. It does not mean that in certain contingencies a question of law might possibly arise. The practice of the Privy Council is not to interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below (9). If the High Court is right in holding that there are concurrent findings of fact the inference is that the Privy Council will decline to go behind those findings. No doubt it was held by *Pontifex J* (10) that the

(1) *Pestonji Modi v. Queen Insurance Co* 25 B 332 336 (1900). See also *Harish v. Nishikanta* 28 C 591, 593 (1901). *Ramayya v. Sivayya* 24 M 549 553 (1900).

(2) *Tooley Persaud v. Benayek Misser* 23 J A 102 105 (1896) s.c. 23 C 918. In the matter of the Petition of *Feda Hosse n* 1 C. 431, 441 (1876). *Nirbhai Dass v. Ram Kumar*, 16 A 274 (1894). *Sukalbutti Mandani v. Babu Lal Mandar* 28 C 190 191 (1901), s.c. 5 C W N 455. But concurrent findings that there is no evidence are decisions of law. *Harendra Lal v. Hari Das Deb*, P. C., 19 C. L. J. 484 (1914).

(3) *Karnjanam v. Srinivas* 2a M 215 (1901), s.c., 6 C W N 24, 4 Bom. I 1 248.

(4) *In re Vishwambhar Panle* 20 I 199

703 (1896).

(5) *Shuja Ali v. Pam Kumar* 20 A 118 (1897). *Hanuman Prasad v. Bhagwati Prasad* 21 A 236 233 (1902).

(6) *Alman v. Hosiba* 1 C. W. N. LXVXXIII (1897).

(7) In the goods of *Prem Chand Moonshce Upendra v. Gopal* 21 C 481 486 (1894) in which it was also held that the costs of a rejected application for leave to appeal to Privy Council should not be included in the costs of the appeal already dealt with.

(8) *Sonbai v. Ahmeibhai* 9 Bom. II C R. 396 401 (1872).

(9) *Chuman Lal v. Hari Chand* P. C., 18 C. L. J. 71 (1913).

(10) *In Moran v. Mittu Bibee* 2 C 228 (1876).

questions of law referred to were not limited to questions arising out of the facts concurrently found by the Courts below That view was subsequently accepted by Garth C J and Prinsep, J, (1) but it seems with some doubt This view was accepted by Ranade J, (2) though Jardine, J, refrained from expressing any opinion on the point But when once it is borne in mind that the last paragraph of sect 110 has reference to the practice of the Privy Council it is impossible to say that a question which only arises if the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts in India are disregarded, a question which never can arise so long as the Privy Council maintains those concurrent findings of fact is a substantial question of law which the appeal to the Privy Council "involves (3) Where a discretion is vested in a Court the Privy Council will not allow an appeal against the exercise of that discretion, e g no appeal against a mere decree as to costs (4)

(1) *Gopinath Birbar v Goluck Chunder Bhose* 16 C 292 295 (1884) note

(2) *In re Vishwambhar Pandit*, 20 R 699 (1895)

(3) *Banho Lal v Jagat Narain* 23 A. 91 98 (1900) Further in *Sukalbutti Mandrani v Balulal Mandar*, 28 C 190, 193 (1900) it was held that *Gopinath Birbar v Goluck*

Chunder Bhose supra must be taken to have been overruled by the Privy Council in *Tulsi Pershad Bhakt v Benayek Misser* 23 C 918 (1896) *Meka Venkataramayya Apparow v Shri Raja Parthasarathy Apparow*, P C, 17 C W N 1222 (1913)

(4) *Keemeo Bae v Juchman Das* 5 W R P C 59 (1837)

PART VIII

REFERENCE, REVIEW AND REVISION

113 *Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, any Court may state a case and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court, and the High Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit*

Reference — See notes to O XLVI r 1.

114 *Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved—*

Review

- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed *by this Code*, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
- (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed *by this Code*, or
- (c) by a *decision* on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, *and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit*

Application for review of judgment — Save for the words in italics this section corresponds with a portion of sect 376 of Act VII of 1859 as modified by a portion of sect 623 of Act X of 1877. In Act VIII of 1859 the clauses (a), (b) and (c) ran 'by a decree of a Court of original jurisdiction from which no appeal shall have been preferred to a Supreme Court or by a decree of a District Court in appeal from which no appeal shall have been admitted by the Sudder Court or by a decree of the Sudder Court from which either no appeal may have been preferred to Her Majesty in Council or an appeal having been preferred no proceedings in the suit have been transmitted to Her Majesty in Council'. Their present form was given by the Code of 1877 save that by the present section the words 'by this Code' have been substituted for *hereby* and *decision* for 'judgment'. The remaining words in italics are new.

The terms of this section are repeated in O XLVII r 1, where the remainder of sect 623 of the Codes of 1877 and 1882 is given. Order XLVII substantially contains the provisions of the Chapter on review of judgment in the Codes of 1877 and 1882. See notes to O XLVII, *post*.

115 The High Court may call for the record of any case *which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears—*

Revision.

- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
- (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
- (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,

the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit

Revision.—The revisional power has been held to be not an inherent power, but one conferred by statute and that while a power of superintendence is given to the High Courts over all Courts the revisional power in the case of each branch of jurisdiction is the creation of separate and distinct legislation (1) Jurisdiction has been generally divided into original (whether ordinary or extraordinary) and appellate jurisdiction. Differing views have been held upon the question whether the power of revision under this section and of superintendence under clause 15 of the High Courts Act 24 & 25 Vict c 101 comes or does not come under the head of appellate jurisdiction (2) In the former view the capital distinction is between jurisdiction which is original and jurisdiction which is not original, irrespective of the circumstances and conditions in which the latter is to be exercised. Appellate jurisdiction may thus be exercised in a variety of forms—as in what is commonly known as appeal, revision or superintendence (3) In the latter view appeal, revision, and superintendence though distinct from original jurisdiction come under different heads of jurisdictions—viz appellate, revisional, and superintending (4) The Code of 1859 gave the Courts no

(1) *Sol g Ram v Ramji Lal* 29 A 554 556 (1906) and therefore, on the latter ground it was held that the High Court could not in the exercise of criminal revisional powers interfere with a sanction to prosecute given by the Civil Court, *Mazhar Hasan v Said Hasan* 31 A 38 (1908)

(2) See judgments of Full Bench in *Chappan v Modin* 22 W 65 (1894), and see *Shew Prosad Bungalowdhur v Pam Chunler Haribux*, 41 C 323 (1913)

(3) *Chappan v Modin* *supra* per Subramanya Ayyar J, at pp 80 83

(4) *Ib* per Davies J at p 85, and see

Sarat Chandra v Brojo Lal 30 C 986, at p 988 (1903) 'Revisional jurisdiction of the Court is not necessarily a part of its appellate jurisdiction for a Court which has no appellate jurisdiction over another Court may still exercise revisional jurisdiction over it,' per Sale J, s. c. 7 C. W. N 849. It has also been held that a power of revision is not an incident of appellate powers but on the contrary can only be exercised where there is no appeal. *Khoja Shivji Hasham Gulam* 20 B 180 (189) See *post*, note on 'Appeal'

revisional powers By clause 15 of the High Courts Act, 24 & 25 Vict c 104, which was passed on August 6, 1861, each of the High Courts which were thereafter to be established under that Act were given a power of superintendence over all Courts subject to their appellate jurisdictions The Presidency High Courts were not established until the issue of their first Letters Patent in 1862, but before that date, Act XXIII of 1861, which was passed on August 28th of that year, gave in sect 35 powers of revision in a very restricted form to the Sudder Court Under that Act, the Sudder Court might call for the record of any case *decided on appeal* in which no further appeal lay if the Subordinate Court, on hearing the appeal, appeared to have exercised a jurisdiction *not* vested in it by law When, therefore, the High Courts were established, among the powers vested in it were those of revision given to the Sudder Court under sect 35 of the Act of 1861, which is the basis of the present section (1) The power of revision was thus limited to cases decided on appeal where the lower Court had exceeded its jurisdiction (2)

The question then arose as to the nature of the jurisdiction given by clause 15 of the High Courts Act It was held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the Letters Patent conferred no powers of revision, that in such matters the High Court had only such powers as the Sudder Court had, and that the power of "superintendence" conferred by the High Courts Act gave the Court no revisional power, no power to interfere with or set aside the judicial proceedings of a Subordinate Court, but that clause 15 conferred on the High Court administrative authority and not judicial powers (3) In a subsequent Full Bench of the same Court (4) the Judges said that they would prefer not to use the terms "administrative authority" or "judicial powers" or "judicial superintendence" as without giving exhaustive definitions of the words which it might fail to do the Court might by using them lead to future difficulty, and that each case must be considered as it arose That the authority of the High Courts under this clause is not merely administrative appears from a decision of the Privy Council approving the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, which holding that it could interfere with orders passed without jurisdiction, stayed proceedings on one order and quashed another (5) There has been, no doubt, a disinclination, and rightly, on the part of some Judges to rigidly define what they can, or cannot, do by way of their powers of superintendence,

(1) See *Chappan v Moidin* 22 M. 68, at p 98 (1898), and *Shew Prosad Bangshidhur v Ram Chunder Haribux*, 41 C 323 (1913), and *Vasudevad v Sankaran*, 22 M. L. J 60 (1911)

(2) Whilst the Act of 1861 dealt with excess of jurisdiction the present Code extends equally to a refusal of jurisdiction by a Court through a misconception of its authority *Shiva Nathaji v Joma Kashanath*, 7 B at p 352

(3) *Tej Pam v Harsukh*, I A 101, 104

(1875), F B, see *Chappan v Moidin* 22 M. 68, at p 99 (1898)

(4) *Muhammad Sulaiman v Fatima*, 9 A 101, 106 (1886)

(5) *Nilmoni Singh v Taranath Mookerjee*, 9 C 295, 297, 299 (1882) P C., and see cases cited *post* and see *Gobind v Kunja*, 10 C L J 407, 413 (1909) (clause 15 of the High Courts Act authorizes the High Court to revise orders of subordinate Courts), *Shew Prosad Bangshidhur v Ram Chunder Haribux*, *supra*

The terms of this section are repeated in O XLVII r 1 where the remainder of sect 623 of the Codes of 1877 and 1882 is given. Order XLVII substantially contains the provisions of the Chapter on review of judgment in the Codes of 1877 and 1882. See notes to O XLVII *post*.

115 The High Court may call for the record of any case *which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears—*

Revision

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,

the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit

Revision.—The revisional power has been held to be not an inherent power but one conferred by statute and that while a power of superintendence is given to the High Courts over all Courts the revisional power in the case of each branch of jurisdiction is the creation of separate and distinct legislation (1) Jurisdiction has been generally divided into original (whether ordinary or extraordinary) and appellate jurisdiction. Differing views have been held upon the question whether the power of revision under this section and of superintendence under clause 15 of the High Courts Act 24 & 25 Vict c 104 comes or does not come under the head of appellate jurisdiction (2) In the former view the capital distinction is between jurisdiction which is original and jurisdiction which is not original irrespective of the circumstances and conditions in which the latter is to be exercised. Appellate jurisdiction may thus be exercised in a variety of forms—as in what is commonly known as appeal revision or superintendence (3) In the latter view appeal revision and superintendence though distinct from original jurisdiction come under different heads of jurisdictions—viz appellate revisional and superintending (4) The Code of 1859 gave the Courts no

(1) *Salg Ram v Ramji* Lal 28 A 544 (1906) and therefore on the latter ground it was held that the High Court could not in the exercise of criminal revisional powers interfere with a sanction to prosecute given by the Civil Court. *Mazhar Hasan v Sad Hasan* 31 A 38 (1905)

(2) See judgments of Full Bench in *Chappin v Moln* 22 M 63 (1895) and see *Shew Prosad Bungsidhur v Parn Chander Harbu* 41 C 723 (1913)

(3) *Clappan v Modan* *supra* per S Bha in *Ayyar J* at pp 80-83

(4) *Ib* per Divies J at p 80—and see

Sarat Chandra v Brojo Lal 30 C 986 at p 988 (1903). Revisional jurisdiction on the part of the Court is not necessarily a part of its appellate jurisdiction for a Court which has no appellate jurisdiction over another Court may still exercise revisional jurisdiction over it. *per Sale J* in *C 7 C W N* 843. It has also been held that a power of revision is not an incident of appellate powers but on the contrary can only be exercised where there is no appeal. *Kloja S vji v Haslan* *Culm* 20 P 480 (189). See *post* note on Appeal.

revisional powers By clause 15 of the High Courts Act, 21 & 25 Vict c 104, which was passed on August 6, 1861, each of the High Courts which were thereafter to be established under that Act were given a power of superintendence over all Courts subject to their appellate jurisdictions The Presidency High Courts were not established until the issue of their first Letters Patent in 1862; but before that date, Act XXIII of 1861, which was passed on August 23rd of that year, gave in sect 35 powers of revision in a very restricted form to the Sudder Court Under that Act, the Sudder Court might call for the record of any case *decided on appeal* in which no further appeal lay if the Subordinate Court, on hearing the appeal, appeared to have exercised a jurisdiction *not* vested in it by law When, therefore, the High Courts were established, among the powers vested in it were those of revision given to the Sudder Court under sect 35 of the Act of 1861, which is the basis of the present section (1) The power of revision was thus limited to cases decided on appeal where the lower Court had exceeded its jurisdiction (2)

The question then arose as to the nature of the jurisdiction given by clause 15 of the High Courts Act It was held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the Letters Patent conferred no powers of revision, that in such matters the High Court had only such powers as the Sudder Court had, and that the power of "superintendence" conferred by the High Courts Act gave the Court no revisional power, no power to interfere with or set aside the judicial proceedings of a Subordinate Court, but that clause 15 conferred on the High Court administrative authority and not judicial powers (3) In a subsequent Full Bench of the same Court (4) the Judges said that they would prefer not to use the terms "administrative authority" or "judicial powers," or "judicial superintendence," as without giving exhaustive definitions of the words which it might fail to do the Court might by using them lead to future difficulty, and that each case must be considered as it arose That the authority of the High Courts under this clause is not merely administrative, appears from a decision of the Privy Council approving the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, which, holding that it could interfere with orders passed without jurisdiction, stayed proceedings on one order and quashed another (5) There has been no doubt, a disinclination, and rightly on the part of some Judges, to rigidly define what they can, or cannot, do by way of their powers of superintendence,

(1) See *Chappan v Mondin*, 22 M. 68 at p 98 (1898), and *Shew Prosad Bungsaidhur v Ram Chunder Harilux*, 41 C 323 (1913), and *Vasudev v Sankaran*, 22 M. L. 1 60 (1911)

(2) Whilst the Act of 1861 dealt with excess of jurisdiction the present Code extends equally to a refusal of jurisdiction by a Court through a misconception of its authority *Shiva Nathaji v Jona Kashinath*, 7 B at p 352

(3) *Tej Pam v Harshukh*, 1 A 101, 101

(1875), F. B., see *Chappan v Mondin* 22 M. 68, at p 99 (1898)

(4) *Mahammad Sulaiman v Fatima*, 9 A. 104, 106 (1886)

(5) *Nilmom Singh v Jaganath Mookerjee*, 9 C. 297, 297, 298 (1882), P. C.; and see *cases cited post* and see *Hall v Kunja*, 10 C. L. 1 497, 417 (1899) (clause 15 of the High Courts Act and also the High Court to revise and set aside subordinate Courts), *Shew Prosad Bungsaidhur v Ram Chunder Harilux*, 41 C. 323

which have been said to be very wide (1) Certain limitations have, however, been laid down which will ordinarily govern the Courts, there being a residue of undefined jurisdiction to which the Court may have recourse in cases of an unusual character (2)

Sect 622 of the Code of 1877 was the same as that of the last Code, except that the words "*or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, or with material irregularity,*" were not in it. It thus extended the power of revision, which was no longer limited to cases decided on appeal, and which might be exercised not only where the Court exceeded its jurisdiction but declined a jurisdiction which was vested in it. Lastly, by sect 92 of Act XII of 1879, the words italicised were added, since when the section retained the same form. As regards the amendments now effected, which are of an unimportant character, *vide post*

As regards the Charter Act, it has been held that the High Court will interfere where the Court has wrongly declined jurisdiction, (3) or has exceeded its jurisdiction, (4) that is in the first two contingencies mentioned in this section. If, however, the Court has jurisdiction it will not (ordinarily at least) interfere merely because the order passed in such jurisdiction is erroneous either in law or fact (5). An erroneous decision by a Court having jurisdiction can only properly be corrected by appeal, and if the right of appeal does not exist the same results which an appeal would give cannot be arrived at indirectly (6). While these rules are of general application in cases of an ordinary character there is a residue of jurisdiction which the Courts have left undefined. So where the Court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit, but passed a decree therein which was contrary to law and was incapable of

(1) *In re Siddeshwar Boral* 4 C. W. N. 36, 38 (1899), *In re Madho Ram*, 21 A. 181, at p. 182 (1899), *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni* 1 C. W. N. 617 (1896) [the law having advisedly and widely left this power unlimited it is not desirable to limit it by any hard and fast rule but a party's claim to interference is very much weakened when he has another remedy provided for him by law]

(2) *Vide post*

(3) See cases collected in editor's note to *Tej Ram v Harsukh* 1 A. at p. 101. *In re Gobind Koomar Chowdhry*, B. L. R. (F. B.) 714 (1867), *In re Mathra Parshad* 1 A. 296 (1876), *In re Lukhykant Bose*, 1 C. 180, at p. 182 (1876), *Ram Lal v Janki Mahatoon*, 4 C. L. P. 14 (1879), *Gurubari Singh v Hurdeo Narain* 3 I. A. 230, 238 (1876) [refusal to confirm sale]. And see *Mohendra Dunlar v Dinabandhu*, 19 C. L. J. 15 (1913), jurisdiction refused by mistaken return of plaintiff.

(4) *Naimoni Singh v Taranath Moolkerjee*, 4 C. 295, 297, 299 (1882) P. C., *In re Lukhykant Bose* 1 C. 180 at p. 182 (1876),

Ram Lal v Janki Mahatoon, 4 C. L. P. 14 (1879) in the case *In re Siddeshwar Boral* 4 C. W. N. 36 (1899) the Court passed an order without any evidence and thus without jurisdiction and see cases cited in editor's note to *Tej Ram v Harsukh*, 1 A. at p. 101.

(5) *Tej Ram v Harsukh* 1 A. 101 (1876), *In re Chander Nath Sen*, 2 C. 293 (1876), *Muhammad Sulaiman v Fatima* 9 A. 104 (1886), *In re Lukhykant Bose*, 1 C. 180 (1876) [the Court will not interfere where no question of jurisdiction is concerned], *Ram Lal v Janki Mahatoon* 4 C. L. P. 14 (1879) [clause 15 applies where the Court disclaims or acts beyond its jurisdiction], *In re Madho Ram* 21 A. 181 (1899), *Corporation of Calcutta v Bhupati Roy*, 26 C. 74, 76 (1898), and see cases cited in editor's note to *Tej Ram v Harsukh* 1 A. at p. 101.

(6) See *Yenkubai v Lakshman* 12 B. 617 (1887) [clause 15 does not give a right of appeal where none exists at law], *In re Din Costa*, B. L. R. (F. B.) 432 (1860), *In re Lukhykant Bose*, 1 C. 180 (1876).

execution the High Court interfered to set matters right (1). Generally the High Court will direct a Subordinate Court to do its duty (2) to abstain from taking action in matters of which it has no cognizance (3). It will direct it to do that which is legal and correct that which is illegal in its proceedings (3) and will correct abuse of powers by a Subordinate Court (4).

From the above review of the case law it will appear that to a large extent clause 15 and this section cover common ground. In neither case will these extraordinary powers be exercised where matters can be corrected by appeal. In neither case (in that of the Charter ordinarily at least) will the Court interfere in such a way as to give a party the benefit of an appeal when the law says that he is not to have one. In both cases the Court will interfere where jurisdiction is concerned. The section applies also expressly to cases of illegal exercise of jurisdiction and material irregularity. It will therefore be, as regards judicial matters only necessary to resort to the Charter Act in cases in which the revisional powers given by the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes do not apply, (5) or where it is doubtful (6) whether they do apply by reason of the nature of the proceedings sought to be corrected, (7) or where the order, passed in proceedings which considered apart from the matter complained of are subject to the ordinary revisional powers is of a very peculiar character, (8) or in cases where the administrative authority of the High Court is required to be invoked. Courts in the exercise of superintending powers will not ordinarily interfere, except in cases of grave and otherwise irreparable injustice (9).

As regards other revisional jurisdictions, the Bombay High Court has interfered under Reg. II of 1827 (Bom.) (10). Sect. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1857) provides that the High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made on any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was *according to law*, (11) may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. In a recent case in the Calcutta High Court where an application (under sect. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act) for the recovery of the possession of immovable property had been refused on

(1) *Abdullah v Salaru* 18 A. 4 (1895), where the Court described the circumstances of the case as extraordinary.

(2) *Taj Ram v Harsukh* 1 A. 101 (1875), *Muhammad Salaman v Fatma*, 3 A. 101 (1886).

(3) *In re Gobind Koomar Chowdhry*, B. L. R. (F. B.) 714 (1867).

(4) *In re Siddeshwar Boral* 4 C. W. N. 36 (1899).

(5) See *In re Madho Ram*, 21 A. 181, at p. 182 (1899) where it was held that the case was not a criminal proceeding and did not fall under this section.

In re Siddeshwar Boral, 4 C. W. N. 36 left undecided.

(8) See *Abdullah v Salaru*, 18 A. 4 (1895).

(9) *Jamatia v Macleod* 31 B. 138 (1906), *Amjad Ali v Ali Hussain*, 15 C. W. N. 356 (1910), *Chandi v Kripal*, 15 C. W. N. 682 (1911).

(10) *Girdharlal v Lallu Jagjivan*, 20 B. 50 (1891), but see repealing Act XII of 1873.

(11) That is, to see whether there has been a material misapplication or misapprehension of law or material error in procedure. *Muhammad Bakar v Bahal Singh*, 13 A. 277 (1890), but see *per* Fulton J., in *Bai Jasoda v Bamanasha* 23 B. 334 (1898), at p. 340. As to erroneous decision of fact, see *Bai Jasoda v Bamanasha* 23 B. 334 (1898) at p. 338. *Turner v Jagmohan Singh* 2 A. L. J. 297 (1905), where the Court interfered.

the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not been established, and it had been held by a single Judge sitting on the Original Side that (assuming that this refusal was erroneous) the High Court was not justified in interfering under this section, it was held on appeal that the High Court had a right of revision and that this order was a judgment (1) It is generally agreed that this provision gives no right of appeal either on law or fact, (2) that the exercise of the power given is discretionary, (3) and that the High Court will be slow to interfere when substantial justice has been done, though technically the plaintiff or defendant may have a legitimate ground of attack or defence (4) It is also established that there is no rule that a Court cannot act under sect 25, except in cases in which it might act under the present section (5) The High Court's power of interfering in revision conferred by the Provincial Small Cause Court Act is wider than the power conferred by the present section (6) The Allahabad High Court has, however in several cases considered that the discretion to be exercised under sect 25 should be ordinarily guided by the same considerations as those which governed the application of this section, (7) though a Judge is not absolutely bound to refuse any application under sect 25, which could not be admitted under the present section (8) The Bombay High Court, however, has held that the provisions of the present section do not afford a safe guide for the exercise of jurisdiction under the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, since the wording of the two sections is wholly different that of the Small Cause Court Act being of the widest description and conferring the most ample discretion on the High Court, whilst this section ought to be construed in a restricted and limited sense (9) What the order should be where the Court determines to interfere must depend entirely on the circumstances of the case (10) Sect 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act is subject to the provisions of this section (11)

As to analogous remedies in English law, see case noted below (12)

(1) *Shew Prosad Bangshidhur v Ram Chunder Haribux*, 41 C 323 (1913)

(2) *Muhammad Bakar v Bahal Singh*, 13 A 277 (1890), Poona Municipality v Ramp, 21 B 250, 254 (1895)

(3) *Muhammad Bakar v Bahal Singh*, *supra*, Poona Municipality v Ramp *supra*

(4) *Poona Municipality v Ramp* *supra*, at p 255, *Muhammad Bakar v Bahal Singh*, *supra*

(5) *Sarman Lal v Khuban*, 16 A 476 (1891)

(6) *Turner v Jagmohan Singh*, 2 A L J 297 (1900), *McCarron v Welts*, 27 A 192 (1901) (See *Shew Prosad Bangshidhur v Ram Chunder Haribux*, 41 C 323 (1913))

(7) *Sarman Lal v Khuban*, 16 A 476 (1891) (the Court added before the decision of the Privy Council in *Anur Hassan v Sheo Baksh* *supra*, *Raghu Nath v Official Liquidator*, 15 A 139 (1893), *Sarman Lal v Khuban* 17 A 122 (1893) in which last two

cases as in the next, the Court refused to interfere on the ground that the lower Court had erred upon the question of limitation

(8) *Vian Ram v Ralla Pam*, 21 A 69 (1898)

(9) *Poona Municipality v Ramp*, 21 B 250 (1895), and see *Bai Jasoda v Damansha*, 23 B 334 (1898)

(10) *Bai Jasoda v Damansha*, 23 B 334 (1898), at p 340, where the Court, instead of remitting the case for a new trial, reversed the decree dismissing the suit and passed a decree for the plaintiff see *Behram v Ardeshr* 27 B 563 (1903), at p 574

(11) *Nagardas Vachraj v Anandrao Bhai v Bom L R* 495 (1907) [and an order made under that Act can be altered, rescinded, or set aside, s c, 31 B 590], *Seetharama Bhagavathar v Venkataswami*, 17 M L J 103 (1907)

(12) *Shiva Nathaji v Jona Nathaji*, 7 B 311 (1893), at p 303

High Court.—The power of review under this section belongs to the High Court only, it being intended that it should be exercised in correction only of such errors as were not open to appeal, and within certain specified limits (1) Under the Charter Act the Chief Justice determines what Judges shall constitute Benches to hear suits and applications (2)

"May call for."—The section gives discretionary power to the High Court to interfere or not (3) In the case cited below, (4) Sir Arnold White, C.J., stating that he "would be glad to find some mode of escape," yet considered that if he was satisfied that the Court of first instance or Court of Appeal had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, he was bound to interfere and exercise the powers conferred by the section This, however, it is submitted, is not so The word "may" governs the whole section and indicates a discretion whether the ground upon which interference is sought is one of jurisdiction or illegality, or material irregularity and the concluding words are, that the Court may pass such order as it thinks fit So where an order was passed without jurisdiction but no objection was taken before the District Court, the High Court declined to interfere, as if it were to set aside the order of the District Court it would have the effect of placing the opposite party in the position of being obliged to bring a suit to establish the right which he claimed, though the period within which he was entitled to bring that suit had elapsed, in other words, it would be placing him under an obligation to bring a suit that *prima facie* would be barred under the Limitation Act (5) So also in an earlier case the Calcutta High Court observed as follows—"Now, as the order of the Judge in this matter, although passed without jurisdiction, was really a null order, and had merely the effect of getting rid of the decision of the first Court, which was wrong, we think we ought not to make any order in this case" (6)

A fortiori, the same freedom exists as regards illegality and irregularity So the High Court, in the under mentioned case (7) declined, under the circumstances, to interfere, even though the orders complained of were made irregularly Thus a Munsif granted a review on a ground on which it was held it could not legally have been granted His order in review, however, had the effect of making the decree a right, instead of a wrong decree The District Judge allowed an appeal from that order on grounds which, having regard to sect 115

(1) *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar* 7 A 270, at p 281 (1884)

(2) *Ramadhun v. Sewbalal*, 37 C 714 (1910), but see *Haladhar Maiti v. Choytonna Maiti*, 30 C 558 (1903) [revision of order of Presidency Small Cause Court], and see *R v. Har Prasad Das*, 40 C 477 (F B) (1913)

(3) *Muhammad Naim ul lah v. Ihsan ul lah Khan*, 14 A 226 (1892) at p 232, *Cooke v. Equitable Coal Co* 8 C W N 621 (1904), at p 621, *Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath*, 7 B 341 (1883)

(4) *Pamasamy Chettiar v. Orr*, 26 M 176, 178, 179 (1902), and see *Sarnam Dewari v.*

Sakuna Bibi, 3 A 417 (1881) at p 417, *Straight, J*

(5) *Dayaram Jagjivan v. Dayaram*, 28 P 478 (1904) at p 478, *theft v. Abdul Ali*, 18 J 41 (1883) at p 452, where, however, it was held that the applicant was not entitled to a writ of certiorari

(6) *Bhoysrub v. Khatoon*, 6 C 11 (1881)

(7) *In re Jagan Nath*, 10 J 41 (1883) at p 41, where it was held that the order of the District Judge was null and void

of the last Code, were, it was held, not open to him. On application for revision of this Appellate order, it was held that the proper course was to set aside only the District Judge's order, and to leave standing the order of the Munsif granting a review, which order, though wrong in principle, was, it appeared, right in its results (1). In an application under this section, the extraordinary jurisdiction is invoked, and the Court must be on its guard against its being abused, merely because the lower Court has fallen into formal error (2). Again, the Court does not interfere if the result of any irregularity on the part of the lower Court has been to promote the justice of the case (3). In short, it is this justice of the case and not any mere technicality which will influence the Court's interference. It has been held that the Court cannot interfere under this section on the ground that an order is inexpedient (4). Assuming that the section applies, the Court is not bound to act under it in every case (5).

As the power is a discretionary one, the Court may refuse to interfere where there has been laches or delay in moving the Court (6) inasmuch as delay, unless explained, is evidence of absence of real injury and ground for complaint, and may, where it is considerable, prejudice the position of the opposing party, and if by his laches a party has failed to avail himself of other remedies open to him, he has no claim to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court. The Court will in all cases regard its exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction as discretionary and subject to considerations of the importance of the particular case or of the principle involved in it of delay on the part of an applicant, and of his merits with respect to the case in which the interference of the Court is sought (7).

The Court will not, as a rule interfere in revision with an exercise of discretion, though it may not approve of it (8). It was held that even if a party were not entitled to appeal to have a decree against him set aside the error of the lower Court could be corrected under this section by a direction to exercise the discretionary powers given by sect. 504 of the last Code (9).

(1) Abdul Sadiq v. Abdul Aziz, 21 A. 152 (1898).

(2) Nana Bajaji v. Pandurang Vasuder, 9 B. 97 (1884) at p. 99 *per* West J. So also in execution proceedings the Court will look at the substance of the transaction and will not be disposed to set them aside upon mere technical grounds when they find them to be substantially right. Narayanasami v. Natasa, 16 M. 124 (1892) at p. 428.

(3) Cooke v. Equitable Coal Co., 5 C. W. N. 631, 624 (1901). But see *Brayabala v. Gurusis*, 3 C. L. J. 293 (1900), and *Gopal v. Votobar*, 16 C. W. N. 1029 (1912).

(4) *Petition of Nawal Singh* 31 A. 333 (1912).

(5) *Ram Singh v. Salig Ram*, 25 A. 84 at p. 85 (1900).

(6) *Durga Prasad v. Shree Charan*, 1 A. 154 (1887) [in which the Court refused to interfere there being a delay of nearly seventeen

months] *Subbaya v. Yellamma* 9 M. 130 (1885) at p. 133 [where the petitioner had

not taken the proper steps in the District Court]. *Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath* 7 B. 311 (1883). In *Balmakund v. Siva Jatan*, 6 A. 123 (1882) the petitioner was held not fairly chargeable with laches. *Punna Lal v. Seth Cowaji* 25 P. R. 1914.

(7) *Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath* 7 B. 311 (1883). *F. L. Maharajah of Burdwan v. Parba Krishna Poy*, 15 C. W. N. 872 (1911).

(8) *Vasudeva v. Chinnaasami* 7 M. 584 586 (1884). *Bai Devlori v. Lalchand Jivandas* 19 B. 790 793 (1894). *Payachandi Maya chand v. Sultan Rahumbar* 18 B. 347 (1893). *J. v. Venkateswara* 10 M. 98 (1890). *Lingammal v. Chinna Venkatammal* 6 M. 227 (1883). *Pamathan v. Ananthanarayana* 33 M. 11. (1900).

(9) *Deshaiah v. Krishnan* 8 M. 102 (1884).

The High Court can interfere under this section of its own motion and without an application made to it by a party to the suit (1) Revisional power has been exercised on the application of a pre-emptor in regard to a sale, (2) of a Collector in regard to an order under sect. 112 of the last Code; (3) and on the report of a District Judge (4). But the High Court will not interfere on a reference by the Collector with a Mamlatdar's decision in a possessory suit. The aggrieved party can himself apply to the Court (5).

"Any case"—The matter must be a civil one and also one in which there is no remedy by way of appeal. Mahmood J. was of opinion that the word should be understood in its broadest and most ordinary sense including all adjudications which might constitute the subject of appeal or revision (6). It has, however, been a matter of dispute whether the section applies to interlocutory orders when there is an appeal from the final decree. The Calcutta High Court has held that there is nothing in this section which prevents the High Court from setting aside an interlocutory order and that the word "case" is wide enough to include such an order and the words "records of any case" include so much of the proceedings in any suit as relate to an interlocutory order (7). The Bombay (8), Allahabad, (9) and Madras (10) High Courts answer the question in the negative, and in a recent case in the Calcutta High Court the question has been considered doubtful (11).

It may be that the word "case" is wide enough to include an interlocutory order but it must be controlled by due regard to the purpose with which this section was framed, which was to enable the party to a suit to get a decision or order of a lower Court rectified where there would otherwise be no remedy. It is on this ground, therefore, that it has been held that an application under this section cannot be entertained in the case of those interlocutory orders against which though no immediate appeal lies a remedy is supplied by sect.

(1) *Andrew Anthony v Dupont* 4 M. 217 (1881) *Gotam Mahammad v Saroda Mohan* 4 C. W. N. 69, (1900) [*dist. Mahom. d. Foyez v. Goluck Das* 7 C. L. R. 191 (1880)] *Luran Mal v Jauki Pershad* 28 C. 680 (1901) s. c., 6 C. W. N. 114 *Secretary of State v. Jillo* 21 A. 133 (1898) *Dabi Das v. Fiaz Hussain* 28 A. 72 (1905) *Baikanta v. Satu* 38 C. 421 (1911)

(2) *Bisheshwar Kuar v. Hari Singh* 5 A. 42 (1889)

(3) *Collector of Kanara v. Krishnappa Hedger* 15 B. 77-78 (1890) *dist. from, In re Secretary of State* 2 C. L. R. 461 (1876)

(4) *Andrew Anthony v. Dupont supra.*

(5) *Pandu v. Bhavdu* 21 B. 805 (1896) and see *Vora Isabali v. Dandbhav* 14 B. 371 (1889)

(6) *Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram* 7 A. 661 (1885)

(7) *Dhapi v. Ram Pershad* 14 C. 768 (1887) but see *Omrao Mirza v. Mary Jones*

12 C. 1 R. 148 (1882)

(8) *Mot Lal Kashibai v. Nana* 18 B. 30 (1897) *Damodar v. Paghunath* 26 B. 771 (1902)

(9) *Harsaran v. Muhammad Paza* 4 A. 91 (1881) [rejection of application to appeal as pauper and Muhammad Ayab v. Muhammad Mahmud 32 A. 673 (1910) but see *Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram* 7 A. 661 (1885)], *Chattarpal Singh v. Ganga Sahai* 5 A. 293 (1883) [order setting aside award] *Farid Ahmad v. Dulari Bibi* 6 A. 933 (1884) [order transferring suit] see *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar* 7 A. 26 (1884) *Surti v. Ganga* 7 A. 411 (1885) *per Oldfield J.* [order amending decree] but see judgment of Mahmood J. in *Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram* 7 A. 661 (1885)

(10) *In re Nizam of Hyderabad* 9 M. 256 (1886)

(11) *Chandi v. Kripat* 15 C. W. N. 682 (1911)

591 (now 105), which provides that they may be made a ground of objection in the appeal against the final decree (1)

The High Court has revised, under this section, proceedings under Reg of 1806, relating to foreclosure, (2) adjudications under sect 407 of the last Code, (3) an order under sect 335 of the same Code, though provisionally final, (4) an order under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, (5) an order under sect 5 of the Religious Endowments Act, (6) an order under sect 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (7) a lunacy matter (8) Whether an order under the former sect 310A was subject to appeal or revision depended on the circumstances of each particular case (9) A decision under sect 5 of the Court Fees Act is not a decision in a case within the meaning of this section (10) The matter of amending a decree does not by itself constitute a "case," but forms part of the proceedings in the suit in which the decree is made (11) On the same principle, viz the order being of an interlocutory character only, the High Court has refused to deal with an order relating to an award, (12) though in other cases relating to awards it has interfered (13) It has been held that an order passed under the Legal Practitioners Act is not a criminal proceeding, nor one within the powers of civil revision (14) *Semble*, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the Court which originally heard a case should be the Court to decide whether an application to review its former judgment should, or should not be granted, and where that Court rejects such an application, its decision should not be open either to appeal or to revision by a higher Court (15) In a recent Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, the case of an order passed by a Civil or Revenue Court under sect 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code was considered and it was held that sect 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not apply and that the High Court could exercise

(1) Motilal Kashibai : Nana 18 B 35 (1892)

(2) Hazari Lal : Khem Rai 3 A 576 (1881), *folk in Nand Ram v Bhopal Singh* 34 A 592 (1912)

(3) Chattarpal Singh : Raja Ram 7 A 661 (1885), Muhammad Husain v Ajudha Prasad, 10 A 407 (1888), Debo Das : Mohunt Ram, 2 C W N 474 (1898), Gopal Chandra : Bigoo Mistry, 8 C W N 70 (1903)

(4) Sheoraj Singh : Banwari Das, 6 A 172 (1884)

(5) Collector of Thana v Bhashai Mahadev, 8 B 264 (1884)

(6) Oopala Ayyar v Arunachellam Chetty, 26 M 85 (1902)

(7) Beni : Sarju, 33 A 512 (1911), Rama Ihin : Sewlalak, 37 C 714 (1910) (a Civil Court acting under sect 165 of the Criminal Code is not exercising Criminal Jurisdiction)

(8) *In re* Basharat Ali 21 C 133 (1896) [on the merits the Court refused to interfere]

(9) Kedar Nath : Uma Charan 6 C W N 57 (1900)

(10) Balkaran Rai v Cobind Nath, 12 A 129 157 (1890), *per* Edgo, C J

(11) Raghunath Das : Raj Kumar, 7 A 276 (1884) Surta : Ganga 7 A 411 (1885), *per* Oldfield J, *contra* Mahmood, J, who held the order to be a separate adjudication and so capable of revision

(12) Chhattar Singh : Ganga Sahai, 5 A 293 (1883), Damodar Trimbak : Raghunath Hari 26 B 551 (1902)

(13) Pugarin v Mordin, 6 M 414 (1882), Dagdusa Lakchand : Buhhan Govind, 9 B 82 (1884), Mana Vikrama v Mallicherry Kristnan, 3 M 68 (1890), Ganga Charan : Saril Mandal 6 C W N 614 (1901)

(14) *In re* Malho Ram 21 A 181 (1899) *In re* Siddeshwar Boral, 1 C W N 31 (1899) the point was left undecided

(15) Ram Lal : Ratan Lal, 26 A 572 (1901)

the powers vested in it by this section and by sect. 15 of the High Courts Act, and that the Bench exercising Criminal Jurisdiction could not (as such) deal with the matter on revision, but could be specially authorized to do so by the Chief Justice under sect. 11 of the High Courts Act (1) An application under this section to set aside an award is incompetent (2) A decision of a Subordinate Court on a question of valuation determining the amount of a Court fee is, notwithstanding its declared finality, subject to revision under this section, and sect. 5, Reg. II of 1827 (3) Proceedings under sect. 206 of the former Code terminated in an order, and could thus be dealt with in revision (4) Sect. 153 of Act X of 1859 does not preclude revision by the High Court of an order of a Collector,

"In which no appeal lies"—The Court cannot act under this section where there is an appeal, (7) even where the petitioner has to invoke the provisions of sect. 5 of the Limitation Act (8) The reason of the rule is that there is another and more complete remedy It is a matter of dispute whether in the case of interlocutory orders, against which there is no immediate appeal, the Court can interfere under this section, seeing that a remedy is supplied by sect. 103, which provides that such orders may be made a ground of objection in the appeal against the final decree In such cases it is said the appeal is merely deferred (9) In a recent case it has been doubted whether interlocutory orders come within the scope of this section (10)

On the same principle it has been held that the Court will not exercise its revisional jurisdiction so long as there is any other remedy open to the petitioner, viz by regular suit or otherwise (11) Probably it is more correct to say that

(1) *R v Har Prasad Das*, 40 C 477, F B (1913), *Kali Prasad Chatterjee v Bhuvan Mohini*, 8 C W N 73 (1903), *R v Gopal Barick*, 34 C. 42 (1906)

(2) *Chulam Jilani v Muhammad Ahmed*, 6 C W N 226 (1901)

(3) *Vithal Krishna v Balkrishna Janar das*, 10 B 610 (1886), F B But see *Balkaran Rai v Gobind Nath*, 12 A 120 (1890) F B, and see *Omrao Mirza v Mary Jones*, 12 C L R 148 (1882)

(4) *Bai Shri Vaktuba v Agarasingur*, 9 Bom L R 547 (1907)

(5) *Mohant Gobind Ramanuja Das v Lakhun Parida*, 11 C W N 112 (1906)

(6) *Ramadin v Sewbalak*, 37 C 714 (1910)

(7) *Raynor v Mussoorie Bank*, 7 A 681 (1885), *Pam Kristo v Naik Tara*, 12 C L R 449 (1883) dist in *Mohant Gobind Ramanuja v Lakhun Parida*, 11 C W N 112 (1906), *Nazar Husain v Keeri Mal*, 12 A 681 (1890), *Sah Man v Kanagasabapathi*, 16 M 20 (1892), *Omrao Mirza v Mary*

Jones 12 C L R 148 (1882), *Gulab Rai v Manghi Lal* 7 A 42 (1881), *Rahima v Nepal Rai* 14 A 620 (1892), *Tarupati Raju v Vasaram Raju* 20 M 155 (1890), *Baldeo Das v Gobind Shankar* 7 A 914 (1885), per Tyrrell, J [the grounds upon which Pethe ram's, C J, judgment proceeded do not appear], *Williams v Brown*, 8 A 108 (1886), but see *Nand Ram v Bhopal*, 34 A 592 (1912) *Hassan Ali Shah v Salig Ram*, 125 P R (1892)

(8) *Vasvanathan Chetti v Ramanathan Chetti*, 24 M 546 (1901)

(9) See note to Case, *supra*, p 465

(10) *Chandi v Kripal*, 15 C W N 682 (1911)

(11) *Guiso v Jaisraj*, 15 A 405 (1893) [the headnote has been said to be misleading see *Debi Das v Fiaz Husain*, 28 A 72 (1905)], *Kashmath Sakhamam v Nana*, 21 B 731 (1897) *Shoo Prasad v Hastura Kuar*, 10 A 119, 122 (1887) [in which proper remedy was held to be an application under s 103 or a suit under s 283 of the former Code],

there is no absolute rule in the matter such as exists in the prohibition relating to appealable cases; and that while the Court will in general discourage applications under this section when some other remedy has been provided, the exercise of the revisional powers is discretionary according to the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases justice, therefore, may require the Court's interference (1).

Sect. 588 (now 101) by enacting that the orders passed under it shall be final, only bars appeals from these orders but does not intend to bar any interference with them by revision (2).

In some cases, where an appeal was preferred but no appeal lay, the Court has dealt with the case as though an application has been originally made to it under this section, and allowed the appeal to be treated as an application under it (3). Conversely, a civil revisional petition has been treated as an appeal on the Court fee being paid (4). It seems reasonable that appellants should be permitted to rely on the provisions of this section without putting them to the expense of making a separate application to get the benefit of it (5). Some Judges, however, take a stricter and more formal view of the matter, and require a separate and distinct application to be made (6). It is as well, therefore, in cases of doubt whether an appeal lies to file concurrently (7) both an appeal and an application under this section to be heard and disposed of together.

Court—This must be understood in its ordinary legal sense as "a place

Sunder Das v. Mansa Pam, 7 A. 407 (1884); Venkataraman v. Mahalingayyan, 9 M. 406 (1896); Raghu Nath v. Puri Chattraput, 1 C. W. N. 633 (1897); Subbaya v. Yellamma, 9 M. 130, 133 (1885); Panarao v. Babaji, 20 B. 620 (1895); Ismailji v. Macleod, 31 B. 135 (1902).

(1) Delvi Das v. Fajaz Husain, 28 A. 272 (1905); Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Hashimath, 7 B. 341 (1893); F. B. [in which it was said that the question did not admit of a precise categorical reply]; Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prasad, 18 A. 163, 168 (1895) [in which the Court interfered under this section, it being doubtful whether a suit would lie]; Golam Mohammad v. Saroda Mohan, 4 C. W. N. 695, 698 (1900) [in which it was held that there was no reason under the circumstances why the petitioner should be driven to a regular suit]; Tiruchottambal Chetti v. Seshayyanagar, 4 M. 383 at p. 384 (1881); Balrajund v. Jaisan Lal, 6 A. 123 (1882), at p. 124, per Stuart C.J.; Sree Krishna v. Chandok Chand, 32 M. 324 (1909).

(2) Mahabura Nath v. Umesh Chandra, 1 C. W. N. 616 (1897), at p. 631.

(3) Annan v. Balaji Chetti v. Muthulinga Pillai, 1 M. 111 (1871) [in which

the petition of special appeal was given effect to as a petition under s. 35 of Act XXIII. of 1861]; Bhovrub Chunder v. Wajedunnissa Khatoon, 6 C. L. R. 234 (1880); Venkatamma v. Chengalrayappa, 7 M. 553, 556 (1884); Dayaram Jagjivan v. Govardhandas, 28 B. 458, at p. 460 (1904); Goda Ram v. Sural Mal, 27 A. 480 (1904); Seetharama Bhagavata v. Venkatagiri, 17 M. L. J. 109 (1907); Merali Varam v. Sheriff Dewu, 30 B. 104, 107 (1901).

(4) Sriharan v. Sanyal v. Paramathan Somayajipad, 23 M. 101 (1899); Venkatamma v. Chengalrayappa, 7 M. 553, 556 (1884) [when the application was presented as an appeal, then amended and received as an application under this section, and ultimately, it being held that an appeal lay treated as an appeal].

(5) See Durga Narain v. Goburldhun Ghose, 9 C. L. R. 87, 89 (1881), s. c., 7 C. 330, at p. 333 in which case, however, the Court did not consider the case one for interference under this section.

(6) See Ganga Charan v. Sasti Mandal, 1 C. W. N. 614, 615 (1901).

(7) See Sudendhoo Narain v. Golinda Nath, 9 C. W. N. 501, 509 (1907).

where justice is judicially ministered." A District Registrar is therefore not a Court, and the High Court cannot revise his proceedings (1)

"Subordinate."—The Court referred to in the words "If the Court" of the former section was a Court other than the High Court. The section therefore did not apply to a case where the order of which review was sought was made by the High Court (2). It applies to subordinate Courts as the amended section now makes clear. The High Court has jurisdiction under this section over the Presidency Small Cause Courts, and applications can be dealt with by a specially constituted Bench (3) or, according to the existing rule in the Calcutta High Court, by a single Judge sitting on the Original Side (4). This section applies to a Mamlatdar's Court in Bombay, (5) and a Court acting under the Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act, (6) and the Court of the Resident at Aden in the exercise of his civil jurisdiction under the Aden Act (7).

A decision under sect. 5 of the Court Fees Act is not, it has been held, (8) the decision of a Court within the meaning of this section. A District Judge acting under sect. 23 of the Bombay District Municipal Act Amendment Act (II of 1884) is not a "Court" under this section and the High Court has therefore no jurisdiction to revise his order refusing to set aside an election (9). Neither is a Collector acting under sect. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act "a Court" (10). This section does not apply to a Revenue Court in Madras, (11) or in the North West Provinces (12). The High Court at Bombay under clause 29 of the Council Order relating to Zanzibar of the year 1897 has power of revision over all the Civil Courts of Zanzibar (13).

Jurisdiction.—The word "jurisdiction" is used in two different senses: it may either mean what is ordinarily understood by the term "jurisdiction"—that is, jurisdiction local, pecuniary, personal or with reference to the subject-matter of a suit, (14) or it may mean the legal authority of a Court to do certain things, to make a particular order in a case over which it has jurisdiction in the

(1) *Manavala v. Kumarappa* 30 M. 326 (1907), 17 M. L. J. 313 S. C.

(2) *In re Premji Trikumdas* 17 B. 514 (1893).

(3) *Pamadhun v. Swabalak* 37 C. 714 (1910), and see *Rangiah Naidu v. Rungiah*, 31 M. 490 (1908).

(4) *Sarat Chandra t. Brojo Lal* 30 C. 986 (1903), s. c., "C. W. N. 843.

(5) See *Nanabayaji t. Pandurang Vasudev*, 9 B. 97 (1884), *Purshottam t. Mahadu* 14 Bom. L. P. 947 (1912), 37 B. 14, *Kashiram v. Rajaram*, 35 B. 487 (1911).

(6) See *Gurusasaya t. Chanmalappa* 19 B. 286 (1894), *Lakshman Babaji t. Ramchand*, 23 B. 321 (1898), *Raysachand Mayachand v. Sultan Rahimbar*, 18 B. 347 (1893).

(7) *Rhumbai v. Mariam*, 31 B. 267 (1909).

(8) *Balkaran Rai t. Gobind Nath* 12 A. 129 at p. 157, per Edg., C. J.

(9) *Balaji Saktharam v. Menonji Nowroji* 21 B. 29 (1895).

(10) *British India Steam Navigation Co. t. Secretary of State for India* 38 C. 230 (1910), 15 C. W. N. 87.

(11) *Vellu Periya t. Moidin Padsha* 9 M. 332 (1886), *Appandai v. Suhari Joushi* 16 M. 451 (1892), *Venkatanarasimbat. Suranna*, 17 M. 298 (1893) having regard to the provisions of s. 4 of the Code.

(12) *Ram Dayal v. Ramadhun* 12 A. 198 (1890).

(13) *Merali Visram v. Sheriff Dewji* 36 B. 105 (1911). See *contra Khoja Shivji v. Hasham Gulam* 20 B. 480 (1895).

(14) *Moresh Chunder t. Jahruddin Mollah* 3 C. W. N. 509 512 (1901). *Har Prasad t. Jafar Ali* 7 A. 315 350 (1885), *Dhan Singh t. Basant Singh* 8 A. 519 579 (1886), *Sheo Prasad t. Kastura Kuar* 10 A. 119 121, 122 (1887), *Amitray Krishna t. Balkrishna Ganesh* 11 B. 488 at pp. 491 492 (1888) and see *Sukh Lal v. Tara Chand* 2 C. 1 J. 211, 244 (1905).

sense stated. So if a Court has jurisdiction to deal with an appeal in the former sense, it is only in the latter sense that an erroneous order of remand by an Appellate Court can be treated as an order without jurisdiction (1). It was held in the case first cited that the word "*jurisdiction*" is used in the former sense in sect 578 of the former Code (now 99). In some cases it has been held that the term is used in both senses in the present section (2). In other cases it has been said that the word "*jurisdiction*" is used in the first mentioned sense and refers to the forum for the institution of a suit (3). It would probably tend to clearness in the law if the word were used in the narrow and more ordinary sense, (4) though, as has been pointed out, (5) the extent to which the restraints attaching to the mode of exercise of jurisdiction should be included in the conception of the jurisdiction itself is a question of nicety upon which there has been considerable difference of judicial opinion. A Judge cannot assume as a matter of law that which in fact has no existence in law, and so give himself jurisdiction. He cannot, by wrongly determining a question, give himself jurisdiction, and the High Court may thus inquire whether such question is rightly or wrongly decided (6).

On the principle *omnia rite acta*, the Court will not presume that a Judge has acted without jurisdiction (7). Indeed it has on the contrary been said, that unless the facts from which want of jurisdiction on the part of a Subordinate Court may be inferred are patent upon the face of the record, the High Court will not interfere in revision (8). The High Court may interfere where the lower Court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, (9) or to have

(1) *Mohesh Chunder v Jahiruddin Mollah*, 5 C W N 509, 512 (1901), and see *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 345, 350 (1885); *Dhan Singh v Basant Singh*, 8 A 519, 529 (1886); *Anantkrishna Krishna v Balkrishna Ganesh*, 11 B 488, at pp 491, 492 (1887).

(2) *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 315 (1885); *Dhan Singh v Basant Singh*, 8 A 519 (1886), per Mahmood, J., see cases cited post, and *Mohant Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896), at p 624, where it was said that excess of, and failure to exercise, jurisdiction included applying to a case a mode of procedure not applicable to it, or refusing to apply to it a mode of procedure applicable to it.

(3) *Ross Alston v Pitambar Das*, 2 A 599 (1903), at p 526, per Baderjee, J.; *Manisha Pradi v Siyali Koya*, 11 M 220 (1887), at pp 227, 229, per M Aiyar, J., p 232, per Brandt, J.

(4) See *Shew Prasad Bungludhur v Ram Chunder Haribux*, 41 C 323 (1913).

(5) *Sukh Lal v Tara Chand* 2 C L J 233, 244 (1905).

(6) *Manisha Pradi v Siyali Koya*, 11 M 220 (1887) at pp 222, 223, 231, and so where jurisdiction is declined, *Vishwanath Gowind v Rambhat*, 15 B 149, 151 (1890) [*"The*

Subordinate Judge has refused to exercise a jurisdiction which, if he is wrong, is by law vested in him, and we can examine his order to see if he is right in his refusal'"].

(7) *Shew Prasad v Kastura Kuar*, 10 A 119 (1887).

(8) *Mahr Ali v Muhammad Husen*, 14 A 413 (1892).

(9) *In re Suljan Dastagar*, B L R (T B) 531 (1866) [i.e. where the Court exercises a jurisdiction when it has none, or exceeds it when it has jurisdiction], *Burj Mohun v Rai Uma*, 20 C 8, 11 (1892) [order setting aside sale under Code], *Lakshmana v Najmuddin*, 9 M 145 (1884) [order setting aside execution sale, though no injury proved], *Bhojrab Chunder v Wajedunissa*, 6 C L R 231 (1890) [hearing appeal where none], *Kristo Indar v Roopinee*, 6 W R, Act X., 56 (1866) [id.], *Bhowanoo Pershad v Dhurm Narain* 3 W R 24 (1865) [ib.], *Annamalai v Muthulinga*, 6 M H C R 360 (1871) [id.], *Rahim Bux v Nun lo Lal*, 14 C 321 (1887) [Banking Company Act, power to act as: lease, s 174], *Lal Mohun v Jagendra Chunder*, 14 C 636 (1887) [id.], *Shields v Wilkinson*, 9 A 398 (1887) [decree where no evidence], *Abdul Rahman v Kutta Ahmed*, 10 M 68 (1886) [order to take inventory under Act XIX. of

failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, (1) the Courts sometimes underrating

1811, after parties referred to regular suit], *Gossain Money v Gour Pershad*, 11 C. 146 (1881) [order restraining execution pending appeal], *Kunhamel v Chathu* 9 M. 437 (1886) [no jurisdiction to order refund under s 315], *Digluva Tilakchand v Bakhani Govind* 9 B. 82 (1881) [order filing award, arbitrators without authority, deal with costs], *Dhapa v Ram Pershad*, 14 C. 768 (1887) [no jurisdiction under s 136 unless s 131 complied with], *Muhammad Hussain v Ajoodhia Prasad*, 10 A. 467, 470 (1888) [order under s 407], *Luis v Luis*, 12 M. 186 (1888) [order setting aside order under s. 491], *Sadasook v Kannayya*, 10 M. 96 (1893), *Sasoon v Hurry Das Bhukut*, 21 C. 455 (1896), s. c., 1 C. W. N. 41 [Small Cause Court, new trial], *Giddayya v Jagannatha*, 21 M. 363 (1897) [reversal by District Munsif of decree of Village Munsif], *Manomohini Chaudhurani v Nara Narain*, 4 C. W. N. xxi (1899) [setting aside decree which was not *ex parte*], *Mahomed Hamidulla v Tohurenissa Bibi*, 25 C. 155, 158 (1897) [id.], *Ningapa v Dolapa* 21 B. 585 (1890) [decree passed by harkun in possessory suit] *Luehmun Singh v Shamshere Singh*, 2 I. A. 53 (1874) [application for review], *Raja Har Narain v Chaudhrai Bhagwant*, 18 I. A. 55, s. c., 13 A. 300 (1891) [invalidity of award when not made within time fixed by Court], *Chinaya v Gangava*, 21 B. 775 (1890) [order in execution for ouster of person not party to suit], *Bhau v Dale*, 21 B. 777 (1890) [Mamlatdar, decree by, remedy as between joint owners], *Babaji Pamp v Babaji Devji*, 23 B. 47 (1897) [Mamlatdar no jurisdiction to determine questions between riparian proprietors], *Lakshman Babaji v Ramchandra Parashram*, 23 B. 321 (1898) [Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act, jurisdiction of Special Judge], *Muhammad Yusuf v Abdul Rahman*, 16 I. A. 101 (1889) [setting aside non appealable judgment], *Mazari Lal v Kheru Rai*, 3 A. 576, 579 (1891) [order dispossessing mortgagee], *Nalmakshya Ghosal v Mafakshar Hossain*, 28 C. 177 (1900), s. c., 5 C. W. N. 192 [order amending decree], *Puran Mal v Janki Prasad* 28 C. 680, 683 (1901) [order of Court taking over management of properties], s. c., 6 C. W. N. 114 *Golam Mahammad v Saroda Mohan*, 4 C. W. N. 695, 697 (1900) [issue of successive writs of possession without inquiry], *Malad*

har Maiti v Choytonna Maiti, 30 C. 588 (1903) [jurisdiction of Registrar Small Cause Court], *Dwahbal v Sadashivdas*, 21 B. 310 (1899), s. c., 1 Bom. L. R. 836 [incompetent reference under s 616a], *Krishnasami Pannikondar v Muthu Krishna Pannikondar*, 21 M. 361 (1900) [appointment of curator, omission to take evidence before making order], *Ramasamy Chettiar v Orr*, 26 M. 176 (1902) [suit brought on ordinary side of Court, though maintainable on Small Cause side], *Amrita Lal Kolay v Nibaran Chandra* 31 C. 310 (1901), s. c., 8 C. W. N. 216 [Jurisdiction S. C. C. title to immovable property], *Dayaram v Govardhandas* 28 B. 458 (1904) [order passed without jurisdiction in execution], *Ramanadham Chetty v Narayanan Chetty*, 27 M. 602, 607 (1901) [decision of review petition during pendency of appeal], *Ganga Charan v Sasti Mandal*, 6 C. W. N. 614 (1901), *Corporation of Calcutta v Cohen*, 6 C. W. N. 480 (1901) [Jurisdiction of Small Cause Court to declare old valuations to be still in force], *Monomohini Chaudhurani v Nara Narayan* 4 C. W. N. 456 (1899) [no jurisdiction to set aside *ex parte* decree of Superior Court], *Shankarabhai Khojabhai v Somabhai Itanchhodabhai*, 3 Bom. L. R. 120 (1900) [Judge deciding Small Cause Court suit under ordinary jurisdiction], *Peary Mohun Ghosal v Haran Chunder* 11 C. 261 (1885) [S. C. C., trespass to immovable property, Court held to have jurisdiction], *Sarnam Tewari v Sakina Bibi* 3 A. 417 (1881) [decisions of both Courts without jurisdiction], *Yule & Co v Mahomed Hossein* 21 C. 129 (1896) [reference by P. S. C. under s 60 of its Act, and s 617 of Code, liberty given to withdraw suit after disposal of reference instead of entering judgment for defendants] *Horananda Baopjee v Ananta Das*, 6 C. W. N. 492 (1904) [s 153 Bengal Tenancy Act], *Menat Ah v Amdar Ah* 9 C. W. N. 605, 607 (1905) [amended decree], *Jankay Nath Guha v Brojolal Guha* 33 C. 757, 770 (1906) [no appeal no jurisdiction to refuse filing of award] *Bai Shri Vaktuba v Agarsang*, 6 Bom. L. R. 547 (1907), s. c., 31 B. 447 [order passed under s 206 making additions to the decree], *Baikanta v Sita*, 39 C. 421 (1911)

(1) *Gobin Prasad v Chandar Sekhar*, 9 A. 486 (1887) [declining to hear suit on merits],

their powers, and the High Court is called upon to enlarge their too narrow views (1) If a Court allows an application or decrees a suit which is in fact time-barred, without considering whether it was so or not, it can be said to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, so as to bring the matter within the scope of this section. But this cannot be said of a Court merely because it has omitted to consider *ex proprio motu* the question whether a litigant was entitled to proceed out of time by reason of some special provision of law, when such a question had not been raised by him or on his behalf (2) The High Court can interfere under this section when the Court below refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by reason of an erroneous interpretation of a provision of the Code (3)

Ramjiwan Mal v. Chand Mal, 7 A. 227 (1884) [refusing jurisdiction on ground suit triable by District Court], *Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai*, 8 A. 111 (1886) [erroneous view of his jurisdiction taken by Munsif, return of plaint], *Mohendra Sundar v. Dinabandhu*, 19 C. L. J. 15 (1913) (return of plaint), *Vishvanath Govind v. Rambhat*, 15 B. 148 (1890) [return of plaint on ground suit governed by a 539], *Mana Vikrama v. Malichury* 3 M. 68 (1890) [refusal to file award], *Burj Mohun v. Rai Uma*, 20 C. 8, 11 (1892), s. o, 19 I. A. 154 [refusal to confirm execution sale], followed in *Radhasyam Kar v. Dinobandhu Biswas*, 18 C. L. J. 533 (1913), *Navabchand Nemchand v. Amichand Talachand*, 18 B. 731 (1893) [rejection of application for execution] *Amarchand v. Javalys*, 21 B. 738 (1886) [Mamlatdar erroneously holding he could not receive a suit against heirs], *Kanumathi v. Mangappa*, 16 M. 451 (1892) [Judge declining to entertain application for leave to sue in *forma pauperis* erroneously supposing a succession certificate was necessary], *Shamray Pandoy v. Nuloy Ramaji*, 10 B. 200 (1885) [refusal to entertain application for execution], *Benode Mohini v. Sharat Chunder*, 8 C. 837, 841 (1882) [application for revival of suit], *Rama v. Kunji*, 9 M. 375 (1886) [jurisdiction held to be declined the Legal Practitioners Act being no bar to suit], *Subhaji Rai v. Srinivasa Rai*, 2 M. 264 (1880) [jurisdiction to refuse to confirm execution sale declined], *Seshadri v. Krishnan*, 8 M. 192 (1881) [direction to exercise power given by s. 544], *Musavvut Jamerla v. Iuchmun Landay*, 4 C. L. P. 71 (1879) [refusal to investigate claim made in execution], *Jogolanund Singh v. Amrith Lal*, 22 C. 767 (F. B.) (1890) [refusal to set aside sale under s. 310A], *Nathubhai v. Mulchand v. Nana Balu*, 10 B. 511 (1891) [refusal to grant execution], *Collector of*

Vizagapatam v. Abdul Kharim, 21 M. 113 (1897) [failure to exercise jurisdiction in consequence of misconstruction of s. 412], *Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal*, 13 A. 320 393 (1891) [refusal to hear and determine appeal], *Gurindra Kumar v. Rajeswari Roy*, 27 C. 5 (1899) [order refusing to amend probate], *Raghunath Charan v. Shamo Koen*, 31 C. 344 (1903) [refusal to hear appeal], *Gobind Prasad v. Chandar Sekhar*, 0 A. 486 (1887) at p. 492 [The Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction, and probably acted with material irregularity in dismissing this suit on the ground that the representatives of M. C. had not been made a party, *per Edge, C. J.*], *Vishvanath Govind v. Rambhat*, 15 B. 148 (1890) [returning plaint upon erroneous construction of s. 539], *Vishnu v. Ramchandra* 9 Bom. L. R. 936 (1907) [rejecting complaint under s. 328], *Zamiran v. Fateh Ali*, 32 C. 146 (1904) [refusing to accept plaint], *Ganesh Singh v. Kashi Singh*, 28 A. 621 (1906) [arbitration failure of Court to decide as to validity of reference], *Wilks v. Jawad Husain*, 29 A. 469 (1907) [refusal to hear application for review], *Akbar Khan v. Muhammad Ali Khan*, 31 A. 610 (1909), *Ramdoyal v. Upendra Nath*, 17 C. W. N. (1912) [Specific Relief Act, refusal to grant relief to plaintiff found to be in possession within six months], *Kartie v. Gorachand*, 17 C. L. J. 593 (1912) [omitting to deal with merits of an appeal]

(1) *Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashi Nath*, 7 B. at p. 302 (1883) [the section now extends to refusal of jurisdiction by a Court through a misconception of its authority]

(2) *Pancha Mandal v. Sheikh Isaf*, 17 C. W. N. 687 (1913)

(3) *Maharaja of Burdwan v. Ajuria*, 14 C. L. J. 50 (1911)

Illegality.—The first part of the section down to the words "*so rested*" deals with jurisdiction. The remainder assumes the existence of jurisdiction, but deals with the mode in which such jurisdiction is exercised. A question may arise whether a Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction it possesses has acted according to law. Such a question relates not to the existence of jurisdiction, but to the exercise of it in either an illegal or irregular manner (1). This distinction has not always been preserved, it being in some earlier cases considered erroneously that the Privy Council had decided (2) that only questions relating to the jurisdiction of the Court can be entertained under this section (3). This opinion, however, is not tenable, since it practically treats the additional words added to the section in 1879 as superfluous or unnecessarily introduced (4). All that the Privy Council case really decides is that this section does not give a right of appeal on questions of law or fact, and that where the Subordinate Court has jurisdiction, the High Court can only interfere where that Court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of such jurisdiction (5).

A Court cannot interfere under this section simply upon the ground that there has been an erroneous decision upon a question of law or fact (6). A Court that has decided a suit over which it had jurisdiction cannot, only on the ground that it has arrived at a wrong decision, be said to have exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity (7). Any other view would impose on the

(1) See *Sukh Lal v Tara Chand*, 2 C L J 211, 245 (1905).

(2) In *Amir Hassan v Sheo Baksh*, 11 C 6 (1884).

(3) *Magn Ram v Jiwa Lal*, 7 A. 336, at 338 (1885), F B, *Badami Kuar v Dina Rai*, 8 A. 11, at p. 113, *per Petheram, C.J.* "the questions to which a 622 applies are questions of jurisdiction only," *Narayanasami v Natesa*, 16 M. 424, at p. 428 (1892) ["the error of procedure must be such as to have led to the assumption of a jurisdiction, etc.," *per M. Aiyar, J.J.*, *Mamsha Eradi v Siyali Koya*, 11 M. 220, at pp. 229, 230 (1887) *per M. Aiyar J.*, "the words 'act illegally, etc., apply to those cases only in which there is an error in the procedure by reason of which the Subordinate Court concludes that it has, or has not, jurisdiction. This dictum was however, subsequently withdrawn by the learned judge in *Kristnamma Naidu v Chapa Naidu*, 17 M. 410, at p. 414 (1893).

(4) *Kristnamma Naidu v Chapa Naidu*, 17 M. 410, 414 (1893), and cases *post*. *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896) at p. 625, *Enat Mondul v Baloram Dey*, 3 C W N at p. 585 (1899).

(5) *Sew Bux v Shub Chander*, 13 C (1886) at p. 230, and see *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896), at p. 624.

(6) It has, however, recently been held by the Madras High Court that when an Appellate Court erroneously (that is, by an error of Law) decided that the Court of the first instance had or had not jurisdiction to entertain a suit, the High Court could set aside the order under this section on the double ground of exercise of jurisdiction and illegality. *Vuppuluri v Seetaramachandra*, 21 M. L. J. 112 (1912) [*Aiyar, J.*, dissenting].

(7) *Amir Hassan v Sheo Baksh*, 11 I A 237, s. c., 11 C 6 (1884), *dist in* *Port Canning Improvement Co., Ltd v Roson Ali*, 17 C W N 160 (1912), *Magn Ram v Jiwa Lal* 7 A. 336 (1885), *Sunder Das v Mansa Ram* 7 A. 407 (1884), *Chattar pal Singh v Raja Ram* 7 A. 661 (1885), *Badami Kuar v Dina Rai*, 8 A. 111 (1886), *Muhamma I Husain v Ajudhia Prasad*, 10 A. 467, 471 (1888), *Hari Bhikaji v Naro Vishvanath*, 9 B. 432 (1885), *Jivraji v Pragn*, 10 M. 61 (1886), *Venkubai v Lakshman Venkoba*, 12 B. 617 (1887), *Krishna Mohini v Kedarnath Chuckerbutty*, 15 C. 416 (1888), *Narayanasami v Natesa*, 16 M. 424, 426 (1892), *Enat Mondul v Baloram Dey*, 3 C W N 581, 583, 585 (1899), *Corporation of Calcutta v Bhupati Roy*, 25 C. 74 (1898), *Mathura Nath v Umes Chandra*, 1 C W N 626 (1897),

Court the duties of a Court of Appeal. Mere errors of law and fact can only be corrected by appeal. Such as a wrong decision on a question of *res judicata* (1) or limitation, (2) or a merely erroneous construction of the provisions of an Act, (3) or a decision as to the inadmissibility of a document in evidence, (4) or the misconstruction of a document, (5) or a decision that a person was not a legal representative within the meaning of sect 47, *ante* (6). Where a Judge having both Small Cause and ordinary jurisdiction transferred to his file as ordinary Judge a suit filed in his Court as a Small Cause Court suit, it was held that there was not a material irregularity, and that as his decree decided a question of title to immoveable property, the High Court could not interfere under its extraordinary jurisdiction, for since this decree could not have been passed in a Small Cause Court, it was not final (7).

The mere fact of a Court having come to a wrong decision even on a point of law is not sufficient to constitute an illegality or irregularity, (8) that is, an erroneous decision is not by itself any ground for revision. The Privy Council have thus excluded one class of cases, but it is still left open to consider in what

Raghu Nath v Rai Chatrapat 1 C W N 633 (1897), Sotish Chunder Lahury v Nulcomul Lahury, 11 C 45 (1884), Copi Koer v Gopi Lal, 21 C 799 (1891), Corporation of Calcutta v Cohen, 6 C W N 480 (1901), Cooke v Equitable Coal Co 8 C W N 621, 624 (1904), Ross Alston v Pitambar Das 25 A 509, 526 (1903), *per* Banerjee J, Parasurama Ayyar v Seshier, 27 M 504 (1903), Kahi Charan v Sarat Chunder, 30 C 397 (1903), *s c*, 7 C W N 545, Ram Lal v Ratan Lal, 26 A. 572 (1904), Joseph v Salt Company, 17 M 371 (1892) [mistake concerning principles of valuation], *Quere* whether following cases did not raise points of law only Kirparam v Modia, 19 B 135 (1894), Court of Wards v Darmalingu, 8 M 2 (1884), Pitambar Das v Jambusar Municipality, 17 B 510 (1892), Ross Alston v Pitambar, 25 A 509 (1903), Patel Kudabhai v Hargovan Mansukh, 13 B 133 (1891), Maulvi Muhammad v Syed Husain, 3 A. 203 (1880), Ram Lal v Ratan Lal, 26 A. 572 (1904) [order rejecting application for review] *dist*, Willis v Jawad Husain 29 A 469 (1907), Ram Singh v Salig Ram, 23 A 84 (1905).

(1) Hari Bhukaji v Naro Vishvanath, 9 B 432 (1885), Amritrav Krishna v Balkrishna Ganesh 11 B 489, 492 (1897).

(2) Sundar Singh v Doru Shankar, 20 A. 78 (1897), Amritrav Krishna v Balkrishna Ganesh 11 B 489, 492 (1897), Ananda Lal v Deben Lal, 2 C W N cccxxxiv (1899), Ramgopal v Joharmall 39 C 473

(1912), but see Kadash v Bissonath, 1 C W N 67 (1896), Har Prasad v Jafar Ali, 7 A 345 (1885), Pitambar Das v Jambusar Municipality, 17 B 510 (1892).

(3) Rahhaba Khanum v Noorjehan Begum, 13 C 90 (1886), but where it was held that the case did not fall within a section at all, it was held that the Court had declined jurisdiction in consequence of a misconstruction Collector of Vizagapatam v Abdul Kharim, 21 M 113 (1897), and see Rama v Kunji, 9 M 375 (1886), and as to construction of decree, Maulvi Muhammad v Syed Husain, 3 A 203 (1880).

(4) Madhavray Ganeshpant v Gulabbhai Lalubhai, 23 B 177 (1893), but see Fattchand Harchand v Kisan, 18 B 614 (1893), where there was revision of an order excluding a document for want of stamp, and Gurunath Shrinivas v Chembasappa, 18 B 745 (1893) admitting a document though unregistered. But see Benod v Ram Sarup, 10 C W N 1015 (1912).

(5) Dasrath Rai v Sheodin Rai, 16 A 39 (1893).

(6) Ganga Charan Bhuttacharjee v Soshi Bhushan Roy, 32 C 572 (1905).

(7) Hari Balu Gachawad v Ganpatrao Lakhurjao Gachawad, 38 B 190 (1913).

(8) Kristnamma Naidu v Chivji Naidu, 17 M 410 (1893), at p 412, Sheth Narain Mookerjee v Balkuntha Nath Isar, 11 C W N 857 (1907), Narayan v Nagindas 30 B 113 115 (1906). See *Post Mondal v Balaram D.v.*, 3 C W N 531 (1892).

other cases the clause may be applicable (1) This is a question of difficulty, upon which there has been considerable conflict of opinion. There may be a decision which is erroneous but not illegal or materially irregular (2) It is not always easy to draw a clear line between an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and a mistake of law (3) A distinction has been drawn between an irregular act and an erroneous decision (4) but the distinction is ordinarily at least, of little use, as the illegal or irregular act is generally preceded by, and based upon, an erroneous decision.

It is not difficult to give examples of extreme cases. The difficulty exists as to those falling within these limits. Thus, a wrong decision based upon an erroneous construction of sect 11 that a suit is not barred by *res judicata* is no ground for revision (5) but a Judge would act illegally who while admitting that a case fell within the section, held that as the former decision was erroneous, he would on this ground determine the point again, (6) or if he directed, contrary to the provisions of sect 60 that in execution of a decree the tools of a judgment debtor be sold (7) So it has been held that this part of the section contemplates a perverse decision on a question of law or procedure—that is a decision involving a conscious departure from some rules of law or procedure (8).

The Calcutta High Court has gone further, and held that while acting with “*material irregularity*” implies only the committing of an error of procedure, acting “*illegally*” does not mean the same thing for Courts may commit gross and palpable errors other than those of procedure which would justify it being said that they had acted “*illegally*,” and that this part of the section was intended to authorize the High Courts to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of Subordinate Courts so as to prevent gross injustice in non appealable cases, and that it was advisedly expressed in indefinite language from the difficulty of defining exactly the classes of cases which may stand in need of such extraordinary interference. In this view the question whether any case comes under the clause has to be determined with reference to the grossness and palpableness of the error complained of, and to the gravity of the injustice resulting from it (9).

Coming to the particular application of the section, the following cases have been expressly held or may perhaps be considered to have been held to come under the heading of acting “*illegally*”—the rule of adjudication being that a Judge shall decide *secundum allegata et probata* a Judge was held

(1) *Kristnamma Naidu v Chapa Naidu* at p 418, and see *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C. W. N 617 (1896), at p 626

(2) *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 345 (1885), at p. 351

(3) *Sew Bux v Shib Chunder*, 13 C at 230 (1886), *Debo Das v Mohunt Pam*, 2 C W N 474 (1898), at p 477

(4) *Enat Mondul v Baloram Dey*, 3 C W N 581 (1899) at p 585, *per Banerjee*, J

(5) *Idé ante*, p 474

(6) *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali* 7 A 345 (1885) at p. 351 *Idé post* and see *Rabbaba Khanum v Noorjehan Begum* 13 C 90, at p 93 (1886) where it was said that if the Subordinate Judge had held that a 32 had no application to interpleader suits

there would have been a failure to exercise jurisdiction, but what he in fact did was to put an erroneous construction on that section.

(7) *Badami Kuar v Dinu Rai*, 8 A 111 (1886) at p 115 *Idé post*

(8) *Kristnamma Naidu v Chapa Naidu* 17 M. 410 (1893) F B., but see as to this case *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896) at p 625

(9) *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni* 1 C W N 617 (1896) at p 626 (*Banerjee* and *Gordon JJ.*), *Mathura Nath v Umes Chandra* 1 C W N 626 (1897) *per Banerjee, J.*, *Raghu Nath v Rai Chatraput* 1 C. W. N 633 (1897) *per Banerjee, J.*, *contra, per Maclean C.J.*, in *Enat Mondul v Baloram Dey*, 3 C W N 581 (1899), at p 583

other cases the clause may be applicable (1) This is a question of difficulty, upon which there has been considerable conflict of opinion. There may be a decision which is erroneous, but not illegal or materially irregular (2) It is not always easy to draw a clear line between an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and a mistake of law (3) A distinction has been drawn between an irregular act and an erroneous decision (1) but the distinction is ordinarily at least, of little use, as the illegal or irregular act is generally preceded by, and based upon, an erroneous decision.

It is not difficult to give examples of extreme cases. The difficulty exists as to those falling within these limits. Thus, a wrong decision based upon an erroneous construction of sect. 11 that a suit is not barred by *res judicata* is no ground for revision (5) but a Judge would act illegally who while admitting that a case fell within the section, held that as the former decision was erroneous, he would on this ground determine the point again, (6) or if he directed, contrary to the provisions of sect. 60 that in execution of a decree the tools of a judgment debtor be sold (7) So it has been held that this part of the section contemplates a perverse decision on a question of law or procedure—that is a decision involving a conscious departure from some rules of law or procedure (8)

The Calcutta High Court has gone further, and held that while acting with “*material irregularity*” implies only the committing of an error of procedure, acting “*illegally*” does not mean the same thing, for Courts may commit gross and palpable errors other than those of procedure which would justify it being said that they had acted “*illegally*,” and that this part of the section was intended to authorize the High Courts to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of Subordinate Courts so as to prevent gross injustice in non-appealable cases, and that it was advisedly expressed in indefinite language from the difficulty of defining exactly the classes of cases which may stand in need of such extraordinary interference. In this view, the question whether any case comes under the clause has to be determined with reference to the grossness and palpableness of the error complained of, and to the gravity of the injustice resulting from it (9)

Coming to the particular application of the section, the following cases have been expressly held or may perhaps be considered to have been held, to come under the heading of acting “*illegally*”—the rule of adjudication being that a Judge shall decide, *secundum allegata et probata* a Judge was held

(1) *Krishnamma Naidu v Chapa Naidu*, at p. 418, and see *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896), at p. 626

(2) *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 315 (1885), at p. 351

(3) *Sew Bux v Shib Chunder*, 13 C. at 230 (1886), *Debo Das v Mohunt Pam*, 2 C. W N 474 (1893), at p. 477

(4) *Enat Mondul v Baloram Dey*, 3 C W N 581 (1899), at p. 585, *per Banerjee, J*

(5) *Vide ante*, p. 474

(6) *Har Prasad v Jafar Ali*, 7 A 315 (1885), at p. 351 *vide post*, and see *Rabbaba Khanum v Noorjehan Begum*, 13 C 90, at p. 93 (1886) where it was said that if the Subordinate Judge had held that a 32 had no application to interpleader suits

there would have been a failure to exercise jurisdiction, but what he in fact did was to put an erroneous construction on that section.

(7) *Badami Kuar v Dinn Rai*, 8 A. 111 (1886), at p. 115, *vide post*

(8) *Krishnamma Naidu v Chapa Naidu*, 17 M. 410 (1893), F B., but see as to this case, *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896), at p. 625

(9) *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni*, 1 C W N 617 (1896), at p. 626 (Banerjee and Gordon, JJ), *Mathura Nath v Umes Chandra*, 1 C W N 626 (1897), *per Banerjee, J*, *Raghu Nath v Rai Chaitraput*, 1 C. W. N 633 (1897), *per Banerjee, J*, *contra, per Maclean, C.J.*, in *Enat Mondul v Baloram Dey*, 3 C W N 581 (1899), at p. 583

to have acted illegally in raising a question of the execution of an instrument when execution was admitted, (1) the appointment of arbitrators against consent of one of the parties, the order of reference to them, their award, and the decree passed thereon, (2) entertaining an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree after the time allowed by the law of limitation, (3) or setting aside an *ex parte* decree without notice to the plaintiff, (4) admitting that a matter was litigated under the circumstances described in sect 11, *ante*, but holding that the former decision was erroneous, and on this ground determining it again, (5) admitting that a claim could have been made part of a suit formerly tried, but holding that the circumstances were such as rendered it inequitable to apply the provisions of O II r 2, *post*, and allowing a plaintiff to sue, (6) a Judge, professing to act under sect 206 of the last Code, saying that "dismissed" means "decreed," and thus altering the whole nature of the decree under the colour of amending it; (7) a Judge reviewing, in disregard of the provisions of sect 624 of the same Code, a judgment of his predecessor, (8) a Judge before whom witnesses are produced, dismissing the claim without hearing them, on the ground that the plaintiff's story is obviously untrue, (9) Judge refusing to give effect by amending decree to his predecessor's decretal order, (10) refusing summonses, (11) passing a decree where there is no evidence at all or admission to support it (12) the Judge addressing himself to matters entirely foreign to the inquiry he had to make, (13) erroneously holding that a particular Act or section of it is applicable to the case, and that by reason of that Act or section the suit does not at all lie, (14) not permitting a plaintiff in a suit brought upon two hundis to adduce evidence of payment otherwise than by the hundis, (15) excluding from evidence a document because not stamped, (16) admitting a document in evidence though unregistered, (17) allowing a tenant to dispute his landlord's title, (18)

(1) Gorakh Babaji v. Vithal Narayan, 11 B 435 (1887)

(2) Purgadin v. Moidin 6 M. 414 (1882) held also to constitute a case of material irregularity

(3) Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali, 7 A 345 (1885) [see *qu* whether in this case there was not merely an error of law in construing art 164 of the Limitation Act and whether same criticism does not apply to Davies, J. judgment in *Krishnamma Naidu v. Chapa Naidu*, 17 M at p 421 (1893)]

(4) Subbiah v. Dilawar Khan, 24 M. L. J. 462 (1913)

(5) Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali 7 A 345 (1885) at p 351 *per* Mahmood J., who held it, as well as the next four cases to be cases both of illegality and material irregularity

(6) *Id*

(7) *Id*, at p 352 [the case referred to is *Sarta v. Ganga*, 7 A. 411 (1885)]

(8) *Id*

(9) *Id*

(10) Balmakun v. Jatan Lal 6 A 125, 219 (1882) held also to be material irregularity

(11) Kaji Ahmad v. Kaji Mahamal, 9 B 308 (1884)

(12) Shields v. Wilkinson, 0 A 398, 409, *per* Broadhurst J. Edge, C.J., considered the case to be one of absence of jurisdiction, and see *Manisha Khatu v. Siyali Koya*, 11 M at p 232 (1887), *Bissessur Das v. Johann Smidt*, 10 C W N 14 (1905)

(13) Debo Das v. Mohunt Ram, 2 C W N 474, 478, 479 (1898), *follo*, Gopal Chandra v. Bigoo Mistry, 8 C W N 70 (1903) [pauper application]

(14) Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose 15 C 47 50 (1887) held also to be material irregularity *fall* in *Shri Vishvambhar v. Shri Vasudev* 16 B 708 (1892) in which conversely the Judge erroneously held himself bound to make the order complained of

(15) Chenbasappa v. Lakshman Ramchandra, 18 B 369 372 (1893)

(16) Fatchchand v. Harchand v. Kisan 15 B 614 (1893) *see qu*, *see* p 474 n (4) *ante*

(17) Gurunath Shrinivas v. Chenbasappa, 18 B 745 (1893), *see qu* *see* last note

(18) Patel Kishabhai v. Hargovan Manmukh 19 B 133 (1891), *see qu* whether this was not merely a mistake of law

directing contrary to the provisions of sect 266 of the last Code that in execution of a decree the tools of a judgment debtor be sold, (1) making an order without hearing the party a pleader, (2) A suing B for some property and the Court giving a decree to C, who was not a party to the suit (3) the adoption of a procedure different from that provided by law and such as to cause material injury to the suitor, the application of a section of the Code to a case to which it does not apply, (4) holding wrongly and contrary to authority, that there is a cause of action, (5) refusing to make a person a party to a proceeding, (6) a Judge or assessor hearing a case who has an interest in it, (7) Appellate Court questioning contrary to the express provisions of the Statute the admissibility of document improperly stamped but admitted in evidence by Court of first instance, (8) attaching under a personal decree trust property, (9) non suiting a plaintiff such a procedure not being permitted by the Code, (10) decree in pauper suit omitting to order plaintiff to pay Court fees when suit dismissed, (11) omitting to state a case under sect 69 of the Presidency Small Court Act, (12) a District Judge revoking a sanction granted by a Subordinate Court on the ground that 'a sanction could not be granted to a third party' (13)

Irregularity—Just as in the reported cases questions of illegality are mixed up with those of jurisdiction so it is not easy always to distinguish "illegality" from "material irregularity." In fact as will have been seen from the notes to the last paragraph the Courts have often spoken of the same act as being both an illegality and irregularity. A distinction has been drawn between cases in which a Judge omits to do something which a Statute enacts shall be done and cases in which a Judge does something which a Statute says shall not be done. In the former case the omission may not amount to more than an irregularity in procedure. In the latter the doing of the prohibited thing is *ultra vires* and illegal and without jurisdiction (14) using the latter term in its broadest sense. It has been said also that material "irregularity" implies only the committing of an error of procedure whilst acting 'illegally' means something more (15). One thing is clear namely that an irregularity is something less than an illegality and before the Court will interfere

(1) *Badami Kuar v Dinu Rai* 8 A 111 (1886) at p 115 *per* Straight J and *per* Mahmood J in *Dhan Singh v Basant Singh* 8 A 519 (1886) at p 529, and *per* Trevelyan J in *Sew Bux v Shub Chunder* 13 C 225 (1886) at p 231 [the word costs should be tools]

(2) *Chakrapani v Varshalamma* 18 M. 227 (1891)

(3) *Sew Bux v Shub Chunder* 13 C 225 230 (1886)

(4) *Ib.*, considered also apparently to be a material irregularity

(5) *Ross Alston v Pitambar Das* 20 A. 524 (1903) *sed qu.* whether as held by Banerjee J *contra* there was not merely an error of law

(6) *Khettramon Das v Shyama Churn* 1 C 539 (1894) held also to be material

irregularity, followed in *Sri Prasad Narn v Dulhan Genda*, 18 C L J 612 (1913), but see *Rabbaba Khanum v Noorjehan Begum* 19 C 90 (1886)

(7) *Kadumath Khagavala v Collector of Poona* 8 B 553 (1884) *Svaminrao v Collector of Dharwar* 17 B 299 (1890)

(8) *Shudappa v Irava* 18 B 737 (1893)

(9) *In re Sharda* 28 C 574 (1901)

(10) *Vasudeva v Channasami* 11 M 584 at p 586 (1894)

(11) *Collector of Kanara v Rambhat* 18 B 454 (1893)

(12) *Seshammala v Munusami*, 20 M. 358 (1896)

(13) *Ram Prasad Malla (in re)* 3 C. 13 (1909)

(14) *Rameshwar Singh v Sheodin Singh* 12 A. 510 (1889) F B

(15) *Mohunt Bhagwan v Khetter Moni* 1 C. W N 61 (1896) *vide ante* p 455

it must be shown to be material—that is, an irregularity which has prejudicially affected the merits of the case

Certain cases of what has been held to be material irregularity will be found noted in the commentary on “acting illegally” Other reported cases are—determining an issue which does not really arise in the case, and basing the decision on such determination, (1) omissions or errors of procedure in the investigation of a matter, such as the omission to comply with the procedure prescribed by sect 3 of Act XIX of 1841, relative to curators, (2) entertaining and granting an application under sect 108 of the last Code, without notice to the other side, in contravention of the directions of sect 109 of the same Code, (3) determining a suit upon an issue which was not one on which the dispute between the parties could be properly adjudicated upon, (4) treating delivery of summons by post to a person who was not shown to have been the defendant as good service, (5) Judge and Assessors sitting to determine amount of compensation to be awarded under Land Acquisition Act, and refusing to take into consideration any of the matters prescribed by sect 24 of that Act, or improperly taking into consideration any of the matters prohibited by sect 25 thereof, (6) Appellate Court disposing of a suit on a point taken by itself in appeal without affording the parties an opportunity of proving what was necessary to meet that point, or deciding the suit without hearing the parties at all, (7) where evidence has been improperly taken, (8) appointment of a curator under Act XIX of 1841 without holding inquiry under sect 3 of that Act, (9) grant of leave under sect 18 of the Religious Endowments Act on an unverified petition not presented in Court, (10) in contravention of sect 529, now O XLVII r 7, entertaining an appeal from an order admitting a review, (11) going into a fresh point on a new trial the materials necessary for its decision not being before the Court, (12) wrongly holding as regards service, and there upon passing *ex parte* decree, (13) refusing to draw up a preliminary decree in

(1) Venkubai v Venkaji Anaji, 12 B 617 (1887)

(2) Papamma v Collector of Godavari, 12 M 341, 344, 347 (1889)

(3) Badami Kuar v Dinu Rai, 8 A 111 (1880), at p 115, *per* Straight, J., and *per* Mahmood, J., in Dhan Singh v Basant Singh, 8 A 519, at p 529 (1886)

(4) Rudrappa v Narsingrao, 29 B 213 (1901)

(5) Jagannath Brakkbhau v Sassoon, 18 B 606 (1893)

(6) Joseph v Salt Company, 371 (1892), but as to a mistake concerning the principles of valuation, ib

(7) Kristnamma Naidu v Chaya Naidu, 17 M 410 (1893), at p 421 *per* Davies, J [the rest of the Bench, however, agreed in dismissing the petition], as to the last point see Chakra Paul v Varahamma, 18 M 227 (1894), where the Court interfered, an order having been passed without hearing the

party a pleader So also where a party has not been permitted to adduce evidence Chenbasappa v Lakshman Ramchanra, 18 B 369 at p 372 (1893)

(8) Shiva Nathaji v Joma Kashinath, 7 B 341 (1883) at p 357

(9) Krishnasami Pannikondar v Muthu Krishna Pannikondar, 24 M 364 (1900) *per* Shephard J, Arnold White, C.J., holding that the Judge acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity

(10) Amdoo Mujan v Muhammad Davud, 24 M 635 (1901)

(11) Abdul Sadiq v Abdul Aziz, 21 A 152, 154 (1899), as however, it was held that the District Judge had no power to act aside the order, &c whether the question was not one of jurisdiction

(12) Rali v Parmanan I Jowraj, 13 B 642 (1889)

(13) Abraham Pillai v Donald Smith, 29 M 324 (1906)

accordance with the findings, (1) ordering the amount deposited to be returned to the transferee of a non transferable occupancy holding, (2) failing to decide an issue which became necessary by the reversal of the decision of other issues by the first Court, (3) an order for consolidation of suits which is erroneous in principle and will lead to irremediable mischief, (4) allowing withdrawal of suit under O XLIII r 1, with leave to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action after the defendant had obtained a decree in his favour, (5) interference by a Collector, under sect 23 of the Mamlatdar's Court Act, with the findings on fact of a Mamlatdar which are on their face legal and regular (6) It has been held that failure of a lower Appellate Court to frame and try the requisite issue under O XLI r 25 may, under certain circumstances, be a material irregularity (7) But the mere fact that a lower Court erroneously refused to allow amendment of a plaint is not ground for interference (8)

“May pass such order”—The words employed indicate very wide powers, and the Court may do or direct anything to be done which it considers called for under the circumstances. The actual order will, however be controlled by these latter (9) Where the decision of a Court of first instance or of both such Court and the Appellate Court are without jurisdiction the Court has set aside both decisions and returned the plaint for presentation in the proper Court (10) In such a case there has been no trial, and the High Court will not undertake the functions of a Court before which the case should have but has never, gone. Where want of jurisdiction is alleged as regards the Appellate Court only if the latter Court exceeds its jurisdiction, the High Court may set aside that portion of the order which was in excess of jurisdiction, and if the Appellate Court had not jurisdiction at all it may set aside the decision altogether and may refer the appeal to the Court which had jurisdiction, even if it were too late to prefer a fresh appeal to that Court (11) But if the original order was non appealable the Court, in setting aside the decision on appeal of a Court not possessed of jurisdiction will not enter into the question of the merits in order to determine if the first order was correct or not (12) It has been held that the Court may at least pass any order which it might be authorized to pass on second appeal (13) The question, however whether the High Court, in dealing with a case under this section can examine the evidence and itself investigate the facts is the object of conflict. In some cases it has done so, (14) in others not (15)

(1) *Sidhanath v Ganesh*, 14 Bom. L. R. 916 (1912), 37 B. 60

(2) *Nalanat Fulmani* 15 C. L. J. 388 (1912)

(3) *Sibu Saute v Nitai* 15 C. L. J. 114 (1911)

(4) *Kali Charan v Surja Kumar*, 17 C. W. N. 526 (1912)

(5) *Eknath v Ranoji* 35 B. 261 (1911)

(6) *Kashiram v Pajuram* 35 B. 487 (1911)

(7) *Ramjas v Inha General Navigation Railway Co.*, 16 C. W. N. 424 (1911)

(8) *Venkatasubbish v Seshasulcham* 2* M. L. J. 136 (1911)

(9) See *Sarnam Tewari v Sakina Bibi* 3 A. 417 (1881) at p. 420

(10) *Ib*

(11) *In re Subjan Ostagar* 7 B. L. R. (I. B.) 351 (1866)

(12) *In re Docowri Kazi* B. L. R. (I. B.) 517 (1866)

(13) *Maulvi Muhammad v Syed Husain* 3 A. 203 (1880) F. B. Har Prasad v Jafar Ali 7 A. 315 (1885) at p. 349

(14) *Kailash Chandra v Bissonath Paraman* 1 C. W. N. 67 (1896) *Shields v Wilkinson* 9 A. 398 (1887) and see *Maulvi Muhammad v Syed Husain* 3 A. 203 (1880) at p. 204 per Stuart, C. J. *Sarnam Tewari v Sakina Bibi* 3 A. 417 (1881) at p. 419, per Stuart, C. J.

(15) *Ramrao v Babaji*, 20 B. 630, at p. 632

Execution of orders passed in revision—The same procedure which applies to High Court decrees in appellate jurisdiction must be applied under sect 141 to orders in revisional jurisdiction. Application for execution of such orders must be made to the Court whose decree is revised, and that Court must execute the decree or order passed in revision according to the rules prescribed for the execution of its own decrees (1)

Appeal from orders passed in revision—The Bombay and Allahabad High Courts have held that the Letters Patent provide for an appeal only from a judgment passed in the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, and that therefore no appeal lies from an order of a single Judge dismissing an application for the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction (2). The same view was at first taken by the Madras High Court (3). It was, however, subsequently held, by a Full Bench (proceeding as regards some opinions of the Judges, on the ground that the revisional is part of the Court's appellate jurisdiction), that an appeal lies against an order made by a single Judge of the High Court under this section, when such order amounts to a judgment (4). And this case has been recently followed in the Calcutta High Court where it was held on appeal that an order made by a single Judge sitting on the original side interfering with a judgment of the Presidency Small Cause Court is a judgment within the meaning of sect 15 of the Letters Patent and is appealable. In this case one of the Judges was of opinion that a comparison of the Charter Act the Letters Patent and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act leads to the result that the High Court has a right to interfere by way of revision, and another Judge expressed the view that the revisional is a form of the appellate jurisdiction (5). An order passed under this section deciding that a certain person should be allowed to sue as a pauper was held not to be a final decree in an appeal within the meaning of sect 595 of the last Code nor a final judgment made on appeal within the meaning of sect 39 of the Letters Patent, and it was held, on an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against such an order, that the High Court had no power to grant a certificate (6).

(1895), *Rallu v Parmanand Jewraj* 13 B 642 (1889) at pp 647, 649 [where the High Court reversing the decision of the Small Cause Court, remitted the case to be disposed of according to law, and see *Seshammal v Muniam* 20 M 378 (1896)], cf. *Seshadri v Krishnan*, 8 M 192, 195 (1884), and see *Manisha Pradi v Syali Koya* 11 M 226 (1887), at p 230 [‘In revision we are no doubt bound to accept the facts as found by the Subordinate Court, provided that they are so found upon legal evidence and there is no material irregularity in their procedure, per *Hernan*, J.]

(1) *Gold v Goldenberg* 16 B 550 (1891)

(2) *Nisar Ali v Ali Ali*, 28 A. 133 (1907), *Hiralal v Pal Asi*, 22 B 891 (1897) [appli-

cation under s 25 Provincial Small Cause Court Act], and see *per Edg CJ* in *Muhammad Naim ul Isha v Ihsanullah Khan* 14 A 226 (1892) at p 232

(3) *Sriramulu v Ramaswami*, 22 M 109 (1893) [revisional application under this section]

(4) *Chappan v Moslin Kutti* 22 M 68 (1893)

(5) *Shew Prosad Bungulhur v Ram Chunder Hari Bux*, *Kulooram Sitarani Ram Chunder Hari Bux*, 41 C 323 (1913), distinguishing *Hiralal v Bai Asi supra*, and see *Gobind v Kunja*, 10 C L J 407 (1909)

(6) *Babu Sakant v Copal Chandra* 8 C W N 296 (1904)

PART IX

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CHARTERED HIGH COURTS

116 This *Part* applies only to High Courts which are or may hereafter be established under the *Indian High Courts Act, 1861*
Part to apply only to certain High Courts

117 *Save* as provided in this *Part* or in *Part A* or in rules the provisions of this Code *shall* apply to such High Courts
Application of Code to High Courts

High Courts—It was held that neither under this section nor sect 63 of the last Code was an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent affected by sect 588 of that Code (1) It has been held that sect 629 (now O XLVII r 7) applied to the High Court (2)

118 *Where any such High Court* considers it necessary that a decree passed in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction should be executed before the amount of the costs incurred in the suit can be ascertained by taxation, the Court may order that the decree shall be executed forthwith, except as to so much thereof as relates to the costs,

and, as to so much thereof as relates to the costs, that the decree may be executed as soon as the amount of the costs shall be ascertained by taxation

119 Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to authorize any person on behalf of another to address the Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction
Unauthorized persons not to address Court

(1) Toolsey Money v Sudevi Dossee 26 C 361 (1899) dissenting from the decisions of the Madras and Allahabad High Courts there cited and following the decision of the Privy

Council in Hurrish Chunder v Kahi Sunder 9 C 432 (1882)

(2) Achaya v Ratnavelu 9 M 253 (1885), considered in the first case in last note

jurisdiction, or to examine witnesses, except *where* the Court shall have in the exercise of the power conferred by its charter authorized him so to do, or to interfere with the power of the High Court to make rules concerning advocates, vakils and attorneys.

Who may address Court—This section corresponds with that in the former Codes (1)

1 120 (1) The following provisions shall not apply to the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, namely, sections 16, 17 and 90

Provisions not applicable to High Court in original civil or insolvent jurisdiction.

1 (2) Nothing in this Code shall extend or apply to any Judge of a High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction as an Insolvent Court

Original jurisdiction—See note to sect 117, *ante*, and to Preamble It has been held that in this section the word “ordinary” has been omitted before “original civil jurisdiction” (2)

Insolvency—The words in the Code of 1877 were slightly different, but their meaning was the same (3) The Insolvency Court has nothing to do with the procedure to be followed in the execution of a judgment entered up under sect 86 of the Insolvent Act The execution itself is a proceeding of the High Court and sect 619 of the last Code applied (4)

(1) See *In re* Pleaders of the High Court, 8 B 103, at p 131 (1883) *In re* A Valida

Application, 37 C 853 (1910)

(2) *In re* A Vakils Application 37 C

(3) *In re* Bhugwandas Hurjivan, 8 B 511, at p 520 (1881)

(4) *Id*

PART X.

RULES

121 *The rules in the First Schedule shall have effect as if enacted in the body of this Code until annulled or altered in accordance with the provisions of this Part.*

Effect of rules in First Schedule

122 *High Courts established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, and the Chief Courts of the Punjab and Lower Burma, may, from time to time after previous publication, make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of Civil Courts subject to their superintendence, and may by such rules annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule*

Power of certain High Courts to make rules

123 (1) *A Committee, to be called the Rule Committee, shall be constituted at each of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, Lahore and Rangoon*

Constitution of Rule Committees in certain Provinces

(2) *Each such Committee shall consist of the following persons, namely —*

- (a) *three Judges of the High Court established at the town at which such Committee is constituted, one of whom at least has served as a District Judge or (in the Punjab or Burma) a Divisional Judge for three years,*
- (b) *a barrister practising in that Court,*
- (c) *an advocate (not being a barrister) or vakil or pleader enrolled in that Court*
- (d) *a Judge of a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court, and*
- (e) *in the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, an attorney*

(3) The members of each such Committee shall be appointed by the Chief Justice or Chief Judge, who shall also nominate one of their number to be president.

Provided that, if the Chief Justice or Chief Judge elects to be himself a member of a Committee, the number of other Judges appointed to be members shall be two, and the Chief Justice or Chief Judge shall be the President of the Committee.

(4) Each member of any such Committee shall hold office for such period as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice or Chief Judge in this behalf, and whenever any member retires, resigns, dies or ceases to reside in the province in which the Committee was constituted, or becomes incapable of acting as a member of the Committee, the said Chief Justice or Chief Judge may appoint another person to be a member in his stead.

(5) There shall be a Secretary to each such Committee, who shall be appointed by the Chief Justice or Chief Judge and shall receive such remuneration as may be provided in this behalf by the Governor General in Council or by the Local Government, as the case may be.

124 Every Rule Committee shall make a report to the High Court established at the town at which it is constituted, and may propose to annul, alter or add to any rules under section 123, and may bring any such proposal into consideration.

125 High Courts, other than the Courts specified in section 124, may exercise the powers conferred by that section in such manner and subject to such conditions as the Governor General in Council may determine. Power of other High Courts to make rules. Pr. H. C. Court may, after previous publication, any rules which have been made by, , , .

126 Rules made under the foregoing provisions shall be subject to the previous sanction of the following authorities, namely —

- (a) if the rule is made by a High Court established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, to the sanction of the authority prescribed by section 17 of that Act for rules made under that section,
- (b) if the rule is made by any other High Court, to the sanction of the Local Government.

127 Rules so made and sanctioned shall be published in the Gazette of India or in the local official Gazette, as the case may be, and shall from the date of publication or from such other date as may be specified have the same force and effect, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court which made them, as if they had been contained in the First Schedule.

128 (1) Such rules shall be not inconsistent with the provisions in the body of this Code, but, subject thereto, may provide for any matters relating to the procedure of Civil Courts

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub section (1), such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely —

- (a) the service of summonses, notices and other processes by post or in any other manner either generally or in any specified areas, and the proof of such service,
- (b) the maintenance and custody, while under attachment, of luc-stock and other moveable property, the fees payable for such maintenance and custody, the sale of such luc stock and property and the proceeds of such sale,
- (c) procedure in suits by way of counter claim, and the valuation of such suits for the purposes of jurisdiction,
- (d) procedure in garnishee and charging orders either in addition to, or in substitution for, the attachment and sale of debts,
- (e) procedure where the defendant claims to be entitled to contribution or indemnity over against any person whether a party to the suit or not,
- (f) summary procedure—
 - (i) in suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising—
 - on a contract express or implied, or
 - on an enactment where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty, or
 - on a guarantee where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or a liquidated demand only, or
 - on a trust, or
 - (ii) in suits for the recovery of immovable property, with or without a claim for rent or mesne profits, by a

landlord against a tenant whose term has expired or has been duly determined by notice to quit, or has become liable to forfeiture for non-payment of rent, or against persons claiming under such tenant,

- (g) *procedure by way of originating summons,*
- (h) *consolidation of suits, appeals and other proceedings,*
- (i) *delegation to any Registrar Prothonotary or Master or other official of the Court of any judicial, quasi-judicial and non judicial duties, and*
- (j) *all forms, registers, books, entries and accounts which may be necessary or desirable for the transaction of the business of Civil Courts*

It has been held that in this section we have legislative recognition that such suits as were maintainable in respect of debts at the time of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, are still maintainable in this country (1)

[s 652,
third
para]

129 Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court established under the *Indian High Courts Act, 1861* may make such rules *not inconsistent with the Letters Patent establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.*

Power of Chartered High Courts to make rules as to their original civil procedure

[s 652,
second
para]

130 A High Court not established under the *Indian High Courts Act, 1861*, may with the previous sanction of the Local Government, make, with respect to any matter other than procedure, any rule which any High Court so established might, under section 15 of that *Act* make with respect to any such matter for any part of the territories under its jurisdiction which is not included within the limits of a Presidency-town

Power of other High Courts to make rules as to matters other than procedure

[s 652,
fourth
para]

131 Rules made in accordance with section 129 or section 130 shall be published in the *Gazette of India* or in the local official Gazette, as the case may be, and shall from the date of publication or from such other date as may be specified have the force of law

Publication of rules

Rules—These sections effect the most important difference between the present and the last Code Under the law as it formerly stood High Courts

had power to make rules to regulate the procedure of the original side of the Court and High Courts and Chief Courts had power to make rules to regulate the procedure of Courts subordinate to them but neither High Courts nor Chief Courts could make rules to regulate any matters which were dealt with by the Code of Civil Procedure nor could they in any way affect the provisions of that Code. The power which is given to the High Court in England and other countries was denied to the High Courts in India with the result that there could be no elasticity in matters of procedure which fell within the ambit of the Code and that defects in the existing practice could only be remedied when discovered by the dilatory process of legislation.

This may have been proper at the time the Code was first enacted but it has been rightly considered that there is no reason nowadays for denying to the High Courts the power to regulate these minor matters of procedure a power which they are far more competent to exercise than the Legislature. In the present Code therefore the Legislature has enlarged the rule making powers of the High Courts and Chief Courts and vested in them the authority to make changes in minor matters of procedure. This is done by placing the sections of the Code relating to these matters in the first Schedule and giving to the High Courts and Chief Courts power to vary or amend the rules in the Schedule or to make additional rules on matters which are specified in the Code. The result follows that the rules in the Schedule provide a procedure for the present but that that procedure can be altered at any time and from time to time as seems fit to the Courts. It has been thought desirable that in exercising these wider powers the Courts should have the advice of representatives of the two branches of the legal profession and accordingly it has been provided that rules should only be made after taking the opinion of a Rule Committee composed of three Judges of the High Court a Judge of a subordinate Civil Court and of three other members appointed by the respective Chief Justices or Chief Judges one representing the Bar the other the Vakils or Pleaders and the third the attorneys. It was believed that a Standing Committee of this kind would be of great value. Provision has been made for the appointment of a permanent Secretary to conduct the routine work of the Committee and as is hoped to assist in drafting rules for them.

The division between matters which should be dealt with in the Act and matters which should be left to rules is not easy to determine on any logical basis.

Matters which affect more than one province and matters in which it is essential that there should be uniformity in all provinces have been kept in the Act. Minor matters have been relegated to the Schedule. But between these two classes there are many matters as to which opinions may differ whether they are proper subjects for rules or not. It is probably impossible to devise an arrangement which would disarm all criticism, but that adopted in the Code is the best that presented itself at present. It may be said against this innovation that it will create divergence of practice between the various provinces and that this will cause confusion. The answer which has been given is that the divergence will be only in minor matters and that even in this divergence there may be advantages. The conditions and requirements of

provinces differ greatly. A rule of procedure which may be proper in Calcutta may be entirely inappropriate in the Punjab. It is desirable that the general principles of procedure should be uniform all over India, but no harm can result from a divergence in the practice in Judges' Chambers, or in the particular form of plaints or interrogatories.

It may also be objected that the plan of putting some of the provisions relating to any particular subject in the Act and others in rules will lead to confusion. This is an objection which applies to all rules made under statutory authority, but it is one which it is hoped will have little force in this particular case as soon as practitioners have become familiar with the altered system.

The rules suggested in the Schedule to the draft will be found to depart to no very considerable extent from the last Code though important amendments have been made. The subjects of counterclaim and garnishee orders which were included in the earlier Bill, have been omitted from the Schedule. They raise questions on which there was a great divergence of opinion and on which the requirements of different provinces appeared to vary. It has therefore been thought better not to make these procedures compulsory all over India, but to leave it to the Courts of each province to introduce them by rules if thought advisable. Power is given in the rule making section for these purposes. With sect 122, compare first paragraph of sect 652 of last Code, with sect 128 O II r 6, and with sects 129-131, the second, third and fourth paragraphs respectively of sect 652 of the last Code. New rules published since the date of the last edition are collected in the Appendix.

High Court rules—These sections correspond with certain modifications with the second, third and fourth paragraphs of sect 652 of the last Code. The second paragraph of that section was added by sect 63, Act VII of 1888 and the last two paragraphs by sect 2 Act XIII of 1895. Rules made and published under this section have the force of law. Hence, it was held that where an application for execution was not accompanied by a copy of the decree of which execution was sought the application could not be treated as a step in aid of execution within the meaning of the Limitation Act (1). The rule must not, however, be *ultra vires*, (2) and no rule it was held, could add to or modify the conditions and limitations of the law laid down in the Limitation Act (3). It has been recently said by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that, until such new Rules are made it is probable that the Rules made under the last Code should be considered as in force (4). As regards paragraph (1) of sect 652 and the High Courts, see sect 122 *ante*.

(1) *Sadashiva v. Ramchandra* 5 Bom. L. R. 394 (1903)

(2) *Rajam Chetti v. Seshayya* 18 M. 236 (1895). See *Lalithwar Singh v. Rameshwar Singh*, 31 C. 619, 624 (1907). For an instance of a High Court Rule differing from the Code, see *Behram Jung Nawab v. Haji*

Sultan Ali Shastri, 37 B. 572 (1912) (O. XII r. 10 does not apply in Bombay)

(3) *Chunilal Jethabhai v. Dahanabhai Amulakh*, 9 Bom. L. J. 1138 (1907)

(4) *In re District Munsif of Tiruvallur*, I B. 37 M. 17 (1914)

PART XI

MISCELLANEOUS.

132 (1) Women who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public shall be exempt from personal appearance in Court

Exemption of certain women from personal appearance.

(2) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to exempt such women from arrest in execution of civil process in any case in which the arrest of women is not prohibited by this Code.

Women—This is the only section which deals with the exemption of women (1) from personal appearance in Court. The privilege is limited to the class of persons described in the section, and cannot be claimed by all women of rank (2). It has been designed for the protection of *purdanashin*. The words "*who according to*," etc., were held not to apply to a case of a Parsi widow, who alleged that according to Parsi customs she could not leave her house for two years after her husband's death, the custom being of a varying and uncertain character (3). But a Court, independently of the section, would always have regard to such circumstances as were put forward in that case (*viz* the alleged custom, age, and health of the applicant, and her desire to leave the jurisdiction) as an excuse for non attendance (4). See notes to O XVIII r 4 and O XXVI r 1.

133 (1) The Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, exempt from personal appearance in Court any person whose rank, in the opinion of such Government, entitles him to the privilege of exemption

Exemption of other persons.

(1) An unmarried girl of twelve years was held to be too advanced in age to allow of any of the immunities of childhood. *Mamath v Moorta*, 21 W R 375 (1875). As to examination in house see *ib.* and Suit 29 of 1903, C H C., *Dhara Bundari v Suruti Bala*, 28th

July 1904

(2) *Davis v Middleton* 8 W F 282 (1867)

(3) *Rustomji v Banoo Bai*, 14 B 584 (1889)

(4) *ib*

(2) The names and residences of the persons so exempted shall, from time to time, be forwarded to the High Court by the Local Government and a list of such persons shall be kept in such Court, and a list of such persons as reside within the local limits of the jurisdiction of each Court subordinate to the High Court shall be kept in such subordinate Court

(3) Where any person so exempted claims the privilege of such exemption, and it is consequently necessary to examine him by commission, he shall pay the costs of that commission, unless the party requiring his evidence pays such costs

Exemption from appearance—Act VIII of 1859, sects 22, 23 The exemption is absolute, and not limited to cases in which the party claiming it has been summoned by the opposite party A Rajah instituted a suit under Act X of 1859 through an agent appointed in that behalf The Deputy Collector, not being satisfied with the information which the agent could give, adjourned the hearing to a subsequent day, and required the personal appearance of the Rajah The Rajah claimed to be exempted, but the Deputy Collector refused the application and dismissed the case It was held that the Rajah was not bound to attend and the suit was wrongly dismissed (1)

134 *The provisions of sections 55, 57 and 59 shall apply, so far as may be, to all persons arrested under this Code*
Arrest other than in execution of decree

642] **135** (1) No Judge, Magistrate or other judicial officer shall be liable to arrest under civil process while going to, presiding in, or returning from, his Court
Exemption from arrest under civil process

(2) Where any matter is pending before a tribunal having jurisdiction therein, or believing in good faith that it has such jurisdiction, the parties thereto, their pleaders, mukhtars, revenue agents and recognized agents, and their witnesses acting in obedience to a summons, shall be exempt from arrest under civil process other than process issued by such tribunal for contempt of Court while going to or purpose of such matter, and

(3) Nothing in sub section 1 shall apply to claim exemption from arrest under an order for immediate execution or where such judgment debtor attends to show cause why he should not be committed to prison in execution of a decree

Exemption from arrest—The privilege is not that of the person mentioned and for his personal benefit, but of the Court, and is conferred for the purpose of ensuring the due administration of justice (1) A case not governed by this section must be determined upon the principles of English law, on which this section rests (2) The validity of a commitment by a Court of inferior jurisdiction can be inquired into, and if it be found that a person was, when committed by such Court, entitled to privilege from arrest he will be released (3) Where plaintiff, a resident of Bengal, went to Madras on the 21th October to attend a case which, however, was adjourned for seven weeks on the 27th October, and while waiting in Madras for the suit to come on was arrested on the 10th November, he was directed to be released (4) In a suit under Chapter XXXIX of the last Code (see now Order XXXVII) when the defendant is not allowed to defend without leave, a defendant appearing in Court for that purpose is privileged (5) If there is no *bona fides* on the part of that person that his attendance is required he has no privilege (6) The privilege being that of the Court, he cannot, when arrested for contempt claim privilege (7) The privilege attaches only when going to, or attending or returning from a tribunal Therefore, where an insolvent who was wrongly imprisoned was arrested on his release from jail it was held that he could not claim privilege (8)

"*Tribunal*" is a comprehensive term intended to cover Criminal as well as Revenue and Civil Courts, (9) Insolvency Courts, (10) and arbitrators (11) The words of the section are now as under the last Code not "*from arrest under the Code,*" but from arrest "*under civil process*" (12)

136 (1) Where an application is made that any person

Procedure where person to be arrested or property to be attached is outside district

shall be arrested or that any property shall be attached under any provision of this Code not relating to the execution of decrees, and such person resides or such property is situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court to which the application is made, the Court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant of arrest or make an order of attachment, and send

(1) John v Carter 4 B L R O C J 90 91 (1870), Wooma Churn v Teil 14 B L R App 13 (1875), Samarapuri v Parry, 13 M 150, 153 (1889), Ardeshrup Framji v Kalyan Das 32 A 3 (1909)

(2) In re Soorendra Nath 5 C 106 108 (1879)

(3) In re Omrito Lall Dey, 1 C 78 (1875) In re Juggessur Roy, 5 C L R 170 (1879)

(4) In re Siva Bux, 4 M 317 (1881)

(5) In re Soorendra Nath, 5 C. 106 (1879)

(6) Wooma Churn v Teil 14 B L R App 13 (1875)

(7) John v Carter, 4 B L R, O C J 90

(1870)

(8) Samarapuri v Parry, 13 M 150 (1889)

(9) R v Harakh Nath 4 A. 27 29 (1881) In re Oboy Churn Mookerjee 2 Tayl & Bell 231 (1851) a person was held privileged who was arrested immediately after his acquittal on a charge of misdemeanour

(10) Samarapuri v Parry 13 M 150 158 (1889).

(11) In re Juggessur Roy 5 C L R 1 0 (1879)

(12) See R v Harakh Nath 4 A. 27 (1881) The section was modified by s 7 Act VI of 1883

(2) The names and residences of the persons so exempted shall, from time to time, be forwarded to the High Court by the Local Government and a list of such persons shall be kept in such Court, and a list of such persons as reside within the local limits of the jurisdiction of each Court subordinate to the High Court shall be kept in such subordinate Court

(3) Where any person so exempted claims the privilege of such exemption, and it is consequently necessary to examine him by commission, he shall pay the costs of that commission, unless the party requiring his evidence pays such costs

Exemption from appearance—Act VIII of 1859, sects 22, 23 The exemption is absolute, and not limited to cases in which the party claiming it has been summoned by the opposite party A Rajah instituted a suit under Act X of 1859 through an agent appointed in that behalf The Deputy Collector, not being satisfied with the information which the agent could give, adjourned the hearing to a subsequent day and required the personal appearance of the Rajah The Rajah claimed to be exempted, but the Deputy Collector refused the application and dismissed the case It was held that the Rajah was not bound to attend and the suit was wrongly dismissed (1)

134 *The provisions of sections 55, 56 and 59 shall apply, so far as may be, to all persons arrested under this Code*
Arrest other than in execution of decree

642] **135** (1) No Judge, Magistrate or other judicial officer shall be liable to arrest under civil process while going to, presiding in, or returning from, his Court
Exemption from arrest under civil process

(2) Where any matter is pending before a tribunal having jurisdiction therein, or believing in good faith that it has such jurisdiction, the parties thereto, then pleaders, mukhtars, revenue agents and recognized agents, and their witnesses acting in obedience to a summons, shall be exempt from arrest under civil process other than process issued by such tribunal for contempt of Court while going to or attending such tribunal for the purpose of such matter, and while returning from such tribunal

(3) Nothing in sub section (2) shall enable a judgment debtor to claim exemption from arrest under an order for immediate execution or where such judgment debtor attends to show cause why he should not be committed to prison in execution of a decree

Exemption from arrest—The privilege is not that of the person mentioned and for his personal benefit, but of the Court, and is conferred for the purpose of ensuring the due administration of justice (1). A case not governed by this section must be determined upon the principles of English law, on which this section rests (2). The validity of a commitment by a Court of inferior jurisdiction can be inquired into, and if it be found that a person was, when committed by such Court, entitled to privilege from arrest he will be released (3). Where plaintiff, a resident of Bengal, went to Madras on the 21st October to attend a case which, however, was adjourned for seven weeks on the 27th October, and while waiting in Madras for the suit to come on was arrested on the 10th November, he was directed to be released (4). In a suit under Chapter XXXIX of the last Code (see now Order XXXVII), when the defendant is not allowed to defend without leave, a defendant appearing in Court for that purpose is privileged (5). If there is no *bona fides* on the part of that person that his attendance is required he has no privilege (6). The privilege being that of the Court, he cannot, when arrested for contempt, claim privilege (7). The privilege attaches only when going to, or attending, or returning from a tribunal. Therefore, where an insolvent who was wrongly imprisoned was arrested on his release from jail, it was held that he could not claim privilege (8).

"**Tribunal**" is a comprehensive term intended to cover Criminal as well as Revenue and Civil Courts, (9) Insolvency Courts, (10) and arbitrators (11). The words of the section are now as under the last Code not "*from arrest under the Code,*" but from arrest "*under civil process*" (12).

136. (1) Where an application is made that any person shall be arrested or that any property shall be attached under any provision of this Code not relating to the execution of decrees, and such person resides or such property is situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court to which the application is made, the Court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant of arrest or make an order of attachment, and send

Procedure where person to be arrested or property to be attached is outside district

shall be arrested or that any property shall be attached under any provision of this Code not relating to the execution of decrees, and such person resides or such property is situate

outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court to which the application is made, the Court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant of arrest or make an order of attachment, and send

(1) *John v Carter*, 4 B L R O C J 90 91 (1870), *Wooma Churn v Tel* 14 B L R App 13 (1875), *Samarapuri v Parry* 13 M 150, 158 (1889), *Ardeshirji Framji v Kalyan Das*, 32 A 3 (1909)

(2) *In re Soorendra Nath*, 5 C 106 108 (1879)

(3) *In re Omrita Lall Dey*, 1 C 78 (1875) *In re Juggessur Roy*, 5 C L R 150 (1879)

(4) *In re Siva Bux*, 4 M 317 (1881)

(5) *In re Soorendra Nath*, 5 C 106 (1879)

(6) *Wooma Churn v Tel*, 14 B L R App 13 (1875)

(7) *John v Carter*, 4 B L R, O C J 90

(1870)

" "

was arrested immediately after his acquittal on a charge of murder

(10) *Samarapuri v Parry* 13 M 150, 158 (1889).

(11) *In re Juggessur Roy*, 5 C L R 170 (1879)

(12) *Ben R v Harakh Nath*, 4 A 27 (1881) The section was modified by s 7, Act VI. of 1894

to the District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person or property resides or is situate a copy of the warrant or order, together with the probable amount of the costs of the arrest or attachment

(2) The District Court shall, on receipt of such copy and amount, cause the arrest or attachment to be made by its own officers, or by a Court subordinate to itself, and shall inform the Court which issued or made such warrant or order of the arrest or attachment

(3) The Court making an arrest under this section shall send the person arrested to the Court by which the warrant of arrest was issued, unless he shows cause to the satisfaction of the former Court why he should not be sent to the latter Court, or unless he furnishes sufficient security for his appearance before the latter Court or for satisfying any decree that may be passed against him by that Court, in either of which cases the Court making the arrest shall release him

(4) Where a person to be arrested or moveable property to be attached under this section is within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal or at Madras or at Bombay, or of the Chief Court of Lower Burma, the copy of the warrant of arrest or of the order of attachment, and the probable amount of the costs of the arrest or attachment, shall be sent to the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta, Madras Bombay or Rangoon, as the case may be, and that Court, on receipt of the copy and amount, shall proceed as if it were the District Court

Under any provision of this Code—It was held that this section did not authorize the Court to attach any property which it was not authorized to attach by other sections of the Code (1) It has however, been held by the Calcutta High Court that under this section of the last Code read with sect 483 of the same Code the Court could attach property outside the jurisdiction, in other words that this section was intended to extend the operation of attachments before judgments to property beyond the jurisdiction (2)

Resides—The intent of this special provision must be regarded Bare residence is sufficient under this section So where an officer, whose regiment was in Burma proceeding on leave to England resided a few days at Madras it was held that he was liable to arrest under this section (3)

(1) *Krishnasami v. Ingels* 8 M 20 (1894).
Raja Goculdas v. Jankibai, 5 Bom L. P 570 (1903)

—16 (1902) and see observations of Parnell
J. in Raja Goculdas v. Jankibai, 5 L. P at p 571 (1903)

(2) *Ram Kirtab v. Madh'o Lal* 7 C. W. N

(3) *Forrest v. Forre* 8 M 20, (1883)

137 (1) The language which, on the commencement of this Code, is the language of any Court subordinate to a High Court shall continue to be the language of such subordinate Court until the Local Government otherwise directs.

(2) The Local Government may declare what shall be the language of any such Court and in what character applications to and proceedings in such Court shall be written

(3) Where this Code requires or allows anything other than the recording of evidence to be done in writing in any such Court, such writing may be in English, but if any party or his pleader is unacquainted with English a translation into the language of the Court shall, at his request, be supplied to him, and the Court shall make such order as it thinks fit in respect of the payment of the costs of such translation

138 (1) The Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, direct with respect to any Judge specified in the notification, or falling under a description set forth therein, that evidence in cases in which an appeal is allowed shall be taken down by him in the English language and in manner prescribed

(2) Where a Judge is prevented by any sufficient reason from complying with a direction under sub section (1), he shall record the reason and cause the evidence to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court

Evidence in English—The section corresponding with this rule in the last Code, was inserted by Act VII of 1888 sect 17 As to Oudh see Act XVIII of 1876 sect 19 Clause (3) is now O XVIII r 7 Clause (4) of the corresponding section in the last Code has not been re enacted

139. In the case of any affidavit under this Code—

Oath on affidavit by whom to be administered. (a) any Court or Magistrate, or (b) any officer or other person whom a High Court may appoint in this behalf, or (c) any officer appointed by any other Court which the Local Government has generally or specially empowered in this behalf, may administer the oath to the deponent

140 (1) In any Admiralty or Vice Admiralty cause of salvage, towage or collision, the Court, whether it be exercising its original or its appellate jurisdiction, may, if it thinks fit, and shall upon request of either

Assessors in cases of salvage, etc.

party to such cause, summon to its assistance, in such manner as it may direct or as may be prescribed, two competent assessors, and such assessors shall attend and assist accordingly.

(2) Every such assessor shall receive such fees for his attendance, to be paid by such of the parties as the Court may direct or as may be prescribed.

647.] 141 The procedure *provided in this Code in regard to suits* shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

Procedure for miscellaneous proceedings.—The object of this section, which corresponds with sect 38, Act XXIII of 1861, is to make applicable to proceedings other than suits and appeals, the procedure, so far as it is applicable, which is adopted in suits and appeals. An appeal, however, is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. This section, therefore, does not confer any right of appeal where it does not exist under the Code or any other law (1). The right of appeal must be given by statute conferring that right (2). If, however, a right of appeal is given by law, then the procedure in such appeal will be that laid down by the Code (3).

Proceedings other than suits.—The procedure applicable during the bearing of the suit until decree is provided for by the Code, as also that applicable in execution of or appeal from the decree. This section in the last Code did not on its true construction apply to execution of the decree, and was inapplicable to petitions for execution before and independently of, the passing of sect 4, Act VI of 1892, which amended it, by expressly declaring that it was not applicable to such cases (4). Prior, however, to the Amending Act it had been held, in a number of cases that all execution proceedings should, for the purposes of this section, be treated as miscellaneous proceedings (5).

(1) Hareenath Koonloo v. Modhoo Soodun, 19 W. R. 122 (1873), Nimgappa v. Gangawa, 10 B. 133 (1885) [fol., Jung Bahadur v. Mahadeo Prasad, 31 C. 207, 209 (1903)], *contra* (apparently) Paresah Nath v. Secretary of State, 10 C. 71 (1888), *sed quæ*, neither does it empower any Court to invade the jurisdiction of another Court. Damodara v. Kuttappa, 30 M. 16 (1911).

(2) Minakshi v. Subramanya, 11 M. 26 (1885), s. c., 11 I. A. 160.

(3) See Tara Chandra v. Ahund Chunder, 10 W. R. 470 (1868).

(4) Thakur Prasad v. Fakirullah, 17 A. 106 (1891), s. c., 22 I. A. 41.

(5) *In re Harshadkar Prasad*, I. A. 178 (1876) [stay of execution], Ganga Prasad v.

Bhup Singh, 1 A. 160 (1876) [District Court transferring to itself execution proceedings in 'Subori'].

A. H.
Code c.

Kureem, 5 A. H. C. 161 (1873) [and of s. 119 of same Code], Syud D. Shan v. Muset Khodija, 8 W. R. 61 (1867) [and of s. 170 of same Code], Balaji Panchodias v. Mohanlal Dalakhram, 5 B. 180 (1881) [and of s. 26 of Code of 1877], Sitalakshmi v. Vythilinga, 8 M. 518 (1884) [transfer of claim registered under s. 331], Lakhmi Chandra v. Gatto Bai, 10 B. 133 (1886) [applicability of ss.

gawa, 10 B. 133 (1886) [applicability of ss.

All such cases, in so far as they proceed upon the ground that this section of the last Code was applicable to execution proceedings, must be considered both as overruled by the Privy Council and superseded by the Amendment of 1892 introducing the Explanation. Under the Code, as it stood after the introduction of the Explanation to s 407 of the last Code this section does not apply to execution proceedings (1) The Amending Act, VI of 1892, by making this section inapplicable in proceedings for the execution of decrees, deprived the Civil Courts of the power to apply by analogy to proceedings for the execution of decrees, the procedure specifically prescribed for proceedings in suits at a stage prior to decree, and limited the procedure which could be applied under the Code in proceedings for execution to the procedure which is expressly, as in Chapter XIX of the last Code, or by implication, prescribed for proceedings for execution, or at the execution stage of a suit (2) The explanation has now been omitted, but presumably the law remains the same (3) It has recently been held by the Calcutta High Court that the explanation was only omitted because it had been rendered superfluous by the decision of the Privy Council in *Thakur Prasad v Fakirullah* (4)

Chapter XIX of the last Code did not however, contain a complete procedure for proceedings in execution (5) and where this was the case the matter might have been disposed of under the inherent power of the Court (6) Thus it was held that a Court had inherent power if not conferred by statute, to dismiss an application for execution when the applicant fails through his own laches to put the Court in a position to proceed with his application, as also to proceed forthwith to decide an application for execution of a decree on the materials before it, when time has been granted to a party to perform any act necessary for the further progress of the application and that

102 and 103 to proceeding taken under s 311], *Hefayat Ali v Ram Singh* 7 A 359 (1885) [s 374 held applicable to application for execution but see now s 375A] *Fakaruddin v Official Trustee* 10 C 538 (1884) [s 623 held applicable to a decision under s 244], *Gaur Mohan v Tarachand* 7 B L R App 17 (1869), *Rajpal v Chooramun* 4 A H C R 10 (1872) [applicability of s 110 of the Code of 1859 (98 of present Code) to execution proceedings] *Bassessur Bhugut v Murlu Sahu* 9 C 163 (1882) [applicability of s 97, ante], *Sheo Prasad v Kastura Kuar* 10 A 119 (1887) [applicability of s 103 ante], *Kaleo Kristo v Mahomed Kader* 12 W R 428 (1869) [s 119 of Code of 1859 or for rehearing], *Saryu Prasad v Sita Ram* 10 A 71 (1887) [s 647 makes ss 373-374 applicable to proceedings in execution of a decree]

(1) *Thakur Prasad v Fakirullah* 17 A 106 (1894) s c, 22 I A 44 *Dhonkal Singh v Bhakkar Singh* 15 A 84 (1893), *Bunko*

Bahary v Md Madhub 18 C 635 (1891), *Hajrat Akramnissa v Valulnissa* 18 B 429 (1893) *Rura Mal v Kuria* 1894 P R No 62 The case of *Tukaram v Khandu* 20 B 541 (1895) is not against this view as the decision proceeds upon the ground of the Court's inherent power in a matter of this kind A similar view of the section was taken in an early case *In re Jodoo Monce* Dorse 11 W R 494 (1869)

(2) *Dhonkal Singh v Phakkar Singh* 15 A 84 at p 93 (1893) per Sir John Edge C J

(3) See *Asim v Raj Mohan* 13 C L J 532 (1910) the procedure laid down for suits is not applicable in its entirety to execution proceedings

(4) *Hari Charan Chose v Manmatlal Nathi* Sen 41 C 1 (1913)

(5) *Dhonka Singh v Phakkar Singh* 15 A 84 (1893) at p 91

(6) *Id.*, at p 97

act has not been done (1) So again, if a Judge makes an *ex parte* order in execution proceedings, except in cases in which he is expressly empowered to make such an order the party who has not been heard has a right to apply to the Judge to set it aside, and if the Judge finds that such order was wrong, he is at liberty, after hearing both parties, to recall the same (2) Applications for execution are, of course proceedings in the suits in which the decrees were made (3)

The miscellaneous provisions to which this section was intended to apply are, it has been said, "matters, such as application for probate, (4) certificates of guardianship (5) or to collect debts, which, especially when contested, partake of the nature of suits and to which the procedure laid down in the Code is clearly more or less applicable" (6) It has also been held applicable to proceedings under the Divorce Act, (7) to matters of procedure in the revenue Courts not specially provided for, (8) to proceedings before the Judge under the Registration Act, (9) a preliminary inquiry into the conduct of a Civil Court Ameen, (10) applications to the High Court for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Reg II of 1827, (11) proceedings under sect 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, (12) matters relating to companies, (13) applications under sect 18 of the Religious Endowments Act (14) and other similar matters other than suits and appeals It has also been held that the provisions of sect 100 of the last Code were applicable to proceedings for the restoration to the file of a case dismissed for default (15) It does not, however, appear why these proceedings which were in a suit were treated as miscellaneous

94] 142 All orders and notices served on or given to any person under the provisions of this Code shall be in writing

(1) Dhonkal Singh v Phakkar Singh 16 A. 84 (1893), at p. 9.

(2) Sheo Prosunno v Baidharn Lall 13 W. R. 232 (1870).

(3) Shyama Charan v Debendra Nath 2 C. 481 487 (1900).

(4) Bhakur Prasad v Fakirullah 17 A. 106 111 (1891), *In re Dintarini Deb* 8 C. 840 882 (1882) *In the matter of the will of Dawubai*, 18 B. 237 (1893), *Amur Hasan v Ahmad Ali* 9 A. 36 41 (1886).

(5) Bhakur Prasad v Fakirullah, 17 A. 106 111 (1891), *Amur Hasan v Ahmad Ali* 9 A. 36 41 (1886) *Bai Jamna Bai*, 30 B. 20 (1911).

(6) Bunko Behary v Nil Malhab 18 C. 627 629 (1891).

(7) *Amur Hasan v Ahmad Ali* 9 A. 36 41 (1886) *See King v King* 6 B. 416 (1882) [*ref Stephen v Stephen* 17 C. 570 (1890)]

(8) *Amur Hasan v Ahmad Ali* 9 A. 36 41 (1886) *Madho Prakash v Murli Manohar* 5 A. 406 (1883) *dist Bahadur misra v Ajad* 14 A. 350 (1881).

(9) *Reasut Hossein v Badi v Abdul Hal* 2 C. 131 (1877) s. c. 3 F. 1 221.

(10) *In re Collector of Larkoh* 14 W. 1 390 (1870).

(11) *In re Nagappa* 5 B. H. C. R. 217 (1868).

(12) *Dijendra Nath v Soyendra Nath* 24 C. 197 206 (1896), s. c. 1 C. W. N. 236.

(13) *In re West Hopetown Tea Company* 9 A. 180 (1886), *Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation v Dorabji Curraj* 27 B. 415 (1903).

(14) *Amloo Miyan v Muhammad Davu* 1 24 N. 685 681 (1901).

(15) *Lall v Bai Vajiram Bai Maganavari* 18 B. 53 (1893).

143 Postage, where chargeable on a notice, summons or letter issued under this Code and forwarded by post, and the fee for registering the same, shall be paid within a time to be fixed before the communication is made [s.]

Postage
Provided that the Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, may remit such postage, or fee, or both, or may prescribe a scale of court-fees to be levied in lieu thereof

144 (1) Where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed, and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. [s.]

(2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub section (1)

Restitution on reversal or variance of decree—It is the legal effect of a decree that it is to be executed. It is no less the effect of a decree of reversal that the party against whom the decree was given is to have restitution of all that he has been deprived of under it. On the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost, and it is not merely in the power of the Courts but it is a duty cast upon them to enforce that obligation. It is not a mere matter of discretion with the Court which reverses a decree whether the party against whom it was given is or is not to be restored to what he has been deprived of under it (1).

The Code of 1859 did not expressly provide for restitution (2). The Privy Council, however, held that the Courts had an inherent power in this respect and that property taken under an erroneous decree was on its reversal recoverable.

(1) *Hukum Chand v. Kamalanand*, 33 C 927, 931, 942 (1905). *Hurro Chunder v. Shooroodhance*, 9 W R 402 (1868), s.c. B. L. R., F. B. Rul 985. *Dorasami v. Annasami*, 23 M. 306 (1899). See also *Shib Naram v. Kishore Naram* 10 W R 131.

Kooldip Singh 21 C 983 J.L. (1891). *Coffin v. Karbari Rawat* 2 L C 501 (1891). *Radhey Singh v. Mangun Jai* 1 C 710 (1902). *Parbhu Dayal* 32 A. 79 (1909), *Saurin* C L J 213 (1911).

(2) *1 A. B. C. v. 1 A. B. C.* 10 W R 711 (1891).

either by summary process of execution of the appellate decree of reversal or by a new suit (1)

The Court has, independently of the statutory power conferred on it, an inherent (2) power in this respect. It is both its right and duty to prevent its proceedings being made the cause of injustice and therefore to order the restitution of the thing improperly taken, and generally to restore the party to the position he would have occupied but for its erroneous order since reversed. The Codes, subsequent to that of 1859, provided for restitution, and the cases under them extended the operation of the words of the Statute as defined in the present amended section. The first clause of the section has been re cast, so as to bring it into closer conformity with the existing practice, and the second clause has been added.

It is immaterial whether the erroneous action of the Court was due to carrying into effect a wrong decree or whether it was due to execution proceedings wrongly conceived for the purpose of carrying out a right decree. In either case the Court, upon the error being ascertained, is bound, so far as it can, to place the aggrieved party back in his original position and to take means not merely to restore to him the property of which he had been wrongly deprived, but also to give him compensation for such loss as he had thereby sustained. It is competent to the Court in the course of the execution proceedings to afford the aggrieved party this remedy in full (3). Where a claimant under the former section elected to put forward his claim to mesne profits in execution proceedings, and the claim was dismissed and he acquiesced in the dismissal and did not appeal, the order of dismissal was held a bar to further proceedings in respect of the same claim, so long as it remained unreversed (4).

The High Court of Calcutta has power under clause 15 of the Charter to order the Court of first instance to enforce restitution of the amount realized from the defendant in excess of the amount allowed by the Court of Appeal, and also to execute that part of the decree which awarded costs to the defendant (5).

The High Court made an order dismissing an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council with costs—Held, that though there was no section in the Code directly applicable to the case, yet by analogy to this

(1) Cases cited *post*

(2) *Rodgers v Comptoir d'Escompte*, 7 Moo P C N S 314 (1871), *Shama Ierabad v Hurro Pershad*, 10 M L A 203, 211, 212 (1865), *Mookoond Lal v Mahomed Jaun*, 14 C 481, 486 (1887), *Vasquey v Narayan* 21 M 311, 314 (1900), *Balvantrao v Sadruddin*, 13 B L S 485 (1887), *in re Paj Kissen*, B L L., 1 B L W L 605, 607 (1866), *Rohini Singh v Hadling* 21 C 310, 313 (1893), *Sham Sundar v Kaur*, 29 A 143 (1906), *Dinesh v Sankar*, 2 C L J 537 (1901), *Raja Singh v Kooldup*, 21 C 909, 911 (1891), *Coffin v Harbari Rawat*, 22 C 501, 504 (1895), *Kedar v Doya Moyte*, 20 W P 19 (1873), *Hamida v Bhudan*, 20 W R 238 (1873), *Hurro Chandra Bhorooodhon v W R* 402 (1868),

Dorasami v Annasami, 23 M 306 (1899), *Lati Kooer v Sobadra*, 2 C L R 75 (1878), *Venkatesh v Govindrao*, 21 B 55 (1895), *Hukum Chand v Kamalanand*, 33 C 927, 941, 942 (1900), *Dinesh Prasad v Sankar Chaudhary*, 2 C L J 537 (1901), *Sham Sundar Lal v Kaur* *Zainami Begam*, 29 A 113 (1906), *Bani Madho v Pran Singh*, 15 C L J 187 (1911)

(3) *Duljeet Gosain v Dewat Gosain* 22 W J 420 (1874), *Ayya Vayyar v Sistrum Ayyar*, 9 M 506 (1880)

(4) *Srinath v Pam Pattan*, 21 A 301, 303 (1892)

(5) *Pe petition of Govind Koomar*, B L R., 1 B Rul 711 (1867)

section the proper Court to execute the order as to costs was the lower Court (1)

The section was held applicable by analogy to proceedings before Courts of Revenue (2). It has been held that the principle of this section cannot be extended to the case of a decree which has been set aside under sect 108 of the last Code (now represented by O IX r 13), for such a decree cannot be revived by any subsequent proceeding (3).

"Decree"—The former section provided for restitution to which a party was entitled *under a decree passed in appeal under Chapter ALI* of the last Code. It was held therefore not to apply where the benefit claimed was not granted in an appeal, but in a review setting aside the decree of the Appellate Court itself (4). But in such a case the Court might in the exercise of its inherent power, or treating the application as one for execution of the decree passed on review, order restitution (5). Nor on the same grounds did the section apply where the decree under which the benefit was sought was an order of the Privy Council (6) though the principle embodied in it did (7). The qualifying words *'passed in an appeal under this Chapter'* have been now omitted. But it has been held that this section only applies to a case where a party is entitled to a benefit by way of restitution or otherwise under a decree passed in an appeal (8). The decree to be executed is the final decree whether that decree reverses, modifies, or affirms the decree of the lower Court (9).

"Varied or reversed"—As to the legal effect of such variance or reversal, see first paragraph.

Money recovered under a decree or judgment cannot be recovered back whilst the decree or judgment under which it was recovered remains in force, but this rule of law rests upon this ground that the original decree or judgment must be taken to be subsisting and valid until it has been reversed or superseded by some ulterior proceeding. If it has been so reversed or superseded the money recovered under it ought certainly to be refunded. The true question in such cases is, whether the decree or judgment under which the money was originally recovered has been reversed or suspended (10). The supersession to which their Lordships of the Privy Council were referring in this case must be a superseding by a decree of a Court which had competent jurisdiction to reverse the decree under which the money had been paid if it had been

(1) Jogendra Chunder Sen v Wazidunnissa Khatun 31 C 860 (1907) 11 C W N 836

(2) Mashullah Khan v Majidunnissa 6 A 149 (1903)

(3) Raghu Nandan v Jagdis 14 C W N 182 (1909)

(4) Collector of Muzrut v Kalka Prasad 25 A 665 667 (1906)

(5) Ib

(6) Sadiq Husain v Lalita Prasad 20 A 139, 142 (1897)

(7) Bibee Hamida v Bibee Bhudhun 20 W R 238 (1873), but see Gopal v Ooday 12 W R 411, 412 (1869), as to execution of Privy Council decrees, see O XLIV r 15

(8) Girdhari Lal v Khushali Ram 31 A 364 (1909) Prag Narain v Kamakhia Singh 31 A 551 (P C) (1909)

(9) Kristo v Barrada Caunt 14 M I A 465 489 490 (1872), Mahommed Sulaiman v Muhammad Yar Khan 11 A 267 273 (1888) Nanchand v Vethu 19 B 258 (1891) Abdul Rahman v Saiba 22 B 500 506 (1896), Manari Krishan v Unmappan 15 M I 170 171 (1891) Naurang Rai v Latif, 13 A 391 (1891) Mulchand v Ram Ratan, 20 A 493 (1898)

(10) Shama Pershad v Hurro Pershad 10 M I A 203 211 212 s c, 3 W P P C 11

"Any party"—The Allahabad High Court held that the former section applied only to parties to the proceedings in the suit, and in the appeal and not to assignees of interests of the parties to the suit when these assignees had not been made parties to the suit or the appeal (1) and that the assignee could not be compelled by separate suits to repay the money he had received (2). It has however, been recently ruled that the section must be read with sect. 244 (now 47) of the former Code, and therefore the assignee of the decree of the Appellate Court which reversed the decree appealed against, being the representative of the party in whose favour the appellate decree is passed, is entitled to apply for restitution (3).

"Entitled"—The procedure laid down is not confined to cases in which the restitution desired is provided for in the decree itself (4). This was held, notwithstanding the words "*under a decree*" which have been now omitted.

It has, however, been held that no one is entitled (5) to restitution if there is no decree in his favour. Thus when a certain sum claimed as rent was paid into Court by the defendant and made over to the plaintiff after he got a decree from the lower Appellate Court, but the lower Appellate Court's judgment was set aside on second appeal by the second defendant, it was held that the first defendant was not entitled to restitution (6). But a person entitled to restitution cannot, after getting back his property, retain any amount of money, which formed a portion of the sale proceeds of the property which had been restored and which had been withdrawn by him before the setting aside of the erroneous decree under which the property was sold. The auction purchaser may bring a suit for the recovery of the money retained by the party to whom the property has been restored (7).

"Cause such restitution to be made as will"—"*So far as may be place the parties in the position which they would have occupied (8) but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed*" these words are also the following — "*and for this purpose may make any orders (9) including orders*

(1) *Sadiq Husam v Lalita Prasad* 20 A 139 142 (1897) followed in *Frizoni v Ram Narain Singh*, 5 C. W. N. 426 (1901) in which execution was sought against a person not a party to the decree in appeal and who had not derived any interest subsequent to such decree.

(2) *Lalita Prasad v Sadiq Husam* 24 A 288 (1902).

(3) *Jamini Nath Ray v Dharma Das Sur*, 33 C. 857 (1906).

(4) *Balvantrao v Sadruddin* 13 A. 485 488 (1887). *Paja Singh v Koolidip Singh* 21 C. 989, 996 997 (1894), *Kassam v Luis*, 17 M. 82, 84 (1893), *Rohini Singh v Hadding* 21 C. 340 343 (1893). *Kassam Saib v Luis* 17 M. 82 84 (1893).

(5) *See Nand Ram v Silaram* 8 A. 542 548 (1886).

(6) *Kassam v Luis*, 17 M. 82 (1893).

(7) *Hira Lal v Gour Mohi* 13 C. 326 330 (1886).

(8) See *Shiam Sundar v Kaisar*, 20 A. 143 (1906), *Dinsh v Sankar* 2 C. L. J. 537 (1904), *Radhey Singh v Mangni Ram*, 6 C. W. N. 710 712 (1902), *Bibee Hamida v Bibee Bhodhun* 20 W. R. 238 (1873).

(9) See *Radhey Singh v Mangni Ram*, 6 C. W. N. 710 (1902) [adjustment of account allowed though decree did not expressly direct it], *Vasudev v Vishnu*, 11 B. 724 726 (1887) [refund of payment whether certified to Court or not]. *Wooma Soondaree v Gooroo Pershad*, 15 W. R. 74 (1871) [refund of excess payment], *Mashulla v Majid un nissa* 26 A. 149, 151 (1903) [refund on reversal of decree of Court of Pevenne].

for the refund of costs (1) and for the payment of interest, (2) damages, compensation, (3) and mesne profits, (4) which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal," summarize the effect of the preceding case law which is noted below. The Court, however, is not restricted to the specific orders mentioned, but may make any which are properly consequential on variation or reversal, that is, such orders as are necessary to place the party in the position which he would have occupied but for the decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.

This power is subject to the following limitations. When a decree is reversed on appeal the person entitled to restitution is entitled to the restoration of his property (if the judgment-creditor himself was the purchaser), and not merely to the proceeds of the sale thereof (5). For when a decree-holder purchases under his own decree, and that decree is afterwards reversed on appeal, he is not entitled to the benefits of the execution proceeding and the sale thereunder (6). But in order not to lessen the inducement to purchase at execution sales the rule is that a sale in execution at which a third party becomes the purchaser is upheld notwithstanding the subsequent reversal of the decree (7). A third party, however, is not protected merely because he is a stranger when grounds for setting aside a sale under sects 244 or 311 of the last Code (now

(1) *Kedarnath v Daya Moyee*, 20 W R 49 (1893) [if decree under which costs are recovered is reversed, no express order is needed for refund of costs].

(2) *Rodger v Comptour d'Escompte*, 7 Moo P C N S 314, 320, 330 (1871), *Hamuda v Bhudhun* 20 W R 238 (1873), *Hardat v Izzat un nissa*, 21 A 1, 3 (1898), *Jay Kurun v Asmudh Kooer*, 5 W R 125 (1866) [interest on mesne profits], *Bhagwan Singh v Ummat ul Husnain*, 18 A 262, 264 (1896), *Arunachellam v Arunachellam*, 15 M 203, 212, 213 (1891), *Watkins v Shahzada* 1 C W N 670 (1897), *Wooma Soondaree v Gooroo Pershad*, 15 W R 74 (1871) [interest on refund of excess payment in execution], *Kedarnath v Doya Moyee*, 20 W R 49 (1873) [interest on costs], *Ayya Vayyar v Shastram Ayyar*, 9 M 506 (1886), *Phul Chand v Shankar*, 20 A 430, 432 (1898) [interest on amount levied in execution], *Collector of Ahmedabad v Laxmi*, 35 B 255 (1911).

(3) *Duljeet Gossain v Rewat Gossain*, 22 W R 435 (1874), *Ayya Vayyar v Shastram Ayyar*, 9 M 506 (1886).

(4) *Radhey Singh v Mangru Ram*, 6 C W N 710 (1902), *Hamuda v Bhudhun* 20 W R 238 (1873), *Hardat v Izzat un nissa* 21 A 1, 3 (1898), *Kabana Sundram v Fgna* 15 M 203 (1891), *Jay Kurun v Asmudh Kooer*, 5 W R 125 (1866), *Arunachellam v Arunachellam*, 15 M 203 (1891), *Watkins v Shahzada* 1 C W N 670 (1897), *Wooma Soondaree v Gooroo Pershad*, 15 W R 74 (1871), *Kedarnath v Doya Moyee*, 20 W R 49 (1873), *Ayya Vayyar v Shastram Ayyar*, 9 M 506 (1886), *Phul Chand v Shankar*, 20 A 430, 432 (1898), *Collector of Ahmedabad v Laxmi*, 35 B 255 (1911).

486 (1887), *Raja Singh v Kooldip*, 21 C 989, 993 (1894) [mesne profits given though decree silent], but see *Ram Ghulam v Dwarha*, 7 A 170 (1884), though see *Gannu Lal v Ram Sahai*, 7 A 107 (1884), *Azizuddin v Ram Anugra*, 14 C 603 (1897), *Coslin v Harbari Rawat*, 22 C 501 (1890), *Jaawant v Dip Singh*, 7 A 432 (1883), *Sham Sunder v Kaiser*, 29 A 143 (1906), *Jay Kurun v Asmudh Kooer*, 5 W R 125 (1866) [interest on mesne profits], *Prasunno v Mathooru*, 17 W R 233 (1872) [where respondent has received *Wasilat* to which he is not entitled he can not as against appellant set up that a third party is entitled to it].

(5) *Sadaswayyar v Nuttu Sabapathi*, 5 M 100 (1891).

(6) *Zain ul abdin v Mahomed Asghar*, 10 A 160, 172 (1887), *Chandant Ram Dena*, 31 C 499, 501 (1901), See *Umedmal v Sreenath Roy*, 27 C 810 (1900). See also *Raghunath v Kaniz Rasul*, 24 A 467, 471 (1902); *Nathadu v Nallu*, 27 M 98, 100, 101 (1903); *Banka Lal v Jagut Naram*, 22 A 168, 175 (1900).

(7) *Rewa Mahton v Ram Kishore*, 14 C 18, 26, 27, 131 A 108 (1880), *Mukhoda v Gopal*, 26 C 734, 737 (1899); *Zain ul abdin Khan v Muhammad Asghar*, 10 A 160, 172, 27, 131 A 12 (1887), *Dorosami v Anifa*, 27 W 706, 711, 312 (1899).

represented by sect 47 and O XXI r 90) are established (1) There is no real distinction between an auction purchaser at a sale in execution of a money decree and an auction purchaser at a sale in execution of a mortgage decree in this respect (2)

When an application for probate of a will is refused by the District Court, but granted by the High Court on the ground that the will was proved, it is the duty of the Lower Court to prepare and issue a probate or copy of the will under the seal of the Court under the section (3)

"No suit shall be instituted" (clause (2))—There has never been any question but that restitution can be obtained in execution of the final decree of the Appellate Court (4) Prior, however, to this Code it was a matter of conflict whether an alternative remedy lay also by way of a separate suit In some cases this was considered to be so (5) in others it was held that such a suit was prohibited (6) by sect 244 of the last Code The second clause now expressly prohibits a suit

Security for restitution—When the Appellate Court has seized of the appeal, it has an inherent power over the subject of litigation, the nature of which is indicated and implied by this section, and can in the exercise of that power, and notwithstanding that the decree has been executed, call upon the respondent to furnish security for the due performance of any decree which may be made (7) Where any person had become surety for the restitution of any property taken in execution of a decree it was held by the Bombay, (8) Madras (9) and Allahabad (10) High Courts that the security bond could be enforced in execution of that decree The Calcutta High Court, (11) however, held that a separate suit was necessary The former view has now been adopted in sect 145, as that amended section (which replaces sect 253 of the last Code) now makes special provision in clause (b) for the case

145. Where any person has become liable as surety—

Enforcement of liability of surety. (a) for the performance of any decree or any part thereof, or

(1) *Levina Ashton v Madhabmoni*, 14 C W N 560, 568 (1910)

(2) *Mukhoda v Copal*, 26 C 734, 735, 736 (1899)

(3) *Bayabai v Sarasvatibai*, 17 B 686 (1892)

(4) *Radhey Singh v Mangni Ram*, 6 C W N 710, 712 (1902), *Saran v Bhagwan*, 25 A 441 (1903) *Dhan Kunwar v Mahtab Singh*, 22 A 79 (1899), *Jamini Nath Roy v Dharma Das Sur*, 33 C 857 (1906), *Kahana Sundram v Egna Vedeswara* 11 M 201 (1897), *Arunachellam v Arunachellam*, 15 M 203 (1891)

(5) *Vasudev v Narayana*, 24 M 341, 315, *Shama Pershad v Hurro Pershad* 10 M I A 203, 211 (1867) See *Coffin v Karbari Pawat*, 22 C 501 (1895)

(6) *Sheodhal Sahu v Bhawan* 29 A 348 (1907), *Masah Ullah Khan v Masjid an nassa*,

26 A 149 (1903) [in this case a suit was held allowable as sect 244 did not apply to proceedings before Revenue Courts], *Prag Narain v Kamakhia*, 36 I A 107 (1909), 14 C W N 55

(7) *Hukum Chand v Kamalanand*, 33 C 927, 931, 942 (1905)

(8) *Venkapa v Basalingapa*, 12 B 411, 415 (1887), *Kusaji v Vinayak*, 23 B 478 482, 483 (1898), *Jamsedji v Bawabhai*, 25 B 409, 413, 414 (1900)

(9) *Thurumalai v Ramayyar*, 13 M 1, 5 (1889), *Arunachellam v Arunachellam*, 15 M 203, 211, 212 (1891)

(10) *Janki Kuar v Sarup Ram*, 17 A 99, 102 (1895)

(11) *Surjoo v Balmukund*, 23 C 212, 216 (1895)

Limitation—Previous applications for execution against the judgment debtor will not take an application against the surety out of limitation, Art 179 of Sched II of the Limitation Act not being applicable (1)

Appeal—An appeal it has been held, lay from an order enforcing a claim against a surety under the former section (2)

146 *Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law*
Proceedings by or for the time being in force, where any proceeding
against representatives may be taken or application made by or against
any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may
be made by or against any person claiming under him

Representatives—It ought to have been hardly necessary to enact this section. But it appears to be necessary to meet cases such as that which held that because sect 108 of the last Code did not expressly refer to a legal representative he could not take the benefit of that section (3)

147 *In all suits to which any person under disability is a*
Consent or agreement party any consent or agreement as to any pro-
by persons under dis ceeding shall, if given or made with the express
ability leave of the Court by the next friend or guardian
for the suit, have the same force and effect as if such person were
under no disability and had given such consent or made such
agreement

148 *Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for*
Enlargement of time the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by
this Code, the Court may, in its discretion,
from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period
originally fixed or granted may have expired

Enlargement of time—In examining the provisions of the Bill, the attention of the Select Committee was directed to a number of clauses in which power was given to the Court to fix a period or to give or allow time for the performance of any act by a party. On the strength of the facts underlying reported decisions, the clauses were expanded to make it clear, in some cases that the period or time may be extended and in others that this power of extension may be exercised even though the original period of time has expired. The Committee were of opinion that uniformity in this matter was of importance because it might not possibly be argued that the express conferment of these powers in certain cases negates them by necessary implication in others. This difficulty has been sought to be removed by the general enactment contained in

(1) Narayan Ganpatbhat : Timmaja 8
 Bom L R 807 (1906) 31 B 50
 (2) Chorea Lal Jha : Sheo Narain 8 W R
 24 (1867) Akhrot Pamanah : Almel
 Eusoojee 15 W P 538 (1871) 7 B L R

81 Suleman : Shivram 12 B 71 (1887)
 (3) Janki Prasad : Sukhran 21 A 274
 (1899) ded from in Canada Prasad Roy :
 Shib Nara n Mukerjee 29 C 33 (1901)

the present section. The principle embodied in this section was acted upon under the last Code in several cases, as under act 549 of that Code (1) (now O. XLI r 10) and under sect 51 where leave was obtained to amend plaint within a certain time (2). This section is the legislative recognition of the rule laid down in those cases (3). It cannot be taken to give a Court power to interfere with or modify its decree after an appeal has been filed against it (4). This section applies to cases in which the time fixed by the Code for doing some act is extended, but not to the extension of the time fixed by a mortgage decree for the payment of a prior mortgage (5). Under it the Court can extend the time for making an award, although the time has already expired (6). It has been recently held that this section does not entitle the Court to extend the time for payment of purchase money in pre-emption cases and that an order under it is not a decree under sect 2 nor appealable under sect 104 (7). But in another recent case in the Allahabad High Court where an application to set aside a decree had been granted on the condition of payment of a sum of money as damages by a certain date, and this condition had not been fulfilled, and the Court had then held that it had no jurisdiction to extend the time for such payment and had therefore proceeded to disallow the application to set aside the decree, it was held on appeal that an appeal lay from this order, and that the lower Court had such jurisdiction (8).

149. *Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for Power to make up any document by the law for the time being in deficiency of court fees, force relating to court fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance*

Court fee—Sect 582A of the former Code, which this section replaces, was added by Act VI of 1892, settling a matter in respect of which the case law was in conflict (9). It was applied in the last mentioned case, which was held to come either under sect 5 of the Limitation Act or this section (10).

(1) *Jumna Bai v Vissandas*, 21 B 576, 579 (1897), *Budri Naram v Shoo Koer*, 17 I A 1, 3, 4, s c, 17 C 512, 514 (1889)

(2) *Bhagwan Das Bugla v Haji Ahmed*, 16 B 263, 266 (1891)

(3) *Amir Hossain v Babu Hansi*, 14 C. W. N 882 (1910)

(4) *Parmanand v Kripisandhn* 37 C. 548 (1909)

(5) *Het Singh v Tila Ram* 34 A 398 (1912)

(6) *Shul Krishna v Satish*, 38 C. 522 (1911)

(7) *Suranjan Singh v Ram Bahal Lal*, 33 A 583 (1913), distinguishing *Rahima v*

Nepal Rai, 14 A. 520 (1892)

(8) *Jagannath Sahi v Ramta Prasad Upadhyay*, 36 A. 77 (1913), distinguishing *Suranjan Singh v Ram Bahal Lal* (1913)

(9) See *Durga Charan v Dokharam* 26 C 925 (1899), *Lakha Narain v Kirtibax*, 18 C. L. J 133 (1913)

(10) And see as to insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal, *Chenappa v Raghunatha* 15 M. 29 (1891), *Parshotam Lal v Lachman Das*, 9 A. 252 (1886), *Nassurut Ali v Mahomed Kanoo*, 11 W. R. 541 (1869), *contra Balkaran Rai v Govind Nath*, 12 A 129 (1890).

It was held not applicable to pauper appeals (1) Though that section dealt expressly with insufficiently stamped memoranda of appeals it was held that a defective plaint could be subsequently validated (2) If the deficiency is not paid by the date fixed by the Court, this section will not assist the plaintiff (3) When a party asks for this indulgence, the record should indicate that all the circumstances have been brought to the notice of the Court (4) As a general rule the Court's discretion under this section is unshackled, but where the document is a plaint the discretion must be exercised in accordance with O VII r 11 (c) (5)

150. *Save as otherwise provided, where the business of any Court is transferred to any other Court, the Court to which the business is so transferred shall have the same powers and shall perform the same duties as those respectively conferred and imposed by or under this Code upon the Court from which the business was so transferred.*

151. *Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.*

Inherent jurisdiction—This is an extremely important section, expressly recognizing as it does the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts, a matter which is fully dealt with in the notes to the Preamble. In addition to the cases there cited it may be noted that it has again been quite recently held that the Code is not exhaustive, and that when the Court has jurisdiction to make an order it has (although there may be no section of the Code applicable) inherent power to have that order carried into effect (6) It has been held that the Courts in India have an inherent power to amend or vary decrees so as to bring them in accordance with the judgments after they are signed by the Judges, even if they do not fall within this section (7) Where owing to the death of the plaintiff before the date fixed for the hearing, there was no appearance, and the suit was dismissed for default, it was held that the mistake inadvertently made in so dismissing it could be rectified under this section and (apart from it) under the inherent power (8) But where, according to established principles, certain questions have been removed from the jurisdiction of a Court they cannot be brought within it on the plea that the Court has inherent power to do what justice requires for the parties before it (9) An order for consolidation of suits can be made under this section (10)

(1) *Bai Ful v Desai Manorbhai*, 22 B 849, 857 (1897)

(2) *Valambal v Vythilinga*, 25 M 380, 382 24 M 331, 333 (1900)

(3) *Budhan v Sitanath*, 13 C L J 78 (1910)

(4) *Ib*
(5) *Achut Ramchandra Pat v Nagappa Pab Balga*, 38 B 41 (1913)

(6) *Per Maclean, C.J.*, in *Jogendra Chandra Sen v Huse Wazid un nissa*, 34 C 860, 11 C W N 856 (1907) [order as to costs on

dismissal of application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council]

(7) *Brjatan v Jaynarsin*, 37 C 649, 657 (1910), *Langat v Janki*, 14 C L J 481 (1911)

(8) *Debi Baksh v Habib Shah*, 17 C W N 829 (P C) (1913), 40 L A 151, 35 A 331, 18 C L J 9

(9) *Jethabhai v Chaprey*, 34 B 467, 483 (1909)

(10) *Kalicharan v Suraj Kumar*, 17 C W N 526 (1912)

152 *Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties*

Decrees or orders—See notes to O XX post

153 *The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit, and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding*

Amendment—This is O 28, r 13 of the English rules under which amendments have been made in legal documents of every kind such as interrogatories notices of motion particulars of objection petitions and the like. It is not open to a Court to convert a suit for declaration into one for possession of its own accord (1)

154 *Nothing in this Code shall affect any present right of appeal which shall have accrued to any party at its commencement*

The words "any present right of appeal" mean a right existing on January 1st 1909, to appeal against a particular order passed under the last Code and subsisting at that date (2)

155 *The enactments mentioned in the Fourth Schedule are hereby amended to the extent specified in the fourth column thereof.*

156 *The enactments mentioned in the Fifth Schedule are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the fourth column thereof*

157. *Notifications published, declarations and rules made, places appointed, agreements filed, scales prescribed, forms framed, appointments made and powers conferred under Act VIII. of 1855 or under any Code of Civil Procedure or any Act amending the*

(1) Venkatchellur Narayana 21 M. L. J. 405 (1913)

(2) Benod r. Ram Sarup 16 C. W. N. 101 (1912). Bisheshwar r. Jasoda 17 C. W. N.

622 (1913), and as to inherent power to execute pending appeal to Dayal r. Bahu, 40 C. J. 55 (1912)

same or under any other enactment hereby repealed shall, so far as they are consistent with this Code, have the same force and effect as if they had been respectively published, made, appointed, filed, prescribed, framed and conferred under this Code and by the authority empowered thereby in such behalf (1)

[s 3,
second
para]

158 In every enactment or notification passed or issued before the commencement of this Code in which reference is made to or to any Chapter or section of Act VIII. of 1859 or any Code of Civil Procedure or any Act amending the same or any other enactment hereby repealed, such reference shall, so far as may be practicable, be taken to be made to this Code or to its corresponding Part, Order, section or rule.

Repeal—The ordinary rule of construction of Statutes gives them a future operation only unless the legislative intent appears clear from their terms that they are to have a retrospective operation. This presumption against retrospective operation does not, however, exist in the case of enactments relating to procedure, including pleadings practice and evidence. In fact, the general principle is that alterations in procedure are always retrospective in effect and apply to pending proceedings unless there be a declared intention to the contrary or good reason against it. When the effect of an enactment is to take away a right, then it does not *prima facie* apply to existing rights, but when it deals with procedure only *prima facie*, it applies to all actions pending as well as future (2). There is however, a distinction between "relief" and the mode or procedure for obtaining such relief. The "relief" remains unaffected by a change of procedure (3). The intention to take away a vested right (including a right of suit) is not to be imputed to the Legislature unless it is expressed in unequivocal terms (4).

(1) It was pointed out in *District Munsif of Tiruvallur (in re)* (F B) 37 M 17 (1914) that this is an enabling (and not a repealing) section.

(2) *In re Bhagwandas Harjivan*, 8 B 511, 518-523 (1884); *Hajrat Akramnasa v Valulnassa* 18 B 429 (1893); *Gungaram v Panamchan* 1 21 B 822 (1896); *Vedavalli Nasarath v Mangamma* 27 M. 533 (1903); 8 C, 14 M. L. J 340; *Bhobo Sundari v Rakhal Chunder*, 12 C 583 (1886). The rule was concisely stated by Holloway, J, in *Morris v Sambamurthy*, 6 M H C 1. 126 (1871) as follows: "Rights already acquired shall not be affected by the retroaction of a new law. Rules as to procedure are an exception. The law as to the acquisition of

rights is that prevailing at the period of the arising of the matters of fact which generate them. Their enforcement must be according to the rules of process at the period of suit. Put as there pointed out the practical difficulty lies in the application of the principle and in distinguishing between material and processual laws. See also *Hukm Chand* 41

(3) *Per Trevelyan J in Bhobo Sundari v Pakhal Chunder* 12 C. 583 (1886)

(4) *Gopewar Pal v Jiban Chandra Chandra* 8 B 19 C L J 549 (1914), following Commissioner of Public Works v Logan, A C 335 (1903), distinguish *Ng Lala Soni Ram v Hanthaya Lal* 10 I A 74 (1913), 35 A. 227 and *Munjoon Bibi v Akel Mahmud* 17 C I J 316 (1913)

THE SCHEDULES.

THE FIRST SCHEDULE

ORDER 1.

Parties to Suits.

1. All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise.

Who may be joined as plaintiffs.

2. Where it appears to the Court that any joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may put the plaintiffs to their election or order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient.

Power of Court to order separate trials

3. All persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if separate suits were brought against such persons any common question of law or fact would arise.

Who may be joined as defendants.

Scope of the English and Indian rules—Sections 26–32 of the last Code were first incorporated in Act X of 1877 from the various rules of Order XVI, framed under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873. Section 26 was substantially the same with Rule 1 of the Order, as it stood at the time of the enactment of the Code, with the exception that that rule did not contain the words “in respect of the same cause of action”. The rule was construed very broadly in the earlier cases, and held to justify a joinder of plaintiffs having distinct

causes of action, (1) and seeking wholly distinct reliefs, and not to import any limitation on the power of joinder (2). It was gradually narrowed in its application, and in *Hannay v Smurthwaite*, (3) Lord Bowen observed that it was not "the intention of this rule to allow writs to be issued under which any number of plaintiffs might join any number of causes of action, or that a writ should be like an omnibus travelling on a certain route into which any number of persons may get as passengers for the journey." It was thus first restricted to cases in which relief was claimed in respect of the same subject matter "as Order XVI dealing with parties, assumes an ascertained subject matter," (4) a principle recognized here in *Haramom Dassi & Hari Churn Chowdhry* (5). In accordance with this view, it was held in a number of cases that where the causes of action were separate and distinct they could not be joined in one action (6).

The English rule (7) was then altered in October, 1896, the alteration restricting it to cases in which the right to relief, alleged to exist, was "*in respect of, or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions,*" and where, if the persons joined brought separate actions, "*any common question of law or fact would arise*" Power also was expressly given in it to the Courts to "order separate trials, or make such other order as may be expedient," "if upon the application of any defendant it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action."

The present English rule was therefore in widely different terms from sect 26 of the last Code. A limited liberty of joining plaintiffs with separate causes of action is given. The nature of the limitation is plain upon the face of the rule. It was not thereby intended to allow any number of

(1) *Booth & Briscoe*, 2 Q B D 496, *Mukim Chand*, O P C 369.

(2) *Gort v Rowney*, 17 Q B D 633, *per Laher*, M R.

(3) 2 Q B 422 (1893).

(4) *Smith v Richardson*, 4 C P D 113.

(5) 22 C 833 (1895), *Mukim Chand* C P C 369, 370.

(6) *Smurthwaite & Hannay*, A C 491 (1891) [sixteen persons, nine shippers and seven consignees, under various bills of lading, sued shipowners for short delivery], *Carter & Rigby*, 2 Q B 113 (1896) [fifty persons, relatives of as many miners drowned by flooding of a mine, brought action for negligence], *P & O S N Co & Tsuno Kyuma*, A C 661 (1895) [sixty two persons, or groups of persons sued for damages by reason of collision between two ships], *Pudde & Kyle*, 2 I R 265 (1900) [libel in same words and in same document, but of different persons]. In these cases the suits were held not maintainable under O 16, r 1, as it stood prior to its amendment. The first case was decided after the amendment,

but was under the Irish rule, which is in the same terms as the old English rule.

(7) Is in the following terms—"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would arise, provided that if upon the application of any defendant it shall appear that such joinder may delay or embarrass the trial of the action, the Court or a Judge may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient, and judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, with out any amendment. But the defendant though unsuccessful, shall be entitled to his costs occasioned by so joining any person who shall not be found entitled to relief unless the Court or a Judge in disposing of the costs shall otherwise direct."

different plaintiffs to join in one action any number of separate and different causes of action but it was intended merely to effect a modification of the old rule by which a limited liberty of joining plaintiffs with separate causes of action should be conferred. The conditions are firstly that the right to relief alleged to exist in each plaintiff should be in respect of, or arise out of, the same transaction, and secondly that there should be a common question of fact or law (1). Where, however, there were in effect two plaintiffs and two causes of action not arising out of the same transaction the case was held not to be within the present rule (2).

From the foregoing it will appear that the English rule was wider than that laid down in sect. 26 of the Code of 1882 which might generally be said to have represented the views commonly entertained by the English Courts in the middle period between the first promulgation of the rule and its amendment in 1896. While it is sufficient under the English rule that the right to relief should arise out of the same transaction, the Court being given a control over the exercise of such right, the right of joinder given by that section was only in respect of the *same cause of action*, a right which was still further limited by certain decisions owing to the interpretation placed upon the term "*cause of action*" as to which, see *post*. The use of the term "*cause of action*" in the last Code gave rise to difficulty (*vide post*), the phrase therefore has been omitted and r 1 has been made to correspond with the present English rule as regards plaintiffs. It is in substantially the same terms as O XVI r 1 down to the words "*would arise*". The portion in the English rule from "*provided that*" to "*expedient*" has been substantially embodied in r 2 and in O II r 6 *post*, and the portion as to judgment being given is embodied in O I r 1. The second paragraph of sect. 26 of the last Code has not been re-enacted, as to which see notes to O I r 4. Rule 3 dealing with defendants corresponding with sect. 28 of the last Code has been modified to bring it in conformity with r 1. The result is an extension of the right of joinder in conformity with the English law, the decisions under which will be applicable to this rule. The Select Committee said, "It is hoped that the multiplicity of suits will be further curtailed by the new provisions we have inserted to remove limitations which we regard as needless on the comprehensiveness of a suit, and by the wider powers of amendment vested in the Courts." An adequate check (see r 2) is provided by the power of a Court to interfere where embarrassment is likely to result.

"Persons"—This and the following rules deal only with the joinder of parties and have no reference to the joinder of causes of action. Sect. 31 of the last Code, which provided that nothing in the section should be deemed

(1) Universities of Oxford and Cambridge

decided before the rule was altered must now be considered with reference to the alteration. The rule has been held to leave untouched the practice in Admiralty of allowing joinder of parties in collision salvage, and wages actions. The Maréchal Suchet 1896, p. 233.

(2) Stroud v. Lawson L. R. 2 Q. B. 41 (1856)

the new rule subject to the control of the Court. Other cases cited in the A. P.

to enable plaintiffs to join in respect of distinct causes of action, has been omitted, all reference to cause of action being omitted from this section, and O II deals with the joinder of causes of action

Generally, as to parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, every person can sue and be liable to be sued, and may thus be a party. The Code, which presupposes this rule, does not contain any provisions as to who may be parties. The portions of the Code which contain special provisions enacted on grounds of general interest, public convenience or policy, and in the case of the incompetent, for their protection, refer generally only to the mode of suing or being sued in such cases. Every person who has a primary right or interest which has been violated in such a manner as to give him a secondary right to relief, may bring a suit as plaintiff against any person as defendant against whom an order for enforcement of that right is asked (1)

Subject to a few exceptions, the Common Law Courts were rigidly tied down to disposing of claims arising between exactly the same parties upon each side and in the same rights. They could give a judgment for A against C or against C, D and E, but they could not give relief of one sort against C and of another sort against D and E. Nor could they give relief of one kind to A and of another kind to B, or of one kind to A and B jointly and another to A separately. All the plaintiffs, if more than one, had to be jointly entitled, and all the defendants jointly liable, with respect to every single matter upon which the Court was asked to adjudicate. In Chancery, on the other hand, the course was to deal with the controversy or transaction forming the subject matter of the action as a whole, and endeavour to do complete justice to it and for that object the Court insisted on all the parties interested in the subject matter being brought before it (2). The Chancery Rule has now been adopted as a general one by both English and Indian Courts. See r 10 clause (2) *post*. The same person cannot, however, be both plaintiff and defendant in a suit unless he appears upon the record in different capacities (3).

In order to enable a person to sue, the right must be a real and existing one (4). The legal interest must be existing at the date of the institution of the suit, (5) which must be brought by the person who, at the date of the suit, represents so far as its subject matter is concerned the person with whom the original transaction took place (6). While the interest may be future, it must be a present and existing one at the time of the suit. Merely "an expectation of the possibility of a future event which, if it occurs, may give birth to an interest," is not such an interest as will give a right of

(1) See *Hukm Chsn I*, C P C. 350 *et seq.*, where the subject is more fully discussed.

(2) *Wilson's Judicature Acts* 2nd ed notes on O XVI r 1.

(3) So it has been held that a suit in the name of a firm can be maintained by or against one of its members in a capacity different to that of partner. *Premji Luthra v*

Dossa Doongersey, 10 B 358, 361 (1883).

(4) *Bibee Zamadonnissa v Wooljilmonee Dossee* 20 W R 72 (1873).

(5) *Iyyappa v Rama Lakshamma* 13 M 519 (1870).

(6) *Gossain Gunga v Dabee Dass* 23 W R 118 (1866).

suit (1) The right must have come into existence before the date of the suit, and therefore a real owner's disclaimer made in his deposition in a suit has been held not sufficient to give a plaintiff a right to maintain a suit (2) The plaintiff must have a subsisting cause of action at the time of the institution of the suit, and he cannot take advantage of events that have happened subsequently (3) A suit by a person in respect of an act by which he may never be injuriously affected at all is premature (4) Leaving such general considerations, it may be stated that the question as to whether there is a right to relief in any case and as to the person in whom that right is vested, and against whom it may be claimed and the nature of the relief, are questions of substantive law and not part of the law of procedure which may restrict or even extinguish such a right but cannot create or extend it (5) This matter therefore does not come within the scope of this Commentary, and will not be dealt with by it (6) The rules relating to parties laid down by the Code refer not so much to the persons who may be parties as to their joinder. As to defendants, *vide post*

"May be joined"—This section, under the Code of 1852, was held to be an enabling one, allowing a number of plaintiffs with the same right to relief to join in one suit instead of bringing separate suits. It did not say that all persons must be joined as plaintiffs when they had the same cause of action against the defendant (7) The present section is equally enabling. There is a distinction between a joint right and a right enjoyed in common with others. In the first case it may be necessary for all persons jointly interested to be joined as parties, and if they are not joined the suit may be bad for misjoinder (8) Where a person sues under a power of attorney, the principal's name should appear as plaintiff (9) It was held that Act X of 1859 allowed suits to be instituted by zemindars in their own names by their authorized agents, but the

..

- (1) *Davis v Angel*, 4 D F & J 531
- (2) *Hari Gobind Adhikari v Akhoy Kumar Mozumdar*, 16 C 364 (1889)
- (3) *Budh Singh v Niradbaran Roy*, 2 C L J 431, 438 (1905)
- (4) *Bhukdaree Singh v Kishen Prosad*, 15 W R 106 (1871)
- (5) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 353
- (6) *Ib.*, at pp 353-367, the following subjects are discussed:—p 353 Right to relief of worshippers; p 355 Right of aunt of person for slander of his relations; p 357 Right of aunt in respect of property bailed or leased; p 358 Suit by assignee of *chase in action*; p 358 Right of aunt by transferee of property not in transferor's possession; p 361 When agent may sue on behalf of principal; p 363 Suits by Co-sharers. A number of cases on these and other points

will also be found in the notes to s 26 of O Kincaly's Civ Pr Code, to which reference may be made

(7) *Bajju Lal Parbatia v Bulak Lal Pathak*, 21 C 385, 388 (1897). As a general rule, however, all the parties interested in the subject matter of a suit should be joined in it whether as plaintiffs or defendants. *Rajendronath Dutt v Shaik Mahomed Lal* 8 I A. at p 142 (1881)

(8) *Bajju Lal v Bulak Lal*, *supra*, at p 390, this difference between common and joint interest is the basis of the distinction between necessary and proper parties. See *Hukm Chand*, C P C 367, 368

(9) *Choonoo Sookul v Har Pershad*, 1 A H C R 277 (1869)

(10) *Ladlee Pershad v Gunga Pershad*, 4 A. H C R 59 (1872)

of the joint family co plaintiffs (1) Where the plaintiff has assigned his rights during the pendency of the suit it is irregular to substitute for his name that of the purchaser, but it is an irregularity which can be cured by the consent of the defendant (2) In a suit by or against unincorporated partnerships, the names of all the partners had to be given This is the rule of the old Common Law, according to which a partnership is not a distinct legal entity entitled to sue or be sued in the firm name as a corporation In India, the only departure from it recognized was in regard to corporations or incorporated companies authorized to sue or be sued in the name of some officer thereof, under sect 435 of the last Code See now O XXIX r 1 (3) A firm thus could not sue or be sued without the names of all the members of the firm being given in the plaint (4) See now O XXX

The question whether and in what circumstances a benamidar is competent to maintain a suit in his own name and without the beneficial owner being a party to the suit (5) has been discussed in a number of rulings in the various High Courts and in regard to it a considerable conflict of authority prevails In those cases which approve (6) the right of the benamidar so

(1) Kishen Pershad v Har Narain 38 I A 45 (1911)

(2) Beer Chunder v Shakh Tameezood deen 12 W R 87 (1890) s c 3 B L R 214

(3) S 435 of last Code See Cannon v Kylash 25 W R 117 (1876)

(4) Pulin Behari v Watson B L R 17 B 904 906 (1895) Gunga Dutt v Dabee Das 25 W R 118 (1876) See now O XXA.

(5) If the real owner be co plaintiff there is, of course, no objection In Kali Prosonno v Dmonath, 11 B L R 56 64 (1873) it was held that the real owner should have been co plaintiff In Sita Nath v Nobin Chunder 5 C L R 102 (1879), it was said that the Court ought to direct that the beneficial owner be made a party and ought not to dismiss the suit

(6) Doo d Tidluck v Harry Dey, Mort 249 (suit on bond) [see Gopekrishna Gosain v Gungapersad Gosain 6 M I A 63 72 (1854) the Supreme Court distinguishing between legal and equitable title allowed the benamidar, that is the party in whose name the title deed was, to sue See Mohendra Nath v Kali Proshad, 30 C at p 272 (1902)], Bhaishankar v Harivallabh 1 B H C R 20 (1863) [possessory suit for land, held good if consent of owner could be shown], Pro sunno Coomar v Cooroo Churn 3 W R 159 (1865) [suit for declaration of right to land, real owner should sue, but benamidar may sue as trustee if no objection], Sreenath Nag v Chudernath 17 W R 192 (1872) [suit for possession after foreclosure, de-

fendant held estopped], Ram Bhuroose v Bisnessur, 18 W R 451 (1872) [benamidar can sue for land, defendant could not raise

authority to sue *res judicata*, foll Shangara v Krishnan 15 M 267 (1891)], Nand Kisbore v Ahmad Ata, 18 A 69 (1895) [benamidar may sue for land, consent presumed, adverse decision *res judicata*], Bhola Pershad v Ram Lal, 24 C 31, 36 (1896) [suit to enforce mortgage, cannot be held that a suit by a benamidar can so extend to property instituted though it may be partially defective, assignees of owner were added under s 32 after institution of suit], Sachitananda v Baloram, 24 C 644 (1897) [suit for foreclosure and possession of land may be brought by benamidar, suit should not be dismissed because beneficial owner not added as a party—estoppel], followed in Chowdhury Kartibas Das v Gopal Jai, 19 C L J 193 (1913), Rayji v Mahadev, 22 B 672 (1897) [a benami certified purchaser can sue in his own name even when the true owner's name is disclosed, *per* Ranade, J], Bijamma v Venkataramayya 21 M 30 (1897) [benamidar, payee, or holder of note may sue], Dagdu v Balvant, 22 B 820 (1897) [suit for redemption, benamidar may maintain suit in his own name], Yad Ram v Umrao 21 A 380 (1899) [benamidar mortgagee may sue, previous cases reviewed]

to sue, the right has been based partly on the fact that he is the transferee named in the registered instrument constituting the transfer and on the principle that a contract can be enforced by the parties who have entered into it, partly on the ground that the defendant is estopped from raising the question, and partly on the view that the benamidar must be presumed to be suing on behalf of the beneficial owner or to put the same idea into other words, that the suit is really brought by the beneficial owner through and in the name of, the benamidar. On the other hand those rulings which are adverse (1) to the right of the benamidar to sue are mainly based on the ground that a suit cannot be maintained by any person who fails to prove, if his title is challenged, that he has a real interest of his own in the subject matter of the suit (2). In some cases it seems to have been held that there is a distinction between suits on bonds and the like and suits for immoveable property in that in the former case a benamidar may, and in the latter may not, sue (3). But even in this the cases are not uniform (4). As to benamidar defendants, see *post*, and as to adding a benamidar as a party, r 10, *post*. O XXXI contains provisions relating to suits concerning property vested in trustees. The question has arisen in this country generally with reference

(1) *Meheroonissa v Hur Churn How*, 10 W R 220 (1868) [suit for declaration of title to land, held a benamidar has no right to maintain a suit in a Civil Court for property in which he has no beneficial interest], *Fuzelun Bibee v Omdah Bibee*, 11 B L R 60, n (1868) [suit for possession by benamidar dismissed], *Kally Prosonno v Dinonath Mullick*, 11 B L R 56, 64 (1873) [suit to have sale set aside], *Bibee Tamoonnessa v Woonjulumonee*, 20 W R 72 (1873) [suit should be brought by real and not colourable owner], *Dhoolbunnessar v Jaggessuree*, 22 W R 413 (1874) [suit for money on bond not maintainable], *Judoo Nath v Guriya Bhoosun*, 23 W R 446 (1875) [suit on bond, if plaintiff not real holder suit must be dismissed], *Sita Nath v Nohn Chunder*, 5 C L R 102 (1879) [suit for possession of land secured by mortgage, Court was not prepared to say that benamidar could sue in his own name], *Hari Gobind v Akhoy Kumar*, 16 C 364 (1889) [suit for land, held plaintiff as benamidar could not sue and that neither the disclaimer of the real owner nor the fact that he was a party to the suit made any difference], *Timmalayappa v Swami Naskar*, 18 M 469 (1894), *Issur Chandra v Gopal Chandra*, 25 C 98 (1897) [a mere benamidar cannot maintain a suit for ejectment, he having neither title to nor possession of the property], *Baroda Sundari v Dino Bandhu* 25 C 874 (1898) n c 3 C W N 12 [a benamidar

has no right to sue for recovery of possession of immoveable property], *Mohendra Nath v Kali Proshad*, 30 C 265 (1902) [the same]; *Chunnam v Ramachandra*, 15 M 54 (1891) [the Court pointed out that when the execution of a document is proved further evidence is not required to show that the transferee has taken the interest which the document purports to convey, it is not necessary to prove as against a third person that the consideration passed but dismissed the appeal on its appearing that the plaintiff had no interest]

(2) *Yad Ram v Umrao Singh*, 21 A 380, 381 (1890). As to alienation by benamidar, consent of true owner, equitable rights of purchaser, see *Sarju Parshad v Bir Bharddar*, 20 I A 108 (1890), and as to *bond fide* transfer without notice that transferor was benamidar, *Mir Mahomed v Kishori Mohun*, 22 I A 129 (1895), s c, 22 C 909.

(3) *Mohendra Nath v Kali Proshad*, 30 C 265, at p 272 (1902), *Hari Gobind v Akhoy Kumar*, 16 C 364 (1889), *Bijamma v Venkatavamayya*, 21 M 30 (1897), *Sarat Chunder v Kedar Nath*, 2 C W N 286 (1898) [a benamidar can sue on a promissory note]

(4) *Dhoolbunnessar v Jaggessuree*, 22 W R 413 (1874), *Judoo Nath v Guriya Bhoosun*, 23 W R 446 (1876) in both of which cases the suits were held not to be maintainable.

to suits by a benamidar, who, as already stated, in some cases has been held not to occupy the position of a mere name lender, but a position analogous to that of a trustee holding the legal estate

This rule itself is not obligatory. It does not enact that any persons must join as parties. It does not even say that all persons who may be interested in the result of an action must necessarily be parties, (1) or that all persons must join as plaintiffs when they have the same cause of action against the defendant (2). Nor is it laid down anywhere else in the Code as to who must be joined as plaintiffs as distinct from those who may be so joined, and though some idea may be formed from the provisions of rule 10 yet they cannot furnish any general rule, as the first clause of the rule is restricted to the case of a *bonâ fide* mistake and the discretion of the Court under the second clause is regulated by considerations different from those which must regulate the action of the plaintiffs themselves. The exact character of the right is immaterial (3) there being no distinction between legal and equitable rights, so far as relief in a particular Court is concerned.

R 1 was introduced to prevent a miscarriage of justice from want of parties and to enable persons aggrieved by the same act, or having the same right to relief to join in one suit instead of bringing separate suits (4). The former section was not exhaustive in words, and did not say that only persons referred to in it might be joined as parties. The contrary might no doubt, have been contended for on the authority of the maxim *expressio unius personæ est exclusio alterius*. On the other hand, it was held that there were clearly cases not falling within sects 26 and 28 of the former Code, in which plaintiffs and defendants were and must be allowed to join in a suit. Thus persons having a successive interest were allowed to join as plaintiffs, (5) and in the case cited, in a suit by a daughter to set aside her mother's alienation of the property she held as a widow, the daughter's son was allowed to join as a co plaintiff, though he could not acquire the property in his mother's lifetime. And in some cases persons were allowed to join merely *ex abundanti cautela*. Thus a receiver of an insolvent's estate may, after the insolvent's death, sue for everything due to his estate, but for greater security his executrix may be joined as a plaintiff (6). It is somewhat on a similar principle, that, as a general rule, unless the policy of insurance has been legally assigned, and the assignment recognized by the insurance company, or unless there has been an equitable assignment, and it can be shown that the holder of the policy has given value for it, the company is entitled to insist upon the legal representative of the assured being made a party to the suit for the amount due under the policy (7). Where however, there was misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action it was held that there was nothing to necessitate the dismissal of the suit, but that the party should be put to election and the plaint amended (8).

(1) Gobind Prasad v Chandar Sekhar, 9 A 486 491 (1887) per Edge C.J.

(1886)

(2) Baiju Lal v Bulak Lal, 25 C. 395 (1897)

(6) Bachubai v Shambu, 9 B 536, 547 (1885)

(3) Hukim Chaml C. P. C. 372 373.

(7) Rajnarain v Universal Life Assurance Co., 10 C. L. P. 501 (1882)

(4) See Baiju Lal v Bulak Lal 21 C 385 (1891)

(8) Aldridge v Barrow, 31 C 602 (1907)
See notes to O 11 r 3 post

(5) Narayana v Chelagamma 10 M 1

Relief—It was considered that the expression "*the right*" in the then subsisting English rule was not identical with "*an right*," (1) and the expression "*any relief*" to be equivalent to the "*same relief*" (2) In *Sandes v Wildsmith*, (3) Wills, J., after observing that the words "*the right to any relief claimed*" were "the governing words of the rule," said that the meaning of the rule was "that where it is doubtful in whom a right sought to be enforced is vested, it is permissible to put in all possible claimants, but it does not mean that where there are two rights which are essentially different from each other, and there is no doubt as to the person in whom each of those rights is vested it is permissible to roll two actions into one" The English and present rule use the words "*any right to relief*"

"In respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction"—The words "*in respect of the same cause of action*" were added in the section of the last Code, as taken from the corresponding English rule on account of its extreme broadness, specially with reference to the decision in *Booth v Briscoe* (4) in which eight persons were allowed to join in an action of libel, though no joint injury was shown The section was held not to authorize the joinder of several plaintiffs in respect of separate causes of action (5) Under the last Code the exact effect of this rule, as depending on the identity of the "*cause of action*," had in the end to depend on the sense in which that expression was understood as used in this section It is in its broadest sense taken to denote the conditions of the maintenance of an action, which generally consists of a right and its breach Thus every cause of action presupposes the existence of a right, but it may be observed that an actual breach is not always necessary to constitute a cause of action In some cases even an actual denial or refusal of the right is not necessary, and a suit may be brought simply on the basis of a right Thus any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit not only against any person denying but also against every one interested in denying, his title to such character or right (6) There was a considerable conflict of opinion in cases in which a breach is essential to constitute a cause of action, but the question was whether the breach alone will do that, or the right infringed also must be considered a part of it Earlier decisions of the Bombay (7) and the Madras (8) High Courts were in favour of the construction,

(1) *Gort v Rowney*, 17 Q B D 633, per Bowen, LJ

(2) *Smurthwaite v Hannay* (1894), A. C. 500, per Lord Herschell, LC, adopted in *Haramoni Dossee v Hari Churn Chowdhry*, 22 C at p 841 (1895) As to the correspondence between this rule and Explanation VI of s 11, see *Somasundara v Kulandaivelu*, 28 M. 457 (1904)

(3) (1893), 1 Q B 772

(4) 2 Q B D 496

(5) *Mohuna Chandra v Atul Chandra*, 21 Q. 540, 543 (1897)

(6) S 42 Act I of 1877, *Hukm Chand*, C P C. 377

(7) *Nasserwanji Merwanji v Gordon*, 6 B 266 (1882) [in a suit against a company and its directors by the agents two of whom were shareholders the plaintiffs were not allowed to join a cause of action based on an agreement with a cause of action common to two only as shareholders]

(8) *Lengammal v Chinna Venkatammal*, 6 M. 239 (1883) [where a Hindu widow and her adopted son sued together to recover family property the suit was disallowed as the claims of mother and son were conflicting This case, however, has been explained and distinguished in *Pinapati v Pinapati*, 26 M. 647 (1903)]

which included not only the act of violation complained of, but also the right violated by that act. The Calcutta High Court, on the other hand held, in *Haramoni Dass v Hari Churn*, (1) that the expression "*cause of action*" must be understood as used in this section of the old Code "in its popular sense, so as to include the facts constituting the infringement of the right, but not necessarily also those constituting the right itself." According to this view the qualification implied in the words "*in respect of the same cause of action*" was satisfied if the facts which constituted the infringement of the right of the several plaintiffs were the same, though the facts constituting the right upon which they based their claim to that relief in the alternative may not be the same. Macpherson and Banerjee, JJ., observed that that construction was necessary, as, if the expression were taken in the other sense "it is difficult to imagine a case in which two plaintiffs can claim the same relief in the alternative in respect of the same cause of action that is in respect of the same right and the same infringement thereof," and "from the very fact of their claiming the same relief in the alternative the facts which constitute their right to it, as alleged by them must be not only different but also conflicting and mutually exclusive." This decision was in accordance with a preceding one in the Bombay High Court, in which an adopted son and his mother made common cause to set aside an attachment which with the proceedings consequent thereon were held to constitute the sole cause of action in the case (2). In an earlier case in the same Court where managers of a temple had passed a rule restraining the right of persons to enter the temple, it was held that all could join in a suit for an injunction (3). Both these cases were opposed to the view taken in the earliest Bombay case and were in accordance with that interpretation which was placed on the words "*cause of action*" by the Calcutta High Court. This interpretation was adopted in the most recent decisions of the Bombay (4) and Madras (5) High Courts. The Allahabad High Court also appeared to take the same view. Thus (6) persons having different reversionary shares in a certain estate held by a widow were held entitled to sue jointly to avoid a deed of gift of it made by her. Oldfield J. observed that the plaintiffs though owning different shares in the property, were alike affected by the deed of gift and acts of obstruction of the defendants to their possession, and might join in bringing the suit. And that view prevailed on appeal to the Full Bench. Probably therefore it may be stated that had this section been unamended, that view of the term "*cause of action*" which was adopted by

(1) 22 C 833 (1895) foll in *Sundar Jha v Bansman Jha*, 33 C 367 (1906), *Aldridge v Barrow*, 34 C 602, 608 (1907), s c, 11 C W N 688.

(2) *Fakrapat Rudrapat*, 16 B 119 (1892).

(3) *Kalidas v Gor Parjaram*, 15 B 309 (1891), and several members of a caste have been allowed to join in a suit against trustees for maladministration. *Thakersey v Hurbhum*, 8 B 172 470 (1883).

(4) In *Varajal v Ramdat* 26 F 279, 265

(1901) the Court stated, though it was not necessary to decide the point, that they were inclined to agree with the Calcutta case, s c 3 Bom L R 878.

(5) In *Pinapati v Pinapati*, 26 M 647 (1903), the Court agreed with the Calcutta decision, though it considered its own previous decision not in conflict with it.

(6) *Ram Sewak Singh v Nakeded Singh*, 4 A. 261 (1882).

the Calcutta High Court would in future have been adopted by all the High Courts

Even according to this view of the expression "*cause of action*," however, every separate act causing injury to a person constitutes a separate cause of action. Thus where a number of prisoners were unlawfully detained in jail after the expiry of their term, the cause of action of each in a suit for damages against the Superintendent of the jail was held to be separate, as the actual acts of detention, even if simultaneous, in respect of all the persons would be generally different in the case of each person detained (1). In the case cited, thirteen persons of the crew were on the same day convicted of desertion, and detained in the same circumstances and released at the same time, and they brought a suit for an aggregate sum, and it was held that there was nothing to justify their joining together in one suit. The headnote of the case observes that they were committed to jail under one warrant, but there is nothing in the Report itself to bear that out, and the point would be immaterial unless the act of detention were deemed to be one (2). So where six persons jointly sought a declaration that certain proceedings of a District Temple Committee removing them from office were illegal the plaint was returned, the wrongful dismissal of each forming a distinct cause of action (3). And a plaint was directed to be amended where there was an assault by two persons on the same occasion on two other persons (4). In a recent case in which six persons jointly sued for libel, it was held that though the injury was caused by one act of the defendant, yet each plaintiff had a separate cause of action in respect of his own reputation (5). It was not always easy to determine what is a separate act, and how far the unity of the act may be affected by a difference in the objects or persons affected by it. Thus where two persons living in the same house were plundered of their several properties at the same time, and sued jointly for the value of the properties plundered the objection of misjoinder was not allowed to prevail, and Loch, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, said "The cause of action is common to both viz the attack on their residence, the time when the injury complained of was committed, is one and the same, and the parties who committed the injury are also the same in both cases. No Court is ousted of its jurisdiction by the form of this action, and the irregularity, if any there be does not injure the defendants but is in their favour, inasmuch as they have to defend one instead of two actions, and justice can be done in the form in which the suit has been brought. The cause, the time, the place and the parties charged, being the same in both instances, the fact that plaintiffs have not a joint interest in the whole of the property plundered by the defendants is insufficient to put them out of Court" (6).

Cause of action is essentially different from subject matter and the cause of action mentioned in sect 26 in the last Code could not in any case be identical with the subject matter, the identity of which was generally held to be the

(1) *Ali Serang v Beadon* 11 C. 524 (1885)

(2) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 379

(3) *Ramanuja v Devanayka*, 8 M 361
(1888)

(4) *Varajlal v Ramdat*, 26 B 259 (1901)

(5) *Aldridge v Barrow*, 34 C 662 (1907)

(6) *Jugobundhoo Dutt v Maszyk*, 1864, W
R 81. See *Hukm Chand*, C P C 379

test of the application of the corresponding early rule of the English Supreme Court. The rule enacted in that section was narrower or broader according as the cause of action was understood in the broad or restricted sense above mentioned (1). Thus in the case (2) to which reference has already been made, Innea, J., observed that if some such words as "in respect to a particular subject matter" stood in place of "in respect of the same cause of action," the suit might not have been bad for misjoinder, but that "looking to the language of sect 26, and that of the latter part of sect 54 (of the former Code), as they jointly stand, it appears to us that the Code does not authorize the joining of plaintiffs in a suit in respect of distinct causes of action, in which they are not interested, and their interests are not merely conflicting but antagonistic." On the other hand, Tyrrell, J., in pointing out (3) the distinction between the cause of action and the subject-matter, observed that "the plaintiffs had distinct and separate subject matters of action, to wit, their separate shares in the estate possessed for her life by the widow in alienating the property to N, to the jeopardy of the future rights of the plaintiffs as her reversionary successors to two thirds of the estate," and that "the plaintiffs therefore, though unconnected and separate in respect to the subject matters of the suit were conveniently and rightly joined in vindicating the one interest common to them all, centreing in the main issue in the case, which was simply the nature and extent of the widow's dominion over the estate she admittedly possessed."

With a view to meet these various difficulties the Legislature has now omitted all reference to cause of action and broadened the rule of joinder in accordance with the procedure of English Courts, as to which *vide ante*.

"Jointly"—Thus where a person sued his brothers for his share of their deceased father's estate but was transported for life, his sons were made co-plaintiffs, on the ground that they would be co-owners with their father in the ancestral estate, the High Court observing that "it is true they would be in law sufficiently represented by their father but in fact they might not be represented effectually" (4).

"Severally"—In the Court of Chancery there were many cases in which co-plaintiffs might severally be entitled to the same relief and might, before the Judicature Act, have been properly joined although their claim was neither joint nor alternative (5).

"In the alternative"—These words apply to cases in which there is a doubt as to who is the person entitled to sue upon the cause of action, as in the case of a sale to an agent, in which it may be doubtful whether the principal or agent should sue, or to cases where parties have different and conflicting interests in the same subject matter, and an act is committed which gives the same cause of action to either party, according to the eventual determination of the Court as to which of the two is entitled to recover.

(1) *Hukm Chand*, C. P. C. 379

Singh 4 A. 261 (1882)

(2) *Jingammal v Venkatammal* 6 M. 239 (1882)

(4) *Narakkal v Narayana* 6 M. 331 (1883)

(5) *Smurthwaite v Hannay*, A. C. 501

(3) See *Ram Sewak Singh v Naktel* (1894)

as in a case in which the plaintiffs were respectively a Receiver appointed to take possession of and manage a colliery business and other persons who were executors of the will of an equitable mortgagee of the colliery. They sued for damages for a wrongful levy of execution against the colliery, which was a trespass giving rise to a right of action in which the plaintiffs were severally or, at all events alternatively interested (1) In a subsequent decision in which this passage was cited the Court said, with reference to the view taken in the earlier case as to the meaning of the term "*cause of action*" "We feel no doubt that the cases here suggested are among those to which the words '*in the alternative*' are intended to apply, but what we feel some difficulty in understanding is as to how the principal and agent in the one case and the parties having different and conflicting interests in the other, can be said to have the same cause of action if that expression be taken to include the facts which constitute the right and its infringement when the facts which constitute their rights must be different" (2) A plaint was held not to be bad because it prayed for a decree in favour of all the plaintiffs in certain allegations, or in the alternative in favour of one of them, if other allegations should be proved (3)

Rule 2 Separate trials—See notes to O II r 6

Rule 3 Joinder of defendants—The third rule (4) (which [modified to meet the amendments made in r 1] corresponds with sect 28 of the last Code) is now substantially the same as r 4 of O XVI of the Rules under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. The former section differed from it in that the Indian Legislature had introduced the words "*in respect of the same matter*" The English rule has been construed to embrace cases in which the cause of action is not the same (5) but not those in which the actions are based on entirely disconnected acts (6) The terms of the English rule were held to be wider and more general than the terms of the former section (7) specially as its application was subject to ss 44-45 of the former Code, dealing with the joinder of distinct causes of action. It was said with reference to the former Code that the Indian Legislature had in several ways shown that it did not intend to introduce here the wide latitude as to the joinder of parties allowed in English Courts (8) It thus altogether omitted to enact any provisions corresponding to rr 48-55 of the Order dealing with the third party procedure and to rr 5 and 7 of the Order the former of which provides that "it shall not be necessary that every defendant

(1) *Langammal v Venkatammal* 6 M 239, 243-244 (1882)

(2) *Haramoni Dassi v Hari Churn Chowdhry*, 22 C at p 840 (1895)

(3) *Lakshmakka v Nagi Reddi* 28 M 500 (1904)

(4) See *Hukm Chand* C P C 408

(5) *Child v Stenning* 5 Ch D 695

(6) See *Muthappa Chetty v Muthu Palani* 27 M 80 (1903) citing *Burstall v Deyfus* 26 Ch D 30. *Saddler v Great Western Railway*

Co (1896) A C 450, *Cowen v Couldridge* (1897), 1 Q B 318

(7) *Muthappa Chetty v Muthu Palani* 27 M 80 (1903). But in *Kovouri Basivi v Tallaparagada* 35 M 39 (1910), it was held that the test whether sect 28 of the last Code applied was not whether the causes of action were the same but whether the relief was sought in the same matter

(8) See *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey*, 5 A. at p 170 (1882)

test of the application of the corresponding early rule of the English Supreme Court. The rule enacted in that section was narrower or broader according as the cause of action was understood in the broad or restricted sense above mentioned (1). Thus in the case (2) to which reference has already been made, Innes, J., observed that if some such words as "in respect to a particular subject matter" stood in place of "in respect of the same cause of action," the suit might not have been had for misjoinder, but that "looking to the language of sect 26, and that of the latter part of sect 54 (of the former Code), as they jointly stand, it appears to us that the Code does not authorize the joining of plaintiffs in a suit in respect of distinct causes of action in which they are not interested, and their interests are not merely conflicting but antagonistic." On the other hand Tyrrell, J., in pointing out (3) the distinction between the cause of action and the subject matter, observed that "the plaintiffs had distinct and separate subject matters of action, to wit, their separate shares in the estate possessed for her life by the widow in alienating the property to N, to the jeopardy of the future rights of the plaintiffs as her reversionary successors to two thirds of the estate," and that "the plaintiffs therefore, though unconnected and separate in respect to the subject matters of the suit, were conveniently and rightly joined in vindicating the one interest common to them all, centreing in the main issue in the case, which was simply the nature and extent of the widow's dominion over the estate she admittedly possessed."

With a view to meet these various difficulties the Legislature has now omitted all reference to cause of action and broadened the rule of joinder in accordance with the procedure of English Courts, as to which *vide ante*.

"Jointly."—Thus where a person sued his brothers for his share of their deceased father's estate but was transported for life, his sons were made co-plaintiffs, on the ground that they would be co-owners with their father in the ancestral estate, the High Court observing that "it is true they would be in law sufficiently represented by their father, but in fact they might not be represented effectually" (4).

"Severally."—In the Court of Chancery there were many cases in which co-plaintiffs might severally be entitled to the same relief and might, before the Judicature Act, have been properly joined although their claim was neither joint nor alternative (5).

"In the alternative."—These words apply to cases in which there is a doubt as to who is the person entitled to sue upon the cause of action, as in the case of a sale to an agent, in which it may be doubtful whether the principal or agent should sue or to cases where parties have different and conflicting interests in the same subject matter, and an act is committed which gives the same cause of action to either party, according to the eventual determination of the Court as to which of the two is entitled to recover.

(1) *Hukm Chand, C P C 379**Singh 4 A 261 (1892)*(2) *Langammal v Venkatammal 6 M 239 (1882)*(4) *Naralka v Narayana 6 M 331 (1893)*(3) *See Ram Senuk Singh v Nakeled*(5) *Smurthwaite v Hannay, A C 501 (1894)*

as in a case in which the plaintiffs were respectively a Receiver appointed to take possession of and manage a colliery business and other persons who were executors of the will of an equitable mortgagee of the colliery. They sued for damages for a wrongful levy of execution against the colliery, which was a trespass giving rise to a right of action in which the plaintiffs were severally or, at all events alternatively interested (1) In a subsequent decision in which this passage was cited the Court said with reference to the view taken in the earlier case as to the meaning of the term "cause of action" "We feel no doubt that the cases here suggested are among those to which the words 'in the alternative' are intended to apply, but what we feel some difficulty in understanding is as to how the principal and agent in the one case and the parties having different and conflicting interests in the other can be said to have the same cause of action if that expression be taken to include the facts which constitute the right and its infringement when the facts which constitute their rights must be different (2) A plaint was held not to be bad because it prayed for a decree in favour of all the plaintiffs in certain allegations, or in the alternative in favour of one of them if other allegations should be proved (3)

Rule 2 Separate trials—See notes to O II r 6

Rule 3 Joinder of defendants—The third rule (4) (which [modified to meet the amendments made in r 1] corresponds with sect 28 of the last Code) is now substantially the same as r 4 of O XVI of the Rules under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. The former section differed from it in that the Indian Legislature had introduced the words "in respect of the same matter". The English rule has been construed to embrace cases in which the cause of action is not the same (5) but not those in which the actions are based on entirely disconnected acts (6). The terms of the English rule were held to be wider and more general than the terms of the former section (7) specially as its application was subject to ss 44-45 of the former Code dealing with the joinder of distinct causes of action. It was said with reference to the former Code that the Indian Legislature had in several ways shown that it did not intend to introduce here the wide latitude as to the joinder of parties allowed in English Courts (8). It thus altogether omitted to enact any provisions corresponding to rr 48-55 of the Order dealing with the third party procedure and to rr 5 and 7 of the Order the former of which provides that "it shall not be necessary that every defendant

(1) *Lingammal v Venkatamma* 6 M. 239, 243-244 (1882)

(2) *Haramoni Dass v Hari Churn Chowdhry*, 22 C at p 840 (1891)

(3) *Lakshmakka v Nagi Peddi* 28 M 500 (1904)

(4) See *Hukm Chand* C P C 408

(5) *Child v Stenning* 5 Ch D 695

(6) See *Muthappa Chetty v Muthu Palam* 27 M. 80 (1903) citing *Bursfall v Beyfus* 28 Ch D 35. *Saddler v Great Western Railway*

Co (1896) A C 450. *Gower v Couldridge* (1897) 1 Q B 318

(7) *Muthappa Chetty v Muthu Palam* 27 M. 80 (1903). But in *Kovouri Basivi v Tallaparagada* 35 M 39 (1910) it was held that the test whether sect 28 of the last Code applied was not whether the causes of action were the same but whether the relief was sought in the same matter

(8) See *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey* 5 A. at p 170 (1882)

shall be interested as to all the reliefs prayed for, or as to every cause of action included in any proceeding against him" English r 7 provides that 'where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, to the intent that the question as to which, if any of the defendants is liable, and to what extent may be determined as between all parties' These observations are no longer applicable The limiting words "*in respect of the same matter*" have been omitted, the English rr 5 and 7 have been incorporated in the present Code as rr 5 and 7 of the present Order, and power has been given to promulgate further rules The question of the joinder of defendants must now be dealt with on principles substantially the same as those which govern the English Courts in the same matter

Persons—See notes p 513, *ante* In the under mentioned case (1) it was held that the rules by which the Poona Cantonment Committee was created did by implication though not by express words create the committee a corporation for the purposes of the conservancy of the cantonment It could therefore sue and be sued in its own name on contracts entered into in its corporate character

'May be joined'—It was held that the provisions (2) of sect 28 also, like those of sect 26 of the last Code, were neither imperative (3) and obligatory, nor exhaustive The third rule is in the same terms as sect 28 of the Code of 1882 except as to the omission (which is of importance) of the words "*in respect of the same matter*" and the introduction of words which bring it into conformity with r 1 Additional power to make certain persons defendants is given expressly by r 6 and there are several other cases in which persons may and in fact must, be joined as co defendants though '*any right to relief*' is not alleged and cannot be alleged, to exist against them Reference may be made to the case of co sharers and others who ought to join as co plaintiffs and in their refusal to join as such, must be joined as co defendants There are besides persons against whom no right to relief exists or is alleged to exist and against whom no relief is or can be claimed but who must be joined as co defendants for an effective and final determination of the suit or "*whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit*" and whom the Court may, on that account, implead under r 10, and therefore it must be permissible for the plaintiff to implead as defendants in a suit In the case noted (4) the minor brother of a person who had entered into a contract was held to be rightly joined as a defendant, even though no decree for specific performance such as was asked against the party to the contract, could be asked against him, the decision proceeding on the ground that the plaintiff was interested in having the minor before the Court, "*in order to obtain an adjudication against him, as well with regard to the existence of the contract as with regard to the question*

(1) Cantonment Committee Poona & (1881)

Bujori 14 B 286 (1889)

(4) Alagappa v Sivaramasundara, 19 M

(2) Hukm Chani C P C 409

211 (1891)

(3) Jodai Mollah v Kelly Dass, 8 C 215

whether the contract is of such a nature as to be binding on him." A leading instance of this necessity of joinder is found in the case of suits on mortgages, in which, on the grounds of equity and good conscience, it has long been considered a general rule in England as well as in India, that all the persons having an interest in the mortgaged property must be impleaded as parties (1). Unlike the right of joint contractees, when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise (2). And in suits on joint torts, the tortfeasors may be sued jointly or separately at the option of the plaintiff, as their responsibility has been held to be not only joint, but several also (3). The distinction between this rule and r 10 is this: the former refers to the action of a plaintiff at the time of presentation of the plaint in joining in the same suit as defendants parties against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, while the latter refers to the action of the Court at a stage subsequent to the presentation of the plaint in adding a party either as plaintiff or defendant, whose presence, in the opinion of the Court, is necessary (4).

The Code does not contain any express provision as to who should be considered necessary parties, and what would be the effect of the omission of a plaintiff to bring on the record all necessary parties. R 13, however, by implication shows that an objection for want of parties is a valid objection to a suit or proceeding, and this section and r 10 by implication show who are to be deemed necessary parties. Reading this and r 10 together, it has been held that in order that a party may be considered a necessary party defendant, two conditions must be satisfied—*first*, that there must be a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved in the suit, and *second*, that his presence should be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit (5).

In a recent case in the Allahabad High Court where mortgagees suing for recovery of the whole of the mortgage money by sale of the mortgaged property, omitted by an oversight to implead persons who owned a share in the property distinct from the shares owned by the other defendants, it was held that only so much of the claim should be decreed as related to the latter shares (6).

It is necessary, however, to concur in the language of Judge Story, in which he states the impossibility of laying down any rules which shall be of universal application to the joinder of parties in equity, observing that "whether the common formula be adopted that all persons materially

(1) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 409. This rule has been enacted in s 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Under this rule the plaintiff "may," but under s 85 of the Act cited (now incorporated in the Code as O XXXIV r 1) he must, make persons of whose interest he has notice, parties to the suit. See *Lala Surja Prosad v Golab Chand* 27 C 724, at p 759 (1900), *Sidheswari Prosad v Dharanjit Narain*, 19 C L J 437 (1914),

Ganesh Lal v Charan Singh, 35 A. 217 (1913).

(2) Contract Act s 43.

(3) See cases cited in *Hukm Chand*, C. P. C. 413.

(4) *Saileyananda v Umeshananda*, 4 C W N 462, 464 (1899).

(5) *Durga Charan Barkar v Jotindra Mohun Tagore* 27 C 493, at p 497 (1899).

(6) *Ganesh Lal v Charan Singh* 35 A 217 (1913), 17 C W N CCLXXVII.

interested in the suit, or in the subject of the suit ought to be made parties, or that all persons materially interested in the object of the suit ought to be made parties, we express but a general truth in the application of the doctrine, which is useful and valuable indeed, as a practical guide, but is still open to exceptions and qualifications and limitations, the nature and extent and application of which are not, and cannot independently of judicial decision be always clearly defined "(1)

In a suit for declaration of right against a proprietor of an estate it is necessary that the proprietor himself be made a party to the suit, not his *karindah* only. A decree against the latter does not bind the former. The *karindah* may, of course, be retained as a party if it is intended to make a personal claim against him (2). As regards benamidar plaintiffs, see *ante*. A plaintiff is entitled to a decree against a benamidar defendant who has covenanted with him for the quiet enjoyment of property (3). In a suit for rent, defendant pleaded non liability on the ground that he was a benamidar and that the *jote* belonged to A. It was held that the Court was not competent to introduce A into the suit, against whom no relief had been sought by the plaintiff (4). *Darputindar* and *Seputindar* are proper, though not necessary, parties (5). In a suit for pre-emption the vendor is not a necessary party (6).

"Any right to relief"—It is not necessary that the relief to which the right is alleged to exist should be the same (7). Whether there is a right to relief in any case depends on the principles of the substantive law applicable, and reference is made to a few typical cases in the text book cited (8). In the under mentioned case, (9) the absent decree holders were held not to be merely parties against whom the auction purchaser defendants were entitled to claim some indemnity, but persons against whom a right to relief existed in the plaintiff if the suit was well founded.

"In respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction"—See notes, *ante*, in particular note under same title, and the next paragraph but one *post*.

"Jointly, severally, or in the alternative"—The right to relief may exist jointly, severally, or in the alternative (10). These latter words refer

(1) 1 Story, Eq. P. C. 76 (c)

(2) *Madho Rao v. Thakur Pershad*, 4 Agta 127 (1868)

(3) *Somasundaram v. Fischer*, 19 M. 60 (1895)

(4) *Moharance Surno Moyee v. Bykunt Chunder*, 25 W. R. 17 (1876) [defendant dead when plaint filed. Court cannot hear or receive written statement from person not a party]

(5) *Upendra v. Sheikh Sobhan*, 15 C. I. J. 6 (1911)

(6) *Harbans v. Tota Sahu*, 32 A. 14 (1909)

(7) *Alagappa v. Sivaramasundara*, 19 M. 211, 215, 216 (1891), *vide ante*, p. 524

(8) *Hukm Chand*, C. P. C. 115-118, where also will be found discussed the question as to how far public officers and Government may be made defendants.

(9) *Durga Charan Sarkar v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore*, 27 C. 493, 496, 499 (1899)

(10) For illustrations see notes to Annual Practice, 1914, Ord. XVI r. 4, and *Hukm*

to sue jointly or in the alternative. But this case has not been followed in *Aiyathurai v. Santhu Meera*, 31 M. 232 (1909)

primarily to cases like those of principal debtor and surety in which both are liable, but the creditor may, at his option, enforce his right against either, though not against both. They are not restricted, however, to those cases, and find application also where the plaintiff has no option, and the liability depends on the facts as they may be found (1). Thus, in suits on contracts entered into by an agent and repudiated by the principal, both the principal and the agent may be joined as defendants with a claim for relief against them in the alternative (2). Where the claim was to have a *mokurrari* patta enforced as against the co sharer granting it and the other co sharers who repudiated it, and in the alternative to have the *salam* paid for the patta returned, it was held that the suit was in substance to enforce a contract to place the plaintiff in possession of the land under the patta and to declare his rights to it as against all the defendants, and to ask for compensation as against the defendant granting it, and that such alternative claims might be allowed against one or more of the defendants (3). In a suit by a purchaser of land for arrears of rent against the tenant and the vendor, to whom the tenant alleged having paid the same, the two defendants were held to be properly joined, and a decree against the vendor was sustained on appeal (4). The plaintiff in a suit to recover money from certain persons alleged to have borrowed money from his agent, is entitled, when the alleged debtors deny the loan, to make his agent a co defendant and pray for a decree in the alternative against such agent (5).

Omission of the words "in respect of the same matter"—It was a subject of doubt under the Code of 1882 whether the use of the two expressions "*cause of action*" and "*same matter*," in sects 26 and 28 respectively of that Code, was intended to convey any distinction. As already pointed out, r 1 now omits all reference to cause of action. The subject will be found further discussed in the notes to O II r 3, dealing with the question whether that rule is a proviso to this. Whether the terms be synonymous or the latter more comprehensive than the former, it was held that if there were but one cause of action the joinder of defendants was justified (6). On the other hand, where there were separate causes of action against separate sets of defendants, it was held that the trial could not proceed (7). The difficulty arose in cases where, though there may be strictly different causes of action, the joinder was sought to be justified on the ground that there was yet "*the same matter*," as to which see O II r 3, *post*. This raised the question whether assuming that the latter term was more comprehensive than "*cause of action*," sect 28 of the last Code (corresponding with rule 3 of this order) was not controlled by the section corresponding with O II r 3, *post*, (8) and that was the basis of the decision in

(1) *Hukm Chand, op cit*(2) *Buddree Doss v Hoare*, 8 C. 170 (1882)(3) *Rajdhur v Kalkristna*, 8 C. 963 (1882)(4) *Madan Mohun Lal v Holloway*, 12 C. 555 (1886)(5) *Meyappa Chetti v Perrannan Chetti*, 29 M. 50 (1905)(6) *Loku Nath v Keshab Ram*, 13 C. 147, 152 (1886), *Ishan Chandra v Rameshwar*, 24 C. 831 (1897)(7) *Ram Prosad v Sachu Dass*, 6 C. W. N. 585 (1902)(8) *Hukm Chand*, C. P. C. 422

a case (1) in which the Punjab Chief Court held that a suit by a person to set aside the attachments, made on different dates at the instance of different defendants, of various sums to which the plaintiff was entitled, was bad for misjoinder of causes of action, as also that an order merely for the distribution of assets among several persons under sect 293 of the former Code did not give a cause of action to a person considering himself entitled to the assets, and that a suit against those persons was not tenable, though it may be that where several decree holders combine in getting an order of distribution passed to the prejudice of another decree holder who is solely entitled to the money in the hands of the Court, the latter is entitled to have the question decided in a single joint suit against the former, as well as to recover the monies severally realized by them under the order, as was the case in No 90, P R, 1892, and in *Gowri Prosad v Ram Ratan* (2) In *Gangabai v Bal*, (3) 148 persons were joined as defendants, and there was held to be no misjoinder, as the order which the plaintiff sought to have reversed or modified was common to all the defendants, and the plaintiff's claim to relief, in so far as that order was concerned, existed against all the defendants jointly. In the under mentioned suit (4) the matter was held not to be the same, the matter in the one case being an alleged breach of contract by an agent of the firm, and in the other being the right of one partner in the firm as against the other partner to have accounts taken and the partnership wound up. Where a number of persons join fraudulently in combination do some act which leads to plaintiff's ouster from the full enjoyment of his proprietary right, they may all be joined in one suit (5). So also in a suit for damages for assault against several persons, they may all be joined together, if it was simultaneously "made by parties proceeding together and acting in conjunction as to time, place, and assault," as the assault is in such a case only a single act (6). Where a suit was against two defendants uniting two causes of action, one of which was stated to have arisen out of a joint account of the defendants, and the other out of a transaction in which defendant No 1 alone was concerned, it was held that the right to relief against the defendants *quoad* the second branch of the claim could not be said to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of the same matter, so as to justify the joinder in the one suit under the former section (7). A suit (8) against one defendant was for specific performance of a contract to sell land and as against another for a declaration that he was not entitled to any charge upon that land, and Sargent, C J, held that the relief claimed against the two defendants could not be said to be in respect of the same matter, the right to relief against one defendant being in respect of the non fulfilment of the contract, and that against the other defendant in respect of a threatened disturbance of his possession. Where on the other hand, both sets of

(1) *Jhama Lal v Sant Lal* (1897) P R No 43, *Hukm Chand C P C* 422

(2) 13 C 159 (1886)

(3) (1893), B P J 195

(4) *Muthappa Chetty v Muthu Palani* 27 M 80 (1903)

(5) *Gujadhar Pershad v Sahib Roy*, 19

W R 203 (1872)

(6) *Ramesur Bhattacharjee v Shib Narain*, 14 W R 419, *Varajlal v Ramdat* 3 Bom L R 878 (1901)

(7) *Sama Lal v Bag Husain* (1888), P J No 189

(8) *Lukumsey v Fazulla*, 3 B 177 (1880)

creditors attached goods which the plaintiff claimed as his, and the plaintiff had to establish his ownership as against both, it was held that the right to relief against all the attaching creditors was in respect of the same matter (1) The former section was held not to permit a tenant to bring a suit to have it determined which of two defendants, both of whom claimed rent from him is his landlord, (2) the High Court observing in the case cited, that "the plaintiffs had no cause of action against the second defendant beyond that he demanded rent from them and obtained a decree for that rent," and "their only cause of action against the first defendant was that he had, on some other occasion, demanded and received rent from them" and "that cannot be considered the 'same matter' within the meaning of the section" In a recent case decided under the last Code it was broadly held that the general principle governing the joinder of defendants was, that there must be a cause of action in which all the defendants are more or less interested, although the relief against them may vary, but that separate causes of action against separate defendants quite unconnected not involving any common question of law or fact could not safely be joined in one action (3) In a recent case under the present Code it has been held that the first condition to be fulfilled before joining several persons as co-defendants is that the right to relief must arise against them all from the same act or transaction (or the same series of acts or transactions) and the second condition is that some common question of law or fact would arise against them if separate suits were brought (4)

The Legislature recognizing that the words under discussion have given rise to great difficulty, have followed the wording of the English rule and omitted them vide ante and notes to O 11 r 3

4. Judgment may be given without any amendment—

Court may give judgment for or against one or more of joint parties

(a) for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to,

(ss
2

(b) against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities

"Judgment may be given," etc.—Misjoinder of plaintiffs is only a plea in abatement and rather to the form than the substance of the action. It ought not therefore, if possible to defeat the action altogether unless the defendant has been prejudiced. The provision here referred to is obviously based on the principle that the misjoinder of a party as plaintiff to whom the relief claimed could not be awarded whilst there are others to whom it might

(1) *Raghunath v Sarosh* 23 B 266 (1898)

(2) *Koylash Chandra Dutt v Golak Chunder Poddar* 2 C W N 61 (1897) As to the joinder of the purchaser of a tenure, see *San Jogemaya Dass v Girenbra Nath*

Mookerjee 4 C. W. N. 590 (1900)

(3) *Mowji Monji v Kuverji Nanaji*, 31 B 510 (1907)

(4) *Umabai v Bhan Balwant*, 34 B 358, 366 (1909)

be awarded, is a mere defect of form which is not fatal to the action (1) Where a person and the widowed daughter-in-law of his deceased father sued for pre-emption as joint co-sharers, and the widow was found to be entitled only to maintenance and therefore not to be a co-sharer, it was held that a decree could not be given to the other plaintiff without an amendment of the plaint, and as it was too late to amend the plaint, the suit was altogether dismissed (2)

"Respective liabilities."—The liabilities of all the defendants need not be the same, and there will be no misjoinder if some of the defendants are found not to be liable. Thus, if in a suit against six persons for possession of a certain share of land and in the alternative for its rent, the fact that only one of the defendants is found to be in possession and that a portion of the claim for rent is not sustainable against another defendant, is not a ground for dismissing the suit altogether for misjoinder of defendants (3) An insolvent and his trustees have been sued together though their liabilities were not the same (4) It was held there was no misjoinder in a suit against two agents, one of whom was liable to account for twenty years and the other jointly liable with the former for the last two years of this period (5) The suit, however, has been held to be bad where the plaintiff has united different causes of action in one suit against different defendants who were not jointly liable in respect of each and all of such causes of action (6) Where the defendants combined to keep the plaintiff out of his property it was held they were properly joined (7) In the under-mentioned case the right to relief, so far as regards the first and second sets of defendants, was a right to relief against them severally, but the cause of action arose out of the single subject matter, which formed the subject of the plaintiff's original mortgage (8) Where there is no misjoinder of causes, a plaintiff is permitted to bring a single suit against a number of persons, even though some of them may not be interested in the entire subject matter of the suit (9) The general principle

(1) Ramanuja v. Devanayaka, 8 M 361, 365 (1885), as to misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action see Varajal v. Ramdat, 16 B 259 (1901)

(2) Karan Singh v. Muhammad Ismail, 7 A 860 (1885)

(3) Janakinath v. Ramrunjun, 4 C 949 953 (1879)

(4) Ajidhva Nath v. Anant Das, 3 A 799 (1881)

(5) Degamber Mozumdar v. Kallynath Roy, 7 C 654, 657, 658 (1881)

(6) Narasingh Das v. Mangul Dubey, 5 A 179 (1883), foll. in Bhagwati v. Bindeshri, 6 A 106, 108 (1883), in which it was pointed out that joint interest in the main questions raised by the litigation was a condition precedent to the joinder of several causes of action against several defendants, expld. in Indar Kumar v. Gur Prasad, 11 A 33 (1899)

(7) Omur Ali v. Weylayet Ali, 4 C L R 455 (1879), foll. in Lole Nath Surma v. Keshab Ram 13 C 147, 152 (1886) in which the cause of action alleged was one and the same conspiracy. In Hira Lal Mozumdar v. Prosunno Chunder, 12 C L R 556 (1893), the defendants were held to have but one defence. In Sudhendhu v. Durga Das 14 C 435, 439 (1887) and Ram Narain Dutt v. Annoda Prosad, 14 C 691 (1887), it was held that the defendants had not combined and so there was no community of interest. In Ram Narain Dutt v. Annoda Prosad, 14 C 681 (1887), it was held there was misjoinder of causes of action.

(8) Bangsee Singh v. Soodist Lal, 7 C 739, 745 (1899)

(9) Muhammad Balsh v. Ramdat (1890), P R No 5

that the difference of the extent of the defendant's liabilities does not prevent a joinder of them in a suit is specially applicable in cases in which several properties comprised in an estate are alienated to different persons, and all such alienees are allowed to be joined in one suit (1). An unsuccessful defendant may be ordered to pay the costs of the successful one (2).

Costs—The second paragraph of sect 26 of the last Code dealt with the question of costs. The words "*entitled to his costs*," etc., in that section, referred to the joining of persons as plaintiffs, as mentioned in the first sentence of the section. The words in the corresponding English rule were held to refer to "the persons who bring the action, who act by one solicitor, and who speak of themselves as the plaintiffs, though they allege that each of them has a separate right" (3). If one or some of the plaintiffs are successful, and the other or others unsuccessful, the successful were held liable to pay to the defendant the costs of the unsuccessful plaintiff, (4) and to recover from the defendant the whole of his general costs of the action, (5). *Esher, M R*, observing in the case cited, that the last sentence of the section as to costs applies "as between a plaintiff who has succeeded in the action and a defendant who has failed." And it is a settled rule of English practice that the costs occasioned to the defendant by the joining of the unsuccessful plaintiff may be deducted from those payable by the defendant to the successful plaintiff (6). The Select Committee in their report stated that they understood that in practice the provisions of sect 26 of the last Code relating to costs was not operative in the Mofussil and that part of the section has therefore not been reproduced.

5 It shall not be necessary that every defendant shall be interested as to all the relief claimed in any suit against him
Defendant need not be interested in all the relief claimed

"As to all the relief"—This rule, which is new, is taken from the first portion of O XVI r 5 of the English rules. The words 'or as to

(1) *Hukm Chand, C P C 427*. See *Sami Chetti v Ammani* 7 M. H. C. R. 260 (1873), *Yasudevar Kuleadi*, ib 290 (1873), *Mahomed v Krishnan* 11 M. 106 (1886) *Abdul v Ayaga* 12 M. 231 (1889), *Chuhar Mall v Bakhtwadi* (1890), P. R. No 149, *Shoroop Chunder v Mothoor Mohun* 4 W. R. 109 (1865), *Krishna Gopal v Hurry Nath Dutt*, 25 W. R. 60 (1870), *Haranund v Prosunno Chunder*, 9 C. 763 (1883). So in *Ishan Chandra v Rameswar*, 24 C. 831 (1897) (approved in *Umabai v Vitthal*, 33 B. 293 (1908)) it was held that the reversionary heirs of a Hindu can in a suit to set aside the separate alienations of several parcels of

the husband's land made by the widow join the several alienees. Though see *Ganesha Lal v Khairati Singh* 16 A. 249 (1894), *Kachar Bhoj v Bat Rathore* 7 B. 259 (1883) in which there was held to be no joinder, each alienation being treated as a separate cause of action. The latter case has been distinguished in *Umabai v Vitthal* 33 B. 293 (1908).

(2) *Child v Stennish*, 11 Ch. D. 67.

(3) *D'Hormeguez v Grey* 10 Q. B. D. 13.

(4) *ib*.

(5) *Gort v Rowney*, 17 Q. B. D. 12.

(6) *Umfrevill v Johnson* 10 C. 411.
590, *Hukm Chand C. 1* & 30.

every cause of action included" which appear in the English rule have been omitted

- 9] 6. The plaintiff may, at his option, join as parties to the same suit all or any of the persons severally, jointly and severally, liable on any one contract, including parties to bills of exchange, hundis and promissory notes

Joinder of parties in same contract—This rule, which corresponds with sect 29 of the last Code, is the same as r 6 of O 16 of the English rules except that the word "hundis" has been added. It is a modification of the general principle which required that wherever more than one person was liable to contribution to the plaintiff's demands, they should all be made parties to the suit (1). The word "contract" is, however, to be construed strictly and a liability to account under a will is not a liability under a contract (2). In *Baldeo Prasad v. Grish Chundar* (3) the endorsee of a cheque sued the endorser for a duplicate or the amount of the cheque said to have been lost and the High Court ordered the plaint to be returned so that the drawer might be joined as a defendant, but this was on the ground that a duplicate cheque could not be given by the endorser without the co-operation of the drawer. The rule is merely an enabling one and does not prevent the joinder in any case in which it would otherwise be proper. Thus it has been held that the drawer and the acceptor of a bill of exchange may be joined as co-defendants in a suit brought by the holder (4). When two out of three defendants liable for a joint debt had promised to pay separately it was held that the suit could proceed against them only (5).

7. *Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to obtain redress, he may join two or more defendants in order that the question as to which of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties*

"Is in doubt"—This rule which is new, is taken from O 16 r 7 of the English rules with some slight verbal modifications. It has been held under that rule that while alternative relief of different kinds may be given against alternative defendants (6) it does not enable a plaintiff to bring separate causes

(1) (1900), Ann. Proc. 167

(2) *Smith v. Allen* 2 Ch. 319 (1891). As to the effect of this section and s. 43 of the Contract Act see *Muhammad Askari v. Rakhoo Ram* 22 A. 307, 316 (1900)

(3) 2 A. 751 (1880)

(4) *Pestonjee v. Mirza Mahomed* 3 O. 541 (1878)

(5) *Bhugabuth Thakur v. Mahabub Kisto* Sett. 23 C. 553 (1890)

(6) *Honduras etc. Co. v. Imler* 1 L. R. 307. *Massey v. Heynes* 21 Q. B. D. 331

of action against different persons in one action³ (1) The costs of a successful defendant sued in the alternative may be ordered to be paid by the unsuccessful co-defendant (2)

8 (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons^(ss. 32) may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend, in such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. But the Court shall in such case give, at the plaintiff's expense, notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or, where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct

(2) Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is instituted or defended under sub rule (1) may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit.

Scope of Indian and English rule—It is a general rule that all persons interested ought to be made parties to a suit, however numerous they may be, so that the Court may be enabled to do complete justice by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested, and that the orders of the Court may be safely executed by those who are compelled to obey them, and future litigations may be prevented, also that a person who ought to be, but is not, a party to a proceeding is not ordinarily bound by any decree or order passed therein. This rule yields to the exigencies of particular cases, and there are well established qualifications to it, such as the power of the Court under this rule to make a representative order (3)

This rule, which corresponds with sect 30 and a portion of sect 32 of the last Code,(4) is the same as the English r 9 of O 16, except that in the present rule the word "suit" is substituted for "cause of matter" and it is here necessary to obtain permission of the Court for suing also, while under the English rule the permission is required only for defending a suit on behalf of others. The second sentence also has been added (5) The effect of the statutory rule is merely to give Legislative sanction to the practice which long prevailed in the Equity Courts of England. The great risk from abatement, and the inconvenience and the expense involved in a great number of persons being parties, led those Courts to recognize the representative system as it was not inconsistent with general principles that certain judicial proceedings taken by, or against,

(1) Thompson v London City Co, 1 Q B 884 (1899), Frankenburg v Great Horseless Car Co, 1 Q B 512 (1900).

(2) Sanderson v Blyth, etc., 2 K. B 533, C. A. (1903)

(3) Chudasama Sursangji v Partapsang Khengarji, 28 B 209 (1903), s c, 5 B L R. 937 See also Hira Lal v Bharon, 5 A at

p 607 (1893), which states one of the grounds on which the section is based.

(4) Hukm Chand, C. P C. 431

(5) See as to these amendments of the English rule, observations of Morris, J, in Oriental Bank Corporation v Cobind Lal Seal, 9 C 606, 607 (1893)

a select number as representing a large class might, if fairly and honestly conducted, bind or benefit the whole class (1)

In the first place, the rule does not constitute but presupposes the existence of a right to sue, without which it can find no application (2) The rule deals with procedure only, and does not affect substantive rights (3) In the under mentioned case (4) Shephard, J, referring to the case of Jan Ali v Ram Nath (5) observed that 'it seems to have been considered that the granting of leave under the section would have made up for the insufficiency of interest disclosed in the plaint, but added that "with great deference, that view appears to be incorrect

Nextly assuming that a right of suit exists under the substantive law, the rule is merely an enabling one, allowing a suit to be instituted under certain circumstances by some of the persons interested on behalf of all (6) Beverley, J, observed in the case first cited, that "there are no words in the section to the effect that where persons have the same interest in a suit they are debarred from suing either jointly or severally unless they obtain the permission of the Court to sue on behalf of all the persons similarly interested," and "the section does not forbid them from suing in their own right, it merely says that if they desire to sue on behalf of others they must obtain the permission of the Court" Ameer Ali, J after observing that "that section is an enabling section and must be read in conjunction with Explanation V to sect 13' (corresponding with sect 11), said 'The effect of sect 30, therefore to my mind is that unless such permission is obtained by the person suing or defending the suit, his action has no binding effect upon the persons whom he chooses to represent Where there is a joint right it may be necessary for all persons jointly interested to be joined as parties, and if they are not joined the suit may be bad for misjoinder In order to prevent the record from being unnecessarily encumbered by many names sect 30 allows one or more persons having a joint interest to sue or defend with the authorization or permission of the Court on behalf of all The section in fact, embodies a rule of convenience based on reason and good policy but in my opinion it was not intended to take away nor does it take away any right It seems to me that sect 30 does not give any warrant for the contention that because a person has a right in common with others he may not maintain an action for the establishment or enforcement of his own right There is no obligation on him to sue or defend on behalf of others and if he does not seek any relief on behalf of those who have an interest in common with him or to bind them by his action, there is nothing in the section or in any other law to debar him from maintaining the action Even if he were to bring a suit on behalf of himself and the others he may choose to go on with the action on his own behalf, and would be entitled

(1) Jenkins v Robertson 1 H. L. Sc 117

(2) Anunlay Ph kaji v Shankar Day 7 B 323 (1883)

(3) Srinivasa Chariar v Raghaya Chariar, 23 M at p 31 (1897)

(4) 11, 7 M L J R 281, 23 M at p 32 (1897)

(5) 8 D. 32 at p. 41

(6) Baiju Lal v Bulak Lal 21 C 387 389 (1897). The Rule is permissive and not prohibitive Srinivasa Chariar v Raghaya Chariar 23 M 24, 31 (1897) Gulla v Kishan 32 A 281 (1910)

to do so, if he makes the necessary amendments. The English cases on the point are collected in *Daniell's Chancery Practice* (1) and tend to show that the plaintiff, if he has a right in himself to bring an action, or the defendant if he has a right in himself to defend an action is entitled to sue or to defend in any way he chooses without making any person a party to the action or to the defence, so long as the effect remains confined to himself (2). As to execution, see the case cited below, (3) and as to public charity suits (4) notes to sects 92 and 93, *ante*.

"Numerous"—There is no absolute rule as to what number will be considered sufficient, though in the case mentioned (5) twenty persons were not considered sufficiently numerous. A question as to the applicability, however, of the rule has arisen where the parties are numerous. This rule, as already observed, deals with procedure only and does not confer substantive rights of suit. Under the ordinary rule of the substantive law no action is maintainable by a private individual for an infringement of the rights of the general public, unless he has suffered special damage (6). As this rule presupposes a right to sue it gives none where there is otherwise none. This rule does not therefore allow one or more persons to sue on behalf of the general public (7).

he sues on their behalf and not on behalf of the general public (8). In the case cited (9) it was held that a suit could not be brought on behalf of a portion (10) of the general public, such as the Hindu community, as the entire Hindu community was incapable of ascertainment, and that the words "numerous parties" (in the former section) meant parties capable of being ascertained, as "seems clear from a reference to the provisions for service of notice upon all such parties" (11). No doubt the rule is often applied where the parties though numerous can be definitely ascertained, as in the case of

(1) P 215, 5th ed.

(2) The same view was taken by Shephard, J., in *Srinivasa Charitar : Raghava Charitar*, 23 M. 28, 32 (1897), where it was pointed out that there was an individual right to sue, and that if the course prescribed by this Rule was not followed in a case such as that dealt with, the only consequence was that the judgment did not bind the persons whose names were not on the record. In *Kalkidas v Gor Parjaram* 15 B 309, 319 (1890), and *Tanudin v Pandu* 18 B 699 (1893), the corresponding section was held to be inapplicable, as the plaintiffs sued for themselves, and it was not a case of persons suing on behalf of a class.

(3) *Sadagopachari : Krishnamachari*, 12 M 356 (1889).

(4) *Budree Das Mukim v Choona Lal Joherry*, 33 C 789 (1906).

(5) *Harrison : Stewardson*, 2 Hs 530, and *tide post* notes on "Permission."

(6) *Adamson v Arumugam*, 9 M 463, 466 (1886), *London Association of Shipowners : London and India Docks*, 3 Ch D (1892), at pp 257, 270, and next note.

(7) *Monmotho Nath Das : Harish Chandra Das*, 33 C 905 s c, 10 C W N 867 (1906).

(8) *Ib*.

(9) *Sajedur Raja v Baidyanath Deb*, 20 C 397 (1892).

(10) See *Monmotho Nath Das : Harish Chandra Das*, 33 C 905, s c, 10 C W N 867 (1906).

(11) *Sajedur Raja : Baidyanath Deb*, *supra*.

creditors, (1) legatces, (2) members of a *samahan*, (3) debenture holders, bond holders, club, and the like (4) The rule, however, is not limited to such cases The decision of the Madras High Court, (5) which was cited in the Calcutta case, (6) is not an authority for the principle laid down by the latter The Hindu community, (7) no more than the Mahomedan community, (8) is not the general public but only a particular portion, though it may be a large one of the population of this country, which consists of various races and creeds (9) Nextly, the observation of the Madras High Court that the section is "rather designed to allow one or more persons to represent a class having special interests," seems to show that the decision in the Calcutta case is incorrect, even according to the Madras decision which it approved (10) Further, the provisions of the rule as to advertisement appear to have been overlooked, and, lastly, other decisions are not consistent with it One or more persons have been allowed to represent classes of the general public having special interests, though they cannot sue on behalf of the whole general public So suits have been allowed by one or more persons on behalf of others of a sect, (11) caste, (12) worshippers at a mosque, (13) parishioners of a church, (14) fellow villagers, (15) or class of villagers (16) All these cases are suits on behalf of a defined class, though that class is composed of a more or less "indefinite number of persons" (17) Thus in one of the cases cited (18) two Brahmans were permitted to sue to enforce a trust for the benefit of Brahmans generally, of whatever kind or sect or place In many if not in all of these cases, if the matter is looked at strictly, it cannot be said that all the parties are capable of being ascertained so that a notice might, if required, be served on each and all of them An inquiry made for such a purpose would have no abiding result While it was being made, and after it had been made, its subject matter would

(1) *Oriental Bank v. Gobind Lall Seal*, 9 C 604 (1883), see *Manickavelu v. Arbuthnot*, 1 M 208 (1882)

(2) *Geereballa Dabce v. Chunder Kant*, 11 C 213 (1885)

(3) *Chennu v. Krishnan*, 25 M 399 (1901)

(4) *Ann. Pr.* 1906, notes to Ord. XVI r 9

(5) *Adamson v. Arunugan*, 9 M 463 (1886)

(6) *Sajedur Raja v. Budyanath Deb*, 20 C 397 (1892)

(7) *Monmotho Nath Das v. Harish Chandra Das*, 33 C 905, s.c., 10 C W N 867 (1906)

(8) *Jawahra v. Akbar Husam*, 7 A st p 182, *Bam Chandra v. Ali Muhammad*, 35 A 197 (1913)

(9) *Monmotho Nath Das v. Harish Chandra Das*, 10 C W N 867 (1906), s.c., 33 C 905

(10) *Ganapati Iyer v. Hindu and Mahomedan Follower*, cclxxxii

(11) *Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar*, 23 M 28 (1897), *Dhunput Singh v. Pares*

Nath, 21 C 180 (1893), *Maharaj Bahadur v. Pares Nath*, 31 C 839, 845 (1904), *Raghava v. Rajaratnam*, 14 M 57 (1890), *Baldeo Bharthi v. Bir Gor*, 22 A 269 (1900)

(12) *Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal*, 21 M 10 (1897), *Monmotho Nath Das v. Harish Chandra Das*, 10 C W N 867 (1906)

(13) *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mandal*, 8 C 32 (1881)

(14) *Fernandez v. Rodriguez*, 21 B 784 (1897)

(15) *Haradhone Dasse v. Rajudoyal Rai*, 21 C 181 n (1890), *Kalu Kabir v. Jan Meah*, 29 C 100 (1901), *Thanakat v. Munappa*, 5 M 490, 199 (1885)

(16) *Ahmedbhai Habibkhai v. Balkrishna Mukund*, 10 B 391 (1894), *Rhondal Panla v. Pandal Pos*, 12 B 221 (1887)

(17) To use the language of the Court in *Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar*, 23 M 28, 30 (1897)

(18) *Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal*, 21 M 10 (1897)

constantly be liable to change owing to deaths and births, marriages and departures of the members of the class on which the suit was brought, it may be instituted. The limitation of this rule therefore to cases where the parties can be ascertained has been dissented from in a case in which it was held that the Bhatnagar caste of Chattri was a defined class of the general public and that the suit had been properly instituted under the former section, whether all the members of such caste were or were not capable of being accurately ascertained as that notices could, if required, be served on each and all of them (1).

To sum up, no suit can be brought on behalf of the general public. A suit may lie on behalf of a class of the general public having special interests though that class may consist of a more or less indefinite number of persons, as also on behalf of numerous parties who can in the strict sense be accurately ascertained, as in the case of a suit by a legatee on behalf of all other legatees.

"Persons."—"Parties" was the word used originally in the corresponding rule of the English law, but it has since been altered to "persons." In *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Gobind Lall Seal* (2) it was contended, without success, that the word "parties" did not mean persons in the position of creditors, but "only parties necessary to the suit, without whose presence on the record the suit would be defective," and *Norris, J.* observed that the word "parties" meant persons, and "that the provisions would be unintelligible unless the word received that meaning." In accordance with this decision the word "persons" has been substituted for the word "parties" in the former Code as being the more appropriate expression. As a result of the representative system enacted in this rule, the parties represented by another, though interested, will not be parties to the suit, (3) but they can apply to be made parties; and if any person thinks that he is not properly represented by the plaintiff, as holding different views from him, he should apply to be made a party personally (4). It has been held that it is undesirable that individual creditors should be added as parties in an administration suit, unless they can show strong reason to think that the person who has filed the suit on their behalf is not conducting it properly (5). Though the effect of an order under this rule is that the parties, who have obtained permission to sue as representatives, have the conduct of the suit on behalf of all those they purport to represent, yet if any person is dissatisfied with the conduct of the suit, or deems that he is not properly represented, it is open to him to make an application to secure his views being properly represented, and if necessary to take the conduct of the suit out of the hands of those who by the permission of the Court represent him (6).

(1) *Monmotho Nath Das v. Harish Chandra Das*, 10 C. W. N. 887 (1906), s. c. 33 C. 905.

(2) 9 C. 604, 606 (1883).

(3) *Leathley v. McAndrew*, Eng. (1875), W. N. 259.

(4) *Watson v. Cave*, 17 Ch. D. 10, *Fraser v. Cooper*, 21 Ch. D. 718.

(5) *Vasanthi v. Esmabhai*, 34 B. 420 (1909).

(6) *Dhunsooverbhai v. Advocate-General*, 1 Bom. L. R. 743 (1899).

A represented person should not be made a party simply for the security of the defendant's costs, as the Court may order security for them otherwise (1)

"Same interest."—The word "interest" in the corresponding English rule was formerly held to denote "beneficial proprietary interest." (2) But it has been more recently held that the rule is not confined to such cases, and that, given a common interest and a common grievance, a representative suit is in order if the relief sought is in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent (3) In the first of the cases last cited, it was held that the plaintiffs had a common right, which was invaded by a common enemy, and that they were entitled to join in attacking the common enemy in respect of the common right, although *inter se* they might have different rights The identity of interest in a suit depends directly on the identity of the relief sought and only indirectly on the right on the basis of which the relief is sought The rule is therefore independent of the joint, common, or several character of the right sought to be enforced, except so far as that character may determine the nature of the relief sought Whether a right is "joint," or "common," or "several," the rule is equally applicable or not applicable according as the relief sought is, or is not, the same in any of those cases (4) Where there is a joint right all interested must sue, or some one or more may sue on behalf of the rest Where the right is common or several a complete option is given Separate suits may be prosecuted by each of the persons interested, or if numerous parties possess the same interest, some one or more may sue on behalf of the rest under the terms of this rule The matter has been well summarised by Shephard, J., (5) who said, "The rule of the Court of Chancery, to which the section owes its origin, appears to have been made applicable in two classes of cases There are the cases in which the number of persons claiming *concurrent* interest in the subject-matter, and therefore, according to strict rule, *necessary* (6) parties to the suit, is so large that they cannot all be conveniently joined with any chance of bringing the suit to a conclusion And there are the cases in which numerous persons have *distinct but similar rights which might be prosecuted in distinct suits* For instance, there is the case of numerous creditors of the

(1) *De Hart v. Stevenson*, 1 Q. B. D. 313

(2) *Temperton v. Russell*, 1 Q. B. 435 (1893)

(3) *Duke of Bedford v. Ellis*, A. C. 1 (1901), at p. 8, see lower Court, 1 Ch. 491 (1899), and cf. *Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society, etc.*, A. C. 126, 413 (1901)

(4) *Hukm Chaml, C. P. C.* 431, 435

(5) *Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar*, 23 M. 28, 31 (1897), s. c., 7 M. L. J. R. 290

(6) *Jawahra v. Akbar Husain*, 7 A. at p. 182 (1884). The passage at p. 180, 17 C. (1883), *Mohini Mohun Das v. Bungsi Budden*, was not meant to limit the rule to cases of joint rights strictly so called "Joint interests" was there used in the non-technical sense of "same interests." As to joint rights,

see *Nityanand Ghose v. Mohendra Krato*, 21 C. 181 s. (1889), *Chuni Lal v. Ram Kishan*, 15 C. 465 (1889), *Lutifunnissa v. Nazim*, 11 C. 33 (1881), and see *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath*, 8 C. 32 (1881), where the right was treated as a joint one [It has, however, since, been held, following *Zafaryab v. Bakhtawar*, 5 A. 497 (1883), *Jawahra v. Akbar Husain*, 7 A. 178 (1884), that the right of worship of each worshipper is an independent right wholly irrespective of the right of the other worshippers, and that neither the founder of other worshippers nor I sue under this section is necessary. *Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin*, 20 C. 810, 816 (1897) and see as to individual rights, *Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Parjaram*, 15 B. 3 (1890)]

same person or that of many persons claiming a right of common or right of fishing in respect of the same property (1) As already stated the rule is an enabling one and therefore a person whose individual several right has been infringed may sue alone. But he may also sue on behalf of himself and others, whose individual rights have been infringed, if they have the same interest with him within the meaning of the rule (2) Co-sharers in joint property have, however, not necessarily the same interest in a suit relating to that property. In *Hira Lal v Bhairon* (3) the suit was by one co-sharer against three other co-sharers to prevent them from usurping exclusive possession of the joint land and it was held that the suit would lie, and that the corresponding section to this rule did not apply to it, as though the remaining co-sharers would in such a case have co-parcenary or joint interest with the plaintiff in the subject matter of the suit, they would not have the same interest in the suit, and would not be so "interested" in like manner as he was, as it might be "indifferent to them whether the defendants usurped exclusive rights in the *shamilat*, or it may be inconvenient to them at this moment to assert their own rights." And this decision was cited with approval in *Dhunput Singh v Pareshnath Singh*, (4) in which it was held that the other persons of the *Situmbary* sect were similarly interested in suing, though the Digambyri Jains were not similarly interested. It was held by a Full Bench of the High Court in *Vasudevan v Sankaran* (5) that sect 30 (corresponding to this rule) has no application to suits to which a *Karnaran* is a party in a representative capacity, Shephard, J., pointing out that the interest of the *Karnaran* "with his right of management and possession and his obligation to maintain the junior members, is surely not identical with the interest of a junior member who has a claim for maintenance only." It has been held that a suit is maintainable under this rule where a right to a village pathway is the subject matter of litigation, even in the absence of special damage (6). Where a party to a suit represents others under this rule, the decree is binding on those he represents, but when such a party disobeys an injunction (which is personal in its nature) and is proceeded against in execution for that disobedience, an order in such proceedings will not be binding on those whom he was allowed to represent (7).

Permission—The Calcutta High Court has held that the requirement as to the permission is imperative, so that where it is not obtained the suit

(1) In *Ahmedbhai v Balkrishna*, 10 B 391 (1895), *Bhundul v Pandul Pos*, 12 B 221 (1888), *Haradhone Doss v Ramdoyal Rai*, 21 C 181 n (1890), *Kalu Khabur v Jan Meah*, 29 C 100 (1901).

(2) In *Jawahra v Akbar Husain*, 7 A 178 (1884) at p 183, *Mahmood J*, said, that the rule only applied where no individual right was interfered with but what was meant was necessarily applied. There was in this case a private individual right, and it was

therefore held that the plaintiff could sue alone and need not have recourse to this rule or ss 92, 93, *ante*.

(3) 5 A 602 (1883)

(4) 21 C 189 (1891)

(5) 7 M. L. J. R 102, cited in *Hulm Chand*, C P C 436

(6) *Kalu Charan v Ram Kumar*, 17 C W N 73 (1912)

(7) *Srinivasa v Arayar Srinivasa* 33 M 483 (1910)

A represented person should not be made a party simply for the security of the defendant's costs, as the Court may order security for them otherwise (1)

"Same interest"—The word "interest" in the corresponding English rule was formerly held to denote "beneficial proprietary interest." (2) But it has been more recently held that the rule is not confined to such cases, and that, given a common interest and a common grievance, a representative suit is in order if the relief sought is in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent (3) In the first of the cases last cited, it was held that the plaintiffs had a common right, which was invaded by a common enemy, and that they were entitled to join in attacking the common enemy in respect of the common right, although *inter se* they might have different rights The identity of interest in a suit depends directly on the identity of the relief sought, and only indirectly on the right on the basis of which the relief is sought The rule is therefore independent of the joint, common, or several character of the right sought to be enforced, except so far as that character may determine the nature of the relief sought Whether a right is "joint," or "common," or "several," the rule is equally applicable or not applicable according as the relief sought is, or is not, the same in any of those cases (4) Where there is a joint right all interested must sue, or some one or more may sue on behalf of the rest Where the right is common or several, a complete option is given Separate suits may be prosecuted by each of the persons interested, or if numerous parties possess the same interest, some one or more may sue on behalf of the rest under the terms of this rule The matter has been well summarised by Shephard, J, (5) who said, "The rule of the Court of Chancery, to which the section owes its origin, appears to have been made applicable in two classes of cases There are the cases in which the number of persons claiming concurrent interest in the subject matter, and therefore, according to strict rule, necessary (6) parties to the suit, is so large that they cannot all be conveniently joined with any chance of bringing the suit to a conclusion And there are the cases in which numerous persons have distinct but similar rights which might be prosecuted in distinct suits For instance, there is the case of numerous creditors of the

(1) De Hart v Stevenson, 1 Q B D 313

(2) Temperton v Russell, 1 Q B 435 (1893)

(3) Duke of Bedford v Ellis, A C 1 (1901), at p 8, see lower Court, 1 Ch 494 (1899), and cf Taff Vale Ry Co v Amalgamated Society, etc., A C 426, 413 (1901)

(4) Hukin Chanl, C P C 131, 435

(5) Srinivasa Chariar v Paghava Chariar, 23 M 28, 31 (1897), s c, 7 M L J R 286

(6) Jawahra v Akbar Husain 7 A st p 182 (1884). The passage at p 559, 17 C (1889), Mohini Mohun Das v Bungu Bud dan, was not meant to limit the rule to cases of joint rights strictly so called "Joint interests" was there used in the non technical sense of "same interests." As to joint rights,

see Nityanand Ghose v Mohendro Krste 21 C 181 n (1889), Chuni Lal v Ram Kichen 15 C 465 (1888), Lutifunnissa v Nazim, 11 C 33 (1894), and see Jan Ali v Yam Nath 8 C 32 (1881), where the right was treated as a joint one [It has, however, since, been held, following *Zafaryab v Bakhtawar*, 5 A 497 (1883), *Jawahra v Akbar Husain*, 7 A 178 (1881), that the right of worship of each worshipper is an independent right wholly irrespective of the right of the other worshippers, and that neither the founder of other worshippers nor is any under this section is necessary *Mohindun v Sayiduddin*, 20 C 810, 816 (1893) and see as to individual rights, *Kahdas Jivram v Gori Parjaram*, 15 B 39 (1900)]

same person or that of many persons claiming a right of common or right of fishing in respect of the same property (1). As already stated the rule is an enabling one, and therefore a person whose individual several right has been infringed may sue alone. But he may also sue on behalf of himself and others whose individual rights have been infringed if they have the same interest with him within the meaning of the rule (2). Co-sharers in joint property have, however, not necessarily the same interest in a suit relating to that property. In *Hira Lal v Bharon* (3) the suit was by one co-sharer against three other co-sharers to prevent them from usurping exclusive possession of the joint land and it was held that the suit would lie, and that the corresponding section to this rule did not apply to it, as though the remaining co-sharers would in such a case have co-parcenary or joint interest with the plaintiff in the subject matter of the suit, they would not have the same interest in the suit, and would not be so "interested" in like manner as he was, as it might be "indifferent to them whether the defendants usurped exclusive rights in the *shamlat* or it may be inconvenient to them at this moment to assert their own rights". And this decision was cited with approval in *Dhunput Singh v Parashnath Singh* (4) in which it was held that the other persons of the *Situmbari* sect were similarly interested in suing, though the *Digambari* Jains were not similarly interested. It was held by a Full Bench of the High Court in *Vasudevan v Sankaran* (5) that sect 30 (corresponding to this rule) has no application to suits to which a *Karnatan* is a party in a representative capacity, *Shepherd, J.*, pointing out that the interest of the *Karnatan* "with his right of management and possession and his obligation to maintain the junior members is surely not identical with the interest of a junior member who has a claim for maintenance only". It has been held that a suit is maintainable under this rule where a right to a village pathway is the subject matter of litigation, even in the absence of special damage (6). Where a party to a suit represents others under this rule, the decree is binding on those he represents, but when such a party disobeys an injunction (which is *per se* in its nature) and is proceeded against in execution for that disobedience, the order in such proceedings will not be binding on those whom he was allowed to represent (7).

Permission.—The Calcutta High Court has held that the requirement, as to the permission is imperative, so that where it is not obtained the suit

(1) In *Al medbhoy v Balkrishna*, 19 B 391 (1893), *Bhundul v Iandal Pos*, 12 B 221 (1888), *Haradhone Dass v Pamdoyal Rai*, 21 C 181 n (1899), *Kalu Khabar v Jan Meah*, 20 C 100 (1901).

(2) In *Jawahra v Akbar Husain* 7 A 178 (1881) at p. 183, *Mahmood, J.*, said that the rule only applied where no individual right was interfered with but what was meant was necessarily applied. There was in this case a private individual right and it was

therefore held that the plaintiff could sue and need not have recourse to it.

(3) 5 A 602 (1883).

(4) 21 C 169 (1891).

(5) 7 M. L. J. R 102,

(6) *Chand, C P C* 430.

(7) *Kali Charan v R*

73 (1912).

(8) 493 (1910).

must be dismissed (1) and that the permission must have been obtained prior to the institution of the suit, and cannot be given at the hearing *nunc pro tunc* (2). A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, however, has held that permission may, as under the old Chancery practice in England, be given at any time, as it does not involve a question of jurisdiction, and is analogous to that of adding parties, and where a suit is defective as to parties the requisite parties can be added after the suit is filed (3). The decision has been followed by the Allahabad High Court (4) and the Madras High Court, (5) the latter also holding that where leave had been given after the commencement of the suit it was immaterial that an application to sue had been previously refused. The permission need not be in express words (6). In the case cited, Petheram C J and Ghose, J, observed "that if permission can be well gathered from the proceedings of the Court in which the suit was instituted, the Appellate Court ought to hold that such permission was really granted." The Court should exercise a judicial discretion in granting the permission to some definite person or persons (7) and permission should be given only if the number of persons suing or defending is so large as will fairly and honestly try the legal right in dispute, (8) and every right adverse to the opposite party would be represented (9).

"On behalf"—The first part of the rule implies that the plaintiff therein contemplated wishes to sue on behalf of other persons similarly interested in suing they also wishing the same (10). In a recent case the Court referring to this observation, though not deciding the point observed that as the plaintiff sued on behalf of the sect of Dig unbary Jains this section *prima facie* applied but that there was nothing to indicate that the other members of the sect wished to bring the suit (11). The present section includes also the words "or for the benefit of." "On behalf" will only be so far as the "same interest" is concerned. Thus an order appointing a person to represent a class such as the next of kin does not affect one of the next of kin who has a distinct and independent right, (12) nor will it affect the class except as regards the property which he can legally

(1) *Geerdeballa v Chunder Kant* 11 C 213 (1885), *Aityanani Ghose v Mohendra Kristo Ghose*, 21 C 181 n (1890)

(2) *Oriental Bank Corporation v Gobind Lal* 9 C 601 (1883) *per Norris, J*

(3) *Fernandez v Rodrigues*, 21 B 781 (1897)

(4) *Bali v Bharthi v Bir Gov*, 22 A 269 (1890)

(5) *Chennu Menon v Krishnan* 25 M 393 (1901). In *Srinivasa Chariar v Raghava Chariar* 23 M 28 (1897) it was also held that the granting of leave was not a condition precedent.

(6) *Dhunput Singh v Parshad Nath* 21 C 180 (1893) [followed in *Kala Khatri v Jan Meah*, 21 C 100 (1901)] dissenting from dictum of Stuart, C.J., in *Hira Lal v*

Bhaston 5 A 602, 601 (1883) on which the decision in the case did not turn and which was not approved by the other Judges. *Ragava v Rajaratnam* 14 M 57 (1891) is not against this view, as it was simply held that the order in question did not intend to give permission. *Dasondhay v Muhammad*, 33 A 660 (1911)

(7) *Kala Kanta v Gouri Prasad*, 17 C 808 810 (1890)

(8) *Adair v New River Co*, 11 Ves 423

(9) *Cramer v Bird*, L R 6 F 1 143

(10) *Hira Lal v Bhaston* 5 A 602 (1883) *per Strang and Tyrrell, JJ*

(11) *Maharaja Bahadur Singh v Parshad Nath Singh* 31 C 879, 815 (1901)

(12) *In re Last Wilkinson v Blal v*, 2 Ch 793 (1896)

represent (1). It has been held that persons or bodies acting in their own names and others with the leave of the Court under sect. 26 of the last Code (now represented by this rule) have authority to enter into a compromise as to liability those whom they represent. In such a suit all the members of the class represented are in effect parties, and any one of them is entitled to bring himself on the record as an actual party. There is no difference between the powers of the representatives in the original litigation and in appeal (2).

Notice—The notice must include the names of the persons who have been permitted to represent others, so that the persons interested may have an opportunity of knowing who have been selected to represent them (3). It is the duty of the Court to cause service of the notices or advertisements to be published under this rule. If a plaintiff omits to move the Court for that purpose, his suit should not be dismissed on account of the failure of the Court to perform this duty (4).

9 No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it.

English and Indian rules compared—This rule reproduces sect. 19 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1860, and is now substantially the same with the first sentence of O XVI r 11, as it appeared after the revision of the rules in 1883. Following the English rule the rule has now been amended to include the case of non joinder also. The rest of Order XVI r 11 corresponds with portions of the following rule.

Misjoinder—Misjoinder is of several kinds (5). (a) *Of plaintiffs* This is dealt with by this rule, which deals with misjoinder of parties only. There is no misjoinder where a plaintiff is entitled to recover all the estate sued for, and the name of another person is added merely as a matter of caution (b). (b) *Of defendants* This is also covered by the present rule. (c) *Of causes of action, or subjects of suit* This class of misjoinder is dealt with by O II rr 3-7, post. (d) *Of plaintiffs and causes of action* This was impliedly forbidden by the second paragraph of this section in the last Code, read with sect. 26 of that Code (7). But see now, post, "Distinct causes of action." (e) *Of defendants*

(1) Sahib Ghambi Marakayar v Hamid Marakayar, 36 M 414 (1911).

(2) Krishnamachariar v Chinnamal 24 M L J 192 (1913).

(3) Kali Kanta Surma v Court Promad, 17 C 910 (1890).

(4) Makh Lal v Jagdeo Tewari 35 C 1021 (1908).

(5) O Kincaid's Civ Pr Code s 31.

(6) Bachubar v Shamji, 9 B 536 (1885).

(7) See Mohun Chandra v Atul Chandra, 24 C 540, 513 (1897), in which the frame of the suit was held to be bad there being a misjoinder of two plaintiffs with two distinct causes of action, and see post.

and causes of action or multifariousness strictly so called, that is when one of the defendants is not interested in the whole of the relief sought See notes to O II, *post*

Where a plaintiff alleging himself to be entitled on the death of a Hindu widow to the possession of certain immoveable property, upon the death of such widow brought a joint suit against three sets of defendants being persons to whom the widow in her lifetime had by separate alienations transferred separate portions of the property claimed *Held* that such suit was bad for misjoinder of both parties and causes of action and that sect 578 of the former Code could not be applied to cure the defect but the plaintiff was allowed on terms to withdraw his suit as against two out of three sets of defendants with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action (1) But see now sect 99 which is amended to include misjoinder

Nonjoinder—Even before the revision of the rules in 1883, the Court notwithstanding the absence of these words treated the English rule as comprehending cases of 'non joinder as well as misjoinder' (2) It was said that it could not be legitimately inferred from the provision as to misjoinder that the suit 'shall be defeated by reason of non joinder of plaintiffs who ought to sue, (3) and that a similar construction to that put upon the English rule should be followed here, the power given by the last clause of the first paragraph of this section in the old Code being held to amount to a direction to the Court not to dismiss a suit on the ground either of misjoinder or of non joinder (4) The amendment of the section now makes this point clear The English rule which corresponds with this and the next rule was intended to do away with pleas in abatement and demurrers for want of parties (5) The present remedy is to apply for the joinder of the party The rule as to parties is for the purposes of justice and the Court has ample powers under rule 10 to add parties whenever they ought to have been joined or whenever without them the Court cannot deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it (6) So far as the initial stage of the suit is concerned there can be no question If an objection is taken by the defendant to the non joinder of a necessary party the Court will not dismiss the suit if an application be made to it by the plaintiff to add that party but will add the party and proceed with the suit (7) There is however this distinction between the two cases that misjoinder of plaintiffs can never subsequently be fatal to a

(1) *Ganesha Lal v Khairati Singh* 10 A 278 (1894)

(2) *Werderman v Société Générale d'Electricité* 19 Ch D 246 251 cited in *Mahabala v Kunhanna* 21 M 373 at p 383 (1898)

(3) *Kale Khan v Sgra Ram* P R No 153 (1889) p 534 *per* Plowden J

(4) *Mahabala v Kunhanna* 21 M 373 at p 383 (1898)

(5) *Ib Kendall v Hamilton* 4 A p. Cas. 504 *per* Cairns L C. *Robinson v Gersel* 2 Q B 685 (1894)

(6) *Mahabala v Kunhanna supra*

(7) *Ramsebak v Ramall Koondoo* 8 C 815 (1891) at p 873 though a question may arise whether the suit is not barred under the provisions of s 22 of the Limitation Act

suit, though non joinder of a plaintiff in certain cases may (1) An objection may be taken to misjoinder and no notice may be taken of it. If there has in fact been a misjoinder, the suit will be dismissed as regards the party misjoined and the Court will deal with the rights of the other parties (2) Where however, it is the right of the defendant if he takes the objection in proper time to insist upon all of certain persons being joined as plaintiffs, and if after the objection has been raised the plaintiff proceeds with the suit without taking steps to add the person or persons whose non joinder has been objected to and the Court finds that the objection is well founded, the suit must be dismissed (3) A suit may be dismissed for non joinder of persons against whom the plaintiff is entitled to relief in respect of the matter involved in the suit and whose presence is necessary in order to enable the Court to adjudicate upon all the questions involved in the suit (4) Apart from cases where joinder of parties is required under the Common Law the effect of non joinder must also be considered with reference to any special statutory requirements which may exist on the subject. Thus sect 85 of the Transfer of Property Act required that all persons having an interest in the mortgaged property should be joined, provided that the plaintiff has notice of such interest. This section is now incorporated as r 1 of O XXIV. As to the effect of non joinder of persons interested in mortgaged property, see the cases undermentioned (5)

The principle of this section should be applied, so far as may be by Appellate Courts also (6) In the case cited, the suit was for possession of a small corner of *gorah* land, which had been awarded to the plaintiff on a partition of the whole culturable land of the village. Only eleven of the proprietors were made defendants by the plaintiff but the Original Court impleaded the entire proprietary body as co-defendants. On appeal the

(1) *Pamsebuk v Pamlall Koonloo*, 6 C 815 (1881) at p 825

(2) *Ib*

(3) *Ib* at p 823 *Rajendronath Dutt v Saikh Mahomed* 8 C 42 (1881) where a suit by three out of four shebats was dismissed for non joinder of the fourth. In *Ramayya v Venkataratnam* 17 M 122 (1893) the objection of non joinder was held not to be fatal there having been an application to all party which was refused and the plaint showing that the plaintiff sued in a representative capacity. In *Mahabala v Kunhianna* 21 M 373 (1898) it was held that there was no non joinder as one tenant in common could sue in tort without joining others. In *Chief of Lundu v Secretary of State* 14 B 299 at p 305 (1889), the Court in remanding the case said that the lower Court would consider whether certain persons should be joined after the fuller statement of the plaintiffs

claim

(4) *Durga Charan Sarkar v Jotindra Mohan Tagore* 27 C 403 (1900)

(5) *Janki Prasad v Kishen Dat* 16 A 478 F B (1894), *Bhawani Prasad v Kallu* 17 A 537 F B (1895), *Ghulam Hadir v Musakim*, 18 A 109 (1895) [non joinder is fatal unless cured by action of Court under s 29, where non joinder Court will dismiss suit] *Sri Gopal v Prithi Singh* 20 A 110 (1897), *Mehrbano v Nader Ali* 22 A 212 (1900), *Baldeo Singh v Jaggu Ram* 23 A 1 (1900), *Kudrat Ullah v Kubra Begam* 23 A 25 (1900), *Krishnan v Chadayan* 17 M 17 (1892), *Ramasamayyan v Virasami Ayyar* 21 M 222 (1898), *Palani v Rangayya* 22 M 207 (1898), *Sorabji v Rattonji* 22 B 701 (1899), *Lala Suraj Prasad v Golab Chan* 1, 27 C 724 (1900), *Siddeswari Prasad v Dharampuri Narain* 19 C L J 437 (1914)

(6) *Ali Mir v Gulab Din* 1892 P R No 5 cited in *Hukm Chand* C P C 442

plaintiff again impleaded only eleven, contending that he could obtain full relief from them. The lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for the non joinder of the other proprietors. The Chief Court held the dismissal to be wrong and observed that the lower Appellate Court should either have decided the appeal as between the parties before it, leaving with the plaintiff the risk of not having the other defendants before the Court " or, under O XLI r 20 made them respondents. In a recent appeal under sect 15 of the Letters Patent where in a suit instituted under the last Code a co sharer had omitted to join parties who were apparently his co-sharers, it was held by the Calcutta High Court that the suit was bad for misjoinder since it was not under this rule but under sect 31 of the last Code which did not contain a saving clause in favour of non-joinder (1)

"Defeated"—If there is such a misjoinder as to cause inconvenience and expense to the defendant the suit should not be tried, but the proper course will not be to dismiss the suit, but to reject the plaint (2). Where there is no misjoinder of parties but misjoinder of causes of action against the same defendant the causes not triable conveniently should be tried separately or excluded under O II r 6 (3). Where, however, there was misjoinder both of parties and causes of action it was held that the suit should be dismissed (4).

Distinct causes of action—The second paragraph of this section under the last Code ran "*Nothing in this section shall be deemed to enable plaintiffs to join in respect of distinct causes of action*". It was not to be read as if it ran '*Nothing shall be deemed to enable a plaintiff to join distinct causes of action*'. This was clear from the provisions of sect 45 of that Code, and O II r 3 of this, which distinctly enable a plaintiff to join in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant or the same set of defendants (5). In this case, a plaintiff came into Court claiming a portion of the inheritance of a deceased Mahomedan on the allegation that he had by two separate sale deeds of different dates purchased the property from two of the heirs of the deceased, and that the said property was withheld from him by another of the heirs of the deceased, who was in possession of some of it and by certain transferees of other portions from the said heir. Both the remaining heir and the transferees from him were made defendants. Held that there was no misjoinder of parties or of causes of action in such a suit (6).

The second paragraph was held not to apply where plaintiffs joined in respect of the same cause of action as for instance where a widow and the son adopted by her to her deceased husband sued to have the deceased's property declared theirs the widow admitting the adoption and there being no antagonism

(1) Sheikh Fazu v Sheikh Doman, 19 C L J 455 (1914)

(2) Sudhendu Mohun Roy v Durga Das 14 C 435 (1887)

(3) Janakinath v Pamrunjun 6 C 949 953 954 (1879), Gur Prosad Singh v Gur

Prosad Lal, 19 C L J 316 (1914)

(4) Ram Narain Dutt v Annota Prosad Joshi 14 C 681 (1884)

(5) Mazhar Ali Khan v Sajjal Hussain Khan 24 A 358 (1902)

(6) Ib

between the claims of the two (1) A Mahomedan widow and her daughter instituted a suit against her husband's heirs for their shares in the husband's property, the widow alleging that a certain conveyance and a release which she was induced to execute under a false representation were invalid, and the daughter relying on this and on the further allegation that the widow had no power in any case to execute the release so far as the daughter's share was concerned. For defendants it was contended that the suit was bad for misjoinder and multifariousness, but it was held that neither of these contentions was good. The plaintiffs sought their share of the family property and claimed that their shares had been improperly dealt with. It was true that the defendants set up different claims to the property, but they were all based on the validity or otherwise of the release (2)

This paragraph no longer appears in the present rule doubtless because of the amendments made in O I r 1. Probably the position now is that where two or more plaintiffs base their claims to relief on a common ground within the meaning of that rule claims may be united in the same suit.

10. (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the *Suit in name of wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff* wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a *bonâ fide* mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. [s 2]

(2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings either *Court may strike out or add parties* upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. [s 3]

(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff *suing without a next friend* or as the next friend of a plaintiff *under any disability* without his consent.

(4) Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless *Where defendant added, plaint to be amended* the Court otherwise directs be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall [s 3]

(1) Fakirapa v Rudrapa, 16 B 110 (1891), foll in Ningawa v Ramappa 5 Bom L R 708 710 (1903)

(2) Amrilibi v Abdul Latif 3 Bom L R 658 (1901)

be served on the new defendant and, *if the Court thinks fit*, on the original defendants

21 (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, section 22, the proceedings as against *any person* added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons

Sub Rule (1) English rule and Indian rule compared—This rule is an amalgamation of sects 27 32 and 33 of the last Code and the first sub rule corresponds with sect 27 of the old Code (1) The latter, as originally enacted was the same as r 2 of O XVI of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, with the exception that the terms in which the substitution or the addition of the plaintiff could be ordered were not required to be “just,” but such as ‘the Court might think just’ Act XII of 1888 inserted further in this section the words ‘at any stage of the suit,’ and “with his or their consent” the former evidently to avoid the construction placed on the section by Pontifex, J (2) and the latter with reference to the construction placed on the English r 2, in which a person was not allowed to be joined as a plaintiff without his consent (3) This is now provided for by the third sub rule Sir Arthur Wilson in explaining the effect of the first sub rule, says (4) ‘It has often happened that actions have been inadvertently brought by the wrong person—as by *cestui que trust* instead of trustee, by mortgagor instead of mortgagee Often the same mistake has been made where it was a matter of real difficulty to say which of two persons ought to sue—as in the case of contracts made by agents as to which it is often a question of much nicety to determine who ought to sue Though the Common Law Courts had the largest powers of adding parties or amending misdescriptions of parties, they had no power to substitute one plaintiff for another such as this rule confers’ (5) The same difficulty was experienced in British India as the Courts had no power here also to substitute any person’s name for the plaintiffs (6) The rule, however does not give a Court unlimited power to remodel the proceedings (7) It has been held that the power given under this rule is not excluded in cases where the person originally suing has no right to institute the suit (8)

“Suit”—In the undermentioned case (9) Banerjee J held that this word did not include an appeal sect 582 of the former Code (corresponding with sect 107 of this) not making all the provisions applicable to suits applicable also to appeals Maclean C J, expressed a grave doubt whether this word

(1) See *Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 381
(2) *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Cocool Chunder* 6 C. 376 (1879)
(3) *Tryon v. National Provident Institution* 16 Q. B. D. 678
(4) *Wils. Prac.* 173 See *Gopal Dass Agrawallah v. Budree Das Sureka* 33 C. 657 (1906) s. c. 10 C. W. N. 662
(5) *De Gendré v. Bogardus*, L. R. 7 C. P.

409

(6) *Judooputtee v. Chunder Kant* 9 W. R. 309 (1868)
(7) *Turquand v. Fearon* 4 Q. B. D. 280
(8) *Krishna Bai v. Collector Tanjore* 30 W. 419 (1907)
(9) *Dwarkanath Biswas v. Debendro Nath Tagore* 4 C. W. N. 68 (1899)

and plaintiff could be read as including an "appeal" and 'appellant'. These doubts were however, based on the wording of sect 582. The drafting has now been altered, the first portion of sect 582 standing by itself as sect 107 and the latter portion being represented by O XXII r 13. In an early case (1) the High Court in a special appeal allowed the name of the real persons to be substituted for that of the receiver who had by mistake brought the suit on their behalf in his name. And in *Seshamma v Chennappa* (2) the original Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the will relied upon was not genuine and the lower Appellate Court on the ground that the suit was wrongly brought in the name of the plaintiffs as executors. The High Court on second appeal, allowed an amendment by substituting the minor son as plaintiff with one of the original plaintiffs as next friend. In the converse case where a plaintiff sued in his personal instead of his representative capacity an order under this rule was made (3).

The principle of the section has been moreover held to be of general application and to apply analogically to a miscellaneous application also (4). In the case cited an application to raise the attachment of a property was made by the Official Assignee of Bombay as an attorney of the Official Assignee of Madras, and he was instead of the latter, wrongly described as the applicant, and Strachey, J, held that as the affidavit annexed to the application showed the real fact, the application was not to be dismissed but amended by the substitution of the correct name and that the analogy of a plaint would under this rule support the amendment.

"Doubtful"—So where it was doubtful whether a road contractor or the vestry ought to sue a tramway company which had injured the road the vestry was therefore added as a co plaintiff in a suit by the road contractor (5). In the under mentioned case the suit was filed by a benamidar. Parsons J said that he would hesitate before deciding that the suit was wrongly filed but any defect there may have been cured by the lower Court acting under this section (6).

"The right plaintiff"—The question as to who is the right plaintiff will depend on the circumstances of the case in which the question should arise, and on the substantive law applicable. From a general point of view, it has been explained already who may be a plaintiff. Every person will be a right plaintiff in a suit if he could join as a plaintiff in that suit (7). If however there has been a *bond fide* mistake the Court will rectify it. So where a suit was brought by one X as the authorized manager of Y an amendment was made by striking out X and instituting Y his employers as plaintiffs in the case (8). A case of misdescription must be distinguished from that of

(1) *Juggernaut Pershad v Hogg* 19 W R 117 (1869)

(2) 20 M 467 (1897)

(3) *Gopal Dass Agravallal v Budree Das Sureka* 33 C 57 (1906)

(4) *Sardarmal v Aranrayal* 21 B 205 (1896)

(5) *Valde Fravers Asphalt Co v London Tramways Co* 48 L J C P 312

(6) *Ravji v Maladev* 22 B 672 (1897)

(7) *Hukm Chaml C P C 382 vide ante* p 514

(8) *Subodini Debi v Ganoda Kant Roy* 14 C 400 (1897)

non joinder (1) The rule has been said to be applicable where it is found that a plaintiff cannot get the full relief which he seeks without joining some other persons as co plaintiff (2) It may, however, be a question whether in some cases, at any rate such a joinder should not be made under sub clause (2) Under this sub rule there may be substitution, with which the second sub rule does not deal (3) or addition In the case of the first sub rule the original plaintiff may be either a wrong plaintiff or a doubtful plaintiff The second sub rule deals with the case of a person who is a right plaintiff in the sense that he is a person who should sue though he may be a person who is unable to obtain relief unless others are joined as co plaintiffs with him The matter however is not one of practical importance unless it be correct, as has been held (4) that a change of parties as plaintiffs under this sub rule does not give rise to such a question of limitation as arises under the second sub rule

"May"—The Court is not bound to add any person In a case (5) apparently under the section corresponding to the second sub rule the Court overruled the defendant's objection as to the non joinder of certain co sharers of the plaintiff, but the lower Appellate Court decided it against the plaintiff It was contended on second appeal before the High Court that that Court was bound to do justice by adding them as parties The High Court observed however that if the plaintiff has insisted upon his right to bring an action in the absence of his co sharers, he must abide by the result, and that it is too late at this stage of the case, for him to ask to be allowed an indulgence of which he did not avail himself when it was available

"Mistake"—The mistake may be either of law or fact (6) Fry J (7) considered that the corresponding rule of the English law did not apply where the plaintiff did not admit his mistake and insisted on his rights but that while the Court could not substitute one plaintiff for another, except by the first plaintiff's consent and where he admits that he has commenced his action improperly, yet in a proper case the Court will add a plaintiff under the second sub rule Where a son sued for his share in the family inheritance to which his father then alive was entitled alleging that the father was insane it was held that in the absence of anything to show that the father authorized the suit the Court could not regard its being brought in his son's name and not in his own as a *bonâ fide* mistake such as could be corrected under

(1) *Kasturehand v. Sagarmal* 17 B 413 (1892) In *Mandardhar Aitch v. Secretary of State* 6 C W N 218 (1901) it was held that there was no misdescription

(2) *Ayscough v. Bullar* 41 Ch D 341, and see *Vadilal v. Shah Khushal* 27 B 157 (1902)

(3) *Heimiger v. Droz* 20 B at p 463 (1900)

(4) *Subodini Debi v. Gano la Kant Roy* 14 C 400 (1887) See however, s 22 of the Limitation Act which is not repealed by ss 30-32 of the Code and pp 754 756 45-*Mitra v. Limitation Act* 4th ed The dictum

in this case does not appear to be correct for if the substituted or added plaintiff is a new plaintiff then s 22 of the Limitation Act will equally apply in the case of the first as of the second sub rule This dictum has been recently doubted in *Bhola Roy v. Han Bahadur*, 19 C L J 5 (1913)

(5) *Obhoy Coband v. Harychurn* 8 C 277 (1882)

(6) *Gopal Dass Agrawallah v. Budree Das Sureka* 33 C 647 (1906) *Duckett v. Cover* 6 Ch D 89

(7) *Emden v. Carter* 17 Ch D 169 173

this rule (1) An action, through a *bona fide* mistake was commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, and the case on a point of law was decided against him. The original plaintiff then moved to substitute another as plaintiff, which was done (2) There can be no *bona fide* mistake when the person asking to be substituted or added acquired his right to be a plaintiff since the institution of the suit, and had no *locus standi* at the time of the institution (3) The mistake must be as to the plaintiff, because a mistake as to the defendant can be rectified only under the second sub rule (1)

“Necessary for the determination”—Under this rule it is essential that the order for substitution or addition should be necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute (5) It contemplates it has been said, only cases in which the necessity is of the joinder of a person as a plaintiff, and there can be no determination of the matter in dispute until such joinder—a case which chiefly arises in suits for the enforcement of or relating to joint rights by persons jointly entrusted as co contractors, joint owners and co sharers of property, or as members of joint families, or partners in business (6) The question who should be joined is part of the substantive law applicable to the case and is not therefore here considered (7)

“Substituted or added”—There is no difference in principle whether a plaintiff is added or substituted (8) In the following cases plaintiffs have been substituted (9) or added, (10) under this rule or the section corresponding to

(1) Muhammad Kulu Khan : Saifulla Khan (1887) 1 R No 91

(2) Hughes : Pump House etc, Co 2 K B 485, C 1 (1902)

(3) House Property Co : Horse Nail Co, 29 Ch D 190

(4) See Challinor v Roder 1 Times Rep 527, see Ganendra : Surya Kant, 17 C W N 462 (1912) [alleged mistake as to defendants]

(5) See Hainger : Droz, 25 B 433 464 (1900) in which the section was held to be inapplicable.

(6) Hukm Chand C P C 383

(7) See ib p 383-402, where the question is considered under the following headings — p 384 ‘One of joint lessors cannot sue for his share of rent’ p 385 ‘Separate rent may be claimed under special arrangement among co sharers,’ p 386 ‘All co sharers are necessary parties in a suit for relief by any co sharer in respect of his own share’ p 387 ‘Suit by one of several persons entitled to equity of redemption for redemption of his own share’ p 388 ‘Suits by one of several mortgagees for sale or foreclosure’ p 389 ‘One of the heirs of a creditor cannot sue for his share of the debt’ p 390 ‘One

of the heirs of a promisee cannot sue for his rights’ p 392 ‘In England co contractees must be joined in a suit to enforce joint rights’ p 393 ‘Non joinder of co contractees not necessarily fatal in India,’ p 395 ‘Case of persons jointly interested different from that of joint contractees’

p 395 ‘All joint lessors must be parties in a suit for rent by one of them,’ p 396 ‘All co sharers must be parties in a suit relating to joint property,’ p 396 ‘Even in a suit by managing co sharer’ p 397 ‘Suit by a member of a joint Hindu family’ p 398 ‘Manager of same cannot sue’ p 399

‘All partners must be parties in a suit by one,’ p 400 ‘Suit by surviving partners representative of deceased partner not necessary party’ p 401 ‘Persons jointly injured need not all be parties in a suit on tort’

(8) Hughes : Pump House etc Co (1902) K B 485 C 1 A

(9) Ib The Duke of Buccleugh 1 P 201 C A (1892)

(10) Caldwell : Lough Harbour etc, Co, 2 C D 221 and see Long v Crossley, 13 C D 383 Bourke v Davis, 44 C D 112 As to notice see Tildesly : Harper 3 Ch D 277

the second sub rule It is no objection to the substitution or addition of another person that the suit will fail even if he is substituted or added, as the object of the provisions of the section is not that a party's case should be so framed as to succeed, but that it should be so framed that it can be adjudicated upon by the Court, whether in his favour or against him (1) The institution of a suit by a wrong party cannot operate to keep alive the rights of one who by his delay has brought himself within the provisions of the Limitation Act (2) It has therefore often been held that if the period of limitation has lapsed as regards the person added, the suit must be dismissed (3) Although this rule only applies where the action has been commenced through a *bona fide* mistake as to the plaintiff, yet as the former section and sect 32 of the former Code were both used together, the Court had full power under the combined rules to deal with all questions relating to the adding, striking out, or substitution of parties (4)

Consent—Reference to this has been struck out as it has been dealt with in the third sub rule No person is obliged to have his or her name added as plaintiff in a suit without his or her consent And the justice of the rule is obvious, because the suit may be improperly brought, and if a party were made plaintiff without his consent, he might also be made liable to costs If other parties should be joined as plaintiff, and they refuse to be joined, the proper course is to make them defendants so that they are all before the Court, and the latter may make what order it considers just as to costs (5)

"Upon such terms"—Amendment is an indulgence, and the applicant will generally have to bear costs The terms usually imposed are that, if the original plaintiff is found not to be entitled to maintain the action, he must pay the costs up to the time of the joinder or substitution, and that the plaintiff joined or substituted will be entitled only to such relief as he could have claimed if the action had commenced at the time of his joinder as plaintiff (6)

(1) Long v Crossley, 13 C D 388, 391

(2) Kishen Lall v Chunder Cooma Roy, W R 152 (1864)

(3) See cases cited in Mitra's Limitation Act notes to s 22, Hukim Chand O P C 403 As to whether s 22 is applicable to change of plaintiffs under this section *vide ante*. The question chiefly arises in suits on joint contracts by one or more of the promisees, or for joint rights by one or more of the co owners where the remaining promisees or co owners do not join until after the expiry of the limitation period.

(4) Annual Practice, 1906 See notes to O XVI r 2

(5) Uma Sundari Das v Ramji, 7 C 242 (1881), and see generally as to impleading defendants who refuse to concur in a suit, Pustum Ally v Amer Ally 10 W R 487 (1868), Jagadamba Das v Haran Chandra

6 B L R 526 n (1868), Kanna Pesharody v Narayanan, 3 M 236 (1881), Kandiya Lall v Chandar, 7 A 326 (1884), Kali Chandra v Raj Kishore 11 C 618 (1885), Parameswaran v Shangaran, 14 M 489 (1891), Dwarka Nath v Tara Prosunna Roy, 17 C 160 (1889), Unni Nambiar v Nilakandan Bhattathuripad, 4 M 141 (1891), Shoshee Shekharaswar Poy v Giris Chandra, 1 C W N 659 (1890), Dwarka Nath v Tara Prosunna 17 C 160 (1889), Jibanti Nath Khan v Gocool Chunder, 19 C 760 (1891), Tarni Kant v Nund Kishore, 12 C I R 588 (1882), Bissesswar Roy v Broja Kant Roy, 1 C W N 221 (1894)

(6) Ayscough v Bullar, 41 Ch D 346 And see Long v Crossley, 13 C D 388, Turquand v Fearon 4 Q B D 282

Origin and scope of sub-rule 2—This clause, which as well as clauses 3 and 5 corresponds with sect 32 of the last Code, is taken from r 11, O 16, of the English rules. The distinction between this clause and O I r 1, is that the latter refers to the action of the plaintiff at the time of the presentation of the plaint in joining defendants, whilst this rule refers to the action of the Court at a stage subsequent to the presentation of the plaint in adding a party either as plaintiff or defendant (1). It deals with joinder and not with substitution (2). It does not apparently apply to divorce proceedings, (3) but the provisions of sect 53 of Act 1. of 1891 (Land Acquisition) are sufficiently large to allow the adaptation of this section to matters before the Judge referred to him by the Collector (4). As to Revenue Courts, (5) see note. It was held under the Code of 1859 that the section should receive a very liberal construction; (6) and under the Code of 1882 that the section was wide enough to meet every case of defect of parties (7). The section is not exhaustive, and it was held in the case cited below, (8) that even if it did not apply, the Court had, in the circumstances of that case, which dealt with a public trust, an inherent power to add new parties. The effect of the amendment of the section is to bring it into greater conformity with the English rule (*vide post*). The last clause but two of sect 32 of the last Code is now incorporated in O I r. 8. Where in a suit for the recovery of possession of property, the plaintiff falsely denied the title of persons whom he had joined as defendants and asserted that an exchange by which he had transferred this property to the defendants had never been acted upon, but it was found that the exchange had in fact terminated his title and had been acted upon, and he could not sue the principal defendant, it was held that he had not made a *bona fide* mistake within the meaning of this rule (9).

Court—Upon the question whether the powers given by this rule are exercisable only by the Court of first instance, or both by it and a Court of Appeal, a distinction must be drawn between the case (A) where a person has been a party to the original suit but is not a party to the appeal and this may be (a) where the party to the original suit has died, or (b) has not been added a party to the appeal, and (B) where the person sought to be added has not been a party to the original suit.

Case (A) (a) is provided for by sect 107. When the person alleged by the appellant to be the legal representative of a deceased respondent had been put on the record under these provisions, the Madras High Court held that the Court might add under this section another person who claims on good *prima facie* grounds to be the representative of the deceased (10).

(1) *Saidajananda v Umeshananda*, 4 C W N 462, 461 (1899).

(2) *Heimiger v Droz*, 25 B 433, 463 (1900), but see *Annual Practice* 1905, p 171.

(3) *Ramsay v Boyle*, 30 C 489 (1903).

(4) *Kishan Chand v Jagannath Prosad* 25 A 133 (1902).

(5) *Shub Gopal v Baldeo*, 2 A 261 (1879).

(6) *Nga Tha Ya v Mi Khan Mhaw*, 5 B L. L. 371, 379 (1870). *Valatchand v Advio*

cate General 8 B H C R at p 100 (1871).

(7) *Bhola Pershad v Ram Lall* 24 C 34 (1899).

(8) *Gyanananda Asram v Kristo Chandra* 8 C W N 404 (1901).

(9) *Ganendra v Surya Kant*, 17 C W N 462 (1912).

(10) *Atheappan Ayanna* 8 M 300 (1884), and under similar circumstances the Bombay High Court, following this decision, added a

Case (A) (b) is provided for by O XLI r 20, so far as the addition of a person as respondent is concerned. The Court may in second appeal act under this rule, although the person added was not a party to the first appeal (1). Under the Code of 1859 the Court exercised this jurisdiction under the section corresponding to the present one (2). The Bombay High Court has held that the Court cannot make any person a co appellant who was a party to the original suit but who did not appeal (3).

As regards case (B), it is sufficiently established that the powers conferred by this section may be exercised under sect 107 by a Court of Appeal, and that by the operation of that section the present rule is applicable to the Appellate Court. So an Appellate Court may strike out the name of any party improperly joined (4). It may also add a party and remand the suit for trial, (5) or without remand proceed with the appeal if the party added so desires (6).

It is true that the Court in *Mishin Lal v Imtiaz Ali* (7) observed that "a person who has been a stranger to the suit in the Court of first instance ought not to be brought in to the record of an appeal, unless he is brought in as a representative under the sections applying to the bringing in to the record of a representative in case of the death of a party to the suit, or the devolution of title. When an Appellate Court thinks it is necessary to have as a party before it in appeal a person not appearing in a representative capacity and who is not a party to the suit in the Court of first instance, the Appellate Court should, in our opinion, remand the case to the Court of first instance, direct that Court to bring in the particular person as a defendant, or as a plaintiff if he consented give him time to file his statement and opportunity to produce his evidence, and try the issues raised between him and the opposite side." These observations, however which were *obiter dicta*, must

person claiming to be an adopted son. *Lakshmi Bai v Santapa*, 13 B 22. The first case was referred to in *Kadir v Muthu Krishna*, 26 M 230, 231 (1902), and dissented from in *Muhammad Husain v Khushalo*, 10 A 223, 237 (1888), referring to *Harnaram Singh v Kharag Singh* 9 A 447 (1887). Since these two last decisions, the last paragraph was added to s 368 of the former Code, enabling the Court under that section to join a person claiming to be the legal representative.

(1) *Paya v Kovamel*, 19 M 151 (1895) dissented from *Chunni v Lala Ram*, 16 A 5 (1893), *contra*.

(2) *Achambah Paurey v Ramsahoy Paurey*, W R 136 (1864).

(3) *Vasudev v Sabuthai*, 10 B 227 (1885).

(4) *Vasudev v Sabuthai*, 10 B 227 (1885). In *Krishnabai v Sonabai*, 2 B H. C. R 310 (1865), the Court struck out, on appeal, an infant party as plaintiff and made her defendant. See *Annual Practice*, 1905, p 167, *Seton*, 574, *Bucha Singh v Mirza*

Mashook, 15 W R 572 (1871), *Nagur Chand v Doorga Das Chowdhury*, 11 W R 137 (1869). In *Kewal Sahai v Issur Dyal*, 12 W R 334, 336 (1869), the Court, on the facts, refused to strike out parties. In *Kristo Sunkur Dutt v Koylashnath Dutt*, 15 W R 6 (1871), the lower Court was directed to strike a person's name out of the list of defendants in the decree.

(5) *Thurthasami v Gopala*, 13 M 32 (1889), *Krishnabai v Jonubai*, 2 B H C R 310 (1865).

(6) *Cyanananda Asram v Kristo Chandra* 8 C W N 404 (1901). In *Pateshri Partap v Rudra Narain*, 26 A 528 (1904), the Court, on its own motion added a party in appeal, even though the suit, so far as he was concerned, would have been by that time barred by limitation.

(7) 18 A 332 (1896). In *Chironan v Ram chandra*, 15 M 54, 56 (1891) the High Court directed the Subordinate Judge to add a party.

it is submitted be read in connection with the circumstances of that case under which a remand might have been necessary. In a subsequent decision, (1) the same High Court assumed that the Appellate Court might itself add a new party, though upon such addition it would ordinarily and in the absence of consent of the party so added be necessary to remand the case so that it might be re-tried in his presence. In *Madhub Chunder v. Buktesuree* (2) the lower Appellate Court had dismissed a suit brought by a person on behalf of a minor without obtaining a certificate of guardianship, and the High Court on special appeal allowed the minor who had just come of age to be made a plaintiff. In this case the party was already on the record, and the suit which was originally instituted on his behalf was allowed to proceed directly at his instance. Where the receiver of an estate, under the permission of the Court and on behalf of the parties interested in the estate, brought a suit by mistake in his own name, it was held on appeal that the receiver having full power to institute the suit and no objection having been taken in the first Court, the error could be rectified without the consent of the persons interested or further notice of appeal (3). A lower Court cannot add parties after the suit has been carried out of it into the Court of Appeal (4).

"May"—The section is thus permissive and not imperative, (5) the matter resting in the Court's discretion. As to the meaning of this word see notes to Preamble, *ante*. But notwithstanding that the Court has a discretion to act, if the case is one in which it should act, it ought to act.

Speaking of the expression in the corresponding rule of the English law Jessel, M R, in *Wilson v. Church* (6) said "It is absurd to say that the Court 'may' do so, if it did not mean that it was the duty of the Judge to add the party if the proceedings were in such a state that the party could properly be added. The Legislature were obliged to say 'may' because it might be at any stage of the proceedings." And it is held there, as a general rule, that if the Court thinks that the effect of non joinder in a suit can be removed by making a person a defendant, the Court should order him to be so made, and not allow the suit to be defeated on account of non joinder (7). And the same rule applies in this country (8). And in *Jonab Ali v. Golam Assad* (9) Jackson J. observed "As to the defect of parties it seems almost incredible that the Judge should, when a suit is ready for hearing and when he himself has failed to take action under that section (corresponding to sect. 32 of the Code of 1882) dismiss a suit upon the technical ground that some persons having interest in the subject matter of the suit have not been made parties. If it were at all necessary, it was the duty of the Court to take action under that section and bring the proper parties on the record."

(1) *Habib Baksh v. Baldeo Prasad* 23 A 107 172, 173 (1901)

(2) 12 W. R. 102 (1869)

(3) *Juggunnath Pershad Dutt v. Hogg* 12 W. R. 117 (1869)

(4) *Ram Nidhee Koondoo v. Ajoodhya Ram Khan* 20 W. P. 123 (1873)

(5) *Poran Mundul v. Sham Chand Ghose*,

1 W. R. 228 (1864)

(6) 9 Ch. D. 552 at p. 558

(7) *Van Gelder v. Sowerby* 44 Ch. D. 34, 394

(8) *Jonab Ali v. Golam Assad* 21 W. P. 187 (1874) and see *post*

(9) 21 W. R. 187 (1874)

The power conferred by this rule, which should be liberally construed, is necessarily very wide. It should, however, be exercised in a reasonable manner, (1) and the Courts ought to take care in its exercise. Thus, Markby, J., in the case cited, (2) said "To bring persons on to the record, whose interests are not identical with either plaintiff or defendant, necessarily complicates the proceedings, and greatly impedes the progress of the suit. This disadvantage very frequently outweighs the advantages arising from finality of litigation, which is, upon the whole, the best justification for bringing in fresh parties. This alone ought to make the Courts of first instance very careful in the exercise of the power granted by sect. 73 (now the present rule)." If embarrassment or inconvenience will be caused, the order will probably not be made. (3)

It is not profitable, however, in a matter of discretion to attempt to formulate particular rules for its exercise. Addition has been refused, where it would have led to a great variation in the plaint. (4) Generally, but not always, the Court will in the exercise of its discretion refuse to give leave to add a plaintiff when the result would be to introduce a new cause of action and subject to the rule enacted by clause 1, where the original plaintiff has no right of action, he cannot by amendment under this rule introduce a plaintiff in whom there is a right of action and so make an entirely new case. (5) And generally, care should be taken that the nature of the suit is not changed. (6) But it was held in the under-mentioned case that at an early stage a person may be added as a party, even though the addition may lead to an alteration in the nature of the proceedings. Thus in an action *in personam* against the owners of a vessel for damages caused by its collision, the ship has been added as a defendant. The vessel had not been impleaded originally, as at the time of the institution of the suit it was submerged in the harbour. It was contended that it was not competent to engraft proceedings *in personam* upon proceedings *in rem*, but Farran, J., said, "The later decisions afford no ground for the contention that at an early stage and in a proper case the initial proceedings cannot be amended so as to bring them into the form which they would have assumed in the first instance, but for the ship not being, or not being supposed to be, amenable to the process of the Court." (7)

(1) *Googlee Sahoo v. Prem Lal*, 7 C 148, 149 (1881); *Thakur Das v. President Municipal Co.*, 1890, P R No 36, cited in *Hukm Chand*, C P G 445.

(2) *Kalce Pershad Singh v. Joy Narain Roy*, 11 W R 361, 365 (1869), and see observations of Phear, J., in *Karlack Nath v. Chummun Roy*, 21 W R 50, 51 (1874).

(3) *The Germanie*, 1896, P 84; *McChene v. Gyles*, No 2 1 Ch 917, 918 (1902); *Bower v. Hartley*, 1 Q B D 652, *per Mellish, J.*, and *James, L.J.* as where by the addition of new parties either of the parties on the record would be prejudiced or hindered of their remedies. *Vidianada v. Sitarama*, 5 W

52, 54 (1881).

(4) *Budda Soundree v. Doorganund*, 22 W R 97 (1874).

(5) *Annual Practice*, 1905, p 163, *et ibi casus*. So also as to introducing a new cause of action where this would be the effect of adding defendant and would be inconvenient, the Court will refuse to do so. *Raleigh v. Goschen*, 1898, 1 Ch 81.

(6) *See Oh Ling Tee v. Aulimice*, 10 W R 86 (1863) in which the Court refused to transform the suit into one for general administration.

(7) *Bombay and Persia S N Co v. Shej herd*, 12 B 237 (1887).

The exercise of discretion must, of course, be of a judicial character, but will, as in other cases, not be interfered with on appeal, unless it is manifestly unjudicial and wrong (1) It is independent of the restrictions imposed by law on the parties So the Court may make the Government a party, even though the notice required by the Code has not been given, the absence of the notice not affecting the power of the Court in any case (2) An application to strike out or change the parties on the record should not be made *ex parte* (3) And before a person is added as a party, unless he is in Court and cognizant of the proceedings, a notice may be issued asking him to show cause why he should not be so added, and the notice should show the grounds on which either of the parties applies to have him added (4) The defendant on record cannot object to the addition of any person as a defendant, even in a suit which has been instituted with special leave required on account of the accrual of only a part of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court (5)

"At any stage," etc.—The rule has been here simplified The former section drew a distinction (6) between orders striking out and orders adding The former could be made only on or before the first hearing, the latter at any time before the suit had actually terminated (7) (*vide post*) And, further, while orders of the first kind could only be made upon the application of the party, the latter orders might have been made at any time Both the English rule and the present section contain the words "*at any stage of the proceedings*" Under the last Code the words were "*at any time*," and under the Code of 1859 "*at any hearing*" Under the English rule it has been held that there is jurisdiction to allow amendment, even after final judgment, as long as anything remains to be done in the action though it be only assessment of damages, though whether or not the Court will exercise the jurisdiction will depend on the circumstances of each case (8) Under the Code of 1859 also, in *Vakat Chand v Advocate General* (9) parties were allowed to be added after a decree had been made whereby the suit was referred to the Commissioner's Office to have accounts taken and property sold But when the plaintiff, after his case had been gone into and some of his witnesses examined, applied to have certain persons made co defendants, the Court was held to have exercised its discretion properly in refusing to add them at that stage, even though "they were the parties from whom, if he got a decree, he would have to receive possession" (10) Under the Code of 1882, ' though

(1) *Gjaram t Issur Chunder*, 2 W R 158 (1865)

(2) *Balmokoond Lall t Jirjuddin Roy*, 9 C 271 (1882)

(3) *Tildesley t Harper*, 3 Ch. D 277

(4) *Ramnaram v Monco Bibee*, 9 C 735 (1883) See 1876, Eng W N 23

(5) *Foolibai t Rampratab Samratrai*, 17 B 466 (1893)

(6) *Seo Abbaal Begam t Imdadi Jan* 18 A 53, 54 (1895)

(7) *Jotindra Mohan Tagore t Bejoy Chand Mahatap*, 32 C 483 (1904)

(8) *The Duke of Buccleugh* (1892) P 201, C A, Annual Practice 1903 p 166 and cases there cited.

(9) 8 B H C R O J 96 (1871), see cases cited in *Ahmedbhoy t Vullcebhoy*, 8 B at p 330 (1894)

(10) *Poran Mundul t Sham Chand*, 1 W R 228 (1864)

sect 34 limits the time during which the defendant may object as of right for want of parties, there is nothing in the Code to prevent his applying at any time to the Court to exercise its powers of adding persons who ought to have been joined, or to prevent the Court from exercising its power upon such an application" (1). An order allowing a co widow, who was not a party to the suit, to be joined in execution proceedings as a joint decree holder was not set aside, as the Court (2) was not prepared to say that the Subordinate Judge had not a discretionary power at any stage of the suit. They observed, however, that the power was restricted to the cases in which joinder might be necessary for the adjudication of questions raised in the suit, and that in that case that period had passed, and that "it is unusual and inconvenient to allow a person, who might have applied before decree, to be joined as co-plaintiff after decree, even if it be lawful to do so, where no interest has devolved and no interest has been created since the institution of proceedings." In *Tikam Singh v Thakur Kishore* (3) the suit was for a sale of the property under the Transfer of Property Act, and defendant's minor brother and sons, who were members of a joint Hindu family, and interested in the property within the meaning of sect 85 of the Act, were added as co defendants, on an application by the plaintiff presented even after a decree had been made against him, and set aside under sect 108 of the former Code, corresponding with O IX r 13 (4) this. If, however it becomes necessary to enforce a judgment against persons who have acquired a title after it was made this cannot be done by execution but an action must be brought for that purpose (4).

"Upon or without the application"—This is an application, if made, of either party, plaintiff or defendant. Though either party may apply, the result of such application may vary according as it is made by either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, a person may sometimes be made a co defendant on plaintiff's application but not on the defendant's (5). And, as a general rule, a person whose right to join as a plaintiff is denied by the plaintiff on the record should not be made a co plaintiff, though he may be made a defendant (6). The plaintiff is not bound to make the application, even in cases in which the Court will usually allow the addition of a person as a party. So while the Court will usually sanction the addition of assignees *pendente lite*, the plaintiff is not bound to implead them (7). A person may, however, be made a party without the application of either party and on his own application, (8) the Court acting

(1) *Kale Khan v Siva Ram*, 1889, P R No 156, p 535, *per* Plowden, J

(2) *Lingammal v Venkatammal*, 6 M 227 (1883), see also *Sotish Chunder v Nil Comul*, 11 C 45 51 (1884)

(3) 1893, A W N 12, s c, 20 A 188, and see *Sotish Chunder v Nil Comul*, 11 C 45, 51 (1884) in which it was suggested that a party might be added in execution proceedings. As to this case, see *Hukm Chand*, C P C 418 n

(4) *Goodall v Mussoorie Bank*, 10 A 97 (1887)

(5) See *Horwell v London Omnibus Co*, 2 Ex D 365, *Lerculey v Harrison*, 1876, Eng W N 39

(6) *Googlee Sahoo v Premilal*, 7 C. 148 (1881)

(7) *Umamoyi Burmonce v Farini Rasad*, 7 W R 225 (1867)

(8) *Oriental Bank Corporation v Charmlol*, 11 C 117 (1884)

itself on the information of a third party. The right to make the application contemplated arises with the necessity for making it (1). A person may, however, be added as a defendant to an interpleader suit, even if the plaintiff does not recognize any right in the party who seeks to be added to share in the thing in respect of which the interpleader suit is brought (2).

In representative suits falling within O I r 8 of the Code, a person who is not a party on record is often made such on an application by himself, and, in fact as O I r 8 states the course to be taken by any one of the class on behalf or against which a suit is brought, who desires to intervene is by applying to be made a defendant in person (3). There is a considerable difference between the position of a person who is made a defendant on his own application, and who is so made without any application of his. The former has to make out a *prima facie* case before the plaintiff can be asked to meet it, (4) but against the latter, the plaintiff has to prove his case, as against the original defendant (5) whose position as regards the burden of proof is not altered by a person being made a co defendant on his own application (6). It was held that when the name of a person who had been made a party was struck out all the evidence produced by him ought to be excluded (7). The order giving leave to strike out a defendant should provide for his costs (8). If when a name is struck out the Court has not jurisdiction to try the case the plaint should be returned to be presented in the proper Court (9). In a suit (10) for possession of land between persons, each of whom claimed to be the lessee of it and the lessors from whom they alleged having derived their right respectively had been made parties, it was held that that had been done unnecessarily as there was no cause of action against either of them and the Court ordered their names to be struck out. And where two persons in the same suit claim pre-emption in regard to the sale, but without having any joint right the name of one of them ought to be struck out (11).

in Mohendrobhoosun : Shosheetbhoosun 6 C 882 (1880) that this section did not contemplate any application by the person desiring to be added, but the learned Judge (Wilson J) subsequently stated that he did not intend to lay down that a third party could not come in and apply. In the first case cited at p. 646 and the second case at p. 94.

(1) Oriental Bank Corporation : Charnol 12 C 642 (1886)

(2) Rabbaba : Noorjehan 13 C 90 (1886)

(3) See Watson v Cave 17 Ch. D. 19
Fraser : Cooper, 21 Ch. D. 718 May :
Newton, 34 Ch. D. 317, and s. 30 *ante*.

Adikunda : C. L. R. 560 (1889)

(5) Ram Taruck Ghosal v Radha Bullab 15 W. R. 97 (1871)

(6) Konjul Sahoo v Guroo Buksh Koor

13 W. R. 362 (1870) Hukm Chand C P C 449 and see ib. as to application by foreigner and Annual Practice 190 p. 167

(7) Buhla Singh v Mashook Ali 15 W. R. 52 (1871) the name was struck out by the Appellate Court

(8) Wymer : Dodds 11 C. D. 438. See also as to costs Amos : Herne Bay Laid in Co. 54 L. T. 264

(9) Shrilhar : Chima 10 B. H. C. R. 17 (183) As to striking out see in addition to cases already cited Suklawat Ali : Kestro Tewari 6 N. W. P. 208 (1874) Syed Hossein Ali : Abdur Rahim 7 C. W. N. 529 531 (1903)

(10) Nagur Chand : Doorga Das 11 W. R. 137 (1869)

(11) Bura Mul : Padma Kishen 1881, P. P. No. 3 Khawas Khan : Rasal Khan 1891 P. R. No. 29 cited in Hukm Chand C P C 443

As to the exercise of powers under this section on appeal, *vide ante*, p 551, "Court."

The terms will be such as the Court thinks just under the particular circumstances of the case. So the Court has imposed the term that the person added as a defendant should consent to be bound by all the previous proceedings in the suit in the Court, and by any order that the Court might make as to the costs of those proceedings, (1) as without such consent the evidence already existing on the record could not be used against him (2). So also a party has been added who consented to be bound by the preliminary judgment which had already been passed, the Court directing that further proceedings were to be carried on against him in the same manner as if he had been an original defendant (3). An order has been made for adding a Bank as defendant on its undertaking, if the Court should so direct, to pay its own costs and those of the other party to the action to enter appearance at once, to appear on motion for judgment next day, and to waive questions of form (4). And the Court has offered on the defendant's application to add a person as a co defendant against the wish of the plaintiff if the defendant would indemnify plaintiff against his costs (5). A Court cannot of its own motion add a Receiver as a defendant when the leave of the Court appointing the Receiver has not been obtained (6).

Striking out—Further, no name could be struck out by the Court *suo motu* without an application from a party, nor at the trial, but only on or before the first hearing. Thus, where a suit was dismissed against one of the defendants some time after the issues were settled the order was set aside as illegal (7). And the name of a person who had been added as a defendant after the first hearing could not be struck out in any case even if a notice could not be served on him on account of the non discovery of his whereabouts (8). If persons improperly joined do not move to be struck out and take a part in the defence they may be held liable jointly with the other defendant for costs of the action (9). And where a defendant having put in a statement of defence applied to have his name struck out he was refused his costs as he had not applied at the first possible moment (10).

This distinction between orders striking out and orders adding parties has been abolished and either class of order may now be made before or after the first hearing at any time, and either upon the application of the party or of the Court's own motion. It will be observed that the words in the second paragraph of the former section "*order that any plaintiff be made a defendant or that any defendant be made a plaintiff*" do not now appear, but the same

(1) Ahmedbhoys v Vuleebhoys 8 B 323 at p 338 (1884)

(2) Watson v Hargobind 22 W R 35 (1874) per Mitter J

(3) Re Dracup W N (1892) Eng 43

(4) Debenture Corporation v Muriela 8 Times Rep 496

(5) *In re Harrison* 2 Ch 319 (1897)

(6) Jatindra v Sarfataj 14 C W N

653 (1910)

(7) Singa Reddi v Madava Rau 20 M 360 (1896) and see Kladar v Clotaliti 8 B 116 (1884)

(8) Abbasi Begam v Imbadi Jan 18 A 53 (1895)

(9) Fwinberrow v Brad W N (78) 169

(10) Vallance v Birmingham Land Corp,

2 C D 361

power to order this remains, as in such a case a Court would strike the party off the side of the suit in which he had been placed and re-add him on the opposite side. Such a transposition is made frequently in, though not confined to partnership suits (1). Thus, in *Ekluji Muncherji v. Vulleebhoj* (2) the plaintiff wished to withdraw, and ten of the defendants supported his application, and on the application of two of the other defendants, the Court allowed them to be made plaintiffs and the plaintiff to be made a defendant. A defendant who has assigned all his rights in the subject matter of the suit, and has no longer any interest in it, has no right to be made an plaintiff (3).

"Ought to have been joined," "or whose presence may be necessary."—No provisions have been laid down in the Code as to the persons who ought to be joined, or whose presence may be necessary before the Court, and the question must be determined on general principles with reference to the object contemplated by the rule which is "to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit." Other sections may, however, be considered to furnish a guide to the Court in the exercise of its discretion under this rule (4).

In the words of Lord Redesdale, "All persons materially interested in the subject ought generally to be parties to the suit, plaintiffs or defendants, however numerous they may be, so that the Court may be enabled to do complete justice by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested, and that the orders of the Court may be safely executed by those who are compelled to obey them and future litigation may be prevented" (5). Lord Hardwicke observed that "the general rule is that you must have all parties before the Court who will be necessary to make the determination complete and to quiet the question" (6). Lord Lyndhurst, in *Small v. Atwood* (7) said that "the general rule is that all persons who are interested in the question must be parties to a suit instituted in a Court of Equity." A similar principle is expressed in *Comyn's Digest* namely, "that all concerned in the demand ought to be made parties in Equity." Not all concerned in the subject matter, respecting which a thing is demanded but all concerned in the very thing which is demanded in the matter petitioned for, in the prayer of the bill, or, in other words in the object of the suit. But a person who has no interest should not be added but only those whose claims must necessarily be taken into consideration before deciding on the plaintiff's title (8).

(1) See *Krishnabai v. Jonubai*, 2 B. H. C. 310 (1865).

(2) 7 B. 167 (1883).

(3) *Sayad Abdul Huk v. Gulam Jilani*, 20 B. 677 (1895).

(4) *Naraini Kuar v. Durjan Kuar*, 2 A. 738 (1860).

(5) *Mitford on Pleading*, 164.

(6) *Pooro v. Clark*, 2 Alt. 515.

(7) *Yonge*, 458. See *Ram Tarnak v. Padha Bullab*, 15 W. R. 97-98 (1871). All

persons are to be made parties who are either legally or equitably interested in the subject matter and result of the suit. *Joy Gobind Das v. Courceproshah Shaha*, 7 W. R. 201 (1867). *Iajendronath Dutt v. Shaikh Mahomed*, 8 C. at p. 50 (1881).

(8) *Khajjah Abdul Gunnee v. Pogose*, 12 W. R. 436-438 (1869), *Government v. Ferguson*, 9 W. R. 159 (1868) nor of a person against whom no relief is sought. *Surno Mowee v. Bykunt*, 25 W. R. 17 (1876).

The rule refers to two classes of parties—those who are indispensable and necessary, that is those who “ought” to have been joined, and proper parties. Necessary parties defendants are those without whom no decree at all can be rendered, proper parties defendants are those whose presence renders the decree more effectual, and all the proper parties are those by whose presence the decree becomes a complete determination of all the questions which can arise and of all the rights which are connected with the subject matter of the controversy (1). As a general rule if the plaintiff applies in proper time he is entitled to have a person added as a defendant if he had been entitled to join him originally (2).

Under the corresponding section of the Code of 1859, it was one of the essential conditions of a person being added as a party by the Court, that he should “be entitled to or claim some share or interest in the subject matter of the suit.” It was not easy to determine what was the character of the interest which would satisfy the requirement of the rule (3). It was held in some cases (4) that only such a person might be added as a party under that section as should have with either of the parties a community of interest such as that of a joint owner or a superior interest such as that of a landlord or an inferior interest such as that of a tenant or a substituted interest such as that of the next of kin after a Hindu widow (5) and that the interest of the person should not be such as would exclude the parties altogether from any share or interest in the subject matter of the suit as in such a case it would of course be very unlikely that new issues—which do not concern the original parties—should not arise and that the party so claiming should be likely to be affected by the result (6) and thus fulfil the second requirement of the rule under the Code of 1859 permitting the addition of persons as parties. Thus when a person was made a party on his alleging that he was the real proprietor and the plaintiff only his benamidar, his addition as a party was held to have been wrong as the issue thus raised was foreign to the suit (7). And it was held that upon a suit brought by a person claiming as landlord for arrears of rent a third person is not to be allowed to

(1) Keshavram : Ramlal 30 B 156 161 (1905)

(2) Buddree Dass : Hoare Miller & Co 8 C 170 (1881)

(3) Hukm Chand C P C 456

(4) See Kal prashad Singh v Jai Narayan Poy 3 B L R A C 23 (1869)

(5) See as to addition of parties claiming under the defendant Saroda Pershad : Kylash Chunder 7 W R 315 (1867) Gudadiur Chatterjee : Raj Kristo Roy 13 W R 73 (1870)

(6) As to the meaning of this term see Nga Tha Ya : Mi Khan Mhaw 5 B L R 371 Ferguson : Government 9 W R 169 (1869) Kallee Pershad Singh : Joy Narayan Roy 11 W R 361 (1869) Ahmed Hossein : Kladja 3 B L R A C 28 n Konjul

Sahoo : Guroo Buxh Koer 13 W R 36 (1870) Ram Taruek v Radha Bullab 15 W R 97 (1871) Dukheena Mohun Roy : Amertooddeen 12 W R 247 (1879)

(7) Rughoo Nath : Bynnal 24 W R 349 (1875) and generally as to a person claiming adversely to the parties not being made a party see Joy Chandra Das v Gourcer prasad 7 W R 201 (1867) Puddolochun : Lal Chand 10 W R 283 (1868) In Joy Kishen : Poy Kishen 16 W R 101 (1871) the parties interest was held not to be adverse to plaintiff and defendant, see post. Persons should not be made co plaintiffs unless their cause of action is the same as that of the other plaintiffs Government : Bowre Bhoon z 2 W R 280 (1869)

intervene, and by setting up a superior claim to the landlord's title, to raise, as between himself and the original plaintiff, an entirely distinct question between new parties" (1) In a suit for ejectment against a certain person, other persons not claiming through him should not be added as parties, as they cannot be affected by the decision against him, and their addition would lead to issues altogether foreign to those between the original parties to the suit (2)

In an ejectment suit by a landlord against his tenant, the Court should not bring on to the record the person from whom the plaintiff holds the land, nor persons claiming to hold it from a third party, nor any such third party himself, (3) the Court observing that "the case ought not to have been converted from a suit of one character into a suit of an entirely different character" In short, a person claiming adversely to both the parties should not be added as a party (4)

In an ejectment suit, the person from whom the party in actual possession claims the holding may be, and is generally, made a party, but he is not a necessary party, and it is wrong for an Appellate Court for the first time to direct the plaintiff to make him a defendant (5)

As to the interpretation put upon the expression "likely to be affected," see the corresponding section of the Code of 1859, and *ante* The expression is not used in the present Code, but under the corresponding English rule it has been held that it is only of persons who or whose property will be directly and legally affected by the decision that the presence may be said to "be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter," and that a person whose interest will be affected only indirectly and commercially cannot be made a party (6)

The words "*whose presence before the Court may be necessary*" are very wide, but every person who is in any way connected with the transaction to which the suit refers has not necessarily such interest in or connection with the suit that his presence must be considered to be necessary for the complete determination of it (7) These words in the English rule do

(1) Protap Chunder v Jogendro Chunder, 1 C L R 168, 171 (1878), and see Loden Mollish v Kally Dass Roy, 8 C 238 (1881) Choolie Lal v Koki Singh, 19 W R 218 (1873) In the following cases the intervenor was held to have been properly made a party Doyal Chand v Nabin Chandra 8 B L R 180 (1891), Kanhya Roy v Hyder Buksh 25 W R 29 (1875), Chourasoo v Bokhooroo, 24 W P 350, Radhamonee v Ram Narain, 22 W R 440, Tarini Kant v Krishna Moni, 5 C L 1. 179 (1879)

(2) Kartic Nath v Chummun Poy 21 W R 51 (1873) the headnote of which is in correct (Ganu v Moro, 10 B H C J 123 (1873))

(3) Sankaran v Ananthanarayana, 11 M 375 (1892)

(4) Cooroo Prasunn v Bhatia, 20 W R 387 (1876) Chunder, 21 W R 21 (1876)

(5) Kashi v Sadashiv, 183 (1912), Shreekh v Romoni Mohan Dey, 183 (1913)

(6) Moser v Moser

(7) Hukm v Khera, 183 (1912) Khera v Khera, 183 (1912) Bhima P v Khera, 183 (1912)

been held not to authorize a plaintiff, who has no right to sue to amend by joining as co plaintiff a person who has such right (1) The object is only to improve the position of the plaintiff on record, and not to allow the suit instituted by one person to be converted in a new suit by another proper person. The same view has been taken in this country, it being held that a person can be added as plaintiff only in a suit which, though partially defective is to some extent properly instituted, and in which the original plaintiff has some title to sue (2) The Court should not add persons so as to introduce a right of action which previous thereto did not exist (3) The rule under the Code of 1809 also was the same, and it was often held that when the plaintiff had no right of action against the defendants he could not amend his case by joining as parties to the suit other persons who had a right of action against them (4) In a suit by a purchaser of goods against the vendors for damages, on the ground that the bulk did not correspond with the sample the persons who had agreed to sell the same to them cannot be made parties as though their presence would save great expense, and prevent further litigation, it could not be said to be necessary to an effectual and complete adjudication (5) In the case cited Pontifex J observed that the first vendor might be made a party under r 18 of English O 16 but that had not been embodied in the Code and that he was not at liberty to construe this section as giving the power under clause 18 of O XVI.

In accordance with the principles regulating the joinder of parties, it is a general rule that every person who has an interest in the subject of a suit may be added as a party. The interest must however, be an existing one. Thus in a suit by an adopted son against the widow for his father's property in her possession it was held that a reversioner should not be made a co defendant as he had no interest at the time in the property and his interest being contingent upon the death of the widow it was a question whether he would ever have any interest at all (6) But it is sufficient that the interest is in existence at the time of the addition it not being necessary that the party added should have had a right at the time of the suit or should have derived a right from an original plaintiff (7) There can thus be no ground for adding those persons as parties who according to the original defendants should be interested in a portion of the property claimed, if the plaintiff withdraws his claim to that portion as against them (8) It is on this principle that assignees *pendente lite* are in England

(1) Wacott v Lyons 29 Ch D 585

(2) Chunder Coomar Roy v Gocool Chunder 6 C 370 (1879) Dwarkanath v Grish Chunder, 6 C 827 (1881), Bhana Tukaram v Hasbinath 20 B 537 (1895)

(3) Dwarkanath v Grish Chunder, *supra*

(4) See Gopal Kashi v Ramabai 12 B H C R 17 (1875), Subbairar v Kristnayyar, 1 M 383 (1878) But though an action to restrain a nuisance of a temporary nature must be brought by the occupier Jones v Chappell L R 20 L J 539, where the action is brought by the reversioner permission has

been given to add the former as co plaintiff Broder v Saillard 2 Ch D 697

(5) Mahomed Badsha v Nicol 4 C 300 (1878)

(6) Hulm Chand v P C 453, *hri to* Sunkar Dutt v Koylasnath Dutt 15 W P 6 (1871)

(7) Bhole Pershad v Ram Lal 21 C 34 (1896) as to addition of adopted son see Paravastani v Ambalavana 1 M H C 1 157 (1863)

(8) Latoree Bheo v B Ksh 11 1 W 1 101 (18 0)

as well as in this country, generally added as parties (1) In a recent Privy Council decision where a party had been joined as co plaintiff, being, by virtue of an agreement with the other plaintiffs, a co owner in an undivided share of the property claimed by them, it was held that he could not maintain the suit after the other plaintiffs had compromised their claim, for he had no present existing interest (2) The necessity of the presence of persons other than the actual litigants on account of their interest in the subject of a suit generally arises in suits by or against co owners, including members of joint families, and specially in suits for partition (3) In suits against the *karnatan* by any member of the *tarwad* affecting the property or the rights of the *tarwad*, all the members of the *tarwad* must be parties actually or constructively (4) On a similar principle in suits for partition of any property all the co sharers must be parties (5) The same principles apply to a dissolution of partnership, and in case of the death of one of the partners, his representatives must be impleaded as parties in a suit between the remaining partners for the taking of the accounts (6) In a suit by a benamidar the real owner or his assignee may be added (7) A mortgage bond was executed ostensibly in favour of R, but J was the real mortgagee. A suit was brought by R, the benamidar, to enforce the bond, J, the

(1) *Hukm Chand, C P C 451, Ahmed Bhoj v Vulleebhoj, 8 B 323 (1881), Bhola Prasad v Ram Lal, 21 C 31 (1897) Chunderkant Mookerjee v Ramcoomar Koondur, 13 B L R 530 (1874) [assignment of share in proceeds of suit] as to limitation in the case of substitution of assignees, see Harak Chand v Deonath Sahay, 25 C 409 (1897), Mahadev v Bah 26 B 730 (1902), Mitra v Limitation 4th ed p 761, the proper practice is to add and not substitute the assignee Juddooputtee v Chunder Kant, 9 W R 309 (1868), Shushee Bhoosun v Muddan Mohun 2 C L R 297 (1878)*

(2) *Basant Singh v Mahabar Prasad P C 30 A 273 (1913), distinguishing Achal Ram v Hazim Hussain Khan 32 I A 113 (1904), 27 A 271*

(3) *Mammah v Pukka 7 M 428 (1884), Moidin Kutta v Krishnan 10 M 322 (1881)*

(4) *Hukm Chand C P C 451 and see rr 4 9, ante and post*

(5) *Chudasama v Partap-sang 28 B 709 214 (1903), Lakhmichand v Bachu Bhas 35 B 393 (1911), Kahi Kanta v Gouri Prasad, 17 C 906 (1890) [all the shares must be before the Court], Torit Bhoosun v Iaraprosunno, 4 C 756 (1879), Pahalahd Singh v Luchmunbutty, 12 W R 256 259 (1869), Parbati Churn Deb v Am ud deen 7 C 577 (1881), Pandurang v Bhaskar 11*

B H C R 72 (1874) Udaram v Kausu ib 76 (1875) Ishwar Chunder v Ram Krishna Das, 5 C 902 (1880) [apportionment of rent co sharers parties] Obhoy Gobind v Hurychurn S C 2, 7 (1882) [suit for enhanced rent co sharers parties], Timappaya v Lakshminarayana 6 M 284 (1883) Chandu v Kunhamed 14 M 324 (1891) [suit for possession of share in property of a Mahomedan family] Sreenath Chunder v Mohesh Chunder 1 C L R 453 (1878) Annoda Churn Roy v Kally Coomar Roy 4 C 89 (1878) [apportionment of rent, co sharers parties], Mohundrobhoosun v Shoshee bhoosun 5 C 832 (1880), Sadu v Ram 16 B 603 (1892) [mortgagee, purchaser]

(6) *Ramlal v Lakhmichand 1 B H C L A 51 51 (1861) As to parties in a suit to recover a partnership debt see Motilal v Ghelathai 17 B 6 (1892) Vaidyanatha v Chumasani 17 M 103 117 (1893) Devi Das v Nerpai 20 A 365 (1898) Ram Narain v Ram Chunder, 18 C 86 (1890) Lutchmanen v Siva Prokasa 26 C 349 (1899) [joint family business] Imam ud din v Laladhar 14 A 524 (1897) [suit for damages for breach of contract of service], Alagappa v Velhan 18 M 33 (1894) [release of certain partners suit by creditor against others], Muchdhar v Ram Pratab, 1 C W N 20 (1896)*

(7) See notes to r 1, ante.

real mortgagee, made over the debt on a date previous to the suit, but executed the formal deed of assignment on a date subsequent thereto. The assignees were then added as plaintiffs to the suit. *Held*, (1) that a benamidar may sue and that the assignees were rightly added as plaintiffs under this section. *Held* also, that the section corresponding to this rule was wide enough to meet every case of defect of parties, and, further, that the power to add parties must be exercised with reference to the interests which those parties have at the time when the addition is being considered (2).

In the following cases joinder was said to be necessary or proper, (3) or

(1) *Bhola Perahad v. Ram Lall*, 24 C 34 (1896), distinguishing the case of *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Gocool Chunder Bhutta* chargee 6 C 370 (1879).

(2) *Id*.

(3) *Suits by and against Hindus as such*. *Paravartani v. Ambalavana*, 1 N H C R 197 (1863) [suit by widow, subsequent adoption adding of adopted son], *Byreddi v. Chinna*, 6 M 331 (1883) [suit by father his transportation, sons added], *Dayabhai v. Gopalji*, 18 B 141 (1893) [who should sue after death of manager, addition of co sharers], *Gokool Perahad v. Etwaree*, 20 W R 138 (1873), *Nundun Lall v. Lloyd*, 22 W R 74 (1874), *Balkrishna v. Munier*, 10 L 32 (1885), *Hari Gopal v. Gokaldas*, 12 B 158 (1887), *Chunder Chowdhry v. Macnaghten*, 23 W R 386 (1876) [members of joint Hindu family or other co owners must join in suit to recover joint property], *Rajendronath Dutt v. Shaikh Mahomed*, 8 C 42 (1881), *Bechn Lal v. Olullah*, 11 C 338 (1882) [as also all coheirs and mutwallis], *Curungaswami v. Ramalakshamma*, 18 M 53 (1894) [suit by remote reversioner, nearer reversioner added], *Mammali v. Pakki*, 7 M 428 (1884), *Moidun v. Krishnan*, 10 M 322 (1887) [suit by member of Malabar Tarwad against Karnavan]. *Suits in respect of mortgages*. *Sorabji v. Rattonji*, 22 B 701 (1896) [suit for foreclosure, prior mortgagee necessary], *Sulhawat Ali v. Kesho Tewari*, 6 N W P 208 (1874) [suit for redemption, persons interested in accounts necessary parties], *Ragho Salvi v. Balkrishna*, 9 B 128 (1884), *Bhandin v. Sheikh Ismail*, 11 B 425 (1887), *Dittaram v. Gangaram*, 23 B 287 (1898) [suit for redemption, all persons interested in equity should be parties], *At Cca v. Sittingbourne*, L R 1 Eq 636 [as also in case of foreclosure or enforcement of vendor's

lien], *Hughes v. Delhi Bank*, 15 C 30 (1887) [or to determine rights of contending mortgagees], *Ibn Husam v. Pandat*, 12 A. 110 (1889) [or for contribution], *Parasaram Saran v. Mulu*, 9 A. 68 (1886) [draft of sole mortgagee leaving several heirs, who can sue] *suit for mutation of names*, *Virasami v. Rama Doss*, 15 M 330 (1891) [collector necessary]. *Rest Law, suits by co sharers*. *Manohar Das v. Mansur Ali*, 5 A 40 (1882), *Murlidhar v. Ishri Prasad*, 6 A 516 (1884), *Jara Chunder v. Ameer Mundal*, 22 W R 391 (1874), *Guru Mahomed v. Moran*, 4 C 96 F B (1878) [suit for fractional proportion of rent], *Hindu Bashmi Dan v. Pearl*, 10 F B 151 (1879) [to recover

churn, 8 C 277 (1882) [apportionment], *Bheeloo v. Oomarkhan*, 1 N W P 236 (1869), *Doorga Prasad Mytee v. Joynarain Hazrak*, 2 C 474 (1877), *Rashidbhai Mukherji v. Sakht Sundari*, 11 C 614 (1885), *Jogenbhai Chunder Choso v. Nobin Chunder*, 8 C 333 (1882) [enhancement], *Abdool Hossain v. Lall Chand*, 10 C 36 (1883), *Santie Ram v. Bylunt Parya*, 19 W R 280 (1873) [measurement], *Tulsi Panday v. Lala Bachu Lal*, 12 C L R 223 (1883), *F B v. Doh Sat v. Syed Ikram*, 4 C L R 63 (1880), *Harendra Narain v. Moran*, 15 C 40 at p 46 (1887), *Ibrahim Pir v. Cursetji*, 11 B 614 (1887), *Balkrishna v. Moro*, 21 B 151 (1896) [ejectment], *Hindoy v. Mohobutnessa*, 20 C 280 (1892) [when patnidars proper parties], *Moheeb Ali v. Ameer Rai*, 17 C 538 (1890) [application under s 158 of Bengal Tenancy Act]. *When Government a necessary or proper party*, *Krishna Lall v. Bhyrub Chunder*, 22 W R 52 (1874) [to obtain settlement of Chur], *Cannou v. Lisonath*, 5 C L 1 151 (1879) [to recover Chur Lall

unnecessary (1) As regards the effect of the absence of parties if the suit cannot properly go on without adding a party and the plaintiff proceeds notwithstanding objection, the suit must be dismissed (2)

"Questions involved in the suit"—It has been said that in deciding on the necessity of the presence of a person before the Court and adding him as a party, it is useful in ordinary cases to see whether there were questions directly arising out of and incidental to the original cause of action in which such person had an identity or community of interest with the original

settled with defendant]. Sardarsingi v Ganpatsing, 14 B 395, 399 (1899) [suit regarding Talukdari settlement in Bombay], Nilkanthappa v Magistrate, 6 B 670 (1890), Balaram v Magistrate, 6 B 672 (1892) [order for removal of obstruction from public road], Mahomed Israile v Wise, 13 B L R 118 F B (1874) [suit to set aside settlement], Gobinda Chandra Shaha v Hemanta Kumari, 8 C W N 657 (1903) [suit to set aside sale under Public Demands Recovery Act], suit on obligation by heirs of obligee Kandhiya Lal v Chandar 7 A 313 (1881) Partnership suit by surviving partner Gobin Prasad v Chandar Shikhar, 9 A 486 (1897), Ram Narain Nursing Doss v Bam Chunder, 18 C 86 (1890) vide ante, p 564, Agency Aga Tha Yah v M Khan Mahaw, 13 W R 443 (1870), Buddreo Doss v Hoare Miller, 8 C 170 (1881) Suit by legatee Purshottam v Kala Govindp, 26 B 301 (1901) [addition of other legatees] Suit to declare property not liable to attachment Durga Charan Sarkar v Jotindra Mohan Tagore, 27 C 493 (1899) [other but absent decree holders] Suit for removal of trustee Satalajananda v Umeshananda, 4 C W N 462 (1899) Benamidar, as to a benamidar a right of suit in his own name see the matter discussed in Hukm Chand, C P C pp 373-375, and in notes to r 1, ante but whatever view may be taken of this right any objection may be met by the addition of the real owner as beneficiary

(1) See following cases Government not necessary party Chuni Lal v Ram Kishen Sahu 15 C 460 (1888) F B [obstruction to alleged highway], Coswami Ranchor v Sri Girdharji 20 A 120 (1897) [Civ Pr Code, s 140, suit for possession of attached property], Bal Mokoond Lal v Jirjadhun Roy, 9 C 271 (1882), Jahnnai Chowdharam v Secretary of State, 7 C W N 317 (1902), Balkishen Doss v Simpson 27 C 833 (1898)

[suit to set aside sale for arrears of revenue], Isapa v Apasaheb 16 B 649 (1891) [suit for declaration that plaintiff is Kadim Naik of a village] Suits against corporations Nubeen Chunder Paul v Stephenson, 15 W R 531 (1871) Syed Ameer Sahib v Venkatarama 16 M 296 (1892), Harsabai Mal v Maharaj Singh, 2 A 294 (1879), Krishnayya v Bellary Municipal Council, 15 M 292 (1891) Hindu family, Hari Vasudev v Mahadu, 20 B 437 (1895) [loan from joint family funds] Pent Suit intervenors, vide ante, p 561, and as to N H P Rent Act, 1881, see Madho Prasad v Ambar, 5 A 503 (1883) Gobind Ram v Narain Das 9 A 394 (1897) Separate Registration Fischer v Secretary of State 26 I A 16 (1898) [suit against Government cancelling order of zemindar and lessees not necessary parties] Specific performance Luckumsoy v Fazulla, 5 B 177 (1890), Mokund Lal v Chotay Lal 10 C 1061 (1884) Purushattama v Raju 11 M 11 (1887) Probate Ward v Huckle 12 P D 119 [esting of person interested in intestacy] Divorce Ramsay v Boyle 30 C 489 497 (1903) [intervention of alleged adulterers] Administration Dhunraj v Broughton, 15 P L R 296 (1875) Oriental Bank v Gobind Lal Seal, 10 C 713 (1884) [joinder of third parties in possession of assets]

(2) Ramsebuk v Ram Lal Moonloo 6 C 815 (1881) [suit on joint contract, all contractors not parties], Rajen Ironath Dutt v Shaikh Mahomed 8 C 42 (1881) [suit for possession of property by trustees in which complete justice could not be done in absence of one trustee] Durga Charan Sarkar v Jotindra Mohan Tagore, 27 C 493 (1899), objection should be taken Shreekul v Ajpal 15 B 297 (1899), and a person who refuses to join as plaintiff or as defendant Jugodumba v Hari Ch 10 W R 103 (1878)

plaintiff or defendant (1) The rule expressly provides for the addition as parties, of persons "whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit" It has been held in some cases, that only those questions are deemed to be involved in the suit which arise between the original parties, and that where new questions will arise between them and any other person there is no justification for his joinder as a party (2) On the same principle it has even been held that if in an appeal a respondent dies, and on the appellant's application the name of a person is entered on the record as the respondent's representative, another person claiming to be such representative in lieu of him cannot be impleaded as a party under this section and sect 107, as the question of representative title between the two persons is not a question involved in the suit (3) In the case first cited it was held that the questions referred to in the section must be questions between the plaintiff and the defendant, and not such as may arise between co plaintiffs and co defendants *inter se* In the second case the majority of the Full Bench held that a person who is not, in fact the legal representative is not a person who ought to be joined, and that if the section applied it would be the duty of the Court to decide on the representative title Mahmood J dissented from the decision of the majority of the Court and held that the applicant had "shown a sufficient case to entitle her to be made a respondent without the condition precedent of any decision" as to her representative title to the deceased The same view had been taken by the Madras High Court, (4) in which Turner, C J observed "that where there appears a substantial doubt whether the person indicated by the appellant is the representative of a deceased respondent or a representative for all purposes connected with the matters in litigation and if a person other than the person indicated by the appellant lays claim to the representative character and on good *prima facie* grounds and where if he be not allowed to join the interests of the person entitled to the estate of the deceased may be prejudiced we consider the Court ought to proceed under sect 32 to make him a party to the appeal' The Madras High Court has in other cases also construed the expression under comment in a broad sense (5) Thus (6) a person who claimed to be jointly interested with the plaintiff in a bond on which the suit was brought was held to have been rightly made a party, the Court observing that the acceptance of a construction of the words restricting them to questions between the parties to the suit would involve the addition of the

(1) Narain Kumar v Dyan Kumar 2 A 738 742 (1880)

(2) Hukm Chand C. P C 461, see following cases in which addition disallowed Kallan Rao v Ram Ratan, 18 A 306 (1896), of person who claimed by a title distinct from that under which parties to the suit claimed Hirra Nand v Maya Das, 1891 P R No 83 cited in Hukm Chand C. P C 461, of a person who in a suit of one who claimed to be entitled to an interest in the property in preference to the judgment debtor

15 B 145 (1890) in which there was a dispute as to who was entitled to represent a deceased plaintiff

(4) Athappa v Ayanna 8 M. 30 (1884), vide ante p 551

(5) Hukm Chand, C. P C. 462

(6) Vydyanadayan v Sitaramayyan, 5 M. 52 (1891)

words "between the parties to the suit," and that "there can be few, if any, questions which cannot be determined between the parties to the suit one way or the other, and of which the determination, if they be material, will, as between the parties to the suit, not be final," and "on the other hand, the interpretation warranted by the terms would enable the Court to avoid conflicting decisions on the same question which would work injustice to a party to the suit, and finally and effectually to put an end to litigation respecting them" In a suit against the personal representatives of the obligor of a bond, who was also the manager of a *mull*, it was contended that the bond debt had been incurred for the *mull*, and the successor in the management was held to have been properly made defendant (1) The Calcutta High Court also took a broad view (2) of the expression in a case (3) in which certain lands belonging to a joint estate were held by one of the co-sharers under a private arrangement and let out by him to *patnidars*, and on partition they were allotted to another co-sharer, who in a suit brought by him against the tenants for rent, impleaded the *patnidars* as defendants in order that the question of the tenants' liability might be decided in their presence, and the Court held "that they were properly made defendants in the suit and that the Courts were justified in trying the question of the right to receive the rent as between the plaintiffs and the *patnidars*," and that "the trial of that question was in truth necessary in order to ascertain whether the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the tenant defendants existed or not" The expression as used in the corresponding English rule also has received a broad but still a limited interpretation (4) Thus it was said that the term "involved" was somewhat elastic and might be so construed as to include a great number of subsidiary or collateral rights but though it was difficult to define the meaning of it there must be some reasonable limit (5) Esher, M R, said "I can find no case which decides that we cannot construe the rule as enabling the Court under such circumstances to effectuate what was one of the great objects of the Judicature Acts namely that, where there is one subject matter out of which several disputes arise all parties may be brought before the Court and all those disputes may be determined at the same time without the delay and expense of several actions and trials" (6)

Sub rule (3) Consent of person added as plaintiff—In the case of the addition of a person as plaintiff or as next friend their consent is

(1) *Thurthasami v. Copals* 13 M 32 (1889)

(2) See *Hukm Chand* 462

(3) *Hindoy Nath v. Mohobulnessa* 90 C 285 (1892)

(4) See *Hukm Chand* C P C 463

(5) *Norris v. Beazley*, 2 C P D 86

(6) *Montgomery v. Fry* 2 Q B 321 (1890)
and in *Byrne v. Brown* 22 Q B D 657 it was held to be one of the chief objects of the

rule to secure that wherever a Court can see in the transaction brought before it that the rights of one of the parties will or may be so affected that under the forms of law other actions may be brought in respect of that transaction the Court shall have power to bring all the parties before it and determine the rights of all in one proceeding See *Hukm Chand* C P C 464

necessary (1) The section does not, however, require, as does the English rule, (2) that the consent should be in writing. The Court, if it thinks it necessary to add a plaintiff, may stay the action until his consent is obtained (3) *Vide ante*

Representative suits—See notes to O I r 8

Sub-rule (4)—Defendant added, amendment of plaint—This rule, which corresponds with sect 33 of the last Code, is taken from O XVI r 13 of the Rules under the Judicature Act, but some confusion crept into the wording of that section in its modification with reference to the Indian law. The words "*if previously filed*" thus appeared to be unnecessary, and what was intended to be served on the new and the original defendant was evidently not only "*an amended copy of the summons*," but an amended copy of the plaint (4). The rule has now been amended so as to include service of a copy of the plaint. The rule does not contemplate that upon the addition of defendants to a suit a cause of action different from that upon which the suit was founded which may have occurred to the plaintiff against the added defendants, should be added to the claim. All that it requires is, that when a defendant is added the plaint should be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and that an amended copy of the summons and plaint be served on the defendants. The amendment there referred to is such amendment as is necessitated by the addition of a defendant, and not such an amendment as would add to or alter the nature of the suit as originally brought (5).

Sub rule (5)—"Subject to the provisions"—This clause formerly commenced with the words "*All parties whose names are so added, etc*" According to a strict construction of the section, these words referred to all the previous clauses of the section and therefore also to cases in which the Court had made a person a defendant of its own motion. The power of a Court to add a party and the duty of that Court to dismiss the suit as barred by limitation are two different questions, and a Court may under this section add a party necessary to a suit although it may be obliged by the Limitation Act to dismiss such suit after such party has been added (6). It had however, been held (it is submitted erroneously) that no question of limitation could be raised by a defendant who has been added by order of Court after the period of limitation. But it has been held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that a Court acting under the second paragraph of sect 32 of the last Code is bound by the provisions of sect 22 of the Limitation Act (7). Sect 22 of the Limitation Act, which is the section generally applicable, does not apply where really new persons are not made defendants but only the names of those already so are

(1) *Uma Sundari Ramji*, 7 C 242 (1882), if objection is taken the proper course is to make the party defendant (2) and see *Behari Lal Doss v. Padma Nath Doss* 22 W R 229 (1874)

(2) See cases cited in *Annual Practice*, 1905 pp 107, 108, and *Cox v. James* 19 Ch D 17

(3) See *Canby v. Gandy*, 30 Ch D 171,

C. A. v. Roberts v. Holland, 1 Q B 169 (1893)

(4) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 468

(5) *Hingu Lal v. Balloo Ram* 21 A 573 555 (1902)

(6) *Imam ud din v. Tuladhar*, 11 A 171 (1892)

(7) *Ram Kinkar v. Akhli* 35 C 519 (F B) (1907), 11 Q W N 370

expressly mentioned, as where a clerical error is corrected (1) or where the persons are comprised in the designation given (2)

"Shall be deemed to have begun"—It has been pointed out (3) that it is peculiar that this provision is different from that in sect 22 of the Indian Limitation Act, under which the suit is deemed to have been instituted in regard to a person when he is made a party. The effect of the law of limitation in regard to the joinder of defendants under the present section is, that if the period of limitation for a suit against the added defendant shall have expired before the service of summons, and the claim against the original defendant is such as cannot proceed without joining as defendant the person against whom the claim is barred, the entire claim will fail even as against the original defendant. Thus a pre-emption claim against one of the joint vendees will fail if the summons is not served on his co-vendee till after the expiry of the period of limitation for a suit for the claim (4) even though the delay in the service may not be due to the plaintiff. Where in a suit a person is added as a party defendant at the instance of the Court after the period of limitation, sect 22 of the Limitation Act applies, and bars the plaintiff's remedy as against the added defendant (5).

There is no reference in this section to the Indian Limitation Act in regard to persons joined as plaintiffs but sect 22 of the Act applies also to the case of joinder of a plaintiff, where the joinder is under clause 2 as well as when it is under clause 1 (6).

Appeal—See sect 101 and O XLIII r 1 and notes thereto. The Code of 1882 gave an appeal from certain orders under sect 538 clause 2. All orders under sect 32 were not appealable, but where there was no appeal the order might have been attacked under sect 591 of the former Code on appeal from the final decree (7). An order based on an erroneous construction of the section was held not subject to revision under sect 622 corresponding with sect 115 *post* (8). A party who had assented to an order could not of course complain of it in appeal (9). Where an order adding a defendant under this section was not appealed against, and no objection was taken thereto in the memorandum of appeal an oral objection taken on appeal to such order was disallowed (10).

(1) *Nannu v Crooke*, 2 A. 296 (1879)
Pearcy v Nataraja, 37 I. A. 27 (1909). 3^d C 299

(2) *Praga Lal v Maxwell* 7 A. 281 (1883)

(3) *Hukm Chaml* C. P. C. 466

(4) *Habib ulah v Acharbar* 4 A. 145 (1881)

(5) *Ramkinkar Biswas v Akhal Chandra Chowdhuri* 11 C. W. N. 370 (1907). 35 C. 519, F. B.

(6) See *Fatmalal v Purbhai Virji* 21 B. 780 (1897), *Krishna v Melampuruma* 10 M. 44 (1886), *Jibanti Nath v Gokool Chunder* 19 C. 760 (1891) [defendant cannot be made co-plaintiff after limitation period] *Harak Chaml v Deonath Salay* 25 C. 409 (1897)

[limitation applies to assignment after suit *vide ante* p. 562]

(7) *Googlee Sahoo v Premalal Saloo* 7 C. 148 (1881) see *Ridhnath Sahoo v Copee Saloo* 14 W. R. 90 (1870)

(8) *Rabbaba v Noorjehan* 13 C. 90 (1886). As to act on under the Charter Act see *Julooputtee v Chunder Kant* 1 W. P. 309 (1868)

(9) *Pakkhal Doss v Protap Chunder* 12 W. R. 457 (1869). *Beer Chunder Ioy v Shaikh Tameezooddeen* 12 W. R. 87 (1869). *Shah Khalil Mahomed v Shah Peer Nazur* 18 W. R. 112 (1872)

(10) *Bins Lal v Jam Lal* 20 A. 370 (1895)

Under the present Code no direct appeal is given and the same rule as to revision will apply. The Code may, however, be objected to in the appeal from the final decree under sect 105, *post*

- [s. 32] 11. The Court may give the conduct of the suit to such person as it deems proper.

Conduct of suit.

Conduct of suit—This rule was originally part of sect 32 of the last Code which referred to conduct of suit by the plaintiff. The word "suit" does not ordinarily include defence, but, according to the English practice the conduct of the defence also is often given to one of the defendants, as for instance when a surviving partner of a partnership was made a co-defendant as one of the executors of a deceased partner, the conduct of the defence was given to the other executor on the ground that the interests of the surviving partner might conflict with those of the estate of the deceased partner (1). Apparently with a view to adopt that practice, the word "person" has been substituted for plaintiff.

- [s. 35] 12 (1) *Where* there are more plaintiffs than one, any one

Appearance of one of several plaintiffs or defendants for others

or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding; and in like manner, *where* there are more defendants than one, any one or more of them may be authorized by any other of them to appear, plead or act for such other in any proceeding.

(2) The authority shall be in writing signed by the party giving it and shall be filed in Court

Appearance by one of several plaintiffs or defendants—O III r 1 enacts that parties may appear and act themselves personally in all suits. The present rule provides for the actual representation of a party to a suit in the course of its progress by another party on the same side, and O III r 1 lastly enacts that a party may, unless the Court otherwise directs, be represented by a stranger to the suit, namely, by a professional adviser or by certain recognized agents specified in O III r 2, *post*. It was held under the corresponding section of the Code of 1859 (sect 115) that it was sufficient if the authority was in writing, and that no general power of attorney was necessary (2).

- [s. 34] 13. All objections on the ground of non joinder or mis

Objections as to non joinder or misjoinder

joinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived

"Objections"—The objection dealt with by this rule is one for joinder

(1) Peck v Ray, 3 Cl. 232 (1891)

103 (1865)

(2) Ambaram v Jimatang 2 B H C. R.

or misjoinder of parties. It does not refer to objections on the ground of want of a cause of action or right of suit in the plaintiff which may not be disclosed until the case has been proceeded with and evidence has been taken (1). In the case of objections with which the rule does deal, the question whether there is or is not a want of parties in any particular case will depend on the substantive law applicable to it. The rule of procedure does nothing more than provide that certain rules of substantive law can only be enforced or given effect to in a particular way or under particular limitations. So while sect 45 of the Contract Act is a matter of substantive law, the rule includes an objection for want of a co promisee as a plaintiff it being intended to be a restriction on the right or necessity, as the case may be of joint promisors or promisees to sue or be sued together just as other limitation and procedure rules are virtually restrictions on the exercise of rights which but for them, would exist and be enforceable (2). O II r 7 enacts a similar rule as regards causes of action.

"At the earliest possible opportunity"—The necessity for this provision and that in O II r 7 is founded on the fact that if the objection is taken in time the plaintiff may take steps to join the persons whose non-joinder may be objected to (3) or remedy the misjoinder of claims objected to. The first hearing of a suit may however, be the earliest opportunity a defendant may have of raising the objection which if taken in the defendant's written statement, cannot be considered too late (4). But the grounds of objection must have existed before the first hearing otherwise an objection could not have been made or waived. If it did not so exist an objection may be made after the first hearing at the earliest opportunity after it came into existence (5). The time now fixed is the settlement of issues. As pointed out in the first of the cases last cited cases might occur in which sect 34 would not prevent the defendant from objecting to the want of a proper party even after the first hearing viz where after the first hearing and before decree a co parcener or remainderman or reversioner is born or where a woman (who is a party) is married to a man who is not a party to the suit. The objection did not exist at or before the first hearing and therefore could not have been made or waived by the defendant and if he made it at the earliest opportunity after it came into existence he would have satisfied the spirit of sect 34. The section has been amended accordingly.

If the objection is admitted by the plaintiff the Court should in the case of parties, act under O I r 10 and not dismiss the suit (6) and the Court may,

(1) *Heminger v Droz* 25 B 433 467 (1900) in which case the defect was in the plaintiff's title and not merely in the omission to add the real owner whose interest entirely excluded his own.

(2) *Per Powell J* in *Kale Khan v Seva Ram* 1899 P B No 156 and in *Jadulla Khan v Bhanu Lal* 1892 P B No 78 cited in *Hukm Chandra C P C* 468 469.

(3) *Rajnara v Universal Life Assurance*

Co 7 C 594 603 (1881).

(4) *Imam ud din v Laladhar* 14 A 524 (1892).

(5) *Modhe v Dongre* 5 B 609 (1881) cited *post*. See also *Imam ud din v Laladhar* *supra* at p 526 where the Court referred to but did not decide upon the question of the effect of ignorance of the facts on which the objection depends.

(6) *See Van Geller v Sowerby* 41 Cl D 374 and *ante* p 541.

where it is possible, whether the defendant omits to object (1) or objects and the plaintiff refuses to admit the objection, exercise of its own motion the powers given by that rule. If the objection when taken is not admitted by the plaintiff, and he does not apply to amend, but maintains the correctness of the plaint, and the Court, without immediately deciding the point, tries the case, and at its conclusion finds that the objection is good on facts proved by the defendant, the suit must be dismissed (2).

"Waived."—Where an objection as to misjoinder (3) or of non joinder (4) is not taken in the Court of first instance it will be disallowed in appeal, and the claim will be disposed of on the merits. In *Dhirm Das v Shama Soondri*, (5) the plaintiff widow made an adoption pending the suit, but the son was not made a party, and on an objection being taken as to that before the Privy Council, Lord Campbell spoke of it as "a safe maxim for a Court of Appeal to be governed by, that an objection, which, if taken, might have been cured, and which has not been taken in the Court below, shall not be taken in the Court of Appeal." And see now sect 99, which amends the former sect 578 so as to include cases of misjoinder. The former section concluded with the words "by the defendant." It was pointed out (6) that these words showed that the section did not limit the right of the plaintiff to add parties at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, in the case cited it was said "Often a defendant may be indifferent to the absence of persons who ought to be parties, but it nevertheless, may be most important for the plaintiff to add them in order that they may be bound by the decree in the cause. The plaintiff may not, until an advanced stage in a cause, become aware that persons ought to be made parties who have not been so made. The defendant may be well aware that those ought to be made parties, but purposely lets the first hearing pass without objecting to their absence from the suit, and thus, so far as he is concerned, waives the right to object. But his waiver of that objection would not affect the absent parties, and a decree made in their absence would not bind them. Hence it is that, although sect 31 limits the defendant's right to object, the second passage of sect 32 (corresponding with sect 29), leaves it open to the plaintiff 'at any time' before decree to obtain permission to make new parties." The words have now been omitted as unnecessary.

(1) *Imam ud din v Laladhar*, 14 A 524 (1892), at p 526.

(2) *Boydonth Bag v Grish Chunder*, 3 C 26 at p 29 (1877); *Ramsebak v Ramlall* 6 C 823 (1881), *Badri Das v Jawala Pershad*, 1891, P R No 86, F B, cited in *Hukm Chand*, C P C 469, *Halidov v Nathu*, 7 P 217 (1883), in *Arumugam v Sundarajev*, 8 M L J R 3, the non joinder in the particular case was held not sufficient to justify dismissal.

(3) *Lakirapa v Rudrapa* 16 B 119 122 (1891) *Juleha v Gopal Pat*, 6 A 72 (1894) misjoinder both of parties and causes of

action], *Magaluri Narayana* 3 M 359 (1881)

(4) *Paramasiva v Krishna*, 14 M 495 (1891), *Moidinkutti v Krishnan* 10 M 323 329 (1887), *Hira Lal v Ramju*, 6 A 57 (1884), *Purshottam v Kala Govindji*, 26 B 301 (1901), *Uma Sundari Das v Ramji Haldar* 7 C 242, 244 (1881).

(5) 3 M I A 229, 242 (1843), *foli*, *Hari Saran v Bhubaneswari*, 15 J A 195 (1889).

(6) *Modhe v Dongre*, 5 B 609, 612 (1881) *per Westropp CJ*, though such application may be refused if made at a late stage and if inconvenient. See *Mokha Harakraj v Biswaswar*, 5 B L R App 11, 12 (1870).

ORDER II.

Frame of Suit.

1. Every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them

Frame of suit.

2 (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action, but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court

Suit to include the whole claim

(2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished

Relinquishment of part of claim.

(3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted

Omission to sue for one of several reliefs

Explanation—For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action

Illustration

A lets a house to B at a yearly rent of Rs 1200. The rent for the whole of the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 is due and unpaid. A sues B in 1908 only for the rent due for 1906. A shall not afterwards sue B for the rent due for 1905 or 1907.

Previous provisions—The terms of sect 7 of the Code of 1859 and of sect 13 of the 1st Code so far as regards the first two paragraphs did not vary materially. The former declared that every suit shall include the

whole of the claim arising out of the cause of action" The last Code substitutes the words "*which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of,*" (1) and the clause "*but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court*" were added. The cases therefore decided under the Code of 1859 were in point, (2) so far as these two paragraphs were concerned. The last two paragraphs were, however, new, and were introduced to do away with the view taken under the Code of 1859, that the plaintiff, though prohibited from splitting his claim, was not bound to pursue all his remedies at once (3). This section in the Code of 1882 was therefore, in this respect, more comprehensive in that it provided that a person entitled to more remedies than one in respect of the same cause of action must combine all his remedies in the first suit, unless he obtained the leave of the Court to reserve some of his remedies for a subsequent suit (4). The present rules are in substantially the same terms as the corresponding sections in the last Code, with the exception of the omission in clause 3 of r 2 of the words "*obtained before the first hearing,*" as to which, see post.

The section enacts the general rule that "contestants are not allowed to split up a cause of action even where they have an election of different remedies, into different actions, or to supplement an incomplete remedy they may have selected at the first by availing themselves subsequently of another" (5).

Principle and scope of the two rules.—R 1 contains provisions of a positive and directory character as to the framing of the suit with a view to procure finality of decision (6). Where, however, it was argued that the phrase "*the subjects in dispute*" in the former section connoted the *corpus* or object matter of the claim, and that therefore all possible claims to the same should necessarily be offered for decision in the suit, the Madras High Court (7) said "In our opinion the expression '*the subjects in dispute*' signifies the general relation between the parties to the suit for the determination of which the suit is brought. In other words the object of sect 12 (now r 1) is to require the plaintiff to bring forward his whole case as to the matter of litigation on the question of right involved in the suit, and not to require him to unite all the causes of action which he may have against the defendant in respect of the *corpus* or object matter of the suit." In this respect, therefore r 1 bears the same construction as r 2, in which there is nothing to warrant the inference that all causes of action ought to

(1) As to these words "in respect of" and "arising out of," see *Venkoba v. Subbanna* 11 W 151, at p. 153 (1887).

(2) *Duncan Bros. v. Jeetmull Greebharoo* Lall, 19 C at p. 378 (1892).

(3) See *Muluk Iugesser Bakh v. Monohur Doss* 2 N W P 90 (1870), *Jebunti Nath Khan v. Shih Nath Chuckerlatty* 8 C at p. 821 (1882), *Sabeer Khan v. Kali Doss*, 1 W I 179 (1843). A plaintiff was, however, then as now bound to include in his plaint all the grounds upon which his suit was

based. *Abhiram Das v. Shyam Das*, J B L R A C J 421 (1869).

(4) *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythunatha Ayyar*, 26 M at p. 776 (1902), and see *Govind v. Parashram*, 25 B at p. 167 (1900) and post.

(5) *Wells Res. Judicata* § 228.

(6) See e.g. *Lala Surja Prasad v. Golub Chand*, 27 C 721, 761 (1900).

(7) *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythunatha Ayyar*, 26 M 760, 763 (1902) and see 76, ib.

be included in the alternative, or otherwise in one and the same suit (1) The penalty for non-compliance with r 1 is provided for partly in r 2 and partly by Explanation IV to sect 11. The former provides that if the plaintiff omits to include a portion of the entire claim which has arisen at the date of the suit, out of the cause of action on which the suit is based, he shall be precluded from suing again in respect of such portion, and the latter provides that the matter of every ground which the plaintiff might and ought to urge in support of the cause of action on which the suit is founded shall be deemed to be a matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit, and decided therein whether such ground was actually relied upon or not in the suit. In other words r 2 requires that the whole claim which has arisen at the date of the suit out of the cause of action shall be included in the suit so as to avoid splitting of a claim or claims arising out of one and the same cause of action. And Explanation IV to sect 11 enjoins that every ground which could and ought to have been urged in support of the claim actually made in the suit shall be deemed to have been adjudicated upon therein whether it was actually urged or not (2). The rule embodied in r 2 does not operate to give the defendant a ground of exception to the first suit but by prohibiting a second suit it indirectly compels the plaintiff to include his whole demand in the first suit (3) and is thus a complement to r 1. To illustrate the operation of r 2 over the second suit and not the first where the plaintiff claimed by right of inheritance for partition of one out of a number of villages left by his ancestor and the lower Court dismissed the claim as untenable under the corresponding section of the Code of 1859 the Appellate Court held that though that section might operate as a bar to any future claim by plaintiff for partition of the remaining villages by right of inheritance it could not be taken to be a bar to the then present claim (4).

R 2 which provides against what is called the splitting of a cause of action is founded on the maxim that no one shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause (5). It is directed against two evils: the splitting of claims and the splitting of remedies in respect of one cause of action. If a man omits from his suit a portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of it, if he omits one of his remedies he cannot afterwards pursue it (6). It has been said that there is no rule of procedure which is founded on better reason and good sense (7). At the same time it has been pointed out

(1) *Ramaswami Ayyar v Vythianatha Ayyar* 26 M. 77 (1907) *vide also post*

(2) *ib* at pp 766-67

(3) *Ittappan v Manavikrama* 21 M. 153 at p 156 (1897). There are however cases in which the nature of the right is such that independently of the rule the plaintiff is prohibited from covering his claim in it. See also *Musamat Soonder v Khiloo Mulla* 2 N. W. P. 30 (18 0)

(4) *Chow Singh v Bahadur Singh* 11 A. 36 (1896)

(5) *Balmakund v Sangari* 19 A. at p 383 (1897). *Umed Dholchand v Pir Saheb* 11 B. 131 136 (1883). See *Whitley Stokes* *u. Anglo Indian Codes* 397. *Sadho Saran v Hawal Pande* 19 A. 98 99 (1903). *Narayan v Shamrao* 27 B. 3 9 382 (1903)

(6) *Govind v Parashram* 20 B. 161 at p 167 (1900). *Chhabd Das v Vassu* 4 P. I. vol 49 p 4 (1914). *Trimbal v Bhagwan Das* 23 B. 318 (1899)

(7) *Hikmatulla Khan v Imam Ali* 11 A. 203 at p 206 (1899)

that while in order to effect the good object of preventing unnecessary litigation, suitors are deprived of rights to which they would otherwise be entitled under the general law, the Courts should be careful in carrying out these provisions to confine their scope and construction within certain recognized limits and principles so as not to take suitors unfairly by surprise and to do as little injustice as possible in individual cases (1). So far as regards the party sought to be barred, the principle is that where the cause of action is the same and the plaintiff has had an opportunity in the former suit of recovering and procuring what he seeks to recover in the second the latter suit is barred (2). The distinction between this rule and that of *res judicata* is that whereas the latter rule prescribes that what has been decided or is deemed to have been decided cannot be raised again, the present rule prohibits that being put forward which should have been, but was not, offered for the Court's decision and in respect of which in consequence of such omission no decision has been given. The present rule depends entirely on the identity of the cause of action, the bar being created by the institution of the suit and not by the judgment (3). The bar exists not because the point has been decided but because it should and would have been decided if the plaintiff had put it forward.

The plea under r 2 it has been held, (4) does not involve a question of jurisdiction and no Court is bound to take it up *proprio motu*. As it is introduced simply for the benefit of a defendant, to prevent him being harassed by numerous suits, he should expressly plead it before judgment, if he wishes to take advantage of it. Further, where objection is taken to the suit the onus is on the defendant to show that the causes of action are identical and that the suit is therefore barred, (5) and he cannot in this, any more than in any other matter, plead his own wrong (6).

The former section has been held applicable to suits under the N.W.P.

(1) *Anderson Wright & Co v Kalagarlu*, 12 C 339, at p 345 (1883), per Garth CJ. The same learned Judge, in *Pramada Das v Lakshmi Narayan Mitter* 12 C at p 63 (1883) said: 'Now speaking for myself I am one of those who believe that, however construed s 43 has done and will do a vast amount of injustice, and I am therefore particularly careful to give it a construction no larger than it will reasonably bear.' There cannot however, be any doubt that the rule, if applied properly, is one of justice and not mere technicality. In this as in other respects if injustice ensue it must be laid not to the rule but to its improper application to cases.

Bank v Gopal, 14 C L J 589 (1911)

(2) *Sro Nelson v Couch*, 15 C B N S 99, *Serrao v Noel*, 15 Q B D 549, 550

(3) *Monsharam v Gonesh*, 17 C W N 221 (1912)

(4) *Muhammad Nur v Mahruva* 1885, P R No 37

(5) *Upendra Lal Mookerjee v Secretary of State*, 20 C 716 (1893)

(6) *Subbayya v Venkatesappa* (N 49, 53 (1883). In *Shaikh Punja v Shaikh Oodoy* 18 W R 337 (1872), the plaintiff was held to be prohibited from raising the question of the validity of the decree which he held. As to inconsistent contentions, see *Gandy v Gandy*, L R 30 Ch D 57, where it was held that a party was not at liberty to retain the benefit of a decision given on the footing that his liability under a covenant continued, and at the same time to insist that his liability under it had determined.

cause of action once there can be no doubt that the cause and the will of the party to address himself and the rule therefore is designed to supply a serious grievance.

Rent Act, (1) as also to suits under Act X of 1859 the principle on which it is based being one of general equity, (2) but not to suits under the Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act, that Act having been amended so as to remove the bar created by this rule (3) The Act of a guardian binds a minor unless unreasonable or improper, and the rule is therefore a bar to a suit by a minor who has attained majority and whose guardian had previously relinquished a claim (4) The rule does not apply where there has been no adjudication and leave has been specially granted to bring a fresh suit (5)

"Sult"—The word does not here apply to execution proceedings. R 2 deals with the frame and initiatory stages of a suit and is not applicable after judgment and after the rights of the parties have been decided by a decree, in which the cause of action has merged to proceedings in execution any more than for example, sect 44 of the last Code (or O II rr 1 5 of this) would be applicable (6) The question as to the applicability of the principle embodied in the section might arise in two ways. Firstly where the decree gives reliefs of a different character such as a decree for possession and a decree for costs. There is nothing in the Code to prevent separate and successive applications for execution as regards each of them (7) Secondly relief of a single character may be given by a money decree for, say, Rs 1000. The Full Bench in the first mentioned case reserved its opinion whether in such a case the plaintiff would be entitled to split up the execution of the decree by successive applications to execute to the extent for instance of Rs 10. The rule has been held not to apply in a case where there were two suits and where one being struck off on the objection of the defendant the plaintiff applied and was allowed to amend his claim in the other suit (8) An application to file an award is in many respects analogous to a suit and therefore the privilege given to a plaintiff in a suit to abandon portion of the claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of the Court has been held to apply also to a case where the party comes in with an application to cause an arbitration award to be filed (9) As to whether a proceeding for revocation of probate is a suit or not, see case cited (10)

"Shall include"—Ordinarily a claim is expressly specified. In some cases however, the claim in the prior suit will be construed to include a claim which though not specially stated is naturally implied in it. So a prior suit for redemption of land was held to have included the trees on the land and the Court having failed to adjudicate upon the portion of the claim relating to

(1) *Madho v. Murl* 5 A 406 F B (1883)(2) *Adhiram v. Raghu* 12 C 50 (1885)*Lurbhoo v. Pamjeawan* 1 A H C P 119 (1869) See *Lam Sunder v. Krishna* 17 W R 350 (1872)(3) *Laluchand v. Gurjappa* 6 B 169 (1895)(4) *Gopal v. Narasinga* 22 M 309 (1899)(5) *Venkata v. Ranga* 10 M 160 (1885) *Behari Lal Pal v. Baran Mai* 17 A 53 (1894) see post, p. 593(6) *Sadho Saran v. Hawal Bande* 13 A F B 94 100 101 (1893) foll. *Radha**Kishen Lal v. Radha Pershad Singh* 18 C 315 (1891)(7) *Ib*(8) *Ram Laran Koonde v. H. Sen* *Buksh* 3 C 785 (1888)(9) *Grish v. Brojonath* 20 W 1 51 (1873)(10) *Khurodamoyi Barmani v. Basanta Sundari* 4 C L J 402 (1906)

the trees, a fresh suit based on it was competent to the plaintiff (1) If a mortgagor in a suit for redemption of an usufructuary mortgage omits to claim surplus profits, a subsequent suit for the recovery of such profits is barred by this section (2) The omission in a prior suit against one of several joint promisors of a part of the cause of action is no bar under sect 43 of the last Code (now represented by this rule) to a subsequent suit against another joint promisor for the portion so omitted (3) A plaintiff who omits to sue for a portion of his claim, stating that he does not relinquish it but means to sue again for it, can gain nothing by such statement, but, on the other hand, neither can such a statement furnish a reason for holding the first suit to be barred (4) As regards a plaintiff's claim for relief, he must either include it or obtain the leave of the Court to omit it, if he does neither he is barred (5)

"The plaintiff"—It has been held that a defendant's claim to set off stands in the position of a claim by a plaintiff in a separate suit, and that he may, in relation to his cross claim, be rightly regarded as a plaintiff within the meaning of the section (6)

Conditions of applicability of the rule.—The main conditions, the existence of which is necessary for the applicability of the rule, and which are dealt with in detail hereafter, are (a) the existence of a cause of action in the prior suit, (b) which was known to the party, (c) and which the Court had jurisdiction to try, and (d) the identity of parties, and (e) of the cause of action, the meaning of which last-mentioned term in connection with the subject is subsequently defined and exemplified by reference to cases of tort, contract, and of a miscellaneous character

(a) **Existence of cause of action in prior suit presupposed**—The first thing to be considered is whether the cause of action in the second suit is the same as in the first. If so, but not otherwise, the second suit is barred in respect of any portion of the claim which was omitted from the first suit (7) Where there is an infringement of one right and one cause of action has arisen, the plaintiff must make his whole claim once for all in one suit. If the plaintiff had thus an opportunity in the former suit of recovering what he seeks in the second, the former suit is a bar to the latter action (8) But this rule, which requires the whole claim to be put forward, presupposes the existence of a cause of action and will have no application where it is found that the former suit had no cause of action. This will generally be the case when the former suit was dismissed as premature, in which case the claim may be put forward in a suit brought on the maturing of the cause of action (9)

(1) *Bakshuram v Darbu*, 10 B H C R 309 (1873)

(2) *Ram Din v Bhup Singh*, 39 A 225 (1908)

(3) *Ramanujulu v Araya Mudu*, 33 M 317 (1909)

(4) *Musuniat Soonder Bibee v Khilloo Mull*, 2 N W P 60 (1870), and see *Makul v Narayan Dye*, 20 C 322 (1892)

(5) *Makul v Narayan Dye*, 20 C 322,

at p 325 (1892)

(6) *Nawbat Pattak v Mahesh Narayan Lal*, 32 C 651 (1905)

(7) *Kakaji v Bapuji*, 8 B H C R 207, 209 (1871), *Ittappan v Manavikrama*, 21 M at pp 156, 158

(8) *Ib.*, at p 158

(9) *Hukm Chandi C P C 500, citat.*, *Ahmad Khan v Mahr Khan*, 1893, P 1 No 35

There is no bar if the plaintiff had in fact no cause of action in respect of his claim at the date of the institution of the prior suit and so could not have sued or properly sued, (1) and where nothing is decided but that should he sue again (2) In short, only the claim which the plaintiff is able to make must be put forward, and only so much of the claim is required to be included as the plaintiff may be able to make at the time of institution of the suit (3) If further, a person has a claim by reason of the defendant's default, but is entitled to waive it and does so he is not precluded by such waiver from enforcing his claim in the case of a subsequent default, the cause of action not being the same (4)

(b) Which was known to the party—An omission to sue can only be a bar when the claim was known at the date of the institution of the first suit. A right which a litigant possesses without knowing or ever having known that he possesses it can hardly be regarded as a "portion of his claim" within the meaning of the section (5). A person cannot, moreover omit or relinquish that of which he has no knowledge. The provision as to omitting a claim clearly involves the idea that the plaintiff so omitting was at some time prior to the suit, aware or informed of the claim or aware of the facts which would

(1) *Venkoba v Subbanna* 11 M 151 153 [claim must have been enforceable at date of former suit], *Shadi & Ganda* 1890 P P No 127, *Raja Nilmani Singh v Annada prasad Mookerjee* 1 B L R 1 B 9* 100 (1889) [the plaintiff could not in the prior suit have recovered damages] *Balkrishna & Hari Shankar* 8 B H C R A C J 64 foll. in *Narayan Babaji & Pandurang Ram chandra* 12 B H C R 148 155 (1875) [suit for partition held not barred as the property being mortgaged was not available for actual partition at the time of the former suit] *aliter* if the property was available for partition *Ukha & Daga* 7 B 18* (1889) disapproved in *Monsharam & Gonsah* 17 C W N 521 (1912), *Nund Lal Boso & Meer Abou Mahomed* 5 C 597 601 (1879) [the compensation money subject of the second suit had not been drawn from the Collector's Court until after the institution of the former suit] *Maya & Avuthraman* 22 M 197 (1898) *Chaladom v Kakkath* 23 M 669 (1902) [conversion complained of was subsequent to date of former suit]

(2) *Kakaji & Bapuji* 8 B H C P at 1 208 (1871), this case was cited with approval in *Becharji & Pujaj* 11 B 31 55 56 (1889) where the Court in the first case had refused to adjudicate upon a particular question

(3) See *Hukm Chand* C 1 C 503 and cases cited in n. (8) p 554

(4) *Seo Ram Bhai & Deva* 1881 P P No. 123 [provision in mortgage that principal should be paid without interest within one year if not paid monthly interest payable, in default of payment of interest mortgagee entitled to sue for both principal and interest. Held no one was obliged to take advantage of forfeiture and suit for interest did not bar second suit for principal and interest accrued due subsequent to former suit] *Raman & Wazira* 1886 P R 79 Mortgage provided that in default of payment mortgagee might sue for possession. On default suit brought for interest due held not to bar suit for possession on case of subsequent default] *Badi Bibi & Sami Ili* 18 M 257 (1892) and *Hukm Chand* C P C 501 503

(5) *Amanat Bibi & Imdad Hussa* 13 C 809 808 (1888) see I R 151 A 106 11. Following this decision the Punjab Civil Court held that to constitute the bar the plaintiff must have been aware of the facts which would have enabled them to make the claim. *Shadi & Ganda* 1890 P P No 127. *Batul Kunwar & Mum Lal* 3 L 10 (1909) *Corachand & Basanta* I C 11 12 (1911)

give him a cause of action (1). It has also been held that where the facts have been fraudulently concealed, the fraud gives a new cause of action on which the second suit may be brought (2). Where, however, a person knows of the facts before the institution of the suit and omits to make a particular claim by an oversight, it is no answer to say that such omission was due to mere mistake, and was not actuated by any fraudulent or dishonest motive. If the words of a law are clear and positive, they cannot be contested by any consideration of the motives of the party to whom it is to be applied, nor limited by what the Judges who apply it may suppose to have been the reasons for enacting it (3). Nor, where the plaintiff is aware of his cause of action is it necessary that the amount of damages resulting therefrom should be known or even be capable of being known. So it is a general principle in cases of breach of contract or tort, that where there is but one cause of action damages must be assessed once for all (4). In some cases of wrong the cause of suit is not complete until actual damage has ensued, but when once the cause of suit is matured, the subsequent occurrence of further damage whether after or before this has been adjudicated upon does not originate a fresh cause of suit, were it otherwise, litigation might have no end, for in few cases does the damage flowing from a wrong or breach of contract cease with one event (5). Therefore as regards damage actually incurred, all must be claimed and as regards those which have not actually accrued at date of suit, that is future or prospective damage, those not known may be estimated, and are therefore, in contemplation of law deemed to be known, and must be claimed for once for all (6).

(c) And which the Court had jurisdiction to try.—It is obvious that a plaintiff is not debarred from having a matter tried in a second suit if by reason of the absence of necessary jurisdiction it could not be heard in the first. He is entitled to have his claim adjudicated. All that the section says is that if he had an opportunity of having it adjudicated, which he neglected

(1) Viraragava v Krishnasami 6 M. 344, 300 (1882), Ambu v Kettillamma 11 M. 23 26 (1890), Manothode v Appu, 15 M. 296, 297 (1892), Sankaran v Parvathi 19 M. 115, 148 (1885). And see observations in Doorla Nath v Kallee Narain, 21 W. R. 212 213 (1875).

(2) Lachman Singh v Sanwal Singh 1 A. 543 (1878), Bulwant Singh v Chuttan Singh, 3 N. W. P. 27, 30 (1871).

(3) Moonshie Buzloor Pubeem v Shumsoonissa Begum, 8 W. R. P. C. 3 12, 13 (1867), s. c., 11 Moo. I. A. 651, 605 ref., Bulwant Singh v Chuttan Singh 3 N. W. P. 27 (1871) which understood the P. C. ruling as applying to knowledge as well as motive, foll. in Ganes Chandra v Ram Kumar, 3 B. L. R., A. C. J. 265 (1869) a case of bona fide mistake ref., Ram Churn v San Drogo Moje 17 W. R. 122 127 (1872) where the

decree in the first litigation disclosed to the party that she had a larger interest than she thought foll. Syed Abdulla v Hurkshen Singh 2 C. L. J. 490 (1905). In Meer Mahomed v Forbes 5 W. R. Act. A., 90 (1866) a person having sued for an amount in a certain coin when it was due in a higher coin was held barred from suing for the difference.

(4) Serrao v Noel 15 Q. B. D. 559, Darley Main Colliery v Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127.

(5) Rajah Nil Moneo Singh v Issur Chunder Ghoshal, 9 W. R. 121 122 (1868), for an instance in which the cause of action is not complete until damage has accrued see Darley Main Colliery v Mitchell 11 App. Cas. 127.

(6) See cases cited ante and Bennett v Hood 13 Gra. 47 (1866), Brunson v Humphrey 11 Q. B. D. 41.

to avail himself of, he cannot sue again. A reasonable construction must be put upon the section and the words "whole claim must be understood with the qualification "in so far as it is cognizable by the Court in which the suit can be lawfully entertained" (1). It was intended to prohibit a second suit when the whole claim arising out of the cause of action was within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court in which the plaintiff had brought his first suit or such suit had been made cognizable by the Court in point of pecuniary value by the relinquishment of a portion of the plaintiff's claim under the express provision in the same section (2). If the first Court had, in fact, no jurisdiction in respect of the claim or any portion of it the plaintiff need not, and indeed could not, have sued. If, in the same circumstances, and in the belief that a Court has jurisdiction, a party does sue, he cannot be said to relinquish or omit a claim which is put forward even though erroneously. If therefore, as in the first case next mentioned a party sues and obtains a decree which is infructuous for want of jurisdiction, or, as in the second case, he is refused a decree he is not precluded from suing again. Where the cause of action was not split because the plaintiff did not in the first case either relinquish or omit to sue for any portion of his claim and the necessity for the second suit arose out of the fact that the decree in the first suit was infructuous so far as regarded a certain portion of the property, in consequence of its having been made without jurisdiction the section was held not to apply (3). And where a plaintiff had a right to sue his mortgagor for the mortgage debt in the Court within whose jurisdiction the mortgagor resided, the fact that he erroneously claimed in that suit relief against the lands which that Court had no jurisdiction to give and therefore refused did not bar a subsequent suit in the proper Court to enforce the mortgage by sale of the mortgaged property (4). The principle has been held to apply even where the jurisdiction might have existed with a permission which was never applied for. So where at the date of the former suit the land in respect of which the subsequent suit was brought was subject to provisions which deprived the Courts of jurisdiction except where authority was given by Government to entertain a particular suit it was held not obligatory on a plaintiff to obtain the permission of Government. The latter was not bound to give the Courts jurisdiction and might possibly refuse it or might give it after such a lapse of time as would be a bar to a party proceeding with the rest of his claim. Innes J. said "If at the time of a cause of action so arising to a plaintiff, or in the interval between that and a subsequent date any part of his claim is not cognizable by the Court it cannot I think be intended that he must postpone his suit for the cognizable portion of his claim until the Court acquires jurisdiction over the portion at present uncognizable

(1) Pattaravy Mudali v. Aulmulla Mulla 11 M. C. R. 419 422 (1870)

(2) Subba Rao v. Rama Rao 3 M. L. C. R. 376 (186) [ref. Pattaravy v. Aulmulla 5 M. H. C. R. 419. Nihal Singh v. Jowaya Singh 1884 P. R. No 162. Grish Chunder v. Ramessuree 22 W. R. 308 (1874)].

(3) Bungssee Singh v. Soodist Lal 7 C.

39 747 (1881). Grish Chunder v. Ramessuree 22 W. R. 308 (1874)

(4) Narasinga v. Venkatanarayana 16 M. 491 (1892). See Ram Soondur v. Krishno 17 W. R. 390 (1872) [where a former judgment decided that the plaintiff had no cause of action there was no cause of action used and determined].

or be barred of all future remedy for the recovery of that portion (1) Under the Code of 1859 where property was in two districts it was necessary to apply to the High Court under sect 12 of that Code for sanction of the trial. It was held in some cases that a plaintiff was not bound to include all such properties in one suit and to apply for sanction and that he might sue separately in each district (2) The Calcutta High Court however held that a plaintiff should include all properties and apply for sanction (3) Sanction however is no longer necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction over the whole property by a Court in which any portion of it is situate and the plaintiff has now an absolute right to sue for the whole of the property situate in several districts in any one of such districts. A suit therefore for partition must include the property in all the districts and a suit for partition of property in any one district will not be allowed (4) The principle applies to defect of material as of local jurisdiction. The former Court must have had jurisdiction to try the particular question raised in the second suit. Where the former suit was instituted in the Revenue Court a subsequent suit in the Civil Court is not barred in respect of a matter not triable by the Revenue Court (5)

(d) Parties must be the same—Not merely must both suits arise out of the same cause of action but they must be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim (6) This rule bars a second suit only when the plaintiff in that suit was also the plaintiff in the first (7) But if a person would have been barred so will a person claiming through him as heir (8) or assignee. And as a plaintiff having an entire demand cannot divide it into distinct parts and maintain separate actions upon each by parity of reason he cannot by an assignment enable others to do it (9) In the under mentioned case (10) it was held that the Advocate General as plaintiff in that suit was barred by a decree in a previous suit under this section. The trustees in that suit having then omitted to ask for an account could not sue again. The Advocate General represented the same interests as they did and was therefore equally bound. It was however held that even if that were not the case the Court in the exercise of its discretion would

(1) Pattaravy : *Aumula* 5 M H C R 419 4th (18 0)

(2) Subba Rao : *Rama Rao* 4 M H C R 376 (1867) ref *Pattaravy : Aumula* 5 M H C R 419 (1870) *Nihal Singh : So raya Singh* 1884 P R No 16th dist *Hari Narayan : Canpatrav Daji* - B 2^o 2 9 (1883)

(3) *J moonas : Damasoonlry* 2 W P 148 (186)

(4) *Anup Shal v Jaswant Shah* 1891 P R No 10 See *Hakim Chanl C P C* 0 nls 20 ant

(5) *Hakim : Naim Cuf* 1893 P R No 30 *Dania : Abal* 4 A 180 (1890) *Imam : Col nil* 4 A 318 (1887) *Ch nn Lal : Banaspur Sngl* 9 A 23 (1886)

(6) *Balmakundi Sangari* 19 A st pp 383 384 (1897) and see *Hingu Lal : Baldeo Ram* 24 A 503 at p 504 (190th) in which it was held that as regards the defendant *Ganesh* who was not a party to the former suit s 43 had no application.

(7) *Dil an Ram Shaha : Bhagnath Shah* 1^o C 69th at p 707 in which case the plaintiff had been defendant in the former suit as regards minors *vide ante* p 577

(8) *Sooraj Persalil : Sahab Lal* 7 B P 20 (1860)

(9) *Grant Aldrich* 38 Cal 514 (*Am r*) cited in *Hakim Chanl C P C* 116

(10) *Advocate General of Bombay : Bai P jahal* 18 B 171 (1894)

not direct the account asked for. As regards defendants, however it is to be observed that this rule has reference to the *subject matter* of the claim, and *not to the persons* against whom it may be made (1) It occurs in an Order which relates to the frame of a suit, and not to the array of parties. It lays down no rule as to who is to be impleaded as a defendant, and does no more than provide that the plaintiff must include, in the relief he asks for in his plaint, the whole claim he is entitled to make in respect of his cause of action against the defendant. It nowhere prescribes that where one person has two distinct causes of action, different in their nature and in their incidents, respecting the same property, one against one person, and one against another, he is bound to join those causes of action in one suit (2) Not only must the plaintiff be the same, but the bar applies only to a suit against the same defendant (3) This rule does not affect that which lays down the principle of bar for jointness. The principle of the maxim, *Nemo debet bis vexari*, applies not only to the case of one individual being sued twice for the same cause of action, but also to the case of a person suing twice on the same contract (4) The rule that a decision against a joint, not joint and several, contractor, or a joint tortfeasor, is a bar to a suit against another contractor or tortfeasor, while proceeding also on the ground of unity of cause of action, is based on a different principle, viz merger of the right of action in a judgment (5)

(c) And there must be identity of the cause of action.—In order that the action should be a bar, the cause of action must be the same in both suits, both claim and remedy have reference to the same cause of action. The rule has no application where the causes are distinct. The rule does not compel a plaintiff, who has several causes of action, to lump them together under the penalty of having a subsequent suit barred. It applies only where there has been a splitting of a single cause of action. As pointed out by the Privy Council the "section does not say that every suit shall include every cause of action, or every claim which the party has, but every

(1) Nobin Chandra Roy v Magantara, 10 C. 924, at p 927 (1884)

(2) Balmakund v Sangari, 19 A. 379, at pp 384, 388, 389 (1897)

(3) Sabeer Khan v Hali Doss 1 W R 199, 201 (1864) ['if the present suit includes persons who were not defendants in the former suit it is at least as to such persons wholly unaffected by the actions referred to]. Dal Singh v Jowala Devi, 1896, P R No 58 [the Court observed that it followed from the authorities that the identity of the defendants is essential when the bar under s 43 is pleaded] In Ramayya v Venkataratnam, 17 M 122, 128 (1893) the section was held not to apply as the defendants were born subsequent to the former suit, and cf Canpat Rai v Hira

Singh, 1891, P R No 29, Balmakund v Sangari, *supra*. And in Madul v Jaleem, 4 N W P H C P 142 (1872) Pearson J, dissenting (in this respect, it is submitted, rightly) held that the section did not apply, and said that the direction that 'every suit shall include etc' is to be understood in respect of the defendants impleaded in that suit but see also Murti v Bhola Ram 1 C A at p 173 (1893)

(4) Cambefort v Chapman 19 Q B D 32

(5) See the subject, which is foreign to the section, treated in Hukm Chand Res Jud 731, C P C, 551 and the leading decision of Kendall v Hamilton 4 App Cas 504, which has been referred to in numerous cases in this country which will be found in the text books cited

suit shall include the whole of the claim arising out of the cause of action, meaning the cause of action for which the suit is brought" (1) It has also been held, in the under mentioned case, (2) that a plaintiff was not bound to alter the nature of his suit upon the addition, at their own instance, of certain persons as defendants. In this case a suit had been brought by A for the recovery of certain moveable property. Two persons were in possession of a house, which, as well as the moveable property, had originally belonged to the same person. They were, on their own application, added as defendants. In a subsequent suit by A's son to recover the house, it was held that his father was not bound to set up a claim to the house in the first suit against the added defendants. To have done so would have been to alter the nature of the suit as originally brought, and to have offended against the provisions of sect 44 of the last Code and O II rr 4, 5 of this.

As in the case of *res judicata*, the claims in the two suits must have been made under the same title. The plaintiff must not only be the same person, but he must be suing in the same right. Thus, a suit for damages, under Lord Campbell's Act (corresponding to Indian Act XIII of 1855), is no bar to a suit for damages suffered by the personal estate and effects of the deceased, inasmuch as the action under the Act is not connected with the estate of the deceased, and the damages recovered form no part of that estate, whereas the second action is brought by the executor or administrator as representing the estate of the testator or intestate (3).

In order to determine whether in any case the causes of action in the two suits are the same, it is necessary to determine what was the cause of action

(1) *Pittapur Raja v. Surya Rau*, 8 M 520 524 (1885), s. c., 12 I A 119, *Amanat Bih v. Imdad Husain*, 15 I A 111, 112 (1888) *Mahomed Reasat Ali v. Hasan Banu*, 20 I A 155, 158 (1893), *Subbayya v. Venkatesappa*, 6 M 49 52 53 (1882), *Thyila v. Kunhamed* 4 M 308 310 (1891), *Pragji v. Endarni*, 9 B H C R 257 (1872) (although the Code allows of claims arising from different causes of action being included in one suit, there is no provision which makes it obligatory), *Irupati v. Narasimha*, 11 M 210 211 (1887), *Ambu v. Ketildamma*, 14 M 23 (1890), *Bulwant v. Chittan*, 3 N W. P 27 (1871), *Ganesh Chandra v. Ram Kumar*, 3 B L R 265 (1869), *Bungseo Singh v. Soodst Lal*, 7 C 739, 747 (1891), *Andi v. Thatay*, 10 M 347 (1887) [the claim and the remedy mentioned in s. 43 have no reference to the cause of action litigated in the previous suit], *Udmi v. Raji*, 1891, P R No 23; *Chunni Lal v. Banaspat Singh*, 9 A 23 (1886), *Balmakund v. Sangari*, 19 A 379, 383 (1897) [the two essentials are same cause

of action and same parties], *Munahce Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum*, 8 W R P C 312 (1867), *Naro Balvant v. Ramchandra*, 13 B 326, 329 (1893), *Bikrama Singh v. Prah Dial*, 1889, P R No 129, cited *Hukm Chand*, C P C 501 [ejectment, claim for mesne profits]; *Purshottam v. Atmaram*, 23 B 597, 601 (1899), *Narayan v. Shesunrao*, 27 B 379, 388 (1903), *Rama swami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar*, 26 M 760 (1902) [the real test is whether the cause of action is the same and not whether the transaction is sought to be established in different modes or by different means], *Preonath Mukerji v. Brahmanath Prasad* 29 A 256 (1906) [cause of action the same], *Maung Po v. Ma Lon Ma Gale*, 38 C 623 (1911), 31 I A 110, 14 C L J 15, suit for divorce and partition in Burmah.

(2) *Hingu Lal v. Baldeo Ram*, 21 A 553 (1902).

(3) *Leggott v. Great Northern Railway Co.*, L R 1 Q B D 599.

in the former suit, and this cause of action, it has been held, must be sought for between the four corners of the plaint (1) The Court has not to see how the facts stood upon the finding of the Court in the first suit. The question to be determined turns not upon what was the proper suit for the plaintiff to have brought, or the proper remedies for him to have applied for, having regard to the facts as found upon the trial of the first suit, but upon whether the causes of action alleged in the plaints in the two suits are one and the same, or are distinct (2) The cause of action as alleged in the plaint cannot be altered by the result of the suit (3) So where a suit for confirmation of possession is dismissed upon the ground that the plaintiff is not in possession, such suit is no bar to another for recovery of possession (4) And in the under mentioned case (5) it was held that there was nothing in the former section which would justify the Court in going behind two bonds to consider the circumstances out of which they sprang albeit those circumstances might themselves at the time constitute a cause of action.

Meaning of "cause of action"—The meaning of the term 'cause of action' has been discussed in the notes to sect 20 and O I r 1, *ante*. The question of the identity of the cause of action in the two suits will depend considerably on the circumstance whether, in cases other than those in which the cause consists merely of a right, the term is used in its restricted sense of the infringement of a right, or in the wider sense both of the right and its infringement. The wider the meaning which is attached to the term 'cause of action,' the more restricted is the operation of the section, for if the term is composed of only one element, there is more likelihood of the identity of the two suits than where their identity is required in all of several elements. The term has, in connection with this section, been defined in a number of cases in its wider sense (6) though there are others in which the term appears to have

(1) *Jibunti Nath Khan v Shib Nath Chuckerbatty* 8 C 819 822 (1882), *Nonoo Singh Monda v Anand Singh Monda* 12 C 291 (1885). As to plaintiff not knowing nature of defence see *Mt Ackjoo v Lalla* 23 W R 400 (1875). In order to see whether there is a bar of *res judicata* that is to see what was heard and decided it is necessary to look both at the pleadings and judgment. *Jagatjit Singh v Sarabjit Singh* 19 C. 159 172 (1891), see notes to s 11 *ante*.

(2) *Jibunti Nath v Shib Nath supra* at pp 823 824.

(3) *Ittappan v Manavikrama* 21 M 153 157 (1897).

(4) *Jibunti Nath v Shib Nath supra*. *Nonoo Singh v Anand Singh, supra*. *Komola Kamny v Lokenath Kur*, 8 C 875 (1882), *Mohan Lal v Bilaso* 14 A 512 (1892) *ref.* *Thakore Becharji v Thakore Pujaji*, 14 B 31, 51 (1889), *Amlu v Kethilamma* 14 M. 23, 24 (1890). See however, *Nathur Budhu*, 18 B 537, 542 (1893), the Court expressed an

opinion *obiter* that s 43 must be applied as if the facts had been as found by the Court and not as alleged in the plaint, *Banlo Ali v Gokul Misur* 34 A 172 183 (1911).

(5) *Umed Dholchand v Pir Sahab* 7 B 131 (1883).

(6) *Jibunti Nath v Shib Nath* 8 C 819 822 (1882), *Nonoo Singh v Anand Singh* 12 C. 291 294 (1885), *Ittappan v Manavikrama*, 21 M. 153 156 (1897). *Ram Bhai v Devia* 1831 P R No 123 [in which case the breach was one but the antecedent rights were distinct and in which Brandreth J., expressly observed that both the antecedent right and the breach were necessary to constitute the cause of action]. *Salma Bibi v Sheikh Muhammad* 18 A 131 (1893), *Sheo Prasad v Lalit Kuar* 18 A 403 (1895). *Rajjo Koor v Dela Dial* 18 A. 432 (1895), in *Dial Singh v Jowala Devi*, 1896, P R. No 58 it was pointed out that while the term is also used in the Code in its limited sense as in the former s. 26 [see *Haramoni*

been understood, though not expressly stated to have been used, in its restricted sense (1)

It was said of the last Code that the term "*cause of action*" had not been used in all its sections in precisely the same sense (2) It is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to the form of action (3) The test has been said to be whether the same evidence and arguments apply in the two cases (4)

The cause of action must be distinguished from the subject matter (5) of the suit, as well as from the relief (6) claimed The words have no relation whatever to the defence, but refer to the grounds set forth in the plaint (7)

Dassi v Hari Churn Chowdhry, 22 C 833 (1895) in the present rule the wider meaning was intended as has also been held to be the case for the purpose of former s 45 (see *Jhama Lal v Sant Lal*, 1897, P R No 43), *Murti v Bhola Ram*, 16 A 165 (1893), citing *Read v Brown*, 22 Q R D 128, but in which the decision of the majority was rather in favour of the opposite construction, *Hukm Chand C P C 511*, *Balmakund v Sangari*, 19 A 379 384 (1897), *Dampana boyina v Addala*, 25 M 736 739 (1902), *Narayan v Shamrao* 27 B 379 385 (1903)

(1) See *Hukm Chand C P C 511*, 512 See cases cited *post*

(2) *Anderson, Wright & Co v Kalaguria*, 12 C. at p 347 (1885), *Maulvi Muhammad v Muhammad Abdul*, 24 I A 22, 26 (1896)

(3) *Duncan Bros v Jeetmull Greedharoo Mull*, 19 C 372, 379 (1892) as in the case of the rule relating to *res judicata* The cause of action, into whatever Protean forms it may be moulded by the ingenuity of pleaders is to be regarded as the same if it rests on facts which are integrally connected with those upon which a right and infringement of the right have already been once asserted as a ground for the Court's interference, *per West, J, Vishnu v Krishnarao*, 11 B at p 185 n (1874) The difficulty in the way of interpretation of this term in the Code has now been removed by the amendment of s 26 (now O I r 1)

(4) *Appasami v Ramasami*, 9 M 279, 281 (1880), *Narayan v Shamrao*, 27 B 379, 383 (1903), s c, 5 Bom L R 233, *Rangayya v Narayappa*, 24 M 491, 499 (1901), P C. *Brusden v Humphreys*, 14 Q B D 148, in *Naro Balvant v Ramchandra*, 13 B 329 (1889), it was pointed out that the evidence in the two suits was essentially different The test, however, was not accepted in *Elce,*

C J, in Murti v Bhola Ram, 16 A 165, 173 (1893), and in *Anderson, Wright & Co v Kalaguria*, 12 C 339 (1885), *Garth, C J.* held that the different actions required different evidence, though *Wilson, J.* held that the former s 43 applied on the ground that though there were several breaches they were under one contract More properly it can be described as a rough test *Furshottam v Atmaram*, 1 Bom L R 76, 81 (1890), s c, 23 B 507, and seems to different issues, *Soorasoonderes Dabca v Gopal Lal Thakoor*, 19 W R 141 (1873)

(5) See *Suddaruddin Ahmed v Baidmal hub Roy Chowdhry*, 15 C 145, 160 (1887) in which the Full Bench, holding that the dismissal of a suit for rent at an enhanced rate was no bar to a subsequent suit for rent at the rate originally fixed, observed that it might be the subject matter was the same but the cause of action was not

(6) *Shankar Baksh v Daya Shankar*, 15 C 422 (1887) [difference in the mode of relief does not affect the identity of the cause of action], *Narayan v Shamrao*, 27 B 379, 383 (1903), *Nagathat v Ponnusami*, 13 M 44, 45 (1889), in which case the relief was said to be substantially the same though the cause of action was different [suit to cancel document, suit to declare that it was not intended to take effect], *Rangayya v Narayappa*, 24 M 491, 499 (1901), in which the relief asked for was different but the cause of action was identical in the two cases *Narayan v Shamrao*, 27 B 379, 383, 385 (1903)

(7) *Dampana boyina v Addala*, 25 M 736, 739 (1902), in which also, at pp 745-747, the distinction between "*cause of action*" and "*same matter*," in s 26 of the former Code, is pointed out

If the causes of action in two suits are separate the fact that the suit which might have preceded in point of time has actually been posterior does not affect the question (1) Nor does the fact that joinder of claims might be made without being open to the charge of multifariousness take away the plaintiff's right to bring separate suits in respect of separate causes of action. Because a plaintiff has not formerly availed himself of the right to join separate claims when that is permissible, that is no objection under this section to a subsequent suit (2)

Prior valid causes of action cannot be made into one by a transaction which is inoperative in law and challenged as such in the suit. So a suit to cancel a release, obtained by duress of all claims against defendants, and to recover the amount of one such claim was held to be no bar to subsequent suits upon other causes of action so released (3). The same rule applies if a document is inadmissible in evidence and in consequence a party sues on the original transaction prior to such document. So where a balance was found due between the parties, and a promissory note was executed providing for its payment by instalments and the note being inadmissible for want of stamp, the plaintiff had to sue on the original transaction, he was held to be bound to sue for the full amount and a suit for the amount due for some of the instalments provided for in the note was held to bar a subsequent suit for the balance (4).

The duty to obey a foreign judgment is a new and separate cause of action from that of the original cause of action to which the judgment gave effect (5).

Each right which gives a right of action as also as a general rule distinct acts, constitute separate causes of action (6). So as regards separate rights, a cause of action in respect of injury to a proprietary or permanent interest in an estate is not the same as that in respect of injury to a temporary or leasehold interest, (7) and the cause of action accruing to a co sharer by reason of exclusion from joint possession is not the same as that which he possesses to have the joint estate partitioned, (8) nor is the cause of action the same in a

(1) *Doorga Nath Roy v. Roy Kallee Narain* 24 W R 212 213 (1875)

(2) See *In re Hurco Mohun Paramanick* 15 W R 486 (1871) s c 14 B L R 418 419, *Laluchand v. Gurjappa* 20 B 409 414 (1897), *Dampasaboyina v. Addala* 25 M at p 745 (1902), as to alternative relief see *Sudduruddin Ahmed v. Banismadhub Roy* 15 C at p 149 (1887). So the fact that a prior mortgagee might have been but was not impleaded did not bring the case within the section *Balmakund v. Sangari*, 19 A at p 388 (1897). Where there are separate causes of action against separate defendants in respect of which they are not jointly concerned *Raja Ram Tewary v. Iuchman Palsal* 8 W R 17 (1867) the plaint will be rejected.

(3) *Subbaya v. Venkatesappa*, 6 M 49 (1882)

(4) *Benara Das v. Bhikan Das* 3 A 717 (1881) *Oldfield J. diss.*

(5) *Lakshmanan v. Karuppan* 6 M 273 (1882)

(6) *Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 513 514

(7) *Upendra Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State* 20 C 716 (1893)

(8) *Abdan Nasir v. Pasulan* 20 C 385 (1892) the suit however may be barred where the cause of action in each case was partition. So a suit to partition debts bars a subsequent suit to partition lands *Ukha v. Daga* 2 B 182 (1882) disapproved in *Monslaram v. Conesh* 17 C W N 521 (1912). In however, *Ittappan v. Manavikrama* 21 M 173 158 161 (1897) it was held

suit to recover possession of land upon the strength of alleged title thereto, and a suit based on the fact that there was no title, and that for the consideration money plaintiff got nothing (1) And when plaintiff had first sued for ejectment in the Revenue Court and afterwards for rent prior to ejectment under sect 34 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901, it was held that the causes of action were distinct and that the latter suit was not barred by rule 2 of this Order (2) A right of a Mahomedan widow to dower is distinct from a right to a life interest in the estate of her deceased husband (3) Similarly, a suit for maintenance is distinct from a subsequent claim for a share in ancestral property (4) If a suit for partition has been brought, but for some reason the properties have not been actually divided by the decree made therein, it is open to any one of the joint owners to maintain a subsequent suit for partition (5) A Burmese Buddhist husband's suit for divorce is distinct from his suit for partition based on divorce (6)

Torts—As a general rule, every tort is a separate and indivisible cause of action So a claim in respect of a distinct prior tort need not be included in a suit on a subsequent one, and will not be barred by the suit on that other, (7) even though the suit brought might have embraced the claims on both the torts (8) Each of several wrongful alienations of property constitutes a separate cause of action (9) A suit for recovery of land A from X is no bar to a suit for the recovery of land from Y, though the title thereto is the same, and the causes of action may have arisen at the same time, both the persons withholding and the property being different (10) An act prejudicially affecting more than one person gives to each a separate cause of action, as if the act done to each were separate So a libel against several persons has often been held to afford a separate cause of action to each (11)

that the right of a tenant in common to have each field separately divided was different from the right to claim partition of all fields

(1) Hanuman Kamut : Hanuman Mandur, 15 G 51 (1887)

(2) Nandan Singh : Ganga Prasad, 35 A 514 (F B) (1913)

(3) Mahomed Pesarat Ali : Hasin Banu 21 C 157 (1893), s c, 20 I A 155

(4) Pramada Das : Lakh Narain 12 C 60 (1885)

(5) Monshiram : Gonesh, 17 G W N 21 (1912)

(6) Maung Pe r Ma Lon Ma Gale, 15 C W N 766 (1911)

(7) Mahabeer Singh : Rambhajan Sah, 16 C 545 (1889)

(8) Hukm Chand, C P C 518

(9) Looloo Singh : Rajendur Lala 8 W R 364 (1867), Pragn : Endarp, 9 B H C R. 257 (1872), Rao Kuran Singh : Fyz Ali, 14 Moo 1 A 187, 196 (1871) [suit to impeach alienations by Hindu widow and mother,

suit to set aside mortgage granted by them before alienations], Shafkat un nissa : Shib Sahai, 4 A 171, at p 173 (1881), Jehan : Sawak, 1 Agra, F B 109 (1866) [suit to set aside alienations by Hindu widow to A, the same to B] See also in connection with the subject of alienation, Ram Lechun Lal : Gour Pershad, 5 N W P 172 (1873) [suit to set aside alienation of half share made by guardian, suit for share recovered by alienee in execution in another suit], Debi Prosad Chowdhury : Golap Bhagat, 40 C 721 (F B)

(10) Dampnanboyina v Addala, 25 M. 736 (1902), as to suits against several alienees, vide pp 742, 745, ib

(11) Hukm Chand, C P C 527, and see Ali Serang : Beadon, 11 C. 524 (1885), Salma Bibi : Sheikh Muhammad, 18 A 131, at p 138 (1895), Rajjo Kusr : Dabi Dial, 18 A 432 (1896), Ramanuja : Deva nayka, 8 M 361 (1885)

Even in the case of the same person if his rights in several capacities are infringed there will be a separate cause of action to him inasmuch as he will be considered in each case as if he were a distinct person (1) Where the plaintiff's right is infringed by more persons than one and by different acts done separately by each of them the plaintiff has a separate cause of action against each of those persons (2) A tort, though connected with a contract, constitutes a distinct cause of action from breach of the contract and so a suit for the hire of a carriage will not bar a suit for the injury done to it during the hirer's use of it (3) And so as regards distinct acts constituting distinct causes of action, where for instance some co sharers sell their shares on different dates to different persons, each sale gives a distinct and separate cause of action to the remaining co sharer claiming all the shares sold by right of pre-emption (4) So also a suit on an unduly stamped instrument for which the plaintiff had to pay duty and penalty does not bar a suit for recovery of amount so paid (5) there being two distinct causes of action one of which accrued since the institution of the former suit. Unity of title to different properties injured does not make the different acts causing the injuries a single tort. So a man's right to enjoy a piece of land may depend upon one and the same title, but if he is ejected from different parts of it by distinct acts of ouster each act of ouster would constitute a distinct and separate cause of action (6) There is it is submitted no question but that there is no unity of cause of action in such cases where there is no unity in the act of dispossession even though the plaintiff's title may be one and the same. So conversely if the alleged wrongs be distinct and separable committed by several persons and proceeding from no combination or conspiracy of such persons the wrong doers must respectively be sued separately in respect of their own misfeasance and not collectively in respect of wrongs to which they have been neither directly nor indirectly

(1) *Hukm Chand C P C 528* and authorities there cited.

(2) *Balmakund v Sangari 19 A at p 384 (1897)*. It cannot be said that a cause of action against one person is a part of the cause of action against another though it is not a joint one against both. *Dampena boyina v Addala 25 M. at p 740 (1907)*.

(3) *Hukm Chand C. P C 528 citing Shaw v Beers 25 Ala 449 (1897)* and cf. *Doorga Nath v Roy Kalce 24 W R 212 (1875)* [suit by lessor to recover lands resumed by lessee, suit to recover lands leased].

(4) *Kahan Singh v Gur Dayal 4 A 163 (1881)*. See *Balmakund v Sangari 19 A at p 384 (1897)*. See *Harban v Tota Sahu 32 A. 14 (1909)*.

(5) *Ishar Das v Masud Khan 6 A 70 (1883)*.

(6) *Jardine Skinner & Co v Rance Shama*

Soonduree 13 W R 136 (1870). *Hayatullah Khan v Nasir Khan 6 A 616 (1881)*, *Narayan v Shamrao 27 B 379 385 (1903)*. *Quere whether Jumoona Dasse v Bamasoon decree 2 W R 148 (1865)* which held to the contrary and as to which see *Madda Singh v Bikan Singh 1881 P P No. 9* was correctly decided. See on this case *Hukm Chand C P C 532 O'Keefe C P C 110*. In *Ram Soondur Shaha 20 W P 103 (1873)* the Court remanded the case to ascertain whether there were separate and distinct acts of dispossession and see cases cited *post* and cf. *Pittapur Raja Suria Rau 8 M 529 (1885)* where there was unity of title and *Ramhurry Mondul v Mothoor Mohun 20 W R 450 (1873)* [suits for possession of shares of different properties all bought with joint funds but in different names and at different times].

parties (1) A question may, however, arise as to the unity of the cause of action where there is unity of the act of dispossession, that is, infringement but different rights infringed. If the term "cause of action" be given its wider sense, then in such cases it cannot be said that there is identity of cause of action. It has, however, been held that it is not the title upon which a party relies, but the infringement of it, which constitutes his cause of action (2) The fact that a defendant's title rests upon different and distinct transactions, supported by distinct and separate evidence, does not necessarily imply that to a party contesting that title there are different causes of action warranting separate suits (3) The unity of a tortious act is not affected by the different modes in which it causes injury. Thus, in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff may recover damages not only for his unlawful arrest and imprisonment and for the expenses of his defence, but also for the injury caused to his good fame and character by reason of the false accusation, and, in consequence, a subsequent suit for the latter will be barred (4)

An act sometimes consists of a series, and so may an act constituting a tort. The various acts may thus constitute a single wrong, so as to furnish but a single cause of action. As a general rule, acts of a similar character, performed in pursuance of the same general purpose, constitute one act and one tort, particularly so if the acts are done at the same time, or in actual continuation (5) So a libel constitutes a single cause of action even though it consists of several statements in the libellous pamphlet. A litigant cannot select one portion of a libel as the ground for one action, and another as the ground for a second, and so on (6)

Generally, where goods are wrongfully detained after seizure, the action

(1) *Koondun Lal v. Rao Himmut Singh*, 3 N. W. P. 86, 87 (1871), and see *Musst Ruita Bibco v. Durnee Lal* 2 N. W. P. 153 (1870) in which, though the plaintiff's title was one and the same the different alienations sought to be set aside were held to constitute distinct causes of action. The question of combination or absence of concert affecting or not the unity of the cause of action, has been considered with reference to misjoinder in the following cases—*Gujadhar Pershad v. Bahadur Roy*, 19 W. R. 203 (1873) *Omur Ali v. Wajayat Ali* 4 C. L. R. 455 (1879), *Loko Nath Surma v. Keshav Ram*, 13 C. 147 (1886) There was held to be combination and one and the same cause of action against all defendants in *Sudhendhu v. Durga Das*, 14 C. 435 (1887), *Ram Narain Dutt v. Annoda Prasad Joshi*, 14 C. 681 (1887), *Mangul v. Girdhari*, 1892, P. P. No. 127, in *Hurro Moneo v. Onkol Chunder Mookerjee*, 8 W. L. 161 (1867) it was held there was none. See *Hukm Chand v. P. C. 519-521*, and as

to former s. 43, *Dampanaboyina v. Addala* 25 M. 736 (1902) In *Ram Chander v. Omora Churn* 18 W. R. 155 (1871), there was held to be not a single cause of action though the defendants were alleged to have leagued

13 W. R. 198 (1870), *Koondun Lal v. Himmut Singh* 3 N. W. P. 86, 87 (1871), it is however, to be observed that in these cases the Court was dealing with the contention that it was the title alone which constituted the cause of action.

(3) *Ram Soondur Shaha v. Delannoy*, 20 W. R. 103 (1872)

(4) *Hukm Chand v. P. C. 519* [citing *Sheldon v. Carpenter* 1 V. L. 579 (Amr.), *De La Guerra v. New Hall* 55 Cal. 21 (Amr.)]

(5) 1b 520

(6) *Macdowall v. Kulkarni*, 5 Q. J. P. 1

tion does not constitute a separate cause of action, but is only the consequence of the seizure. So, after a suit for recovery of property, a suit for damages for wrongful detention of the same property is barred (1). In such cases there is one cause of action, for which damages must be assessed once for all, and different remedies. The same principle has in some cases been applied to suits for mesne profits of land from which the owner is dispossessed, (2) and a suit for possession of land has been held a bar to a suit for mesne profits of that land (3). It has, however, in other cases been held to the contrary, both on account of sect 10 of the Code of 1859, (4) and sect 44 of the last Code, corresponding with O II rr 4, 5 of this, (5) that claims to recover possession of immoveable property and for mesne profits are distinct claims, (6) and, conversely, a suit for mesne profits of land has been held not to bar a suit for its possession, the fact of the priority of the suit for mesne profits being immaterial so far as the construction of the Code is concerned (7). These cases proceed on the principle that the right to possess immoveable property and the right to enjoy the profits of such property are distinct causes of action. The causes of action in a suit to recover possession under sect 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and in a suit to recover mesne profits, are not the same, in that in the first case the party is entitled to recover possession though he had no title, whereas, if he were a trespasser, mesne profits would not be given against the true owner (8). But where a suit was brought for possession of mortgaged

(1) Shaikh Panju t Shaikh Oodey, 18 W R 337 (1872), Saem Sirdar t Rama luddy, 22 W R 424 (1874), Serrao t Noel 15 Q B D 549, and see Debi Dal Singh t Ajaib Singh, 3 A 543 (1881). In *Munghroo v Gyaram*, 14 W R 233 (1870), the cause of action being the detention of a boat, the plaintiff was held bound to sue for the whole of the demurrage due, *Mohabut Mandal t Shoorendro Nath Roy*, 4 W R, s c, C R 20 (1865) [suit for value of cattle taken, suit for damages].

(2) Venkoba t Subbanna 11 M 151 (1887) but see *Tirupati t Narasimha*, 11 M 210 (1887), which has been followed in *Gutta Saramma t Maganti Ramedu*, 31 M 405 (1908), *Mewa Kuar t Banarsi Prasad*, 17 A 533 (1893). See remarks of Privy Council in this case on appeal, 23 A 227, 232 (1900), s c, 5 C. W. N 193, and *Fatima Bibi t Abdul Majid* 14 A 531, 536 (1892), in which the opinion was expressed that the term "cause of action" had not been used in the same sense in s 43 and in ss. 44-47 of the last Code.

(3) Venkoba t Subbanna, 11 M 151 (1887).

(4) *Chowdry Imdad Ali t Doonyad Ali* 14 W R 92 (1870), *Baboo Issur Dutt t Alluck Nussar*, 7 W R 429 (1867), *Sitaram*

t *Blagvant*, 6 B H C R 109, A. C. J. (1869) decided under the Code of 1859, which however, expressly dealt with the point. The decision in *Ram Ruttun Audo t Pam Chunder Pal*, 25 W R 113 (1870) is not to the contrary as there in the former suit mesne profits were expressly prayed for. In *Rookminsee Koor t Ram Tohul Roy*, 21 W R 223 (1874) it was held that though a claim for mesne profits was a separate cause of action, yet it cannot itself be divided and every suit must include the whole of the mesne profits which had then accrued.

(5) *Lessor Babu t Janki Bibi* 10 C 615 (1891).

(6) *Ib Bikrama Singh t Prab Dal* 1839, P 1 No 129, F B which must be taken to supersede *Phalla t Kesav Singh* 1882, P R No 138. And see *Pratap Chandra t Ram Swarnamayi* 4 B L R F R 113 (1869). *Mon Mohun Sirkar t Secretary of State* 17 C 968 (1890), *Subraya t Rathnavelu* 32 A 330 (1903).

(7) *Monohur Lall t Gouri Sunkur*, 9 C 283 (1882), *Tirupati t Narasimha*, 11 M 210 (1887).

(8) *Sheo Kumar t Narain Das*, 24 A 501, 503 (1902).

property and a deposit was made in Court, a second suit to recover mesne profits from the date of deposit to that of recovery of possession was held barred (1)

As to whether or not there is a new cause of action in the case of continuing torts, the general rule appears to be that in the case of such torts as are not of a necessarily injurious and permanent character, there is a continuing obligation to abate them and the continuance of the nuisance is held to be a new tort and therefore a separate cause of action, but the rule is otherwise in the case of all torts of a permanent character which continue to operate injuriously without any external agency (2) While if there are different persons injured there are different torts, the question as to the number of causes of action which the same person may have, turns upon the number of torts and not upon the number of different pieces of property which may have been injured. Thus an act which damages two properties belonging to the same man at the same time and by the same means does not create two causes of action. The elements of damage are multifarious but the cause of it is a unit, but it will be otherwise if the cause itself is not single and indivisible (3) A suit for certain moneys said to have been misappropriated by the defendant while acting as manager of a joint family, was held to bar a subsequent suit for the plaintiff's share of certain joint paddy held by the defendant at the time of the first suit, Mitter, J. observing "The causes of action in both the cases originated in the refusal of the defendant to give to the plaintiffs their share of the properties realized by him as manager

the manager of a joint Hindu family holds possession of various items of property on behalf of the family. Can it be contended for a moment that each member of the family has a separate cause of action for his share in each item of those properties?" (4)

An act which causes injury both to person and property may constitute different torts. Both causes of action may be founded upon one act, but they are not on that account identical causes of action (5) All the claims in

(1) Rukhmabai v. Venkatesh, 31 B 527 (1907)

(2) See Hukm Chand v. P. C. 525-527 and cases there cited.

(3) See ib., 528, and Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonissa, 11 Moo I A. 605 (1867) where the Privy Council pointed out that there was nothing to distinguish the deposit of the particular company's paper from the deposit of those which the plaintiff had deposited with it and recovered in the former suit, Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau, 8 M. 520, 12 I A 116 (1883), in which the conversion of several things was held to be one cause of action, but the particular case was distinguished, and the suit held not to be barred (suit as upon dispossession for land,

subsequent suit for personality, same title to both under will)

(4) Ganes Chandra v. Pam Kumar, 3 F L R, A C 265 (1869), s. c. s. d. n. n. Radhakishore v. Ram Coomar, 12 W P 79. Similarly a suit for certain sums misappropriated by a general agent has been held to bar a suit for all other sums misappropriated before the former suit, on the ground that the cause of action is not the misappropriation but the refusal to account on demand. Menohur Dass v. Setai Pershad, 23 W R 416 (1875)

(5) Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q B D 111, Darley Main Colliery v. Mitchell, 11 App Cas 114. See former case discussed in Hukm Chand, C P C 530-531

respect of the tort which is the cause of action should be made in one suit (1)

Contract.—Each separate contract made with the same or different persons constitutes a separate cause of action. So the holder of two independent mortgages over the same property may sue and obtain a decree for sale on each of them separately (2) and two bonds have been held to constitute separate causes of action, even though the circumstances out of which they sprung might themselves at the time have constituted a cause of action (3). Each of several contracts made with separate persons, though made at one and the same time, is a distinct and separate cause of action (4). Thus in the second of the last mentioned cases an engagement for payment of rent with each tenant was held to be a separate cause of action, as also in the second each purchase of goods made by several persons. A bond executed by father and son living together, joint in all their concerns, constitutes a separate cause of action from that executed by the son alone, as the father could not be responsible for the latter (5). Where there are separate contracts the breach of each constitutes a separate cause of action (6). Where there is a single contract, and several breaches which have occurred before any suit is brought, all the breaches must be included in one action even though the claim may be in part for a debt and in part for damages (7). In *Bikrama Singh v. Prab Dial*, (8) *Plowden, J.*, said "Where there is an obligation created by a single contract, and several breaches have occurred before action brought, a plaintiff who does not claim all that he is entitled to in respect of such breaches does truly split his claim. The illustration seems to regard the obligation and the several breaches before suit as constituting but one cause of action. Another similar instance would be of an instalment bond and several defaults in payment of instalments due

(1) *Maksud Ali v. Nargis Dye*, 20 C 322

Ramsarn Pandyan, 20 W R 144 (1873) [suit for declaration of title to mokurruce, suit for amount plaintiff entitled to on account of that title].

(2) *Sundar Singh v. Bholu*, 20 A 322 (1898), but see *Sri Gopal v. Pirthi Singh*, 24 A 429, 439 (1902), s.c., 29 I A 118, and *Hari v. Kusum*, 37 C 581 (1910).

(3) *Umed Dholchand v. Pir Saheb*, 7 B 144 (1883). For the purposes of the rule against misjoinder of causes of action a suit to set aside two bonds alleged to have been executed as parts of the same transaction was held not to be bad, the cause of action being under the circumstances single. *Muhammad Baksh v. Ramulal*, 1890, P R No. 5, *Anantnarayan v. Savithri*, 22 M L J 231 (1911), 36 W 171.

(4) *Baroo Sarcar v. Massini Mundul*, 21 W R 206 (1874), *Jumona Das v. Poolkhar Singh*, 22 W R 133 (1875), in which it was held that there was misjoinder of causes of action and defendants. In *Purum Soolk v. Subban*, 2 Agra, 323 (1867), a creditor's suit against some heirs of deceased was held not to bar a subsequent suit against other heirs for balance unrecovered.

(5) *Gokal Chand v. Khwaja Ali Shah*, 1890, P R No 32.

(6) See *Hukm Chand*, C P C 531, as to several contracts forming part of one transaction and breaches of several covenants *vide post*, p 596.

(7) *Duncan Bros v. Jeetmull Gredharilal*, 19 C 372 (1892) approving of the opinion of *Wilson, J.*, in *Anderson, Wright & Co v. Kalagurda Surjinarain*, 12 C 331 (1885), dist in *Banku v. Gopal*, 14 C L J 251 (1911).

(8) 1889, P R No 129.

before action brought. Similarly a plaintiff excluded by a defendant for a definite period from enjoyment of profits of his property, would probably be bound to claim all the mesne profits which he was entitled to recover up to date of suit in respect of exclusion for such period." The Explanation is now amended so as to expressly include successive claims arising under the same obligation.

Claims under the same contract for several instalments of the same rent, or for several instalments of the same negotiable instrument, have been frequently held to be claims for the same cause of action (1). Though a party may sue in respect of each instalment of rent, (2) or of a debt (3) as it falls due, the aggregate of two or more of such unpaid instalments cannot be divided into two or more causes of action but is deemed for the purpose of this section one cause of action. Whatever instalments are due must be sued for (4). There is no distinction between a suit omitting to claim an earlier rent, and a suit omitting to claim a later rent which is due at the date of its institution (5). The same principle applies to all interest due at the time of suit, though a suit for interest which may accrue due after the former suit will not be barred (6). Similarly, though, where there are more covenants than one in a contract which are to be performed at different times, the breach of each constitutes a single and independent cause of action on which a separate suit may be brought when a suit is brought on any contract after there has been a breach of several covenants, the breach of them all is considered a single cause of action (7). So, also, in the case of continuing contracts for the doing of any act, though there is a separate covenant for the doing of that act at every moment during the period of the contract, and a breach at every moment the contract is or remains unfulfilled, the entire breach at the time of any suit is deemed a single cause of action (8). Contracts for service

(1) *Anderson, Wright & Co v Kalagurda Surjaram*, 12 C 339, 342 (1885), *vide post*.

(2) *Ib*. So while a separate suit can be for the rent of each year, a suit must embrace all the rent due at the time it is brought. *Chockalinga Pillai v Kumara Viruthalam*, 4 M H C R 334 (1869), *Alagu v Abdoola*, 8 M 147 (1881), *Sutto Churn Ghosal v Obhoy Nund Doss*, 2 W R Act X, 31 (1865), *Ram Soondur Saik v Kristo Chunder*, 17 W R 380 (1872), *Kristo harkur v Ram Dhun*, 24 W R 328 (1875) [the last three cases are not of authority now to justify suits in respect of action when a contract has been withdrawn with permission].

Chand Charan v Jogendra Chandra, 1 C W N exx (1897), *Balaji v Bhikaji*, 8 B 161 (1891), *Vasanthi v Tirthabashini*, 22 C 400, 691 (1895).

(3) *Blacktooth v Gidl*, 12 B L R 37

(1873), *Appasami v Ramasami*, 9 M 279 (1890), *Bikrama Singh v Prab Dial*, 1899, P R 129.

(4) *Chockalinga Pillai v Kumara Viruthalam*, 4 M H C R 334 (1869), *Idem*, *Shannu gam Pillai v Syed Gulam Ghose*, 27 M 116 (1903), *Atul Krishna Ghose v Nripenbro Naram Ghose*, 1 C L J 114 (1903).

(5) *Faruck Chunder Mookerjee v Panchu Molani*, 6 C 791 (1891), *Adhiram Narsin v Raghu Mohapatro*, 12 C 50 (1895).

(6) *Shadapa v Balaji*, 7 B 440 (1887).

(7) *Hukam Chand, C P C*, 536.

(8) *See ib*, 510. The principle is, however, not applicable when the covenants are so different in their nature as to be considered separate contracts, in which case the breach of each covenant will be a separate cause of action *ib*, 512. And if performance of several covenants is secured differently their breach will not constitute a single cause of action. *Yashwantr Vithal*, 21 B 267 (1895).

for a term are entire contracts. The breach of such a contract constitutes a single cause of action, and a claim for damages for the breach may be made only once (1). If several items which make up a claim are of the same nature, and form part of the same course of dealing so as to pass under the same description, and form part of one transaction, they must be considered as one cause of action and must be joined in one suit, though they may have arisen out of several contracts (2). Where, however, the contract expressly provides that each monthly demand is to be deemed or treated as a separate contract, the plaintiff is entitled to bring separate suits for damages (3). Where several articles are sold in succession by A to B, if the vendor sues for the price, he must sue for the price of all the goods sold up to the date of his suit, and cannot sue separately first for one and then for another (4). The principle of such cases is that the transaction really constitutes one demand. On the same principle, a running account generally constitutes one demand and one cause of action, as also wages for work done under a general hiring (5). All damages claimed in respect of the cause of action and accrued at date of suit must be sued for in one action, (6) as also all claims and relief arising thereout (7).

The scope of the identity of the cause of action has been considerably extended by the addition of the Explanation of the rule, which supersedes those cases in which it was held that a suit on a collateral security given for a debt would not bar a suit for the debt itself. This is generally not the case now, and, conversely, a suit for a bill will bar a suit to enforce a security given in respect of it (8). As regards, however mortgages of immoveable property,

(1) *Simpson v Cleghorn*, 6 C L R 91 (1880), and see *English and American cases cited in Hukum Chand C P C 542-544*.

(2) *Anderson v Kalaguria*, 12 C 339 (1883) per Carth, C J, and see *Chockalinga Pillai v Kumara Viruthalam*, 4 M H C R 334 (1890), distinguished in case next cited.

(3) *Mundulani Co v Fazul Hahoo*, 8 C C, Pef 2 of 1912 (3rd Feb 1914) (Jenkins C J, and Woodroffe J), following *Volkart v Suleji*, 19 M 304.

(4) *Shanmugam Pillai v Syed Gulam Ghose*, 27 M 116, 117 (1903).

(5) See *Hukum Chand, C P C 546-548*. In *Nawab Mehdi Ullee v Mahomed Wajid Khan*, 1 N W P 70 (1869), a prior suit to recover a receipt given by way of security for loan of Rs 500 was held not to bar a subsequent suit for balance due on whole account between parties, for in the first case it was not necessary to go into the general account. All that the Court had to do was to satisfy itself that at the time the suit was brought the money advanced on the security of the receipt had been repaid. As to suit on account stated, see *Banarsi Das v Bhukhare*

3 A 717 (1881).

(6) *Sheo Shunkar Sahay v Hriday Naram*, 9 C 143 (1882), a c, in appeal *Madan Mohan Lal v Sheo Sanker Sahay* 12 C 482 (1885), *vide post*.

(7) *Hikmatulla Khan v Imam Ah*, 12 A 203 (1890) usufructuary mortgage, cause of action when possession of property refused suit for unpaid interest subsequent suit for interest and principal] *Mian Singh v Sham Das* 1899, P R No 70, cited in *Hukum Chand C P C 535* [bond suit for one year's interest suit for principal and interest] *Shub Kristo Dahi v Abdool Sobhan* 15 W R 408 (1871) [suit for specific performance suit to recover money part of consideration], *Lalji Lal v Hulas*, 3 A. 660 (1881) [suit for specific performance of contract of mortgage, suit for recovery of means profits of mortgaged property], *Mewa Kuar v Banarsi Prasad* 17 A 533 (1890) [claim for possession and means profits arising out of one cause of action].

(8) See *Preonath Mukerji v Bishnath Prasad* 29 A 256 (1906). Under the Code of 1859, it was held that the taking of a mere

the rule must now be read in subordination to sect 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. But that Act does not nullify the rule entirely, and does not remove both the restriction on the splitting of claims and the splitting of remedies. Its only purpose is to relieve a mortgagee from the restriction placed on the splitting of his remedies (1). It has been held (2) that a mortgagee taking out a money decree was not bound to bring one suit for the whole of the property belonging to his judgment debtor if it had passed to different parties under different title deeds, but might follow the property upon which he had a lien into the hands first of one purchaser and then of another, which would appear also to be law now in the case of suits under sect 67 of the Transfer of Property Act. Where a mortgagee holds two mortgages on the same property executed by the same person, he cannot maintain a suit to recover the sum due on the later mortgage only, by sale of the property subject to the prior mortgage (3). It has been held that where a mortgagee wishes to make out a case that he is entitled to a decree against the mortgagor personally or against his unhypothecated property in the event of the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property being insufficient to pay the mortgage-debt, he is bound to put forward in his plaint the allegations which, if established, would entitle him to that relief (4).

Miscellaneous—As regards mortgages, in the following cases the cause of action in the two suits was held not to be the same—

Suit by mortgagee against mortgagor to declare mortgage lien, suit against attaching creditors of mortgagors to declare lien over surplus moneys, proceeds of sale by Collector of portion of mortgaged properties (5) suit by purchaser of equity of redemption of share for recovery thereof on redemption of whole, suit after purchase of remainder of mortgagor's interest for possession thereof (6). A suit on a second mortgage is no bar to a suit on the first (7). Suit for overdue interest on mortgage held not to bar subsequent suit to secure principal and interest by sale, there being two separate contracts contained in same instrument and distinct covenants secured in a different manner (8). Suit by obligee against obligor to enforce lien, suit by former against purchaser in execution of money decree to have it declared that property was liable to be sold under obligee's

money decree would not necessarily extinguish the creditor's lien. *Montazooddeen v. Rajoomar* 14 B 1 R 408 (1875), *Jennemjoy Mullick v. Dossmoney Dosssee* 7 C 714 (1881), but under the Code of 1877 and prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act (*vide post*) it was held that a separate suit for enforcing the lien was barred. *Guman v. Ram Padarath* 2 A 838 (1880).

(1) *Govind v. Parashram*, 25 B 161, 167, 168 (1900), a.c., 2 Bom L R 561, in which the suit was held to be barred as there was a splitting of claims. In *Wheela Nath v. Muhammad Salig* 26 A 223 (1904) the suit was held not to be barred, as no question of the character arose.

(2) *In re Hurry Mohun Paramanick*, 14 B L R 418 n (1871), a.c., 15 W R 486.

(3) *Keshavram v. Ranchhod*, 30 B 150 (1905), *Gobind v. Lala Hanhar*, 14 C W N 1053 (1910), *Atab Paramanick v. Arif Tarafdar*, 19 C L J 590 (1914).

(4) *Gulam Hussain v. Mahamallah*, 31 B 510 (1910).

(5) *Kristodas Kundoo v. Ramkant Roy*, 6 C 142 (1880).

(6) *Brahannajshi v. Krishna*, 9 M 92 (1895).

(7) *Moro Paghunath v. Balag*, 13 B 45 (1888).

(8) *Yashwant v. Vithal*, 25 B 267 (1895), *vide ante*, p. 594.

decree (1) Suit by mortgagee for sale in which holder of prior mortgage not impleaded, suit by same as purchaser of the property in execution for redemption of prior mortgage (2) Suit by mortgagee for establishment of his right as such to mortgaged property under sect 283 of the Code of 1882 against mortgagor, judgment-debtor and execution-creditor, suit by him against them for possession of the property under the mortgage deed (3) Suit by person to whom lands were hypothecated and usufructuary mortgage given for rent due under terms of *pattanchits* executed on date of mortgage, suit to recover principal and interest under mortgage (4) A contract to pay rent and a mortgage to secure payment of rent constitute separate rights of action (5) Failure in a redemption suit does not bar a subsequent suit in ejectment and *vice versa* (6) Suit to redeem part of *talukdari* estate, previous suits to establish right in same part of estate (7) Suit on mortgage, subsequent suit against mortgagor's sons not born at date of previous decree (8) Ejectment suit by a mortgagor's vendee against purchaser under a mortgage decree, subsequent suit to redeem (9) Suit by mortgagee against his mortgagors does not bar a subsequent suit to enforce the mortgage lien against purchasers or mortgagors and subsequent mortgagees (10) Cause of action of mortgagee against his mortgagor is not the same as that against a rival mortgagee (11) Suit for redemption, suit for mesne profits against mortgagee in possession (12) The holder of two independent mortgages over the same property has two separate causes of action (13) As to claims arising in connection with defendant's default and waiver, *vide ante*, p 579 Suit on mortgage to recover money and for order of sale, suit to eject tenant and to assert right of mortgagee to possession under usufructuary mortgage, (14) suit based upon adjusted account, suit based on mortgage, (15) suit to redeem mortgage alleged to be executed in 1856 over fifty caunes of land, suit to redeem fourteen out of the fifty caunes on the footing of a mortgage of 1853 which had been pleaded by the defendants in the previous suit (16) A former suit to redeem *lanam* is no bar to a subsequent suit based on the *lanam* and title, so far as the latter is based on title (17) A suit brought by A against B

- (1) *Bahraich v Surju* 4 A 257 (1881)
- (2) *Balmakund v Sangari* 1897, ALL W N 91
- (3) *Ganpat Rai v Hira Singh* 1891, P R No 29
- (4) *Nanu v Raman* 16 M 335 (1892)
- (5) *Chuni Lal v Banaspat Singh*, 9 A. 23 (1886), and see as to same *Banda Hasan v Abadi Begam*, 4 A 180 (1880)
- (6) *Naro Balvant v Ram Chandra*, 13 B 320 (1888), *Shridhar Vinayak v Narayan*, 11 B H. C. R 224, 230 (1874)
- (7) *Amanat Bibi v Imdad Husam*, 15 C. 800 (1888), s c., 15 I A 106.
- (8) *Ramayya v Venkataratnam* 17 M 122 (1893)
- (9) *Kuppu v Venkata Krishna* 20 M 82 (1896)
- (10) *Laluchan v Corjappa* 20 R 460, 474

- (1893)
- (11) *Balmakund v Sangari* 19 A. 379, 388 & B (1897)
- (12) *Baboo Gour Kishen v Sahay Fakcor Chand*, 7 W R 364 (1867)
- (13) *Sundar Singh v Bholu*, 20 A 322 F B (1898), but see *Sri Gopal v Parthi Singh*, 24 A. 429 439 (1902), see also *Hari v Kusum*, 35 C 689 (1910) and the cases there mentioned
- (14) *Veerana v Muthukumara* 27 M 102 (1903)
- (15) *Hansraj Lakshmidas v Lalji Anandji*, 28 R 447 (1904)
- (16) *Pamaswami Ayyar v Vythinatha Ayyar* 26 M 760 (1902)
- (17) *Parambath v Puthengatt I*, 28 M 106 (1905).

on an alleged mortgage which was dismissed, is no bar to subsequent suit on another mortgage of the same property (1) A suit brought by a wife during the life of her husband for the recovery of the prompt portion of her dower will be no bar to a subsequent suit for the recovery of the deferred portion (2)

In the following cases the cause of action was held to be the same—Where an occupancy tenant made a mortgage with possession of his holding, a suit by the proprietor for the cancellation of the mortgage was held to bar a suit for the possession of the holding as the cause of action in the two suits would be the same, the defendants taking possession under his mortgage not affording a second and distinct cause of action from the execution of the deed itself (3) A suit to redeem a mortgage on the ground of the mortgagee having received more than the amount due in respect of mortgage bars a subsequent suit for the amount of the surplus received by him (4) Suit for redemption of *lanam* subsequent suit based on admissions known to the plaintiff at time of previous suit that defendants were *lanamdars* under plaintiff's predecessor in title (5) Suit for possession of a portion of a house alleged to have been partitioned in proceedings before a Court of Revenue, subsequent suit for partition of the same house in a Civil Court (6) As to specific performance see below (7)

The general rule is that every partition shall embrace all the joint property but it is subject to certain exceptions—such as (a) where different portions of it are situated in and out of British India, (b) where a portion of it is not immediately available for partition, by reason of (i) its being in possession of mortgagees, or (ii) because it was *inam* land, which required Government permission to give jurisdiction to the Court, (c) where property is held in partnership by the joint family along with strangers, who have no interest in the family partition among the sharers, and who could not therefore be made parties in the family partition suit (8) The section was held not to apply where the title on which the former suit was based was exclusive

(1) *Thrikakat Madathil v. Thiruthiyil Krishnen*, 29 M 163 (1905), *Ram Sahai v. Ahmadi*, 33 A 302 (1910)

(2) *Umda Begam v. Muhammadi*, 33 A 291 (1910)

(3) *Savit Ram v. Chanda Singh* 1886, P R No 47

(4) *Baloji Tamaji v. Tamangonda*, 6 B H C R, A C 97 (1869)

(5) *Rangasami Pillai v. Krishna Pillai* 22 M 259 (1898)

(6) *Balbhaddar Nath v. Ram Lal* 26 A 501 (1904)

(7) *Nathu v. Budhu*, 18 B 537 (1893) [suit for specific performance and execution of sale deed, suit on sale deed executed by Court to recover possession, but see *Narayana v. Kandam* 22 M 24 (1898)] *Chidambaram v. Srinivas* 8 M L J R 11, cited *Hukma*

Chand, C P C 515 [suit for specific performance, suit for recovery of deposit money], *Paragodant Perumtoduka*, 27 M 380 (1903), *Venkatarama v. Venkata*, 24 M 27 (1899) [suit for specific performance, subsequent suit for money paid on a consideration that failed], *Rangayya Goundan v. Nanjappa Rao*, 24 M 491 (1901), s c, 3 Bom L R 709 [suit for possession and damages, suit for specific performance and transfer, basis of both actions an agreement for sale]

(8) *Purshottam v. Atmaram* 1 Bom L R 76 (1899), s c, 23 B 597 [the claim of A to obtain his share of property owned jointly by him and B cannot be said to have been founded on the same cause of action as his claim to obtain his share of property owned jointly by him and B and C]

ownership, while that on which the subsequent suit was based was joint ownership (1)

The *karnatan* of a Malabar *tarwad* is not barred from bringing successive suits for land in possession of an *anandraman*, the cause of action being the right to demand restoration of *tarwad* property at any time and it being in the discretion of the *karnatan* to leave any item of property he pleases in the possession of *anandratans* (2)

"Shall not afterwards sue"—The bar is not avoided by an expression of intention to sue again (3) A plaintiff may however, obtain leave to omit to sue in respect of one of several remedies A suit, however which is withdrawn with permission to sue again does not create any bar as the effect of such permission is to leave matters in the position in which they would have stood if no such suit had been instituted (4) The same principle was held to apply even when the suit was dismissed for non appearances of parties under sect 140 of the N W P Act, 1881, with leave specially reserved to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit, the reason assigned for the decision being that before the case was struck off the plaintiff could have so amended his plaint as to have included the claim in the first suit, and *a fortiori* there was no reason why he should not include it in the subsequent suit (5)

The bar affects the plaintiff in the second suit if he was plaintiff in the first, and those who claim under him, (6) and it is not avoided by the plaintiff having been a minor at the time of the former suit (7) The rule says "*shall not afterwards sue*" It does not therefore apply where the suits are simultaneous and not successive (8) In the case cited below, (9) the Madras High Court held that of the two simultaneous suits, both would of course not be barred and the decree in either might stand provided the decree in the other was reversed, and option was given to the plaintiff to choose which would stand the other being dismissed Fractions of a day are, however, recognized, and where two suits are presented on the same day it must be presumed, until the contrary is proved that the suits were presented and admitted in the order in

(1) *Narayan v Shamrao* 27 B 379 (1903), as to title being the same but the cause of action different see ib at pp 386, 389

(2) *Kannan v Tenju*, 5 M 1 (1882) As to the position of a *karnatan* as understood in Malabar, see *Vasudevan v Sankaran* 20 M at p 138 (1896)

(3) See *ante*, p 577, *Soonder Bibee v Khuldee Mull* 2 N W P 90 (1870), *Chajju Singh v Nihal Singh* 1888 P R No 190, *Maksud Ali v Nargis Dye*, 20 C 322 (1892)

(4) See *ante* p 574 and *Behari Lal Pal v Baran Mal*, 17 A 53 (1894), and cases there cited

(5) *Mulchanli v Bhikari Das* 7 A 624 (1885), *sed quare*. As regards this case it has been submitted (*Hukm Chandi*, C P C 559) that this argument does not appear to be

correct, and the circumstance that a suit is dismissed and not decreed cannot affect the bar which has been attached by s 43 (now r 2) to the institution of a suit as distinct from its decision to which s 13 (now s 11) would apply

(6) *Idem ante*, p 582, *Bata v Faiz Baksh*, 1893, P R No 76.

(7) *Gopal v Narasinga* 22 M 309 (1899)

(8) *Yathu v Narayan*, 5 B II C R, A C 30 (1868), *Haleshar v Jagan* 1 A 650 (1875), *Seva Ram v Kanshi Ram*, 1890, P R No 76

(9) *Appasami v Pamasami* 9 M 279 (1886), in *Alagar Abuloola*, 8 M 147 (1884), it was held that the plaintiff should have been allowed to withdraw both suits and to file one suit in a competent Court

on an alleged mortgage which was dismissed, is no bar to subsequent suit on another mortgage of the same property (1) A suit brought by a wife during the life of her husband for the recovery of the prompt portion of her dower will be no bar to a subsequent suit for the recovery of the deferred portion (2)

In the following cases the cause of action was held to be the same—Where an occupancy tenant made a mortgage with possession of his holding, a suit by the proprietor for the cancellation of the mortgage was held to bar a suit for the possession of the holding, as the cause of action in the two suits would be the same, the defendants taking possession under his mortgage not affording a second and distinct cause of action from the execution of the deed itself (3) A suit to redeem a mortgage on the ground of the mortgagee having received more than the amount due in respect of mortgage bars a subsequent suit for the amount of the surplus received by him (4) Suit for redemption of *lanam* subsequent suit based on admissions known to the plaintiff at time of previous suit that defendants were *lanamdars* under plaintiff's predecessor in title (5) Suit for possession of a portion of a house alleged to have been partitioned in proceedings before a Court of Revenue, subsequent suit for partition of the same house in a Civil Court (6) As to specific performance see below (7)

The general rule is that every partition shall embrace all the joint property but it is subject to certain exceptions—such as (a) where different portions of it are situated in and out of British India, (b) where a portion of it is not immediately available for partition, by reason of (i) its being in possession of mortgagees, or (ii) because it was *nam* land, which required Government permission to give jurisdiction to the Court, (c) where property is held in partnership by the joint family along with strangers, who have no interest in the family partition among the sharers, and who could not therefore be made parties in the family partition suit (8) The section was held not to apply where the title on which the former suit was based was exclusive

(1) *Thrikankat Madathil v Thiruthiyil Krishnen* 29 M 163 (1905), *Ram Sahai v Ahmadi* 33 A 302 (1910)

(2) *Uma Begam v Muhammad*, 33 A 291 (1910)

(3) *Sarot Ram v Chanda Singh* 1886 F R No 47

(4) *Baloji Farnaji v Tamangonda* 6 B H C R A C 97 (1869)

(5) *Rangasami Pillai v Krishna Pillai* 22 M 259 (1898)

(6) *Balbhaddar Nath v Ram Lal*, 26 A. 501 (1904)

(7) *Nathu v Budhu*, 18 B 537 (1893) [suit for specific performance and execution of sale deed suit on sale deed executed by Court to recover possession *but see Narayana v Kandam* 22 M 24 (1894)], *Chidambaram v Sivadasa* 8 M I J Rej 61, cited *Hukm*

Chand C P C 515 [suit for specific performance, suit for recovery of deposited money] *Parangodan v Perumtodu*, 27 M 389 (1903), *Venkatarama v Venkata*, 24 M 27 (1899) [suit for specific performance, subsequent suit for money paid on a consideration that failed], *Rangayya Goundan v Nanjappa Rao*, 24 M 491 (1901); s c 3 Bom L R 799 [suit for possession and damages, suit for specific performance and transfer, basis of both actions an agreement for sale]

(8) *Purshottam v Atmarani*, 1 Bom. L R 76 (1899), s c, 23 B 597 [the claim of A to obtain his share of property owned jointly by him and B cannot be said to have been founded on the same cause of action as his claim to obtain his share of property owned jointly by him and B and C]

ownership, while that on which the subsequent suit was based was joint ownership (1)

The *larnavan* of a Malabar *tarwad* is not barred from bringing successive suits for land in possession of an *anandratan*, the cause of action being the right to demand restoration of *tarwad* property at any time and it being in the discretion of the *larnavan* to leave any item of property he pleases in the possession of *anandratans* (2)

"Shall not afterwards sue"—The bar is not avoided by an expression of intention to sue again (3) A plaintiff may, however obtain leave to omit to sue in respect of one of several remedies. A suit, however which is withdrawn with permission to sue again does not create any bar, as the effect of such permission is to leave matters in the position in which they would have stood if no such suit had been instituted (4) The same principle was held to apply even when the suit was dismissed for non appearances of parties under sect 110 of the N W P Act, 1881, with leave specially reserved to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit, the reason assigned for the decision being that before the case was struck off the plaintiff could have so amended his plaint as to have included the claim in the first suit, and *a fortiori* there was no reason why he should not include it in the subsequent suit (5)

The bar affects the plaintiff in the second suit if he was plaintiff in the first, and those who claim under him, (6) and it is not avoided by the plaintiff having been a minor at the time of the former suit (7) The rule says 'shall not afterwards sue'. It does not therefore apply where the suits are simultaneous and not successive (8) In the case cited below (9) the Madras High Court held that of the two simultaneous suits both would of course not be barred and the decree in either might stand provided the decree in the other was reversed, and option was given to the plaintiff to choose which would stand the other being dismissed. Fractions of a day are however recognized and where two suits are presented on the same day it must be presumed until the contrary is proved, that the suits were presented and admitted in the order in

(1) *Narayan v Shamrao* 27 B 379 (1903) as to title being the same but the cause of action different see ibid at pp 356 359

(2) *Kannan v Tenju* 5 M J (1882) As to the position of a *larnavan* as understood in Malabar see *Vasudevan v Sankaran* 20 M at p 138 (1896)

(3) See ante p 577 *Soonder Bibee v Khuloo Mull* 2 N W P 80 (1870), *Chajju Singh v Nihal Singh* 1888 P R No 190, *Maksud Ali v Narg s Dye*, 20 C 322 (1892)

(4) See ante p 574 and *Belari Lal Pal v Baran Mai*, 17 A 53 (1894) and cases there cited.

(5) *Mulchanli v Bhikari Das* 7 A 674 (1885) *sed quere*. As regards this case it has been submitted (*Hukm Chandi C P C* 509) that this argument does not appear to be

correct and the circumstance that a suit is dismissed and not decreed cannot affect the bar which has been attached by s 43 (now r 4) to the institution of a suit as distinct from its decision to which s 13 (now s 14) would apply

(6) *Idem ante* p 582 *Bata v Faiz Baksh* 1893 P R No 6

(7) *Gopal v Naras inga* 22 M 309 (1899)

(8) *Vithu v Narayan* 5 B 11 C R A C 30 (1864) *Kaleshar v Jagan* 1 A 640 (1878) *Deva Ram v Kanku Ram* 1890 P R No 76

(9) *Appasami v Ramasami* 9 M 279 (1886), in *Alagur Abduloola* 8 M 147 (1884) it was held that the plaintiff should have been allowed to withdraw both suits and to file one suit in a competent Court

which their numbers appear in the register (1) The rule only bars a subsequent suit. It therefore does not preclude a landlord from adopting any other remedy the law gives him to enable him to recover his rent as, for instance, by distress under the Rent Recovery Act (2)

"In respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished — The Privy Council observed that the right which a litigant possesses without knowing or ever having known that he possesses it can hardly be regarded as a portion of his claim within the meaning of the section (3). It has been said that a plaintiff must be taken to have abandoned or relinquished his claim on a real cause of action if he brings it in a false one (4). But this statement has been adversely criticized (5) there being nothing in r 2 to warrant the inference that all causes of action ought to be included in the alternative or otherwise and if it were correct it would make no difference whether the cause of action is false in the sense that the facts alleged as constituting it are false or it is false in the sense that the facts alleged do not in law constitute a cause of action.

More than one relief — The present rule unlike that of the Code of 1859 refers as has been already pointed out both to the splitting of remedies or reliefs as well as the splitting of claims (6). Both the claim and the remedy have reference to the cause of action litigated in the previous suit (7). There is no bar where the remedy sought in the subsequent suit is in respect of a cause of action different from that which formed the basis of the relief in the former suit (8). Further the bar in regard to the remedy is applicable only where the plaintiff was at the time of the former suit entitled to more than one remedy and where the plaintiffs were entitled to only one remedy in the former suit the provisions of the section are not applicable to the second suit (9) nor where a plaintiff's suit for a remedy has been dismissed on the ground that he is not entitled to it but to another remedy for which he

(1) *Murti v Bhola Ram* 16 A 163 172 13 (1893) overruling *Zahur Husain v Muhammad Hasan* 1888 ALL W N 14"

(2) *Rajah Sawara v Venkatarayer* 21 M 236 (1897)

(3) *Amanat Bibi v Imdad Husain* L 1 A 106 112 (1888). See this subject discussed ante p 579

(4) *Fangasamu Pillai v Krishna Pillai* 22 M 259

(5) *Ramaswami v Vythunatha* 26 M 60 at p 777 (1902)

(6) *Vide ante* p 575

(7) *Andi v Thatha* 10 M 347 (1884) [suit for declaration of right to enjoy separate possession of land & consequent suit for partition of that land]

(8) See *Nathu v Budhu* 18 B 537 (1893) [suit for specific performance decreed under which sale deed executed by Court; subsequent suit on sale deed to recover possession held not barred as claim to possession not based on contract but on new cause of act on arising from deed of sale]. In a similar case in the Madras High Court a contrary view was taken on the ground that the right to possession and conveyance arise conjointly and suit for possession was not a separate cause of action. *Narayana v Kandasami* 22 M 91 (1898). The principle however in the text was applied in *Amlu v Kethiamma* 14 M 23 (1890)

(9) *Ram Sewah Singh v Nalci* 15 M 4 A 261 (1889)

subsequently sues (1) In a case in the Punjab Chief Court (2) Buroey J observed that what the plaintiff "asked for in the former suit was not a remedy to which he was entitled, and was, therefore, not one of the other alternative remedies between which the plaintiff could have chosen," and in a subsequent case (3) in the same Court, Tremlett, J, observed, that "if the defendant's contentions were sound, we should have to hold that the construction of s. 43 (now r 2) is that a plaintiff entitled to only one remedy on his cause of action who by mistake sues for what the Court considers is not the remedy to which he is entitled, will be precluded from subsequently suing for the proper one" and, "put in this form, it is clear that the language of the section contemplates no such proposition"

The rule applies to the case where there being identity of cause of action in the two suits, the plaintiff was entitled in the first suit to more than one remedy, (4) either cumulatively or alternatively If without the leave of the Court he omits to sue for any of such remedies he cannot do so afterwards (5) a personal decree for maintenance and a declaration that it is a child's own property are two remedies referable to the same cause of action viz the right to receive maintenance, and therefore two separate suits cannot be brought in respect of the two remedies against the same defendant (5)

It is not very easy to define what constitutes "a claim or demand" from a "remedy," for the former appears to include the latter Doubtless the two terms were intended to overlap While a claim is defined as a demand of right, a remedy has been said to be that by which a person recovers a right (6) It has also been broadly defined to denote a judicial or decretal order with its proper legal results, which is the result of a writ or warrant for obtaining the relief he has achieved by his suit (7) In cases are common instances in which there is more than one remedy, viz a person asks for relief and ancillary thereto for an injunction or specific performance or for breach of the contract, and in these cases the remedies are alternative (8) In some cases the words "claim or demand" and "remedy" are used indiscriminately So it is that a claim for specific performance bars a subsequent suit for damages in the same form, as both claims arise out of the same cause of action

(1) *Pearl v Kheah*, 3 A. 857 (1881)
Similarly the dismissal of a suit for confirmation of possession on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession is no bar to a suit for recovery of possession *vide ante*, p. 585, and cases there cited of case in last note

(2) *Prab Devi v Haskishen Das*, 1884 P. R. No. 47

(3) *Farmeshri v Vasdeo*, 1883, P. R. No. 35

(4) These words can scarcely mean a remedy against more than one person *Kaladhun v Shiba Nath*, 5 C at p. 496 (1882)

(5) *Pearl v Kheah*

(1887), 3 A. 857

12 M 285

31 285, 286

(6) *Yam*

(1887), 3 A. 857

(7) *Yam*

at p. 285

Yam

12 M 285

Yam

31 285, 286

(8) *Yam*

of contract (1) And where a plaintiff was entitled both to recover rent and to forfeiture for non-payment he was held barred after suing for the rent from suing to enforce a forfeiture for non-payment of the same rent, as both the claims arose out of the same cause of action, namely, the non-payment of rent (2) Similarly, a suit for an injunction against a defendant directing him to abstain from excluding the plaintiff and preventing him from using his house has been held to be a bar to a suit for damages for the exclusion from the house (3) The amendment now substitutes the word "relief" for "remedy"

Upon the question formerly discussed, whether in execution of a simple money decree, only the rights of the debtor pass and the mortgagor retains his lien, see below (4) Sect 99 of the Transfer of Property Act restrained a mortgagee from selling the mortgaged premises, except under a decree for sale (5) Under the Code of 1859 a declaratory decree might be sued for and obtained, and a subsequent suit brought for the consequential relief (6) But see now sect 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which virtually repeals sect 15 of the Code of 1859 Under the special provisions of the amended Dekkan Agriculturists Act excluding the operation of this section, a suit by a mortgagor for account does not bar a subsequent suit for redemption, (7) though prior to the amendment of this Act the contrary was held upon the principle enacted by this section (8) If mesne profits are not asked for in a suit for specific performance of a contract to reconvey a plot of land, a subsequent suit for them will be barred by this rule (9)

Leave to omit relief—The words in the last Code were "*obtained before the first hearing*" It was, however, held that leave might be applied for and obtained when the case was called on for first hearing and before anything had been done towards the hearing of the case (10) Though these words have been omitted probably the same rule will hold now Such leave should be obtained from the Court before which the original suit was pending (11)

5] **3. Save as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the joinder of causes of same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly, and any plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or the**

(1) *Shib Kristo v. Abdool Sobhan*, 16 W R 408 (1871), see Specific Relief Act 1877, ss 30, 19

(2) *Subbaraya v. Krishna*, 6 M 159 (1882)

(3) *Chajju Singh v. Nihal Singh*, 1888, P R No 190

(4) *Rashbehary Ghose's Law of Mortgage*, 3rd ed 712, 733, and cases there cited

(5) See O 34, r 14 and notes

(6) *Kalidhun v. Shiba Nath*, 8 C 483, P B (1882), foll. *Saraut v. Kunj Behari*, 5 A 315 (1883), 1 B

(7) *Laluchand v. Girjappa*, 20 B 474

(8) See cases cited in last mentioned decision, and as to decree ordering payment, and in default sale, and subsequent suit for redemption, *Govinda v. Marji*, 1897, Bom. P J 364

(9) *Ganesh Ram v. Moheah Ram*, 13 C W N 669 (1900)

(10) *Pestonji v. Abdool* 5 B 463 (1880)

(11) *Muhammad Fayaz v. Kallu* 33 A 211 (1910)

same defendants jointly may unite such causes of action in the same suit.

(2) *Where* causes of action are united, the jurisdiction of the Court as regards the suit shall depend on the amount or value of the aggregate subject-matters at the date of instituting the suit.

Origin and scope of rules relating to joinder of causes of action.—The first paragraph of r 3, which corresponds with sect 8, Act VIII of 1859, is taken from the English O. 18, r. 1, which, though it does not contain any reference to the case of more than one defendant, has been construed as if it referred to the "same defendants" also, it having been held (1) that "to bring into one claim distinct causes of action against different persons, neither of them having anything to do with the other (and only historically connected as one matter in the transaction), is not contemplated by O 18, r 1, which authorizes the joinder, not of several actions against distinct persons, but of several causes of action" It was, however, pointed out that the provisions contained in several of the English rules had been omitted from the Code, and the inference therefore was that it was not intended to introduce into this country the wide scope now afforded to suits in the English Courts, and that r 3 is different from the much more general language of the English r. 1 and r 6, which provide that claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them or any of them separately, and were diametrically opposed to the prohibition of sect 31 of the last Code, that plaintiffs might not join in respect of distinct causes of action (2) The rule is based on considerations of convenience, the misjoinder contemplated leading to complication and difficulty of dealing with the case of each defendant separately, and being vexatious and harassing to the defendants (3)

Objections (as to which see O 1 r 13) on the ground of misjoinder are favourite ones in this country There may be misjoinder of plaintiffs or misjoinder of defendants This matter is dealt with in the preceding Order The rules under discussion relate only to joinder of causes of action They assume that the action has been rightly constituted under the provisions relating to the joinder of parties (4) Then there is misjoinder of subjects of suit, which is sometimes called multifariousness, though the term is not used

(1) *Burstall v. Beyfus*, 26 Ch. D. 35, *per* Selborne, L.C. In England it is settled law that two separate causes of action cannot be charged against two defendants in one action: *Muthappa v. Muthu*, 27 M. 80, at p. 83 (1903)

(2) *Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey*, 5 A. 163, 170, 179 (1882), F. B., a leading decision which deserves careful study *Mahmood, J.* was, however, of opinion (at p. 176) that the Code did not prescribe a narrower rule upon the particular point then under discussion In *Muthappa v. Muthu*, 27 M. 80, 83 (1903),

it was also said that the terms of the English rule were wider and more general than the terms of the Code But this case has not been followed *Aiyathurai v. Santhu Meera*, 31 M. 252 (1905) See now O 1 r 9, *ante*.

(3) See judgment of Peacock, C.J., in *Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Pershad*, 8 W. R. 15, 16 (1867), *s. c.*, B. L. R. (F. B.) 731; *Imrit Nath v. Baboo Roy*, 18 W. R. 288 (1872), *Sudhendu v. Durga*, 14 C. at p. 438 (1887)

(4) *Hannay v. Smurthwaite*, 2 Q. B. 425 (1893), *per* Bowen, L.J.

in the Code Multifariousness, however, properly so called, exists when one of the defendants is not interested in the whole of the relief sought (1) This is prohibited by the first clause of r 3, where the parties have distinct and separate interests (2) Misjoinder of subjects of suit is where two subjects distinct in their nature are united in one suit, and for convenience sake the Court requires them to be separated Whether the various subjects shall be dealt with together is a matter of discretion to be determined upon considerations of convenience with regard to the circumstances of each particular case (3) This matter is dealt with in r 6 In other words while multifariousness strictly so called is, in cases coming within the terms of the first paragraph of r 3 absolutely prohibited an alleged misjoinder of subjects, as it was formerly called not amounting to multifariousness in the former sense, is left to be dealt with according to the discretion of the Court R 3 applies to cases where there are only one plaintiff, one defendant and several causes of action, and to cases where the plaintiffs or defendants, though consisting of two or more individuals may be considered as an unit with reference to all the different causes of action Where there is more than one plaintiff or defendant, the test is—is there community of interest in the issues to be determined? in other words joint interest in the questions raised by the litigation is a condition precedent to the joinder of several causes of action (4) The question of absence of cause of action and misjoinder must be distinguished It may be, for instance that certain defendants can substantiate pleas which as a matter of substantive law or on the merits would absolve them from liability But this circumstance has no effect upon the question of misjoinder which is purely a matter of adjective law or procedure (5) While as already stated, the rule enacted in r 3 is based on substantial grounds of convenience, it must also be remembered that the policy of the law is not to favour multiplication of suits, (6) and it is exceedingly undesirable that any suit should fail on account of any such technical objection (7) unless it has been taken and is thoroughly well founded

(1) *Pointon v Pointon* L R 12 Eq 547 at p 541 (1871) and see *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey* 5 A. at p 172 (1882) and at p 177 as to the sufficiency of each party having an interest in some matters in the suit and that they are connected with the others

(2) See *Burstell v Beyfus* 26 Ch. D 3, in which also the present English procedure which supersedes the demurrer is considered

(3) *Pointon v Pointon*, *supra*, at pp 541-542 *Coates v Legard* 19 Eq 56 (1874) The plaintiff will not be allowed needlessly to enlarge the area of the dispute *per Collins MR Sarchasin Corp v Wild* 1 Ch D p 422 (1903)

(4) See *Bhagwati v Buleshr* 6 A 106 108 (1883) *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey*

5 A 163, 171 (1882), *Sarala Sundari Devi v Saroda Prasad Sur*, 2 C L J 602 (1901) ref to in *Jaggeshwar Dutt v Bhuban Mohan Mitra* 33 C 425, 441 (1906)

(5) *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey* 5 A at pp 178-179 (1882) *per Mahmood J* In *Jankinath v Ramrunjun* 4 C 919 (1879) it was held that the fact that the claim for possession or rent against certain defendants was unsustainable in fact was no ground for dismissing the whole suit for misjoinder This distinction does not appear to have been preserved in the judgment of *Stuart CJ* in *Bisheshur v Ram Churan* 5 A H C P 25, 28 (1872)

(6) *Shoroor v Mothoor* 4 W P 109 at p 110 (1865), *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey*, 5 A at p 179 (1882)

(7) *Sudhendu v Durga* 14 C at p 138

It was held that the provisions of sect 45 of the last Code did not apply to suits for arrears of rent under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, so as to admit of a joint suit being brought in respect of arrears of rent due in respect of several holdings (1)

Summary of rules on this matter—A summary of the rules which deal with the joinder of parties shows that any number of plaintiffs may join in respect of relief claimed arising out of the "*same act or transaction*," that they may not join in respect of distinct causes of action in cases not within O 1 r 1, *ante*, that any number of defendants may be joined where relief is sought against them under O 1 r 3, or in respect of any one contract under O 1 r 6, that no suit shall fail for mere misjoinder, and that except where plaintiffs have joined in respect of distinct causes of action as above stated the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy as far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it (2) Putting it shortly, the rules provide that a suit shall include the whole claim, that any plaintiff or plaintiffs having several causes of action, in which they are jointly interested against one defendant or several defendants jointly, may unite them in the same suit, but unless such causes of action are of the kind mentioned in clauses (a) (b) or (c) of r 4 of this Order, they may not be joined, without leave of the Court with a suit for the recovery of immoveable property, that where a plaintiff or plaintiffs have united in the same suit several causes of action against a defendant or defendants the Court of its own motion, or on the application of the defendants or upon agreement of the parties, may order separate trials or confine the scope of the suit, or exclude causes of action and direct amendment of the plaint, where by the joinder of several causes of action inconvenience and confusion are likely to be caused (3) As to whether sect 45 of the last Code was a restrictive proviso to sect 28 of that Code, see *post*

"May unite"—It is a pre requisite of the right to join in one suit more than one cause of action against a defendant that the Court to which the plaint is presented should have jurisdiction over all the causes of action (4) In the case cited, it was observed that "unless the plaintiff could lawfully unite them, the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction over either, and that 'he should have returned the plaint, although, without amendment, it could not have been presented in either Court which had jurisdiction over either cause of action'" It is, however, proper to unite several causes of action in a suit when the title to all the property to which the defence relates is the same though the lands

(1887), Haranund v Prosunno 9 C at p 765 (1883)

(1) Jagan Nath Prasad v Tori, 29 A 18 (1906)

(2) See Narasimh Das v Mangal Dubey, 5 A 113, at p. 167 (1887) F B a decision

under the last Code. The text is therefore, in this and other instances, altered to meet the present provisions

(3) *Ib.* at p 169 (1882) F B

(4) Khimji Jivraj v Purulhataji & 11 171 (1883).

claimed may not be in one district (1) For recent applications of the provision, see cases cited (2)

Was sect 45 of last Code a restrictive proviso to sect 28 of that Code? The effect in this respect of the amendments—There was force in the argument which answered this question in the negative though the contrary was held under the last Code by the majority of the Full Bench (3) in which it was raised Chapter III of that Code dealt with the parties to a suit and Chapter IV of the same Code with the frame of a suit. The former assumed the existence of an ascertained subject matter in dispute, and from that point of view laid down rules as to the persons who might be made parties to the suit Chapter IV assumed the existence of ascertained parties, and dealt with the subject matter of the suit. The two modes of dealing did not clash with one another. Where there was identity of subject-matter the rules governing the case were to be found in Chapter III, where there was identity of parties the scope of the action was to be limited by the rules in Chapter IV. The two Chapters thus regarded an action from two different points of view, and the rules contained in one could not in this aspect of the case be regarded as provisos to the rules contained in the other. By sect 26 of the last Code all plaintiffs might join in respect of the same 'cause of action'. By sect 28 all defendants might be joined against whom the right to any relief in respect of "*the same matter*," whether jointly severally or in the alternative, was alleged to exist. The term "*matter*" in sect 28 of that Code was not convertible with "*cause of action*" but was more comprehensive—a conclusion which received support not only from the circumstance that the two expressions were used in contiguous sections (26, 27, 28) of the same Chapter, and could therefore scarcely be construed to have the same meaning but also from the fact that the last part of sect 31, which prohibited plaintiffs joining in respect of distinct "*causes of action*" was meant to be a limitation of the latitude allowed by Chapter III as to the joinder of parties in respect of the "*same matter*." So long then, as the matter in dispute was identical the plaintiff was entitled to bring before the Court all persons whose presence was necessary to afford him full relief in respect of that matter. Sect 45 was not applicable to cases in which the subject matter of the suit was the same but related to cases in which the causes of action were entirely distinct. Sect 28 on the other hand related to cases in which the subject matter was one and the same, and sect 45 was not a restrictive proviso to sect 28 for the effect of such a view would be to nullify an important part of the latter section. The essence of the provisions of sect 45 was that there should be joint rights in the plaintiffs and joint liability of the defendants whilst sect 28 contemplated the granting of relief against the defendants not only jointly and in the alternative but also severally, and it could not be conceived how this could be done in a case in which the liability

(1) Harchan Lal Singh v. Lal Bahadur Singh 21 A 359 (1894)

(2) Shub Prasad Chandhuri v. Vakai Pahi 33 C. 601 (1906) Sarada Charan Chatterji v. Iswar Samal 11 C. W. N. 1164 (1907)

(enhancement and increase of rent), Partha sarathy v. Thandavaraya 17 M. I. J. 615 (1907)

(3) Narasingh Das v. Mangal Dubey 5 A 163 (1893) F. B.

of the defendants was joint, as required by sect 45. The latter section did not limit the operation of sect 28, nor did sect 28 extend the scope of sect 45. Sect 28 laid down a rule which was distinct from and independent of the rule embodied in sect 45 (1).

According to this view of the two sections, a suit might have been brought against several defendants against whom the right to any relief in respect of "*the same matter*" existed, and also a suit uniting several distinct causes of

Bench held that it was difficult to in sect 28 as meaning more than the same "*cause of action*"; and that Chapter III must necessarily be read with and controlled by the subsequent provisions of Chapter IV. If, then, sect 28 and sect 45 were read together, the joint, several, or alternative liability of defendants mentioned in sect 28 meant such a liability in respect of one or several causes of action, which cause or causes of action were united in the same suit against the same defendants jointly, in other words, while the cause or causes of action had to be joint as to all the defendants, the relief asked might be joint, several, or in the alternative (2). It might, it was said, be that the term "*same matter*" was more comprehensive than "*cause of action*," and that if sect 28 stood by itself, it would in effect allow a joinder prohibited by sect 45. But if, as was held, that section did not affect but was on the contrary, controlled by sects 44 and 45, which regulated the

which was entirely regulated by the provisions of Chapter IV, and a suit, though not bad for misjoinder of parties under sect 28, might be bad for misjoinder of causes of action under sect 45. It was not clear however why the two different expressions should have been used and neither of the views stated was free from difficulty (3).

The case of several liability is retained in O I r 3 corresponding with sect 28 of that Code. But the words "*in respect of the same matter*" have been now omitted from O I r 3. For the reasons given by him, the opinion of Mahmood, J., would still seem preferable even had this not been so. The position would now appear to be this. O I r 1 allows plaintiffs to join where the relief claimed (whether the claim be joint or several) is in respect of or arises out of "*the same act or transaction*." The necessary corollary of this is that if all persons may be joined as defendants against whom relief is claimed in respect of "*the same matter*" this phrase must include what is understood

(1) Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey, 5 A p 172 *et seq*, per Mahmood J.

(2) *Ib.*, 5 A, p 166 *et seq*.

(3) It has also been held in a recent Madras case that the words "*same matter*" are wider than the term "*cause of action*." Dampasabovina v Addala 27 M 736 at pp. 745-746 (1902). The Calcutta High Court has in some cases justified the joinder of

defendants on the ground that there was but one cause of action. Loke Nath v Keshab Ram, 13 C 147-152 (1886), Ishan Chandra v Ramchwar 24 C 831 (1897), though it has never held that the two terms are synonymous. See also Luckumsey v Fazulla 5 B 177, at p 179 (1880), Janakinath v Pamrunjan, 4 C at pp 952, 953 (1879), Muthappa v Mathu, 27 M 80, at p 83 (1903).

by "*the same act or transaction*" in O I r 1, that is, cases where, though the cause of action may not be the same, relief is claimed on a common ground. The qualification is now omitted, but the same result would follow even if O I r 3 had not been (as is the case) expressly amended to bring it into conformity with the provisions of r 1 of that Order. But where the subject matter of the suit is not the same as regards plaintiffs and defendants and the causes of action are entirely distinct, there being no common ground, then under r 3, in order to justify joinder, there must be joint rights in the plaintiffs and joint liability in the defendants.

Cause of action—As already elsewhere observed, this expression has always had a signification which cannot be said to be precise or definite, (1) being sometimes taken to mean the right, together with the infringement, or the title together with the injury, in other words, all the circumstances which a plaintiff is required to allege in order to show a right to relief, and being sometimes used as indicating merely the injury, which is the cause of the plaintiff coming into Court (2) or as indicating the plaintiff's right merely (3). These differing definitions account in part for the differing views to be found in the cases under this as other sections (4). So the right has been treated as the whole cause of action (5). On the other hand, it was held that the term as used in sect 31 of the last Code, and in the section corresponding with r 3, had the same sense as in English law, viz of every fact which it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove to support his right to the judgment of the Court (6). The title on which a plaintiff sues is only one of several ingredients in the cause of action, and that term includes also the infringement of the plaintiff's right (7). The question under the section which r 3 replaces, has often arisen in cases of alienations of joint property by a coparcener, or of a Hindu widow's estate by the widow, and sometimes in other cases. The cases upon the point are in conflict, and it is not possible to reconcile them. The determination of the question whether there is a misjoinder in respect of cause of action, where one suit is brought against all the alienees, depends upon the view which is adopted of the meaning of the term "*cause of action*," and also on the question discussed in the last paragraph

(1) In *Fatima Bibi v Abdul Majid*, 14 A at p. 536 (1892) it was said that the term '*cause of action*' had not been used in ss 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 of the Code of 1882 in precisely the same sense.

(2) *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dibs*, 5 A at p. 173, per Mahmood J.

(3) See cases cited *post*.

(4) See *Amberun v Waseehun* 11 W R 11, where there was a difference of opinion as to the cases cited *post* and *Hukui Chan* 1, C P C 567-568.

(5) *Ishan Chunder v Rameswar* 24 C 831 (1897) [diss from *Ram Prosad v Sachu Dass*, 6 C W N 585 (1902)], *Sami Chetta v Ammani* 7 M H L R 260 (1893) and cases

cited *post* note 6.

(6) *Sahma Bibi v Sheikh Muhammad* 18 A. 131 (1895), *Ram Prosad v Sachu Dass* 6 C W N 585 (1902).

(7) *Ram Prosad v Sachu Dass* *supra* at p. 589. So also in *Koondun Lal v Rao Hummat* 3 A H C R 86, 87 (1871) the Court said, '*It is not a plaintiff's title which is to be regarded in a suit of this nature in considering a plea of misjoinder but rather the wrongs alleged*,' and pointed out that if

Cordhan Lal v Maharaj 35 A 223 (1911) (1913) proof of title by Sheriff

In some cases, the decision in favour of the unity of the cause of action proceeds upon the theory that the plaintiff's right is the cause of action (1) If this be so, and there be unity as to the right, there is no misjoinder of causes of action in a suit in which the several alienees are defendants (2) Apart from the question as to the correctness or otherwise of this view, practical objections have been urged against joinder in such cases. It has been said that one alienee is not interested in an alienation of another part of the estate made at another time to another person. Evidence against one defendant may not be admissible against another. Different questions may arise as to mesne profits. The procedure may prove vexatious and harassing to the defendants, each of whom has to wait whilst the case is going on against others, and to detain his witnesses meanwhile. The case is complicated in both the Court of first instance and appeal where each case may have to be argued as a separate and distinct cause (3). Even where the action was held sustainable the Court observed that separate actions against the alienees was the better procedure (4). As against this it

(1) *Sami Chetti v. Ammani* 7 M H C R 260 (1873). In this case, which was a suit brought against the alienees of the plaintiff's father's widows to recover the properties which had been alienated by the widows during his minority Holloway, Ag C J said:

The Judge says that the cause of action against each of the purchasers is a distinct one. The plaintiff claims his share of family property. His cause of action the right is his relation to the family to which the property appertains and on this right, if established and if he is not otherwise barred from recovering he will be entitled to that share wherever found. The fact that various persons during his minority have affected to purchase parcels of the property does not destroy the unity of his ground of action. And in a suit by reversers of B against defendants who set up respective titles to different plots of land by purchase from B it was also held there was no misjoinder the Court holding that the cause of action was that plaintiffs were reversers of B. *Ishan Chunder v. Rameswar* 24 C 831 (1897) disapproved in *Ram Prasanna v. Sacha Dass* 6 C W N 585 (1902) applied in *Parbati Kunwar v. Mahmul Fatima* 9 A 17 (1907). In *Mahomed v. Krishnan* 11 M 106 (1886) a suit by junior members of a *tarwad* against the *tarwad* and others including persons to whom he had alienated *tarwad* property, the Court observed (at p. 111) that it made

no difference whether the right enforced was that of a coparcener or reverser and that in the view that the primary ground of action is the interest vested in possession as regards the whole of the property in suit there is unity of title and the claim made is one in respect of the same cause of action. See also the cases in the following note which may have proceeded upon the same principles.

(2) *Vasudeva v. Kuladi* 7 M H C R 260 (1874). *Abdalla Ayaga* 12 M 234 (1889), *Vithu v. Narayan* 5 B H C R, A C J 30 (1868), *Kanth Narain v. Prem Lal* 3 W R 102 (1865). *Shoroop v. Mothoor* 4 W R 103 at p. 110 (1865). *Krishna Copaul v. Hurry Nath*, 23 W R 60 (1876). *Haranud Mozo omdar v. Prosunno Chunder* 9 C 763 (1883) [where the alienation was in execution] (cf. also *In re Rutnessur Das* 14 W R 391 (1870) where the Revenue Commissioner had taken possession of the plaintiff's lands and given them to various defendants. In some of the cases however the alienor was a party as to which see *post*).

(3) See judgment of Iacob C J in *Isha Pau Tewary v. Iuchmun Pershad* 8 W R 15 PC (186) and judgment of first Court in *Sami v. Ammani* 7 M H C R 260 261 (1873).

(4) *Vithu v. Narayan* 5 B H C R, A C J 30 (1868). *Subramanya v. Salsiva* 5 M 75 (1884).

may be said that the policy of the law is not to favour multiplication of suits (1) And in some cases, as observed by the Madras High Court, (2) "it is manifest that the number and nature of the alienations are no unimportant elements for the determination of their propriety. It is most desirable that the whole of them should be at once before the Court called upon to decide the question, in order to secure the soundness of the particular decisions and perhaps the avoidance of discordant decisions in different cases upon facts nearly the same." It would probably be best if the Courts were given as to procedure a discretion to be exercised in a manner to the convenience of trial and of the parties and to the advantage of substantial justice. It is, however, necessary to determine the question by reference to the definition of the term under discussion and the other provisions of the Code. If therefore on the other hand, the words "cause of action" denote both the right and its infringement, (3) there has been said to be distinct causes of action against each of the alienees, and in consequence misjoinder, (4) except perhaps where the suit is both against the alienor and the alienees. In such case it has been said (5) that (there being a complete cause of action both as to right and infringement) against the defendant alienor, it is necessary to bring the alienees on the record to afford ground for decision of the whole dispute and that it cannot be said that a separate cause of action exists against the alienor "in conjunction with each group of alienees the alienations not being the causes of the present action (6) but merely incidental thereto (7). In a case however, where the alienor was a party, the Bombay High Court held that the plaintiffs had distinct causes of action against the several defendants and that there was a misjoinder (8). Whether however

(1) *Shoroop v. Mothoor* 4 W R 109 at p 110 (1805) where it was also said. "Reverend ones frequently bring one suit to set aside such claims and such a suit has never been held to be inadmissible."

(2) *Vasudeva v. Kuleadi* 7 M H C R 230 293 (1874).

(3) *Ganesh Lal v. Khairati* 16 A 279 (1891) where the Court pointed out (at pp 280 281) that the relationship of the reversioner to the widow's husband could not form the cause of action but only a part of the cause which comprised among other things the wrongful possession of the separate suits of defendants over the lands held by them respectively and see cases in next note.

(4) *Ganesh Lal v. Khairati* *supra* [dist in *Parbuti Kunwar v. Mahmud Fatima* 29 A 967 (1907)], *Kachar Bhoj v. Bai Rathore* 7 B 289 (1883), *Paja Ram Tewary v. Iuchmun Pershad* 8 W R 15 (1867), *F B Colam Mustafa v. Sheo Soondurce* 10 W R 18 (1868), *Tewarce Raghoonath v. Syul Mahomed* 4 A H C R 108 (1871).

(5) *Chuhar Mall v. Bakhtwaddi* 1890 P

R No 149. See *Hukm Chand* C P C 573 50.

(6) In the case in question apparently the cause of action was held to be the refusal by the alienor to recognize the plaintiff's right to share in the family property.

(7) In the following cases which have been already cited the alienor was a party to the action: *Sami Chetti v. Ammani* 7 M H C R 260, *Mahomed v. Krishnan* 11 M 106, *Abdal v. Ayaga* 12 M 234, *Chuhar Mall v. Bakhtwaddi* 1890 P R No 149, *Haranund v. Prosunno* 9 C 763, *Vithi v. Narayan* 5 B H C P A C J 30, *Kant v. Narain* 1 Prem Lal 3 W R 102 103 where the Court said. "The case by the sons against the father is so entire as to be hardly capable of being prosecuted in several suits."

(8) *Kachar Bhoj v. Bai Rathore* 7 B 289 (1883), *ref. Sadu Bin Paghu v. Pam B. Govind* 16 B 603 611 (1892), and in *Mata v. Bhugmanee* 1 A H C R 198 (1869) the suit was held bad for misjoinder as though the alienor (a guardian) was a party no relief was sought against her.

the suit is open to objection for misjoinder or not, the Court may always in its discretion direct separate trials to be held. Similarly, in a suit for possession of immoveable property against two defendants, the cause of action being that the first defendant had no title to mortgage the property to the second defendant, it was held that there was no misjoinder, and that there were not two causes of action, but one, namely, the infringement of the plaintiff's right by the first defendant, out of which flowed the title asserted by the second defendant, who derived title from the first defendant, and whose case stood or fell with his (1) *A fortiori* there is but one cause of action against a defendant and others who are not real but merely ostensible purchasers from him (2) So, again, a defendant who, under a decree, subsequently reversed, ousts a plaintiff from possession may be sued with persons to whom subsequent to the ouster, he has leased the land, they stood in the shoes of their lessor and were jointly liable with him to be ousted (3) The joinder of several persons in doing an act does not affect its unity or the unity of the cause of action constituted by that act as in the case of an obstruction or ouster by a number of persons who are alleged to have acted in combination (4) It was held that different causes of action could not be joined in one suit against different parties, where each had a distinct and separate interest, (5) that the Courts should reject plaints against several defendants for causes of action which had accrued against each of them separately and in respect of which they are not jointly concerned, (6) that there was no section of the Code which permitted a person to sue various defendants together in respect of various causes of action (7) and that plaintiffs could not join in one suit in respect of causes of action in which they were not all jointly interested (8)

(1) *Inlar Kuar v Gur Prasad* 11 A 33 (1899) For similar cases of suits against mortgagors alienating property see *Bal Kishen v Bistoo Churn* 22 W R 532 (1874) in which both mortgagor and his alienors were parties also *Krishna Gopaul v Hurry Nath* 25 W R 60 (1876), *Srinath Das v Khetter Mohun* 16 C. 693 (1888)

(2) *Wise v Gureeb Hossein* 13 W R 271 (1870)

(3) *Antu v Vishnu* 22 B 630 (1897)

(4) *Loke Nath Surma v Keshab Pam* 13 C. 147, 152 (1886), *Muthuvijaya v Chocka Lingam* 19 M. 330, 336 (1896), and see as to ousters by different persons on different dates committed as part of the same contest, *Harchanlar v Lal Bahadur*, 16 A 309, 361 (1891), *Varajal v Lamlal* 26 F 209 (1901) [joint assault], *aliter* where it is not shown that the defendants acted in concert or under some common title. For acts done by different persons are not deemed one unless done in concert. *S. Hendu v Durga Das*, 14 C. 430 (1887), *Ram Narain v Annoda Prasad* 14

C 681 (1887) *Koondun v Rao Himmatt*, 3 A H C 86 (1871) *Hurro Monce v Onookool* 8 W R 461 (1867) *In Shooroop v Mothoor* 4 W R 109 (1865) in which the Court expressed a doubt as to whether there was misjoinder it is not clear whether there was combination or not. In *Bisheshur v Pain Churn* 5 A. H. C. 25 (1873) *Pearson J* held that as there was collusion there was no misjoinder. *Stuart C.J.* held there was no cause of action against first defendant a different matter from misjoinder though he held that the suit was bad on that ground. In *Ram Prasad v Sacha Dass*, 6 C. W. N. 580 (1902), there was no combination.

(5) *Baroo v Massum* 21 W R 206 (1874)

(6) *Baboo Motie v Panee* 8 W R. 61 (1867) in which it was held that the defendants had no common interest and that the causes of action were distinct.

(7) *Pam Narain v Annoda Prasad* 14 C. 681 at p. 687 (1887)

(8) *Jayjo Kuar v Debi Dial*, 18 A 432 (1890) vide post.

The following suits have thus been held to be bad for misjoinder — A joint action for the price of timber against defendants, who purchased each one pair of timber separately from the other, (1) A sold to X and B sold to X, a suit by Y against A, B, and X to enforce a right of pre-emption, (2) a suit claiming possession against all of defendants, with mesne profits against some and damages against others, (3) a suit by a talookdar against the zamindar and several purchasers to set aside sales to them respectively of five *patni taluks* sold for arrears of rent due separately upon each, (4) a claim to set aside sale against auction purchaser and for damages against *zurpeshgidars*, (5) a suit against several persons, each a party to a distinct contract, (6) a suit against one defendant for specific performance of a contract to sell land and as against another for a declaration that he was not entitled to any charge upon the same lands, the causes of action being distinct as against the defendants, (7) a suit against one person, an alleged agent of a firm for breach of contract and against another as partner to have accounts taken and the partnership wound up (8)

It is necessary now, however, particularly in the case of suits by reversioners above mentioned, to consider the effect of the enlarged scope of O 1 r 1 and its effect on the question of joinder of defendants, for now apparently all reversioners might join in any suit any number of defendants in respect of several properties, provided they base their claims (which need not be joint but may be several) on a common ground

The relief—The cause of action must, as in other cases, be distinguished from the relief claimed. So where plaintiff a creditor, brought a suit on his own behalf and on behalf of other creditors, asking on his own behalf to set aside a deed as void, and on behalf of other creditors for a declaration that the deed was voidable, it was held that both the plaintiff and the other creditors had one cause of action namely, the right to treat the deed as one which could not affect their rights, although as the plaintiff had obtained a decree which he

(1) *Baroo v Massim*, 21 W R 206 (1874)

(2) *Bhagwati v Bindeshri* 6 A 106 (1883) and see *Kahan Singh v Gur Dayal* 4 A 163 (1881)

(3) *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey* 5 A 163 (1882), *T B, Mahmood, J.*, dissent. The majority of the Court held that the suit was not against defendants jointly (p 168), and that nothing in ss 28 or 44 of the Code of 1882 authorized a suit by a plaintiff against A for dispossessing him or opposing his obtaining possession with distinct claims against B, C, D, and E for damages for separate years in respect of such primary wrongful act on the part of A (at pp 170, 171), and that what was contemplated by the Code was a suit for recovery from a trespasser or trespassers in possession at time of suit, and the joinder of claim for mesne profits against such trespasser or trespassers

(4b) *Mahmood, J.*, considered (at p 170) that the case was similar to *Janakinath v Ramrunjan* 4 C 949

(4) *Imrit Nath v Bahoo Joy*, 18 W R 288 (1872)

(5) *Ram Kishen v Chowdhury Trebeni* 1 C W N 511 (1897)

(6) *Namasivaya v Kader*, 17 M 168 (1893) and as to separate contracts, see case in list note

(7) *Luckumsey v Fazulla*, 5 B 177 (1880), dist, *Mokund Lal v Chotay Lal*, 10 C 1061 (1881), *Jamsetji v Keshunath*, 26 B 326, 1881

398 (1869)

(8) *Muthappa v Muth* 27 M 80 (1903)

hed to execute lie for that purpose required relief by setting aside the deed void (1)

A plaintiff may always put forward an alternative case (2) provided that facts stated as the basis of alternative relief are the same. Where there is a single cause of action, or several causes of action against the same defendant, no difficulty arises. Where the first defendant dispossessed the plaintiff of land sold to him by the second defendant and he sued for possession and mesne profits or in the alternative for the refund of the purchase money from the second defendant, it was held that there was but one cause of action, namely, the dispossession and no misjoinder (3). Two separate alternative causes of action against the same defendant may be joined (4).

A claim for possession by plaintiffs, four anna zemindars to receive a four anna share in a *pattai* alleged to be in possession of all six defendants or in the alternative, except as against one defendant for rent was held not to be bad for misjoinder, it being further held that notwithstanding that the claim for possession or rent might be unsustainable in fact as against some of the defendants, that was no ground for dismissing the suit generally for misjoinder (5).

"Does sect. 45 (now rule 3) contemplate a case where plaintiff has really only one cause of action upon which he can succeed but being in doubt as to which of his alleged causes of action will be successful proceeds upon both with the intention of obtaining relief out of one of them? Are not the several causes of action contemplated by sect. 45 causes of action which it is alleged each afford grounds for separate relief, and combined for cumulative and not alternative relief?" (6). In England it has been held that if two persons could not be joined as defendants unless the causes of action against them were exactly the same, the object of the Legislature would be entirely defeated (7). It would seem from the cases cited that the fact that alternative reliefs were claimed did not authorize a joinder of several causes of action against several persons not jointly interested. So where a suit was brought to set aside the sale of a *mehal* against the persons who had purchased it at an auction sale held for default in payment of Government revenue by *surpeshgirdars*, to whom the *mehal* had been let or in the alternative for damages against the *surpeshgirdars* who had defaulted in the payment it was dismissed for multiplicity as the two claims were based on distinct causes of action (8). And where a plaintiff contracted for sale to him of a house for Rs 2000 and sued, alleging a subsequent sale by the defendant to a third party and prayed for

(1) *Ebrahimi v. Foolbar* 4 Bom. L. R. 180 184 (1902)

(2) *Lakshminarayana v. Hari* 9 B. H. C. P. 1 (1872), in *Kabir Khan v. Khawani* 1897 P. R. No. 41, the plaintiff asked that he might be declared to be the proprietor of the whole village or failing that an occupancy tenant and it was held there was no misjoinder.

(3) *Serajal Haq v. Abdul Rahaman*, 29 C. 107 (1902) a.c., 6 C. W. N. 300

(4) *Bagot v. Eaton* 7 Ch. D. 1, Ann.

Pr. 1005 p. 23

(5) *Jankinath v. Ramrunjun* 4 C. 943 (1899) approved by *Mahmood J.* in *Nar Singh Das v. Mangal Dubey* 5 A. at p. 179 (1899)

(6) *Fatima Begum v. Muhammad Zakaria* 1890 P. R. No. 90 per *Rivaz J.*

(7) *Child v. Stenning* 5 Ch. D. p. 702 and see *Ann. Pr.* 1900 p. 223

(8) *Isam Kichen v. Clowdury Treleni*, 1 C. W. N. 200 (1897).

a decree either for specific performance of the contract of sale on payment of Rs 2400 (Rs 100 having been paid as earnest money), or for pre-emption on the sale on payment of Rs 2500, or whatever might be the market value of the house, Chatterjee, J., observed, that two distinct claims in the alternative, based on distinct causes of action, could not be joined under the section corresponding with rule 3. Rivaz, J., also doubted the correctness of their joinder, putting the query already quoted (1).

Same defendants jointly—It has been already pointed out that joint interest in the main questions raised by the litigation is a condition precedent to the joinder of several causes of action against several defendants, the test being whether there is community of interest in the causes to be determined (2). It was held that there was no provision of the Code allowing distinct causes of action against distinct sets of defendants, that is to say, causes of action in which the defendants are not all jointly interested, to be united in the same suit (3). The mere similarity of the claim is no ground for joining in one suit claims which, though similar, are several and distinct against several persons, (4) nor is the convenience of their trial by one Court (5). Where a cause of action arising out of a joint account of two defendants was united with another arising out of a transaction in which one of the defendants alone was concerned, it was held that the causes of action were not against the same defendants jointly (6). Where the defendants are not jointly liable, each distinct cause of action must form the subject of a separate suit. So where A sold to X, and B sold to X, whereupon Y sued A, B, and X to enforce a right of pre-emption, it was held to be a misjoinder, there being distinct causes of action in respect of which the defendants had no common interest (7). So where plaintiffs in a suit for partition joined as defendants a number of cultivating ryots, whom they sought to eject, it was held that the suit for partition was of little interest to the ryots, and the question of ejectment was a distinct one in the case of each ryot (8). So, also, there has been held to be a misjoinder where the right to relief against one defendant was in respect of the non-fulfilment of a contract, and the right to a declaration against another was in respect of a threatened disturbance of the plaintiff's possession (9). The same has been held in a suit against defendants for possession, and against some of them for damages and against others for mesne profits, (10) and in a suit to recover possession of certain lands by reversal of certain deeds,

(1) *Fatima Begam v Muhammad Zakana*, 1895, P. R. No. 96, Hukm Chand, C. P. C. 571.

(2) *Bhagwati v Bindeshri*, 6 A. 106, 108 (1883), *vide ante*.

(3) *Mullick Kefau v Shoo Persha I*, 23 C. at p. 826 (1896).

(4) *Koondun Lal v Rao Himmat* 3 A. II C. R. 86, 87 (1871), as to trial by one Court, *ib.*, and *Harehandar v Lal Bahadur*, 16 A. at p. 362 (1894).

(5) *Koondun Lal v Rao Himmat*, *supra*.

(6) *Saina Mal v Shah Bag* 1888 P. R.

No. 189.

(7) *Bhagwati v Bindeshri* 6 A. 106 (1883).

(8) *Saminada v Subba*, 1 M. 333 (1877).

(9) *Luckumsey v Fazulla*, 5 B. 177 (1881), *dist.* in *Mokund Lal v Chotay Lal* 10 C. 1061 (1884), where the co-defendant who was not a party to the contract had no distinct interest and was sued as the benamidar of the real defendant. This decision is not opposed to the first.

(10) *Narsingh Das v Manoj Dubey* 5 A. 163 168 (1882).

some of the deeds being of absolute, and some of conditional sale (1) Although there must still be community of interest where the causes of action are entirely distinct, it will be necessary in each case to see whether this is so or whether though the causes of action are several there is a common ground justifying their joinder. On the other hand, there was held to be no misjoinder in a suit against a defendant who had obtained possession under a decree which had been reversed, as also against his lessees, the latter standing in the shoes of their lessor and being jointly liable with him to be ousted (2) In a suit against joint decree holders for the plaintiff's customary fourth share of the profits realized by the decree holder by an execution sale of different houses at different times, the decree holders were held to be joint, though their liability to give the share in respect of the sale of each house was separate (3) So also a suit instituted to eject all the tenants holding separate lands in a village, and to recover arrears of rent from them was held not to be bad for misjoinder, as all the defendants claimed by inheritance or by purchase or otherwise under one and the same person or under one of two persons who had executed the *muckalla* for the lands, and the plaintiff therefore had a common cause of action against the defendants, and was not obliged to sue them separately (4)

As in other cases, (5) a person who is a party in different capacities is not the same defendant—a principle which though partly recognized in rule 5 is of general application. Thus, where a person is a party in two capacities there is misjoinder, unless each cause of action affects him in both capacities (6)

Plaintiffs jointly interested—The words "jointly interested" were first introduced by Act XII of 1879. Under the Code of 1859 it was held to be a misjoinder where the causes of action of the plaintiffs were different and distinct in their nature (7). A suit brought by three persons for the possession

(1) *Raja Ram v Luchman Pershad*, B L R (F B) 73t (1867). This case was distinguished in *Haranund v Prosunno* 9 C 763 (1883) [suit by purchaser of property subsequently sold in execution against parties to the decree and purchasers in execution of different portions of property], and in *Ram Narain v Annoda* 14 C. 681 [plaintiff talookdar obtained decree for ejectment of tenant in execution of decree opposed by defendants. One suit against judgment debtor and all parties opposing but without collusion]. In the first of these suits it was held there was no misjoinder and in the second that there was. Both cases, however, based the decision upon the question whether the plaintiff had one object and the defendants a common defence. As regards these cases it was pointed out (*Hukm Chand* 1 C. P. C. 573) that the test for joinder was the unity of the cause of action and not of the object of the suit, and the unity of the defence was not

knowable until after the institution of the suit.

(2) *Antu v Vishnu*, 22 B. 630 (1897).

(3) *Nanku v Board of Revenue*, 1 A. 414 (1877).

(4) *Thagaraja v Gyanasambandha Sanadha* 11 M. 77 (1883).

(5) *Idem ante* p. 628.

(6) See *Hukm Chand* 1 C. P. C. 571, 572.

(7) *Romona v Manicko* 9 W. P. 620 (1863) in which Phear J. pointing out the inconveniences of such a suit said that "saving all questions of abatement and matters in amendment of the record I have never in my memory heard of a suit decreed in favour of one co-plaintiff and dismissed as against the other co-plaintiff. And that negative fact of course is I think influential to show how very impracticable quite apart from any matter of law it has been found that combined suits of this character should be united together and treated as if they were one."

of immoveable property, in which two of them claimed half the property under a title by inheritance and the third claimed the other half in virtue of a sale thereof to him by the first plaintiff was held to be bid for misjoinder of causes of action (1). The Court said. Although it appears to us that sect 8 of Act VIII of 1859 the first paragraph of sect 45 of Act X of 1877 and the first paragraph of the present Code mean the same thing we assume that the Legislature by the amendment of 1877, by the amendment of 1879 and by the wording of the first paragraph of sect 45 as it at present stands intended to make it clear that their intention was that several plaintiffs could only join in suing several defendants in one suit for several causes of action *when the plaintiffs were jointly interested in each and all of such causes of action* and that the second part of the first paragraph of sect 45 is merely enacting that several plaintiffs jointly interested in the same causes of action against the same defendant or several defendants jointly may sue in the same manner, as by the first part of that paragraph it is enacted one plaintiff may sue one defendant or more jointly in one suit on several causes of action to which the defendants if more than one were parties and that it did not intend to confer a right by sect 45 on several plaintiffs to sue on causes of action which were not jointly vested in them one or more defendants although the acts of all the defendants jointly might have completed a separate cause of action of each several plaintiff and afforded him a cause of action on which he could sue alone. It was assumed however by the Judges that the Legislature did not intend "directly or indirectly to prohibit the joining by Hindu or Mahomedan heirs in one suit of their causes of action in respect of what had been the property of their ancestor or of the family and that it had been the practice in the North West Provinces to allow Hindu or Mahomedan heirs even where their interests were several to join in one suit for the recovery of property which had belonged to a common ancestor through whom title was claimed and that they regarded the decision in *Ram Sewak Singh v. Natched* (2) as necessarily confined to the maintenance of that practice. The same principle was followed in a subsequent case (3) in which it was held that several creditors to each of whom separate debts were owing by the same debtor could not jointly sue for the avoidance of a deed of gift executed by the debtor which deed was alleged to have been made fraudulently with intent to defeat or delay executant's creditors the cause of action of each separate creditor not being the same as that of the others. Similarly a suit by two brothers for a declaration that the parts of the house attached in execution of a decree against their father belonged to them and not to him was held to be irregular though the Court observed that the plaintiffs might well have thought that the case came within the latter part of the first paragraph as in one sense their title was a common title which was assailed by one and the

(1) *Salima Bibi v. Sheikh Muhammad*
18 A 131 (1895). The plaint was returned
so that the plaintiffs might elect which of
them should proceed with the suit. *fol.*
Rahim Baksh v. Amiran Bibi 18 A 219

(1896)

(2) 4 A 261 (1882)

(3) *Rajjo Kuar v. Deb Dal* 18 A 47
(1895)

same action of the execution creditor, and they were jointly interested in opposing the attachment and sale although a sale would only have affected each man's separate interest (1) Where the cause of action in the case of the first plaintiff aimed at the establishment of the title of the first plaintiff as issueless widow of M G to succeed him jointly with the other widows whereas the cause of action in the case of second plaintiff aimed at the establishment of the title of second plaintiff by reason of an adoption to take the estate of M G to the exclusion of all others it was held that it could not be said that the two plaintiffs were jointly interested in these inconsistent causes of action The establishment of first plaintiff's title would exclude second plaintiff from all right to take or share in the estate and the establishment of second plaintiff's title would equally debar first plaintiff from any share in the estate, but a right to be maintained out of it—a right which was not brought in contest (2) The Court added 'Sect 45 permits of the joinder in the same suit of several causes of action in which several plaintiffs are jointly interested against the same defendant These plaintiffs are jointly interested against the same defendant in the sense that it is the object of both plaintiffs to show a title in one or other of them to the whole or a portion of the estate in competition with the defendant, but this is not enough they must each be jointly interested with the other in the several causes of action—not necessarily equally interested but jointly interested i.e. as we understand, not jointly interested as a mere matter of affection but jointly interested as to the subject-matter of the suit which the causes of action have in contemplation' (3) When two persons are interested in a piece of land—one as *meharamdar*, and the other *ludnamdar*—and a third party commits a wrongful act which affects the rights of the persons so interested it may be properly held that the land is common to both to the extent of entitling them to sue jointly in respect of the wrongful act treating such act as giving rise to but one cause of action affecting the two persons more or less (4) So long as several causes of action are by the same or jointly interested plaintiffs and against the same defendant or defendants jointly they may be joined subject only to the Court's discretion of ordering their separation There are no restrictions as to the nature of the cause of action which may be so joined as it is stated (5) there are in most of the Code States of the American Union, but the restrictions there may sometimes prove a good guide here as to the advisability as apart from the legality of the joinder (6) Sect 26 (now O 1 r 1) has now been amended so as to permit plaintiffs to join in whom any right to relief exists in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction that is where if separate suits were brought any common question of law or fact would arise

Procedure to be followed where misjoinder—Under the last Code where a plaint was presented which was bad for misjoinder of causes of action

(1) *Behari Lal v. Kudu Ram* 15 A 340 (1893)

(2) *Langanimal v. Nkatarimal* C M 239 242 (1882)

(3) *Ib.*, at p. 412

(4) *Muthuvijaya Chockkhamam* 19 M 33, (1894)

(5) See *Hukm Chand* C P C, 574.

(6) *Ib.*

it might at any time before the settlement of issues have been returned for amendment (1) If the plaint, having been returned for amendment, was not amended, it might have been rejected (2) If this was not done, and subsequently objection was taken by the defendant, which might be either in the written statement or in a motion to take the plaint off the file or on the settlement of issues, (3) or the Court, on further consideration, considered that there were grounds for considering the plaint bad for misjoinder, the Judge should have raised an issue and decided it, and dismissed the suit (4) If, however, the Judge felt doubtful whether his decision on the point of misjoinder would stand, he might have properly framed the issues of fact for the determination of the case, and then dismissed the suit for misjoinder without recording any finding on the other issues (5) Further, the circumstances must have been such that the first Court had no alternative open to it but to proceed to trial of the matters of fact upon the preliminary determination of which the point raised as to misjoinder turns. It might then have dismissed the suit (6) As to the present Code, *vide post*. Where the District Judge disallowed the objection on the ground that it was not taken at the

(1) Section 53 of last Code, *Ram Prosad v Sachu Dasu*, 9 C W N 585, at p 588 (1902), *Ganesht v Kharati*, 16 A 279, 281 (1894), *Muthappa v Muthu*, 27 M at p 84 (1903). In *Behari Lal v Kodu Ram*, 15 A at p 381 (1893), the Court said "that in the great majority of cases in which two or more plaintiffs sue in one suit in respect of causes of action which are not joint, it would be proper to return the plaint for amendment and leave the plaintiffs to elect as to which of them should be struck out, but they doubted whether a Court should, without giving the parties an opportunity of amendment, absolutely dismiss the whole suit". And in *Aldridge v Barrow*, 34 C 662 (1907), the plaintiffs were put to election.

(2) Sect 54 of last Code. In some of the earlier cases the plaint appears to have been in the first instance rejected, or it was held that it should have been rejected. *Narsingh Das v Mangal Dubey*, 5 A 163, 171 (1882) [rejection stated to be under s 53 of the Code of 1882, *sed qu*], *Raja Ram Towary v Luchmun Pershad*, 8 W R 15 (1867), *Baboo Motu v Rancee*, 8 W R 64 (1867), *Sudhendhu v Durga Das*, 14 C 435, 439 (1887), *Towaree v Syud*, 4 A H C 108 (1871), *Mussumat Rutta v Dameru Lal*, 2 A H C 153 (1870).

(3) *Ram Dyal v Ram Doolal*, 11 W R 273 (1869). The Code, however, it was held, did not apparently contemplate an application by a party that a plaint be amended. *Muthappa*

v Muthu, 27 M at p 84 (1903).

(4) *Kachar Bhoj v Bai Rathore* 7 B 239 291 (1883), *Ram Prosad v Sachu Dasu* 9 C W N at p. 588 (1902), *Bhagwati v Bindeshri*, 6 A 106 (1883), *Baroo v Massum*, 21 W R 206 (1874). The plaint might also be returned for amendment under s. 53 before settlement of issues. In *Sudhendhu v Durga*, 14 C at p 439, the Court held, that with reference to ss. 31 and 53 of the Code of 1882, the Court should not have dismissed but rejected the plaint. It is not clear whether issues had been settled, but neither sections appear to apply. S 31 related to misjoinder of parties, and s 53 dealt with rejection for want of cause of action. In *Janolinath v Ramrunjun* 4 C at pp 953, 954 (1897), the Court said that when distinct causes of action are improperly joined the Court should not dismiss the suit but try them separately. This observation was obiter, and s 45 contemplated separation, not where the joinder was illegal, but where it was permitted, though a joint trial was inconvenient (*vide post*). In *Hurro Wonce*

he would proceed

(5) *Imrit Nath v Roy Dhunput*, 9 B L P 241 (1872), s c, 18 W R 283, *Kachar Bhoj v Bai Rathore*, *supra*.

(6) *Bhagwati v Bindeshri*, 6 A 106, 108 (1883).

earliest possible moment, namely, in the written statement but the objection was taken at the settlement of issues before trial it was given effect to on second appeal (1) The power given to the Court to return a plaint was only discretionary, and if it was shown that the form of a suit was bad, by reason that there has been misjoinder of parties, or of causes of action, it could not be said that a party was precluded from raising the objection and taking it at the hearing of the suit or on appeal There was nothing to warrant the proposition that when a Court of first instance decided a question of misjoinder in favour of the plaintiffs, there was an end of the matter, and that the defendant was precluded from raising the question in appeal (2) Where such a question has been raised, the Appellate Court has allowed a suit or claim to be withdrawn (3) Where the appeal has proceeded, the question has been raised in some cases whether the Appeal Court was precluded from reversing a decision on the ground of misjoinder by reason of sect 578 of the former Code In some cases misjoinder of causes of action has been considered an irregularity not affecting jurisdiction or the merits of the case (4) In other cases it has been held that, assuming but not deciding that misjoinder was a mere irregularity, it did affect the merits (5) In other cases it appears to have been held that misjoinder of causes of action was of the nature not of an irregularity, but an illegality (6) The law upon the point

(1) *Namaswamy v. Nadir*, 17 M 168 175 (1893)

(2) *Muthappa v. Muthu*, 27 M 80, at p 85 (1903) In *Shunkur v. Ials* 2 A II C 413 (1870) it was held that misjoinder was not a ground of special appeal but this it is submitted is not so

(3) *Tara Prosunno v. Koomarce* 23 W R 389, 390 (1875), *Ganesh v. Khairati* 16 A 283 (1894) in which case the appeal proceeded against those defendants in respect of whom there was no misjoinder

(4) *Kalian Singh v. Gur Dayal* 4 A 163 (1881) [held misjoinder of causes of action and parties, objection taken by one defendant held, Court should not having regard to s. 578 have reversed decree], *Wise v. Gureeb Hossain*, 13 W R 271, 272 (1870) [held no misjoinder as objected, but if any the Court would inquire into merits], *Behari Lal v. Kodu Ram*, 15 A 380, 382 (1893) [held to be irregularity though no objection taken to form of suit and s. 578 applied], *Mokund Lal v. Chotay Lal*, 10 C at p. 1068 per Mitter, J (1884)

(5) *Ganesh v. Khairati* 16 A 279, 283 (1894), *M. Kunl Lal v. Chotay Lal* 10 C 1069 per Mitter J (1884), *Namaswamy v. Nadir* 17 M at p. 175 176 (1893) *M. I. Ma Chandra v. M. I. Chandra* 24 C 540 544

(1897) [even if it were granted that an objection like the one that the defendants raised involves only a question of irregularity, a point which is by no means free from doubt] *Muthappa v. Muthu* 27 M 80 81 (1903)

(6) *Musst. Amceerun v. Musst. Waseehun* 12 W R 11, 12 (1869) [objection in first Court held in second appeal by Glover J, it appears to me something more than an irregularity something in fact expressly for hidden and consequently an illegality], *Baroo v. Massim* 21 W R 206 (1874) [though the term illegal was used this particular question was not discussed], *Tarajal v. Ramdat* 26 B 259 (1901) [s. 578 applies to mistakes and irregularities subsequently committed in a suit which has been instituted in such a way as to give the Court jurisdiction to try it The suit however must first be instituted in the manner allowed by law Cf upon the question of jurisdiction *Mullick Hefait v. Sheo Pershad*, 23 C 821 826 (1896)] *Domoon v. Manicko*, 9 W R 525 527 (1868) [Hobhouse J said that joinder of causes of action was forbidden except where authorized and that a decision in a suit in which causes of action were wrongly joined was contrary to law and being so must be set aside]

was thus unsettled (1) Probably in some cases it will be found that the merits were affected Where, however, this was not so, and particularly where no objection had been taken (a circumstance in itself indicating that the party has not suffered disadvantage), the Court would probably have acted rightly in not dismissing the suit upon what, in the supposed circumstances would be a technical objection Where effect was given to the objection, the Appellate Court, in the under mentioned case, (2) did not dismiss the suit, but rejected the plaint, directing the plaintiffs to pay the costs throughout In other cases the Court, both in first and second appeal, has dismissed (3) the suit for misjoinder As to the present Code, *vide post*

Objections to misjoinder, as all other objections to the frame of a suit, should, of course, be taken as early as possible An objection taken not in the written statement, but at the settlement of issues before trial, has been given effect to (4) An objection has been held to be too late after the case has been tried and decided (5) And it has been said that an objection taken for the first time in special, or possibly in regular appeal, might not be allowed to prevail (6) Phear, J, said (7) "As a general rule, if an objection on this ground is pressed and carried to a decision in the first Court, this Court will even upon special appeal, upon its being shown to be well founded, give the objector the benefit of it But, on the other hand, if it is not pressed and carried to a decision in the first Court, and if the parties go to trial in the same way as if the objection had not been made, then the objection will not be given effect to at a later stage, unless it appears clearly that there was a defect in the original trial, in consequence of the misjoinder of the causes of action to which the objection is directed This Court has always held that it is the duty of the first Court, which receives the plaint and entertains the suit to take care that the parties are not prejudiced by any unfair complication in the matter which the plaintiff charges against the defendants But if the parties have chosen to go to trial and have not insisted upon the first Court taking a step of this kind, then it may very fairly be taken against them at a

(1) Misjoinder of parties, it has been held, does not affect either merits or jurisdiction *Ram Kanayo v Prosunno*, 13 W R 175 (1870) In some of the cases previously cited there was misjoinder both of subject matter and parties

(2) *Sudhendhu v Durga*, 14 G. 435, 439 440 (1887), *sed qu.* as to grounds of decision, *vide ante* As to amendment on appeal, see *Langammal v Chinnai*, 6 M 239 (1882), *Karan v Muhammad*, 7 A 860 (1885)

(3) *Ram Narain v Annoda*, 14 C 681 (1887), *Romoono v Mamcho*, 9 W R 525 (1868), *Namasivaya v Kadir*, 17 M 168, 178 (1893), *Bhagwati v Bindeshri*, 6 A 106 (1883), *Muthappa v Muthu*, 27 M 80, 85 (1903), and cases cited *ante passim* In *Bance Krishnan v Koondun Lal* 2 A H C 221 (1870), *Koondun Lal v Rae Hummut*, 3

A H C 86 (1871), *Tewares v Syud Mo hamed*, 4 A H C 103 (1871) the Court dismissed the suit, stating expressly that it did so on the ground of misjoinder only and not on the merits which the plaintiff could raise again in another suit *Quere* as to the decision, *Suroop v Nanchand*, 13 W R 284 (1870) A dismissal for misjoinder is not a hearing or determination within the rule of *res judicata* *Futteh Singh v Musamunt Luchmee*, 21 W R 105 (1873)

(4) *Namasivaya v Kadir*, 17 M 168 170 (1893), cited *ante*

(5) *Ram Dyal v Ram Doolal*, 11 W R 273 (1869)

(6) *Mahomed v Potun* 20 W R 147, 148 (1873)

(7) *Tarisco v Hunnman*, 20 W R 140 (1873)

later stage of the appeal proceedings that they have not, in fact, suffered any material disadvantage in the trial unless it be distinctly shown that there was such disadvantage.

To turn to the present Code, it does not as sect 53 of the last did specifically deal with return for amendment but O VI r 17 allows of amendment, and the Court may, it is presumed return the plaint for that purpose. Under the last Code (sect 54 (d)) a plaint so returned and not amended was rejected. This provision has not been re enacted, but O VI r 18 deals with failure to amend after order. As regards an objection on the score of misjoinder r 7 of this Order provides for its being taken at the earliest opportunity and if not so taken the objection is deemed waived. Even if taken, the objection will under sect 99, count for nothing in appeal unless it be shown that such misjoinder has affected the merits of the case. Here, therefore as elsewhere the Code has diminished the importance of merely technical objections.

4 No cause of action shall, unless with the leave of the Court, be joined with a suit for the recovery

Only certain claims to be joined for recovery of immovable property

of immovable property, except—

- (a) claims for mesne profits or arrears of rent in respect of the property claimed or any part thereof,
- (b) claims for damages for breach of any contract under which the property or any part thereof is held, and
- (c) claims in which the relief sought is based on the same cause of action

Provided that nothing in this rule shall be deemed to prevent any party in a suit for foreclosure or redemption from asking to be put into possession of the mortgaged property

5 No claim by or against an executor, administrator or heir, as such, shall be joined with claims by

Claims by or against executor, administrator or heir

or against him personally, unless the last mentioned claims are alleged to arise with

reference to the estate in respect of which the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued as executor, administrator or heir, or are such as he was entitled to, or liable for jointly with the deceased person whom he represents.

Origin of rules.—These two rules represent with the amendments italicized sect 44 of the last Code which it was stated was not very happily expressed (1) R 4 is taken from English O 18 r 2 the words *or to obtain a declaration of title to immovable property* in the former section were

(1) *Canesh v Jewach*, 31 C. at 1 272 (1889) *Hukm Chand C 1 C 523* (1903), *Chilamkara v Ramasami* 5 M 161

added to meet the decision in *Gledhill v. Hunter*, (1) but have been now omitted R 5 is taken from English O 18, r 5; the word "heir" having been added, as in this country it is not an executor or administrator alone who represents the estate of a deceased person (2) The words after "heir" have also been added

Objections for misjoinder.—Under sect 54 (d) of the last Code, the plaint might have been rejected in case of failure to amend, on its being returned for the purpose under sect 53 of the same Code (3) If the Court, instead of rejecting the plaint or returning it for amendment, proceeded to trial, it should not, it was held, subsequently dismiss the suit for misjoinder, but dispose of it on the merits (4) The objection being of a dilatory character, and beside the merits, must have been taken in the Court of first instance, if not, it was deemed waived (5) It was not allowed to be taken for the first time on appeal and where it was raised for the first time on appeal, the High Court, on second appeal, declined to entertain it (6) A successful objection for misjoinder is a cause for which time may be deducted under sect 14 of the Limitation Act (7) Sect 54 is now O VII r 11, but clause (d) has not been re-enacted See now O VI r 16

Leave—It will be observed that leave can only be applied for in the case of r 4 R 5 is absolute Application should be made before the plaint is filed, though possibly, on good reason shown, leave may be given afterwards (8) A plaintiff may, with the leave of the Court join causes of action, but he is nowhere compelled to do so (9) And even in regard to the excepted causes of action which may be joined, the exception implies only a permission of joinder, but does not render it obligatory (10) Where leave is applied for, the question whether it will be granted must depend upon convenience and the circumstances of the case Amongst these, the Court will consider the connection between the claims sought to be joined So leave has been given to join where it was sought to recover immovable and moveable property comprised in the same instrument and to join claims in respect of personal and real estate, where both estates rested on a common gift in the same will (11) No appeal lay from an order rejecting an application for leave but where the effect of the order was to reject the plaint it was held that the order was a decree, and, as such, appealable (12)

Jurisdiction—Where causes of action are united, jurisdiction depends on the value of the aggregate subject-matters (13)

Rule 4 "Cause of action"—The rule presupposes a case where there

(1) 14 Ch D 492, in which it was held that an action to establish title to land and to recover rent, but not claiming possession was not an action for land

(2) *Ahmad ud din v. Sikandar*, 18 A at p 259 (1896)

(3) *Sanna v. Ganapa*, 5 Bom L R 185 (1903), in which case the Court refused to dismiss the suit in second appeal

(4) *Kushna v. Rakman*, 9 A 221 (1887)

(5) *Dhondiba v. Ramchandra*, 5 B 554, 561 (1881), *Maula v. Gulzar*, 16 A 130 (1893)

(6) *Maula v. Gulzar*, *supra*

(7) *Venkiti Murugappa*, 20 M 48 (1896), F B

(8) See *Ann Pr*, 1905, 225, *O'Keefe v. Civ Pr Code*, *Hukm Chand C P C 564* In *Venkiti Murugappa* 20 M 48, 49 (1896) an opportunity was given to amend the plaint and to file separate suits Cf rules as to leave under O I r 8, *ante*

(9) *Shco v. Sheorahai*, 6 A 353 (1884), *ref*, *Becharji v. Pujari*, 14 B at p 53

(10) *Lessor v. Janki*, 10 C 615 (1891)

(11) See *Ann. Pr*, 1905, pp 225, 226

(12) *Bandhan v. Solhu*, 8 A 191 (1880)

(13) See O II r 3, and as regards the old procedure, see *Luchmee v. Kall...*, B L R (F B) 620

are two or more various causes of action, one of which is to recover immoveable property. Several causes of action to recover immoveable property may be joined. The rule does not prohibit this, but a joinder with such causes of action of a different character, except as excepted in the rule (1). If, however, the Court considers it inadvisable to try the several causes of action in one suit, it can order separate trials (2). There is nothing, moreover, irregular in seeking to recover in one suit immoveable and moveable property if the cause of action is the same in respect of both (3). These decisions appear to be embodied in the new clause (c). And even a claim for possession of certain immoveable property, based on the first paragraph of sect 9 of the Specific Relief Act, may, it has been held, be joined without leave, with a claim for title to that property and for damages for dispossession from it (4). Claims which do not amount to a new cause of action, but which are mere machinery, such as a prayer for an injunction or receiver, may be joined without leave (5). But it has been held that an injunction cannot be asked for where it was not merely ancillary to the claim for possession (6).

"Suit for the recovery of immoveable property"—The expression "*suit for the recovery of immoveable property*," which is that used in sect 16, is more limited than the expression "*suit for immoveable property*" or "*for land*" within the meaning of the Charter. A suit may be one "*for land*" within the meaning of the latter, and not within this rule (7). So it has been held that a claim for specific performance of an agreement to sell a share in a house might be joined with a claim on a promissory note (8). So, again, a suit for recovery of a mortgage debt with an alternative prayer for sale has been held not a suit for recovery of immoveable property (9). Wilson J said (10) "It seems to me that a suit for '*the recovery of immoveable property*' is a suit founded upon an existing title in which the plaintiff seeks to get possession of the property itself. The words '*to obtain a declaration*,' etc. seem to me to apply to a case where a title exists, and the plaintiff asks to have that fact declared not to give him

(11)

Padwick

between

the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts. Sir Charles Sargent in the former

(1) Chulamlara v Ramasami 5 M. 161 (1882), Ambika v Ram Udit, 17 A. 274, 277 (1895), Raghubar v Jwala, 25 A. 229 (1903). As to court fee in case of exception (a) see Preference, 10 A. 401 (1894).

(2) Raghubar v Jwala, *supra*.

(3) Ganesh v Jewach, 31 C. 262, 272 (1903), s. c., 8 C. W. N. 150, 391 A. 10 in which the P. C. approve Girana v Kandasami, 10 M. 375, 506 (1887) which was followed in Nataraj v Nunda Lall Bose 3 C. W. N. 670 (1899), s. c., in appeal 7 C. W. N. 353, Mazhar v Sajjad 21 A. 375 (1902).

(4) Ram Harukh v Shoodhal, 15 A. 384 (1893) not followed in Ramasami v Paraman,

23 M. 448 (1901).

(5) Gledhill v Hunter 14 Ch. D. 491.

(6) Hambling v Wallara, 1889 W. N. (Eng.) 133.

(7) Cutts v Brown 6 C. 328, at p. 332 (1889). (8) *Ib.*

(9) Govinda v Mana 14 M. 281, 286 (1890), and see Gorachand v Rasanta, 15 C. L. J. 258 (1911).

(10) See Cutts v Brown, 6 C. at p. 332 (1889).

(11) Beg v Chandira v Ranku, 13 C. W. N. 451 (1899).

(12) 2 Ch. D. 736, 743 and see O Kinsale, C. P. C., Hakim Chand, C. P. C. 565.

Court said Now when can it be said that a claim is made by 'an heir as such' ? Plainly such a claim is made when the plaintiff rests his claim entirely on the allegation that he is the heir of another and as such asserts a right against the defendant. So where a portion of a claim was founded upon the plaintiff's alleged right as heir of A and another part of the claim had no reference to A's estate it was held that there was a misjoinder and that one of the claims must be struck out (1). The Allahabad High Court has however dissented from this decision holding that the heir referred to in the rule is an heir suing or being sued in his representative capacity who like an executor or administrator represents the estate of a deceased person and that it is impossible to hold that the rule precludes a person from joining a claim for property acquired by himself with a claim for property inherited by him from another when he does not represent persons other than himself (2). And more recently Jenkins C.J. explained the meaning of the rule to be as follows. Those to whom it relates have the common characteristic that they owe their legal condition to the death of another. But there are others of whom this can be predicated as for instance legatees or next of kin who are not named in the rule. Executors administrators and heirs have this characteristic in common not shared by legatees and next of kin namely that not only do they acquire title from the deceased but they may represent him (3). And in a recent case in the Bombay High Court it was held that a claim for maintenance by the widow of a Mitakshara coparcener was not against the estate of her deceased husband (since his interest was extinguished by his death) but was against the property of which he was a coparcener and therefore there was no misjoinder when she sued the surviving coparceners for her *stridhan* property and also for maintenance out of the joint estate (4).

6 Where it appears to the Court that any causes of action joined in one suit cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient

Joinder of causes of action—This rule corresponds subject to certain alterations with the second paragraph of sect 45 of the last Code and with O 18 r 1 and portion of O 16 r 1 of the English rules. See note to O II r 3 the first paragraph of which embodies the first paragraph of sect 45 of the Code of 1882. That rule relates only to the joinder of causes of action. It assumes that the action has been rightly constituted under O I r 1 *ante* (5). Under the English rule it has been held that save in actions for the recovery of land and in actions by a trustee

(1) *Ashabai v Haj Tyeab* 6 B 390 (1882).
In *Gokhai v Lakhmdas* 14 B 490 499 (1890) the Court ordered the plaintiff to elect directing that she might proceed with either claim subject to her paying any costs specially caused to the defendant by the misjoinder but this case has been dissented from in *Jankibai v Shrinivas Ganesh* 38 B 190 (1913).

(2) *Ahmad ud din v Sikandar* 18 A 956 (1896).

(3) *Hafizaboo v Mahomed Cassum* 31 B 103 (1906).

(4) *Jankibai v Shrinivas Ganesh* 38 B 120 (1913) dissenting from *Gokhai v Lakhmdas* 14 B 490 (1890).

(5) See *per Bowen L.J. v Hannah v Smurthwaite* 2 Q B 425 (1893).

in bankruptcy, the plaintiff may without leave, but subject to rules 8, 9, join in one action not several actions, but several "causes of action," (1) which term has been held to comprise every fact which is material to be proved to enable the plaintiff to succeed, (2) the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim, every fact which, if traversed the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment, (3) so connected that, as regards evidence, etc., they can conveniently be disposed of together (4) But this joinder is "always subject to the underlying principle that the burden lies on the plaintiff of proving his case and that no extra burden should be imposed on the defendant through the plaintiff needlessly enlarging the area of dispute" (5)

Order for separation—The Court might, under the terms of sect 45 of the last Code, order separate trials of any "such causes of action"—that is causes of action which might have been joined in the same suit under the first paragraph of that section. The second paragraph, therefore, had no application in cases of misjoinder of causes of action forbidden by the first paragraph, as to which the only course open to the Court was that of returning the plaint for amendment or rejecting it if not amended, or dismissing the suit (*vide ante*) (6) Under sect 45 the Court could, *suo motu* or on the application of the party, order separate trials. This can be done now under this rule which consolidates the provisions of the second paragraph of sect 45, and of sects 46, 47 of the last Code. The power given did not it was held extend to an order for the dismissal of defendants, and that a fresh suit should be brought against them. Such an order would not be one for the 'separate disposal' (or separate trial) of the several causes of action, it would be an order preventing the disposal of them in the suit before the Court. If the Court found that the separate causes of action could not be conveniently tried together, it should it was held deal with them separately as sub suits under the title and number of the principal suit from which they spring (7) So in a suit on title in which the recovery of immoveable property and mesne profits are claimed, the Court may order separate trials in respect of the claim for the recovery of the immoveable property and in respect of the claim for mesne profits (8)

A direction to file separate plaints did not it was held come within the scope of the section which did not require the plaintiff to file separate plaints, but provided for the separate trial of the several causes of action contained in the one plaint filed on the institution of a suit (9) As already stated the

- (1) *Burstall v Beyfus* 26 Ch. D 36 C A
- (2) *Cooke v Gill*, L. R 8 C P p 116
Buckley v Hann 5 Ex. 43. As to meaning of term see notes to a 20, O 1 r 1, *ante*
- (3) *Real v Brown* 22 Q B D 131
- (4) *Ann. Practice*, notes to O 18 r 1
- (5) *Per Collins M.R. Saccharin Corp v Wild* (1903) 1 Ch. p 429
- (6) See *Hukm Chand*, C P C 576, the statement in *Janakinath v Ramrunjun* 4 C at pp 953 954, that when distinct causes of action are improperly joined the Court instead

- of dismissing the suit should try them separately was *obiter* and it is submitted erroneous. The order for separation under the last Code applied only where there was no misjoinder. Cf *Sarala Sundari Das v Saroda Prasad Sur* 2 C L J 602 (1904)
- (7) *Khadar v Chotibibi* 8 B 616 (1884)
- (8) *Fatima Bibi v Abdul Majid* 14 A 531 (1892)
- (9) *Musht Ratta v Dumree Lal* 2 A. H. C P 153 (18 0)

by the procedure adopted (1) In the under-mentioned case it was not necessary to dismiss a suit in which claims upon a set of action and against different persons have been joined that it ought to be tried, so far as relates to the joint claims, defendants the Court excluding from its consideration any claim against all (2) But this could be done only by amendment by the second paragraph of sect 45 of the former Code was applicable to uses of action which might have been joined in the same suit (3) The present rule does not expressly refer to orders confining suits but the principle in this respect which formerly existed still seems to remain as appears from the word "*disposed*" and the authority given to the Court "*to make such order as may be expedient*," which would include such an order as was referred to in sects 46 and 47 of the last Code which tended to replace

consolidation of suits—The rule deals with the separate trial of a set of claims united in one suit Neither does it, nor does any other provision in the Code, provide for the consolidation of several suits Consolidation may be ordered by consent of parties (4) And where the parties consent, consolidation is sometimes ordered by the Court as a matter of course (5) on general principles of equity and justice So where the parties consented to be consolidated were the same and the subject-matter of the suits also was the same the Court made an order for consolidation (6) Where, on the other hand, the parties and the subject-matter were different, consolidation was refused (7) And three suits were held to be improperly tried together, where, from the very nature of the case, a separate trial in each suit had to be given separately (8) In the *Falls of the Clyde* an application by the impugnant for the consolidation of three suits was refused, as the promovent resisted it on the ground that the claims were based upon different circumstances and were in conflict, Sale, J., observing that there being no general order for the consolidation of actions, the only course left in the case was the analogy of the practice of the Court of Admiralty in England for consolidation may be obtained either by a plaintiff (10) or

Amodar Das v Gokal Chand 7 W R 217 (1871)

Kumar Mytee v Koomar Naram 17 C W N 576 (1873)

Chand 579

alls of Ettrick, 22 C at 1 517

wanath v Collector of Mymen

L. P. App. 42 (1871), and see

Arshad v Nundun 21 W R 196

Singh v Alai Ahmed, 15 W R

Ch v Byjnath, 10 C 58 (1883),

Arja Kumar 17 C W N 576

Arshad v Nundun, 21

(8) *Juggut Clunder v Lar Mahomed* 21

W R 217 (1874) The High Court, however,

held that the Subordinate Judge was wrong

in dismissing the suit because the course

so taken though suggested by the plaintiff

was sanctioned by the Munsif It accord-

ingly ordered a remand.

(9) 22 C 511 (1894) The claims were

ordered to be heard successively subject to

one set of costs being allowed, if it were

found that the application for consolidation

had been wrongly resisted

(10) *Martin v Martin & Co* (1897) 1 Q B

429, *Peacock v Byjnath* 10 C 58 (1883),

Nehal Singh v Alai Ahmed 15 W R 110

(1871)

defendant (1) Where the lower Court has consolidated suits the defendants may prefer one appeal (2) Where the plaintiff applied for consolidation which was refused the Court was held to have acted wrongly in treating without consent all the suits as governed by the judgment given in one of them (3)

Postponement of suit pending decision of test action—Where several plaintiffs have commenced several suits against the same defendant the Court may under its general jurisdiction, on the application of the plaintiffs enlarge the time for taking the next step in the rest of the actions until one of them has been tried as a test action and where the selected action fails to be a real trial of the issue another of the actions may be substituted as a test action (4) When several actions had been commenced against different defendants for the same libel, the Court refused to consolidate them but ordered a stay of proceedings in all the actions except such one as the plaintiff might select and if he was not satisfied with the result of the trial of that action he was to select and try one other action all the several defendants in the other actions undertaking to be bound by the verdict in the test actions and to have judgment entered against them respectively for the maximum amount of damages awarded in either of the test actions (5) Where by an order of the Court all the defendants in several actions are bound by the result of a selected action and the defendant in the selected action refuses to appeal against the judgment the Court has it has been held power to substitute another of the defendants for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal (6)

[cf s 46] **7. All objections on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived**

Objections—See as to this notes to O I r 13 *ante* which deals with objections where the misjoinder complained of is of parties. It was held that even on second appeal if a suit was found to be bad for misjoinder of causes of action the proper procedure to follow would be not to dismiss the suit altogether but to direct the Court below to perform the duty which that Court ought to have performed, namely to return the plaint for amendment (i) See notes to O II r 3

(1) See unreported case 10 C at p 60 and as to consolidation actions generally *Daniell's Ch Pr* 1010-1013 *Seton* 831 837 *Ann. Practice* 1905 685-686

(2) *Enayetoolah v Radha Charn* 16 W R 30* (1871).

(3) *Nehal Singh v Alai Ahmed* 16 W R 110 (1871)

Am v Chaderji 4 Ch D 563 JCB

D 459, *Bennett v Lord Bury* 5 C P D 333 *Ann. Practice* 1905 p. 686 and see *Vithu v Narayan* 5 B H. C. R. 30 at p 3. (1865).

(5) *College v Pike* 56 L. T. 191

(6) *Briton Life Assurance v Jones* 60 L. T. 637

() *Sarala Sundari Dasi v Sarda Prasad* Sur 2 C L J 602 (1901)

ORDER III.

Recognized Agents and Pleaders

1. Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, ¹⁵

Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognized agent or by pleader required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except *where* otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf

Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person

"Appearance"—These words ("appear" and "act") have a well defined and well known meaning To appear for a client in Court is to be present and to represent him in the various stages of the litigation at which it is necessary that the client should be present in Court himself, or by some representative (1) There may be appearance if the pleader, though instructed, is not prepared to proceed with the case (2) Under the last Code it was held that where, on the day fixed for hearing a party was present in person merely for the purpose of applying for an adjournment which was refused he must be taken to have "appeared" within the meaning of Chapter VII of that Code, the provisions of which are replaced by this and following rules The party has appeared in person The purpose for which he appeared or the action which he took on appearance, are immaterial But where the party is absent and an application for adjournment is made on his behalf by a pleader who has no other instructions, and whose functions are at an end when the adjournment is refused in that case the party had not appeared within the meaning of the Chapter (3) Where the pleader who applies for an adjournment is accompanied by a recognized agent of the party, but the latter neither makes any application, nor does any act the question is whether he intends to appear, and in fact, does appear for the party in the exercise of his powers under this rule

(1) *Kali Kumar v Nobin Chunder*, 6 C 585 (1880), *per* White, J

(2) *Ram Chandra v Madhav*, 16 B 23 (1891)

(3) See *Kalich Khan v Jaggaswar Prasad*

Singh 35 C 1023 (1908) (Woodroffe J), *Satish Chandra Mukerjee v Ahara Prasad* 34 C 403 (1907), and *post*, notes to O 4, r 1, and O 41, r 17

This rule is merely permissive and enabling. If the recognized agent, although able to do so, does not think proper to conduct the case on behalf of his principal, his mere presence in Court is not an "appearance" in the suit. An appearance may be made by a pleader or a recognized agent, but the concurrence of the pleader or agent is essential. As soon as he ceases to intend to represent the principal, the latter is unrepresented (1). The words in the last Code after "party" were "to a suit or appeal." These words are now omitted. The section will still apply to appeals and proceedings in suits.

"Act"—"To act for a client in Court is to take on his behalf in the Court, or in the offices of the Court, the necessary steps that must be taken in the course of the litigation in order that his case may be properly laid before the Court." (2) The word "act" is, however, taken to refer only to ordinary acts, and thus not to include the instituting or defending of a suit, which a recognized agent cannot do in his own name (3). Nor does a mere power to sue authorize an agent to enter into an agreement with a pleader to pay him more than a reasonable remuneration (4).

"Except where otherwise expressly provided,"—This may be either by the Code itself or by any other law for the time being in force. Thus, this rule is expressly made subject to O XXXIII r 3 in respect of applications to sue *in forma pauperis* (5). Again, clause 10 of the Charter provides that no persons but advocates, vakils, or attorneys of the High Court shall be allowed to plead or act (6) for any suitor in the High Court. So it has been held that the former section did not authorize a recognized agent to address a High Court as the suitor himself may do, because that clause forbids that for every person whatever except advocates and vakils (7) and that an authorized agent could not file a petition of appeal on the appellate side of the High Court (8). Under the Rules of the High Court an advocate may appear and plead only. He cannot therefore file an appeal in the registrar's office (9).

"Party in person"—Where a barrister or pleader appears before the Court as a litigant in person, he must not address the Court from the advocate's table or in robes, but from the same place and in the same way as any ordinary member of the public (10).

"By a pleader"—As to the meaning of this term, which includes advocates, vakils and attorneys see sect. 3 ante. If a party has more

(1) Soonderlal v. Goorprasad, 23 B 414 (1895).

(2) Kali Kumar v. Nobin Chunder, 6 C. 585 (1880), per White, J.

(3) Choonoo v. Hur Prasad, 1 N. W. P. H. C. R. 277 (1869); Carter v. Motree Lal, 2 N. W. P. H. C. R. 179 (1870); Lodges Pershad v. Choonoo Pershad, 4 N. W. P. H. C. R. 59 (1872); Mokha Hatakraj v. Bhooswar Doss, 5 B. L. R. App. 11 (1870), s. c. 13 W. R. 344.

(4) Keshav Bapuji v. Narayan, 10 B. 18 (1887).

(5) See *Ex parte* De Gurgum, 4 B. H. C. R.,

A. C. J. 91 (1867).

(6) See Moran v. Dewan Ali Serani, 5 B. L. R. 418, 420 (1872).

(7) Prannath Chowdhury v. Candada Mohun Tagore, 3 W. R. 108 (1857). As to the Allahabad High Court, see A. S. Letters Patent.

(8) Buzul Kareem v. Ramgopal Manna, 8 Sev. 241.

(9) Ram Tarnak Narick v. Sudhansu, 13 W. R. 163 (1876).

(10) West Hopetown Tea Co., 9 A. 160 (1886).

than one pleader, the senior has the entire control of the case and it is not open to the junior pleader to take any ground of appeal which the senior has not thought fit to argue, except when the senior has obtained the permission of the Court to the taking of that course (1) A pleader represents both counsel and attorney in that he can both plead and act, whereas the former pleads and the latter acts. As to the respective powers of these various classes of legal practitioners a subject which is beyond the scope of the work see the references given below (2) The Calcutta High Court holds (3) that administrative acts required to be done in the offices of the Courts may be done on a pleader's responsibility by his *bona fide* clerks, and a District Judge has no authority to define the acts which may be so done by the pleader himself and by his clerks respectively, as High Courts alone possess such authority. The Punjab Chief Court however has dissented from this decision inasmuch as the Code does not provide for the delegation by a pleader of any portion of his duties to others and on the ground that if a pleader is allowed to perform some of them by deputy there is no reason why he should not be allowed to do so as regards the whole (4)

"Duly appointed"—The Court may inquire as to the agent's authority, and if under r 1 it substitutes the name of the principal it does not decide that the agent had authority (5) The words "*duly appointed*" do not simply mean a person duly appointed by the party in the suit, but a pleader duly appointed according to the law regarding pleaders in force in the particular Court (6) Again, the validity of the appointment must be considered with reference to the general law relating to the employment of legal practitioners. Thus a solicitor or attorney having discharged his client cannot change sides and act for the opposite party (7) As to persons authorized to act for Government or appointed to prosecute or defend Princes and Chiefs, see O XXVII rr 2 4 and sect 8. Vakalatnamas whether executed by principals or their attorneys or agents and mookhtarnamas under the authority of which vakalatnamas may have been executed, do not require to be verified on oath, the responsibility in regard to their being properly and correctly executed resting entirely with the pleaders (8)

2 The recognized agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are—

(1) Sreeneebath Roy : Uml ka Chinn 12 W P 375 (1869)

(2) Hukm Chand C P C pp 471-486 in which the following matters are treated—
pp 471-473 General considerations pp 473-47 Pleadings authority how far exclusive of his client, pp 475 476 Admissions by pleader binding on his client pp 477-486 Stipulations and compromises by pleaders and counsel. See also ib at pp 9 10 O Kamealya Civ Pr Code Commentary to ss 2 and 375

(3) *In re Khola Bix Khan* 15 C 678

(1888) and see R. Karuppa Udayan 20 M 87 (1896) which however was a criminal case

(4) Mula Vali Atma Pam 153 I J No 36 cited in Hukm Chand C P C 4

(5) Nam Narayan Singh : Raghu N I J C 678 (1899)

(6) *In re Pleaders of High Court* I J 132 (1883)

(7) Pam Malli v. V. O. I J

(1880) See also A. J. in 4 M H C R A. J. 22

(8) *Matrasail of J*

(1867)

- (a) persons holding powers of attorney, authorizing them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties ;
- (b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorized to make and do such appearances, applications and acts

Power of attorney.—As to stamp, see Act I of 1879, clause 50, and vakalatnamahs, notes to last rule. A person holding a power may refuse to act on it (1). A warrant of attorney to an attorney of a defendant to receive a plaint, confess action, suffer or consent to a judgment or decree, empowers the attorney to accept service and appear for the defendant (2). The power must authorize the person "to make and do such appearances," etc. A mere authority to look after a case does not make the donee of the power a recognized agent so as to be able to apply to refer a case to arbitration (3). The authority given must be construed with reference to the special purpose for which the power was granted. General words imply authority to do all that the principal himself could do. They mean that the agent can do all that is necessary for the prosecution of the suit in the ordinary way. He cannot, for instance, enter into an agreement with a pleader to pay him more than a reasonable remuneration, nor could he bring the case to a close in a special manner by joining in a reference to arbitration or by offering to be bound by the oath of the opposite party given in a particular form (4). The question of special and general power has become immaterial under this rule (5).

Clause (a). "Persons holding powers of attorney."—The terms of this clause in the former Code were different. It was limited to persons holding *general* powers of attorney within certain local limits, that is from parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction. The meaning to be attached to the word "reside" has been dealt with in the comments on sect 20. The expression "*not resident*" appears to have been introduced into the former section in the Code of 1877, to avoid an agent acting as a recognized agent during a casual temporary absence of the principal, as he was held to be able to do under the Code of 1859 (6). The section, however, it was held, was to be construed broadly so as not to prevent a creditor from enforcing his claims against his debtors, and a person who went for a few months from his usual place of residence to his native province to get his

(1) See notes to next rule

(2) Khelut Chandra Ghose v Saroda Soondery Das, Bourke, 244 (1865)

(3) Bhugwan Dass v Nund Lal, 12 C 173, 177 (1885)

(4) Sadashiv v Naruti, 14 B 455 (1890), citing Keshav Bapuji v Narayan, 10 B. 18

(1886), Thakur Pershad v Kalka Pershad, 6 N W P Rep 210 (1874)

(5) Venkatarama v Narasinga Rao, 24 M L J 180 (1913)

(6) Bhandas v Lakhmichand, 6 B H. C R. A C. 159 (1869)

sister married was held during his absence to be "not resident" at that place (1) In the case cited, Melville, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, observed that "it may be supposed that the Legislature intended to give the benefit of this provision to all persons, and especially to traders, whose interests might be seriously compromised, if during their absence from home and their place of business, they could leave no one behind who could represent them in Court, as well as conduct their business" If the principal was resident within the jurisdiction, then the agent was not a recognized agent within the meaning of clause (a) of the former section An application for execution was not made "in accordance with law" (2) when made by a general attorney of the decree holder at a time when the latter himself was resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree (3) The Legislature has considered it unnecessary to preserve the limitations above noted, and has made the sub clause general

Certificated mukhtars—A mukhtar was at one time not considered a recognized agent (4) Clause (b) of the former section expressly recognized mukhtars This clause has been now omitted as unnecessary It is included in sub clause (a), which is general in its terms

Clause (b) "Persons carrying on trade"—As to "carrying on business," see notes to sect 20 *ante* The words "where no other agent is expressly authorized" were, under the Code of 1859, held to imply that the persons so carrying on business for or in the names of the parties were purely gomastahs or agents, and not partners (5) This decision, however, was subsequently dissented from (6) These latter cases dealt with the point whether service on one partner for his co partner was a good service, which was the case under the provisions of sect 74 of the Code of 1882, and is so under O XXX r 3 (6) of the present Code, but the question is still open as regards other acts, appearances and applications This section and O V r 13 are to be construed together, being intended to carry out the same scheme of relief (7) It would seem that in order to constitute a recognized agent, the business carried on by him should be continuous and not occasional or desultory So a Bombay

(1) *Ram Chandra v Keshav*, 6 B 100 (1881), and see *Damodar Das v Inayat Husain* 28 A. 135 (1905)

(2) Within the meaning of art 179 of the Limitation Act

(3) *Murari Lal v Umrao Singh* 23 A 499 (1901), and it has been so held with reference to an application under s 258 of the last Code *Kasumji v Beni Prasad*, 26 A. 19 (1903)

(4) *Kristo Chunder Goopto v Fuzal Ali*, 17 W R 389 (1872) As to the history of mukhtars, see *In re Khoda Bux Khan* 15 C 638, 646 (1888), and see s 11, Act XX. of 1865, as to certificate *Re Muddan Mohun Biswas*, 6 W R. Ref 29 (1866), *Pe Gujraj Singh* 10 W R. 375 (1868), *Kali Kumar*

Roy v Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty, 7 C. L. R. 562 (1881), 6 C 585 Now see Act XVIII of 1879 as amended by Acts IX. of 1881 and XI of 1898 As to the High Courts' power to prescribe rules for mukhtars, see *Tussudag Hosain v Girhar Narain*, 14 C 556 (1887)

(5) *Luchmeput Dogaret Sibnarain Mundle*, 1 Hyde, 97 (1862-3)

(6) *Ram Chandra Bose v Snead*, 7 B L. R. App 58 (1871), *Kustoor Mull v Sookeram*, 11 B L. R. App. 26 (1873), which appears to approve of the former case, but in which it was held that the service should be made at the place of business.

(7) *Goonidas v Ganeshlal*, 4 P 416 (1890), see O V r 13 post

firm simply employed by the owners of a ship visiting Bombay to procure freight for her for a particular voyage, could not, it was held, be regarded under ordinary circumstances as carrying on business in the name of the owners of such ship (1) A gomastah of a firm ceases to be a recognized agent as soon as the firm ceases to exist (2) But it is different where a firm does exist, though not actually carrying on business The survivor of a firm which has ceased to carry on business, who is engaged in collecting the assets of such firm and otherwise winding up its affairs, is a recognized agent of the owner of such firm (3) A political agent is not, as such, a recognized agent (4)

Objection to agent acting—An agent cannot act under this rule so long as his principal is within the jurisdiction, but if he does, and there has thus been an irregularity, the Appellate Court ought not, on that account, to dismiss the suit, unless the irregularity has affected the merits of the case (5) Similarly, where a recognized agent obtained a decree in appeal without objection, it was held the debtor could not, in execution of it, object to the agent (6)

Punjab, Oudh, Central Provinces—The last clause of sect 37 of the former Code created an exception in the case of these Provinces This has now been omitted as no longer necessary The former Chief Commissionership of Oudh has been included in the Lieutenant Governorship of the United Provinces See as to former section Notification (7) (Punjab), October 3 1877, No 3857 *Punjab Gazette*, October 4, 1877, Part I p 391, Notification (Oudh) July 18 1878 No 522A *N W P and Oudh Gazette* July 27, 1878 p 1038 In some of the Scheduled Districts there are special statutory provisions as to recognized agents as in Ajmere (see Ajmere Regulation I of 1877 sect 23)

38.]

3 (1) Processes served on the recognized agent of a party shall be as effectual as if the same had been served on the party in person, unless the Court otherwise directs

(1) The provisions for the service of process on a party to a suit shall apply to the service of process on his recognized agent

Service on agent—The rule is of an enabling character, and does not of course, bar service of notice on the parties themselves (8) Further, a person to whom a power of attorney has been given may refuse to act upon

(1) *Patani v. Saunders*, 8 B H C R 159 (1871), see note, 7 B H C P 111

(2) *Mokha Harakraj v. Bascwar*, 13 W R 744 (1870)

(3) *Holkar v. Pitambardas* 9 B H C R 427 (1872)

(4) *Venkatesw v. Madhavray*, 11 B. 53 (1880)

(5) 8 G, ante *Bhajan Das v. Lakshmichand*, 1

6 B H C R 159 (1869) This rule applies to the whole section *Munoo Das v. Ishan Chunder*, 15 W R 245 (1871)

(6) *Parvatibai v. Vinsayek*, 12 B 69 (1887)

(7) The special authority need not be in writing *Mula Mal v. Atma Ram*, 1890, P 1 No 26.

(8) *Ram Lal Chowdhry v. Surinder Jal*, 1864, W R Misc 21

the power, and may thus refuse to accept service of summons (1) Service upon an attorney's clerk of an order directed to be served on the attorney has been held to be not good (2)

4 (1) The appointment of a pleader to make or do any **Appointment of appearance, apprehension or act for any person** shall be in writing, and shall be signed by such pleader person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by power-of attorney to act in this behalf

(2) Every such appointment, when accepted by a pleader, shall be filed in Court, and shall be considered to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court, by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client

(3) No advocate of any High Court established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or of any Chief Court, and no advocate of any other High Court who is a barrister shall be required to present any document empowering him to act

5 Any process served on the pleader of any party or left **Service of process on at the office or ordinary residence of such** pleader, and whether the same is for the personal appearance of the party or not, shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents, and, unless the Court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person

Service of process on pleader—Act VIII of 1859, sect 18 A service on the petitioner's attorney on the record is good, even when decree nisi has been obtained in her favour in a divorce suit, and the petitioner has left India for England (3) Service of notice of appeal upon respondent's pleader is good service on him (4) So also is service of summons calling on a party to appear and give evidence (5) Personal appearance to give evidence is within the meaning of the words "personal appearance of the party" (6)

"Left at the office"—These words, it has been held in England do not mean that a process will be considered served on a pleader, simply if it is pushed under the door of the office, or dealt with in some other similar manner,

(1) *Juchmee Chund v. Bengal Coal Co.*, 8 C 317 32f (1882)

(2) *Prattall Salgram v. Kadd 2 Hyl.*, 11f (1864)

(3) *King v. King* C B 41f (1882)

(4) *Jehur Dutt v. Shil Parthasarthy* 1f W J 290 (1871)

(5) *Shivrudappa v. Kasi nath* 1f W J 290 (1871)

B H C R 1, A C 141 (1871)

(6) II

or even if it is left at the office without being handed to any one and the provision virtually means that the process must have been left with an adult person at the office (1)

[s 41] 6 (1) Besides the recognized agents described in rule 4, any person residing within the jurisdiction of the Court may be appointed an agent to accept service of process

(2) Such appointment may be special or general and shall be made by an instrument in writing signed by the principal, and such instrument or, if the appointment is general, a certified copy thereof shall be filed in Court

Agent to receive process.—Service on such agent will be sufficient in any case as provided for in O V r 12 of the Code (2) This rule corresponds with s 14 50 51 Art VIII of 1849 and sect 41 of the last Code

ORDER IV

Institution of Suits.

[s 48] 1. (1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf

(2) Every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII, so far as they are applicable

[s 58
st para] 2 The Court shall cause the particulars of every suit to be entered in a book to be kept for the purpose and called the register of civil suits Such entries shall be numbered in every year according to the order in which the plaints are admitted

Plaints—See sect 26 ante

(1) *Montgomery v Liebenthal*, 1 Q B 497 n test O 9 r 8 Hukm Chand C P C (1898)

(2) See as to the first rule, Ann fr

ORDER V.

Issue and Service of Summons.

Issue of Summons

1. (1) When a suit has been *duly instituted* a summons ^{is} may be issued to *the* defendant to appear and answer the claim on a day to be therein specified.

Summons.
Provided that no such summons shall be issued when the defendant has appeared at the presentation of the plaint and admitted the plaintiff's claim

(2) *A defendant to whom a summons has been issued under sub rule (1) may appear—*

(a) in person, or

(b) by a pleader duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit, or

(c) by a pleader accompanied by some person able to answer all such questions

(3) Every such summons shall be signed by the Judge or such officer as he appoints, and shall be sealed with the seal of the Court.

Summons—Instead of the words in the former section (sect 61), "*When the plaint has been registered and the copies or concise statements required by sect 55 have been filed,*" the present section runs "*when a suit has been duly instituted*" The first duty of the Court after the filing of the plaint is [provided that the defendant was alive at that date, for if not, the suit cannot proceed (1)] to summon the defendant, whether he be an adult or not (2) Natural justice requires that before an order is passed against a man he should be heard and a decree against one who has never been summoned is not binding upon him (3) A summons, therefore, is the first of the several writs which are incidental to the proceedings in a suit, as being the official notification to a defendant that he has been sued and should appear in Court and answer the claim (4) Generally and in the absence of any special rule,

(1) Mohun Chunder v Azeem Gazee 12 W R 45 (1869)

(2) Suresh Chund v Juggat Chund 14 C. 204 (1886)

(3) *Ib* at p 218

(4) See Hukm Chand v C. P. C., notes to this section, where the subject is minutely discussed

the summons should be in the language of the Court, and addressed to the defendant himself and not to his agent. In the first place the form of the summons should be such as that it can be served, then it should contain such full particulars of the description of the person summoned as will render it unlikely that the person served should mistake his identity. Secondly, the contents should be such as to acquaint the defendant as to the nature of the claim made against him. The title of the suit and the plaintiff's name should be stated, as also the amount and nature of the claim. The Form requires also a statement of the particulars of the claim. What these particulars are has not been judicially determined, but the question is not of much practical importance, as the summons is in every case to be accompanied by a copy of the plaint or of a concise statement of it. Forms of summons are given which are to be used with such variation as the circumstances of each case may require, and are a guide as to what a summons should contain. Thirdly, the day of appearance is to be specified in the summons, and, according to Form 180 of the Code of 1882, it should have at its foot a memorandum stating hours of attendance at the office. Even where there is no express rule to that effect, the hour fixed for appearance or attendance should also be stated, though, considering the language of sect. 96 of the last Code, in which the attendance was required on the day fixed in the summons, the mention of the exact hour did not appear to be material (1). The words "*to appear*" refer to appearance under O IX r 6, *post* (2). It is desirable that a summons should contain all that is required, at the same time, formalism is not favoured at present and it will be sufficient if the summons substantially fulfils its purpose of giving the defendant notice (3). And a person by appearing and defending may waive all objections arising from want of service or defect in the service of summons (4). A fresh summons is sometimes required. There are no provisions as to the issue of successive summons though the practice as to their issue is recognized in O IX r 5, *post*. An application for fresh summons to appear should not, however, be made until the first has been returned into Court, (5) and should generally be supported by grounds showing that it was not by any default of the applicant that the summons was not served (6).

"Signed" and "sealed"—As to the meaning of the word "*signed*," see sect. 2, *ante* (7). The Letters Patent for the High Courts and the Acts (8) relating to the other Civil Courts provide for the use of seals. The seal is but one element of the proof of authenticity, and the better view is that its omission is a matter of form rather than of substance, as its omission does not prevent

(1) *Hukm Chand, loc cit*

(2) *Hira Dai v. Hira Lal*, 7 A 538 (1885)

(3) See *Hukm Chand, loc cit*

(4) *Suresh Chunder v. Juggat Chunder*, 14 C at p 215 (1886).

(5) *Jasur Chunder v. Aushootosh Chatterjee*, 1 Ind Jur, N 8 283 (1862)

(6) *Urquhart v. Gilbert*, 1 Ind. Jur, N 9 221, though in *Harlan v. East India Railway*, 1 Hyde 197 (1862-63), a new summons was granted on an objection raised to the

sufficiency of service, without any petition.

(7) And as to initials *R v. Janki Prasad* 8 A 293 (1886); *Kubra Bibee v. Wajid Khan*, 16 A 59 (1894); *Hukm Chand, C P C*, 666, 667

(8) See s. 16 Act XII of 1887 (Bengal), s. 11, Act XIV of 1889 (Bombay), s. 9, Act III of 1873 (Madras), s. 13 Act XIII of 1879 (Oudh) s. 8, Act XI of 1889 (Burma), s. 14 (d), Act XI III of 1881 (Lunjab), s. 13 (1) Act XVI of 1885 (Central Provinces)

the writ imparting to the parties against whom it is issued information that an action is instituted against them. In the same way the signature is the official authentication of the seal of which the person signing is the keeper, and the better opinion is that an unsigned writ is not void (1). The summons is to be signed either by the Judge or such officer as he appoints such as the Clerk of the Court or Registrar, where there is one.

Proviso—If the defendant voluntarily appears an appearance which is usually designated *gratis*, there is no necessity to issue a summons. In case of such appearance when the defendant admits the claim the Judge if satisfied of the defendant's identity is bound to pass a judgment in favour of the plaintiff and no question of fraudulent appearance can be gone into at the time, but if by the practice of the Court there are specific rules as to the order in which cases are to be called on it does not appear that a Judge is bound to dispose of a case either when the plaint is filed or at any subsequent time before it is called on in regular course, and the voluntary appearance of the defendant and his willingness to admit the debt do not make any difference in this respect (2).

2 Every summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint or, if so permitted, by a concise statement
Copy or statement annexed to summons

Concise statement—This should be of the nature of the claim made and of the relief or remedy sought in the suit.

3 (1) Where the Court sees reason to require the personal appearance of the defendant the summons shall order him to appear in person in Court on the day therein specified
Court may order defendant or plaintiff to appear in person

(2) Where the Court sees reason to require the personal appearance of the plaintiff on the same day, it shall make an order for such appearance.

Personal attendance—Act VIII of 1859 sects 12 and 66 of last Code. An order passed for the personal attendance of the plaintiff after his appearance by a pleader on the day fixed for the settlement of issues and after their settlement was held not to be an order passed under sect 42 Act VIII of 1859 or one to which the provisions of sect 117 Act VIII were applicable although it might have been passed under sects 127 or 166 of that Act. Further looking at the severe penalties attached by the law to the non attendance of parties ordered to attend great caution and discretion should be used in ordering their personal attendance (3). As to the result of non appearance see O 1A r 12 post.

(1) Huk v Cl and C P C 604-608

(3) Juggernath Pershad v Bundi Al

() Bank of Bengal v Curr 3 B L R 8 D N W 131

393 403 (1863)

- [s. 67.] 4. No party shall be ordered to appear in person unless he resides—
 No party to be ordered to appear in person unless resident within certain limits
 (a) within the local limits of the Court's ordinary original jurisdiction, or
 (b) without such limits but at a place less than fifty or (where there is railway or steamer communication or other established public conveyance for five-sixths of the distance between the place where he resides and the place where the Court is situate), less than two hundred miles distance from the court-house.

Appearance in person.—This is sect 42 of the Code of 1859 and 67 of last Code with modifications italicized. In a rent suit to which the provisions of this section were applicable, and in which the plaintiff improperly summoned failed to attend and his suit was struck off, it was held he should apply for revival (1)

- [s. 68.] 5. The Court shall determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit, and the summons shall contain a direction accordingly.
 Summons to be either to settle issues or for final disposal.

Provided that, in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit.

Summons.—This is sect 68 of the last Code unaltered. As to this section, (2) see below.

- [s. 69.] 6. The day for the appearance of the defendant shall be fixed with reference to the current business of the Court, the place of residence of the defendant and the time necessary for the service of the summons, and the day shall be so fixed as to allow the defendant sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on such day.
 Fixing day for appearance of defendant

Sufficient time must be allowed.—See sect 45 of Code of 1859. What may be sufficient time in a particular case can only be determined by considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, and this was so stated in the second clause of the former section, now omitted. The time must be sufficient not only to enable a party to appear, but to answer. The nature of the rights

(1) Sheikh Golam t. Fulton Singh, 3 W. R. Vol X, 162 (1861). See Act VIII of 1855, s. 118 clause (c).

(2) See Meerooddeen t. Mahomed Musun,

Narab 207 (1864), Tuljaram Harichand v. Sitaram Narayan, 38 B. 377 (1913) (in a mortgage suit the first summons should be for settlement of issues).

involved in the suit, and the importance of the claim made in it, as well as the actual distance of the defendant from the Court, and the facilities for obtaining legal advice, must also be taken into consideration in determining the sufficiency of the time allowed. In the case cited below (1) the claim involved a right to landed and other property of the aggregate value of upwards of Rs 6000, and was likely to raise questions of Mahomedan law, and only two days having been allowed from the issue of the summons, it was held that the time allowed was insufficient. In another case (2) the summons was served on the 17th April by a copy of it being fixed on the outer door of the defendant's place of business at Poona while the defendant was at Sholapur, and it was held that two days were not a sufficient time to enable him to attend for defence at Poona. It was held that the Subordinate Judge should have postponed the hearing. If the time is unreasonably short the Appellate Court will interfere (3). In the under mentioned case (4) the Court said "We take this opportunity to call the special attention of the Courts below to the urgent necessity there is that they should carefully *themselves see* that due and reasonable time is given in all cases for the service of notices in order that the Courts themselves may not be made the instruments of fraud and injustice by means of those processes the vigilant superintendence of the issue and service of which properly and justly is one of their most important duties."

7 The summons to appear and answer shall order the defendant to produce *all* documents in his possession or power upon which *he* intends to rely in support of his case

Summons to order defendant to produce documents relied on by him

8 Where the summons is for the final disposal of the suit, it shall *also* direct the defendant to produce, on the day fixed for his appearance *all* witnesses upon whose evidence he intends to rely in support of his case

On issue of summons for final disposal defendant to be directed to produce his witnesses

Service of Summons

9 (1) Where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, or has an agent resident within that jurisdiction who is empowered to accept the service of the summons, the summons shall, *unless the Court otherwise directs*, be delivered or sent to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates

Delivery or transmission of summons for service

(2) The proper officer may be an officer of a Court *other*

(1) Khadar Bhu t Rahman Bhu 3 M. H. C. R. 167 (1866)

(2) Chanbasappa r Mainaba 7 B. H. C. 1 A. C. 138 (1869)

(3) Khatir Bhu t Khatman 11: 7 M. H.

C. R. 167 (1866) Chanbasappa t Mainaba 7 B. H. C. R. 138 A. C. J. (1869)

(4) Lokhenath r Sobanath, 5 W. R., Act V, 33 (1864)

than that in which the suit is instituted, and, where he is such an officer, the summons may be sent to him by post or in such other manner as the Court may direct

Issue of summons for service—The awarding of process is a judicial act but its service is ministerial. In this country a summons can be served only through the Court and there is a complete code of rules relating to the service of summons in all cases. It has therefore been contended that parties cannot contract themselves out of the rules prescribed, and the contrary rule has not been recognized by the Courts in any case (1). The object of the summons is to notify to the defendant that he is sued and the particulars in regard thereto. And in the under mentioned case it was held that a decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction was not a nullity merely because of an irregularity in service the parties being shown to be aware of the suit which is the whole object of service (2). The Code proceeds upon the assumption that every Court has a jurisdiction within certain limits separate and distinct from every other Court, and its provisions are applicable only to Courts possessing such a jurisdiction (3). The Court therefore in this case held that it had not the power to execute its own decree or serve its own process out of the local limits of its jurisdiction. A special bailiff cannot be sent to execute civil process in foreign territory (4). The effect of the words *if the defendant resides within the jurisdiction* coupled with the corresponding words in sects 65 and 89 of the former Code was said to be that a summons could be served directly by an officer of the Court on a person residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court even if he were present though it might be casually or incidentally within the jurisdiction but that it must in such cases be sent where he resides, even though it be known that at the time he is not there but elsewhere. Whether such a construction would be accepted was however doubtful the question not having been raised or decided. The general rule elsewhere is different and a summons may always be served on a defendant if he is within the jurisdiction even if he has just come there at the time of service provided that he has done so voluntarily and not induced to do so by fraud or false pretences of the plaintiff or only as a witness (5). In cases of any but the shortest stay the point is likely to be solved by a liberal interpretation for the purposes of this section of the word *resides*. It has been held that the residence under this rule is the place where a person eats drinks and sleeps or where his family or servants eat drink and sleep (6). In the Mofussil the Nazir is the proper officer of the Court to whom under this section the summons is delivered for service. It is for him to return the summons to the Court as unserved and this he does by countersigning the bailiff's endorsement (7). No officer can serve a summons beyond the local limits of the exercise of his functions.

(1) *Hukm Chand* C. P. C. 64 65(2) *Macintosh v. Kally Dass Mullik* 11

1 L. R. 18 (1833)

(3) *Sagoro Dutt v. I am Chunder Mitter* 1

H. L. 120 (1863) at p. 129, 7 W. L. R. J

(4) *Hassam Azim v. Hassam Mahomed* 2

B. L. R. 59 (1868) 10 W. R. 340

(5) *Hukm Chand* C. P. C. 671(6) *Kumari v. Jotindra* 39 C. 394 (1911)

13 C. L. J. 221

(7) *Ferozshah v. Abdul* 13 B. 600 (1889)

and it is a general rule that a process can only be served by the officer to whom it is directed or by his duly appointed deputy (1) The section was first substituted by sect 10, Act VII of 1883

10. Service of the summons shall be made by delivering or tendering a copy thereof signed by the Judge or such officer as he appoints in this behalf, and sealed with the seal of the Court

Mode of service—A copy summons must be either delivered or tendered, but the mere showing of the summons is not a tendering of it (2) The section corresponds with sect 48 of the Code of 1859 and 73 of the last Code As to service on corporations and companies see O XXIX r 2 *post* and as to Bengal rent suits, sect 148 clause (d) Act VIII of 1885 There are no special provisions as to the service of summons upon infants and therefore the same rules appear to apply as in the case of adults There should be personal service under O V r 12 or service in some of the ways provided in the following sections, or failing service in these ways an order under r 20 The provisions appear to apply to suits against minors—at least until the appointment of a guardian *ad litem* there being no provision that a summons for a minor may be served on his guardian *ad litem* (3) Wherever practicable service must be in person under this rule and r 12 *post* Substituted service can only be made where the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way (4)

11. Save as otherwise prescribed, where there are more than one defendants, service of the summons shall be made on each defendant.

Several defendants—This section corresponds with sect 48 of the Code of 1859 (5) The second paragraph of the corresponding sect 74 of the last Code, now omitted, was taken from English O 9 r 6, now cancelled, and for which O 48A is now substituted The framers of the rule relied upon its being always the interest of one person who is served to inform others who are jointly liable with him if he is liable (6) *Quære* whether that section applied when some of the defendants who were interested in the partnership were minors (7) As to suits against partners see O XXX

(1) *Hukm Chand* C P C 672 citing *Fitnam Tr Pro* § 206.

(2) *R. v. Karsanlal* 5 B H C 1 20 (1868) *

(3) *Suresh Chunder v. Jugut Chunder*, 14 C 204, 215 (1886)

(4) *Abraham Pillai v. Donald Smith* 29 N 324 (1906)

(5) As regards the earlier law see *Luchmut Dugare v. Sibnarain Munle* 1 Hyde, 37, and other cases cited in the notes to O III r 2, *ante*

(6) *Ex parte Young* 19 Ch D at p 139

in which also it was queried whether the English rule applied not only to a partnership existing at the time the plaint was filed but also to one dissolved before the plaint in respect of a cause of action existing during its existence.

(7) *Jotindra Mohan* 26 C 267 (1893) s.c. 31 W 100, however, he noted that a summons served on his guardian *ad litem* *Jugut Chunder* 44 C 100

. 75.]

12. Wherever it is practicable, service shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he has an agent empowered to accept service, in which case service on such agent shall be sufficient.

Service to be on defendant in person when practicable, or on his agent.

Service, personal or on an agent—This section corresponds with sect 49 of the Code of 1859. The summons, at a proper and reasonable time and place, should be given directly to the defendant, and not to another person for delivery to him, after the serving officer has satisfied himself of the identity of the person named in the summons with the person on whom he serves it (1). A person who, being the *ammoolkhtar* of the male defendant, looked after the affairs of the female defendant, was held not to be an agent empowered to accept service (2). There may be personal service on a minor (3). See notes to r 10, *ante*.

. 76.]

13. (1) In a suit relating to any business or work against

Service on agent by whom defendant carries on business

a person who does not reside within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court from which the summons is issued, service on any manager or agent who, at the time of service, personally carries on such business or work for such person within such limits, shall be deemed good service.

(2) For the purpose of this rule the master of a ship shall be deemed to be the agent of the owner or charterer.

Agent carrying on business—To satisfy the conditions of this rule as to service of summons on an agent there must be a person residing without the local jurisdiction but carrying on business or work within those limits by a manager or agent and sued on account of such work, that is business either actually itself carried on by the agent or manager, or forming part of the business in the sense of a connected course of transactions to the management of which he has been duly appointed (1). This rule and O III r 2 clause (b) are to be construed together, and are intended to carry out the same scheme of relief, which rests upon the idea that where an agent has been put forward substantially to take the place of his principal within a particular jurisdiction, he should take the place of such principal (at the option of any person who has dealt with him) in any legal proceedings that may arise out of the business or work in which the agent has been virtually a local principal. The manager or agent contemplated by the Code is one who has an initiative and independent discretion, albeit subject

(1) See *Hukm Chand, C F C, 677, 678*, where the points mentioned (together with the question of service on Government or railway officials through head of office) are more fully discussed.

(2) *Ram Soonduree v Ranceo Sarat, 17 W R 33 (1871)*. See notes to O III r 2.

(3) *Suresh Chunder v Jugut Chunder, 14 C at p. 215 (1886)*, see O V r 10.

(4) *Coulidas v Ganshid, 1 B 416 (1880)*.

possibly to principles and general orders prescribed for his guidance. A mere servant employed to carry out orders or to execute a particular commission, or a factor or common agent who is not identified with the firm for which he acts, is not such an agent (1). Upon the principle embodied in the rule, it was held, prior to its enactment, that service of summons on an agent to whom a ship was consigned was good service on the owner in respect of matters connected with the ship (2). Service unduly made under this rule does not become effectual by reason of the fact of such service being subsequently notified to the parties really interested as defendants (3). *Seemle*—Service duly effected under this rule is effectual without reference to the circumstance of its being or not being communicated to the real defendants (4). An opinion has been expressed that it would be anomalous to hold that, though the Code requires the appointment of a proper person as guardian to act for a minor generally in the conduct of the case, service of summons on a person other than such person may be sufficient service on the minor. The question was not decided, as the Court held that there was no service of summons under the sections corresponding with either rr 11 or 13 of O V, even assuming that these sections applied to a case in which some of the defendants who are interested in the partnership or business are minors (5).

14. *Where* in a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immoveable property, service cannot be made on the defendant in person, and the defendant *has* no agent empowered to accept the service, it may be made on any agent of the defendant in charge of the property.

“Immoveable property”—Act VIII of 1859 sect 61. A suit for foreclosure or sale of immoveable property is within the meaning of these words (6).

15. *Where* in any suit the defendant cannot be found and *has* no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, service may be made on any adult male member of the family of the defendant who is residing with him.

Explanation—A servant is not a member of the family within the meaning of this rule.

“Cannot be found”—This section corresponds to sect 53 of the Code of 1859. See notes to r 17.

“Agent empowered”—This clause involves an essential condition of

(1) Goculdas v Ganeshlal 4 B 410 (1880)

(2) Rajaram Govindram v Brown, 7 B H

(3) R. 97, O C I (1870).

(4) Goculdas v Ganeshlal 4 B 416 (1880)

(1) lb

(5) Jotindra Mohan v Srinath Poy, 26 C.

267 273 (1898)

(6) Michael v Amarendra Bala, 9 C. 733 (1887)

the service on the adult members of the family, which will not be good unless it is proved that there was no agent empowered to accept the service (1)

"On any adult member," etc.—The person on whom service is made must be both adult and male. The object of this provision is that the copy shall be delivered to some person of the age of discretion who will understand for what purpose such copy is delivered, and will give it to the defendant on his coming. This is all the more necessary as there is no provision in the Code requiring the officer to inform the person with whom the copy is left of its contents so as to impress upon him the importance of delivering it to the defendant as soon as possible. An adult member will be deemed to reside with the defendant only if the two are *bonâ fide* living in commensality or at least in the same house (2)

79] 16 Where the serving officer delivers or tenders a copy of the summons to the defendant personally, or to an agent or other person on his behalf, he shall require the signature of the person to whom the copy is so delivered or tendered to an acknowledgment of service endorsed on the original summons

Acknowledgment—The serving officer under this section which corresponds to sect 54 of the Code of 1859 must either deliver or tender a copy of the summons and obtain an acknowledgment on the original. The mere showing of a summons is not sufficient (3). If the party refuses the acknowledgment then the serving officer should proceed under the next rule (4). A mere refusal to sign a receipt or a summons is not an offence under sect 173 or sect 180 of the Penal Code (5).

80] 17 Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgment, or where the serving officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the defendant, and there is no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, nor any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and shall then return the original to the Court from which it was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which

(1) *Hukm Chand C P C F 80* [see Cal H 90 (1868).
C Gen Rules (9) d]

(2) *Hukm Chand C P C F 80*

(3) *Cf R : Karsanlal S B H C R Cr R (1892)*

(4) *Maruti : Vilu 10 B 117 119 (1891)*

(5) *R : Krishna Cobinda 20 C 34*

he did so, and the name and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed

Refusal to accept service—This section which corresponds with sect 55 of the Code of 1859, and sect 80 of the last Code, has been amended in several particulars. If the defendant himself or other person (that is agent or manager, or adult male member of his family) be found, but the defendant or such person refuses to sign, then the serving officer may at once affix the summons on the dwelling house.

It was not clear from the language of the section as it stood what results should follow when the defendant retained the copy of summons delivered but refused to sign the acknowledgment. Similarly, if the defendant refused to sign the acknowledgment, but did not "ordinarily" reside in any house, as in the case of roving traders and strolling players, no provision appeared to exist. In such a case it was considered that the refusal should operate as service and the following proviso was inserted in the draft—"Provided that, where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgment and (a) retains the copy of the summons delivered to him or (b) no house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain can be discovered, the Court may direct that the summons shall be deemed to have been duly served." The proposal has however, not been adopted.

"Cannot find"—But if the defendant cannot be found then the return must show that there is no agent or other person on whom the service could be made before a service on the dwelling house is good. The words "cannot find" constitute a condition of the mode of service provided (1) Thus where the summons was served on the defendant's paternal uncle who was a member of the same joint family and lived in the same house, it was held that the service was insufficient since there was no proof that defendant could not be found (2) It must be shown that proper efforts to find the defendant were made as for instance that the serving officer went to the place or places and at the times at which it was reasonable to expect the defendant would be found (3) "It is true that you may go to a man's house and not find him but that is not attempting to find him, you should go to his house, make inquiries and if necessary, follow him. You should make inquiries to find out when he is likely to be at home and go to the house at a time when he can be found (4) The summons can be affixed to the dwelling house only if the defendant could not be found after diligent search and reasonable efforts made to find him (5) Where

(1) *Rama Bai v. Sridhar* 4 C. L. R. 397 (1879)

(2) *Makhan Das v. Manu Lal* 35 A. 556 (1913)

(3) *Rajendra Nath v. Hadjee Syed* 2 C. W. N. 574 (1899) a.c., 26 C. 101; *Cohen v. Narsing Das* 19 C. 901 (1897) *Subramania Pillai v. Subramania Ayyar* 21 M. 419 (1898) *Sakharam Bhaskar v. Padmakar Mahadeo* 30 B. 623 (1906), *Kumud v. Jotindra* 33 C.

319 (1911) 15 C. W. N. 399

(4) *Per Pettleram C.J.* in *Cohen v. Narsing Das* *supra*. This case was followed by *Jenkins C.J.* and *Woodroffe J.* in appeal from Order 75 of 1912 (28th Nov. 1913) where it was held that the serving officer must use all reasonable diligence.

(5) *Khudeerun Lal v. Chutterdharee Lal* 21 W. R. 242 (1874), and cf. *Paroda Kant v. Raj Churn* 24 W. P. 381 (1875)

there was no attempt to find the defendants, and there being only one summons for a number of defendants, it was affixed to the house of one only, it was held not duly served, even on that defendant (1) The rule has been amended to embody these rulings to the effect that the serving officer must use diligence. If, though the defendant is absent, the serving officer is told where he is service on the house is bad, (2) the Court observing in the last cited case that mere temporary absence of the person to be served does not justify the process server affixing the summons to the door. But where the serving officer has information that there is no prospect of his being able to serve the defendant personally within a reasonable time, he is not bound to wait, and will be justified in affixing the summons on the door (3) A defendant will also be held not to be found when it is known that he is in the house, but the serving officer cannot get access to him (4) Whether or not the conditions required by the rule are established to the satisfaction of the Court, must of course, in each case depend on its own particular circumstances (5) What has to be regarded in all such cases is this, that the object of the service of a summons in whatever way it may be effected is that the defendant may be informed of the institution of the suit in due time before the day fixed for the hearing, and when from the return of the serving officer, it appears that there is no likelihood that the summons will come to the defendant's knowledge in due time, or a probability that it will not so come to his knowledge, it cannot be said that there has been due service (6)

"Outer door" The words "*or some other conspicuous part*" have been added as in this country many houses have nothing which, without a stretch of language can be described as "outer doors"

"Ordinarily resides"—As to the meaning of the term "*resides*," see sect 20, *ante*. The intention of the provision is that the defendant should be residing in the house in such a manner as to make it probable that a knowledge of the service of summons will reach him. Thus the service will not be good if the defendant have left the house and the village two years before (7) The rule speaks of the house where the defendant resides. Therefore a place of business would not ordinarily come within the section (8) though in some cases, where the defendant both resides and carries on business at the same place it would be so. There must be evidence that the house on which the summons was affixed was that in which the defendant ordinarily resided (9) It has been held that in this rule and rule 9 of this Order a person must be taken to reside where he or his family or servants eat, drink and sleep (10)

(1) *Shiboo Roy v. Hashee Roy*, 25 W. R. 794 (1876)

(2) *Doolce Chan v. Aurlan Singh*, 20 W. P. 12 (1873) *Bhomschetti v. Umabai* 21 I. 223 (1895), *Sakina v. Gauri Sahai* 24 A. 302 (1902), *Subramania Pillai v. Subramania Ayyar*, 21 M. 419 (1897)

(3) *Sankaralinga v. Ratnasabhapati* 21 M. 724 (1897), *Sitarani v. Kaland*, 17 C. W. N. 919 (1911)

(4) *Hukm Chand v. I. C. (Sd) citing Carter v. Y. 12 All. 1 r. 119 (Amr.)*

(5) *Rajendra Nath v. Hadjee Syed*, 2 C. W. N. 571 (1893)

(6) *Bhomschetti v. Umabai* 21 B. 223 per Farran, C.J.

(7) *Anantha Narayana v. Pariyana Kone*, 5 M. H. C. R. 101 (1869)

(8) *Chanbasappa v. Mainaba*, 7 B. H. C. R., 1 C. 138 (1870)

(9) *Gopal Dass v. Gredhatesh Dass*, 6 W. R. 13 (1866)

(10) *Kumari v. Jotin Rao*, 38 C. 701 (1911), 15 C. W. N. 799

"Or carries on business," etc.—These words have been added to bring this rule into closer conformity with sect 20 the principle of which it was considered was equally applicable to the service of process (1)

Return—The return should specify that the copy was affixed to "the outer door (or, now, conspicuous part) of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides;" and merely to report that it has been affixed to the defendant's house is not sufficient as the defendant may have more than one house (2) In a subsequent case (3) the service was held good as the serving person deposed that the defendant was living in the house. But where the return does not say that the copy has been affixed nor does that appear from the inquiry made under r 19 there is no service (4) So also the return must state that the summons was affixed to the house in which the defendant ordinarily resided at the time of the service (5) and where the return to the time had been omitted, the return was considered insufficient (6) The Calcutta High Court rules provide that the return must also show that the summons was tendered to the defendant and returned and that the defendant refused to receive the same whereupon the serving officer informed him of the document was, and acquainted him with the nature and contents thereof

Identification—As the practice of the Courts with regard to identifying persons or houses in connection with the service of process did not appear uniform, it was considered expedient to provide in the return endorsing a summons for, at least, one identifier whom the Court or the parties might use as a witness in case of a dispute with respect to the sufficiency of service. The words "if any" were, however, inserted because it was considered that the Code should not render absolutely illegal the service of process by a person other than the serving officer, where local experience justified the High Court in requiring such a safeguard

18. The serving officer shall, in all cases in which

Endorsement of time and manner of service
The serving officer shall endorse or annex, or cause to be endorsed or annexed, on or to the original summons, a return stating the time when and the manner in which the summons was served, and the name and address of the person (if any) who served the summons and witnessing the delivery or tender of it

Return not evidence of service—This is a rule of the Code of 1859. The return is not legal evidence of service

(1) *Bashrab Charan v Pank of Bengal* 19 C L J 581 (1914)

(2) *Buddoo v Ram 1 Hyde*, 132 (1862-63)

(3) *Ram Coomarr v Ram Soondur* 17 W R 362 (1872)

(4) *Maruti v Vithu* 16 B 117 (1891)

(5) *Rajnaram Ghose v Abdur Rahim* 2 C. W. N. 117 (1898)

(6) *Ram Churn Lahiri v A. I. Dutt* 2

C. W. N. 117 (1898)

(7) *Cal J* 117 (1898)

(8) *Cal J* 117 (1898)

R. M. 117 (1898)

Al. 10 117 (1898)

& Co. 117 (1898)

v. F. 117 (1898)

report of 117 (1898)

Amal 117 (1898)

Whenever it is necessary for the Court to satisfy itself that a summons or other process has been duly served, the presiding officer should for that purpose take the evidence of the serving officer. Thus, in *Raj Kishore v. Bydonath Shaha* (1) Bayley, J., observed that "there is simply a return by the Nazir to the effect that the peon swears that such a notice had been served on the defendants, but a bare return like this, without the deposition on oath of the serving peon taken before a competent authority, which the Nazir is not is wholly insufficient in law to prove the service." The general rules of the Calcutta High Court (2) lay down that the requisite proof may be either by the affidavit or verified statement of the person by whom the service was effected, and of any person who may have accompanied the serving officer for the purpose of identifying the party to whom the process was addressed, or otherwise directing or assisting the serving officer, or, if deemed necessary, by the examination in Court as witnesses of such persons as the Court may think fit to examine. As to the added words, see notes to last rule.

82] 19 Where a summons is returned under rule 17, the Court shall, if the return under that rule has not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer, and may, if it has been so verified, examine the serving officer on oath, or cause him to be so examined by another Court, touching his proceedings, and may make such further inquiry in the matter as it thinks fit, and shall either declare that the summons has been duly served or order such service as it thinks fit.

"Shall either declare"—These words show that the affixing taken by itself, is certainly not effectual complete service. The Court has to see that the conditions precedent to such service have been fulfilled. Service is insufficient until confirmed under this rule. If the Court decides against the service then either a new summons must be issued or substituted service directed (3).

s 82
cond
ara] 20 (1) Where the Court is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way, the Court shall order the summons to be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the Court-house, and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the defendant is known to have

(1) 12 W. R. 365 (1869)

(2) R. 9 (f)

(3) *Nusur Mahomed v. Razhal* 10 B. 202 (1886). As to the effect of failure to followthe provisions of this section in a subsequent criminal trial see *R. v. Nanaleshwar* 27 A. 491 (1905).

last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such other manner as the Court thinks fit.

(2) Service substituted by order of the Court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally.

(3) Where service is substituted by order of the Court, the Court shall fix such time for the appearance of the defendant as the case may require.

Substituted service—This form of service can only be had in cases in which (if there were no difficulties in the way) personal service could be had. This is based on the principle that one cannot do indirectly what cannot be done directly. So the defendant must be a person or a corporation or a firm (1). So, as the Courts have no jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign unless he submits, he cannot be served by substitution (2). If at the time of the issue of summons there could have been at law personal service of it upon the defendant sought to be served, then substituted service may be allowed (3). But if personal service could not at law have been made, then, save as hereinafter mentioned, substituted service cannot be ordered (4). Assuming that personal service *at law* could have been made, the grounds of fact on which service may be ordered are (a) that the defendant is keeping out of the way, or (b) that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. In cases of substituted service the Courts should take care to be satisfied that the conditions on which alone it is good exist (5). It has been already stated that, as a general rule, substituted service cannot be ordered where personal service is not legally possible, but under ground (a) it can. It has been held, be directed where the defendant was out of the jurisdiction at the time of the issue of the writ if the evidence satisfies the Court that he went out of the jurisdiction to evade service (6). As regards ground (b), the section gives full discretion to the Court. So service has been allowed on proof that the defendant could not be found, that he had not been heard of for over two years, and that his uncle and father did not know where he was (7).

(1) *Sloman v Governor of New Zealand*, 1 C P D 567, *Hillyard v Smith* 36 W R (Eng) 7, *O Connor v Star Newspaper Co*, 30 L R (1r) 1. See Annual Practice, notes to O 10.

(2) *Mighell v Sultan of Johore* (1894), 1 Q B 149, and so in the case of a Colonial Government, *Sloman v Governor of New Zealand*, *supra*.

(3) *Trent Cycle Co v Beattie*, 15 Times R 170, C A.

(4) *Fry v Moore*, 23 Q B D 395, C A, *Worcester City etc. Co v Firbank & Co* (1894) 1 Q B 784, *Willing v Bean* (1891), 1 Q B 100.

(5) See *Bamchander v Jageshchunder*, 12 B L R 229 (1873). These observations were made, however, with reference to Reg V of

1812, which did not contain the words 'for any other reason, and were cited in *Bissonath v Tara Prosonno*, 22 W R 482 (1874), *Rama Rai v Sridhur Pershad* 4 C L R 397 (1879), *Nasur Mahomed v Kazbar*, 10 B 202 (1886), though under the Code the service will be valid if any other reason is proved, it is still necessary for its validity that a good reason exists.

(6) *Pe Urquhart* 24 Q B D 73, *Jay v Budd* (1893), 1 Q B 12, C A, *Graves v Lebaudy*, 39 L J 231 A P p 61, see observations at p 186, 3 Q B D, *Watt v Barnett*.

(7) *Rajnarain Ghose v Tek Lal*, 1 C W N 104 (1896), in *Mirza Ally v Syed Hyder*, 2 B 449, 451, the defendant could not be found.

As regards the modes of service, the section expressly mentions two, but also gives the Court a full discretion in the matter, the exercise of which must depend upon the circumstances of each case. The main principle to be always borne in mind is that the summons should, so far as he practicable, be served in such a way that it may come to the knowledge of the defendant. The Court must therefore consider what would be the best form of service for this purpose. The usual modes are service on an agent, such as a solicitor or other agent or any other person with whom the party is in communication, (1) by advertisement and through the post, (2) and by leaving a copy at the last known place of residence, and publication in the Court-house. If there are circumstances which go to show, at the time the order is asked for, that the summons will not reach the defendant, service should not be directed on the last known place of residence. So it was held that where service was made at a place, the last known residence of the defendant, but where he had not been for seven years, the order was bad, the Court observing that the object of the provisions of the law was to secure the process coming to the knowledge of the defendant (3). Such a question is however not likely to arise where the Court is satisfied that the defendant is keeping away.

It has been held that, as a rule, the return by a competent Court that the summons has been duly served, or substituted service effected, raises a presumption in favour of service (4). There is no provision in the Code as to a return of the substituted service showing how and when it was effected. In practice, however, the Court will assure itself of the service having been properly effected, either by affidavit or examination of the serving officer (5). The procedure laid down in this rule has by analogy been applied to the service of notice of appeal on a respondent (6).

Effect of substituted service.—The Court, when an application for leave to effect substituted service is made, decides as to the propriety of granting it, and if service is effected according to the order of the Court, it is while the order remains undischarged, equivalent for all purposes to actual service (7). The Code contains no provisions whereby the propriety and regularity of the order may be directly attacked by a motion to set it aside (8).

(1) Annual Practice, p 60, *Watt v Barnett*, 3 Q B D 367, *Ex parte Warburg* 24 Ch D 364, *eg* an adult relative or a partner where the suit is brought against a firm or in the case of a purdanashin. *Clark v Mullick*, 2 M L A at p 268 (1839).

(2) In *Jagannath v Sassoon*, 18 B 606 (1897), it was considered that the service was not sufficient, as it was not shown that the person to whom the letter was delivered was the defendant himself. The report, however, does not show how the service came to be made by post.

(3) See *Hulm Chand, C P C 659, 650*, citing *Protecteur Assurance Co v Erwin*, 1 L 91 (Amer).

(4) *Nasir Mahomed v Kazbar*, 10 B 202

(1886)

(5) *Hulm Chand, C P C 601*

(6) *Bidhoo v Bonomalee*, 11 W B 456 (1869) (a case under the corresponding section 57 of the Code of 1859), as was also done in *Ex parte Warburg*, 24 Ch D 364, though no express provision to that effect was contained in the Rules of Court.

(7) *Watt v Barnett*, 3 Q B D at p 367, *per Jessel, MR*.

(8) See *English O 12, r 30* (motion to set aside writ), *Fry v Moore*, 23 Q B D 305 (motion to set aside order for substituted service), *Ann Fr*, pp 78, 98, 319, and see as to letting in the defendant to defend, *Watt v Barnett, supra*.

But where judgment is obtained, the defendant may show, with a view to set it aside under O IX r 13, either that the summons was not *duly served*—that is, that the order for substituted service (whatever may have been its propriety) has not been carried out—or that he was *prevented by sufficient cause from appearing*. A summons served under this rule, if served in compliance with the directions of the Court, is *duly served*, even though it does not in fact come to the knowledge of the defendant. But the time and place of the defendant acquiring knowledge is material in determining whether he could attend on the day fixed in the summons, and may furnish a sufficient ground for non attendance on that day. “Effectual” thus means merely effectual for proceeding with the suit, and nothing more. It does not, for instance, mean that substituted service on a man’s house in Bombay is equivalent to personal service on that date, nor does it imply the consequence that a man who happened to be in Central India had personal knowledge of what was done at his house in Bombay on the day substituted service was effected (1). The Court in the last case set aside an *ex parte* decree upon its being shown that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. In an earlier case (2) the Court refused to do so. Though the question whether the defendant was prevented from attending was not expressly alluded to, the Court, however, appears to have based its judgment on the facts proved, which went to show that the defendant had in fact notice in sufficient time and therefore could have attended.

Time for appearance—Where substituted service of the summons is ordered sufficient time ought, under this rule, to be given for notice of the fact to reach the defendant, wherever he may be, and if an *ex parte* decree be obtained by the plaintiff, the Court, on being satisfied that the time fixed was insufficient, will set aside the decree (3).

21. *A summons may be sent by the Court by which it is issued, whether within or without the province, either by one of its officers or by post to any Court (not being the High Court) having jurisdiction in the place where the defendant resides* [s.]

Service of summons where defendant resides within jurisdiction of another Court

22. *Where a summons issued by any Court established beyond the limits of the towns of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Rangoon is to be served within any such limits, it shall be sent to the Court of Small Causes within whose jurisdiction it is to be served.* [s.]

Service, within Presidency towns and Rangoon of summons issued by Courts outside

(1) *Mirza Ally v Syed Hyder*, 2 B 419, at 25 (1865)
p 452 (1875) *per* Pinhey J (3) *Mirza Ally v Syed Hyder*, 2 B 419 (1875)
(2) *Kissurchund v Bhobanessur, Bourke*,

As regards the modes of service, the section expressly mentions two, but also gives the Court a full discretion in the matter, the exercise of which must depend upon the circumstances of each case. The main principle to be always borne in mind is that the summons should, so far as he practicable, be served in such a way that it may come to the knowledge of the defendant. The Court must therefore consider what would be the best form of service for this purpose. The usual modes are service on an agent, such as a solicitor or other agent or any other person with whom the party is in communication, (1) by advertisement and through the post, (2) and by leaving a copy at the last known place of residence, and publication in the Court-house. If there are circumstances which go to show, at the time the order is asked for, that the summons will not reach the defendant, service should not be directed on the last known place of residence. So it was held that where service was made at a place, the last known residence of the defendant, but where he had not been for seven years, the order was bad, the Court observing that the object of the provisions of the law was to secure the process coming to the knowledge of the defendant (3). Such a question is however, not likely to arise where the Court is satisfied that the defendant is keeping away.

It has been held that as a rule, the return by a competent Court that the summons has been duly served, or substituted service effected, raises a presumption in favour of service (4). There is no provision in the Code as to a return of the substituted service showing how and when it was effected. In practice, however, the Court will assure itself of the service having been properly effected, either by affidavit or examination of the serving officer (5). The procedure laid down in this rule has by analogy been applied to the service of notice of appeal on a respondent (6).

Effect of substituted service—The Court, when an application for leave to effect substituted service is made, decides as to the propriety of granting it, and if service is effected according to the order of the Court it is while the order remains undischarged, equivalent for all purposes to actual service (7). The Code contains no provisions whereby the propriety and regularity of the order may be directly attacked by a motion to set it aside (8).

(1) Annual Practice, p 60. Watt v Barnett 3 Q B D 367, *Ex parte Warburg* 24 Ch D 364, *eg* an adult relative or a partner where the suit is brought against a firm or in the case of a purdannah. Clark v Mullick, 2 M I A. at p 268 (1839).

(2) In *Jagannath v Sassoon*, 18 B 606 (1893) it was considered that the service was not sufficient as it was not shown that the person to whom the letter was delivered was the defendant himself. The report, however, does not show how the service came to be made by post.

(3) See *Hukm Chand, C P C 689*, 690 citing *Protecteur Assurance Co v Erwin* 1 I 91 (Ayer).

(4) *Nasir Malani v Kazai* 10 P 202

(1886)

(5) *Hukm Chand, C P C 691*

(6) *Bidhoo v Bonomales* 11 W P 496 (1869) (a case under the corresponding section 57 of the Code of 1859), as was also done in *Ex parte Warburg* 24 Ch D 364 though no express provision to that effect was contained in the Rules of Court.

(7) *Watt v Barnett*, 3 Q B D at p 366, *per Jessel, M.R.*

(8) See *English O 12 r 30* (motion to set aside writ), *Fry v Moore*, 23 Q B D 315 (motion to set aside order for substituted service), *Ann Pr*, pp 78 99 318, and see as to letting in the defendant to defend *Watt v Barnett supra*.

facts are sufficient to justify the waiver of personal service on the defendant and the substitution of an affixing of the summons on his dwelling house, or the adoption of other mode of substituted service. For instance, where a Court has returned a summons as duly served, and the return states that the summons has been posted on the defendant's dwelling house because the defendant has gone elsewhere, it ought to be presumed that this service was justified by the facts, and that the Court duly acted under the provisions of sects 80 and 82 read together (now rr 17-19). But, at the same time, the presumption in favour of the due execution of acts of a judicial nature only obtains *donec probetur in contrarium*, and there may now and then occur cases where there is something in the return distinctly negating that presumption and showing illegality in the mode of service (1). Probably, however, the true rule is that the transmitting Court may accept but is not bound by the return, the section not requiring any declaration touching the sufficiency of the service (2). In this view it devolves upon the transmitting Court to determine upon the sufficiency of the service before trying the suit, raising or not raising the presumption according to the circumstances. The practice of the Calcutta High Court has always been to determine for itself whether the service is sufficient, having regard to the numerous irregularities which exist in "Mofussil service." But the Allahabad High Court has held that usually the decision whether such summons has been properly served or not rests with the serving Court, not with the issuing Court (3).

24 *Where the defendant is confined in a prison, the summons shall be delivered or sent by post or otherwise to the officer in charge of the prison for service on the defendant.* [ss 8]

Defendant in jail—A suitor ought obviously not to be deprived of his remedy by the fact that the defendant is in jail (4). The former section (as to which, see sect 15, Act XV of 1869) was originally enacted to meet the difficulty felt in the last mentioned case. *Wilson J.*, is reported to have held that the endorsement under sect 87 of the last Code ranked higher than a nazir's return, and was evidence of the service of summons (5). The amended section contains no provision as regards the return of service, which is dealt with by r 29, under which the return is evidence of due service.

(1) *Nusur Mahomed v. Hazbar* 10 B 202 (1886), per Scott, J.

(2) *Pomanath Burali v. Guggodonandan*, 22 C 889 (1890). In *Chandhuri Raj v. Jugat Kishore*, 18 A at p. 245 (1896) it seems to have been held that it was the duty of the Court making the return to declare whether the summons had been duly served.

(3) *Dwarka v. Brij Mohan* 33 A 649 (1911), dissenting from *Romanath v. Guggodonandan*,

22 G 889 (1890).

(4) *Bland v. Bland*, 3 P & D 233 as to the present practice in England see *Dawson v. Le Caplain* 21 L J Ex 219, Ann. Pr 1905 p 47. In India a life convict is not civilly dead. *Sheonaram Singh v. Sheobuggun Koor* S D N W, 1803, p 759.

(5) *O'Keefe v. Civ. Pr. Code*, s 87, the reference is not given.

89]

25 *Where* the defendant resides out of British India and has no agent in British India empowered to accept service, the summons shall be addressed to the defendant at the place where he is residing and sent to him by post, if there is postal communication between such place and the place where the Court is situate

"Resides out of British India"—In such cases the mode of service is necessarily of a private character, as it is a general rule that a Court has no authority to send its process for execution out of the territorial limits of the State. So a bailiff cannot be sent to foreign territory to himself serve the summons on the defendant there (1). This rule, which corresponds with sect 60 of the Code of 1859, must be read with the next

"Sent", "Forwarded"—The section in the last Code required that the summons should be *"forwarded"* to the defendant, which was held to mean that the summons must reach him (2). This therefore, did not mean merely put into the post (3) and there had to be proof of facts from which the Court might reasonably conclude that the summons had reached the defendant (4). In some cases it would amount to a denial of justice to require direct proof of receipt or refusal. When proof of posting in due course has been given a presumption may be raised under sects 16 and 114 of the Evidence Act. This would appear to be the case now. The word *"sent"* has been substituted. But there ought to be evidence that he is, or has been recently, residing at the place to which the summons has been sent or that the acknowledgment is in the writing of the defendant (5). In practice the summons is sent under registered cover, both to ensure service as well as to procure good evidence of it (6). If a registered cover is refused the person so refusing cannot take advantage of his refusal and plead ignorance of its contents (7).

90]

26 *Where*—

Service in foreign territory through Political Agent or Court

(a) *in the exercise of any foreign jurisdiction vested in His Majesty or in the Governor General in Council, or Political Agent has been appointed, or a Court has*

(1) *Kasim Ajum v. Kasim Mohammed* 2 B. L. R., A. C. J. 59 (1868), see 10 W. R. 319, *Sigora Dutt v. Ramchandra Mitter*, 1 Hyde, 136 (1862-63), see *Hukm Chand*, C. P. C. 695.

(2) *Takhr ud din v. Ghafar ud din* 23 A. 99 (1900), at p. 105.

(3) *Ib.*, at p. 103.

(4) *Ib.*

(5) *Ib.*, at pp. 102, 103, 105, *Sonitum Lal Jha v. Gopal Chunder*, 15 W. P. 31

(1871)

(6) *Sonitum Bhuashee v. Gopal Chunder* 1, W. R. 31 (1871) see *Pany Ch. C. Circ.*, s. 8 r. 32 (1), and as to period of service outside India, B. H. C. Orders Ch. I r. 62. *Phulpati Batho*, 17 C. W. N. colza.

(7) *Lutf Ali v. Peareo Mohun* 16 W. R. 223 (1871), *Jogendra Chunder v. Dwarka Nath* 15 C. 691 (1883), *Ismat Khan v. Kali Krishna*, 6 C. W. N. 131, 137 (1901), *Balaram v. Balaram* 1, B. 211 (1910).

been established or continued by a summons issued by a Judge in any foreign territory in which the defendant resides, or (b) the Governor General or notification in the Gazette of India, summons so issued may be served in any such territory and not in the exercise of any such jurisdiction.

the summons may be served by post or otherwise, for the purpose of being served upon the defendant, and, if the Political Agent or Court returns the summons with an endorsement signed by such Political Agent or by the Judge or other officer of the Court that the summons has been served on the defendant in manner hereinbefore directed, such endorsement shall be deemed to be evidence of service.

Summons outside India—This section replaces sect 90 of the last Code which was itself substituted for the original by the Amendment Act (VII of 1888) sect 12 and is intended chiefly for Indian Native States. This section does not apply to British or other territories not under or connected with the Indian Government such as Ceylon the Straits Settlements and even Great Britain and *a fortiori* not to countries like China and Persia where there is a British Envoy or Ambassador or Consul as distinguished from a Political Agent, nor to Afghanistan. The general direction contained in r 25 would apply in all such cases. Summonses issued for service on persons residing in British possessions out of British India and in other countries to which this rule does not apply should be addressed to the defendant at the place where he is residing and sent by post in accordance with that section (1). The distinction between the cases in which this rule applies and in which it does not apply is to be preserved as the agency of the post office under r 25 should not be used for the service of a summons except when specially prescribed, for when any other mode for serving a notice is prescribed a service through the post is not been deemed sufficient even though actual delivery of the notice by the post person is proved (2).

Endorsement is evidence—Unlike the ordinary return the endorsement under the signature of Political Agent Judge or other officer is evidence of the service of the summons but it is no longer as under the section prior to its amendment in 1888 conclusive evidence and the defendant may

(1) See *Hukm Chand* O P C 696 citing the *Panj Ch. C. Instrs.* and *N W P Rules* as to service in Afghanistan Straits Settlements Kashmir Nepal Hyderabad etc. and

at p 697

(2) See *Tara Das v. Ram Dyal* 2 C W N 13 (1897)

accordingly prove that notwithstanding the endorsement as to the service the summons was not served

"Sent"—In the under mentioned case (1) it was held that the Subordinate Judge should have sent the summons himself instead of through the Court of the District Judge

- 422.] 27 Where the defendant is a public officer (not belonging to His Majesty's military or naval forces or His Majesty's Indian Marine Service), or is the servant of a railway company or local authority, the Court may, if it appears to it that the summons may be most conveniently so served, send it for service on the defendant to the head of the office in which he is employed, together with a copy to be retained by the defendant

Service on public officers—The exigencies of public service demand that both civil and military officers should not be summoned without proper notice to their superiors. This concession however coupled with the privileges given in connection with attachment casts upon the Government a corresponding duty to provide commensurate facilities for service. This section which replaces sect 422 extends its provisions which had hitherto applied to public officers only to railway servants or servants of local authorities. Military officers are dealt with in the next section. If the summons is not sent to the head of the office it must be served in the usual way. The Government pleader is not the agent of every public officer as he is of Government to accept service. As to the duty of the Head of the office, service and return see r 29 post

- 468.] 28 Where the defendant is a soldier, the Court shall send the summons for service to his commanding officer together with a copy to be retained by the defendant

Soldiers—The words 'an officer or' formerly occurring in sect 168 of the last Code before the words "a soldier" were repealed by the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889). Military officers therefore since that Act ceased to be governed by sect 468 the provisions of which are embodied in this section so far as they relate to soldiers. Owing to the varied conditions of service of military

officers it has been thought expedient to follow the terms of the Contonment Act in leaving the matter to be regulated by Rules

29 (1) *Where a summons is delivered or sent to any person for service under rule 24, rule 27 or rule 28, the Duty of person to whom summons is delivered or sent for service shall be bound to serve it, if possible, and to return it under his signature, with the written acknowledgment of the defendant, and such signature shall be deemed to be evidence of service*

(2) *Where from any cause service is impossible, the summons shall be returned to the Court with a full statement of such cause and of the steps taken to procure service, and such statement shall be deemed to be evidence of non service*

Service—With a general application so much of sect 468 of the last Code has been retained as compels the officer addressed by the Court to execute the process (1) Special provision has been made on the lines of sect 72 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 for treating a return in such a case as evidence though unsupported by affidavit (2) It has also been considered desirable to declare such a return to be evidence of non service also so as to avoid the necessity for summoning public officers where as not infrequently occurs in *ex parte* decree has been passed by inadvertence and is assailed by an application under O 14 r 13

30 (1) The Court may, notwithstanding anything herein before contained, substitute for a summons a Substitution of letter for summons letter signed by the Judge or such officer as he may appoint in this behalf, where the defendant is, in the opinion of the Court, of a rank entitling him to such mark of consideration [s]

(2) *A letter substituted under sub rule (1) shall contain all the particulars required to be stated in a summons, and, subject to the provisions of sub rule (1), shall be treated in all respects as a summons*

(3) *A letter so substituted may be sent to the defendant by post or by a special messenger selected by the Court, or in any other manner which the Court thinks fit, and, where the defendant has an agent empowered to accept service, the letter may be delivered or sent to such agent* [s]

(1) See Mahomed Saib v Aggas 10 M 319 (1887)

(2) See Harrison v Hope 9 B L R App 43 (1872).

Messenger—This section corresponds to sects 64 and 65 of the Code of 1859. It was held in connection with sect 60 of that Code, corresponding to r 25 of the present one, that as no officer of a Court could execute process without its jurisdiction, a special bailiff could not be sent to serve process in foreign territory (1).

(1) *Kasim Ajim v Kasim Mohammed*, 2 B L R, A C J, 59 (1868), s c, 10 W R 349

ORDER VI

Pleadings generally

Pleading **1** ‘ *Pleading* ’ shall mean *plaint or written statement*

2 Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved, and shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively. Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in figures

Pleading to state material facts and not evidence

3 The forms in Appendix A when applicable and where they are not applicable, forms of the like character, as nearly as may be shall be used for all pleadings

Forms of pleading

4 In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading

Particulars to be given where necessary

5 A further and better statement of the nature of the claim or defence, or further and better particulars of any matter stated in any pleading may in all cases be ordered, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise, as may be just

Further and better statement or particulars

6 Any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence of which is intended to be contested, shall be distinctly specified in his pleading by the plaintiff

Condition precedent

or defendant, as the case may be; and, subject thereto, an averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent necessary for the case of the plaintiff or defendant shall be implied in his pleading

7. No pleading shall, except by way of amendment, raise any new ground of claim or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same.

8. Where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract alleged or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied, and not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract

9. Wherever the contents of any document are material, it shall be sufficient in any pleading to state the effect thereof as briefly as possible, without setting out the whole or any part thereof, unless the precise words of the document or any part thereof are material

10. Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred

11. Wherever it is material to allege notice to any person of any fact, matter or thing, it shall be sufficient to allege such notice as a fact, unless the form or the precise terms of such notice, or the circumstances from which such notice is to be inferred, are material

12. Whenever any contract or any relation between any persons is to be implied from a series of letters or conversations or otherwise from a number of circumstances, it shall be sufficient to allege such contract or relation as a fact, and to refer generally to such letters, conversations or circumstances without setting them out in detail. And if in such case the person so pleading desires to rely in the alternative upon more contracts or relations than one as to be implied from such circumstances, he may state the same in the alternative

13 Neither party need in any pleading allege any matter of fact which the law presumes in his favour or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other side unless it is necessary for a bill of exchange, consideration, or claim.

Pleadings.—Rules 1–13 16 18 of this Order are new and rules 2 13 and 16 are taken from the English O 19 rr 4 7, 14 16 20 23 27 respectively. Rules 14 and 15 represent sects 51 and 52 of the last Code. Rule 17 is taken from O 28 r 1 of the English rules and would appear to hold the place of sect 53 of the last Code after clause (a) of that section which is now embodied in O VII r 11 of this Code. Rule 18 is taken from O 28 r 7 of the English rules and would appear to replace sect 54 (d) of the last Code. Other rules from the English O 19 are to be found in O VIII post. As regards this Order the Special Committee stated: In our opinion it is most necessary that litigants in this country should come to trial with all issues clearly defined and that cases should not be expanded or grounds shifted without reference to the true facts. For this purpose we think that the present system of pleadings in the Mofussil which is notoriously lax should be improved and we have incorporated in the rules an order on pleadings which it is hoped will lead to sounder and fairer methods of arriving at the real points in dispute. The forms have been revised and we hope that they will be brought into more general use in the Mofussil. The Committee have added a few rules relating to pleadings based upon the system of pleading introduced by the Judicature Acts in England which is generally admitted to be the best form of pleading in civil suits. In this country outside the Presidency towns the pleadings are seldom artistically drawn. They are neither concise nor precise but contain vague and general statements from which it is difficult to ascertain definitely the real question in controversy between the parties. The sole object of pleadings is thus frequently defeated, the issue is enlarged, the trial is delayed and much unnecessary expense incurred by the parties who are also liable to be taken by surprise. They have further provided that the forms in the Schedule shall when applicable be used for all pleadings and when they are not applicable forms of the like character shall be used. The rules prescribed will not prevent the pleader from exercising his discretion, for the amount of detail must necessarily vary with the nature of each suit. It is however made clear that these must be particularly sufficient to apprise the Court and the other party of the exact nature of the questions to be tried. The Committee have also given a party who considers that his opponent's pleading does not give him the information to which he is entitled the right to apply for further particulars so as to enable him to know what case he has to meet at the trial. They have however endeavoured to modify the rigour of the rules by providing in accordance with sect 55 of the Indian Evidence Act that the Court may notwithstanding the absence of any specific denial require any fact to be proved by the party who relies upon it.

The subject of pleading will be found further discussed in the notes to O VII rr 1-6, but some observations summarized from the English "Annual Practice" may be here made

Rules 2 and 3—The point of rules 2 and 3 is that pleadings are now mere statements of facts not law, of material facts only, and of facts which are not evidence stated in a summary way after, as nearly as possible, the forms of pleading given in the Schedules. The written statement must be as brief as possible but should contain a full and true narrative (1) framed with care, so as to dispense with undue statements at the settlement of issues (2) and should be confined to relevant facts, (3) anything in the nature of argument (4) or evidence or conclusions of law to be drawn from the facts pleaded being inadmissible (5). The whole object of pleading is that the parties and the Court should know what is the real point to be discussed and decided (6) and it should be framed with reference to this object.

Rules 4 and 5—Rules 4 and 5 deal with particularity. In every pleading a certain amount of detail is necessary to ensure clearness and to prevent the other party from being taken by surprise. Pleadings are of no use unless they define clearly the questions at issue between the parties, and for this purpose each party must state his case with precision, otherwise the issue would be "enlarged," as it is called, and neither party would know for certain what was the real point to be discussed and assured at the trial, and therefore would not be able to properly prepare his evidence for it. No precise rule can, however, be laid down as to the degree of particularity which is required. As rule 4 directs the statement of particulars, so rule 5 provides a remedy in case the imperative language of the former rule is overlooked or disobeyed. If the allegations contained in any pleading are too vague, the proper course is to apply by notice and ask for fuller particulars. Each party is entitled to obtain a fair outline of his opponent's case, but cannot compel him to disclose the evidence by which he will attempt to establish that case. Nor will the Court sanction any attempt to deliver interrogatories under the guise of seeking particulars. The object of particulars is to enable the party asking for them to know what case he has to meet at the trial, and so to save unnecessary expense and avoid allowing parties being taken by surprise. On such an application the notice or summons should ask that if the particulars ordered be not delivered within the time prescribed the allegations complained of be struck out, or that the party in fault be precluded from giving any evidence in support of it at the trial. The words "*upon such terms*" in the English rule corresponding to rule 5 have been held to authorize an order that if proper particulars be not

(1) Sreenath Mullick v Brojo Lal Pyne, 1 Hyde, 33 (1862-3); if the statement is knowingly false, an offence under s 191 of the Penal Code is committed. See R. v Mehran Singh, 6 A 626 (1883).

(2) Anund Chunder v Woomees Chunder, 1 Hyde, 147 (1862-3).

(3) Kasublal Dey v Tremearne 3 B L R App 12 (1869). As to particulars in joint

cases see Sheen v Johnson, 2 A 368 (1879).
Ledgard v Bull, 9 A. 191 (1880).

(4) See Bishen Sahaye v Beer Kishore, 8 W R 296 (1867).

(5) See Williamson v London & N W Ry Co 12 Ch D 787 (a case of reply), and as to evidence, Spedding v Fitzpatrick, 3 Ch D 119.

(6) Thorp v Holbworth, 3 Ch D 603.

delivered within a certain time the action shall stand dismissed or be stayed (1) Leave may be given to amend or to add to particulars given

Rule 6—Cases constantly occur in which, although everything has happened which would at common law *prima facie* entitle a man to a certain sum of money, or vest in him a certain right of action, there is yet something more which must be done, or something more which must happen, in the particular case, before he is entitled to sue, either by reason of the provisions of some Statute, or because the parties have expressly so agreed, this something more is called a condition precedent. It is not of the essence of such a cause of action, but it has been made essential. It is an additional formality superimposed on Common Law. Hence, in England the plaintiff could draft a perfectly good statement of claim without making any reference to the condition precedent. But this, till 1875, he was not allowed to do. In former days the plaintiff was required to set out in his declaration every condition precedent, and to aver the due performance of it with all particularity. Then came the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, sect. 57 of which provided "It shall be lawful for the plaintiff or defendant in any action to aver performance of conditions precedent generally, and the opposite party shall not deny such averment generally, but shall specify in his pleading the condition or conditions precedent, the performance of which he intends to contest." And now (O 19, r 14 of the English rules) the plaintiff need say nothing about any condition precedent which has been performed. This provision is reproduced in rule 6 of this Order. A general averment of the due performance of all conditions precedent is implied in every pleading, i.e. it need not be alleged. It is for the defendant, if he contends that there was a condition precedent and that it has not been duly performed, to state specifically what that condition was and to plead its non performance. Otherwise its due performance will be presumed. And it is not sufficient for him to allege generally that "an express condition" had been agreed to. He must state its terms and between whom it was made, and whether verbally or in writing. Nevertheless, when a condition precedent is properly pleaded, the burden of proving its due performance or the waiver of its due performance still rests on the plaintiff.

But it is to be noted that an allegation which is of the essence of the cause of action is not a condition precedent within the meaning of this rule and must still be pleaded in the plaint. Thus the Law Merchant requires that notice of dishonour be given to every person who is sought to be made liable on a negotiable instrument, except the acceptor. Unless such notice was duly given, or was waived or excused, no action lies against the drawer or any indorsee. Hence the plaint must contain either an allegation that notice of dishonour was given to the defendant, or a statement of the facts relied on as excusing the giving of such notice.

Rule 7—The meaning of rule 7 is that a party's second pleading must not contradict his first. Thus, to illustrate from English practice, if a plaintiff claims rent on his writ, he cannot claim the same sum in his reply as damages for unlawfully "holding over." Or, if the statement of claims alleges merely

(1) *Davey v. Bantock* (1893) 1 Q. B. 185, C. A.

a negligent breach of trust the reply must not assert that such breach of trust was fraudulent. Such inconsistent claims should be pleaded if at all alternatively in the statement of claim.

Rule 8—Rule 8 is really a special application of the general principle laid down in rule 2 of O VIII *post*. If the defendant wishes to contend that any contract on which the plaintiff relies is invalid he must do something more than merely deny the agreement, he must plead specially by way of confession and avoidance the matters of fact which rendered it invalid. A traverse merely denies that the contract was in fact made. It leaves unquestioned its sufficiency in law.

Rule 9—It may be noted with reference to rule 9, that in an action of libel the precise words of the document are material. So in some cases the precise words of a will may be material.

Rules 10-12—Rule 10 and the two following rules are special applications of the general principle laid down in rule 2 of this Order (which is indeed the fundamental rule of the present English system of pleading) that every pleading shall contain and contain only a statement of the material facts on which the party pleading relies but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.

14 Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any). Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorized by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.

15 (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.

(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.

(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed.

Subscription—These rules deal with all pleadings. Sects 51 and 52 of the last Code dealt with plaints and sect 115 with written statements. The object of the signature to the plaint is to prevent as far as possible disputes as to whether the suit was instituted with the plaintiff's knowledge and

authority (1) The rule requires that the plaint (as well as written statement) should be subscribed by the party and his pleader, if any. But this requirement as to subscription is governed by O III r 1. The act of signature cannot be done by the pleader instead of the plaintiff, because the Code requires both signatures, but it permits acts to be done by a recognized agent. Reading therefore this section with O III r 1 a personal subscription is not imperative in all cases, and a plaint which may be presented by an authorized agent may in like manner be subscribed by him, and such a subscription is a compliance with the rule (2) Where the plaintiffs described themselves as lately carrying on business under the name of "C & Co.," it was held that there was no irregularity in its being signed "C & Co." (3) It is not possible to set down categorically what is good cause (4) within the meaning of the proviso. A person holding a general power of attorney containing *inter alia* powers to sue and defend suits but not containing a special power to sign a plaint was held to be a person duly authorized within the meaning of the proviso of this section in the last Code in which the words were "duly authorized by him in this behalf that is to sign." Now the signature may be that of any one authorized either to sign or to sue or defend (5). The signature of a plaint by an unauthorized agent, who subsequently becomes empowered to sign is sufficient (6). Under the last Code if a plaint was not signed and verified as required it might have been returned for amendment (7) and rejected if not amended (8). Presumably there is nothing to prevent this being done now.

The mere fact that the plaint in a suit has not been signed by the plaintiff named therein or by any person duly authorized by him as required by this rule will not necessarily make the plaint absolutely void. A defect in the signature of the plaint, or the absence of signature where it appears that the suit was in fact filed with the knowledge and by the authority of the plaintiff named therein, may be waived by the defendant or, if necessary, cured by amendment at any stage of the suit, and having regard to sect. 99, *ante* is not a ground for interference in appeal (9).

Verification—The object of the verification of the plaint is to fix upon the plaintiff the responsibility for the statements which it contains and to affirm a guarantee of his good faith (10). In other words, if he will not swear that he believes his cause to be just, the law does not care to bother itself with it. But when the adversary comes in such verification is of no moment. It is not even evidence. The justice of the cause must then be proved by competent evidence. Like any other formal matter its absence is waived by a failure to object. And if its entire absence does not affect the jurisdiction

(1) Basdeo v. John Smith 22 A. at p. 61

(2) Roy Dhunput v. Jhoomuk 3 C. L. R. 579 (1879), Maharajee Surnomoye v. John Ishary, 3 C. L. R. 15 (1878)

(3) Lachin v. Abdullah 5 B. L. 1. 111 S. (1870)

(4) *In re Rajal Lachman* 7 W. 1. 1. 5 (1867)

(5) Kastolno v. Iustomji 4 B. 468 (1880)

(6) Maharajah of Dewah v. Swami Saran 5 A. 635 (1903)

(7) S. 53 (1) (i) Act XVIII of 1859

(8) v. 51 ib. Basdeo v. Smith 22 A. 55 (1899)

(9) Basdeo v. John Smith, 22 A. 55 (1899)

(10) *Ib.*, 22 A. 61 (1899)

of course mere defects in it cannot (1) It would be difficult to imagine any case in which a defective verification could affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court (2) Under the last Code where a plaint was not verified, or improperly verified, it was returned for amendment, and, if not amended, rejected The suit should not, it was held, be dismissed (3) (*vide ante*) There is no rule that a person named as a co plaintiff is not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signs and verifies the plaint (4) As the object of verification is to secure good faith, and its effect to make the statements in the plaint the plaintiff's own, the Courts are bound to see that plaints are properly verified (5) The verification may be by some other person if the latter is acquainted with the facts The permission to a person to verify on behalf of the plaintiff should be given in each case individually, and not generally (6) When verification by an agent is once expressly allowed, the Court is not competent afterwards to raise an objection to it (7) But the plaintiff may himself be required to subscribe and verify, (8) as where a plaintiff charges fraud on facts known to him (9) It was held that the verification should be by all the plaintiffs, but that the Court might allow one of them to verify, a co plaintiff coming within the meaning of the words "some other person," etc (10) The amended section now provides for verification by one of the plaintiffs or defendants This rule does not apply to the case of corporations, which is provided for by O XXIX r 1, *post* (11) As to the Administrator General, see below (12) In case of a person holding a general power of attorney, or of any other recognized agent, the Court will probably not insist on any extreme stringency of proof as to his acquaintance with the facts of the case (13) *A fortiori* will this be so in the case of a co-partner or other co-plaintiff It has been said that notice of the application for permission to verify should be given to the

(1) Basdeo v John Smidt, 22 A 55 (1899) citing Vanfleet's "Collateral Attack," etc

(2) *Ib.*, citing Rajit Ram v Katesar Nath, 18 A 396 (1896) The mere fact that a plaint contains a defect in the matter of signature or verification does not make it a void and inadmissible plaint Maharajah of Rewah v Swami Saran, 25 A. 635-637 (1903)

(3) Roy Mohun v Bishnu Chandra, 1 B L R 100 (1868) [co plaintiff], Rajit Ram v Katesar Nath, 18 A 396 (1896) In Overend v Steele, 1 Ind. Jur N S 39, the Court removed the plaint from the file

(4) Mohini Mohun v Bungsi Buddhan, 17 C 590 (1889); Chandhi Mal v Dewa Singh, 1896, P R No 18

(5) See Keeno Singh v Lshan Chunder, 6 W R 213 (1866)

(6) *In re* Mulessur Buksh, 5 W R Misc 33 (1866), Nursing Deb v Ram Mohun, Marsh, 170 (1861), Maharajah Mohessur v Sheonram 6 W R Misc 79 (1866)

(7) Rajah Sutto v Suroop Chunder, 12 W R 463 (1869)

(8) Raja of Tomukhi v Bradwood, 9 A 505 (1887), Gokul Chunder v Burreck Begum, Marsh, 311 (1861)

(9) Jardine Skinner v Maharanes Surnamoyee, 24 W R 215 (1875) and last note, Protap Chunder v Krichto Kishore, 8 C 889 (1882)

(10) Chandhi Mal v Dewa Singh, 1896, P R No 48 In Ram Chunder v Chooneelal, 12 B L R 35 (1873), it was queried whether the practice was correct according to which in a suit brought by a firm, one partner could, without special leave, verify on behalf of his co partners

(11) Delhi and London Bank v Oilhan, 21 C 60, s c, 20 I A 139, 142 (1893)

(12) In the goods of Avidil 26 C 401 (1899)

(13) Kastelino v Rustonji, 1 R 468 (1840)

opposite side, but it is not necessary (1) and is certainly not required (2) The substantial portion of the plaint consisting of the statement of the claim of the plaintiffs and the prayer, was written upon two sheets of plain paper and verified by the plaintiffs Subsequently to the affixing of the plaintiffs' signatures a front sheet consisting of a piece of stamped paper with the name of the Court and the names and addresses of the parties, was added, and the plaint thus composed filed in Court Held, that the verification was defective, but that the suit ought not to have been dismissed The plaintiffs ought to have been allowed an opportunity of amending the plaint by making a proper verification (3) The rule does not require the verification of a plaint to be made in the presence of an officer of the Court, but, having regard to the necessity of satisfying the Court that the person other than the plaintiff, who verifies the plaint is acquainted with the facts of the case, it has in one case, been said to be desirable that a verification by such a person should be made in the presence of the Court, unless the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for dispensing with his attendance (4) Persons exempted from attendance are not exempted from signature or verification except the Court allows it for good cause, and then the party verifying should be one proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case (5) When an application is made for verification by an attorney, it has been said to be desirable, though not necessary, that notice should be given to the other side (6) If a written statement is admitted on the record without verification, the allegations contained in it should be noticed and issues framed accordingly (7)

Objections to verification—Objections to verification should be taken before the settlement of issues, after that, the case should be disposed of on the merits and not dismissed for insufficient verification (8)

Mode of verification—It was held under the last Code that in all cases, whether the plaint is verified by the plaintiff or by some other person, the person verifying should state shortly what paragraphs he verifies of his own knowledge, and what paragraphs he believes to be true from the information of others (9) In the first Allahabad case cited a verification in the words "to the limit (or extent) of my knowledge the purport of this is true" was held to be bad, and the Court observed that "the verification must be, if all the facts are to the knowledge of the deponent, a distinct verification that they are to his knowledge true," and that "if he has knowledge as to some, and only information and belief as to others, the verification should show as to which he speaks from his knowledge and as to which he speaks from his

(1) *Finlay v Steele*, 1 Ind. Jur N S 39 (1862)

(2) *Puddomonee Dassee v Shama Churn*, 1 Ind. Jur N S 226 (1862)

(3) *Fateh Chand v Munsab Rai*, 20 A. 442 (1897)

(4) *Kastolino v Rustumji*, 4 B 468 (1890)

(5) *Kinoo Sing v Eshan Chund* 2 Wym. 253 cited in *O Kincaley*

(6) *Finlay Campbell & Co v Steele*, 1 Ind.

Jur N S 39 (1866)

(7) *Radha Churn Roy v Moran & Co* 13 W R 312 (1870)

(8) *Shama Soonduree v Rahmooold-en*, 24 W R 71 (1875)

(9) *Upendra Lal Bose*, 6 C. 675 (1881), *Gurdhari v Kanhaiva Lal*, 15 A. 59 (1892), *Rapt Ram v Hatesar Nath*, 18 A 306 (1896). *Fide* to same effect, *Bibee Solomon v Alalool* Ann 4 C. L. R. 366 (1879)

information and belief" In the last Allahabad case cited, the verification was in the following form "The contents of the petition of plaint are true to the best of my knowledge and belief" and a Full Bench of the Court held that although the verification was not in strict compliance with the Code it substantially complied with it. A failure to distinguish in the pleading between the facts stated on personal knowledge and those stated on information and belief must of necessity defeat to a great extent the object to be attained by verification unless the person verifying is held to have made every allegation upon personal knowledge. The rule has now been amended in accordance with these rulings and governs all pleadings. A verification to the effect that the contents of the plaint are substantially true is not sufficient, (1) as it contains a qualification which is a material departure from the requirements of the Code (2). If an attorney having obtained leave of the Court for that - means to verify the plaint himself, he shall -

account and not as the plaintiff - merely as the plaintiff - and verification and - the attorney to sign the verification for him (3). The General Rules of the North Western Provinces (4) and Calcutta High Courts (5) provide that all verifications "shall correctly specify the date and place at which they are signed." This rule has now been embodied in the third clause.

Course to be taken when verification defective—If the verification of a plaint is discovered to be defective at any time whilst the suit is before the Court of first instance the plaint may be amended by the Court (6). If such defect be not discovered until the suit comes on appeal before an Appellate Court such Court may if it thinks fit return the plaint to the Court of first instance to be amended by it. But where the defect is such that it is covered by the provisions of sect 33 and there is no necessity for the Appellate Court to take any steps to procure the amendment of the plaint. In any event a defect in the verification of a plaint will not of necessity result in the dismissal of the suit (7) or in its being decreed (8).

16 The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to
Striking out pleadings be struck out or amended
or which may tend to
of the suit

Striking out pleadings—This is a general provision taken from O XIX r 27 of the English Rules, for enforcing the preceding rules. Its

(1) *Waggoner v Brown*, 8 How Pr 212 (Amer)

(2) *Hukm Chand C P C 524*

(3) *Upendro Lal Bose 6 C 676 (1881)*

(4) Rule 14 cited in *Hukm Chand C P C 625*

(5) Rule 6

(6) Under the former Code it was held having regard to the provisions of sect 53 of

that Code that the order for amendment could not be made after the settlement of issues. *Baroda Pressed Bazaar Gyanath Roy Chowdhury 2 C. L. J. 11 (1905)*

(7) *Rajni Ram v. Katesar Nath*, 18 A 390 (1896)

(8) *Rustun Gazi v. Tara Prasanna Chowdhury* 11 C W N 871 (1907)

language is wide, but its operation has in England been to some extent limited by the decisions given on it. Although the rule expressly states that the order may be made "*at any stage of the proceedings*," still the application should always be made promptly and as a rule before the close of the pleadings, or the Court may, in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction (1). "The rule that the Court is not to dictate to parties how they should frame their cases, is one that ought always to be preserved sacred. But that rule is, of course, subject to this modification and limitation that the parties must not offend against the rules of pleading which have been laid down by the law, and, if a party introduces a pleading which is unnecessary, and it tends to prejudice, embarrass and delay the trial of the action, it then becomes a pleading which is beyond his right" (2). A reasonable latitude must be given (3). Not every pleading which offends against the rules will be struck out. The applicant must show that he is in some way prejudiced by the irregularity. Still, "the defendant may claim *ex debito justitiæ* to have the plaintiff's case presented in an intelligible form, so that he may not be embarrassed in meeting it" (4).

"Unnecessary."—The word "*unnecessary*" was introduced into the English Rule in 1883. But the mere fact that an opponent's pleading contains some unnecessary matter is not sufficient ground for an application under this rule. A statement will not be struck out merely because it is unnecessary, so long as it is otherwise harmless (5). It is no part of the defendant's duty to reform the plaintiff's pleading or to dictate to him how he shall plead, or *vice versa*. But if wholly immaterial matter be set out in such a way that the applicant must plead to it, and so raise irrelevant issues which may involve expense, trouble and delay, then the irrelevant matter will be struck out, as it will prejudice the fair trial of the action.

"Scandalous"—As regards "scandalous" matter, the Court has a general jurisdiction to expunge it in any record or proceeding (6) and apparently, according to the English practice, any person may make the application (7). Allegations of dishonesty and outrageous conduct etc., are not, however, scandalous, if relevant to the issue (8). "Nothing can be scandalous which is

(1) *Cross v Howe*, 12 L. J. Ch. 342. See Annual Practice, from which following notes are taken, and see the *New Fleming*, etc., Co. v. *Kessowji Naik*, 9 B. 373, 381 (1885).

(2) *Per Bowen, L.J.*, in *Knowles v. Roberts*, 38 C. D. 270.

(3) *Tomkinson v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, 57 L. T. 358.

(4) *Per James, L.J.*, in *Davy v. Garrett*, 7 C. D. p. 486, and see *Watson v. Rodwell*, 3 C. D. 380.

(5) *Per Chitty, J.*, in *Rock v. Pursell*, 84 L. T. Jo. 45, see the remarks of *Kay, J.*, in *Tomkinson v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, 57 L. T. p. 306, and *Hocking & Co. v. Hocking*, 3 R. P. C.

291, and see as to prolixity and irrelevancy, *Kasabli Day v. Tremearne*, 3 B. L. P. App. 12 (1869), *Keshadji Naik v. Nasarwanji Ardesir*, 10 B. H. C. R. 425 (1883), *Smallwood v. Parry*, 1 Coryton 39 (1845), *The New Fleming Spinning etc. Co. v. Kessowji Naik*, 9 B. 373, at p. 381 (1885), *Booleo Singh v. Huroobuts Natta*, 5 W. R. 213 (1867).

(6) *Seton*, 31 *Pract. & Proc.* 141; *Miller*, 54 L. J. Ch. 257.

(7) *Cracknell v. Jallu*, 11 L. J. 111.

(8) *Frederick v. Day*, 11 L. J. 111; *Rubery v. Great S. Ry.*

relevant (1) "The mere fact that these paragraphs state a scandalous fact does not make them scandalous" (2) But if degrading charges be made which are irrelevant, or if, though the charge be relevant unnecessary details are given the pleading becomes scandalous (3) The sole question is whether the matter alleged to be scandalous would be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleading which is material with reference to the relief prayed (4)

"Tend to prejudice, etc"—The Court is "disposed to give a liberal interpretation" to the words "*Tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit*" (5) At the same time parties must not be too ready to find themselves embarrassed If the defendant does not make it clear how much of the plaint he admits and how much he denies, his pleading is embarrassing (6) If he does not make it clear whether he is traversing the allegations contained in the plaint or objecting to them on a point of law, his defence will be struck out as embarrassing (7) In neither case could the plaintiff safely join issue So a plea of justification is embarrassing if it leaves the plaintiff in doubt what the defendant has justified and what he has not (8) But mere prolixity is not embarrassing (9) Nor will a statement be struck out as embarrassing merely because the other party declares that it is untrue (10) The mere fact that a Statement of Claim embraces several causes of action is not, according to English practice, embarrassing, if they are distinctly pleaded in the alternative A claim for alternative relief is not embarrassing (11) So any number of inconsistent defences may now, in England, be pleaded to the same cause of action, and their inconsistency is not "embarrassing" to the pleader (12)

But if a claim against executors personally in their private capacity be improperly joined with a claim against the estate of their testator, it will be struck out (13) So where several plaintiffs or several defendants are improperly joined in one action though the causes of action be separate, the pleading will be struck out (14) Where a pleading is defective only in the sense that it does

(1) *Per Cotton L.J.*, in *Fisher v Owen*, 8 C D p 659

(2) *Per Brett L.J.*, in *Millington v Loring* 6 Q B D p 196

(3) *Duncan v Verser* (1876) W N 64
Blair v Allmon Assurance Society 45 L J C P 663, *Lee v Ashwin* 1 Times Rep 291,
McGuckin v Ralli, 94 I T Jo 12, *Coyle v Cumming*, 27 W R (Eng) 529

(4) *Selbourne, L.C.*, in *Christie v Christie*, 1 R 8 Ch 499, *Cashin v Craddock*, 3 C D 376 *Whitney v Moignard*, 21 Q B D 630

(5) *Berdan v Greenwood*, 3 F & D, 1 256

(6) *British Land Association v Foster*, 4 Times Rep 574

(7) *Stokes v Grant*, 4 C P D 25

(8) *Fleming v Dollan* 23 Q B D 259, and see *Davis v Billing* 8 Times Rep 58

(9) *Weymouth v Rich* 1 Times Rep 609
Heape v Harris, 2 Q B D 670

(10) *Per Bramwell J.*, in *Turquand v Fearon* 40 L J p 544

(11) *Bagot v Yaston*, 7 C D p 8

(12) *Re Morgan* 30 C D 492, *Re In Greenwood*, 3 Ex D 251, 355

(13) *Whitworth v Darbithurst*, 41 W R (Eng) 317, 68 L J 216, for that is contrary to O 18, r 59 of the English rules

(14) *Smith v Richardson* 4 C P D 112
Sander v Wildsmith (1893), 1 Q B 771,
Smurthwaite v Hannay (1891) A C 494,
Sadler v G W Ry Co & Midland Ry Co (1896) A C 450, *Gower v Coul Inridge* (1898) 1 Q B 348, *Stroud v Lawson* (1898) 2 Q B 44 *Walters v Green*, 2 Ch 616 (1899), *Frankenburg v Ct Horseless Carriage Co* (1900), 1 Q B 501, *Kent Coal Co v Martin*, 16 Times Rep 486 and see notes to Annual Practice O 16, rr 1, 2, where all the cases are cited

not contain particulars which it ought to contain and thus deprives the opponent of information to which he is entitled it is not embarrassing in the strict sense of the word (though that epithet is often applied to such a pleading) (1) and application should now be made for a further and better statement of the nature of the claim or defence under r 5 and not for an order to strike out the pleading under this rule

17 *The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow or direct either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties*

18 *If a party who has obtained an order for leave to amend does not amend accordingly within the time limited for that purpose by the order, or if no time is thereby limited then within fourteen days from the date of the order, he shall not be permitted to amend after the expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such fourteen days, as the case may be, unless the time is extended by the Court*

Former and present provisions—The present rules are in very much more general terms than sect 53 of the last Code which they replace. Clause (a) of that section dealt with rejection of the plaint for want of cause of action. This provision has now been referred to O VII r. 11. Clause (b) dealt with return for amendment under certain circumstances which are expressly stated (i) (ii) (iii) and (iv) as to which, see *post*. This return was before the setting out of issues. Clause (c) dealt with amendment by the Court at any time before judgment. The section also contained the important qualification that no plaint should be amended either by the Court or by the party so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. By setting out the extended scope of the present Code and for the better understanding

it was made. It is submitted also that notice should have been given, though it has been held that if a party has notice of the suit but does not appear, the fact that the plaint was under such circumstances amended without notice to him did not nullify the decree thereafter made (1). A defendant (2) might similarly apply. If neither party applied, the Court might, under clause (b) of its own motion in the specific cases therein mentioned, return the plaint to the party to be amended by him so as to remove the particular objections which might exist to it. The party himself then amended his plaint. But under clause (b) the plaintiff need not have amended at all after the plaint was returned to him, but if he did not he incurred the penalty of sect 54 (3). The Original Court could not, unless acting under the orders of an Appellate Court, return a plaint after settlement of issues, for after that period the power to amend was with the Court alone, (4) but if the plaint required amendment and the fact was only discovered after issues had been settled, the Court could amend the plaint at any time before judgment (5). It was apparently not intended by the Legislature that any necessary amendment should take any form other than that of an amendment in writing on the face of the plaint, and the Court was not competent to order an amendment so as to require that a plan should be appended to the plaint (6). Straight, J., incidentally expressed an opinion that a plaint, after being once returned for amendment and amended accordingly, could not be returned again for amendment (7). In cases in which leave under the Charter had to be obtained prior to the institution of the suit, no such amendment could be allowed as would introduce a new cause of action, for the grant of leave must be taken to relate to the suit as put forward in the plaint on which leave is endorsed by the Judge accepting it (8). When a plaint was returned a time had to be fixed within which the amendment must be made (9). The Court, however, had a discretion to extend even after the time originally fixed for amendment had expired (10). If the plaint was not amended within the time fixed it was rejected under sect 54 (d).

Clause (1) of sect 53 of former Code.—A defect in the verification of a plaint did not of necessity result in the dismissal of the suit (11). Before the

(1) *Sadho v. Golab*, 3 C. W. N. 375 (1897).

(2) See *Himodar Das v. Gopal Chand*, 7 A. 79 at p. 83 (1884). In *Muthappa v. Muthu*, 27 M. 80, 84 (1903) Sir A. White, C.J., however said: "The Code apparently does not contemplate an application by a party that a plaint be amended and proceedings stayed till the amendment is made."

(3) *Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath*, 18 A. 396 (1896).

(4) *Rajit Nath v. Chowaro*, 26 A. 218 (1903) [misjoinder of causes of action], and see notes, *post*, O VI r 11, "Rejected."

(5) *Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath*, *supra*. See also *Blusun v. Rask*, 17 C. W. N. 299 (1912).

(6) *Chenbavay v. Rudray*, 11 B. 751 (1899).

(7) *Bade un neri v. Muhammad*, 2 A. 671 (1880).

(8) *Rampurab v. Premsookh*, 15 B. 51 (1899).

(9) See *Ismail v. Arumuga*, 1 M. H. C. R. 427 (1863), and the same rule applies to a memorandum of appeal. *Shro Partab v. Shro Gholam*, 2 A. 875 (1880).

(10) *Bhagwandas Bagla v. Haji Abu*, 16 B. 261 (1891).

(11) *Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath*, 18 A. 396 (1896). In *Shama Soonduree v. Pohnood deen*, 24 W. R. 71 (1875), where a verification was false, the suit was held to have been

settlement of issues the plaint should have been returned for amendment and if the verification was discovered to be defective at any time whilst the suit was before the Court of first instance, the plaint might be amended by the Court. If such defect was not discovered until the suit came in appeal before an Appellate Court, such Court might, if it thought fit return the plaint to the Court of first instance to be amended by it. But where the defect was such that it was covered by the provisions of sect 578 of that Code, there was no necessity to take any steps to procure the amendment of the plaint (1). The Allahabad High Court has in some cases remanded the case under sect 562 of the former Code with an order for the return of the plaint to the plaintiff for duly signing and verifying the same (2).

Clause (II) of sect 53 of former Code.—See as regards clause (i), O VII. rr 1-6, *ante*. The general intention and meaning of a plaint should be regarded and it should not be returned for want of correctness upon grounds of slight and immaterial mistake (3). If a plaint was defective in form or wanting in precision it should be returned for amendment and not rejected (4). Under the rules of the Punjab Chief Court an attempt should be made to remove ambiguity in the statement of any of the particulars before resorting to the return of the plaint for amendment (5). For an instance of a plaint containing particulars other than those required, see the case cited below, (6) in which the plaint was argumentative and referred to evidence, and contained a prayer for the criminal prosecution of the defendant. Where the plaint disclosed a cause of action, but not with sufficient fulness, it might be returned for amendment or amended; but if this was not done the plaintiff was at liberty to prove any cause of action not inconsistent with the plaint (7).

Clause (III) of sect 53 of former Code.—See as to non joinder and misjoinder, O II rr. 3-7. The Court might return for amendment, but a party was not to be prejudiced because the Court had in its absence inadvertently admitted a plaint which was multifarious. The defendant had a right on a motion to take the plaint off the file to raise the question of misjoinder of causes of action before or at the settlement of issues (8). If the cause for suing one defendant was different from that for suing another, the plaint should have been returned for amendment. In the event of serious

wrongly dismissed the defendant having admitted a considerable portion of the plaintiff's claim and taken no objection to the verification. See also *Roy Mohun v Puhoo Soonduree*, 10 W R. 145 (1868).

(1) *Rajit Ram v Katesar Nath* 18 A 396 (1896), *coll.*, *Chanil Mal v Dewa Singh*, 1896 P P No 48.

(2) *Fateh Chand v Mansab Rai* 20 A 442 (1897) and cases therein cited.

(3) See *Mussoorie Bank v Bartow*, 9 A 188 (1886), and in examining the correctness of a plaint the allegations if in the present tense must be deemed to relate to the date of

verification. *Prinle v Caruthers*, 15 N Y 125 (Amer.), cited in *Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 631.

(4) *Pitambur Mokerjee v Hurro Naram*, 1864, W R 50.

(5) S 2 r 1 (1), cited in *Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 631.

(6) *Bishen Sahayo v Beer Kishore* 8 W R 296 (1867), and as to proximity, *ib.*, and notes to O VII rr 1-6.

(7) *Luckhee Pura v Brinlabun Dey*, 12 W R 313 (1869).

(8) *Ram Dyal v Pann Doohal*, 11 W R 273, 275 (1869).

multifariousness being discovered at the first hearing the Court might on the defendant's application before any evidence was recorded, require the plaintiff to elect which cause of action he would proceed to trial upon, and should direct the remainder of the claim to be withdrawn and the plaint amended accordingly (1) Whilst the Court could not return the plaint after settlement of issues it might amend it at any time. If there were misjoinder of causes of action the plaint might be amended by striking out the part which was not properly joined (2) Where there was misjoinder but the first Court proceeded to trial not having returned the plaint for amendment or amended it it should dispose of the case on the merits (3) There was nothing in the Code to warrant the proposition that when a Court of first instance decided a question of misjoinder in favour of the plaintiff there was an end of the matter and the defendant was precluded from raising the question in appeal (4) Where however, a suit was not objected to on the score of misjoinder of causes of action at or before the settlement of issues in the Court of first instance the Court seeing, in second appeal that the suit had proceeded through three Courts, did not feel justified in dismissing the suit (5) The Appeal Court might dispose of the suit in the mode in which the lower Court ought to have disposed of it if it had held as it ought to have done, that there was a misjoinder and might direct that the plaint be returned for amendment (6)

Clause (iv) of sect 53 of former Code—See notes to O II r 1 *ante*

Amendment by Court under clause (c) of former Code—This clause did not form part of the Code as enacted in 1887, and together with the words "*at or in clause (b)*", was introduced by sect 9 of Act VII of 1888 (7) The words "*at any time before judgment*" meant substantially the same as the words "*at any stage of the proceedings*" in the corresponding English rule O 28, r 1 under which leave to amend was refused after judgment, but an amendment might be made at any time so long as anything remained to be done in an action, though it be only the assessment of damages and even on an application for a new trial (8) Under clause (c) the Court itself might amend at any time before judgment but not after (9) The plaint still remained on and was part of the file although the Court might depute any person selected by it to take the plaint, for example, to a pardanashin woman who was plaintiff or to a person who through illness was unable to attend Court for the purpose of its order being complied with. Any amendment under such circumstances would be an amendment by the Court itself. Under

(1) Instructions to Judicial Officers (Punjab Chief Court) s 2 r 1 (iii), s 2 r 31, *Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 632

(2) *Cutts v Brown* 6 C 328, at p 332 (1880)

(3) *Kishna Ram v Pakmini Sewak*, 9 A 221 (1887)

(4) *Muthappa v Muthu*, 27 M. 80 85 (1903) See now, *post*

(5) *Sanna v Ganaja* 7 Bom. L. R. 185 (1903)

(6) *Langammal v Venkatammal* 6 M. 231 (1882), *Ramanuja v Devanayka*, 8 V. 361 (1885), *Salma Bibee v Sheikh Muhammud* 18 A. 131 (1895), *Rajjo Kuar v Debi Dal* 18 A. 432 (1896)

(7) See for the earlier law, *Damodar v Gopal Chand*, 7 A. 70 (1885), *Mudhe v Dongre*, 5 B. 609 (1881)

(8) *Annual Practice* 1900, p 3 n

(9) *Percival v Collector of Chittagong* 30 C. 116 (1900)

this clause the amendment was made by order of the Court, and the party had to comply with it. Further, if the amendment was one going to the maintenance of the suit and the defect in the plaint was not discovered until the suit got into a superior Court on appeal, the Appellate Court could either order the amendment to be made in that Court, or, for example, in a case in which there had been not only misjoinder of parties but misjoinder of causes of action, the Appellate Court might order the Court of first instance to do what it ought to have done at the proper stage of the suit when the suit was before it, and return the plaint to the parties so that they might make their election as to which of them was to continue the suit, and might make the necessary amendments (1).

Amendment by Appeal Court under former Code. It was held under the Code of 1882 that an Appellate Court had power under sect 582 of that Code, read with sect 53, to allow an amendment of the plaint (2). The Appellate Court might itself have made the amendment or directed the lower Court to do so. There are many cases in which amendments have been allowed on appeal, and suits have been remanded (3) for re-trial on amended plaints (1). The High Court, in special appeal, has also directed the lower Appellate Court to amend the plaint by the insertion of a prayer for declaration

(1) *Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath*, 18 A 396 (1896), in which an amendment under clause (c) is distinguished from that under clause (b).

(2) *Rajah Peary Mohan v. Narain Chandra Krishna*, 5 C. W. N. 273 (1900) (on appeal to Privy Council, 37 I. A. 27 (1909)), 37 C.

granted in appeal if not asked for in Court of first instance. Annual Practice, 1905, p. 356, though this is a matter which in each case must be determined on its own circumstances: see *Ecklin v. Little*, 6 Times R. 366, post. The Appellate Court may similarly amend the memorandum of appeal. *Peruval v. Collector of Cluttaigong*, 30 C. 516 (1900).

(3) The view expressed by Ramjinn, J., in *Dharam Ram v. Bhagurath*, 22 C. at p. 714 (1895), that an amendment cannot be made which involves a remand, and that a remand is not justified except in the circumstances mentioned in ss 562 or 566 of the former Code, has not been accepted. There are some observations, however, in *Bai Shri Majraba v. Maganlal*, 19 B. 303 (1894), but these and some others as to the powers of an Appellate Court were not necessary for the decision, the basis of which was that the character of the suit had been changed. And

see *Langammal v. Venkatammal*, 6 M. 239, 244 (1882), in which it was said that the Appellate Court should dispose of the suit in the mode in which the lower Court ought to have disposed of it.

(1) *Rajah Peary Mohan v. Narain Chandra Krishna*, 5 C. W. N. at p. 279 and cases there cited, and *Ram Doyal v. Rajah Ojodha*, 25 W. B. 125 (1876), *Sirdarsingji v. Ganpatisingji*, 11 B. 393 (1885), *Karimbhai v. Conservator of Forests*, 1 B. 222 (1879), *Adkanthappa v. Magistrate*, etc., 6 B. 760 (1880), *Balaram v. Magistrate*, etc., 6 B. 672 (1882), *Joseph v. Bolano*, 18 W. B. 421 (1872), s. c., 9 B. L. R. 111, *Langammal v. Venkatammal*, 6 M. 239 (1882). This has been done in special appeal. *Daboo v. Tuwa*, 11 W. B. 223 (1869), *Dharam Ram v. Bhagurath*, 22 C. 692 (1895), *Annapur v. Banpati*, 5 B. 181 (1880), *Budhabai v. Shamray*, 8 B. 163 (1881), *Thakur Baghu Nath v. Shali Lal*, 19 A. 330 (1897), *Hari Gopal v. Gokabhai*, 12 B. 153 (1887), *Narasimha v. Suryanarayana*, 12 M. 481 (1889), *Shyam Chand v. Land Mortgage Bank*, 9 C. 695 (1883), *Seshamma v. Chennappa*, 20 M. 467 (1897), *Krishnaji v. Sitaram*, 5 B. 496 (1880), and even in the most advanced stage of the suit before the Privy Council. *Mohammed Zahoor v. Rutta Koer*, 11 M. I. A. 468, 487 (1867).

of the plaintiffs' right and to re-hear the appeal (1) It has, however, been said to be undesirable to allow amendment in second appeal when the plaintiff has in two Courts never contemplated it, and has even gone so far as to persistently maintain his case as originally brought (2) Amendment has been refused with reference to a state of facts occurring since the decision by the original Court (3) Amendment has also generally been refused where the plaintiff persisted throughout that the suit as framed was maintainable, and permission to amend was not asked for in the lower Court (4) In a case where no amendment was asked for and refused in the Court of first instance, but, on the other hand, objection was taken in the lower Court, and the plaintiffs elected to take an issue and to allow the suit to proceed subject to the risk of an adverse decision the Court said "It is true that, as a general rule, the plaintiff may be permitted even, on appeal, to amend the plaint when he had framed it *bona fide* under a mistake or erroneous advice, and the other party could be adequately compensated by an award of costs, but it must be observed that when such amendment might possibly create a necessity for fresh written statements and for fresh issues, and practically amount to a trial *de novo* from the commencement, it is much more convenient to leave the plaintiffs to the liberty of maintaining a suit for ejectment, so that the opposite party might in no way be prejudiced in his defence or harassed with a second trial of the same suit." (5) The stage of the proceedings, whether in the original Court or Court of Appeal, at which an application for amendment is made might effect the question whether it should be granted, as to which, see *post*

Proviso to sect 53 of last Code—The object of this proviso was only to prohibit amendments which involved the trial of issues substantially different from those raised by the original pleadings (6) See notes on "Change of character of suit," *post*

Present provisions as to amendment—R 16 is taken from English O 16, r 27, and rr 17 and 18 from O 28, rr 1 and 7. The latter rule provides that on failure to amend the order for amendment becomes void R 18 more specifically states what the effect of a failure to amend is From a review of the preceding case-law and the provisions of sect. 53 of the last Code, it will be seen that the present powers of amendment are given in much wider terms Amendment may be either by the party or by the Court. No mention is made of return for amendment, but this may take place where the party applies or is directed to make an amendment No

(1) *Narasimha v. Suryanarayana*, 12 M 481 (1889), *Seshamma v. Chennappa*, 20 M 467 (1897)

(2) *Surendra Narain v. Bhai Lal*, 22 C 752, 758 (1891); however, in *Lekhn v. Little*, 8 Fines R. 366, it was held that the C. A. had power to amend even where the Court below offered leave and the offer was declined

(3) *Gowinda v. Perumal*, 12 M 136 (1889)

(4) *N. Jagannatha Nath v. Price*, 21 C 581,

588 (1897), *Obhoy Gobind v. Harychurn*, 8 C 277, 278 (1882) In *Durga Prosad v. Nawa Singh*, 1 A 591 (1878), the Court refused to allow an amendment as the plaintiff should have offered, but did not, to pay the sum which he subsequently offered to do when he brought his suit

(5) *Narayana v. Shankunni*, 15 M 255, 257 (1891)

(6) *Lakshmappa v. Naga Reddy*, 28 M 500 (1901)

time is fixed as to when the amendment may be made. It may be "at any stage of the proceedings." As to the meaning of this term, *vide ante*, "Amendment by Court." Amendment may be by the Court of first instance or appeal, though the principles upon which the Appellate Court will proceed in such cases are in general those stated. As regards misjoinder, see now O I r 13, O II r 7, and sect 99. As to amendment of applications for execution, see O XXI r 17. An extremely important amendment is the omission of the proviso in sect 53 a matter which is dealt with *post* as are also the general principles on which amendment will be allowed. It may be broadly stated that in all cases where amendment has hitherto been allowed it will be permitted now, and that in many instances in which it has been refused it would be allowed under the present provisions, the object of which is to extend to India the liberal principles which govern English Courts under which all such amendments are made as are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties subject to certain qualifications which are hereinafter stated.

Case desired to be made must be raised—In the first place a question not raised by the plaint ought not to be decided by the Court (1). The Judicial Committee has held (2) that though it is disposed to give a liberal construction to pleadings in Indian Courts so as to allow every question to be raised and discussed in the suit yet a plaintiff cannot be entitled to relief upon facts and documents neither stated nor referred to in the pleadings. The determination in a cause must be founded upon a case either to be found in the pleadings or involved in or consistent with the case thereby made (3). Even where it was argued that the plaintiff had been misled by various representations made by the defendant into framing his suit as it was then framed, the Privy Council said that even if that were so it would not empower them to depart from the rule, which has always prevailed that a man must recover according to his allegations and his proofs, and that it would not enable them to allow an entirely new case to be brought forward which was not set up or hinted at in the plaint (1). Further, it is to be noted that stricter rules as regards pleading are enacted by the present Code.

Matters in dispute should be ascertained not only from the plaint and answer, but also at the first hearing of the suit when issues are settled, and any indistinctness in the form of the plaint does not require that a decision come to upon issues fixed in the lower Court between the parties should be

(1) Lalji v Gungaram, 2 B H C R A C J 176 (1864)

(2) Mohumud Zahoor v Musst Bhakoor rance, 11 M I A 468 (1867)

(3) Mylajore Iyasawmy v Yeo Kay 14 C 801 (1887), s c, 14 I A 168, Ishen Chunder v Shama Churn, 11 M I A 7 (1867), Ameroonissa v Abdoonissa, 21

I A 100 at 1 107 (1875). A plaintiff is only entitled to succeed upon the cause of action alleged by him in his plaint. Sheo Prasad v Lalit Kuar 18 A 403 (1896), dis from Chimanaji v Sakharani 17 B 305 (1892)

(4) Gopao Lal v Musst Sree Chun Iradoec, 10 W L 12 (1872)

set aside (1) In the case cited (2) the Privy Council said "Some importance was attached by learned counsel for the respondents to the manner in which the plaintiff's case was stated in the plaint, but their Lordships are of opinion that in dealing with the case they must look not to the mere wording of the plaint but to the issue which was settled for trial and to the manner in which the case was treated by the lower Courts" (3) In the case last cited it was pointed out that the object of the plaint was merely to bring the matter in dispute before the Court but it was for the latter, upon the statements before it to determine the real issue between the parties (4) The substance and not merely the form, of the plaint must be looked at Where a plaintiff in form seeks for confirmation of possession yet sets out and states circumstances which are in themselves a dispossession the suit should be treated really as one for recovery of possession (5) Where a suit remains substantially the same as one for rent the fact that the plaintiff claims *bhooler* rent will not disentitle him to a decree for *nugdee* rent, the defendant admitting that rent of this kind was payable (6)

Where there is a slight variance between a plaintiff's pleading and his evidence but the defendant has not been misled thereby or induced to refrain from calling evidence the plaintiff's suit should not be dismissed (7) Though a plaintiff does not prove the precise claim which he makes if he is substantially right he ought to have a decree and not to be left to bring another suit (8) A plaintiff who brings forward a *bona fide* case which he proves in substance though not in form will be assisted by the Court but in the absence of such special circumstances no such assistance will be afforded (9) It is not a rule of universal application that a plaintiff who claims too much or fails to admit reasonable deductions from his claim is therefore to be deprived of that to which he is legally entitled (10) It might promote honesty

(1) *Mulvi Abuloolah v. Mussodeen* 10 W. R. 296 (1871)

(2) *Raja Tup v. Rani Baisi* 7 A. I. 11 (1884) 11 I. A. 143 150 [claim based on custom and law decreed on law]

(3) See also *Arbuthnot v. Betts* 6 E. I. R. 27 s. c. 14 W. R. 181 (1890) where the case was erroneously stated in the plaint but it was held that the suit should not have been dismissed on that ground as the issues raised admitted of the true question being tried The substance and not the mere literal wording of the issues is to be regarded *Hunooman Persaud v. Musst. Babooe* 1 M. I. A. at p. 411 (1856)

(4) Dist. in *Shah Kristo v. Abulool* 5 C. 602 603 (1879) where it was pointed out that the form of the plaint made no difference as regards the substantial defence in the case

(5) *Mulvi Abuloolah v. Shaha Muz* 10 W. R. 27 (1871) *Kadec Nath*

v. Mohesh Chunder 20 W. R. 115 (1890). *Rash Dharee v. Nathonee* 21 W. P. 301 (1875) *Amir Hossein v. Inamban* 11 C. L. R. 443 (1882), *Champu Dait v. Uria Dait* 11 C. L. R. 451 (1882), but see *Sansar Puri v. Indrasun Roy*, 25 W. R. 6 (1895)

Terretput v. Gossain 4 C. 46 (1878)

(6) *Musst. Bibee v. Bhagul* 21 W. I. 438 (1874)

(7) *Ranchordas v. Maneklal* 17 R. 648 (1890)

(8) *Roy Kashore v. Hurce Mohun* 19 W. I. 195 (1893)

(9) *Terretput v. Gossain* 4 C. 46 (1878)

(10) *Muhammad Nemat v. Ghaffar Muhammad* 21 A. 272 273 (1899) In *Wahid Alam v. Safat Alam* 12 A. 556 (1889) it was held that the parties on both sides had overstated their interest in the courtyard in suit, but had not made allegations inconsistent with the use of it, which the Court awarded them

among litigants if every plaintiff who demanded more than his due, and who supported his demand by perjury or forgery, were made to forfeit the whole of his claim, but it is almost needless to say that that is not the law. Such a plaintiff may properly be impleaded in costs or he may be punished in a criminal Court, but if he have a good cause of action a civil Court must give him a decree for so much of his claim as he succeeds in establishing (1). While a plaintiff must be limited to the case which he puts forward in the plaint, he may put forward an alternative case from the commencement, in which case the defendant will then know that he has more than one case to meet and will not be taken by surprise (2). There is nothing in the law to prevent a plaintiff from setting up two proprietary rights in the alternative, such as are based upon the ground that the land is included in his ancestral *jama*, and the other on the ground of his having held adverse possession for more than twelve years (3). In a suit on settlement of account and an agreement to pay, the plaintiff may fall back as an alternative upon the foundation of his case, namely, that in the account current between himself and the defendant the latter was indebted to him (4). And a suit brought on the allegation that partnership accounts had been adjusted, and in the alternative for such other relief as might be proper, was allowed to be amended by omitting the allegation of adjustment and inserting an alternative prayer for an account (5). In a suit to recover land as part of joint estate, but which was subsequently divided into separate shares, *held*, that upon failure of proof of allegation of partition plaintiff might obtain relief upon the first allegation (6). If a plaintiff claims possession generally under some alleged title, such as purchase or gift and also upon the ground of twelve years' possession he is entitled to succeed on the latter ground even though he fail upon the former (7). Where, in a suit for possession, a specific title is alleged but not proved, the plaintiff, in order to succeed on twelve years' adverse possession, must raise it so clearly in the first Court that his adversary knew he intended to rely on it (8). There is, however, a distinction between suits for confirmation of possession under a certain title and declaration of title, and suits in ejectment to recover possession. A person ought not to be allowed to obtain a declaratory decree except in respect of the very title which he asserts and

(1) Lakshenan Rhasaji v. Hari Dinakar, 4 B 584, 588 (1890)

(2) Lakshibai v. Hari U P H C R 1 (1872), as to amendment in order to raise an alternative case, *vide post*

(3) Uma Churn v. Bisbun Nath, 3 C W N 434 (1899). Apart from the question of inconsistency a plaintiff may be precluded from recovering. See Lala Gopal v. Bai Motan, 17 B 631 (1896) where the plaint and conduct of the plaintiff was held to amount to a denial of the defendant landlord's title.

(4) Lalla Sheopershad v. Juggurath, 13 C J R 266, 268 (1883), s.c., 10 I A 74

(5) Dhanu Ram v. Bhagnath, 22 C 692

(1895)

(6) Eubeer Doss v. Gopal Mookhtya, 12 W R 107 (1869)

(7) Govain Dass v. Issur Chunder 3 C 224 (1877), Goluck Chunder v. Nundo Coomar, 4 C 699 (1878)

(8) Knyhaa Churn v. Protab Chunder 7 C 560 (1891), Shro Kurnan v. Govind Shaw, 2 G 418, 423 (1877). In Bundari Dass v. Mudhoo Chunder, 14 C 502 (1887) a plaintiff was held entitled to succeed on the ground of possession, though not alleged in the plaint, or issue framed on it as the defendant had notice that the plaintiff relied on adverse possession. As to remand, see Kylash v. Jadoo, 22 W R 320 (1874)

upon which he goes to trial (1) A plaintiff must be limited to the case which he puts forward in his plaint, but he may put forward an alternative case in his plaint from the commencement, as the defendant then will know that he has more than one case to meet and will not be taken by surprise (2) The rule, however, that a party must prove the particular title he sets up must not be confounded with the question of the means of proving it Thus, if a person claims to hold under a grant, such grant being evidenced by a *sunnud*, and fails to prove the latter, he may prove the grant by other means (3)

Amendment—In so far, as already stated, relief can only be given on a case made in a plaint formally framed in accordance with the provisions of the Code, provisions for amendment are necessary when the plaint is either in substance, or form, defective This section is but one of several dealing with the question of the amendment of pleadings or proceedings (4) Amendments may be of three kinds (5) (a) those which a party desires to make in his own pleadings or proceedings, (b) in his opponent's pleadings and proceedings against the latter's will, (6) (c) amendments which the Court thinks right to make of its own motion in order to determine the real questions in controversy between the parties (7) The present rules deal with the amendment of the plaintiff's pleadings upon the application of the plaintiff himself, or of the defendant, or at the instance of the Court of its own motion The amendment sought may be in respect of substance, parties, or relief The date of amendment is immaterial for purposes of limitation The date of institution of a suit is the date of the first presentation of the plaint, and if the plaint is returned for amendment and is then presented again within the time allowed, the date of first presentation is the date of institution (8)

General principles on which amendment is granted—Amendment is not the right of the suitor in all circumstances (9) It was held under the last Code that it was not enough to show that the proposed amendment did not alter the character of the suit (10) The section gave the Court a discretion which, however, was to be guided by judicial principles (11) If by inadvertence, or other cause the recorded issues (the substance and not the mere literal wording of which is to be regarded) do not enable the Court to

(1) *Sundari Dassee v. Mudhoo Chunder*, 14 C 592, 597, 598 (1887), *Man Gobind v. Umrika Monce*, 16 W R 218, 219 (1871), *Sheikh Torab v. Sheikh Mahomed*, 19 W R 1 (1872), *Goluck Chunder v. Nundo Coomar*, 1 C 699, 703 (1878), *Icnetput Singh v. Gossain Sudersan*, 4 C 46 (1878)

(2) *Lakshimbai v. Hari Ravi*, 9 B H C 11 (1872) [ejectment suit by landlord, failure to prove lease, general title]

(3) *Rash Beharee v. Nibayo Poddar*, 11 W R 105 (1881)

(4) As to amendment of issues, see O XIV

r 5, judgment, O XX r 3, decree, s 152, application for execution, O XXI r 17

(5) *Annual Practice*, 1905, p 319

(6) See O I r 10, O VI r 17

(7) See O I r 10, O VI r 17, O XV r 3, s 152

(8) See *Mitra v. Limitation Act*, 11th ed p 674

(9) *Satyee Chandra v. Mammoo*, 11 C L J 518 (1914)

(10) *Tajiram v. Sulu*, 21 B 570 (1880)

(11) *Damodar Das v. Gopal Chand*, 7 A 73 at p 83 (1881)

try the whole case on the merits an opportunity should (the Privy Council have said) be afforded by amendment and, if need be, by adjournment for the decision of the real points in dispute (1) Where a party who has an honest case has, either through ignorance (2) *bona fide* mistake, or some misapprehension, not placed the real facts before the Court (3) or has misconceived his cause of action and form of suit, (4) he should be allowed to amend, where this may be done without injustice to the defendant, and, in appeal, particularly where the objection that the suit was not maintainable was not taken in the first Court (5) Where, however, there is reason to think that an omission to claim was deliberate, it would it has been said, generally not be proper to allow amendment (6) In short the object of a trial being to get at the rights of the parties any amendment which may be required for that purpose should, subject to the general principles to which reference is about to be made, be allowed Apart from the question of limitation it is unjust to a plaintiff to put him to the great expense of a new suit when a reasonable amendment, not inconsistent with his case as it originally stood might equally well answer his purpose as the new suit (7)

As to the principles governing the grant of leave to amend the Courts should be guided by the *dicta* of the English Judges here cited It was no doubt said (8) with reference to the provisions of the last Code, that the Judicature Act allowed more latitude and scope to judicial discretion than was permitted by that Code It is, however, submitted that the English rule, O 28, r 1, as practically worked, was, to some extent the same as that which existed under that Code For though that rule contains no such proviso as that of this section in the Code of 1882 the English Courts do in practice refuse an amendment which will change the action into one of a substantially different character which would more conveniently be the subject of a fresh action (9) In presenting the report of the Select Committee on the amended Bill Mr Scoble said "The object of sect 9 is to give the Courts greater power of amendments of plaints than they at present possess The tendency of the Courts in England is to allow the greatest latitude in this direction In this country, where there is every likelihood of a poor suitor acting in ignorance or under the advice of ignorant advisers and launching an honest case in a

(1) *Ilunoomanpersaud v Musst Babooee* 6 M. L. A. 293, 410, 411 (1836)

(2) Thus amendment has been refused where the plaintiff spoke exclusively from, or the facts were within, his own knowledge *Mokhoda Soondury v Ram Churn* 8 C. 871 875 (1882), *Krishnaji v Wamaji*, 18 B. 144 (1894) though even in such a case allowance may have to be made for inadvertence and mistake

(3) *Bhyro Dutt v Musst Lekhranee*, 16 W. R. 123 (1871), *Lakshmi Bai v Ravji* 9 B. H. C. R. 1 (1872)

(4) *Pagho v Vishnu* 5 Bom. L. R. 329 (1903), *Bhyan Chand v Land Mortgage Bank*, 9 C. 695, 698 (1883) [where the plaintiff

who had the equity of the case on his side had misconceived his cause of action], *Krishnaji v Sitaram*, 5 B. 496 (1880) [where plaintiff had been erroneously advised as to the form of the suit]

(5) *Ragho v Vishnu suja*

(6) *Lukhee Kant v Sumerooodi* 21 W. L. 209 (1874)

(7) *Modhe v Dongri* 5 B. at p. 613, 614 (1881)

(8) *Per Scott J* in *Damodar v Purma nondas* 7 B. 155 at p. 160 (1883)

(9) See *Annual Practice*, 1905, p. 351, *Raleigh v Goschen* (1898) 1 Ch. 81 and *Blunkhorn v Penrose*, 29 W. L. (Lug.) 217 cited in the case in last note

clumsy and irrational manner, it appeared to the Select Committee *there was abundant reason for adopting the English rule*. The only necessary limitation is to prevent a suit of one character from being turned by amendment into a suit of a different character, and it is therefore provided that amendments which would have this effect are not to be allowed " (1) This limitation was based on the inconvenience which might be caused to a defendant who, summoned to answer one suit, might otherwise be called upon, probably to his surprise, to defend an entirely different claim. Rule 16 has been taken from O 19, r 27 of the English rules, and r. 17 has been worded in close conformity with the English O 28, r 1, a portion of it being taken *totidem verbis* from the English Order. The proviso against converting a suit into one of a different character has been removed. As to the effect of this, *vide post*, "Change of character of suit."

Bramwell, L J, said (2) "My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting *malafide*, or that, by his blunder, he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise." "However negligent or careless (said Brett, M R) may have been the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs." (3) An amendment should be allowed "whenever it can be done without injustice to the other side, and even where they have been put to certain expense and delay, yet if they can be compensated for that in anyway an amendment ought to be allowed for the purpose of raising the real question between the parties." (4) "There is one panacea which heals every sore in litigation and that is costs." (5) "I know of no kind of error or mistake, which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such an amendment as a matter of favour or grace." (6) "The test as to whether the amendment should be allowed is whether or not the defendants can amend without placing the plaintiff in such a position that he cannot be recouped, as it were, by any allowance of costs, or otherwise." (7) An amendment ought to be allowed if thereby "the real substantial question can be raised between the parties," and multiplicity of legal proceedings avoided (8).

It is also to be noted that the stage in the suit at which the application is made may affect the question. Before the hearing there is, as a rule, little difficulty in a party obtaining leave to amend his own pleadings, (9) on pay

(1) Speech on 10th March, 1888, in presenting the Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the Civ. Pr. Code, 1882.

(2) Tildesley v Harper, 10 C D pp 396, 397.

(3) Clarapete v Commercial Union Association, 32 W R (Eng) p 263, Weldon v Neal, 19 Q B D p 396.

(4) Australian Steam Navigation Co v Smith, 11 App Cas p 320.

(5) Per Bowen, L J, Cropper v Smith 26

C D p 711.

(6) *Ib.*, 710, cited with approval in *Dhanti Ram v Bhagurath*, 22 C 712 (1895).

(7) Per Pollock, B, *Steward v Metropolitan Tramways Co*, 16 Q B D p 180, and C A 558.

(8) *J A*, 1873, s 24, *Kurtz v Spence*, 35 C D 774.

(9) Annual Practice, 1905, at p 351.

cases the Judge will require evidence that the party applying to amend could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the new facts sooner (1) Where the amendment has become necessary by reason of a variance between the statement of claim and the evidence given at the trial, it should be asked for at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case (2) After all the evidence on both sides has been taken, leave to amend will, as a rule, be refused (3) If the defendant is not present at the hearing, it has been held in England that notice must be given him of the application to amend (4) Unless the pleading is amended the plaintiff cannot have judgment for more than the amount named in it (5)

After the hearing, and after judgment, the Court has no power to amend. After an interlocutory judgment, or a decree in an Admiralty action which determines liability but leaves the damages to be assessed, the Court still has power to amend the pleadings, (6) and even to add or substitute parties (7) As to amendment in appeal, *vide ante*

General principles on which leave to amend is refused—The following are some of the principal grounds on which the Courts in their discretion may refuse leave to amend (8) Where the amendment desired could not be made without prejudicing the defendant in such a way that he cannot be recouped by costs, (9) and where a right accrued might be prejudiced (10) Thus, though it was under the last Code broadly held that a Court was not precluded from allowing an amendment by the circumstance that at the time of the amendment a suit for what was added by the amendment would be barred by limitation (11) the general rule was that a plaintiff would not be allowed to amend by setting up fresh claims in respect of causes of action which have, since the institution of the suit, become barred, (12) though peculiar circumstances might take the case out of the ordinary rule, (13) and the Privy Council have actually allowed an amendment on the ground that if the plaintiff were left to bring a fresh suit, it might be met by a plea of limitation, a defence which, under the circumstances of the case, was considered

(1) *Moss v. Malings* 33 C. D. 404

(2) *Rainy v. Bravo*, L. R. 4 P. C. 287

(3) *Inderain v. Cohen*, 43 C. D. p. 190 (C. A.) *James v. Smith* (1891) 1 Ch. 384, 389, *Shib Kristo v. Abdulool* 5 C. 002 (1879) where *Wilson J.*, said "When parties have come to trial to determine which of two stories is true, it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the plaintiff to amend by abandoning his own story and adopting that of the defendant, an asking relief on that footing. But see *Chinnai v. Sakharan*, 17 B. 365 (1892), dissented from in *Sheo Prasad v. Lalit Kuar*, 17 A. 403 (1896)

(4) *Beckett v. Beckett* (1901), P. 85

(5) *Chattell v. Duly Mail* (C. A.) 18 Times Rep. 165

(6) "The Alert," 73 L. T. 124

(7) "The Duke of Buccleuch" (1892), P. 201, and see *Prowse v. Peto*, 16 Times Rep. 133

(8) Annual Practitioner, 1905, p. 350

(9) *lb.*, *Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways*, 16 Q. B. D. 180, 550

(10) *Ann. Pr.*, *loc. cit.* and see *Fajth Raghonundun v. Gopal Chand*, 20 W. V. 17 (1873) In *Delhi and London Bank v. Miller*, 7 B. L. R. App. 65, amendment was allowed as it did not appear that prejudice would be caused to the defendants

(11) *Barkat un nissa v. Muhammad Asa Ali*, 17 A. 283 (1895) That Court has also held that an application having once been admitted the date of a subsequent amendment would not by reason of such amendment become the date of the application. *Jewat Dube v. Kali Charan*, 20 A. 478, 480 (1896)

(12) *Weldon v. Neal*, 19 Q. B. D. 374, *Mallikarjuna v. Pullayya*, 16 M. 319 (1892); *Magappa v. Velban* 18 M. 33 (1893)

(13) *Sattappa v. Jogi*, 17 M. 67 (1897), *Dham Pam v. Bhagurath* 22 C. at p. 712 (1899)

in justable (1) In a recent case in the Madras High Court it was held that a petition for an amendment of a plaint based on no new facts and asking for a further relief (in this instance, recovery of money) may be allowed if it is put in before evidence has been taken and if there is no injustice to the defendants even when it is barred by limitation between its date and the date of the plaint (2) Trivial and mere technical amendments are discouraged (3) The Court will always consider the materiality of the proposed amendment and unless material amendment will not be allowed (4) A slight delay is not a sufficient ground for refusing leave, but if an application which could easily have been made at a much earlier stage of the proceedings be delayed until after evidence given and a point of law argued, leave may be refused (5) This principle has been applied to the suit itself Where the plaintiff was guilty of delay and filed the suit on the last day but one on which the law of limitation would permit him to file it, amendment was refused (6) The application may also be refused if the Court is not satisfied as to the truth and substantiality of the proposed amendment, and has reason to think that the application is not an honest one (7)

It has also been said by Lord Fisher, M R., to be "the universal practice except in the most exceptional cases not to allow an amendment for the purpose of adding a plea of fraud where fraud has not been pleaded in the first instance" (8) The circumstances referred to are doubtless those where the plaintiff thoroughly satisfies the Court upon the point why the charge was not made before It is also a well known rule that a charge of fraud must be substantially proved as laid and that when one kind of fraud is charged another kind cannot on failure of proof be substituted for it (9) It was held that a plaint which contained general allegations but no specific instances of fraud could not be amended in second appeal (10) and where fraud was charged but the suit was brought in the wrong form the Court refused to allow the plaint to be amended as to do so in that case would change the character of the suit (11) Perceock C J said "We think that it would not be the exercise of a sound discretion to allow a party who relies upon a document to set up a fresh case where an issue as to the execution of such document is found against him and there are good grounds for believing the document to be a forgery" (12)

(1) M Fammud Zahoor v. Hakoorence Ratta 11 M I A 468 (1867) referred to in Dhant Ram v. Bhagath 22 C 712 (1895) Damodar v. Pirmannandas 7 B at p 161 (1883) Modhe v. Dongre 5 B at pp 613 614 (1881)

(2) Sevugan Chetty v. Krishna Ayyangar 36 M 378 (1911) See Kisan Iras Rupchand v. Pachappa Vithoba 23 B 644 (1909) Suthi Kutti v. Achutan Nair 21 M I J 475 (1911)

(3) Annual Practice Cf Nagendrabala v. Secretary of State 14 C L J 83 (1911)

(4) Ib

(5) Ib v. James v. Smith (1891) 1 Ch 384

(6) Girdharlal v. Jagannath 10 B H C R 182 (1873)

(7) Annual Practice Lawrence v. Norreys

39 C 4 213 221 235

(8) Bentley v. Black 1 J I 780 in Ritchie v. Hawkins 14 I D 56 however Butt J at the trial allowed the plaintiff to amend by adding a charge of fraud with particulars after the defendant upon whom the burden of proof lay had been cross examined and the case closed vide post

(9) Abdul Hossain v. Turner 11 B 690 (1887) s c 14 I A 111

(10) Krishnaji v. Wamnaji 18 B 144 (1893)

(11) Kunhamed v. Kutti 14 M 167 (1891)

(12) Girdhar Manohar v. Dayabhai Kala Mat 8 R 174 177 (1890) citing Narasim Das v. Narr Larry Molonto Marsh, 70 (1864)

Amendment of substance of plaint—An amendment may be sought either in respect of the substance or form of the plaint, or the parties to the suit or the relief sought. So far as amendment of the substance or form of the plaint is concerned, the matter has already been dealt with. If, for instance as regards formal matters, the verification is defective, it will be amended (1). It is the duty of the Court to take care that the plaint, when filed is an accurate and sufficient statement of the essential ingredients of the plaintiff's claim (2). The subject of parties and relief is dealt with in the following paragraphs.

Amendment as to parties—A plaint which may be amended in substance may require, by reason of such amendment, an amendment in respect of parties. So a suit for collision, originally filed as an action *in personam* against the owners of the ship, has been amended also into an action *in rem*, and the ship added as a party defendant (3). But amendment may have reference to parties only, as well as to the substance of the claim. Where a suit was brought by several persons on the basis of a right vested in them jointly and severally the plaint was amended by the omission of the names of all the plaintiffs except one (4). The plaint will be amended where there is a change of parties, or the parties are wrongly described (5). But where the defendants were dead when the suit was instituted, the Court, on appeal, refused to amend by instituting the legal representatives, as the defendant was likely to be precluded from pleading limitation, (6) and where the wrong parties were sued the Court in the under mentioned cases refused amendment (7). Where A and B sued and it appeared that A alone was entitled the name of B was ordered to be struck out and the suit proceeded with (8). But where plaintiffs sued jointly succeeded only in making out the title of one of them to an undivided moiety the suit was dismissed (9).

(1) *Tatch Chand v. Mansab Rai* 20 A 442 (1897).

(2) *Gobind Chandra v. Ganga Dbye*, 7 B L R at p 334 (1871).

(3) *Bombay Persian Navigation Co. v. Shepherd* 12 B 247 (1887).

(4) *Venkatachala v. Kuppasami* 11 W 42 (1887).

(5) See *Delhi and London Bank v. Miller*, 7 B L R App 65 (1871), *Muhammad Yusuf v. Himalaya Bank* 18 A 198 (1896), *Kedar Nath Doss v. Protap Chunder*, 6 C 626 (1881), *Maharajah of Vizianagram v. Lakshmi Chellaya*, 12 B L R 443 (1872), *Gobind Chandra v. Ganga Dbye*, 7 B L R 333 (1871), *Nilkantappa v. Magistrate etc.*, 6 B 70 (1880), *Balaam v. Magistrate, etc.*, 6 B 672 (1882) [in these cases the suits were amended in appeal by the substitution as defendant of the Secretary of State for the Magistrate], *Tibakar Raghunathji v. Shah Lal* 19 A 380 (1897) [substitution in appeal of manager of bank for defendant whose name

suit brought], *Seshamma v. Chinappa* 20 M 467 (1897) [substitution in second appeal of adopted son as plaintiff], *Hari Gopal v. Gokaldas*, 12 B 158 (1887) [parties added in second appeal].

(6) *Malikarjuna v. Pullayya* 16 W 341 (1892), see also *Alwaraj v. Vellian* 15 M 41 (1894).

(7) *Seth Dunraj v. Hankin*, 1 A II C 1 204 (1869) [a different cause of action was said to be substituted, suit originally against Secretary of State, another party introduced], *Rubeen Chundri v. Stephen* 11 15 W R 534 (1871) [suit against corporate body, not in its corporate capacity but through an agent], *Bablia Sooni Luree Doorganan* 1 22 W R 97 (1874) [the amendment was said to involve a material variation of the plaint].

(8) *Sreeram Hazra v. Gyasam Hatee* 11 W R 507 (1890).

(9) *Shoan Lal v. Mukdum*, 20 B 1 34 (1873).

Amendment as to relief—In suits under the Code the Court is certainly bound to take into consideration all the rights of the parties to the suit whether legal or equitable and by its decree to give effect to those rights as far as possible, but it should confine itself to granting such relief as is prayed for by the plaintiff (1) It cannot grant relief of a different kind from that prayed for, such as could not have been properly granted except on an amendment of the plaint, (2) or change the suit so that the question involved in it is irrelevant to the relief claimed (3) If however the specific right and infringement of it are not altered the Court may give relief less than that claimed or a portion of the relief claimed (4) The Court, however, whether of first instance or of appeal has no power to make a decree in favour of the plaintiff beyond the amount stated in the plaint The plaint may, however be amended before judgment so as to enable a Court to pass such a decree (5)

As regards amendment it has been broadly affirmed (6) that an alteration in the relief does not alter the character of a suit It is perhaps more correct to say that an amendment of relief simply does not generally (7) involve such a change in the suit as to make its character inconsistent in the terms of the proviso of the last Code It has also been held that where the object of an amendment of the plaint was merely to seek relief ancillary to the principal prayer, such amendment did not alter the character of the suit (8) So the relief for declaration is in most cases for recovery of possession claimed as ancillary to the latter and there can be no inconsistency between the two (9)

The amendment may be in respect of matters occurring before or after suit brought So as regards the first alternative where the plaintiff in a suit

(1) *Vasavamsi Ayyasami* 1 M. H. C. R. 471 472 (1893)

(2) *Ramechandra v. Vasudev* 10 B. 451 (1886) in which case the lower Court was left to have erred in making a decree for partition in a suit to recover possession from the defendants as tenants under a lease

(3) *Ram Singh v. Deputy Commissioner Barabanki* 17 C. 144 (1889) s. c. 17 I. A. 54 [Oudh Talukdars' claim as proprietors if not then alternatively that there was subproprietary right] In *Mukhoda v. Ram Churn* 8 C. 871 (1887) the plaintiff sued to recover possession of property on the allegation of purchase and the Court gave him a decree for what he had never asked viz a one fourth share as member of a joint family *Balmakund v. Bhagvandas* 10 Bom. L. R. 209 (1912)

(4) *Pulanada v. Ravuthu* 11 M. J. 97 (1887) [claim for ejectment and injunction on decree declaring plaintiff's right directing removal of embankments and regulating cultivation], and see *Ramechandra v. Vasudev* 10 B. 451 (1886) where it was pointed out

that the Court could not be held to have merely awarded a portion of the relief prayed for In a suit for confirmation of possession and to set aside deeds although the confirmation was refused the deeds were set aside *Thakoor Deen v. Ali Hossain* 13 B. L. R. 427 (1874) s. c. 1 I. A. 192

(5) *Percival v. Collector of Chittagong* 30 C. 516 519 (1900) [amendment of memorandum of appeal] *Nathooram v. Jardine Skinner* 1 C. 118 (1864) except in the case of mesne profits

(6) *Kasinath Das v. Balasiv Patuank* 10 C. 805 808 (1893)

(7) In *Kunhamel v. Kuli* 14 M. 167 (1890) the Court refused amendment as to do so would be to change the character of the suit but the question as to the change being only as to the relief asked was not discussed

(8) *Rajali Peary Mohan v. Narendra Krishna* 5 C. W. N. 23 (1900)

(9) *Ragho v. Vishnu* 5 B. L. R. 30 (1903) in which case a suit for a mere declaration was amended into one for possession

for the caption after filing his plaint discovered that the property in suit had been described by mistake as being of a slightly less area than it was in reality, and omitted to claim for a small fraction of the share sold, the plaint was allowed to be amended (1) A change in the relief asked is generally allowed on appeal, especially by the addition of a prayer for consequential relief in a suit for declaration (2) A plaint in a suit for the cancellation of a deed of gift of certain land has been amended so as to make it a suit for possession of that land after the cancellation of the deed (3) As regards events occurring after suit, the general rule is that the rights of parties must be ascertained as at the date of the action brought, and not with reference to events occurring after the institution of the action (4) But this section does not prevent a plaintiff, who has been ousted after suit brought for declaration of title, from amending his plaint by adding a prayer for possession, the suit as amended not being inconsistent with the suit as originally framed, both being based upon the same title (5) Where the reliefs claimed and the facts on which they are claimed are stated in the original plaint, this can be amended by addition of a further relief if it does not involve adding anything to the allegations in the plaint (6) And where a plaintiff filed a suit to obtain a declaration that certain property belonged to his judgment debtor, and that the defendants had no right to it, and pending proceedings, purchased the property, it was held that he was still entitled to a declaratory decree, for the change of circumstances brought about by the plaintiff himself purchasing the property did not take away the right to sue which had already accrued to him (7) But where an amendment rests on an event which did not occur until after the suit had been instituted and had been dealt with by the Court of first instance, and also substantially alters the original cause of action it will be disallowed (8) A mortgagee may relinquish his claim for sale and ask simply for a money decree. Such an amendment does not amount to a conversion of the suit into a suit of another and inconsistent character (9)

Change of character of suit—So far the matter has been dealt with

(1) *Barhat un nissa v Muhammed*, 17 A. 288 (1895)

(2) *Vide ante*, p 677 In *Sardarsingji v Ganpatsingji*, 14 B 395 (1885), the appeal Court allowed the plaintiff to amend by adding a prayer for an injunction. In *Karimbhai v Conservator of Forests*, 1 B 222 (1879), a partner sued to establish his exclusive title to partnership property, and the High Court on appeal allowed an amendment converting the suit into one for dissolution and account, and remanded the case, with directions to the lower Court to make the other partners parties. In *Annappa v Ganpati*, 5 B 181 (1890), the suit was for interest only. The plaint was amended so as to make the suit for account and payment of principal and interest. In *Radhabai v Shamray*, 8 B 163 (1881) an ejectment suit

was amended by the insertion of a prayer for redemption. In *Krishnaji v Sitaram*, 5 B 496 (1880), a suit for possession was changed into a suit for partition.

(3) *Ghulam Husun v Shahbaz Khan*, 1888, P R No 161

(4) *Ramanadan v Pulikutti*, 21 M 284, at p 290 (1898)

(5) *Bishop Mellus v Vicar Apostolic Malabar*, 2 M 295 (1879)

(6) *Servagan Krishna*, 22 M L.J 139 (1911)

(7) *Wamanrao Rustonji*, 21 B 701 (1896)

(8) *Govinda v Perumdevi*, 12 M 130 (1888) [suit for declaration that alienations made by Hindu widow were not binding on plaintiff as reversionary heir, death of widow pending appeal, held, plaintiff could not amend and claim possession]

(9) *Sukhdeo v Lachman*, 21 A 451 (1902)

as a matter of discretion. Sect. 53 of the last Code was however, mandatory in this namely, that no amendment could be allowed which converted a suit of one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. While the power of the Court extended to the elucidation of what was ambiguous, to the amendment of what was erroneous, and the supplying of what was defective, it did not extend to the conversion of a suit of one character into another inconsistent with and opposed to it, e.g. a suit for possession with mesne profits into one for resumption (1) or a claim on contract to one in tort (2).

A number of cases will be found reported (not very profitably) on this point, for it must be remembered that each case is only an authority so far as the same set of facts may (which is unlikely) exist in a subsequent case (3). In some decisions a formal application was made to amend. In others a new case was sought to be argued which however could only have been done after an application to amend had been made and granted and the matter was dealt with as in effect an application to amend since a decision could only be made on allegations formally raised at the trial. Further it is to be noted that the application for amendment was made at different stages of the suit and under different circumstances and it may be that as stated an application which if made before the hearing would be allowed might, if made after hearing be refused. Whether an amendment is consistent with the suit as originally framed may be tested by an inquiry into the nature of the evidence to be offered in either case (1). Amendment is allowed on the ground that the suit had been changed in the following cases.

Claim for rent on contract, claim for use and occupation (5) claim for hire of cargo boats, claim for agency account in respect of estate (6) claim for dower on written agreement claim for same on custom, (7) claim for *den mo'ur* right of widow claim for decree to extent of *nil* of husband and her son as heirs, (8) claim as adopted son claim as joint heir, (9) claim to recover from defendant money paid by him to A on the ground that A's payment was unauthorized, claim for damages for negligence as agent for plaintiff, (10) claim that a sale had been made to pay debts, claim that the father could only alienate his own share based on gift by will claims based on inheritance (12) claim for alienation on ground of illegitimacy of party making it (13) claim on ground that it was without consent of other heirs (14) claim for

(1) Gobind Mohapattur v. Madhub Persad 10 W. R. 211 (1867), and see Hamilton v. Lant Mortgage Bani 5 A 450 459 (1883).

(2) Kasinath v. Salsiv 20 C 803 at p. 808 (1883).

(3) Gopal Dass Vaidyallah v. B. Hreo Dass Surda, 33 C 657 660 (1906).

(4) Ibid. at p. 661.

(5) Surendra Narain v. Bhan Lal 10 C 75 75 76 (1890), Luckhee Kant v. Sumar rooddi 21 W. R. 208 (18 4) Luckmeesut Dass v. Shaikh Enact 22 W. R. 316 (1873).

(6) Shub Krito Sircar v. Abdool Hakeem 5 C 602 (1879), 5 C, 5 C L. P. 400.

(7) Khaja Mal v. 10 C 420 (1887).

(8) Umrikha v. 10 W. R. 133 (1874).

(9) Gopal Lal v. 10 W. R. 12 (1872).

(10) Hamilton v. 10 A 156 (1857).

(11) Shree Lal v. 10 W. R. 19 (1874).

(12) Janki v. 10 W. R. 10 (1874).

(13) 10 W. R. 386 (1874).

a special contract against twelve anna sharers of an estate on the ground that they had taken a *labuzyat*; claim based on the ground that plaintiffs, being occupancy ryots, had a right to a *pottak* at a fair rent, (1) claim based on invalidity of a will, claim assuming its validity, but alleging that it did not dispose of whole of testator's property, (2) claim for declaration that joint property was not liable to be sold in execution on the ground that the decree was for debts incurred for immoral purposes; claim that plaintiffs had separated from their father before the decree was passed against him, (3) claim for share of produce of property left undivided at partition, claim for partition of that property, (4) claim for specific performance, claim to cancel contract and retain deposit, (5) personal claim; claim against an estate; (6) claim to eject tenant, but failure to prove lease, claim to fall back on general title as though no lease had been set up, (7) claim to land as muridar, claim to hold as occupancy ryot, (8) claim as heir of N, claim as heir of J C G; (9) claim to remove building erected by defendant on plaintiff's exclusive property, claim for demolition on joint property because erected without co owners consent, (10) claim for possession with mesne profits, claim for resumption, (11) claim for possession, claim to symbolical possession as landlord (12) claim to *khaz* possession of whole property and mesne profits, claim to proprietary right of one fourth of which he is not entitled to *khaz* possession, (13) claim to establish right of ownership over land; claim to easement over same, (14) claim to redeem one mortgage, claim to redeem another (15) claim for ejectment, claim for declaration of reversionary right, (16) claim for declaration of title by purchase, same by long possession, (17) claim as pre-emptor based on vicinage and separate ownership, claim for pre-emption as joint owner, (18) claim to set aside *curpeshgi*; claim for

(1) Uthur Hossain v Ramphal Roy 20 W R 75 (1873)

(2) Damodar Madhows v Purmanandas 7 I 135 (1883)

(3) Narayanrao v Javherbahu, 12 B 131 (1887)

(4) Gaurishankar v Vinayaram, 18 B 611 (1893)

(5) Stone v Smith, 35 Ch. D 188 but if original plea in the alternative, see Kingdon v Kirk 37 Ch. D 141

(6) Indur Chunder v Laddha Krishna 194 507 (1892), s c 19 I A 90

(7) Lakshminbai v Hari, 9 B R C R 1 (1872)

(8) Soorjo Kumar v Gunadhar Roy, 12 W P 80 (1869), in the cases referred to in this report, it was not shown that the alternative right had not been pleaded

(9) Ishan Chunder v Sharada, 12 W R 187 (1870); see Doorga Narain v Brojo Krishn 23 W R 172 (1875) where amendment was allowed, but the lower Court erred in not allowing the defendant to meet the

fresh allegations

(10) Nobin Chunder v Mohesh Chunder 12 W R 69 (1869)

(11) Gobind Mohapattur v Madhub Prasad 6 W R 211 (1866), s c, L. P (7 B) 531

(12) Nila Bibee v Sonai Libee, 21 W P 422 (1874)

(13) Krishen Chunder v Kakenall 18 W R 507 (1872)

(14) Lalji Ratanji v Gangaram 2 B H C R A C J, 176 (1864) A claim may, however, be made in the alternative, either upon the ground of ownership or easement Narendrab Nath Barua v Abhaya Charan Chatterjadhya 4 C L J 437 (1904) 1 I

(15) Govindrao v Ragho 6 B 513 (1881)

(16) Ramanadhin v Palakutti, 21 W 284 (1893)

(17) Huro Soondure v Unnopoorna, 11 W P 550 (1869)

(18) Mohadeo v Zeeantoonessa 11 W P 169 (1869), Gobind Row v Gardhyree Sah 21 W R 355 (1875)

declaratory decree, (1) claim as whole owner by purchase from A claim as heir or joint purchaser with him, (2) claim for possession based on *kobala* which was in reality a mortgage, claim for repayment of advances, (3) claim by second mortgagee for sale, ignoring title of first mortgagee claim reserving rights of prior mortgagee, (4) claim for property as devisee under will claims for same on ground of want of title in testator to devise, (5) claim as mortgagee, alleging that she had advanced the money out of her own funds claim that money came from reputed husband and that the transaction was by way of gift or provision for her, (6) right to execute mortgage decree, claim to redeem mortgage, (7) claim by co sharer landlord for proportionate share of rent claim for individual share of plaintiff or full rent (8)

In the following cases amendments were allowed in a suit for a declaratory decree, an amendment so as to make the suit one claiming consequential relief, (9) altering a suit from one under Act VIII (B C) of 1869 into an ordinary civil suit, (10) claim to redeem property mortgaged in 1811 claim for redemption on previous mortgage of 1837 in case mortgage of 1811 were not proved (11) In an action on a promissory note, the suit was dismissed on the ground that part of the consideration was illegal, the plaint was allowed to be amended in appeal so as to recover so much of the consideration as was not illegal (12) Where the plaintiff claimed an easement by prescription the claim has been decreed on the presumption of a title arising from a grant (13) A suit for direct possession has been changed into a suit for possession conditional on the defendant's failure to redeem, (14) and a suit for possession into one to redeem (15) It has already been pointed out that a plaintiff may from the

(1) *Musat Doolhun v Lall Behare*, 19 W R 32 (1872)

(2) *Doss Ram v Mohendro Roy*, 18 W R 274 (1872)

(3) *Rajah Sahob Perhlad Sein v Baboo Budhoo*, 12 Moo I A 275 (1869), and see *Murugaser v De Soyza*, App Cas (1891) 69

(4) *Sahg Ram v Har Charan*, 12 A 548 (1890), dist, *Muhammad Niamat v Ghaffar Muhammad*, 21 A 272 (1899)

(5) *Mylapore Iyasawmy v Yeo Kay*, 14 C 801 (1887), s c, 14 I A 168

(6) *Bhowan Doss v Sheikh Mahomed*, 13 M I A 340, 352 (1871)

(7) *Hari Ravi v Shapurj*, 10 P 461 (1886), s c, 13 I A 60

(8) *Lala Ram v Nenu Narain*, 6 C W A 326 (1902)

(9) *Limba v Rama*, 13 B 548 (1888), *Chonni v Umma*, 14 M 46 (1891), *Abdul Kalar v Mahomed*, 15 M 15 (1890) [dist in *Narayana v Shankunni*, 15 M 255 (1891) which was not a case where the objection was taken for the first time in appeal], *Pagho v Vishnu* 5 Bom L R 329 (1903), *Bai Anope*

v Mulchand 6 B 355 (1885) [amendment by insertion of prayer for an account]

(10) *Gobai Chunler v Bykuntath*, 19 W R 61 (1873)

(11) *Parashar v Ganu* 5 Bom L R 643 (1903)

(12) *Joseph v Solano* 18 W R 424 (1872), s c, 9 B L R 441, ref, *Proby v Bell*, 20 W R 6 (1873)

(13) *Rajrup Koer v Abul Hossein*, 6 C 394 (1880), *Punja Kuvarti v Bai Kuvart* 6 L 20 (1881), *Koylash Chunler v Sonatun Chung*, 7 C 132 (1881)

(14) *Rupchand Dagdusa v Davlatvay*, 6 B 495 (1882), *Kasimunnissa v Niralatna*, 8 C 79 (1891), *Adskant Banerji v Suresh Chandra*, 12 C 414, 422 (1885), s c, 12 I A 17 *Dulabhdas Lalshmandas*, 10 B 88 (1885), the Court, however, has a discretion in the matter exercisable with reference to the facts of the case see *Muruga App Cas* (1891), p 69

(15) *Sankana v Virupa* (1893), but see *Durgopal v*, (1879)

commencement raise an alternative case Where he has not done so he may have leave to amend his plaint and to state his case correctly therein if the Court thinks that he has rested his claim upon wrong grounds from misinformation, ignorance of law or fact, mistake or misconstruction of documents (1) Where in a suit for the recovery of a sum due on account, the defendant raised a plea of limitation leave was granted to amend the plaint by setting out an acknowledgment signed by the defendant within the period of limitation (2) Where in a suit for rent the plaintiffs described themselves as "executors and trustees of the properties of an endowment" they were allowed to describe themselves as "*de facto* managers and persons interested in the endowment" (3) Where it was argued that an amendment allowing an alternative case to be raised converted the suit into one of another and inconsistent character, it was held that the alternative claim which arose out of, and was immediately connected with, the same transaction was not inconsistent, (4) the Court, however, adding that the proviso to this section in the last Code must be read with sects. 42 and 45 of that Code and was not intended to interfere with them *Scd quare* as to whether this was not stated too broadly It does not follow that because a plaint might have originally been brought in a particular form, but was not, that therefore it must be amended into that form If so, the object of the provision might in some cases be defeated

As already pointed out the section has been now amended In all cases the Court has a discretion (5) In exercising that discretion, it will, following the English practice in general refuse an amendment which changes the action into one of a substantially different character which would more conveniently be the subject of a fresh action The question thus becomes one of discretion and not subject to a rigid rule Whether amendment should be allowed must depend on the circumstances of each case Mere technical arguments showing a conversion of character will not be given effect to There are such cases of conversion where amendment may be properly allowed On the other hand, any substantial change in the claim made making it more convenient that they should be the subject of a fresh action will be refused

Costs—In England the amendment may be allowed "on such terms as may be just" (6) And the Courts may therefore, there impose terms as to other matters than costs (7) In this country the Courts could formerly by the terms of the former section impose terms only in regard to costs As to these, they are entirely in the discretion of the Court, and they are sometimes (particularly when the application is made before trial) reserved (8) The section has however, now been amended in conformity with the English rule

(1) Lakshminbair Hari, 9 B H C R 1 (1872)

(2) Gunanajit Makany, 34 B 250 (1909)

(3) Dhanpat v Juaraul, 13 C L J 289 (1916)

(4) Baral Chandra Mohun Datta, 25 C 371 349 360 (1898); see, 2 C W N 201 (suit to enforce mortgage, plea of infancy, amended claim that defendant was not by reason of fraud entitled to rely on this defence)

(5) O 28 r 1

(6) Gunanajit Makany, 34 B 250 (1909)

(7) See King v Cooke, 1 Ch D 57

(8) In appeal and in ordering a remand, a party amending has been ordered to deposit all costs up to date within a specified time

Dhanpat v Juaraul, 13 C L J 289 (1916)

ORDER VII

Plaint

1 The *plaint* shall contain the following particulars — [s

Particulars to be contained in *plaint*

- (a) the name of the Court in which the suit is brought,
- (b) the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff
- (c) the name, description and place of residence of the defendant, so far as they can be ascertained,
- (d) where the plaintiff or the defendant is a minor or a person of unsound mind, a statement to that effect,
- (e) the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose,
- (f) the facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction,
- (g) the relief which the plaintiff claims,
- (h) where the plaintiff has allowed a set off or relinquished a portion of his claim, the amount so allowed or relinquished, and
- (i) a statement of the value of the subject matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court fees, so far as the case admits

2 Where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of money, the *plaint* shall state the precise amount claimed

In money suits

But where the plaintiff sues for mesne profits, or for an amount which will be found due to him on taking unsettled accounts between him and the defendant the *plaint* shall state approximately the amount sued for [s

3 Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property, the *plaint* shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries

Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property

or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the *plaint* shall specify such boundaries or numbers

[s 50,
para 4]

4 Where the plaintiff sues in a representative character, the plaintiff *shall* show not only that he has an actual existing interest in the subject matter but that he has taken the steps (if any) necessary to enable him to institute a suit concerning it

[s 50
para 5]

5 The plaintiff *shall* show that the defendant is or claims to be interested in the subject-matter, and that he is liable to be called upon to answer the plaintiff's demand

[s 50
para 6]

6 Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation the plaintiff *shall* show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed

Plaint—The object of a plaint is simply to state the grounds and relief upon and in respect of which a suitor seeks the assistance of the Court. Its essential parts are (i) the title or as it is sometimes called the caption, (ii) the statement, and (iii) the relief, the first of which is referred to in clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d) of rule 1, the second in clauses (e) and (h), and the third in clause (g). The provisions of sect 50 which these rules replace was criticized as not complete. Thus it has been said it is "a general rule, and the section appears to presuppose that the capacity of parties suing or sued should be alleged in the plaint but it does not provide for such allegations expressly. Similarly in the case of joinder of causes of action the circumstances allowing the joinder should be stated, but there is no provision as to that. There appears to be no doubt however, that on the analogy of the practice of other countries all such facts should be stated in the plaint notwithstanding the last clause of sect 53 clause (b) (ii) which provides for a return of the plaint for amendment if it contains particulars other than those mentioned in this section. It is held in the United States that the fact of partnership should be alleged in the plaint as partnership demands and liabilities being joint such allegation is necessary to authorize the joinder of parties. So also the value of suit and the locality of its subject matter and of its cause of action, and other circumstances on which the jurisdiction of the Court may depend must be alleged. Thus the Bombay High Court Circulars (Chap I r 4) expressly lay down that in every suit the Court shall require the plaintiff to state clearly in the plaint how the value of the suit has been arrived at and that in a suit for the price of goods sold retail the plaint should either set out the account in detail or should be accompanied by a copy of the account to be served upon the defendant. Similarly if any law authorizes a suit only after the plaintiff has taken some other proceedings given some notice, or received leave or sanction of some Court or obtained a certificate of some officer, the plaint must state that those proceedings have been taken notice given leave or sanction received

or certificate obtained as the case may be (1) The amended section adds a statement of the value of the subject matter

"Shall contain"—The word formerly used was *must*, and was held to be a strong imperative (2)

Title Rule 1, clauses (a), (b), (c), (d)—The name should be given if possible, in full and to the extent necessary to fully identify the party. If there be more than one plaintiff, or more than one defendant, the name of each must be given. As to cases of agents, assignees, benamidars partners and others, see notes to O I rr 1-4. And as regards suits by or against Government and public officers (3) aliens and foreign native rulers (4) corporations and companies (5) trustees and executors (6) firms (7) minors (8) and military men (9) see also the portions of the Code noted

"If a person sues in a representative or official capacity the capacity should be indicated in the title. The same should also be done when he sues merely as a member of a firm or as secretary or agent of some corporation, or on behalf of a larger number of persons. And the capacity is generally indicated by adding to the name of the party a designation denoting the special character or capacity which he sustains. But the designation may be taken as merely *descriptio personæ* unless it is preceded by the word 'as' or some equivalent of it (10). And the general rule appears to be that the capacity in which a party sues or be sued should not only be indicated in the title but stated in the body of the plaint also (11).

To describe the plaintiff as residing in Chitpore Road in the town of Calcutta, is not a sufficient description of his place of abode. nor is it sufficient under this section to describe the defendant as formerly of Calcutta without alleging that the plaintiff has been unable to ascertain his place of residence more definitely (12). Where it was contended that the plaint was bad as the claim was set out by G. W. H., manager (of a bank) but the words should have been "The Mussoorie Bank, Limited" it was held to be no ground for returning the plaint as the intention and meaning of the plaint was clear that the circumstances set out applied to the bank and the words were not capable of any other meaning (13).

(1) Hukm Chand, C. P. C. 584. It may however be perhaps contended that some of the matters referred to would come within clause (c). Other cases might be met by other portions of the Code as e.g. a 80 which requires a plaint to allege the giving of notice or by other Acts.

(2) Sheo Prasad v. Lalji Kuar, 18 A 403 405 (1896).

(3) Ss 70-82 O XXVII.

(4) Ss 83-87

(5) O XXIV.

(6) O XXXI.

(7) O XXX.

(8) O XXXII.

(9) O XXXIII.

(10) Hukm Chand C. P. C. 587. Thus the words "Deputy Sheriff" following a person's name were held not to denote that he was a party to the suit merely as deputy sheriff. *Gregg v. Clements* 20 Colo 108 (Amer). See also where the plaintiff described himself as B assignee of D & Co., it was held that if action was brought in his individual capacity. *Butterfield v. Macomber* 22 How 1 1 (Amer) cited ib.

(11) Hukm Chand C. P. C. 587.

(12) *Bhee Solomon v. Abdul* 1 A 4 4 (1) B 376 (18 9).

(13) *Mussorie Bank Ltd* 1 J 183 (18 9).

The defendant's name is given in the plaint in the same manner as the plaintiffs

All those titles by which a party is generally known ought to be given and it is not the true construction of the section "to say that where a man has titles, the claim to which titles cannot rationally be disputed, by which he is generally known, all that the Code requires is that he should be described in such a way" as may be sufficient for identification (1) In the case cited an order rejecting the plaint because plaintiff did not amend it, so as to give the full titles to the defendant was held to be correct, their Lordships of the Privy Council observing that "if a plaintiff, from animosity, from pique or anything in fact but a *bona fide* dispute as to the right to a title obstinately refuses to give his adversary that title by which he is generally recognized the Court ought not to permit or sanction that species of insult"

Where a practice existed in the Madras Courts to give as part of the description the age as well as the father's name, and these were not given the High Court refused to interfere with an order rejecting the plaint (2) It is not sufficient to describe the defendant merely as formerly of Colootollah in Calcutta without alleging that the plaintiff has been unable to ascertain his present residence (3) Where a plaint described the defendant as "Mrs S G B of Mussoorie" and stated that she was executrix of the deceased B, it was held not to be open to objection as it was clear that the defendant was stated to be executrix of the deceased and the suit was brought against her in that capacity (4)

There is no provision in the Code as to how the defendant is to be sued and named in the plaint when his real name is not known to the plaintiff, and cannot be ascertained by reasonable diligence (5) Names are only used to designate persons and as a means of identifying them The action is not against the name, but against the person designated thereby If therefore the real defendant has been properly served with a summons in a fictitious name, and he does not appear to defend the suit, a judgment rendered against him in such name will be as effective against him as if his true name had been given in the proceedings in the action (6)

It is one of the first essentials of a suit that the parties, and specially the defendant, must be alive at the time of the institution of the suit If the person named as defendant is found to have been dead at the time of the presentation

(1) Maharaja of Vizianagram v Paja Lakshmi Chollaya, 12 B L R 443, s c, 18 W R 301 (1872) reversing the decision of the High Court in 3 M L C R 31 (1866) In this case the Privy Council though pointing out that the case was distinguishable, appeared to disapprove of *Hukm Chand v Meghraj* 12 W R 450 (1869), in which the Court refused to insist on the insertion of the words 'Poy Bahadur'

(2) *Somyajulu v Suvarya* 7 M L J 81 (1897)

(3) *Babeo Solomon v Abdul Aziz Jt J P* 366 (1879)

(4) *Mussoorie Bank, Ltd v Barlow & C* 183 (1886)

(5) It is stated in *Hukm Chand G P C* 589, 590, that most of the Codes of the United States allow the defendant to be designated by a fictitious name amending it by substituting the true name when discovered.

(6) *Ib*

of the plaintiff, the Court will have no jurisdiction over it,(1) and must refuse to proceed further, leaving the plaintiff to begin *de novo* against any person against whom he may have a right to proceed (2) It has even been held in the United States that if one of the defendants was dead the judgment will be void as against the other defendants also (3) And the principle appears to be of a general application Thus Freeman, in his work on Judgments,(4) observes that "no sort of jurisdiction can be obtained against one who was dead when suit was commenced against him as a defendant, or in his name as plaintiff, and that no judicial record can be made which will estop those claiming under him from showing that he died before the action was begun, and that a judgment for or against him must necessarily be void It is stated (5) that the Courts in several States of the American Union have held the same even in suits against a corporation, commenced after its being dissolved,(6) though the rule does not appear to have been there applied with the same strictness in the case of a plaintiff (7) Thus a judgment in a suit instituted in the name of a party who is dead at the time the suit is brought has been held in some cases to be only voidable (8) And Mr Black in his work on Judgments,(9) observes that "if an action is commenced in the name of a person already dead in interest, or if one of several joint claimants is dead before action brought, it is held that the defendant must take advantage of the fact by plea in abatement at the peril of being estopped by his silence and the judgment for plaintiff will not be disturbed" (10)

A description of a party as insane in the plaint is not evidence that he was excluded from the inheritance by reason of insanity when the succession opened (11)

The statement Rule I, clauses (e), (h)—A plaintiff when he files his suit must allege the cause of action in the manner prescribed in this rule, and must prove the necessary allegations in so far as they are not admitted by the defendant (12) The whole object of pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue, and thus to secure that both shall know before the cause comes on for

(1) Mohun Chunder v Azeem Gazeer, 12 W R 45 (1869)

(2) Moharance Surno Moyee v Bykunt Chunder 25 W R 17 (1875)

(3) Weis v Aaron 21 South (Miss) Rep 763 (Amer), cited in Hukm Chand, C P C 588, from which this note is taken. In this case a judgment against the principal debtor and the surety was held void against the former also, although the latter alone was dead at the time of the institution of the suit

(4) § 153.

(5) Hukm Chand, C P C 588

(6) Taylor v Elliott 52 Ind 588 (Amer), Peck v Holmes 127 Mass 326 (Amer) Croly v Hutton 98 Mo 196 (Amer), Jacobson v Campbell 12 S W Rep 784 (Amer)

(7) Merrill v President of Suffolk Bank 51

Me, 57 (Amer)

(8) McMullan v Hickman 35 W Va 705 (Amer)

(9) § 204

(10) And this, it is stated, has been followed by the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Watt v Brookover, 3 W Va 323, Barannon, J, observing that "the fact that defendant did not know of his death can make no difference as to this point"

(11) Ran Bhai v Jagatpal 18 C 111 (1890), s c, 17 I A 173

(12) Gano v Sidheswar, 4 Bom. L. R 58 (1901), and he must include all the existing grounds on which the suit can be based, for a second suit, on grounds which existed at the time the first was brought, will not be allowed Premanund v Ram Churn, 20 W R 482 (1873)

trial what is the real point to be discussed and decided (1) The two points to be attended to are the form of, and then the contents of, the statement. As to the first, the former section states that the language must be both plain and concise (2) This is a matter now dealt with in O VI r 2. The material parts should be stated in a summary form clearly and precisely yet briefly and succinctly. While a liberal construction should be given to pleadings, so as to give effect to their meaning to be collected from their whole tenor, they ought to be expressed with sufficient definiteness to enable the opposite party to understand the case he is called upon to meet (3) To avoid prolixity, the pleader should omit every allegation which is immaterial and unnecessary, as also all unnecessary details when alleging facts which are material (4) A certain amount of detail is necessary. "Although pleadings must now be concise, they must also be precise" (5)

The statement of facts must be with specific particularity, and not by way of vague generalizations. As observed by Reed J., in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado in *Robinson v. Dolores*, (6) "the conclusions of the pleader stated as facts, broad generalizations, sweeping and comprehensive assertions of conspiracy, fraud, mismanagement, and incompetency, cannot be made, in pleading to supply the wants of specific facts."

Thus it is a settled rule that in an action for false and fraudulent misrepresentation, the statement of claim should state the details of each alleged misrepresentation (7). In fact it is a general rule, that where fraud is intended to be charged, its details must be specified, and general allegations however strong, are insufficient to constitute an averment of it (8). See O V r 4. In the first cited case Lord Selborne observed, that "with regard to fraud if there be any principle which is perfectly well settled, it is that general allegations however strong may be the words in which they are

(1) *Per Jessel, M.P. Thorp v. Hollisworth* 3 Ch D 630.

(2) In *Bisheshwar Pershad v. Ram Churn* 5 A H R 25 (1913), at p 24, Stuart C.J., said: "I do not desire to apply strict rules of pleading or any unnecessary refinements of legal art in order to work out the requirements of our Code of Procedure, but I must insist upon the allegation of all relevant facts being clearly and coherently stated, and it is, in my judgment, no part of the duty of a Court to help litigants by suggesting what their meaning is in effect, or by inferring their right of relief from confused statements which at best only suggest but do not distinctly express, the legal claims."

(3) *Indur Chunder v. Padma Kishore*, 19 I A 90, 93 (1892), s.c., 15 C 507.

(4) *Annual Practice*, 1907 p 236, and see *Hukm Chand, C P C 791 et seq.*, where the subject is more fully considered, and *Odgers on Pleading*. The subject of pleading generally is now dealt with in O VI, ante.

(5) *Per Kay, J. in re Parton*, 20 W R

(Eng) 297.

(6) 29 Pac Rep 750 (Amer.), cited in *Hukm Chand, C P C 711*.

(7) *Schumann v. Young*, 1884 107 W. N 93.

(8) *Wallington v. Mutual Society*, 5 App Cas 627, cited in *Gunga Narain v. Thakuram* 15 C 573, 537 (1885), s.c., 15 I A 119, *Lawrence v. Norreys*, 15 App Cas 221. *The Punjab Chief Court*, in its instructions to Judicial Officers" (s. 2, r. 5 (iii)), laid down "Plaints containing vague and loose statements of a general character alleging 'fraud,' 'collusion,' 'deceit,' 'illegal and fraudulent acts,' and the like, which are never made to take a definite shape and are frequently impossible to prove, are frequently admitted. This should not be allowed. Where fraud is alleged, the particular facts showing that it has actually been committed must be plainly and definitely set forth, the plaint being returned for amendment in this respect when necessary."

stated are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice" This was cited with approval in the Privy Council (1) by Lord Watson who said "When fraud is charged against the defendants it is an acknowledged rule of pleading that the plaintiff must set forth the particulars of the fraud which he alleges There can be no objection to the use of such general words as 'fraud' or 'collusion' but they are quite ineffectual to give a fraudulent colour to the particular statements of fact in the plaint unless these statements, taken by themselves are such as to imply that a fraud has actually been committed" Thus a plaint to set aside an award must definitely state some fraud or other mispractices of the opposite party (2) The decision of the Privy Council cited was acted upon in a case (3) in the Bombay High Court Iltun J observing that the plaint ought, immediately on presentation to have been rejected or returned for amendment as it did not disclose a cause of action A charge of fraud must be substantially proved as laid (1) and it must be so proved at the hearing of the case, and cannot be reserved and proved in the course of taking accounts (5)

Facts must be stated as facts Modern pleadings are merely concise statements of the facts Inferences of law should not be pleaded Pleadings should not contain mere arguments (6) A plaintiff thus cannot aver that "he is entitled to property, for this is a conclusion of mixed fact and law He must state the facts which in his opinion give him that title The material facts only should be pleaded But each party must always state his whole case and all the facts which are essential to the cause of action but not the evidence by which they are to be proved (7) though there are many cases in which facts and evidence are so mixed up as to be almost undistinguishable (8) In other words only operative facts as distinguished from probative or evidential facts should be pleaded and of the former only the ultimate facts

The plaint should include all the existing points on which the plaintiff can succeed (9) And a plaintiff is only entitled to succeed upon the cause of action alleged by him in his plaint (10) It is not however necessary for the plaintiff to state in what form of action he sues (11)

Where the plaint discloses all the facts constituting the cause of action the form of the action is immaterial Thus in a suit for mortgage money and interest by the enforcement of the mortgage lien even if the hypothecation is not proved a personal decree may be given for the amount claimed as damages

(1) Gunga Narain v. Tuluckram 15 I A 119 s.c., 15 C 533

(2) Hurchuran Dos v. Hajari Mulla 1 Ind Jur, O 8 12 (1861)

(3) Krishnaji v. Wamnaji 18 B 144 (1893)

(4) Abdul Hossain v. Turner 11 B 670 (1887), and the evidence must be confined to the allegations Krishnaji v. Wamnaji 18 B 144 (1893)

(5) Advocate General v. Bai Punjabai 15 B 301 (1893)

(6) Bishen Sahay v. Beer Kishore 6 W 1 40 (1867)

(7) Annual Digest O 19 r 1 s.c. O 11 r 2 s.c.

(8) Smith v. West W N (1876) 55, Roberts v. Owen 1 L R 172

(9) Hammer v. Fright 21 W R 316 (Eng)

(10) Premanand v. Ram Churn, 20 W R 482 (1873), Danobundhoo v. Kristomonee, 2 C 152 (1876)

(11) Shree Prasad v. Lalit Kuar, 18 A 403 (1893)

for breach of the contract to give possession of the mortgaged property, (1) the Court observing, in the latter cited case, that it was immaterial whether the demand was regarded in the light of a suit for compensation in damages for breach of the contract, or for money had and received for the plaintiff's use, or for money lent. So also, in a suit for rent on a *kabulyat*, if the *kabulyat* is not proved, a decree may be given for rent at the rate proved to be paid before the alleged *kabulyat* if there should be evidence of that, (2) even though that may not have been expressly claimed in the plaint. In the under-mentioned case (3) this was not done, as there was no such evidence; but the Full Bench said "It is in the discretion of the Court to amend the plaint or the issues, and to allow it (i.e. the alternative claim for rent paid before) to be tried. And where the omission to make the claim in the plaint appears to have been from inadvertence or by mistake, it would be proper to do so." Where in a suit for possession of certain land on the basis of a lease granted to plaintiff in 1234 it was alleged that the plaintiff had continued to hold it since then as a lessee from year to year, he was allowed a decree on the ground of the facts proved showing that he had an occupancy right, such alternative title not being inconsistent with the alleged title under the lease (4).

Nextly, as to the contents of the statement. A defendant is entitled at the earliest stage of the hearing to obtain the declaration of the Court upon the question whether the plaint discloses a cause of action (5).

Among ultimate operative facts, the plaintiff's title or right which has been infringed must be first stated. The expression "*cause of action*" has been understood to be used in this section in its broad sense, as including both the infringement and the right infringed, which latter must therefore be set out in the statement of the plaintiff's cause of action. Thus, in a suit for redemption of a mortgage the mortgage must be stated (6). In a suit for a declaration of title to a property which the plaintiff admits was sold to the defendant's ancestors, and to which the plaintiff cannot establish a right without setting aside that sale, the plaintiff should allege the circumstances which he relies upon for avoiding it (7). And where the plaintiff's right to the thing sued for is derived by assignment, the fact of the assignment ought to be stated in the plaint (8). A plaintiff suing for possession of land by redemption of the mortgage, must show in his plaint the existing title he intends or hopes to prove, and upon which he relies as entitling him to the relief which he asks (9). It is a general principle, that a plaintiff suing for possession must

(1) *Mahesh Singh v. Chastharya Singh*, 1 A 215 (1882), *Sheo Narain v. Jai Gobind*, 1 A 241 (1882).

(2) *Houshan Bibee v. Hurray Kristo Nath*, 3 C 926.

(3) *Lukhee Kanto Das v. Sameerubhi*, 13 B L R 213 (1874).

(4) *Burjoo Pershad v. Kashoo Rawat*, 21 W R 121 (1873).

(5) *Unnamoyee v. Raj Krishna*, 3 C W N 209 (1889).

(6) *Sheo Prasad v. Lalit Kuar*, 18 A 403

(1886).

(7) *Azumashin Khan v. Yousuf Nisa*, 11 B 309 (1882).

(8) *Brooke v. Gibbon*, 21 W R 17 (1873).

(9) *Parmanand v. Sahib Ali*, 11 A 174 (1882). In the case cited, Edg., C.J., with whom the other Judges concurred, observed that it would not have been sufficient to state "that a mortgage of the land in question had been granted to the defendant, or his ancestors, and that they, as the assignees of the mortgagor's right, were entitled to redemption on

show that at the date of the suit he was entitled to that relief (1) It has thus been held that the owner of demised land cannot sue to eject even a trespasser so long as the lease is outstanding (2) The Punjab Chief Court in its Instructions (3) to Judicial Officers, laid down that it should appear in the plaint that the persons if more than one, who sue together as plaintiffs all, either jointly, severally, or in the alternative, claim the right which it is the object of the suit to vindicate "

Where the plaintiff's right alone constitutes the cause of action it will be sufficient to allege only that right Thus, in an action for partition the plaint should state the titles and interests of the co-tenants plaintiff and defendant, but it is neither necessary nor proper to show any derogation of the plaintiff's title (4) But where the suit has been necessitated by any act done to jeopardize the plaintiff's right or evidence of it, that act should also be stated Thus, in a suit for a declaration of right, the plaint should specify not only the title to that right but also the act of interference with that right (5) and the circumstances which necessitate the application for the declaration (6) Where in a suit by a relative of a minor against his administrator, the plaint merely stated that the conduct of the defendant was improper, and that the plaintiff had suspicions that the defendant would waste the property of the minor, but failed to specify any instance of malversation or to give any reason plausible or otherwise for believing that the defendant would waste the estate, the plaint was rejected (7) Similarly in a suit to compel one's neighbours to agree to a particular line of boundary being marked out between plaintiffs lands and theirs it must be stated that they have by some overt act transgressed that boundary (8) In a suit to have a contract cancelled, and the plaintiff's deposit returned with damages the plaint only alleged that the contract was caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact and the High Court held that as that would not have made the contract voidable the plaint did not disclose a cause of action, and that it should have been returned for amendment on that ground (9)

the ground that the mortgage debt had been discharged by usufruct Such a plaint would not show the circumstances constituting the cause of action or when it arose or in fact that any cause of action or right to sue existed at the commencement of the suit

(1) *Laminadan v Palikutta* 21 M. 298 (1898)

(2) *Davis v Abdool Hamed* 8 W. P. 55 (1867)

(3) S. 2 r. 11.

(4) *Phil. Code Plead.*, § 321, cited in *Hukm Chand C P C* 603

(5) *H. de Muhammad v Jiwani* 1898 P. P. No. 42

(6) *Syud Khadim Ali v Nazzer Begum* 3 A. H. C. R. 263 (1871)

(7) *Damodardas v Utamaram* 10 B. H. C. R. 414 (1873), *Westropp C.J.*, observing

that the plaint should specify one or more such acts or should assign some satisfactory reason for apprehending an injury to the estate of the minor by the administrator

(8) *Amecroona v Begum v Gopal Sahoo* 22 W. R. 134 (1871)

(9) *Dayabhai v Ishmichand* J. B. 308 (1895), *Brdwood J.* in the judgment of the Court adding that it should either have alleged a mistake common to both parties as to an essential matter of fact by which the agreement between them was rendered void, and on the discovery of which the deposit was claimed or else relief should have been claimed (if that was really plaintiff's case) on the ground that he had been induced to enter into the agreement by the fraud of the defendant

Where a suit is based on the actual infringement of a right, the infringement and the facts constituting the infringement should also be stated. Thus in a suit for damages for injury done, the nature of the injury should be set out (2). And a suit to fix a boundary should show that the boundary has been transgressed (3).

The plaintiff may base his claim on alternative titles which are not inconsistent with each other, (4) as, for example, when a person claims possession of certain land by hereditary *qazashla* right, or, in the alternative, by the right derived from adverse possession for twelve years, (5) or, upon a mortgage and deed of sale (6). And a mortgagor suing for redemption may aver that the mortgage money has been repaid and that if anything be found to be due that he will pay it (7). But inconsistent titles, it has been held, should not be allowed to be put forward, as, for example, a claim to hold a *hat* on the ground of title by prescription, and of proprietary right to the land where the *hat* is held (8). In the case below, (9) the gist of the plaintiff's charge against the defendant was that she never executed a deed of sale in his favour and that the document set up by him was a forgery, and it was observed that it was not competent to the plaintiff to combine with that charge as an alternative the wholly inconsistent charge that if the plaintiff executed the document no consideration was received by her or that fraud had been practised on her. The Bombay High Court has held that inconsistent assertions of fact cannot be permitted in the pleadings but that on the same basis of facts two distinct titles may be put forth (10). The decision cited of the Madras High Court was dissented from by Allahabad High Court in a case (11) in which the claim was for a declaration that a bond was not executed by the plaintiff, or, at least, that it was null and void for want of actual and valid consideration, and the Court observed that the Code did not authorize the rejection of a plaint containing prayers for such reliefs and that it was unable to follow the Madras High Court "in holding that a Court has power to throw out a suit on the ground that, in its opinion the plaint sets up two inconsistent cases." It however, stated that if a plaintiff chooses to come into Court on a plaint which contains allegations inconsistent with one another, this circumstance might militate strongly against the plaintiff succeeding in the suit though it would not justify the Court on this ground alone in dismissing it. In England the old rule of pleading (12) was that a plaintiff could not plead inconsistent facts

(2) *Mohesh Chunder v. Ramdhan Pal* 13 W. L. 45 (1870), *Hukm Chand v. P. C. 605*

(3) *Ameeroonnissa Begum v. Gopal Sihoo*, 22 W. L. 131 (1871)

(4) *Woodit Singh v. Bulko Singh* 21 W. L. 12 (1873), *Mt Gulab Koor v. Badshah Bahadur*, 13 C. W. N. 1197 (1909), *Lakshmi v. Mira Devi*, 37 M. 29 (1911)

(5) *Id.*

(6) *Ramgutti v. Abdul Wahid*, 20 W. L. 71 (1873)

(7) *Butchanna v. Varahulu* 21 M. 108 (1901)

(8) *Krishna Enay K. Shub v. Obhoy Churn*, 16 W. R. 135 (1871) in which case the Court said the Munsif would have done well to

have refused to receive the plaint on his behalf at all. In *Ameeroonnissa v. Woomarooddeen* 11 W. R. 19 (1870) however the Court thought there was no inconsistency but said that even if there were, it did not see why the plaintiff should not succeed.

(9) *Iyappa v. Pamalakamma*, 13 M. 513 (1890), following *Mahomed Baksh v. Hossain* 15 C. 681 692 (1888), s. c., 15 I. A. 86

(10) *Ningappa v. Shivappa* 10 B. 323 at p. 327 (1891) [suit for recovery of possession on allegation of partition, suit for partition]

(11) *Jino v. Manon*, 18 A. 125 (1895)

(12) See *Rawlings v. Lambert*, 1 J. & H. 153, 166, and cases cited in *Ligot v. Last* 7 Ch. D. 1, 5

But the Judicature Act has enlarged the liberty of the plaintiff in claiming relief, and it is held that there is nothing to prevent either party from setting up two or more inconsistent sets of material facts and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative, (1) and ever since the Judicature Act inconsistent defences such as never indebted and payment are daily pleaded. It is to be observed, however, that there are differences between the position of a plaintiff and a defendant. The plaintiff often has a personal knowledge of the facts which the defendant may not have, and while it is open to a plaintiff under certain circumstances to reserve a ground of claim a defendant failing to insist on a ground of defence in one action cannot raise it afterwards in another action at the suit of the same party. The defendants may be complete strangers to the transactions and the defences raised may have reference to matters not necessarily or probably within their own knowledge. So a Hindu wrote his will, devising certain ancestral property to his wife and on the following day he registered it and took the plaintiff in adoption. The testator died shortly afterwards. It was found that the plaintiff's natural father was aware of the dispositions contained in the will, and that the testator would not have adopted the plaintiff but for the consent of the natural father to those dispositions. The defendants who claimed under a gift from the wife had denied the adoption in their written statement and on appeal raised the further plea that the adoption, if any, was conditional on the provisions of the will being acquiesced in. *held*, that the defendants were not precluded from succeeding on the latter of these inconsistent pleas (2).

Probably having regard to the scope of the Code the rule which should be followed is that inconsistent and alternative claims are allowable if arising out of facts which are not inconsistent, and that a plaintiff should probably not in any case, and certainly not where the facts are presumably within his knowledge, be allowed to plead inconsistent facts but should be called upon to elect so that the defendant may know what case he has to meet and that a defendant similarly should not be allowed to plead inconsistent defences unless he is a stranger to the transaction and the true state of facts is not within his personal knowledge. Thus it has been held that a Mahomedan plaintiff who first claimed the property in suit as the heir of his father on the ground that his mother had no title to it could not in the same suit contend that his daughter had acquired a good title to it from his mother and that therefore he was entitled to it (3).

A plaintiff must be limited to the case which he puts forward in the plaint but he may put forward therein an alternative case from the commencement as the defendant will then know that he has more than one case to meet and will not be taken by surprise (4). The different titles should be set out in the alternative, for a claimant who has failed to recover property under one title may be barred from bringing a second suit to recover the same property by a

(1) Annual Practice, 1905 p 237. It is however, to be noted that under O 19 r 27 the Court has power to strike out embarrassing pleadings. This rule is now reproduced in O VI r 16 of this Code.

(2) *Narayansami v Ramasami* 11 M L J 2 (1890).

(3) *Abdul v Miakhan*, 30 B 237 (1911).

(4) *Lakshmbai v Hari* 9 B II C R 1 (1872) as to amendment for purpose of raising an alternative case. *ib* *Shib Kristo Sircar v Abdool Hakeem*, 5 C. 602 (1879). In *Balmakund v Dalu* 25 A 498 (1903), the alternative case was held to have been made from the commencement.

different title (1) Where in an action of ejectment against a tenant holding over, the lease sued on was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and the plaint was not amended to one containing an alternative claim for partition *held*, that the plaintiff could not be allowed to fall back upon his general title and obtain a decree for partition (2)

As to the place where a cause of action must be deemed to arise, see notes to sects 19 and 20, *ante* The date of accrual is a question of substantive law, it should be given as correctly as practicable (3) In the case cited the suit was for possession, and it was held that the date of the plaintiff's dispossession must be given as accurately as possible, especially when one of the issues was whether he had been in possession within twelve years As to relinquishment, see O II r 2, *ante*, and as to set off, O VIII r 6, *post*

Technical objections, however, should not, unless where it is absolutely necessary, be allowed to prevail Thus where it was objected that a plaint had been drawn for rectification of a compromise instead of a decree, it was held that this was a mere technicality, since rectification of the decree would follow if the plaint was successful (4) In the under-mentioned case, (5) Couch, C.J., said "The plaint in this case is drawn, as so many plaints are, in a very improper manner with reference to the cause of suit, but this Court cannot allow a plaintiff to be defeated in his suit on account of the improper form of the plaint if looking at the whole of it, we can say what is the cause of suit Of course we are not to allow a plaintiff to succeed upon a cause of action which is not in the plaint, but the language of these plaints is not to be read too strictly, and we certainly are not willing to give effect to any technical objections arising upon it" This and similar cases were decided many years ago, and stricter rules have been now enacted in O VI A document referred to in the plaint is not necessarily a part of it (6)

Relief Rule 1, clause (g) —The object of a suit is to obtain some particular remedy or relief This is stated in the prayer of the plaint, for just as the defendant is entitled to know what facts the plaintiff relies on and intends to prove, in order that he may meet them, for the same reason he is entitled to know what use the plaintiff intends to make of his alleged facts, and the Court should know the nature of the plaintiff's demand, which, when obtained is embodied in its judgment In the corresponding provision of the New York Code, "judgment" is substituted for "relief" in order to exclude from the plaint prayers for provisional remedies which, it has been said need not find room in it (7) Mention need not be made in it of that which is machinery for the grant of the relief prayed for Thus it has been held that a demand for money will include a prayer for its recovery by the sale of the property held in mortgage for it, (8) and it is not necessary to mention the sale in the

(1) *Donobundho Chowdhry v Kristomonee Dossee* 2 C 152 (1876) [*dist*, *Thakore Becharji v Thakore Pujari*, 14 B 31 (1899)].
Kalidhura v Shiba Nath 8 C 483, 501 (1882)
 (2) *Ramchandarrao v Vasudev*, 10 B 451 (1896)
 (3) *Boydonth Surmah v Ojan Bibee* 11 W R 239 (1865)

(4) *Srisha Chandra Pal Chowdhry v Triguna Prasad Pal Chowdhry*, 10 C 511 (1913)
 (5) *Kaleo Narain v Chunder Narain*, 1 W R 229 (1875)
 (6) *Foulton v Gwyther & Bourke*, 273 (1867)
 (7) *Hukm Chandi C P C* 615
 (8) *Kasurath v Sadayav*, 20 C 805 (1890)

plaint In a suit for contribution, the amount due from each defendant should be specified; but where this cannot be done, the ascertainment of the amount should form a portion of the relief sought (1) A suit, it was held, is often brought only for accounts, and a subsequent suit for the balance (2) It is preferable and more convenient, however, that the suit should be not only for an account, but for an adjustment of accounts and for payment of the balance that may be found due This is the usual practice on the Original Side of the Presidency High Courts; and it is specially desirable in regard to suits against agents in cases in which, as under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, the period of limitation runs from the date of the termination of the agency, because the agent may make delay in giving the accounts, so that the subsequent suit for balance may be barred (3) The object as to which a relief is claimed should be described with sufficient fulness, so that there may be no doubt or difficulty as to its identification Thus, where the object of a suit is to prevent the plaintiff's rights over certain lands from being infringed upon, the boundaries of the lands should be given in the plaint (4) See the new third rule in this Order and notes to O XX r 9, *post* But it has been held that a plaintiff's suit did not necessarily fail upon the ground that there were no boundaries given in the plaint when they asked merely for a declaratory decree in respect of their title (5) And the mere omission from the schedule annexed to a plaint of the boundaries or other specifications of land will not exclude from the operation of the decree matters which are by name strictly claimed in the plaint, and referred to as such in the decree (6) So, also, in a

(1) *Rupant Rai v Mahomed Ali Khan*, 6 N W P H C R 215 (1873)

(2) *Gobind Mohun v Sheriff*, 7 C. 169 (1881)

(3) *Shoshu Bhooshun Pal v Guru Churn*, 7 C. 89 (1881)

(4) *Ajoodhia Lall v Guman Lall* 11 C L R 134

(5) *Raj Narain Das v Chowdhry Shama*, 3 C W N 162 (1899)

(6) *Shib Narain v Ram Narain*, 20 W R 142 (1873) The corresponding section (26) of the Code of 1859 expressly provided that "when the claim is for land, or for any interest in land, the nature of the tenure or interest must be specified, and if the claim be for land forming part of a village or other known division, or for a house garden or the like, its situation shall be described by the setting forth of boundaries or in such other manner as may suffice for its identification." It has been pointed out (*Hukm Chand C. P. C. 616*) that though it did not appear why this provision had been omitted in the Code of 1882, it was obviously desirable to have regard to it in the preparation of plaints, and to so describe the land to which the suit relates, that there might be no

difficulty in its identification And it was held under that Code that where a small area of land within another area was claimed, the boundaries of the land claimed ought to be given *Mahomed Ismail v Dhundur Kishore Narain*, 25 W R 39 (1875), and that in a suit for a village the plaintiff should make his plaint more precise by filing a survey map of villages *Ram Doyal Khan v Ajoodhia Ram Khan* 11 C 1 (1876) However, where the boundaries of one of the plots were not given, but determined by the Amin in the course of the inquiry, it was held that the suit could not be dismissed for the defect though the plaint might have been returned for amendment *Jonab Ali v Golam Assad* 21 W L 187 (1874) Where the plaint did not contain a specification of the quantity of land in the defendant's possession it was held that the plaint might have been amended but after

property as to identify it *Meer Atabooddeen v Shumsooddeen* 18 W R 461 (1872) In the North West the fields are numbered and their position is given, *S. D. N. W.* (1857),

suit for obstruction to a private right of way, the plaintiff ought to show with reasonable precision and exactitude the termini of the right of way and the course which it takes (1)

It has been held that alternative reliefs inconsistent with each other may be demanded there being nothing in the Code against the joinder of such reliefs (2) In the case cited the plaintiff prayed to be declared the proprietor of the whole village, and, failing that, to be declared its occupancy tenant, and it was held that the plaint could not be returned for amendment though, if it became necessary to consider whether the second relief could not be granted for want of jurisdiction in a Civil Court, the suit might have to be dismissed.

It is usual to insert a prayer for such further and other relief than the specific relief claimed as the Court may hold the plaintiff entitled to. A plaintiff may in such case have relief according to what he has alleged and proved. The prayer for general relief will support any relief consistent with the case made in the plaint provided that there is no surprise on the defendants and that they suffer no inconvenience by it (3) So under the general prayer the Court has granted an injunction (4) But under a prayer for general relief a plaintiff is not entitled to any relief which is inconsistent with his plaint (5) It must be considered as limited by the facts alleged and by the prayer for express relief (6) Under r 7 it is not now necessary to ask for general relief.

Relief not founded on the pleadings should not, as a rule, be granted. But where substantial matters which constituted the title of all the parties are touched in the issues and have been fully put in evidence and formed the main subject of discussion and decision in the Courts, the case does not come within the rule, and a declaration of the rights of the parties though not founded on the pleadings may be made (7)

Mesne profits.—This clause does not apply where mesne profits are claimed only from the date of the suit (8)

Suit as representative (Rule 4)—Whether the suit is brought by the plaintiff in his personal or representative capacity must be determined from the statements in the plaint and not merely from the words indicative of the capacity in the title. So where the averments in and the frame of a plaint

112 Some of these cases were discussed and distinguished in *Rajnarain Das v Chowdhury Shama*, 4 C. W. N 162 (1899) and notwithstanding the omission of the provisions in the Code of 1859, effect was still given to it in the preparation of plaints in suits relating to lands and now clause (3) has been added to the section. And see *Luchmi Narain Bhargedar v Hoare, Miller and Co.*, 17 C. W. N 1098 (1913)

(1) *Harris v Jenkins*, 22 Ch. D 481

(2) *Kabir Khan v Khawam* 1897, P B 41

(3) *Walpole v Oxford* 3 V. ca. 402, see also *Serra v Noel* 15 Q. B. D 549

(4) *Kristo Mohney v Kelly Prosenno* 61 J. R. 682 (1870) but see *Angappa v Shivappa* 11 B at p 327 (1894)

(5) *Hirelal Mullick v Matlal Mullick* 5 B. L. R. 682 (1870) so in *Jugal Kishore v Kartic Chunder* 21 C. at p 120 (1892), it was held that the frame of the suit precluded the plaintiff from claiming particular relief under the general prayer

(6) *Dabhi Dayal v Bhau Pratap* 31 C at p 410 (1903)

(7) *Eri Mohant Gobind Das v Sita Ram Keshto* 2 C. W. N 681 (1893)

(8) *Ramkrishna v Ramesh* 15 L. 416 (1870)

are such as to affix to the plaintiff a representative character, and to show that a cause of action, if any, devolved upon him solely in that character, the omission in the title of the word "as" between the name of the plaintiff and the words descriptive of his representative capacity, will not be deemed to negative his claiming in that capacity (1)

The plaint must show not only an actual existing interest, but also that the plaintiff has taken the steps necessary to enable him to sue. The Indian Succession Act of 1865 (sect 187) provides that no right as executor or legatee can be established without probate or letters of administration, and (sect 190) no right to an intestate's property can be established without letters of administration. As regards, however, Hindus and Mahomedans, neither of whom are governed by this Act, the general rule is that there is no law which obliges a person claiming under a will to obtain probate (2). Nor generally are letters of administration necessary. Upon this general rule, however, are engrafted two special provisions. Sect 187 has since been embodied in the Hindu Wills Act, 1870, but it was excluded from the Probate Act, 1881. The result is, that sect 187 applies to cases governed by the Hindu Wills Act, but does not apply to wills executed by Mahomedans or by those Hindus who are not governed by the Hindu Wills Act, and an executor of theirs can sue without taking out probate (3). Further, no Court can pass a decree against a debtor (4) of a deceased person or proceed to execute a decree against such debtor except upon the production of probate, letters of administration, or certificate mentioned in the Succession Certificate Act (5). A certificate may be obtained in respect of particular debts due to

(1) *Hukm Chand*, C P C 619 citing *Beers v Shannon*, 73 N Y 292 (Amer.), *Beralzheimer v Strauss*, 7 Civ Pro Rep 225 (Amer.), *Marshall v Blesler*, 1 How Pr N S 217 (Amer.) and see *Mussoorie Bank v Barlow*, 9 A 188 (1887) *post*.

(2) *Bhagransang v Richardas*, 6 B 73 (1881), *Krishna Kinkur v Rai Mohun*, 14 C 37 (1886).

(3) *Shaik Moosa v Shaik Essa*, 8 B 241 (1884) [subject to the provisions of Act XXVII of 1860, which then took the place of the Succession Certificate Act, the suit however, was held not to be for the recovery of a debt].

(4) In a suit by a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of a deceased person and for recovery of a debt due to the estate and not otherwise *Srimant Raja v Makerla*, 20 M 162 (1897) [right of succeeding trustee to collect], s c., 24 I A 73. A curator under Act XIX of 1841, is not a person claiming to be so entitled. *Babasab v Narsappa* 20 B 437 (1895), and a plaintiff does not require a certificate where his claim is for family property by survivorship.

Jagmohandas v Allu Maria, 19 B 338 (1894), *Pateshuri v Bhagwati* 17 A 578 (1895), *Subramanian v Rakku* 20 M 232 (1897). Further, the suit must be in respect of a debt. *Sobhanna v Munecla*, 18 M 457 (1894) [suit for damages for wrongful detention, but see *Torregrona v Pragu*, 16 B at p 521 (1892)], *Sabju v Noordin*, 22 M 139 (1898) [unliquidated claim not debt], accrued during lifetime of deceased. *Ranchordas v Bhagubhai* 18 B 394 (1893), *Baid Nath v Shamanand* 22 C 143 (1894) [decree for sale not a decree against debtor for payment of his debt]. A certificate may be granted in respect of a specified debt. *In re Indarman* 18 A 45 (1895) but not for the collection of part only of a debt. *Muhammad v Puttan* 19 A 129 (1896).

(5) Act VII of 1889 held not to apply to proceedings instituted before the Act. *Ammanna v Gurumurthi* 16 M 64 (1892), but see *Fateh Chand v Muhammad Balsh*, 16 A 259 (1894), dist this case. The Act applies to suits in a village Munsif's Court. *Rasbi v Olags*, 21 M 115 (1897). An application by the representative of a

a deceased person, as distinguished from probate or letters of administration which create a representative title to recover all the effects of such person (1) It is not necessary for the institution of a suit that the plaintiff should have taken out a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (2) The Act however, enacts that no Court can "pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debts to a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof" unless he has obtained a certificate under the Act The Courts have construed this provision so as to hold that, unless the certificate is produced, a decree may not be passed even with the defendant's consent, (3) nor in a suit in which a partner of the deceased has joined the legal representative of the latter, (4) or even when the suit is brought solely by an assignee of the legal representative (5) for the assignee is in no better position than the assignor It is quite sufficient however, that the certificate is obtained and produced in the Court after the institution of the suit during the course of the proceedings And this is so also in the case of a suit continued by a legal representative Administration is not necessary for revival (6) And where a certificate was granted by a Court in a native State, and a true copy of it signed by the Political Agent of the State and stamped with the court fee required by the Court Fees Act was produced by the plaintiff, but there was nothing to show that the Political Agent intended to grant a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act it was held that though a decree should not have been granted yet time should have been allowed for the production of a proper certificate (7) It is doubtful whether the Act applies to the case of a person who has been substituted as plaintiff for one who, having taken out a certificate, has died pending the suit (8) See also next paragraph

Defendant's liability to be shown (Rule 5)—A suit against Mrs S G B, Mussoorie, which stated in the body of the plaint that she was executrix of the debtor is a suit against her as executrix (9) Where a defendant is liable as a representative of another, the fact of his liability as a representative should be stated clearly in the plaint, as the effect of a sale in execution of a decree is limited to the judgment debtor's interest, where it does not appear on the face of the proceedings that he was sued in a representative capacity, and it is only in cases where it is manifest that the judgment debtor must have been sued as a representative, that a sale in terms of the interests of the judgment debtor is allowed to convey the interests of other persons (10)

judgment creditor to obtain a certificate under this Act is not a step in aid of execution within the meaning of the Limitation Act *Murgapa Muduvalappa v Basawantrao*, 37 B 409 (1913)

(1) *Karuppaasami Pichu* 15 M 419 at p 420 (1891)

(2) *Kaminathu v Mangappa* 16 M 454 (1893)

(3) *Santaji v Janji*, 15 B 105 (1891)

(4) *Pam Narain v Pam Chunler* 18 C 86 (1891)

(5) *Karuppaasami Pichu* 15 M 419 (1891)

(6) *Torregrosa v Praggi*, 16 B 519 (1891)

(7) *Manasing v Amad Kunhi* 17 M 14 (1891)

(8) *Baid Nath v Shamanan*, 22 C 143 (1891)

(9) *Mussoorie Bank v Barlow*, 9 A 183 (1887)

(10) *Nugenderchunler Ghose v Kaminee Doss*, 11 M I A 211 (1867)

Doobey v Brij Bhokun 21 A 275 (1891)

Deen lyal Lal v Jug Jeep Niram 41 A 217 (1877)

Lok Mahito v Aglone 8 C 141 (1880)

The liability of the legal representative of a deceased debtor to be sued is absolute and not dependent on the assets having come into his hands, it being sufficient to give a decree against him that there are assets of which he may have become possessed, though he will be liable under the decree only as a legal representative (1). A decree obtained against a brother and an aunt of the deceased debtor, and proceedings taken in execution against them, will give to the plaintiff no title to the property forming the estate, and if after the sale a person takes letters of administration to the deceased he will be entitled to the proceeds of the sale in execution held by the Court in preference to the decree holder (2). In *Baswantapa v Ranu* (3) it was held that a decree against a person who is not an heir of the deceased and even a sale in execution of such a decree, can give no right to the decree holder, or to the purchaser at the execution sale to the property which belonged to the deceased or to his real heir or legal representative. In a suit by a creditor against the estate of a deceased debtor who has died leaving a will his heirs in intestacy do not represent his estate and the suit is bad unless the estate is represented (4). If a Hindu sues as representing a joint family he should state it in the plaint (5). And a widow if sued as representative of her deceased husband should be so described (6). And this is a general rule where a person is sued as a representative as where defendants are sued as representatives of a *tarwad* (7). A decree against a Hindu widow may bind a son adopted during the litigation but not brought on the record (8). On the death of one member of a joint Hindu family subject to Mitakshara law his widow cannot represent him so as to make the joint property liable to his debts (9). As to widow's estate in moveables inherited from her husband and the liability of such property for her debts after his death see below (10).

Limitation (Rule 6)—This rule recognizes the principle that a plaintiff must not only show that he has a title but that he has a subsisting title, which he has not lost by the prescriptive sections of the Limitation Act (11). It has been said that under this provision a plaintiff cannot take advantage of any ground of exemption from the law of limitation which has not been set up in the plaint (12). But it has been recently held that this is not an inflexible

(1) *Rayappa Chetti v Ali Sahib* 2 M H C. R. 336 (1865) *Girdharial v Bai Shiv* 8 B 309 (1884)

(2) *Sukh Nanlan v Kennick* 4 A 192 (1882)

(3) 9 B 86 (1885)

(4) *Matangini v Chooneymoney* 22 C 903 (1895)

(5) *Can Savant v Narayan* 7 B 467 (1883)

(6) *S v Girdharial v Bai Shiv* 8 B 309 (1884) *Loki Mahto v Aghoree* 5 C 144 (1879)

(7) *Sankaran v Parvati* 12 M 471 at p. 437 (1889) but a decree against a manager for a debt due by the family has been held to bind the rest *Harivithal v Jisiram Vithal*

14 B 597 (1890)

(8) *Harivaran v Bhubaneswar* 16 C 40 (1883) 15 I A 195

(9) *Phoolbas Koonwur v Lalla Jogeshwar* 1 C 226 (1876) 3 I A

(10) *Bai Jamna v Bhandarkar* 16 P 233 (1891)

(11) *Secretary of State v Vira Rayan* 9 M 175 (1880). It is not sufficient to say the Act does not apply or that the case has been taken out of the Act. The facts should be stated. See *Foraytl v Bristowe* 8 Exch 30

(12) *Jogeshwar Das v Rajnarain Mitter*, 31 C 195 (1903) s.c. in first Court 7 C W N 631 foll. *Delhi Jagannadha Row v Brundharans Seshavva* 17 M I J 291 (1907)

rule If the plaint shows the ground of exemption, the requirements of the Code are satisfied, but the plaintiff is not precluded from taking another and an inconsistent ground to get over the bar of limitation if he believes that the latter is the true ground (1)

7. Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief, which may always be given as the Court may think just, to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement

Relief—This rule is new, and is taken from English O 20 r 6. The plaintiff should always claim in the one action every kind of relief to which he is entitled—be it damages or an injunction, a declaration or a receiver, for he will not be allowed to bring a second suit on the same cause of action to obtain relief which he might have obtained in the first action (2). A Court in refusing a decree for specific performance may give a decree for the refund of the deposit with interest though the plaintiff had not sought this alternative relief (3). In a suit for the sale of mortgaged property the Court may (in certain circumstances) pass a decree for redemption (4). As regards prayer for general relief, see notes to preceding rules

8 Where the plaintiff seeks relief in respect of several distinct claims or causes of action founded upon separate and distinct grounds, they shall be stated, as far as may be, separately and distinctly

Separate grounds—This rule is new and is the first sentence of English O 20 r 7

9 (1) The plaintiff shall endorse on the plaint, or annex thereto, a list of the documents (if any) which he has produced along with it, and, if the plaint is admitted, shall present as many copies on plain paper of the plaint as there are defendants, unless the Court by reason of the length of the plaint or the number of the defendants, or for any other sufficient reason permits him to present a like number of concise statements of the nature of the claim made, or of the relief claimed in the suit, in which case he shall present such statements

1) Hingut H Ramba, 13 C. L. J. 133 (1910) C. W. N. 100 (1912)

(2) See Ann. Pr. notes on this rule

(4) Balkrishn Lal v. Jageswar, 17 C. W. N.

(3) Jagdish Nath v. Chandra Prasad, 17 C. W. N. 219 (1911)

(2) Where the plaintiff sues, or the defendant or any of the defendants is sued, in a representative capacity, such statements shall show in what capacity the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued.

(3) The plaintiff may, by leave of the Court, amend such statements so as to make them correspond with the plaint.

(4) The chief ministerial officer of the Court shall sign such list and copies or statements if, on examination, he finds them to be correct.

"Concise statements."—Act VIII of 1859, sect 38 For forms of concise statements and Register of civil suits, see Schedule IV of the Code of 1882 As to separate registers for suits between landlords and tenants, see sect 146, Act VIII of 1883 (Bengal Tenancy), and sect 66, Act IX of 1883 (Central Province Tenancy)

10. (1) The plaint shall *at any stage of the suit* be returned [s. 10]
to be presented to the Court *in which the suit*
Return of plaint. should have been instituted.

(2) On returning a plaint the Judge shall endorse thereon
the date of its presentation and return, the
Procedure on returning plaint. name of the party presenting it, and a brief
statement of the reasons for returning it

When plaint may be returned—The words of the rule are imperative (1) The section which this rule replaces did not however, state at what stage of the suit the order could be made The section itself was differently construed as applicable to any stage of the suit and as referring merely to the time of presentation The Calcutta High Court held that its provisions might be put in force at any stage of the hearing and that it is not limited to the time of presentation, or before the defendant has been called on to state his case, for the objection, if to valuation, would not appear upon the face of the plaint itself, but would naturally come from the defendant Therefore, a Court was held to have erred which, after hearing the evidence on both sides, found that the suit had been undervalued, but instead of returning the plaint dismissed the suit (2) It has thus been held that the plaint should be returned, and the suit not dismissed after evidence in the first Court, (3) and after trial in the first Appellate Court, or even in the High

(1) Bhadeshwar v Gaurikant, 8 C. 534 (1882), Mutturulandi v Kottayan, 10 M. 211 (1887)

(2) Bhadeshwar v Gaurikant, 8 C. 534 (1882) The contrary was held in an early case under the Code of 1859 it being deter-

mined that the suit should have been dismissed Shaikh Muzbur v Musst Basoo, 8 W R. 46 (1867)

(3) Ram Gutty v Goomomonee, 11 W. R. 177 (1869), Kartick Nath v Roy Nundepat, 23 W R 263 (1875)

Court itself (1) The same views were entertained by the Madras High Court (2) The Bombay (3) and Allahabad (4) High Courts held, that while the section corresponding to this rule, only contemplates the return of a plaint, should error be patent when it is first presented, yet there was nothing in the Code which forbade the return of a plaint at a later stage after the plaint has been admitted and the trial begun, or even concluded, it being a general principle that a Court, on finding, whenever that may be, that it has not jurisdiction should decline to proceed further in a cause placed before it The shape, however, in which a suit is originally instituted is the test of jurisdiction, and a Court, after exercising jurisdiction by amending the plaint, cannot afterwards aver want of jurisdiction with regard to the plaint so amended (5) The words "*at any stage of the hearing*" have now been inserted and remove all doubt on the question raised in the cases cited

The former section was held, however, not to apply to High Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction The practice on the Original Side of the High Court at Bombay has been to retain a plaint when further proceedings in a suit have been stopped for want of jurisdiction, and a plaint is not returned except when, on presentation, the Judge is of opinion that it discloses no cause of action or, it appears to him, that the suit ought to be brought in another Court (6) A similar practice prevails in the Calcutta High Court

It was held, prior to the Limitation Act, that the date of a suit must be taken to be that on which the plaint was originally filed, and not that on which it was filed in another Court as a plaint returned to be filed in that Court (7) It has been held that where a Court returns a plaint under this rule the Court to which the plaint is afterwards presented is bound to give credit for the fee levied in the first instance (8) When a plaint has been returned the suit when

(1) *Musst Fdoo v Shaikh Hefazut*, 13 W R 358 (1870), *Prosad Doss Mullick* 7 C 157 (1881), *Joynath Roy v Lall Bahadur* 8 C 126 (1881) [it is however to be noted that in this case the lower Court both dismissed the suit and returned the plaint] s c, 10 C L R 146, *Moshungan v Mozari Syad*, 12 C 271 (1885) [which dealt also with the question of costs] In *Ledgard v Bull*, 9 A 191 (1886) the Privy Council stated that the Court should have given the plaintiff the alternative of having his suit dismissed or of withdrawing with leave to bring a new action

(2) *Khimji v Purushottam*, 7 M 171 (1843), *Kanda v Konda* 8 M 62 (1881), *Chandur Komli*, 9 M 208 (1887), *Najamma v Subba* 11 M 107 (1887), even if the proper Court of presentation is a Revenue Court *Muttirulandi v Kottayan*, 10 M 211 (1887)

(3) *Prallabharat v Vishwamihar Pandit*,

8 B 313, F B (1884) [overruling *Jagjivan v Magdum*, 7 B 487 (1883)], *Babajit Lal Chmhai*, 9 B 266 (1884), *Bai Makhor v Bulakhi Chaku* 1 B 533 (1874), *Vasudeo v Narayan*, 4 B 612 n (1878) In *Bai Amrit v Hanbhai*, 8 B 380, it was held that the first mentioned ruling did not govern the case where decrees had been passed on the plaint

(4) *Abdul Samad v Rajendro Kishor* 2 A 357 (1879), see *Khooshul v Palmer*, 1 Agra 280 (1866) In *Nidhi Lal v Mazhar Hossein* 7 A at p 215 (1881) it was pointed out that the words "on or before the first hearing" are not in this section

(5) *Motalhai v Surat Municipality* 20 B 675 (1897)

(6) *Bai Amrit v Hanbhai*, 8 B 380 (1884)

(7) *Khellat Chunder v Nussiebunniss* 1 F W R 47 (1871), see s 14 of the Limitation Act

(8) *Vishweswara v Nair* 35 M 567 (1911)

presented to the proper Court is a new suit and not a continuation of the former proceeding (1)

"Should have been instituted"—In the Code of 1882 specific cases were mentioned in which the Court might return a plaint. Where, however a lower Court rejected a suit but refused to return a plaint on the ground that the case did not fall within the provisions of this section, it was held on appeal that the circumstances of the case came within clauses (a) and (c) of the corresponding section of the Code of 1882, but even were it not so in every case where the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit the proper procedure was to return the plaint (2). This is now made clear the second set of italicized words in the first clause being substituted in lieu of the specific clauses (a), (b), (c) of the last Code.

Appeal—An appeal lies under O XLIII r 1 (a). Under the circumstances of the case cited (3) a party was held estopped from appealing against an order returning the plaint.

11 The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases —

- Rejection of plaint*
- (a) *where it does not disclose a cause of action,*
 - (b) *where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so*
 - (c) *where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so*
 - (d) *where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law*

Applicability of rule—It was held that clauses (b) and (c) did not apply to High Courts in the exercise of their ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction (4). An opinion was also expressed that they did not apply to the High Courts in their appellate jurisdiction (5). But sect 582A was, since that decision added to the Code of 1882 by Act VI of 1892. See now sect 149, *ante*.

Rejected—Clause (a) is taken from sect 53 of the last Code. The Court must see whether a cause of action is disclosed in the plaint. Firstly as to the mode in which this is to be done. Apparently this is to be ascertained from a reading of the plaint itself. The Code of 1859 provided (6) for rejection

(1) Mohidin Rowthan v Nallaperumal P 114 21 M L J 1900 (1911)

(2) Lalhaji v Hari 1 Bom L R 174 (1899)

(3) Beni Madhub Das v Jotendra Mohun Tagore 11 C W N 763 (1907) s c 5

C L J 580

(4) And see now O XLIX r 3 post.

(5) Balkaran Rai v Gobind Nath 12 A at p 149 (1890)

(6) s 33 (a).

if upon the face of the plaint, or after questioning the plaintiff, (1) it appeared that there was no cause of action, or that the right of action was barred. (2) It was held that for this purpose the Court should not refer to documents or facts not stated in nor annexed to the plaint (a ruling which equally applies now) nor ascertained by it (under the practice which then prevailed) by interrogation of the plaintiff (3)

The Court has then merely to see whether there is a question to be tried. The rule does not contemplate any forms of action, but requires only that a plaint should contain facts describing a cause of action, and a plaint that does so must be heard (4). The facts must be so alleged that all the constituent facts may be implied and unless this is so there will be no cause of action disclosed (5). A cause of action is deemed stated whenever sufficient facts to sustain an action "can be fairly gathered from all the averments in the complaint though the statement of them may be argumentative, and the complaint deficient in technical language" (6). Insufficiency can only be sustained "when it appears that admitting all the facts alleged, the complaint presents no cause of action whatever. It is not sufficient that the facts are imperfectly or informally averred, or that the pleading lacks definiteness and precision, or that the material facts are argumentatively averred. The plaint is deemed to allege what can be implied from the allegations therein by reasonable and fair intendment (7). So a cause of action will be considered disclosed if there are sufficient facts stated to warrant an inference as to its existence even though all the facts constituting it may not be expressly stated (8).

A plaint may be rejected if it does not disclose a cause of action against any of the defendants unless the plaintiff amends by striking off the name of that defendant (9) and if it is presented by a person not authorized to do so (10). The Court, however, cannot reject a plaint on the ground that the plaintiff is not likely to succeed, (11) not on any ground except that of want of cause of

(1) See *Man Gobind v Umbika Monee* 10 B H C R at p 185 (1873). In *Gunga Narain v Tuluckram*, 15 C at p 537 (1883) the Privy Council held in a case under the present Code that the Subordinate Judge rightly examined the plaintiff's pleader to ascertain whether he was in a position to make an amendment which would introduce a cause of action. But see as to this *post*, p 774.

(2) See *Udaya v Nayar*, 1 M H C P 322 (1863) where the plaint was held not to show on its face that it was barred, and *Chettiar v Sundaram*, 2 M H C R 51 (1864) in which it was held that a Court might reject a plaint as barred even though it has been registered, such an act being of a ministerial nature only.

(3) *Girdharial v Jagannath* 10 B H C R 142 (1873).

(4) *Mohammed I Sharif v Samsher Khan*

1891 P R No 11, cited *Hukm Chand C P* C 625.

(5) *Hukm Chand* 626, *Ramasami v Sattanunai*, 1 M 375 (1881).

(6) *Ib*, citing *Zabriske v Smith* 13 N 1 322 (Amer).

(7) *Ib* citing *Morie v Garrison* 83 N 1 23 (Amer).

(8) *Ramasami Ayyan v Ramu Mupan* 3 M H C R (1867) w1 to the statement of the subject matter imported that the charge was false to the knowledge of the defendant though there was no express allegation of malice and want of reasonable and proper cause.

(9) *Shridhar Hari v Chuma* 10 B H C R 17 (1873).

(10) *Venkatray v Malharay*, 11 R 53 56 (1886).

(11) *Lakshmi v Tikaram*, 1 M H C R 210 (1893).

action (1) The existence or non-existence of a cause of action depends on the provisions of the substantive law applicable. If the plaint discloses a cause of action, but it is barred, it should be rejected under rule 11, clause (d). If no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint might have been rejected under the last Code, if this was done before the issues were settled. Rule 11 contains no limit of time. And the order may apparently be made at any time. The plaint should not be returned for amendment (2) There would, however, appear to be no objection to the Court amending itself the plaint on the spot, (3) though in a large number of cases this may not be found to be practicable. According to the practice of the Original Side of the High Court, the sufficiency of a plaint is allowed to be discussed after it has been filed, on an application made by the defendant to take it off the file (4) It was held under the last Code that the original Court might not reject or return a plaint for amendment after the settlement of the issues, but where it had proceeded to the trial of the suit should dispose of it on the merits (5) If a plaint is not rejected before settlement of issues, and it is then discovered not to allege a cause of action, the Court should either amend it under clause (c) of sect 53 of the last Code or determine the case on the evidence (6) In the latter event it would if the plaint and evidence disclose no cause of action dismiss the suit (7) If the plaint does not disclose a cause of action but the Court does not reject it on that ground an objection may be taken for the first time on appeal, (8) though if the appeal is from a decision on the merits the Appellate Court cannot dismiss the suit simply on the ground that the plaint discloses no cause of action if such a cause is shown by the evidence on the record (9) Nor can the Appellate Court dismiss a suit merely on the ground that the plaint does not show how far the several parties sued for contribution are individually liable if the evidence produced is enough to determine that. The real test in such cases being whether the

(1) As where a plaint asks for a money decree against the mortgagor and the mortgaged property only is liable. *Umasundari v Umacharn* 6 B L R App 117 (1871). Under the Code of 1859 however the Courts rejected plaints for misjoinder. *Raja Ram v Luchmun Pershad* 8 W R 15 (1867), see B L R (F B) 731, whereas now it should return for amendment as also where the plaint is obscure (see *Mahomed v Potun* 20 W R 147) or prolix (*Bishen Sahaye v Beer Kishore*, 8 W R. 295 (1867)). In *Luckymonee Doss v Khetter Coomary* 2 Ind. Jur N S 117 (1867) the plaint consisted of only two counts, and the first did not show the subject of the claim without reference to a schedule and the second did not show a right in the plaintiff.

(2) *Nagar Mull v Macpherson* 3 A 766 (1881)

(3) See *Gunga Narain v Tulukram* 10 C. at 1 536 (1888) where it is added or within a reasonable time, but this would

seem to imply return as to which, see last Code

(4) *Gobind Chandra v Ganga Dhyo*, 7 B L R at p 330 (1871)

(5) *Damodar Das v Gopal Chand*, 7 A. 79 F B (1884), *Kishna Ram v Fakim* 9 A 221 (1887) *contra* *Modhe v Dongre* 5 B 609 (1881), *Prabhakarbhut v Vishwambhar*, 8 B 313 (1884). So far as the power of the Court itself to amend at any time which is referred to in these cases this was settled by clause (c) introduced by s 9 Act VII of 1888 into the last Code

(6) As to the latter course see *Ramsami v Pannu* 3 M H C R 372 (1867)

(7) See *Nurduin v Alauddin* 12 M. 131 (1885)

(8) See *Colvin v Elias* 2 B L R. 212 (1869)

(9) *Shah Ahmed v Tareo Rai* 7 C 313 (1881) *Golam Ali v Futtick Chunder*, 10 W L. 400 (1868), *Pakhtawar Begam v Husain Khanam* 10 C L J 477 (1914)

Judge, after the adjudication of the case, can pass a decree which shall operate as one against each party sought to be made liable for his respective quota (1) Where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action the proper order to be passed on appeal, where the suit is dismissed without taking evidence in the first Court is to reject the plaint and not dismiss the suit so that the plaintiff can present a fresh plaint if he subsequently should find himself in a position to make averments which would give relevancy to his action (2) For it is to be noted that rejection is distinct from dismissal, inasmuch as the former, according to Order 13, leaves the plaintiff free to present a fresh plaint, while the latter would ordinarily bar a new suit. It was held under the former section that a Court could not reject a plaint in part (3)

Form of Order—Rejection of the plaint, and not dismissal of the suit is the proper order to pass (4) In a suit in a Munsif's Court it was found, after issues were fixed and some evidence recorded, that the claim had been under-valued and that if properly valued it would be beyond the Court's jurisdiction, it was held that the proper order was to reject the plaint and return it, so that the plaintiff might add the additional stamps required and sue in the proper Court (5)

When order may be made—A plaint can be rejected after it has been registered and at any stage of the suit, (6) but not after the case has been finally decided so far as the Court is concerned (7)

Clauses (b), (c)—It is competent to a Court to reject after it has been admitted and registered (8) The power of rejection given by this section does not arise merely because the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, but there must be the additional circumstance of a failure on the part of the plaintiff to supply the requisite stamp paper within the period fixed (9) Reading this section with sect. 12 of the Court Fees Act of 1870 the Court is not justified in rejecting a plaint without giving the plaintiff an opportunity of affixing the proper stamp (10) *Quære*, whether "insufficiently stamped" in clause (c) refers to or includes a wholly unstamped paper (11) See also next paragraph. As to mistake or inadvertence as to Court fees see cases cited (12) If a plaint be presented upon insufficient stamp and the

(1) *Bhono v. Pallan* 11 W. R. 131 (1867)

(2) *Ganga Narain v. Liluckram* 15 C. 132 (1889), s. c., 15 I. A. 119

(3) *Itaghalans Juri v. Jyotis Swarnaj* 2 J. A. 225 (1907)

(4) *Muhammad Badik v. Muhammad Jan*, 11 A. 91 (1888); *Balvansh v. Bhimashankar*, 13 B. 517 (1883). For a comparison of orders of rejection see *Law Commission Report on the Court Fees Act*, see *Halkaran Bai v. Gobind Nath* 12 A. 129 (1890)

(5) *Ram Gutter v. Gopimonee* 11 W. I. 177 (1891)

(6) *Kishore Singh v. Babul Singh*, 12 A. 7 (1889); *Venkatesa Swami v. Ramasami* (11 J. A. 183) 338 (1893); *Karamchand v. Chakrabarti* 11 C. W. N. 379 (1897); *Pratibha v. Anant Lal Misser*, 1 C. I. J. 127

(7) *Mahabir v. Ramdas*

(8) *Padmanabha v. Anant Lal Misser* 11 C. 201 B., s. c., 11 C. W. N. 39 (1885)

(9) *Dhondiram v. Bavalu*, 5 Bom. L. J. 198 (1902), s. c., 7 B. 330

(10) *Bal Anand v. Mulchand* 11 B. 355 (1885)

(11) *Bodhanthirasa v. Jagannath Prasad* 13 A. 307 at 311 308 303 (1891)

(12) *Ram Lalal Singh v. Dulri Lal*, 4 A. 110 (1897); *Chaturpal v. Jagram*, 7 A. 411 (1901); and *Law Commission Report on the Court Fees Act*, see *Mushtak v. Umatal* 11 C. W. N. 703 (1897), s. c. 6 C. I. J. 127

deficient Court fee be not put in within the time allowed by the Court, the latter ought to reject the plaint. But if on the date on which the deficient Court-fee is ultimately put in, the suit is not barred, the plaint may be regarded as if it was presented for the first time on that date, and the suit ought to be proceeded with (1).

"Time to be fixed"—The time fixed for making up stamp duty on a plaint may extend beyond the period of limitation for the suit. If a plaint improperly stamped is given back to have a proper stamp fixed, the date of the suit is the date on which it was filed, (2) and therefore no question of limitation can arise. There is nothing in the Code to render a presentation ineffectual because the plaint was insufficiently stamped (3). The view, however, has also been expressed that the presentation of an insufficiently stamped document, which if sufficiently stamped could be treated as a plaint, cannot be regarded as the institution of a suit within the meaning of sect. 4 of the Limitation Act, or of the Code (4). Therefore, when a Court fixes a time under clauses (b) or (c) of this section, it must be a time within limitation, and this section does not give a Court power to extend the ordinarily prescribed period of limitation for suit (5). But in a recent case in the Bombay High Court where a memorandum of appeal insufficiently stamped was filed on the last day allowed by the law of limitation and the Court refused time to pay and rejected the memorandum, this order was reversed on appeal, and it was held that the Court had a discretion under sect. 149, limited only by clause (c) of this rule (6). Apart from the question of limitation, the Court can extend the period originally granted after the time originally fixed has expired (7). If, however, the order is not complied with within the time allowed, the plaint will be rejected. So a plaint was filed one day before the expiry of the period of limitation, but the Court fees were deficient and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the deficient Court fees within a week. This order was complied with one day after the expiry of the time allowed and the plaint was registered. Held, that the suit was barred by limitation, as the deficient Court fees were not supplied within the appointed time, and that the

(1) *Hara Kumar Pal v Shakh Safatullah*, 9 C. W. N. 841, s. c., 2 C. L. J. 970 (1905).

(2) *Mt Begum Begum v Yusuf Ali*, 6 A. H. C. R. 133 (1874), *Skinner v Orde*, 61 A. 126 (1879), *Mengur v Baboo Huree*, 23 W. R. 417 (1875), *Syud Ambur v Kala Chand*, 24 W. R. 258 (1875), *Moti Sahu v Chattri Das*, 19 C. 780 (1892), *Huri Mohun v Naimuddin*, 20 C. 41 (1892), *Chennappa v Raghunatha*, 15 M. 29 (1891), *Surendra Kumar v Kunja Behary*, 27 C. 814 (1900), s. c., 4 C. W. N. 818, *Assan v Pathumma*, 22 M. 494 (1897), *per Subramania Ayyar, J.*, *Dhondiram v Savadan*, 27 B. 330 (1902), s. c., 5 Bom. L. R. 198, *Rajkishori v Madan Mohan*, 31 C. 75 (1903), *disa. from Balkaran Lal v Gobind Nath*, 12 A. 129 (1890).

(3) *Jhanda Khan v Bahadur Ali* (1893),

P. R. No. 3

(4) *Jaini Prasad v Bachu Singh*, 15 A. 65, 70 (1893).

(5) *Id.*, *Venkatramayya v Krishnayya*, 20 M. 319 (1897), *Muhammad Ahmad v Muhammad Sirajuddin*, 23 A. 423 (1901), *Durga Singh v Bisheshar Dyal*, 24 A. 218 (1898), but see cases cited *ante*, n. (2), and in particular, *Assan v Pathumma*, 22 M. 494 (1897), *per Subramania Ayyar, J.*, who *disagreed* with *Venkatramayya v Krishnavya*, *supra*.

(6) *Achut Ramchandra Pai v Nagappa Babu Balgya*, 35 B. 41 (1913).

(7) *Bhugwandas Bagla v Haji Abu*, 16 B. 263 (1891), see also *Paj Kishori v Madan Mohan*, 31 C. 75 at p. 78 (1903), *Amir Hossain v Babu Nanak*, 11 C. W. N. 882 (1910).

fact of the plaint being registered did not prevent its rejection under sect 54 (corresponding with this rule), the terms of which are imperative and mandatory (1) It has been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that the suit is not barred by limitation if the deficiency is supplied within the time fixed by the Court after the expiry of the period of limitation (2)

Clause (d) — The words of the rule are imperative. So the plaintiff is bound to satisfy the Court that his right of action is not barred (3). The Court also is bound to take notice of such a bar, if it exists (4). So far as rejection under this rule is concerned, it is incumbent only when "from the statement on the plaint" the suit appears to be barred (5).

Where a plaint in a Civil Court alleges facts which, if true, would show that the dispute or matter involved in the suit was one to which sect 93 or sect 95 of Act XII of 1881 would apply, the plaint should be rejected under clause (d) of this rule, or possibly in some cases returned under O VII r 10 (6). The language of sect 80 is imperative, and absolutely debars a Court from entertaining a suit instituted without compliance with the provisions of the section. A Court cannot, under such circumstances, stay proceedings and allow time to the plaintiff to serve the requisite notice, but its only course is to reject the plaint under clause (a) of the rule (7). Where the plaintiff sued to establish a *mul rayati* right which by a Government order was not granted and also sought for the position of a *mustajir* and to set aside the executive orders of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, and the lower Courts rejected the plaint under sect 54 (the present rule) held, that upon the allegations made in the plaint the suit ought to have been tried and the plaint could not be rejected on the ground of the suit being barred by any positive rule of law (8).

No rejection in other cases — Neither this nor any other rule authorizes the dismissal of a suit on the ground that the land in dispute as described in the plaint cannot be identified (9). It was even held in the under mentioned case (10) that the plaint ought not to have been rejected. The actual decision may be supported on the ground that the identification was in fact held to be sufficient, but apart from this the order was in form as the plaint had been returned for amendment and was refiled without amendment. A plaint should not be rejected because a wrong date is given for the cause of action.

(1) *Brahmomoyni Dasi v. Andi Sa* 27 C 376 (1899) the question of limitation did not necessarily arise as the rejection was under the terms of this section.

(2) *Gavaranga Sahu v. Boto Krishna*, 32 M 305 (F B) (1909).

(3) *Pajah Perhlad Sen v. Rajender Kashore* 12 W R 6 18 19 (1869), s c, 12 M I A 292.

(4) *Moru v. Gopal*, 2 B 120 123 (1877).

(5) See *Saluji v. Rajasagi*, 2 B H C R 162 (1864), appd in *Balava v. Shudgonda* 7 B H C R 99, 101 (1870), decided under the Code of 1859. It was said that there was a duty imposed on the Court of taking any

objection that may exist in point of law not merely apparent on the plaint but which might be elicited by questioning the plaintiff.

(6) *Tarapat Ojha v. Ram Ratan Kuar*, 15 A 387 (1893).

(7) *Bachchu Singh v. Secretary of State* 25 A 187 (1902).

(8) *Nawab Singh v. Charan Rana* 6 C W N 411 (1901).

(9) *Kazim Shail v. Danesh Shail* 1 C W N 574 (1897), *Jaladhar v. Kunoo* 1 C W N clxxxix (1897).

(10) *Durga Churn v. Kala Chaud* 7 C W N 615 (1903).

Provided the action is not barred it should be amended (1) as also where in a suit for a *labulyat* the date of the commencement of the *labulyat* is not given (2) A plaint should not be rejected or the suit dismissed simply because strictly accurate language has not been used in describing the cause of action (3) nor because costs in respect of a former suit have not been paid, (4) nor because the document on which plaintiff sues has not been filed with the plaint, (5) nor if presented to the wrong Court for in that case it should be returned (6)

Appeal from order rejecting plaint—An order rejecting a plaint is a decree, (7) and is therefore appealable unless there is any statutory prohibition to the contrary (8) Whether there is such a prohibition depends upon the construction to be placed on sect 12 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) which enacts that every question relating to valuation shall be decided by the Court in which a plaint or memorandum of appeal is filed and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit According to one view which has been taken it was the intention of the framers of the Code that whenever a plaint is rejected under this section and in every case filing within it there is an appeal (9) the Court Fees Act not contemplating a case when the Court refuses to hear a suit (10) Therefore when a plaint is rejected under this rule either because the relief sought is undervalued or because although the relief sought being properly valued a sufficient court fees stamp has not been paid there is an appeal (11) This view appears to proceed on the ground that the Code has removed the finality decreed by sect 12 of the Court Fees Act (12) According to another view which has been taken the operation of sect 12 of the Court Fees Act is not affected by the Code but in certain cases there is no question relating to valuation under the meaning of that section (13) It has thus been held in the decisions as to the valuation of the article in the schedule governing the case

(1) *Rajah Sherraj v Nur Khan* 7 A H C R 354 (1875)

(2) *Golam Mohamed v Asmat Ali* 10 W R (F B) 14 (1868) s c B L R (F B) 974

(3) *Inglis v Ram Singh* W R (F B) 159 (1864)

(4) *Luckeymonce v Khetter Coomary* 2 Ind Jur N S 117

(5) *Ex parte Rayachand* 2 B H C R 369 (1860)

(6) *Khandu v Shivji* 5 B H C R 212 (1868) and thus even after the trial has been concluded *Prabakarbhut v Vashwambhar* 8 B 313 (1884)

(7) S 2 ante

(8) S 96

(9) *Muhammad Sadik v Muhammad Jan* 11 A 91 (1888)

(10) *Omrjo v Jones* 12 C L R 149 150

(1882)

(11) *Ib Ali Bhai v Shauji* (1880) when the plaint was insufficiently valued it was held that it was to have been valued according to the schedule under the Court Fees Act

(12) See last case *Muhammad Jan v Fidge* 12 A 129 (1880) and also *Nath* 12 A 129 (1880) and so far as the Court is concerned from a d. point of view the meaning of the section is that it was not intended that

(13) *Ib Ali Bhai v Shauji* 12 A 129 (1880) out that it was not to be decided by the Court but a question of law

appeal lies against a decision as to the class to which a suit belongs, and there fore *a fortiori* when a plaint is rejected or a suit dismissed, on this ground sect 96 has operation, there being no prohibition to the contrary (1) The Bombay High Court, doubting the distinction drawn in the first of the Madras cases cited, has said that where there really is a valuation to be made by a Judge in order to determine a variable proportional fee, it cannot be said that his reasoned choice amongst the several categories of suits is not an essential element of his valuation as the subsequent arithmetical computation by which it is completed, and that where the Judge can enter on a valuation at all the determination of the one factor, as much as of the other must be a "question relating to valuation," and as such a question closed as between the parties by the Judge's decision (2) But in some cases under the Court Fees Act a suit is one admitting of valuation by a Judge in other cases the valuation rests with the plaintiff Again, in some cases the fee is *ad valorem*, thus admitting an inquiry by the Court, in other cases the fee is fixed The cases therefore where a Judge can enter on a valuation are quite different from those where an inquiry is quite gratuitously entered into either because the matter rests in the discretion of the plaintiff or because the fee is fixed (3) The Bombay High Court has therefore held that on the question whether or not any particular suit was one admitting of valuation by the Judge in appeal lies (4) An appeal has also been allowed where the Court of first instance rejected the plaint without giving the plaintiff an opportunity of affixing the proper stamp (5) In a suit for taking accounts valued at Rs 130, it was held that the appeal from the order, rejecting the plaint lay to the District and not the High Court (6) Where excess stamps have been filed in consequence of an overvaluation of the appeal the surplus amount should be refunded (7)

Revision—A decision on valuation was, notwithstanding its declared finality formerly held subject to revision (8)

51 12 Where a plaint is rejected the Judge shall record an order to that effect with the reasons for such plaint

"Record"—The words "*with his own hand*" have been omitted

(1) Gunga Monee v Copal Chunder 19 W R 214 (1873) Chuna v Ramdial, 1 A 360 (1877), Annamalai Chetti v Cloete 4 M 204 (1881), Omrao v Jones 12 C L R 149 (1882) Hanaran v Komappan 14 M 119 (1890), Studd v Mati Mahto, 28 C 334 (1901) Iroakash v Bishambhar 14 C W N 343 (1909)

(2) Vithal v Balkrishna 10 B 610 614 (1886), and see remarks in Muhammad Sidik v Muhammad Jan 11 A 91, at p 93 (1888)

(3) Vithal v Balkrishna *supra* at p 615

(4) *Ib.*, at pp 615 616 See Dada Bhai v

Nagesh 23 B 486 490 (1895) Kashinath v Govinda 15 B 82 (1890) Balwantma v Bhumashankar, 13 B 517 (1889); Sirdarsing v Ganpatsing 17 B 56 (1892)

(5) Bai Anope v Mulchand 9 B 300 (1885), see Thakoor Patuck v Pan soomrun 1 A H C R 17 (1869)

(6) Vithal v Balkrishna 10 B 610 616 (1886), Annamalai Chetti v Cloete 4 M 204 (1881)

(7) Bai Anba v Pranjivanias 19 B 195 (1891)

(8) *In re* Grant, 14 W R 47 (1870)

13 The rejection of the plaint on any of the grounds [s]

Where rejection of plaint does not preclude presentation of fresh plaint.

hereinbefore mentioned shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action

Effect of rejection—The rule, which corresponds with sect 36 of the Code of 1859, and sect 36 of the last Code, says '*of its own force*'. The claim may, however, of course, become, after rejection barred by lapse of time (1) It is to be observed that the rule applies to rejection on any of the grounds hereinbefore mentioned—that is, the grounds in r 11. It has been held that where a plaint has been rejected for default of appearance in the Munsif's Court under sect 13, Bombay Act III of 1876 the rule of *res judicata* applies (2). Such a rejection is analogous rather to the procedure under O IX, r 9.

Documents relied on in plaint

14 (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document in his [s]

Production of document on which plaintiff sues.

possession or power, he shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented, and shall at the same time deliver the document or a copy thereof to be filed with the plaint.

(2) Where he relies on any other documents (whether in

List of other documents.

his possession or power or not) as evidence in support of his claim, he shall enter such

documents in a list to be added or annexed to the plaint

Document sued upon—This is a very wise provision, its object being to prevent the dishonest fabrication of documents, (3) and to give the defendant notice of the documents relied on so as to enable him to reply to the claim (4). All documents sued upon must be produced, such as pottah (5) and title-deeds (6). A defendant is entitled under the Madras High Court Rules to be furnished with a copy of documents sued on, which are deposited with the plaint (7). It was held in an early case (8) that all documents delivered should be received and filed with the plaint, though, if not admissible in evidence, they will afterwards be rejected and returned. And the law is still the same, that the mere production or filing of a document does not operate as its admission in evidence and that it will not be put on the record unless it is duly admitted in accordance with the rules prescribed.

(1) *Kadumbineo v Unnipoorna*, 14 W R 289 (1870)

(2) *Ramchandra v Bhakibai* G B 477 (1882), *ref. Rajaram v Ganesh* 21 B 91, 97 (1895), *Parushottam v Chatargir*, 25 D 82 (1900), *dissented from on the ground that a dismissal in limine does not give rise to the plea of res judicata* *Ramchandra v Nar sinhaacharya* 24 B 251, at pp 253, 254 (1899)

(3) *Premsook v Rajkisto*, 1 Hyde 145 146

(1863)

(4) *Panjab Ch C Instr* s 2 r 10

(5) *Atta Oollah v Sukeecooddeen*, 1864 W R 271

(6) *Lekhraj Roy v Mutty Madhub*, 14 W R 95 (1870)

(7) *Haji Mahomed v Subba Naidu*, 21 M 490 (1897), *see as to Bombay N W P and Panjab Rules Hakim Chand, C P C* 654

(8) *Roshun Jehan v Fnuhut Hossein Marsh* 127 (1864)

Document relied on—The rule requires a plaintiff to file with his plaint a list of all the documents on which he relies, that is, which he is then in a position to know to be essential to his case, whether in his possession or power, or not (1) These words will therefore [as they now expressly state and was formerly held (2) under the corresponding sect 39, clause (1) of the Code of 1859] include all the documents the plaintiff intends to use in evidence and not only those which are the essence of the claim and on which the suit is based (3) which are provided for by the first paragraph They do not include however, documents tendered merely for comparison of hand writing (4)

Penalty—The penalty for not producing these documents when called on to do so is not the rejection of the plaint, but that prescribed in r 18 viz not being able to put them in without the special leave of the Judge (5)

Inspection—The Bombay High Court has held that it has not been the practice to order the plaintiff to give inspection of documents other than those relied on in the plaint and included in the list of documents annexed to the plaint as required by this rule till after the written statement is filed, but that this is not however, an inflexible rule in all cases There may be cases where it would be imperative to order the plaintiff to produce and give inspection to the defendant of a document which he may not have mentioned in the plaint or enumerated in the list of documents annexed thereto (6)

30] **15** *Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, if possible, state in whose possession or power it is*
Statement in case of documents not in his possession or power

31] **16** *Where the suit is founded upon a negotiable instrument, and it is proved that the instrument is lost, and an indemnity is given by the plaintiff, to the satisfaction of the Court, against the claims of any other person upon such instrument, the Court may pass such decree as it would have passed if the plaintiff had produced the instrument in Court when the plaint was presented, and had at the same time delivered a copy of the instrument to be filed with the plaint*
Suits on lost negotiable instruments

"Negotiable instrument"—Act V of 1866, sect 14 A suit will lie on the ground that the indorser refused to give a new cheque for one lost or to refund the money paid for it The drawer should be made a party (7)

- | | |
|--|--|
| (1) <i>Minakshi v Velu</i> 8 M 373 374 (1885) | (4) <i>Minakshi v Velu</i> 8 M 373 374 (1885) |
| (2) <i>Premachok v Rajkuto, I Hyde</i> 145 (1863) | (5) <i>Gopal Gundapa v Vishnu Krishna</i> 22 B 971 (1897) |
| (3) As was held under the first Code in <i>Kameene v Hurromoney Coryton</i> 151 (1864-5) | (6) <i>Khetaldas v Narotum Gordhidas</i> 9 Bom L R 1084 (1907) |
| | (7) <i>Baldeo Prasad v Grish Chamlur</i> 2 A 754 (1880) |

- 17 (1) *Sate in so far as is otherwise provided by the*
Production of shop- Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 where the
book document on which the plaintiff sues is an
entry in a shop book or other account in his possession or power,
the plaintiff shall produce the book or account at the time of filing
the plaint, together with a copy of the entry on which he relies
 (2) The Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf
 shall forthwith mark the document for the
 Original entry to be marked and returned purpose of identification and, after examin-
 ing and comparing the copy with the original shall, if it is found
 correct *certify it to be so and return the book to the plaintiff and*
 cause the copy to be filed

Production—It was held that sect 39 of Act VIII of 1890 which corre-
 sponds with this rule did not require the Court to inspect the document but
 only that it should be marked for identification and the copy compared with
 the original (1) If the book is not produced before the suit is registered & it
 a day is fixed for its production the Court cannot even on a contumacious non-
 production of it reject the plaint the only effect of the non production being
 that provided in the next rule as to the inadmissibility of the book in evidence
 at any subsequent stage (2)

- 18 (1) A document which ought to be produced in Court
 by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented,
 Inadmissibility of docu- ment not produced when
 ment not produced when or to be entered in the list to be added or
 plaint filed annexed to the plaint, and which is not pro-
 duced or entered accordingly shall not without the leave of
 the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing
 of the suit

(2) Nothing in this rule applies to documents produced for
 cross examination of the defendant's witnesses, or in answer to
 any case set up by the defendant or handed to a witness merely
 to refresh his memory

Scope of rule—This rule is intended not to prevent a person from com-
 mencing his suit until he has collected all his documentary evidence but merely
 to place a check upon the fabrication of evidence by excluding documents not
 produced in the first instance unless a good and sufficient reason is given for
 the non production at that time and therefore if a document is not produced
 or entered in the list the plaint itself cannot be rejected (3)

Ought to be produced —See rr 14-17 ante and notes thereto

- (1) *Atmaram v Amirchand* 3 B H C R 99 93 (1866)
 (2) *Gopal Gundapa v Vishnu Krishna* 99 B 971 (1897)
 (3) *Ex parte Rayachand* 2 B H C R A C 369 (1869) *Mewa Lal v Kumerj* 13 C W N 797 (1909)

"Shall not"—The words are imperative, (1) and prohibit a plaintiff from using any document which he ought to have, but did not produce or enter, (2) unless the Court exercises the discretion given to it under this rule (3). But as already stated, if a document is not produced or entered, the plaint itself cannot be rejected (4).

"Leave"—Where documents were referred to an Ameen to inspect, and were ultimately acted upon by the Court, this was held to be abundant proof of "sanction," the term used in the Code of 1859 (5). It is a sufficient reason for the grant of leave that the plaintiff was in ignorance of the existence of the document when the plaint was filed, (6) that the document was with the Collector, to whom it had been sent for the purpose of being stamped, (7) or that the Court is satisfied of its *bond fide* nature and reliableness, (8) or if there is no doubt of the existence of the document at the date of suit (9). The question of reception is one of discretion, which will not be interfered with on appeal (10). Where, however, *Musra* papers which formed the very essence of the action were not filed or produced, the Court was held to have been justified in rejecting them when subsequently tendered in evidence (11).

"Received in evidence"—Merely giving a document to a witness to refresh his memory is not receiving it in evidence, for a document may be so used which is not evidence in itself (12). Such a document is therefore expressly excluded from the section.

Appeal—The reception of evidence afterwards with leave is not a ground of appeal (13). The admission is conclusive even when no reasons are given and the Appellate Court cannot refuse to consider the admitted documents as evidence, (14) though of course, the Appeal Court may attach such weight to the document as it thinks proper, or say whether it ought to be treated as evidence as against particular parties to the suit (15). But the refusal to receive a document may be a good ground of appeal (16).

(1) *Ritchie v Gladstone* 1 Ind Jur, O S 125 (1862)

(2) *Premsook v Rajkrishna* 1 Hyde, 145 (1862-63)

(3) *Lopez v Driberg* W R, 1864 Act X, 67 (1863)

(4) *Ex parte Rayachand* 2 B H C R, A C 369 (1865) *Gopal v Vishnu*, 22 B 971 (1897)

(5) *Gosain Tota v Paja Rukminiballab* 3 B L R, P C 34 (1869), s c, 13 M I A 77, 83. The Allahabad High Court Rules 46 (1) require that the leave, together with the reasons therefor be given by a written order signed by the Judge.

(6) *Ritchie v Gladstone* 1 Ind Jur O S 125 (1862)

(7) *Ex parte Rayachand* 2 B H C R, A C 369 (1865)

(8) *Atta Oollah v Sukceooddeen* 1864,

W R 271 (1863)

(9) *Devidas v Pirjada*, 8 B 377 (1884)

(10) *Atta Oollah v Sukceooddeen* *supra* *vide post*

(11) *Amur Chand v Ram Ruttun* 18 W F 515 (1872)

(12) *Rampi v Rangayya*, 1 M H C R 168 (1863)

(13) *Gosain Tota v Raja Rukminiballab* 3 B L R, P C 34 (1869), s c, 13 M I A 77

(14) *Minakshi v Vellu* 8 W 373 (1885)

(15) *Albar Ali v Bhyca Lal* 6 C 666 (1880)

(16) *Mahaderappa v Srinivasa Pau* 4 M 417 (1881), *Devidas v Pirjada* 8 B 377 (1884). In *Atta Oollah v Sukceooddeen* 1864 W R 271, the Lower Appellate Court received the document and the High Court declined to interfere in special appeal.

ORDER VIII

Written Statement and Set off

1 The defendant may, and if so required by the Court, shall ^{§ 110}
 at or before the first hearing or within such ^{§ 111}
 Written statement. time as the Court may permit, present a written
 statement of his defence

"The defendant"—The rule has been reconstructed and shortened. It formerly commenced *"The parties"*. Ordinarily this was the defendant. But a plaintiff may, after he has filed a plaint, put in a written statement or it may be called for by the Court under r 9 *post*. A Court has no authority to receive a written statement in a suit from one who is not a party or to permit such a person to appear at the hearing (1). A third party will not be allowed to file a statement for a plaintiff or defendant who has neglected to do so himself (2). But if the parties are present in person or by pleader the mere fact that the defendant has not filed a written statement does not warrant the trial of the suit *ex parte* (3). As to the presumption of authenticity see below (4). The corresponding section to this in the Code of 1859 was sect 120.

"At or before the first hearing"—See notes to r 9 *post*. Under the Code of 1859 the word *'before'* did not occur and it was therefore held that the admission of written statements on several dates was wrong (5). Written statements may now be received at any time provided it is before the first hearing or by order of Court under rr 6 and 9. Reasonable time should be given to a defendant to file his written statement (6).

"Present"—The word formerly used was *tender*. The production of the written statement at the trial was held (7) to be the tendering under

(1) Moharane Surnomoyee v Blyant Chunder Mustofee 20 W R 17 (1876)

(2) Denomoyee Dossee v Tara Churn Coondoo Bourke 103 (1865) [application by son to file written statement alleging his interest as reversioner his father the plaintiff having gone away without filing a written statement after he had been ordered to do so]

(3) Sivrajadhani v Kuppagantulu 2 M H C R 311 (1875)

(4) Soorendronath Roy v Heeromonee Burmonce 10 W P L C 30 at p 42 (1868)
 Radha Prasad Singh v Lal Sahab Rai 13 A 53 64 (1890)

(5) Ali Nukeo v Torab Ali W R (1864) p 44

(6) Lokhenath Thakoor v Sobanath Misser 5 W R 39 (1866)

(7) Keshavji Naik v Nasarvanji Ardeshir 10 B H C R 420 427 (1873)

the Code of 1859 But now it would appear to be the presentation of the written statement, whenever that may be

"Written statement"—It has been said that English rules are to be applied with discretion in this country, where a strict system of pleading has not hitherto been followed, but here, as everywhere, the first object of pleading is to inform the persons against whom the suit is directed what the charge is that is laid against them The principle is equally valid as applied to either party in the cause Amendments have, however, now been introduced into the Code to secure a stricter and more accurate system of pleading Under O XIV r 3, *post*, the Court frames the issues according to the allegations in the plaint and written statement (1) As to the nature of a written statement, see notes to O VI r 2 The effect of a written statement may be considered from the point of view of the plaintiff or defendant As regards the former, he has to prove his case He may, however, be dispensed from doing this in whole or in part, by the admission of the defendant What is not admitted must be proved (2) An admission may not only operate to relieve the plaintiff in his proof, but it may shift the burden to the defendant (3) It has sometimes been supposed that no portion of a defendant's written statement can be read against him without the whole statement being read The true rule, however is this that if a man makes a qualified statement (4) you cannot use the statement against him apart from the qualification, not that if a man makes a series of independent unqualified statements any particular one of those statements cannot be used against him (5) A written statement cannot, of course, be read against any party save him by whom it has been made or those who are bound by his admission (6) An admission by one defendant does not bind the others (7) Looking at the matter from the point of view of the defendant, the written statement is, of course not evidence so as to dispense the defendant from proving the facts stated, (8) nor is it evidence in the defendant's favour so that if a defendant admits one fact, and thereby dispenses with proof of it he is not entitled to say that the plaintiff has relied on his statement as evidence and that he the defendant, is in consequence in a position to claim that the whole of it may be read as evidence in his favour (9) Pleadings

(1) *Barjorji Cursetji v Muncherji Kuverji*, 5 B 143, 152 163 (1880)

(2) See *Barjorji Cursetji v Muncherji Kuverji*, 5 B 143 (1880), *Brojo Rajkshore v Bishonauth Dutt* (1864), W R 305 306

(3) See *Maniklal Baboo v Ramdas Mazumdar* 1 B L R, A C 92 (1868)

(4) *Poolin Beharoe Sen v Watson & Co*, 9 W R 190 (1868) [overruling *Nobeen Kushen v Shofatoolah* 1 W R 24], *Radha Churn Chowdhry v Chunder Monce Sikdar*, 9 W R 290 (1868) *Rajah Nilmoney Singh v Ramnath Roy*, 7 W R 29 (1867)

(5) *Balkanathanath Kumar v Chandra Nandan Chowdhry*, 1 B L R, A C 133 137

(1868)

(6) *Juggessur Mookerjee v Gopee Kishen* 5 W R 50 (1866)

(7) See *ib*, *Lachman Singh v Tansukh* 6 A 395 (1884), *Azizullah Khan v Ahmad Ali* 7 A 353 (1885), *Kali Dutt Jha v Abdul Ali*, 16 C 627, 635 (1888)

(8) *Ijutoollah Khan v Ram Churn Gangoolce*, 12 W R 39 (1869), *Moolta Keshce v Koylash Chunder Mitter* 7 W R 493 (1867), *Juggessur Mookerjee v Gopee Kishen*, 5 W R 60, 61 (1866), *Shaikh Shurfuraz v Shaikh Dhunoo* 16 W R 257 (1871)

(9) *Shaikh Shurfuraz v Shaikh Dhunoo* *supra*

in Indian Courts have not hitherto been construed with the same strictness as pleadings in English Courts (1) and therefore a mere omission to deny an allegation has not always been taken as an admission of it so as to dispense the plaintiff from proof of the fact alleged (2) Stricter rules have now been introduced (see O VIII r 5) As against the party affected his statement primarily operates by way of admission and not estoppel (3) If a party wishes to give evidence of a fact of which he became aware after he has filed his plaint or written statement, as the case may be, he should file a written statement or supplementary written statement before the hearing (4) If leave is given to file a further written statement on or before a particular date, it will not, if filed after that date be ordered to be taken off the file if the opposite party has delayed to make an application until the trial (5) Where an additional written statement sought to be admitted was inconsistent with the original written statement, the Court said that in such cases there was a difference between an application by the plaintiff and by the defendant The plaintiff would not be allowed to file such a statement It allowed the filing on payment of all costs observing, however, that the supplementary written statement would rightly be the subject of strong comment at the hearing (6) The Code, it was held, did not contemplate the filing by a plaintiff of a written statement after seeing the written statement of the defendant and by way of rejoinder thereto (7), but rr 6 and 9 refer to written statements in answer to claims of set-off A written statement whether it be called for by the Court after the first hearing or is filed by the parties under this rule at or before the first hearing need not be stamped (8)

2. *The defendant must raise by his pleadings all matters*

New facts must be specially pleaded which show the suit not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of defence as, if not raised, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the plaint, as, for instance, fraud, limitation, release, payment, performance, or facts showing illegality.

Specially pleaded — It often is not enough for a party to deny an allegation in his opponent's pleading, he must go further and dispute its

(1) *Nawab Nazim v Omrao Begam* 21 W R 59 60 (1873) and case cited in next note

(2) *Natha Singh v Jodha Singh* 6 A 406 413 (1884)

(3) See *Abdul Rahim v Madhavray Apaji* 14 B 78 82 (1889), *Maharajah Mirza Ananda v Pidiaparti* 13 I A 32 42 (1885) *Mina Konwari v Juggut Sefani* 10 C 194 (1883) [petition], *Madhopersad v Gajadbur* 11 C 111 (1884)

(4) *Munchershaw Bezonji v New Dhur*

rumsey etc Co 4 B 576 (1880)

(5) *The New Fleming and Spinning etc Co v Kessowji Naik* 9 B 373 381 (1885)

(6) *Dasmant Dasi v Srinath Ghose* 3 B L R App 11 (1869) See however, observations of P C in *Douglas v Collector of Benares* 5 W I A 271 at pp 289, 290 (1851)

(7) *Jadub Ram Deb v Ram Lochun Muduck* 5 W R 56 (1866)

(8) *In re Cherag Ali*, 12 C L R 347 (1882) *Nagu v Yeknath* 5 B 400 (1881)

validity in law, or set up some affirmative case of his own in answer to it. In the technical language of the old pleaders it will not serve his turn to merely *traverse* the allegation, he must *confess and avoid*. Thus if the plaintiff sets up a contract which was in fact made, it will be idle for the defendant merely to *traverse* (i.e. deny) the making of the contract, he should *confess* (i.e. admit) that he made the contract but *avoid* the effect of that confession by pleading the Statute of Frauds or Limitations or setting up that the contract has been duly performed or rescinded. A defendant however, is not bound to admit an allegation which he seeks thus to *avoid* or which he alleges to be bad in law. He may at the same time deny its truth so long as he makes it quite clear how much he is denying. He may indeed, take all three courses at once: the allegation may be traversed in point of fact, and objected to as bad in law and at the same time collateral matter may be pleaded to destroy its effect. Any number of defences may now be pleaded together in the same action without leave although they are obviously inconsistent (1). A defendant may raise by his defence without leave, as many distinct and separate and therefore inconsistent defences as he may think proper subject only to the provision (2) contained in O VI r 16 as to striking out embarrassing matter. And a defence is not embarrassing merely because it contains inconsistent averments (3). But all these various defences must be clearly and distinctly pleaded and the facts upon which each is grounded should be stated separately. As a rule each defence should form a separate paragraph. The defendant must make it quite clear what line of defence he is adopting. Any plea which wears a doubtful aspect will be struck out as embarrassing (4). Above all special defences of this kind must not be mixed up with traverses or insinuated into pleas which deny the facts alleged by the plaintiff (5). The office of a traverse is to contradict not to excuse or justify the act complained of, its object is to compel the plaintiff to prove the truth of the allegation traversed not to dispute its sufficiency in point of law. All matter in confession and avoidance all matter justifying or excusing the act complained of must be specially and separately pleaded, so must all matters which go to show that the contract sued on is illegal or invalid or which if not expressly stated would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings. And no evidence of such matters can be given at the trial if they be not expressly pleaded. This is only fair play' (6).

3 It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages

"It shall not be sufficient" — This is one of the greatest improvements

- (1) Annual Practice notes to O 19, r 15
(2) *Per* Thesiger L.J., in *Berdan v*
Freewood 3 F & D p 200
(3) *Re Morgan* 30 C. D 492

- (4) *Ann Pr loc cit* *Stokes v Grant* 4 C.
P D 25
(5) *Belt v Lawes* 51 L J Q B 309
(6) *Ann Pr loc cit*

introduced by the Judicature Act. Formerly the defendant was allowed to plead what was called "the general issue," i.e. "that he was not guilty," or "that he never was indebted as alleged," both of which were conclusions of mixed law and fact. Now a defendant may no longer deny generally the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim. He must take each matter which is alleged against him separately, and either admit it, or deny it, or say that he does not admit it. "It is not merely denial which is meant; the rule covers non admission" as well. Whether the defendant says "I deny" or "I do not admit," he is equally bound to deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth (1). This is the general principle which now governs every traverse. And in order to make this general principle quite clear, special instances are given in subsequent rules (English) (2). "In actions for a debt or liquidated demand in money, comprised in O 3, r 6 (English), a mere denial of the debt shall be inadmissible" (English O 21, r 1). "In actions upon bills of exchange, promissory notes, or cheques a defence in denial must deny some matter of fact, e.g. the drawing, making, endorsing, accepting, presenting or notice of dishonour of the bill or note" (English O 21, r 2). "In actions for goods bargained and sold, or sold and delivered, the defence must deny the order or contract, the delivery, or the amount claimed, in an action for money had and received, it must deny the receipt of the money, or the existence of those facts which are alleged to make such receipt by the defendant, a receipt to the use of the plaintiff" (English O 21, r 3).

"Deal specifically."—What is meant by dealing specifically with an allegation of fact? It means that the party pleading must make it perfectly clear how much he admits, and how much of it he denies. If he does this the Court will not quarrel with the phrase which he uses. He must not deny *en bloc* everything alleged against him. A defendant may not now plead "that he denies specifically every allegation contained in the Statement of Claim (or plaint)". Still, in order to deny specifically it is not necessary to write out every sentence in the Statement of Claim and traverse it in detail. It is sufficient when dealing with matters of inducement or any other allegations which do not go to the gist of the action, to plead that "the defendant denies each of the allegations contained in paragraph 8". This will have the same effect as copying out the whole paragraph and constantly inserting "not". But when the pleader comes to those allegations which are of the gist of the action he must be more precise. He must plead "The defendant never agreed as alleged" or "never spoke or published any of the said words" or "never made any such representation as is alleged in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim" (3).

Sometimes, in order to obey the rule and to deal specifically with every allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth it is necessary for the defendant to place on the record two or more distinct traverses to one and the same allegation. Thus, if he pleads, "The defendant never broke or entered the plaintiff's close" he thereby admits that the close in question belongs to

(1) *Per Jessel M.R.*, in *Thorp v. Holdsworth*, 3 C. D. p. 640.

(2) *Annual Practice*, notes to O 19, r 17.

(3) *Id.*

the plaintiff. If he intends at the trial to deny that the plaintiff owned or possessed that close, he must say so distinctly and in a separate plea. If he wishes to raise both defences—to deny the act complained of and also the plaintiff's title to the land—he must put on the record two separate paragraphs e.g. 1 "The defendant never broke or entered the said close." 2 "The said close is not the close of the plaintiff." Merely to deny an allegation in terms will often be ambiguous and therefore evasive. The pleader must always answer "the point of substance" alleged against him, otherwise his pleading will be deemed evasive (r 19, corresponding with next rule). And if an allegation be made against him with details of time and place, etc., he must deny the substance of the allegation and not confine himself to denying it along with those immaterial details (1).

"Each allegation of fact"—Only allegations of fact should be denied. Matter of law should not be traversed. And the defendant should never traverse matter not alleged against him. He should be content to answer what is laid against him in the Statement of Claim and not trouble about any other matters which the plaintiff might have, but has not raised (2). Moreover it is no part of his duty when drafting his defence, to anticipate what the plaintiff may hereafter allege in his reply (3).

"Except damages"—'No denial or defence shall be necessary as to damages claimed or their amount, but they shall be deemed to be put in issue in all cases unless expressly admitted' (English O 21, r 4). This rule applies to damage of all kinds whether special or general and whether the alleged damage is part of the cause of action or not (4).

4 *Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the*
Evasive denial *plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer*
the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged
that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to
deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that
he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much
he received. And if an allegation is made with divers circumstances
it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances

Evasion—The pleader must deal specifically with every allegation of fact made by his opponent—that is he must either admit it frankly or deny it boldly. Any half admission or half denial is evasive. Thus a defence in these words, "The terms of the arrangement were never definitely agreed upon as alleged" was held evasive. Jessel MR said "The defendant is bound to deny that any agreements or any terms of arrangement were ever come to if that is what he means, if he does not mean that he should say that there

(1) Annual Practice, notes to O 19 r 1"
 See next rule

(2) *Rassam v Budge* (1893) 1 Q B 571

(3) Ann Pr note O 19 r 18

(4) *Ib* *Wulby v Elston* 8 C B 142
 (1849) 18 L J C P 370, and see the remarks of Hawkins J in *Wood v Earl of Durham* 21 Q B D p. 508

were no terms of arrangement come to except the following terms, and then state what the terms were " (1)

"Point of substance"—Again, a traverse often becomes evasive if it follows too closely the precise language of the allegation traversed. Thus, in *Tillesley v. Harper* (2) the Statement of Claim alleged that the defendant offered the plaintiff a bribe of £500. The defendant pleaded, following the exact words of the Statement of Claim, that "the defendant had never offered the plaintiff a bribe of £500," which would have been true if he had offered £100 or £499, or any other sum. Fry, J., held that the substance was that a bribe had been offered and that that was not fairly or substantially denied. The defendant should have pleaded that he never offered "a bribe of £500 or any other sum." Leave to amend was eventually given (3).

• "Along with those circumstances"—That is to say, if the plaintiff alleges that he "paid the defendant £500 at 35, Fleet Street on March 3rd, 1901, in the presence of A B," it is an evasive traverse for the defendant to plead "The plaintiff did not pay the defendant £500 at 35, Fleet Street, on March 3rd, 1901, in the presence of A B." For he might have paid the defendant £500 on another day or in another place, or when A B was not present. And these details are only "circumstances", they are not of the essence of the allegation. It is sufficient and proper for the defendant to answer the point of substance and to plead "The plaintiff never paid the defendant £500 or any other sum" (4).

5. Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability :

Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission

Answering opponent's pleading—The rules of O VI VIII have defined both the manner in which each party should state his own case, and also prescribe how he should answer his opponent's pleading. The main object of the latter rules (5) is "to secure that each party in turn should fully admit or clearly deny every material allegation made against him so that they may promptly arrive at an issue. With this object three general principles are declared —

1 It is not sufficient to deny generally the matters alleged by the opposite party, but each party must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth (O VIII r 3)

2 When a party in any pleading denies an allegation of fact in the previous pleading of the opposite party, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance (O VIII r 4)

(1) Ann. Pr., note to O 19 r 19; Thorp

(3) 10 C D 393

2 Holdsworth, 3 C. D. p. 641

(4) Ann. Pr., note to O 19, r 19

(2) 7 C D 403

(5) Ib., r 13

3 Every allegation of fact in any pleading shall be taken to be admitted if it is not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted (O VIII r 5)

This rule is taken from English O 19, r. 13, but the Legislature has modified the rigour of the rule by providing in accordance with sect 58 of the Evidence Act, that the Court may notwithstanding the absence of any specific denial require any fact to be proved by the party who relies on it

Admissions—A defendant ought not to deny plain and acknowledged facts which it is neither to his interest nor in his power to do so

to have
ther
pro
an a
plaintiff's favour (2) It is in the discretion of the Court to allow or disallow an application for amendment of a plaint (3) There is no difference in effect between *denying* and *not admitting* an allegation (4) The distinction usually observed is that a party denies any matter which, if it has occurred would have been within his own knowledge, while he refuses to admit matters which are alleged to have happened behind his back But whether he denies or does not admit he must make it perfectly clear how much he disputes and how much he admits (5)

11] 6 (1) Where in a suit for the recovery of money the defendant claims to set off against the plaintiff's demand any ascertained sum of money legally recoverable by him from the plaintiff, not exceeding the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, and both parties fill the same character as they fill in the plaintiff's suit, the defendant may, at the first hearing of the suit, but not afterwards unless permitted by the Court, present a written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be set off

(2) The written statement shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in respect both of the original claim and of the set off but this shall not affect the lien, upon the amount decreed, of any pleader in respect of the costs payable to him under the decree

(1) *Per Mahugs v C, Lee Conservancy Board v Button* 12 C D 383 affirmed 6 App Cas 685

(2) *Satyee Chandra Sarkar v Monmohini Das* 19 C L J 518 (1914) p 523, *per Jenkins v J*

(3) *Id.*

(4) *Per Grove J in Hall v L & N W Ry Co* 35 L T 848

(5) *Thorp v Holdsworth* 3 C D p 610
Harris v Gamble 7 C D 877 *British Land Association v Foster*, 4 Times Rep 571
Rutter v Tregent, 12 C D 718 and see O VIII r 3

(3) *The rules relating to a written statement by a defendant apply to a written statement in answer to a claim of set off*

Illustrations

(a) A bequeaths Rs 2 000 to B and appoints C his executor and residuary legatee. B dies and D takes out administration to B's effects. C pays Rs 1 000 as surety for D, then D sues C for the legacy. C cannot set off the debt of Rs 1 000 against the legacy for neither C nor D fills the same character with respect to the legacy as they fill with respect to the payment of the Rs 1 000.

(b) A dies intestate and in debt to B. C takes out administration to A's effects and B buys part of the effects from C. In a suit for the purchase money by C against B the latter cannot set off the debt against the price for C fills two different characters, one as the vendor to B in which he sues B and the other as representative to A.

(c) A sues B on a bill of exchange. B alleges that A has wrongfully neglected to insure B's goods and is liable to him in compensation which he claims to set off. The amount not being ascertained cannot be set off.

(d) A sues B on a bill of exchange for Rs 500. B holds a judgment against A for Rs 1 000. The two claims being both definite pecuniary demands may be set off.

(e) A sues B for compensation on account of trespass. B holds a promissory note for Rs 1 000 from A and claims to set off that amount against any sum that A may recover in the suit. B may do so for as soon as A recovers both sums are definite pecuniary demands.

(f) A and B sue C for Rs 1 000. C cannot set off a debt due to him by A alone.

(g) A sues B and C for Rs 1 000. B cannot set off a debt due to him alone by A.

(h) A owes the partnership firm of B and C Rs 1 000. B dies leaving C surviving. A sues C for a debt of Rs 1 500 due in his separate character. C may set off the debt of Rs 1 000.

7 *Where the defendant relies upon several distinct grounds of defence or set off founded upon separate and distinct facts, they shall be stated as far as may be separately and distinctly*

Defence or set off founded on separate grounds

8 *Any ground of defence which has arisen after the institution of the suit or the presentation of a written statement claiming a set off may be raised by the defendant or plaintiff, as the case may be, in his written statement*

New ground of defence

Set off—This is sect. 111 of the former Code with the amendments noted in italics and with the omission of the second paragraph of the former section dealing with inquiry. The limitations in jurisdiction which it contained have been transferred to the first clause and the rest of the paragraph was probably

considered unnecessary. The third clause has been added. R 7 is taken from English O 20, r 7. R 8 is new.

This rule deals with the cross claim known as legal set off, and which is a claim or demand which the defendant in an action sets off against the claim of the plaintiff, as being his due, whereby he may extinguish the plaintiff's demand, either in whole or in part, according to the amount of the set off (1). It is to be distinguished from a plea of payment (2). The defence of payment does not admit that the demand sued upon is just, it attacks the plaintiff's claim and urges matter to defeat or at least reduce it on account of some matter connected therewith. But set off arises out of a transaction extrinsic of the plaintiff's cause of action, being a mutual independent claim. Again while set off is the creation of law, payment is an act of the defendant's consent, express or implied (3).

There is a distinction also, as regards the mode of pleading. A set off is a cross debt or claim, on which a separate action may be sustained. Payment can only be the subject of defence to another's action. Set off may be pleaded or not at the defendant's pleasure. Failure to do so will not bar a suit by him for the amount of the set off, as is the case with the defence of payment. Set off must be specially pleaded, and the facts constituting it proved by the defendant as if he were himself the plaintiff to another action (4). Recoupment, which is the keeping back of something due because there is an equitable reason to withhold it, is also to be distinguished both from payment and set off. It can only extinguish the plaintiff's demand in whole or in part, and can never lead to a decree in the defendant's favour (5).

Common law did not recognize any right of set-off. A defendant who had any cross claim could not raise it in the plaintiff's action. He had to bring a cross action. Legal set off is the creation of Statute, that is, to be allowed a set off, it must be shown that there is a statutory right (6). Successive but limited Statutes were enacted to remove the defect and inconvenience arising from this non recognition and consequent circuitry of action and the right to plead a set off was first conferred by 2 Geo II c 22. A set off was allowed in certain cases (7). It was a defence proper to the plaintiff's action defeating or reducing a plaintiff's claim. It was a shield and not a sword (8). It was allowed only in a limited number of cases and when established its effect was to show that the plaintiff could not recover at

(1) Black Dict p 422. See Ishri : Gopal Saran : A 351 355 (1884) as to the general principle of set off which has been held applicable in a case not provided for by the Code, and is recognized in other sections viz 216 221, 246 247.

(2) Koonjo Behary : Nilmoney 4 C I R 296 (1879).

(3) See Hukm Chand : C P C 751.

(4) Waterman on Set off § 2. Hukm Chand : C P C 752. Dale : Sollett 4 Burr 2133. Dinwiddie : Bailey, 6 Ves 142. and as to the difference between a right of account and

set off see Ranger : Great Western Ry Co 5 II L Cas 91. A plaintiff cannot compel a defendant to set off. Pandey : Polkham 21 C 419 (1893).

(5) See the subject fully discussed in Hukm Chand : C P C 54-758.

(6) Laskard etc Ry Co v Caradon Ry Co 18 Times Rep 1.

(7) See the note in Ann Pr 1900 pp 232 and 233 on the subject of set off and counter claims by Mr Blake Odgers & C.

(8) Per Cockburn C J in Stocke : Taylor 1 Q B D 575.

all or was entitled to recover less than what was claimed and if the debt due from the plaintiff to the defendant exceeded the amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff the defendant could not before 1875 recover the difference in the plaintiff's action he could only set off an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim and had to bring a cross action for the balance

Equity, however allowed a set off subject to certain restrictions and limitations Equitable set off was allowed where the party seeking the benefit of it showed some particular equitable ground for being protected against his adversary's demand The existence of any particular condition was not considered absolutely necessary for allowing the set off, though the mere existence of cross demands was not considered sufficient Some of the grounds most often shown for equitable set off were the common origin of and connection between the demands mutual credit, the inability of the defendant otherwise to recover and in cases of assignments and trusts (1) Up to the date of the Judicature Act 1873 there was thus both the statutory or legal set-off and equitable set off both of which were subject to certain limitations

Though the old law as to set off still remains in force the Judicature Act created the modern counterclaim A set off remains precisely what it was before the Act and every other kind of cross claim is a counterclaim The differences between the two are very considerable

A set off was allowed only in certain cases Legal set off was confined to the cases mentioned by the Statutes Equitable set off applied only when the cross claim arose out of the same transaction no set off being allowed unless defendant's claim had some relation to the plaintiff's demand but every cross claim of whatever kind can now in England be pleaded as a counter claim The claim and counterclaim may arise out of entirely different transactions so long as they can conveniently be tried together Thus a claim founded on tort may be opposed to one founded on contract and *vice versa* Nextly a counterclaim is not like a set off a mere defence it is substantially a cross action The effect of this is that if the defendant's claim exceeds that of the plaintiff he will be entitled to a decree for it in the plaintiff's action and need not bring a separate action for the securing of the excess of his claim over the plaintiff's claim

To sum up there were thus in English law three varieties of cross claims— (a) *set off* which might be (a) *legal* where the amount to be set off was a liquidated demand within the Statute and (b) *equitable* where though the amount was unliquidated the cross claim arose out of the same transaction as that sued upon, and (b) *counterclaim* which goes beyond both and allows all sorts of cross claims even those arising out of *different* transactions subject merely to the convenience of trial

In this country however there is no counterclaim in the sense stated (2)

(1) See Hukm Chand C. P. C. 753-767 The subject of set off and counterclaim will be found fully discussed in this Author's notes to sect. 111 of the last Code

(2) See Abul Hasan v. Gohra Jan 5 A 301 (1883) where Straight J. pointed out that

the Indian Law of Procedure did not sanction a set off or counterclaim in all the cases contemplated by the English Supreme Court Rules and Secretary of State v. Madans Lal 13 A. 296-299 300 (1891) per Mahmood, J. Roulet v. Fetterle 18 B. 71 (1894) [under the

Set off, however, had long been, prior to the enactment of sect 121 of the Code of 1859, recognized. A rule of legal set off in India is contained in this rule which is only an amplified version of sect 121 of the Code of 1859 as that section was construed by the Indian Courts. It has, however, been held that that section and the section in the last Code corresponding with the present rule only laid down a rule of procedure in regard to cases of set off but were not exhaustive of those cases, and that it was not intended to take away any rights of set off, whether legal or equitable, which parties would have independently of it (1). And it is well settled that Indian Courts may allow equitable set off in cases in which Equity Courts in England allow the same even though such cases do not fall within the language of the present rule (2). Cross claims are thus in this country limited to cases of set off (as distinguished from counterclaim), whether such set off is legal or equitable. It is, however, to be observed that under this rule a set off is treated as a plea in a cross action, so that the defendant may get a decree for it, whereas, as already pointed out, set off, prior to the Judicature Act could only reduce or extinguish the plaintiff's claim, and a separate action would have had to be brought to recover the amount of any excess beyond the plaintiff's claim.

In pleading a set off the defendant assumes the position of a plaintiff and is required to prove the same facts which he would be required to prove if he had brought an original action on his demand. The plaintiff cannot, by taking a dismissal of the suit, avoid an inquiry into the merits of the set off. *Vide post*. In a suit for rent due on a *mokurari* tenure held by the defendant, the defence was that he was entitled to set off against the plaintiff's claim a certain sum due to him on a decree passed by the Privy Council between the same parties. It was held that the set off could be entertained and inquired into, the decree of the Privy Council not being under execution and sect 216 of the last Code being inapplicable to the case (3).

The present rule does not, of course, affect the special provisions relating to set off in proceedings in insolvency (4) and in the winding up

Code a cross claim cannot be set up as a defence except when it arises out of the very transaction sued upon and is in the nature of a set off. *Fakir Chandra Dutta v. Gisborne*, 8 C W N 174 (1903), where a set off was disallowed as being based upon a separate transaction. S 128 (c) allows of rules being made

(1) *Clark v. Ruthnavaleo* 2 M H C R 296 (1865), *Kustnasamy Pillai v. Municipal Commissioners of Madras*, 4 M H C R 120 (1868), *Kishor Chand Champalal v. Madhaji Vissam*, 4 B 407 (1879), *Kookmny Bulbub v. Mulk Jamania* 9 C 914, 918 (1883), *Bhagbat v. Ramdeb* 11 C 557 (1885), *Prag Lal v. Maxwell*, 7 A 284 (1885), *Chisholm v. Gopal Chunder*, 16 C 711 (1889), *Gobind Parshad v. Murree Brewery*, 1885, P R No 47. This view received statutory recognition by the addition in 1888 of the last paragraph

in s 216 of the last Code. *Subramanian Chettiar v. Muthuswami Aiyangar* 1 M L J 481 (1907), *Kalanand Singh v. Sri Prasad Das*, 19 C L J 152 (1913).

(2) *Brojendra Nath Das v. Budge Budge Jute Mill*, 29 C 527 (1893), *Niaz Gul Khan v. Durga Prasad* 15 A 9 (1893) [*follo* *Nand Ram v. Ram Prasad*, 27 A 145 (1904)] and *vide post*. *Dobson & Barlow v. Dargal Spinning etc. Co.*, 21 B 120, 135 (1896), *Fakir Chandra Dutta v. Gisborne & Co.*, 8 C W N 174 (1903).

(3) *Bharath Prasad Sahi v. Pameshwar Koer* 8 C W N 118 (1903) s c, 30 C 1066 (4) See Insolvent Act 11 & 1st Vict c 21 s 39, *Miller v. Beer*, 6 C L R 294 (1880) [*dist* *Young v. Bank of Bengal*, 1 M I A 47 (1836)] *Miller v. National Bank of India* 91 C 146 (1891).

of limited companies (1) which have been embodied in the Acts governing these proceedings in India. As to the Transfer of Property Act (2) and the special cross claim (3) provided for by sect 95 see below. As to the decree when set-off is allowed and effect of decree as to sum awarded to defendant, see O XX r 19 post.

Equitable set off—It has already been stated (4) that this rule does not take away any rights of equitable set off (5) which parties would have independent of it. The statutory rule of set off is absolute in its terms, and where a case is within it a set off is given as of right, but equitable set off, from its very nature depends on the equities of each particular case, and therefore on the discretion of the Court. It cannot be claimed as of right, and will be allowed only where the Court deems it equitable to allow it in any case (6) though the Court will be guided in the exercise of its discretion by the decisions of the English Equity Courts which have been recognized in this country (7). Equitable set off exists not only in cases of mutual debts and credits but also where the cross demands arise out of one and the same transaction or are so connected in their nature and circumstances as to make it inequitable that the plaintiff should recover and the defendant be driven to a cross suit (8). Thus unascertained damages for partial breach of a contract may be set off in answer to a claim for money due on that contract so far as it was fulfilled, as the cross demands in such a case are connected with the same transaction and arise out of one and the same contract (9) and in a suit for arrears of salary there has been allowed to be set off the value of goods and property damaged lost or not accounted for, by the plaintiff (10). Where a defendant set up an agreement to the effect that the rents payable on account of lands held by the plaintiff

(1) See Act VI of 1882 s 150.

(2) See *Shiva Devi v Jaru Hegga* 15 M 900 (1891) [waste by mortgagee in possession].

(3) *Roulet v Fetterle*, 18 B 717 (1894).

(4) *Idem ante* p 738.

(5) As to the meaning of see also j 73 *ante*.

(6) *Dobson and Barlow v Bengal Spinning etc Co* 21 B 126 at p 130 (1896) where the proposed set off was disallowed there being no equitable grounds for admitting it and there being a likely to be great delay in investigating it.

(7) See *Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 778 equitable set off was very early recognized *vide ante* p 738 and *Pamagopal v Mallikarjanulu* 1 M H C R. 396 where the Court observed that the question should be dealt with on the principle of English Courts of Equity.

(8) *Clark v Ruthnavallu* 2 M H C P 296 (1865) *Kalarand Singh v Sri Prasad Das* 19 C I J 152 (1913) *Fakir Chandra Dutta v Chaborn & Co* 8 C W N 174

(1893) where however the set off was disallowed as being based upon a separate transaction and see *Hosanna Bhee v Smith* 13 B L P 410 (1874) where however the Court as pointed out (*Hukm Chand C. P. C.* 777 n) took a very restricted view of the equity. As to whether it is in equitable will of course depend upon the facts of each case. *Dobson and Barlow v Bengal Spinning etc Co* 21 B 126 at p 130 (1896).

(9) *Kastnasami Pillai v Municipal Commission Madras* 4 M H C R 120 (1868) *Radha Ram Deb v James* 6 W P 410 (1873) *Gauri Sahai v Ram Sahai* (185) N W I H C P 157 *Prag Lal v Maxwell* A 281 (1880) *Coband Pershad v Murree Brewery* 1885 P P No 4 *Nazmul Khan v Durga Prasad* 10 A. 9 (1893) *Brojen Lal Nath Das v Bulge Budge Jute Mill* 20 C J. (1893).

(10) *Chhoti v Chhoti Chander* 10 C 11 (1889).

under the defendant were credited to the plaintiff on account of rent due to him from the defendant, it was held that the plea was one of payment and of account and set off in a general sense, and not one of set off under sect 111 of the last Code (now represented by rule 6 of this Order) (1)

"Sett for the recovery of money."—Thus no set off may be claimed in a suit for property, or for a declaratory decree or injunction, (2) nor is a suit for moveable property one for the recovery of money, even though a money value be assigned in the plaint to the property, and the decree may contain a provision of an alternative character for the payment of the money by the defendant in case of default in the delivery of the property. It has been doubted but not decided, whether a suit for an account can be held to be for recovery of money within the meaning of this section, (3) but a suit for dissolution of partnership with a prayer that the balance due should be paid, is within the section (4). It is to be observed that there is a difference in the wording of the rule as regards the plaintiff's demand and the defendant's set-off. The latter must be of an ascertained sum. The suit, however need not be for an ascertained sum, the words "recovery of money" including claims for unliquidated damages and mesne profits. See illustration (e) to the rule (5). Even in the case of a set off not falling within the provisions of this section the claims must both be for money, as is indicated by the terms, O XX r 19, *post*.

"Claims to set off"—A defendant cannot be permitted to carry on two suits for the same demand at the same time and using a demand in set off as a bar to a subsequent suit for that demand. A defendant may, however it has been submitted, claim a set off of a demand during the pendency of a suit for the same demand (6).

"Ascertained sum"—The word 'debt' was used in the Code of 1859. It was held restricted to an ascertained sum and to exclude unliquidated damages and mesne profits as being damages (7). Under the last and present Code the matter is clear, both from the use of the word "ascertained" and the addition of illustration (c) to the section. The sum sought to be set off under

(1) *Edward Dalglish v Ramdin* 14 C W N 170 (1909)

(2) *Eberle's Hotels v Jonas* 18 Q B D 459, see *Manby v Manby*, 14 W R 136 (1870)

(3) *Nankaraj v Ho Htaw*, 13 C 124 (1886) s c, 13 I A 48

(4) *Rampujan Mal v Chand Mal*, 10 A 587 (1888)

(5) Under the Code of 1859 the suit must have been for a debt and a suit for mesne profits was held not to be such. *Rotee Rumun v Greeja Nund*, 5 W R 160 (1866). This however is not so now [see III (c)] though the result both of the claim and set off must be a pecuniary liability. See *Ahmedabad Advance, etc Co v Lalshushanker*, 30 B

173, 193 (1905)

(6) *Hukm Chand, C P C* 783

(7) *Rutee Zummun v Gurj Nund* Wym R 218, *Bachant v Hamid Hossein* 11 M I A 377, at p 386 (1871), *Gocool Coomar v Bhichooek Singh* 22 W R 1 (18 4) *Scanlan v Herrold*, 10 W R. 295 (1868) *Hosseina Bibee v Smr'h* 22 W R 15 (18 4) s c 13 B L P 440, *Ram Dyal v Ram Dhan Dass* 4 Agra 43 (1868), *Kaleo Coomar v Huro Chunder* 17 W R 177 (1872) [as regards this case it has been said in O Kinsely v C P C that some stress seems to have been laid on the fact that the claims were altogether of another nature but looking at III (c) that would not by itself be a valid objection] *vide post*

this rule must be a sum ascertained, that is liquidated and not damages undetermined (1) such as a liquidated amount due under a bond (2) or a debt payable according to an award (3) The sum to be set off must be ascertained before the set off is claimed and it is not sufficient that it may be ascertained on inquiry (4) The claim is sufficiently certain if it is capable of being reduced to a certainty by simple calculation (5) A sum decreed is ascertained and may be set off (6) No decree by way of set off can be awarded to a defendant for a sum to be ascertained on a settlement of accounts even though the result of the suit shows that nothing is due to the plaintiff (7) There is nothing in this rule to restrict the set-off to claims in respect of the same matter which forms the subject of the plaintiff's suit The rule allows a set off of every ascertained sum of money, and no restriction should be placed on that right which is not to be found in the section itself Though the restrictions on equitable set off of unascertained sums are proper there is no reason as there is no authority for grafting them on to the law in regard to ascertained sums (8) While it is a general principle of set off at law that the amount claimed should be certain and ascertained and that an unliquidated demand may not be set off even if it should arise on the same contract on which the plaintiff's demand is based this is not so in the case of equitable set off This may be allowed in the case of unliquidated damages that is an amount which can only be ascertained by the decision of the Court (9) where the respective claims of the parties arise out of one and the same transaction (10)

(1) Pragi Lal v Maxwell 2 A. 284 (1885)
Raghu Nath Das v Ashraf Hussain 2 A. 250
(1890) [this decision was however prior to

396 (1883)]

(2) Watson & Co v Brojo Soondree Debis 10 W. R. 225 (1871)

(3) Gouri Saha v Ram Saha 7 A. H. C. R. 157 (1875)

(4) Hukm Chand C. P. C. 788 see Zum meeroonissa v Gayer 6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 96 (1866) the contrary was held in Warburton v Anderson 1870 P. R. No. 20 mainly on the ground that the amount spent in repairs though not ascertained at the beginning of the inquiry would be so at the time the inquiry contemplated by the section was finished and the Court would have to make a decree the amount being a debt if the tenant could show that he had not spent more than the landlord was bound to spend However if this argument were correct then it has been pointed out (Hukm Chand 789) every claim for unliquidated damages might be set off as after inquiry the amount of

such damages would also be an ascertained amount

(5) See Hukm Chand C. P. C. 89

(6) See Ill (d) Bhagawan Kunwar v Lala Bajrath Prasad 2 B. L. R. A. C. 84 (1868)

(7) Huro Soondree v Bungshes Mohu 10 W. R. 30 (1866)

(8) Hukm Chand C. P. C. 90 whose observations are supported by Ill (e) the section where the set off is in respect of a different matter As pointed out by him any observations to a contrary effect in Abul Hasan v Zohra Jan 10 A. 299 301 (1883) Amir Zama v Nathu Mal 8 A. 396 (1886) were not necessary No grounds are given for the decision which was under the old Code Heera Lal v Bashen Suhaye 1 W. R. 997 (1864) and it does not appear to have ever been followed

(9) Kristnasamy Pillai v Municipal Commissioners Madras 4 M. H. C. 1 190 198 199 (1868)

(10) Kishorchand Champalal v Madhawal Visram 4 B. 407 (1879) but not where the claims are wholly unconnected Clark v Ruthnavallu Chetti 2 M. H. C. R. 296 (1860) vide ante

"Legally recoverable"—Set off is allowed to prevent cross actions. It was not intended to give new rights, except to the extent of giving facilities for the enforcing of rights which are already enforceable in an action, and it has always been accordingly held that a set-off can only be successfully pleaded when an action could have been maintained for the same debt (1). As the sum must be legally recoverable, a demand arising out of a transaction which is legally invalid cannot be the subject of a set-off. A defendant therefore cannot recover in respect of a claim without cause of action, (2) or barred under sect 11, ante (3), or O II r 2, or by the Limitation Act, (4) or based on a decree incapable of being enforced, (5) or in respect of an infant's debt (6). In a suit for arrears of rent the amount of a new road cess paid by the defendant was held not to have been payable by the plaintiff under the terms of the lease, as a prior income tax was, and therefore not recoverable by the defendant from the plaintiff and thus not liable to be set off (7). In short, the claim sought to be set off must be one upon which a separate action could have been maintained. The money set off must be of course recoverable from the plaintiff not from any one else, and it must be due to the defendant, who cannot set up a right subsisting in a third party. The defendant's right of set-off of a demand against a person is not affected by the circumstance that the suit is brought not by that person but by an assignee of his. This is so, even where the assignment is by a sale in execution of a decree against him (8). A cannot set off against a claim made by B, in respect of separate dealings between him and A a debt due from a firm consisting of a father and two sons, one of whom is B (9). Neither can a defendant set off against a claim of money any portion of an amount in respect of which the defendant, jointly with another, not a party to the suit, can claim contribution from the plaintiff. (10). Where in a suit by a company in liquidation it was argued that the defendant's claim was not legally recoverable as his remedy was only proof in liquidation, where probably he would recover not the whole of the ascertained sum but only a dividend, it was held that the words "legally recoverable" had no reference to the ability of the debtor to pay the demand in full, and that a sum was legally recoverable though in the result the creditor must be satisfied with a dividend (11).

"The same character"—Mutuality of debts is required not only as

(1) *Rawley v Rawley*, 1 Q B D 400, at p 466

(2) *Zameerunnissa v Gayer*, 6 W R Ref 26 (1866) subsisting when the suit was instituted, *Gocool Coomar v Bhuchook Singh*, 22 W R 1 (1874)

(3) See *Amur Zama v Nathu Mal* S A 336 (1886), where it was held that the set off was not barred under s 13

(4) *Pragi Lal v Maxwell*, 7 A 284 (1880), *Heeralal v Bisen Suhaye*, 1 W R 296 (1864). And see *Bachnan Lal v Banarsi Das*, 35 A 238 (1913), 17 C W N 1213 (a debt barred by Limitation Act but not by Punjab Act 1 of 1904 allowed as set off)

(5) *Huro Parshad v Pool Kishore* 16 W R 308 (1871)

(6) *Rawley v Rawley* 1 Q B D 400

(7) *Surnomoyee Dabee v Puresh Nara v Roy*, 4 C 576 (1878) *Shumbhu Nath v Huro Soondaree*, 11 C I R 140 (1882)

(8) *Bhagawan Kunwar v Lal Bahgnath Prasad*, 2 B I R, A C 81 (1868)

(9) *Dhunjat Singh v Forbes* 1 Ind Jur S 351 (1862)

(10) *Umanath v Monsurah*, 14 C W N 786 (1910)

(11) *Ahmedabad Advance, etc Co v Lakshminshanker*, 30 B 173 (1904).

regards the identity of the parties, but also as regards the quality of their rights. The debts should not only be due to and from the same person but in the same capacity. A party may act in different characters and his private will be held different from his official character. So in a suit by a public officer in his official character, the defendant cannot set off a claim against him personally, and *vice versa*. Similarly, a claim which the defendant has against the plaintiff individually cannot be set off against a claim due to plaintiff as trustee, though on account of the special nature of a trust he may set off a claim due to him individually against a claim due by him as trustee (1). An account due as manager cannot be set off against a personal liability (2). A legal representative of a deceased does not fill the same character as regards his own debts and the debts of the deceased. See illustrations (a) and (b) in rule. An executor or administrator, however fills the same character as regards debts due to and from the deceased, and so in an action against the representative as such the latter may set off all claims against the plaintiff which his testator or intestate may have set off against him, and which, therefore, must have been due to the testator or intestate (3). Where in the case of a company in liquidation each liability arose prior to the liquidation, though the amounts were ascertained after it, both parties were held to fill the same character (4). A set off was disallowed where the decree which was sought to be set off was a decree not against the plaintiffs but against third parties *benamidars* of the plaintiffs (5).

Written statement—The rule is that a set off, if claimed, must be specially pleaded. If, however, the particulars are sufficiently set out it is not necessary that it should be specifically stated that they are alleged by way of set-off. The written statement contemplated by this section is deemed a plaint for the sum sought to be set off, and must be stamped accordingly (6). But these cases have been dissented from by Benerjee, J (7). Where the defendant did not raise an issue as to set off in the first Court the Privy Council declined to entertain it (8).

Jurisdiction in cases of set off—The amount claimed to be set off must not exceed the pecuniary limits of the Court's jurisdiction (9). This proviso was in the last Code contained in the second paragraph, which is now omitted. It has been transferred to the first clause. The entire amount

(1) *Hukm Chand, C P C 821*. *Bhorub Chunder Doss v Hafizumssa Khatoon*, 2 C. L. R. 414 (1878) [it is essential to the validity of a set-off that the debts should be mutual due from and to the same parties, and in the same right].

(2) *Abul Hasan v Zohra Jan* 5 A. 299 (1883).

(3) See *Chennappa v Raghunatha* 15 M. 29 (1892), *Watson & Co v Brjo Soonduree Debia*, 16 W. R. 224 (1871), *Grish Chunder Lahoori v Koomarce Dabca*, 1 W. R. Misc 23 (1864).

(4) *Ahmedabad Advance, etc., Co v*

Lakshmishanker, 30 B. 173 (1904).

(5) *Tiluk Chandra Roy v Jasoda Kumar Roy*, 11 C. W. N. 215 (1906).

(6) *Amur Zama v Nathu Mal* 8 A. 396 (1886). *Bai Shri Magrabai v Narotam Hargovan* 13 B. 62 (1889), *Chennappa v Raghunatha* 15 M. 29 (1891).

(7) *Takar Chandra Dutta v Gisborne & Co* 8 C. W. N. 174 (1903).

(8) *Nan Karay v Ho Htaw*, 13 I. A. 48, 56 (1896), s. c., 13 C. 124.

(9) See in *Ram Lal v Lancaster*, 3 A. H. C. R. 114 (1871), *Brojendra Nath Das v Bulge Budge Jute Mill*, 20 C. 527 (1893).

claimed to be set off must not exceed the limits of jurisdiction, the excess of such amount over the plaintiff's claim, for which the defendant may ask a decree in his favour, not being material in the question of jurisdiction (1) And where a Court has two different pecuniary jurisdictions, the jurisdiction referred to in this rule will be that in which the suit is being taken cognizance of Thus, where a Subordinate Judge, with unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, was invested with Small Cause Court jurisdiction, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction took cognizance of a suit, it was held that the claim for set-off in it, of an amount exceeding the pecuniary limit of the Small Cause Court jurisdiction, could not be inquired into by him (2) A question might arise whether a Court could entertain a set off, a claim for which though within its pecuniary jurisdiction, was otherwise not within it It has been held that the rule does not refer to material jurisdiction in any way, or contemplate a case in which a suit for the amount claimed to be set-off is beyond the jurisdiction on account of its nature, as may be the case in some Provinces as regards claims for amounts for rent of agricultural lands (3) It has, however, been also held generally that no Court can entertain a set off if it would not have had jurisdiction to entertain a suit if one had been brought to recover the money sought to be set off (4) And see last paragraph

Effect of set off—The set-off is to have the effect of a plaint (5) in a cross suit and being treated as a cross action it is not affected by anything which relates solely to the plaintiff's claim It is not necessary that the plaintiff's demand should actually exist Thus the defendant may deny the plaintiff's claim, and also plead a set off, and may obtain a decree for it, although no sum may be found due to the plaintiff (6) And if a certain amount is found due to the plaintiff but a greater sum is found due to the defendant, a decree will be made in favour of the defendant for the recovery of the balance (7) And it has been held that the same rule applies in the case of a set off which is not within the purview of this rule (8)

An appeal will lie to the same Court as if the sum had been demanded in a separate suit (9) So long as set-off was deemed a mere defence the plaintiff

(1) *Thakurdas v Nand Lal* 1890, P R No 17

(2) *Barote Ganga v Sepoy Pongu* 14 B 371 (1889), apparently overruling in effect, *Ram pratab v Ganesh Ranganath*, 12 B 91 (1887) which, however, was not referred to

(3) *Thakurdas v Nand Lal*, 1890, P R No 17, and see *Hukm Chand*, C P C 832 where it is said that the principle of connexity is considered sufficient to confer material jurisdiction in such cases

(4) *Beni Madho v Gaya Prasad* 15 A 404 405 (1893)

(5) As to stamp, *vide ante* 'Written statement'

(6) *Hayatkhā v Abdulakha*, 6 B H C R, A C 151 (1869), in an earlier case it was held that a decree could not be awarded for a

sum to be ascertained in a suit for accounts *Harro Soodarce v Bungshee Mohun*, 5 W R 32 (1866), but this was because there could be no set off in respect of an unascertained sum

(7) See O XX r 19, *post*

(8) *Pragi Lal v Maxwell*, 7 A 284 (1885) *per* Oldfield, J. [*contra*, Duthoit, J] The point was queried in *Brojendra Nath Das v Budge Budge Jute Mill*, 20 C 527 (1893), and now see last para of s 216, *post*

(9) O XX r 19, *post*, under which appeals from decrees relating to set off lie to the Courts to which appeals in respect of the original claim would lie See *Rani Lal v Lancaster*, 3 A H C R 111 (1871), as to stamping of memorandum of appeal, see *Chennappa v Raghunatha*, 15 M 29 (1891)

could at any stage of the suit put an end to it by putting an end to the suit itself. It fell with the action to which it was an adjunct. However, as affirmative relief can now be given on a claim for set off, the plaintiff cannot, by refusing to proceed with the case, defeat the defendant's right to recover under his set off (1). As to lien (2) the rule seems to assume that it is usual for a decree to make costs payable to the pleader instead of to the party (3).

Rules relating to written statements—This clause is new, see notes to other rules of same order. *Court fees must be paid on set off claimed in written statement* (4). Where the case was not strictly one of set off under the former section, so as to make applicable to it the provisions of the third paragraph of that section (corresponding with the second clause of this rule) it was held that the written statement need not be stamped as a plaint (5).

9 *No pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to a set off shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit, but the Court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time for presenting the same*

"No pleading," etc—And to sect 112 of the last Code shortened and remodelled. This rule corresponds to sect 122 of the Code of 1859. By r 1 *ante*, written statements must be filed before or at the first hearing by which is meant that they must be filed before the parties have entered upon their case (6). This is subject to r 6. Accordingly an application to file a supplemental written statement after the case had begun was refused (7). Where a written statement was improperly admitted but without prejudice to the opposite party, the Court refused to interfere in appeal (8).

"Court may at any time require"—This may be done at any time. In the Code of 1859 occurred the words "before final judgment" and it was accordingly held to mean that written statements could be called for only by the first Court and before judgment (9). The written statement may be called for from either plaintiff or defendant. The Court was held justified in calling for a written statement which did not add to or vary the plaintiff's claim but

(1) See English O 21, r 16

(2) See *Hukm Chand, C P C 834*, Ann Pr O 65, r 14, the general rule is that the right of set off is not affected by the solicitor's ordinary lien for costs. *Pringle v Gloag* 10 Ch D 676

(3) *Brijnath Dass v Juggernath Dass* 4 C 742 743 (1879)

(4) *Guse v Ananta Ram Rathe* 10 C W N 199 (1905).

(5) *Subramanian Chettiar v Muthuswami Aiyangar*, 17 M L J 481 (1907)

(6) *Munchershaw Bezant v New Dhu rumsey Co*, 4 B 576 at p 578 (1880)

(7) *Ib*

(8) *Lall Mahomed v Dhoolee Ram* 22 W R 377 (1874)

(9) *Juggeshur Mookerjee v Gopabandhu Sen* 5 W R 50 (1897)

simply supplied omissions in the plaint (1) In the High Court an order directing the filing of a written statement is generally asked for and granted on the presentation of the plaint, and it was held that this was not such an order of Court as to subject the party to the penalty of contempt for non compliance (2) It was in an early case held that if a party neglects to file a written statement when ordered to do so the Court would examine him as to his grounds of defence, and confine him to such statements or adjourn the case at his expense (3) But in other cases the Court refused to hear a party who having been ordered to file a written statement omitted to do so (4)

113]

10. Where any party from whom a written statement is so required fails to present the same within the time fixed by the Court, the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.

Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.

Default to present written statement.—The Court may either pass a decree against the defaulting party or make such other order as it thinks proper Where, in a case before Peterson, J., the defendants, after ample opportunity, neglected to put in a written statement, that learned Judge stated that in future he should put the defendant into the box and examine him as to the grounds of his defence, and if on examination it should appear that a written statement was desirable, the case would be adjourned for that purpose at the expense of the defaulting party (5) Defendant remained in Calcutta one month after it was ordered that he should put in a written statement, and then stated that his father had died and he had no money to pay the costs. Peterson applied for leave to file a written statement, as no cause was shown why his father had not done so.

This rule corresponds with sect 106, Act VIII of 1859 It has been held that in Rules 105 and 106 of the Bombay High Court Rules (Original Side) there is nothing to prevent a defendant who has not filed his written statement from defending the suit at the hearing (7)

(1) Jahangeer Buksh v Bheekareo Lall, 11 W R 71 (1860)

(2) Moran and others v Gladstone and others, Cal H C, May 14th, 1868 cited in Broughton, C P C 130

(3) Ramrutton v Oriental Inland Steam Navigation Co., 2 Hyde, 89 (1864)

(4) Shamasoonduree Dosset v Brundabadub

Mitter, Cal H C, Aug 10th, 1865, Sreenath Doss v Rance Doss, W R 27, 1865, cited ib

(5) Ramrutton v Oriental Inland Steam Navigation Co., 2 Hyde, 89 (1864)

(6) Denomoyo Dossee v Tarachurn Coondoo, 1 Bourke, 153 (1868)

(7) Jayantilal v Nagnath, 15 Bom L R 126 (1912)

ORDER IX.

Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Non-appearance.

1. On the day fixed in the summons for the defendant to [5.]
Parties to appear on day fixed in summons for defendant to appear and answer. appear and answer, the parties shall be in attendance at the Court-house in person or by their respective pleaders, and the suit shall then be heard unless the hearing is adjourned to a future day fixed by the Court.

"Day fixed."—This refers to the day fixed for the first hearing of the suit (1) An appearance under the Code is not the same thing as appearance as it used to be in the Supreme Court, and is now in the High Court where the English mode of entering appearance by attorney is recognized, and according to the practice of the High Court there is power to order a case to be set down at once in the general cause list if the defendant enters appearance by his attorney before the time for appearance fixed in the summons has expired. In any case a Court could by consent and on the application of the defendant, issue a new summons altering the day for appearance (2) When, however, dealing with the question of appearance, as that term is used in the Code for the purpose of determining whether the provisions in this Order apply, an objection by the defendant before the day fixed for hearing to the plaintiff's application for attachment before judgment is not an appearance on that date (3)

Application of these provisions —These provisions are, from their very nature and language, applicable to suits in their initial stage and not to proceedings taken in execution of decrees made in those suits. It was, however, at one time erroneously considered that sect 647 of the Code (now 141) applied to execution proceedings as being proceedings of a miscellaneous character, and by virtue of that section these provisions were, so far as was practicable, made applicable to such proceedings. In order to overrule such decisions, sect 647 was amended by Act VI of 1892 by the addition of an Explanation declaring that that section did not apply to applications for the execution of decrees which are proceedings in suits. The application of sect 647 having thus been prohibited to applications for

(1) *Zam ul Abidin v Ahmad Raza* 2 A 67, 70 (1886), s c, 5 I A 233

(1870)

(3) *Hira Das v Hira Lal*, 7 A 538 (1885)
vide post, "Appearance"

(2) *Cumming v Green*, 4 B L R App 75

execution, it was held that there was nothing in the Code as so amended which authorized a Court to apply at the stage of execution any of the procedure enacted in the corresponding Chapter of the last Code (1) But that though this was so the Court might, where necessary, act under the inherent powers it possesses to make such just orders as are necessary for the proper disposal of the work given to it (2)

Appearance—The word “appear” must be interpreted in the same sense in all the following rules as in other parts of this Code in which it occurs such as O XVII r 2 *post*, (3) and whether the plaintiff or defendant is spoken of (4) What then is appearance? If there is none, the judgment is *ex parte*. It has been said that in most cases the question whether a decree is *ex parte* or not is a question of fact (5) It is necessary, however, to ascertain the law governing those facts. O IX r 1 indicates what is meant by appearance, namely, the actual attendance in the Court house of the party in person or by pleader or recognized agent, who, under O III r 1, must be duly appointed to act on his behalf, or by a co party under O 1 r 13. Under the terms of O III r 1, an appearance by a recognized agent is equivalent to an appearance in person, unless the Court directs personal appearance. Plaintiffs must all be represented by the same pleader, or set of pleaders, and cannot be severally represented by different pleaders (6) Defendants can of course be severally represented, though where such several representation is unnecessary and where the interests are not in conflict, the Court will not allow more than one set of costs. Sect 64 of the last Code read with Form No 117 of the Fourth Schedule of that Code explained, it was held, the nature of the defendant’s appearance in obedience to the summons to appear and answer. He was to appear in person or by a duly authorized pleader, *duly instructed and able to answer all material questions*, or who shall be accompanied by some other person (which includes a recognized agent) *able to answer all such questions*. He was further given notice that in default of his appearance—that is, appearance in either of the ways specified—the suit would be determined in his absence, that is, under this Chapter of the last Code. Thus the appearance mentioned in that Chapter meant attendance in person or by an authorized co party or by a pleader “duly instructed,” etc. or by a recognized agent who intended to appear and did in fact appear for the party, whether he was able or not to answer all material questions (7) The test of whether a defendant has or has not “appeared” is whether such of the requirements of the summons as relate to appearance have or have not been complied with (8) On this principle it is held that when a pleader attends who is not duly instructed in

(1) *Dhonkal Singh v Phakkar Singh* 15 A 84, 94 (1893), *Hajrat Akramnissa v Valul nissa Begam*, 18 B 429, 431 (1893) See notes to s 141, *post*

(2) *Dhonkal Singh v Phakkar Singh* *supra*

(3) *Soonderlal v Goorprasad*, 23 B 414, 420 (1898) *per* Strachey, J whose judgment is the only reported one dealing systematically with the subject, and is deserving of

careful study

(4) *Ib* 421

(5) *Cooke v Equitable Coal Co*, 8 C W N 621, 624 (1904)

(6) *Jankubai v Atmaram*, 8 B H C F 241 (1871)

(7) *Muruga Chetty v Rajasami* 2 M L J 284 (1912)

(8) *Enatulla Basunia v Jibon Mohan Roy* 19 C L J 535 (1914)

the suit he does not represent the defendant who in such case does not appear (1) Inasmuch as appearance is attendance in the Court house on the day fixed for hearing it is clear that what is done before the day fixed in the summons and that the mere filing of a *takalutnamah* is not appearing in person or by pleader, (2) nor is an "appearance," in the technical sense as used on the original side of the Court, by the entry of the name of the attorney on the record, nor was there appearance where the defendant had filed a *takalutnama* and objected to attachment issuing before judgment, but did not appear as directed by the summons, nor on a further date when the case was decided (3) Nor is merely putting in a written statement but when the case comes on not attending in person or by pleader an appearance (4)

Nextly, the personal attendance at the day of hearing must be in accordance with law. If a person is ordered to attend in person appearance can only be effected in this way, and if he does not, but sends a pleader, he will be considered absent and there is no appearance. See O IX r 12, *post* (5) If there be no such directions he may appear either in person or by a co-plaintiff or co-defendant under O I r 12 or by a pleader or recognized agent under O III r 1. They must however represent him, and therefore the appearance of an unauthorized pleader is not an appearance by the party (6) There is of course, no difficulty when there is no actual attendance by any of these persons, nor, indeed where there is attendance except in the cases to which reference will be made. If a party attends in person or by pleader there is appearance, though he may neither have filed a written statement (7) nor made a verbal one (8) If the Court has refused to receive a written statement but the pleader attends when issues are settled and cross-examines witnesses there is an appearance (9) It has even been held that where a decree is passed on a *solehnamah* and the defendant alleges that it is a forgery and that she had no notice of the suit it is not *ex parte* (10) But this has been dissented from it being held that the defendant is entitled to go behind the decree and to show that it is in fact *ex parte* and that the fact that the decree appears to be based on a compromise impugned as a forgery does not make sect 108 (now O IX r 13) *post* inapplicable (11) The appearance, moreover is to answer and if an application by a party who attends for leave to be heard is rejected and the defendant is not heard then the judgment is *ex parte* (12) Where both parties appeared and the case was gone through in their presence

(1) Soonderlal v Goorprasad 23 B 414 (1898)

(2) Haloo v Atwaro ~ W R 18 (1867)
Sheo Churn v Heera Lal 11 C L R 537 (1882)

(3) Hira Dair v Hira Lal 7 A 538 (1885)

(4) Purus Ram v Juvantee Pershad 1 A H C R 164 (1869)

(5) And see Krishna Ram v Gobai Prasad 8 A 20 (1885)

(6) Raj Kumar v Jugai Kishore 18 A 241 (1896)

(7) Goluckbur v Bishonath Marsh 37 (1864)

(8) Jankee Ram v Chandra lull 7 W R 295 (1867)

(9) Raghaya v Parapa 1 B 217 (1875)

(10) Hemma Moyee v Watson 14 W R 299 (1870)

(11) Bholai Naskar v Alach Naskar 1 C W N cxvii (1897)

(12) Syul Mahomed v Shaik Muntozul 18 W R 400 (1872)

they did not appear on the following day any application for a further adjournment must be supported by proper materials. He was present on the following day, but without the two witnesses, and his application for a further adjournment was refused on the ground that no proper reasons for it had been made out. On this he withdrew, and the case was then decided on its merits. When he

O IX r. 13) combined with sect 157 of the last Code, and that his remedy was an appeal against the refusal of his application for further adjournment (3)

Lastly, there is the case in which the party being absent, the recognized agent is present. If the latter accompanies a pleader, who applies for an adjournment but who is otherwise uninstructed, then it is a question of fact whether the agent is able to answer all material questions, in which case the party must be deemed to appear by the pleader. In such a case the requirements of the summons as to appearance are as fully satisfied as if the party had appeared in person and applied for an adjournment, and equally, in such a case, the purpose of the appearance or the action taken on appearance is immaterial. If, however, the party being absent, neither the pleader applying for adjournment nor any person accompanying him, whether a recognized agent or not, is able to answer, then apart from O III r 1 there is no appearance within this rule, and the only remaining question is whether the party appears by his recognized agent under the former rule. That is a question of fact. The mere presence of the agent is not necessarily an appearance of the party. It must be determined whether he intended to appear and did in fact appear, for the party in the exercise of his power under O III r 1, *ante* (4). Where a defendant did not appear and it was alleged that he was insane and the Judge struck off the case it was held that he should not have done so, but ought to have made the inquiry contemplated in Act XXXV of 1858 (5).

2 Where on the day so fixed it is found that the summons

Dismissal of suit where summons not served in consequence of plaintiff's failure to pay costs

has not been served upon the defendant in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to pay the court fee or postal charges (1) chargeable for such service, the court

make an order that the suit be dismissed

Provided that no such order shall be made if...

(1) Satish Chandra Mukerjee v. Ahara Prosad Mukerjee, 34 C 403 (F B) (1907) and see Venkatarama v. Nataraja 24 M L J 235 (1912)

(2) Maranassa v. Ram Kalpa Goran, 34 C. 235 (1907), Cooke v. Equitable Coal Co., 8 C W 621 (1904)

(3) Kader Khan v. ... (1903), ... Jibon Mohan Khan v. ...

(4) ... (1895)

(5) ... R. M. v. ...

summons has not been served upon the defendant, if on the day fixed for him to appear and answer he attends in person or by agent when he is allowed to appear by agent

"May make an order that the suit be dismissed"—If the plaintiff has omitted to pay the court fee by accident or the like, the Court may on his application, direct the issue of a fresh summons. If it does not, there is no other course open but to dismiss the suit, or the Court may dismiss the suit at once leaving the plaintiff to apply under r 4, *post*. The rule applies not merely where there is a single defendant, but also where one of several defendants has not been served, for the suit is incomplete and cannot be heard without notice to all the defendants. Where, however, in the latter case no objection was previously taken the Court declined to entertain it on special appeal (1). The suit may be dismissed whether the summons was that originally issued, or that reissued, on account of non-service of the original one (2). But in no case should the case be disposed of before the day fixed for hearing (3). In the under mentioned case the Court was disposed to think, though the case was dealt with on the merits, that an order under the corresponding former section was not appealable (4). If the court fee for serving the summons on a defendant newly added by the Court is not paid the suit according to the Bombay High Court, should be dismissed altogether even as against this original defendant but if it is proceeded with and decreed against him and he does not take that objection on appeal, he cannot raise it for the first time on special appeal (5). The Allahabad High Court appears to have taken a different view (6) holding that in such a case the suit should be dismissed against those defendants only on whom the summons could not be served but that if the suit is by mistake dismissed as against the original defendants also to avoid injustice the dismissal against them should be held to have been ordered under this rule.

Proviso—The rule contemplates a defendant appearing before service of the summons. In the under mentioned case (7) the Court stated that it was not necessary to decide whether, if a plaintiff were merely to lodge a plaint and take no proceedings upon it against a defendant, the latter in such a case would have a right to appear, but that where, as in that case a plaintiff by legal process of arrest, brought the defendant before the Court then he had a right to appear at the hearing of the case, although no summons had been served upon him.

8] **3** *Where neither party appears when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the suit be dismissed*

Where neither party appears, suit to be dismissed

(1) *Shek Abas v Ibrahimji Hasanji* 5 B H C R 118 (1868) 627 (1883)

(2) *Chhaganlal v Vinayakrao* 1893 Bom B H C R 118 (1868) P J 249

(3) *Gulab Dai v Jiwan Ram* 2 A 318 (1879) (1879)

(4) *Lucky Churn v Budurrunnissa* 9 C

(5) *Shek Abas v Ibrahimji Hasanji* 5 B H C R 118 (1868)

(6) *Gulab Dai v Jiwan Ram* 2 A 318 (1879)

(7) *Syed Ali v Ali* 15 B H C (1890)

"Called on for hearing"—The parties are bound to attend from the time the Court opens, and must be in attendance when the case is called on for hearing and, if absent at that time, they will be treated as not appearing (1) The Court is not bound to wait for any party until it is about to close for the day or even till the pleader for the party can find it convenient to attend on account of his engagement in another Court, as, if this were done Courts would find it difficult to get through their work. (2) The subsequent day referred to in sect 98 of the last Code was that to which the first hearing is adjourned, (3) but the day fixed for hearing after a remand on appeal was held to be within the meaning of those words (4) The reference to adjournment has now been omitted because this matter is sufficiently covered by the terms of O XVII r 2

"Neither party appears"—It does not apply when a party is present, but has omitted to serve notice. Failure to take measures to serve a person with a notice as ordered by the Court is not a non appearance (5)

Shall be dismissed—In cases where the Court does not otherwise direct, dismissal is the only consequence and the proviso relates to the postponing of the case, and not to the making of any final order in it (6) Where neither party appears on the day fixed for the hearing of a suit, an order striking the case off the file is illegal, the only order that can be passed in the circumstances being that of dismissal (7) The rejection of an application of the respondent, asking that security for costs may be taken from the appellant on the non appearance of both the parties, has been considered, by virtue of the provisions of sect 647 (now 141) a dismissal under the section which this rule replaces (8)

4 Where a suit is dismissed under rule 2 or rule 3, the [s] Plaintiff may bring a fresh suit or Court may restore suit to file plaintiff may (subject to the law of limitation) bring a fresh suit, or he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his not paying the court fee and postal charges (if any) required within the time fixed before the issue of the summons, or for his non appearance, as the case may be, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit

(1) Kuttiyali v. Pari Makri, 7 M 356 (1884)

(2) Raj Narain v. Akroor Chunder 24 W R 141 (1875) [as to absence of counsel see Lakhmi v. Gatto Bai 7 A 542 (1880)]

(3) Comalammal v. Rungasamy 4 M 11 C R 56 (1868)

(4) Rughoonath Singh v. Ram Coomar 14 W R 81 (1870) See next note

(5) Haradhun v. Protap Narain 14 W 1 401 (1870)

(6) Raj Narain v. Ananga Mohon 26 C 593 601 (1899)

(7) Alvar v. Sheshammal 10 M 270 (1887) and see ib p 290 as to appeal

(8) Lakhmi Chand v. Gatto Bai 7 A. 542 (1885)

"The plaintiff"—These words will include the plaintiff's legal representative, but though the latter may thus apply to have the order of dismissal set aside, the order will be set aside only if he proves a sufficient excuse, such as the plaintiff himself would have been required to prove before the order could be set aside (1) See sect 146

"Fresh suit"—Applying the principle embodied in this rule, if a suit is dismissed by an order purporting to be made under this section before the day fixed for hearing on failure to deposit *talabana*, this irregularity on the part of the Court does not deprive the plaintiff of his right to bring a new suit under this section (2)

"Satisfies the Court"—Each question of this kind must be dealt with, not according to any hard and fast general rule, but according to its own particular circumstances (3)

"Set aside dismissal"—When a suit has been dismissed for default, and the plaintiff has neglected to make an application within thirty days, there can be no review of judgment under sect 114, *post* (4) A Judge, when restoring a suit, has no jurisdiction to pass at that time any order as to the general costs of the suit (5) There is no appeal from an order setting aside the dismissal and appointing a day for proceeding with the suit (6) But where such an order has been set aside on appeal, and the last order has been reversed by the High Court, the proceedings of the first Court and the decree passed by it are not invalidated on the ground that as an effect of the reversal of the order restoring the suit, there were no proceedings in Court at the time of the passing of the decree in which such decree could be passed (7)

9A]

5 (1) *Where*, after a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defendants, and returned unserved, the plaintiff fails for a period of one year from the date of the return made to the Court by the officer ordinarily certifying to the Court returns made by the

Dismissal of suit where plaintiff, after summons returned unserved, fails for a year to apply for fresh summons

serving officers, to apply for the issue of a fresh summons and to satisfy the Court that he has used his best endeavours to discover the residence of the defendant who has not been served, or that such defendant is avoiding service of process, the Court may make an order that the suit be dismissed as against such defendant

(1) *Couvin v Bensley*, 43 C 253 (Amar), cited in *Hukm Chand C P C* 707

(2) *Gulab Das v Jivan Ram* 2 A 318 (1879)

(3) *Lakshmi Chand v Gatto Bai* 7 A 542 (1885), in *Dhunsook Doss v Hurry Baboo Bourke* O C 115 (1866) the evidence offered was considered insufficient

(4) *Kailash Mondol v Nabadvip Chandra*

2 C W N 318 (1896), dist in *Raj Narain Ananga Mohan* 26 C 598 (1899)

(5) *Krishna Vithal v Ganesh Bhalakar* 20 B 201 (1901), s c, 3 B L R 734

(6) *Alwar v Seshammal* 10 M 270 (1887) *Wahid un nissa v Kundan Lal*, 35 A 427 (1913) (plaintiff can apply for revision)

(7) *Alwar v Seshammal* 10 M 270 (1887) p 290

(-) In such case the plaintiff may (subject to the law of limitation) bring a fresh suit

Object and effect of rule—This rule recognizes the practice of issuing fresh summons on the return of the original unserved but was enacted to put an end to the reprehensible practice of instituting a suit and then holding proceedings in *terra re* over the defendant for a long period without taking any steps to bring it to a hearing. (1) Time runs from the date of the return by the Nazir (2) An addition has therefore been made interpreting return as that not of the Bailiff but of the Nazir. A plaintiff cannot however by merely applying to the Court within a year of the return for a fresh summons avoid dismissal of the suit. He must also satisfy the Court that he used diligence in the meanwhile. If he fails to establish either of the two points his suit must be dismissed (3) It is to be observed that the exercise of the power conferred is discretionary only. The refusal to take a fresh summons on a defendant though sufficient to justify the dismissal of the suit against him does not operate to release him from liability (4) As regards the right to bring a fresh suit (5) see the case cited in which the section was recently applied

6 (1) *Here* the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear *when the suit is called on for hearing then—*
Procedure when only plaintiff appears

(a) if it is proved that the summons was duly served the Court may proceed *ex parte*,
When summons duly served

(b) if it is not proved that the summons was duly served the Court shall direct a second summons to be
When summons not duly served

issued and served on the defendant

(c) if it is proved that the summons was served on the defendant but not in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer
When summons served but not in due time

on the day fixed in the summons the Court shall postpone the hearing of the suit to a future day to be fixed by the Court and shall direct notice of such day to be given to the defendant

(2) *Here* it is owing to the plaintiff's default that the

(1) See *Gour Bahadur v. Peary Lal* 10 B I R App 1st (18 5) *Ramkissen Doss v. Lukeynaran* 3 C 312 (1878) *Gerender Coomar v. Juggadamba Dabee* 5 C 1st 6 (18 9) which last case deals with the rules of the H C on the subject. *Urquhart v. Gilbert* 1 I 1 Jur N S 2nd 4 (1869) As to the Court's discretion to issue a second summons see these cases *per* n

(*) *Parnota v. Thal Abdul Pehmanbha* 13 B 500 (1889)

(3) *Byaharimal v. Nitya J. Bom* L P 4 (1901)

(4) *Shank All v. Mahomed* 14 B 27 (1889)

(5) *Sita Ram Singh v. Lokhyal Singh* 25 A 49 (1906)

summons was not *duly served* or *was not* served in sufficient time, the Court shall order *the plaintiff* to pay the costs occasioned by the postponement.

"Appears"—See notes to r. 1, *ante* This rule is not limited in its application to defendants residing within British India (1) By sect 74 of the Dekkhan Ryots Act, the Code is only to be applied so far as it is consistent with the Act (2)

"When the suit is called on"—These words appear to have been inserted so as to limit the rule to the first day of hearing and mark the distinction between these provisions and those of O XVII r 2

Clause (a)—No legal decree can be passed *ex parte* without there being proof of the due service of the summons (3) Where the summons has been served through another Court, see sect 2b, *ante* To justify an *ex parte* decree against all defendants, all must have been served, and if the defendants liability is joint, and if a decree can only go against all, it has been held that without notice to all the defendants no judgment could be passed (4) It was held with reference to sect 56 of the Code of 1800, that "*duly served*" refers to the mode of service and not to the agency by which it is effected (5) Where a summons is sent by post to a defendant residing out of British India, it is not, in the absence of evidence that the person to be served was at the time residing at the place to which the summons was sent sufficient proof of service to show that the summons was posted, but there must be some evidence of its having been received by the defendant (6) The Court may proceed, *ex parte*, whether the defendant has been summoned only to appear and answer the claim or, in addition, to attend and give evidence In the latter case, it is not necessary, before proceeding *ex parte* that all the processes prescribed by law for compelling the attendance of the defendant as a witness should be exhausted, it being sufficient that the service of the summons for his attendance has been effected (7) When a defendant appears, the failure to put in a defence in writing or verbally does not authorize the trial of the suit or make the decree passed in it *ex parte*, (8) not even if the defendant should have been ordered to file a written statement (9) And if the defendant appears at the first hearing and files a written statement, the fact of his non appearance at the final hearing does not operate to make the decision passed in the case *ex parte* (10) In England a plaintiff is by Statute allowed in certain cases to sign judgment for default,

(1) Fakhr ud din v Ghafur ud din 23 A 91 (1900)

(2) Dulchand v Dhondi, 5 B 184 (1880)

(3) *Ib* at p 100, Ram Lochan v Nitya Kaleo, 12 W R 211 (1869)

(4) Penfold v Slyfield, 68 N W Rep (Amer) 226, cited Hukm Chand C P C 710

(5) Mackintosh v Kahu Doss 19 W R 234 (1873)

(6) Fakhr ud din v Ghafur ud din *supra*

(7) Taruck Nath v Jeemut Nosya 5 C. 353 (1879)

(8) Jankee Ram v Chundrabully 7 W 1 230 (1867)

(9) Shivarajadhani v Kuppagantulu 2 M H C R 311 (1865)

(10) Anantharama v Madhava 3 W 234 (1881)

but in this country it has been held that in all cases where the Court proceeds *ex parte*, the plaintiff must produce *prima facie* proof of his case (1) and must prove the claim to the satisfaction of the Court before he can obtain a decree except in the case of summary proceedings on negotiable instruments. It is however, to be noted now that under O VIII r 5 every fact not denied is taken to be admitted, though under that rule such admission is not necessarily equivalent to a proof (2).

The remedies open to a defendant against whom an *ex parte* decree has been passed, and who contends that the Court should not have so proceeded, are either to apply under O IX r 13 (formerly sect 108) *post* or, to appeal from the *ex parte* decree, under sect 96. Under O IX r 13, by which a summary remedy is given, the complainant must satisfy the Court not merely that the *proof* required by this rule was not given but that *in fact* the summons was not duly served, or that the defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing. Where a defendant appeals from an *ex parte* decree, it is sufficient in the first instance to establish that in the Court which passed that decree the necessary *proof* of service of summons was not given. It is not incumbent on the appellant to show that the summons was in fact not duly served (3).

Clause (b)—In the under mentioned case it was held that the Court is bound in every case to issue a fresh summons, though it may order the plaintiff to pay the costs of the postponement, and cannot dismiss the suit or reject an application governed by this rule (4).

Clause (c)—Where, if the defendant had not appeared, the Court would have been bound to postpone the hearing on the ground that sufficient time had not been given to him to appear and answer to the suit his appearing ought not to put him in a worse position and an adjournment should be granted (5).

7. Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit *ex parte*, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance.

Procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance

Appearance at adjourned hearing only—Sect 111 Act VIII of 1859. What the Legislature intended was that the defendant might be admitted to defend the suit merely upon a petition and without any evidence being gone into to prove the truth of the fact stated in that petition. In fact

(1) Amrithnath : Dhunput Singh 8 B 1 R 44, s c, 15 W R 503 (1871)

(2) Satya Chandra : Monmolai 13 C L J 519 (1914)

(3) Fakrudin : Ghafar 11 N 23 A 40 (1900)

(4) Lallubhai Vajiram : Bai Magangavri 18 B 59 (1893). It does not appear however, why these proceedings which were in a suit were treated as miscellaneous.

(5) Shaikh Awla : Shaikh Abdool 15 W R 141 (1872)

the section contains no provision for and does not appear to contemplate taking such evidence (1) If the Court admits the defendant to defend, the suit will proceed in the ordinary course as a defended suit. If the Court refuses this then no appeal lies from the order of refusal, (2) the suit proceeds as an *ex parte* suit, and the defendant may then apply to set aside the decree under O IX r 13, *post*, (3) and if that application be refused he may then appeal under O XLII r 1 (c), or he may appeal against the *ex parte* decree without resorting to the procedure laid down in O IX r 13, *post* (4) But where though the Court refuses to receive a written statement, it frames issues in the presence of the defendant's pleader, who is permitted to cross examine, the decree is not an *ex parte* one (5)

2]

8. *Where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the Court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and, where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder*

Application of rule—This rule corresponds with sect 114 of the Code of 1859. In construing an order alleged by one side and denied by the other to be an order under this rule, the order will be considered as one under it if, apart from the mere description which the Court gives of its action and apart from the actual fact of the plaintiff's appearance or non appearance the real meaning and substance of the Court's action is, that it dismisses the suit on the view, whether right or wrong, that the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear (6) It was formerly considered (7) that the Chapter in which the section corresponding to the rule appeared, applied to execution proceedings but this was subsequently held not to be so, having regard to the change made in 1892 in sect 647, corresponding with sect 141, *post* (8) The rule is applicable to adjourned hearings of cases, (9) and to proceedings before

(1) *Ashruffunnissa v. Leharoux*, 8 C 272 273 (1882)

(2) b 104 *post*. See *Syed Mahomed v. Shah Muntozul* 18 W R 400 (1872)

(3) *Sankaralinga Mudali v. Patnasabha pati* 21 M 324 (1897) *Ashruffunnissa v. Leharoux*, 8 C 272 274 (1882)

(4) *Ashruffunnissa v. Leharoux supra*

(5) *Raghapa bin Hanmapa v. Parapa bin Sivapa* 1 B 217 (1876)

(6) *Lalta Prasad v. Nanikshere* 22 A 66 (1893)

(7) See cases cited *ante* and *Kalee Kisto v. Malomed Kader*, 12 W R 428 (1869).

Raja v. Srinivasa 11 M 319 (1888), *Biswa Sonar v. Binanda Chunder* 10 C 416 (1881) *Seetul Pershad v. Malomed Kureem* 5 All H C R 164 (1873) *Sheo Prasad v. Kashi* 10 A 119 (1887)

(8) See notes *ante* and *Jang Bahadur v. Mahadeo Prashad*, 8 C W N 100 (1903) where the lower Court held that s 103 of the last Code did not apply by operation of s 647 of that Code, and the High Court held that no appeal lay from such decision see 31 C 207

(9) *Mariannissa v. Ramkalpa Goram* 31 C 235 237 (1907)

the Court to which a reference is made under the Land Acquisition Act (1) It has been recently held by the Privy Council that this rule does not apply where the main issue of the case has been decided on its merits and there is a subsequent default in appearance (2) In this case the plaintiff had sued to recover the sum paid by him to release property from a wrongful attachment, and also for damages for it, the District Court had dismissed the first claim on its merits, the plaintiff had then abandoned the second claim and had failed to appear in subsequent proceedings, and the District Judge had thereupon dismissed the whole suit under sect 102 of the last Code, now represented by this rule

Non appearance—An order can only be made for non appearance (3) of the plaintiff A plaintiff fails to appear within the meaning of this rule when his pleader declines to proceed with the suit, and it makes no difference that the party himself was present in Court (4) It was held under the Code of 1839 that where a commission has issued for local inquiry and the Commissioner requires the attendance of the parties, should the defendant appear and the plaintiff make default in appearing on the day appointed the proper course is for the Commissioner to dismiss the suit under this rule (5) A suit can only be dismissed under this rule for default of a nature therein described, and therefore not for non attendance of witnesses (6) The Court should neither receive evidence on behalf of a defendant nor examine the merits of the case (7) If a suit is dismissed for want of evidence, the decision is one on the merits and not under this rule (8) Non appearance caused by the death of the plaintiff should not be confounded with default (9)

Judgment—The suit should either be dismissed or decreed "Struck off" is not a proper mode of disposing of the case (10) though in a case in which such an order was passed, it was held that though the correct expression had not been used, practically the case had to be regarded as having been decided *ex parte* (11)

(1) Bhandi Sing v Ramadhin Roy 10 C W N 991 (1903)

(2) Kanhya Lal v National Bank of India 37 I A 80 (1910) 37 C 42r

(3) As to the meaning of appearance in this connection see Lalta Prasad v Nand Kishore, 22 A 66 (1899) Rampertab Moll v Jakeeram Agurwallah 23 C 991 (1896) Hingra Bibee v Mannu Bibee 8 C W N 9r (1903) s c 31 C 150 In Kanjir Habib 2 Bom L R 20r (1900) it was held that there was no default on A's part as there was nothing to show that B by whom the suit was admittedly instituted acted with authority

(4) Copala Row v Maria Susaya Pillai 30 M 274 (1906) 17 M I J 275 but see Esmaili Haji Jan Mahamed 31 B 4r5 (1908)

(5) Fahan Chander v Soorjo Lal Marsh 139 (1864) *sed qu*, as the parties were present

in the Judges Court through their vakils though where the failure was to pay the Commissioners fees the order was not considered as passed under this section Shaik Sahib v Mahomed 13 M 570 571 (1890)

(6) Mahomed Azeem-oolah v Ali Biksh 5 All H C R 74 (1873)

(7) Purbati v Tulu Koer 18 C L J 123 (1913) p 130 Kesri Chander National Jute Mills Co., 16 C W N 868 (1912)

(8) Kartick Chandra Pal v Sirdar Man Lal 12 C 563 566 (1882)

(9) Debi Baksh Singh v Halib Shah 1 C 35 A 331 (1913) 40 I A 151

(10) Kioob Lal v Toolsee Singh 17 W P 219 (1872) and cf Alwar v Seethammal 10 M 270 271 (1887) Baswa Sonar v Binanda Chunder 10 C 416 (1884)

(11) Beejoy Golinie Radha Benode 10 W R 348 (1868)

Plaintiff's remedy upon dismissal—Where the suit is dismissed the plaintiff may apply for a review without any previous application under the next rule, (1) or he may apply under that rule. It is not necessary to draw up a formal decree and the fact that such a decree has been drawn up cannot alter the nature of an order of dismissal under this rule which is not a decree within the meaning of sect 2, and is not liable to be challenged by way of appeal. The present Code has in this respect altered the pre-existing law (2). An order dismissing a suit at an adjourned hearing for non appearance of the plaintiff and his pleader was held to be an order under sect 101 (now O XVII r 2) and its consequential section (the present rule) and not sect 158 (now O XVII r 3) (3).

03 I

9 (1) *Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal.*

(2) *Notwithstanding that the application has been served on the opposite party*

Application of rule—This rule corresponds with sect 119 of Act VIII of 1859. The rule applies to original cases and not to cases in appeal (4) a special procedure in hearing appeals being provided, nor does it apply to execution proceedings (5). It bars a subsequent suit only when the plaintiff in the latter had been either the plaintiff in the former suit or represented by him (6). It does not bar a suit the plaintiff in which had been a contesting defendant in a former suit (7). When an executor presents an application for probate he cannot be regarded as a plaintiff suing in respect of some cause of action and therefore this rule will not apply (8). It makes it compulsory on a Court to set aside a dismissal order under r 8 of this Order where the plaintiff satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non appearance but

(1) *Raj Narain Purkait v Ananga Mohan Bhandari* 26 C 598 (1899)

(2) *Rukminimayi Das v Parau Chandra Biera* 29 C 341, 15 C L J 334 (1910)
Parbati v Tulsi Koori 18 C L J 198 (1913) p 130. And see *Gulkinson v Subramaniam Aryan* 22 M L 221 (1898)

(3) *Shr mant Sagajuroo v Smith* 20 B 36 (1890)

(4) *Ram Lal Clowdhry v Surdaree Jah* (1864) W P Misc 21, *Anonymous* 1 Ind J 105 (1869) *Kali Kishore v Di*

narajoy Roy, 3 C 228 (1877)

(5) *Madon Mohon Mondul v Brika ta Nath Mondul* 10 C W N 839 (1906). See notes to r 8 ante. *Asim v Raj Mohan* 13 C L J 532 (1910)

(6) *Ottapurekkal v Clerichil* 33 M 31 (1909)

(7) *Ottapurekkal v Clerichil* 33 M 31 (1909)

(8) *Ramani v Kumul* 14 C W N 94 (1910)

it does not take away the Court's power to restore the case for any other valid reason (1) It was held to apply to rent cases under Act VIII of 1869, B C, (2) and to proceedings under sect 9 of the Specific Relief Act (3) As to default of appearance before Commissioner, see notes to r 8, *ante* By O XVII r 2, *post*, the present procedure applies to any day to which the hearing of the trial may be adjourned, but not to the case of a person obtaining time to do some act and making default That falls under r 3 of the latter Order (4) This rule does not apply to suits dismissed for any other reason than non appearance, and includes suits dealt with under O XVII r 2, *post*, but not those disposed of under r 3 of that Order (5) Where a suit was dismissed "in default of prosecution" on the ground that the plaintiff failed to deposit *talabana*, the order was held not to be one under the section corresponding with this rule, (6) as was also the case where a suit was dismissed because neither plaintiff nor his pleader appeared on the day fixed for hearing the argument (7) At an adjourned hearing of a suit, witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff not being in attendance, the plaintiff applied for issue of a warrant against one of them The Court refused the application, and the pleader for the plaintiff thereupon intimated that he had no further instructions to appear, and the suit was dismissed Subsequently an application was made under sect 103 (this rule) to set aside the order of dismissal On objection by the defendant that inasmuch as the dismissal was under sect 158 (O XVII r 3) the remedy of the plaintiff was by way of an application for review,—Held, that the suit was dismissed under sect 102 (last rule) read with sect 157 (O XVII r 2) and that the application was maintainable under sect 103 the present rule (8) And generally, if time is given to do an act and it is not performed, O XVII r 3 applies, otherwise r 2 of the latter Order See notes to these two rules, *post* Sect 38 of Act XV of 1882 did not preclude a plaintiff, whose suit had been dismissed for default, from applying under this rule to have the order of dismissal set aside He had two separate remedies under different enactments If he applied for a new trial under sect 38, he had to do so in eight days, if he applied under this rule, he had to do so in thirty days (9) The rule applies to proceedings before the Court to which a reference is made under the Land Acquisition Act (10)

(1) *Lalta Prosad v Ram Karan*, 34 A 426 (1912)

(2) *Oodwunt Mahtoon v Buihee Chand*, 18 W R 207 (1872)

(3) *Anthony v Dupont*, 4 M 217 (1881)

(4) *Scrava Venkataramaya v Anumukonda Rangayya*, 7 M 41 (1883)

(5) *Comalammal v Rungasawmy Iyengar*, 4 Mad H C R 56 (1868), *Franks v Nuneh Mal*, 7 All H C R 79 (1875), *Mahomed Azcem ool lah v Ali Buksh*, 5 All H C R 74 (1873) See as to these cases, *Mariannassa v Ramkalpa Goram*, 34 C 235, 239 (1907)

(6) *Ram Sundar v Ram Bandhan*, 7 All H C R 126 (1875), in which it was also held that application might be made for a review of judgment

(7) *Rai Chand v Mathura Prasad*, 3 A 292 (1880)

(8) *Mariannassa v Ramkalpa Goram*, 34 C 235 (1907), followed in *Enatulla Basanna v Jibon Mohan*, 10 C L J 535 (1914) And see *Kader Khan v Juggeswar* 35 C 1023 (1908)

(9) *Soonderlal v Goorprasad*, 23 B 414 (1893) As to limitation under this section, see *Hinga Bibee v Manna Bibee*, 8 C W N 97 (1903), *Debi Baksh v Habib Shah*, 17 C W N 829 (1913) 40 I A 151, 35 A 331

(10) *Bhandi Singh v Ramadhin Roy*, 10 C W N 991 (1905) *Behary Lal Sur v Nanda Lal Goswami*, 11 C W N 430 (1907)

"Fresh suit"—A plaintiff is only precluded from instituting a fresh suit where the previous suit was rightly dismissed under r 8, for it is only to such a case that r 9 applies (1). Next, assuming that the case was one to which the provisions of r 8 properly apply, the statutory bar raised by this rule only applies where the cause of action in the two suits is the same. This is a matter to be determined on the facts of each particular case (2). It has been held that while dismissal of a suit under sect 102 of the last Code (now represented by r 8 of this Order) is not intended to operate in favour of the defendant as *res judicata*, yet when read with sect 103 of that Code (now represented by this rule) it precludes a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, referring to the grounds on which the plaintiff asked the Court to decide in his favour (3).

"Reasonable cause"—This must be determined according to the facts of each particular case. See notes to r 13, *post* (4). Where when his suit is dismissed for default of appearance under r 8, the plaintiff applies for its restoration, the defendant cannot contest the application *in limine* as one which cannot be entertained at all under this rule by showing that at the time of the dismissal there was an appearance by the plaintiff, but as an answer to the application on the merits, the defendant can raise the contention that the plaintiff was not prevented from appearing because in fact, he did appear (5).

Appeal—If the plaintiff successfully applies under this rule, no appeal lies from the order directing the suit to be readmitted, (6) though under the last Code an appeal was held to lie against an order rejecting an application under sect 588 clause (8) of that Code, and an appeal is given by O XIII r 1 (c). But it is not every order dismissing an application which is open to appeal, but only an order rejecting an application to have the dismissal of a suit set aside (7).

An appellate or revisional authority should not lightly interfere with an order of restoration of a case dismissed for default, but should do so only upon very strong grounds (8).

The effect of these rules (8 and 9) was recently considered in a Privy Council

(1) *Kanji v Habib* 2 Bom L R 206 (1900)

(2) The causes of action were held to be different in *Chand Kaur v Partab Singh* 16 C 98 (1888), s c 15 I A 156, *Gobind Chunder Addya v Afzul Rabbani* 9 C 426 (1882), *Ramchandra Jivaji Tilve v Khatal Mahomed Gori*, 10 B 28 (1893), and the same in *Shankar Baksh v Daya Shankar* 15 C 422 (1887) s c, 15 I A 66. Upon the question of the finality of a decision under s 102 see *Rungray Ravi v Sudhi Mahomed*, 6 B 482 (1882) at p 486, and as to suit for partition dismissed for default, *Bisheshwar Das v Ram Prasad* 28 A 627 (1906), *Malou Mohon Mondal v Bikantra Nath* 10 C W N 879 (1906)

(3) *Sankar v Madan*, 14 C W N 298 (1909)

(4) And see *Manilal Dhunji v Colam Husein Vazeer*, 13 B 12 (1888), *Ramperias Moll v Jakeeram Agurwallah* 23 C 991 at p 995 (1896); *Sm Toolay Money Dassee v Sm Prasad Money Dassee*, 2 C W N 490 491 (1898)

(5) *Lalla Prasad v Nand Kishore* 22 A 67 (1899)

(6) *Hurdhamun Jha v Jungloor Jha* 7 C 711 (1890)

(7) *Ghashti Bibi v Abdul Samad* 29 A 596 (1907) [for her refusing to restore application under s 310 of last Code]

(8) *Gopal v Row v Maria Sanyal* 11 A 17 M I J 225 (1907) s c, 30 M 274

decision (1) In this case a suit was dismissed for default under r 8 on non-appearance by a plaintiff whose death was not known to the Court. His son applied under r 9, and an order was made setting aside the dismissal. The respondent applied for revision under sect 115, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner reversed that order and on review confirmed the reversal on the ground that the order dismissing the suit was proper under r 8 and that the application by the appellant (the son of the deceased plaintiff) had not been within time, and that O 22, r 3 only applied to a pending suit. The Privy Council held that the rubings of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner were vitiated by applying to a dead man rules which referred only to a defaulter, and that the order setting aside the dismissal was correct, and that "an abuse of the process of the Court" within the meaning of sect 151 had occurred and that (apart from any section) any Court might rightly have considered itself possessed of inherent power to rectify the mistake made in inadvertently dismissing the suit.

10 *Where there are more plaintiffs than one, and one or more of them appear, and the others do not appear, the Court may, at the instance of the plaintiff or plaintiffs appearing, permit the suit to proceed in the same way as if all the plaintiffs had appeared, or make such order as it thinks fit*

Procedure in case of non-attendance of one or more of several plaintiffs

11. *Where there are more defendants than one, and one or more of them appear and the others do not appear, the suit shall proceed, and the Court shall, at the time of pronouncing judgment, make such order as it thinks fit with respect to the defendants who do not appear*

Procedure in case of non attendance of one or more of several defendants

Non attendance of one or more of several plaintiffs or defendants—These rules correspond with sect 116 of the Code of 1859. There is nothing in the latter section which conflicts with or limits the operation of sect 108 (now r 13), and the application of sect 108 is not limited to the case of a sole defendant who has not appeared or where there are more defendants than one and none of them has appeared (2)

12 *Where a plaintiff or defendant, who has been ordered to appear in person, does not appear in person, or show sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court for failing so to appear, he shall be subject to all the provisions of the foregoing*

Consequence of non-attendance without sufficient cause shown, of party ordered to appear in person

(1) *Debi Baksh Singh v. Habib Shah*, 1 P. C. 35 A 331 (1913), 17 C. W. N. 829, 40 I. A. 151.

(2) *Co. Ltd. v. Equitable Coal Co.* 8 C. W. N. 21 (1904). As regards the case of *Durga v. Shyamund* 12 W. R. 376 (1879) cited in the course of argument it is to be observed that

if the judgment of Markby J., is sound (as to which *quære*) the interest was the same between those who appeared and those who did not. The question however, whether the decree was *ex parte* against the absent defendants was, according to the judgment of Hobhouse, J., not necessary for the decision.

rules applicable to plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, who do not appear.

Non appearance in person when ordered—This rule corresponds to sect 117 of the Code of 1859. A person failing to appear in person in obedience to an order to that effect may, in the case of a plaintiff, have his suit dismissed, or, in the case of a defendant, have the suit decided *ex parte* against him, notwithstanding that his pleader is present (1). An appeal it was held would lie from an *ex parte* decree passed under the corresponding section (2).

Setting aside Decrees ex parte

- 3.] **13** In any case in which a decree is passed *ex parte* against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.

Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also

Object of rule—The first object and purpose for which Courts act is of course, that the parties shall be heard, and therefore the object of this rule is to ensure, within reasonable limits as to public convenience, that every defendant shall have a hearing (3). Similar provisions exist in the procedure of the English (4) and United States (5) Courts, the general rule being that, apart from cases where the defendant has not been properly notified of the hearing, that every decree may be set aside for unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party from defending or prosecuting, or for fraud practised by the successful party in obtaining the judgment, or for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect (6). Applications of this character should therefore always be disposed of as substantial justice may require and even where there is a doubt the benefit should be given to the applicant and the

(1) See *Moona Lal v Gopal Singh*, S D N W (1863) p 37 (cited O Kanealy, C P C) *Kastodhono Dutt v Nilmony Singh*, Coryton 3 (1864-5) \

(2) S 96, *post*. The case of *Krishna Ram v Gobind Prasad* 8 A 20 (1885) was decided before the amendment of s 540 by Act VII of 1888

(3) *Chintamony Dass v Raghoonath Sa-boo*, 23 C 981 (1897) at pp 983 984 per Pigot, J

(4) See Ord 13, r 10. Ord 36 r 77 and s 91, County Court Act 1888 51 C 2 Vict c 43

(5) See *Hukin Chan* 1 C P C 714 (C) 1b

decree set aside (1) Further, the Court has an inherent power to deal with an application to set aside an order made *ex parte*, and to set it aside upon a proper cause being substantiated (2)

Setting aside of decrees—The Code provides several ways in which decrees can be set aside Firstly, by proceedings under this and similar provisions where the order has been passed in the absence of the parties or either of them (3) An application to set aside an *ex parte* order is not, strictly speaking, an application for a rehearing, although it may result in it (4) Other modes are by application for review before the Court passing the decree, or by appeal to a superior Court (5) These are proceedings in the suit Except in case of fraud, a separate suit does not lie to set aside a decree (6) A suit will lie to set aside an *ex parte* fraudulent decree, although no endeavour has been made to get the decree set aside and the suit revived under this rule, (7) or after such endeavour has been made and the application has been dismissed (8) the reason being that this rule limits the attention of the tribunal to specific matters, and, instead of subjecting to inquiry the radical question involved, they assume the existence of a real suit A Court has no power to restore an *ex parte* decree once set aside (9)

"In any case"—These words are very wide, and the section, under this and the last Code, is so worded as to exclude the doubt which was entertained under the Codes of 1859 and 1877, whether sect 119 of the former Code and sect 108 of the latter applied only to cases where the defendant had never appeared, or whether they applied also to cases where a defendant had been present on a first, but had been absent on an adjourned, hearing (10) Where, however, it was contended that a decree was

(1) *Ib.*, citing *Watson v. Railroad Co.* 41 Cal 520 (Amer.), *Cameron v. Carroll*, 67 Cal 500 (Amer.), *Lodeman v. Schluter* 71 Cal 94 (Amer.)

(2) *Tyeb Beg Mahomed v. Alibhai* 31 B 45, 49 (1906) [Small Cause Court]

(3) *Sadho Misser v. Golab Singh* 3 C W N at p 377 (1897)

(4) *Parvatishankar v. Ishwardas* 19 B 208, at p 210 (1894)

(5) *Sadho Misser v. Golab Singh* 3 C W N 375, at p 377 (1897)

(6) *Ib.* See as to remedies *Mena Lal v. Bhujhun Jha*, 22 W R 213 (1874), *Narsingh v. Rafikan*, 37 C 197 (1909), 14 C W N 507

(7) *Abdul Vazumdar v. Mahomed Cazi Chowdhry*, 21 C 605 (1894)

(8) *Pran Nath Poy v. Mohesh Chandra Moitra*, 24 C 546 (1897) where an application under this section was rejected and no appeal was laid against such rejection *Dwarkan Prasad v. Lachhoman Das* 21 A 281 (1899), *Kadha Ramjan Shaha v. Pran*

Nath Roy, 28 C 475 (1901) s c, 5 C W N 757, *Hagendra Nath Mahatu v. Pran Nath Roy*, 29 C 305 (1902), s c 6 C W N 473 4 Bom L R 363, dist in *Puran Chand v. Sheodat Rai*, 29 A 212 (1906), where the only fraud alleged was connected with the non service of summons, followed in *Narsingh v. Rafikan* 37 C 197 (1909), 14 C W N 507, and see *Colap v. Indra* 13 C W N 433 (1909), *Balkisen v. Tapesur* 17 C W N 219 (1911)

(9) *Raman Chettiar v. Mohideen Sahib* 17 M L J 81 (1906)

(10) It was held under the Code of 1859 that the action referred to the first hearing *Comalammal v. Rungasawmy Iyengar*, 4 M H C R 56 (1868) *Corachand v. Roghu* 3 B L R App 121 (1869), *Zam ul-abdin v. Ahmed Paza* 2 A. 67 (1878) [contra, *Kalee*

318 (1878), *Ryall v. Sherman*, 1 M 297 (1877), *Shanka Das v. Crohan* 1879, P 1;

not *ex parte* if the defendant has once appeared, it was held that there was no ground for so limiting the meaning of the words of the last Code, and that a decree is *ex parte* if it was made at an adjourned hearing in the absence of the defendant, whether the defendant has or has not appeared at an earlier stage of the case. The present rule therefore applies to every case in which a decree is passed *ex parte*, either by reason of his non appearance at the first or at an adjourned hearing (1). The former section was held to apply to proceedings under Ch VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, (2) and to execution proceedings where the order amounts to a decree under sect 47, *ante* (3).

The rule, moreover, is not limited to the case of a sole defendant, or, where there are several defendants, to cases where none of them have appeared (4). The fact that an order under r 7 has been made against a defendant and has not been appealed against, is no objection to an application being made by him under this rule (5). And it has been held that the fact that an appeal from an *ex parte* decree is pending will not preclude the defendant (against whom the decree was passed) from applying under this rule for an order to set it aside (6). Sect 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882) does not apply to an *ex parte* decree. An application to set aside such a decree passed by a P S C C falls within this rule (7). Satisfaction of an *ex parte* decree does not disentitle a judgment debtor from applying to a Court to set it aside (8). Neither this rule nor any other portion of the Chapter of the last Code in which this rule appeared applied to execution proceedings (9). Nor does the rule apply where the case has been dismissed, not for default by non appearance, but for something else, such as cases falling under O XVII r 3, *post* (10).

No 26], similarly under the Code of 1877, the words of which were 'in any case in which a decree is passed *ex parte* against a defendant under s 100' Sheo Charn v Hira Lal, 11 C L R 537 (1882). As to the difference between the Codes of 1859, 1877 and 1882, see Icknudas Vithaldas v Ibrahim Osman, 2 B at p 648 (1878), Jonardan Dobey v Ramdhone Singh, 23 C at p 712 (1896).

(1) Jonardan Dobey v Ramdhone Singh, 23 C 738 (1896), F B overruling Sital Hari Banerjee v Hira Lal Chatterjee, 21 C 269. The question in issue in the first case was as to non appearance on the day to which the first hearing had been adjourned, but the Court expressed its opinion upon the case of non appearance on any adjourned hearing. See also Rule 2032 of 1906, Cal H C, Hildroth v Sayaji Piraji, 20 B 380 (1890), Hira Dasi v Hira Lal, 7 A 538 (1885), Bhagwan Dasi v Hira, 19 A 355 (1897), Shankar Datt Dube v Radha Krishna, 20 A 105 (1897), Baldeo Shai v Manohar Lal, 18 A, P R No 82, Pamnath v Mamraj,

1884 P R No 139, and see Kader Khan v Juggeswar, 35 C 1023 (1908), and Muniappan Chetty v Balayan Chetty 31 M 505 (1908), Eeatulla Basanna v Jiten Mohan Roy, 19 C L J 535 (1914) p 538, following Jonardan Dobey v Ramdhone Singh, *supra*.

(2) Tyeb Beg Mahomed v Alibhai Vazgalji, 31 B 45 (1906).

(3) Krishna Chandra Palv Protap Chandra Pal, 3 C L J 276 (1906).

(4) Cooke v Equitable Coal Co, 8 C W N 621 (1904).

(5) Sankaralinga Mudali v Ratha Sabha pati Mudali, 21 M 321 (1897).

(6) Damodar v Sarat, 13 C W N 811 (1909).

(7) See notes to r 8 *ante*, Hari Ch Ghose v Manmatha Nath Sen, 41 C 1 (1913).

(8) See notes to O XVII r 3.

"**Ex parte**"—A decree is *ex parte* when the defendant does not appear. As to when a defendant is deemed to have appeared, see notes to r 1, *ante* (1). A Court has jurisdiction to set aside an *ex parte* decree if it is in fact *ex parte*. If one of the parties alleges that it is *ex parte* and the other denies it, the Court must investigate the question though the word purports to show the contrary (2). When a defendant seeks to set aside a decree on the grounds mentioned in this rule, the fact that the decree appears on the face of it to be based upon a petition of compromise which is impugned as a forgery, does not make the rule inapplicable. The defendant is entitled to go behind the decree, and to show that it is in fact *ex parte* (3). And he can apply under O XVII r 1 to invite the Court to reconsider its decision in the light of facts subsequently discovered (4). Where a defendant does appear there is no *ex parte* decree in the strict sense of the word. This rule contemplates cases of *ex parte* proceedings strictly and properly so, and therefore not such as are made under O XI r 21 *post* (5). The expression "passed *ex parte*" in sect 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act means a decree "passed *ex parte*" against a defendant, and does not include cases dismissed for default (6).

"**Defendant**"—The Allahabad High Court have in one case held that where a defendant, against whom a decree has been passed *ex parte* for default

held that where the defendant dies after *ex parte* decree his representatives cannot apply to have it set aside unless they have been brought on the record (9). As to the procedure in the case of the non attendance of one or more of several defendants, see r 11 and notes thereto.

"**May apply**"—Under Art 164 Schedule II of the Limitation Act, the application should be made within thirty days from the date of executing any process for enforcing judgment. The burden of proof is of course on the applicant (10). The very object, however, of an application under this rule is to show that evidence on the record cannot be used against the petitioner on the ground that it was taken behind his back and therefore if the applicant makes out a *prima facie* case the opposite party must rebut it by evidence taken

(1) Radha Kishan v Collector of Jaunpur, 23 A 220 (1901)

(2) Kunja Behari Ghose v Durgamoni Dassi 3 C I J 160, 163 (1906)

(3) Bholai Naskar v Alach Naskar 1 C W N 887 (1897), Kunja Behari Choe v Durgamoni Dassi, 3 C L J 160, 163 (1906), and see Koruna Moyee v Naba Kishore, 6 W P Misc 36 (1896)

(4) Hakimgir v Basdeo, 17 C W N 131 (1911)

(5) Chundi Lal v Chamman Lal 7 A 159 (1884), Kesharia Accomar v Potocah Sett 2 C W N 676 (1898), Khatu Mal v Lal Mal, 1898, P R No 43

(6) Mussumat Jamuna Bibi v Surri Chand Bhagat 2 C W N 693 (1898)

(7) Janki Prasad v Sukhrani 21 A 274 (1899). The case was distinguished and apparently doubted in Betti Jee v Sham Behari Lal 29 A 574 (1907)

(8) Ganodh Prasad Roy v Shib Narain Mukerjee 29 C 33 (1901)

(9) Sambasiva Chetti v Veera Perumal, 28 M. 361 (1904)

(10) Shaikh Torab Ali v Chooramun Singh, 24 W P 262 (1875), Khudeerun Lall v Chatterdharee Lall 21 W P 212 (1874), Mussumat Jhutoo v Lalita Kooer 22 W P 423 (1871)

in the presence of the first party and subject to cross examination by him (1) Proof in support of the application may be given either by the oral testimony of the petitioner or by petition supported by an affidavit (2) And if the requirements of the rule are carried out the application cannot be refused on other grounds (3) A failure to make an application under this rule will not affect any other remedies which the party may possess (4)

"Duly served"—See as to this O V, *ante*, and notes thereto, (5) also as to substituted service case cited (6) When the rule speaks of the summons not being duly served, it refers, it was held, to service on that defendant only who complains, and does not refer to service on his co-defendants (7) Even if the summons be properly served, the Court may restore the suit if it was not served in sufficient time to enable the defendants to appear and answer (8) On similar principles an order was set aside as irregular, it having been made in the absence of one of the parties to whom no intimation had been given of the day when the case would be heard (9) It is the duty of the Court to serve the summons of the registration of the suit. Where, before the admission of a suit, one of the proposed defendants had appeared by a pleader on an application for his appointment as guardian *ad litem* to a minor defendant, it was held that this did not absolve the Court from serving him with a copy of the plaint and notice of the date fixed for hearing, after the plaint had been admitted (10) The burden is upon the petitioner to satisfy the Court that the summons was not duly served on him (11)

"Sufficient cause"—The affirmative provisions in rr 9, 13, and O XII r 19, that a plaintiff or appellant (as the case may be) may prove that he was "prevented by sufficient cause" from appearing or attending when his suit or appeal was called on and dismissed, do not imply the negative, namely, that an application for restoration cannot be granted unless sufficient cause is shown. The effect of the enactments is that, if sufficient cause is shown, restoration is made obligatory on the Courts, there being no discretion in the

(1) *Musst Jhutoo v Lulita Koor*, 22 W R 423 (1874)

(2) See *Hardatrai Shukusandas v Finance and Bullion Association*, 3 B H C R, O C 60 (1866), *Damoodur Doss v Choonee*, 2 Hyde, 226 (1864), *Anund Moyee v Anund Soondur*, 13 W R 237 (1870) but the Court has refused to receive an affidavit in an appeal from an order of rejection *Leslie v Allender*, 17 W R 390 (1872)

(3) *Gopal Pershad v Rama Woogra Sing*, 5 W R Misc 11 (1866)

(4) *Abdul Mozumdar v Mahomed Cazi Chowdhry*, 21 C 605 (1894), *Prannath Roy v Mohesh Chandra Moitra*, 24 C 546 (1897), *Bibi Mutto v Kali Begum*, 6 A 65 (1883), *vide ante*, "Setting aside of decrees," *vide post*, "Appeal," etc

(5) *And Anunl Moyee v Anund Soondur*, 13 W R 237 (1870) where there was no service. If there is service it must be a

proper one *Chanbasappa v Mainaba 7 Bom H C R, A C 133* (1870), *Shiboo Roy v Kaseo Roy*, 25 W R 394 (1876)

(6) *Mirza Ally Belance v Syed Hyder Hossein*, 2 B 449 (1878)

(7) *Ewing & Co v Gosaldas Ghosh*, 3 B L R App 7 (1869), at p 8, *per Phear J*

(8) *Chanbasappa v Mainaba 7 Bom H C R, A C 133* (1870), see *Shaukh Awlad v Shaukh Abdool*, 18 W 1 141 (1872), *Haradhu Chuckerbutty v Protat Narain Chowdhry*, 14 W R 401 (1870)

(9) *Ex parte Maneshankar Hargovan 2 B H C R, A C 381* (1866)

(10) *Culab Chand v Shankar Lal*, 35 A 163 (1913)

(11) *Kumud v Jotindra*, 38 C 394 (1911), 13 C L J 221; *Hedlot v Karan*, 15 C L J 211 (1911), *Indu Meah v Dair Raksh* 14 C L J 42 (1911)

matter, whereas in other cases the merits of the applicant's case will form an important element for consideration when the Court is asked to exercise its discretion (1) The Court has to determine the sufficiency of the cause, and this is a question not of law but of fact dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case (2) No case can therefore be an authority in another, though previous decisions may sometimes help as a guide to Courts in determining what is sufficient cause (3) The rule should in this respect receive a liberal construction (4) so as to promote the ends of justice, it being the spirit and policy of the law to give every party an opportunity of being heard, except in cases of inexcusable fault and neglect, when the Court has, as already pointed out, a discretion to restore, even though the case be not such as render restoration obligatory upon it It is, however, a general principle that the default will not be opened for reasons affecting a co-defendant only who does not join in the application (5)

"Court"—The Court remains the same though the presiding officer may be different, and a Judge can therefore revive a suit tried by his predecessor (6) But a Judge can only set aside a decree of his own but not that of a superior Court (7) If the *ex parte* decree is made by a Court on appeal the Court which passed the original decree appealed against cannot be asked to set it aside (8) After appeal filed the power to set aside the original decree becomes vested in the Appellate Court (9)

"Decree"—There was a difference of opinion under the last Code as to the meaning of this term It was held both that the words *decree* and *"suit"* in this section must be taken to mean the whole decree against all defendants (where there are several) and the entire suit, (10) is also that the

(1) *Somayya v Subamma* 26 M 599 (1903)

(2) *Shankar Das v Croal* 1873 P R No 21, *Venkatarama v Nataraj* 24 M 1 J 23, (1912)

(3) See *Hukin Chand, C P v C* 721 733 and *Hirdut Rai v Bullion Association* 3 B H C R 60 (1866) [it is enough to show a bona fide mistake which is not unreasonable] *Dimodur Dass v Choonee* 2 Hyde 216 (1874) [an understanding between parties for adjournment] It is sufficient for an infant to show that his guardian was negligent *Kesho Persha v Hirdav Narain* 6 C L R 13 (1876) and the Court has restored a case even upon the supposition of the attorney's negligence *Oriental Insurance Corporation v Mercantile Credit Corporation* 2 B H C R 217-269 (1866) though the Court in *Raj Narain Burdhan v Akroor Chunder* 10 W 1 141 (1873) refused to interfere when the pleader was absent, but see *Bulwant v Secretary of State* (1897) 1 J 1 137 though negligence of a party or his agent is no ground for a Court in refusing restoration

the latter may always consider whether (in cases where there is no prejudice to the plaintiff) the imposition of terms and the payment of costs is not unfair in the circumstances and sufficient penalty for the defendant's neglect

(4) *Oriental Insurance Corporation v Mercantile Credit Corporation* 2 B H C R 7 21 (1861)

(5) *Chynn v Jais* 11 How 17-23 (Amer) see *Lawrence v Goswami* Gh 3 B F I App (1893) at 1

(6) *Raghoo Mohan v Kashinail Doy* 10 W 1 156 (1868) see *Kutubuddin v Raja* 1890 P R No 108

(7) *Munrohm Chadduram v Narayan* R v 41 W N 46 (1899)

(8) *Zimutunnessa v M H M* 1 W 1 53 (1874)

(9) *Sankar Bhatta v Bul* 1 J 1 M 53 (1871) see *1 J 1 J 1*

(10) *Mah v H H M* 1 J 1 R 11 20 (1871) see *1 J 1 W*

word "decree" referred to is the decree described in the first sentence of the section, viz the decree passed *ex parte* against the defendant who has not appeared, and that the words "*shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit*" meant that a day is to be appointed for proceeding with the suit so far as the defendant, who has applied to the Court under the provisions of this section is concerned (1) No difficulty arose where there was only one defendant or where, if there were several defendants, an application was successfully made by all of them. In such cases the whole decree against the defendant, or all the defendants, was set aside. The question arose where there were several defendants, and one or more of several (but not all) applied successfully, whether the whole decree was or should be set aside against all the defendants, or only the decree so far as it affected the defendant or defendants who applied. In this connection two sets of circumstances required consideration, (a) where an application was made by one or more defendants to set aside a decree which had been made *ex parte* against all defendants, none having appeared, (b) where a similar application was made in a case where some of the defendants had appeared and contested the suit and some had not appeared, and a decree was passed against all the defendants. Any interpretation of the section which led to the conclusion that a Court must in all cases set aside the decree against all defendants, or could not in any case do so, led to difficulties. Some of the defendants might not object, and in fact might have no ground for objecting to the decree and the Court would not be justified in such case in reopening the whole suit (2) On the other hand, if the Court's power was strictly limited to setting aside the decree as against the defendant who applied, difficulties equally arose (3) For instance, the relief given might be joint and indivisible.

It was therefore held that though "decree" meant "whole decree," and

Doyamao Das v Sarat Chunder Mojumdar, 20 C 175 (1897), s c, 1 C W N 656, *Ajodhya Pershad t Sheo Pershad*, 5 C W N 58 (1900), *dest Jadubansa Narain v Mohunt Hari Charan*, 6 C L J 226 (1907), *Bhura Mal t Har Krishan Das*, 24 A 333 (1902) *per Stanley C J* [ref to *Gauri Sahai v Ashfaq Husam* 29 A 623, 625 (1907)]

(1) *Huro Krishno Dass v Motee Chand Baboo*, 8 W R 260 (1867) [and see *Brojronath Surmah t Anund Moyee*, 7 W R 237 (1867) a case under s 68 Act X of 1859, *Doorga Persaud Ghose t Greeshunder Bose*, 1 W R 222 (1864), *Koroona Moyee Debia t Nubo Krishan* 11 W R 18 (1869), ref to in *Bholai Naskar t Alach Naskar*, 3 C L J 158 (1897), *Keesho Pershad t Hirday Narain* 6 C L R 69 (1880)], *Manaku t Sitaram*, 18 B 142 (1893), *Bhura Mal t Har Krishan Das*, 24 A 367 (1902) *per Allman J*, at pp 390, 399. As regards the citation of cases under the Code of 1854, *Dwarkanath Vetter, J*, in the

first mentioned case, pointed out that the language of s 58, Act X of 1859 and of s 119 of the Code of 1859 were very nearly similar, and except that the word "judgment" is used instead of "decree" in the Code of 1859, the provisions of s 119 of that Code are similar to those of the present section. Therefore, in accordance with the observation of Allman, J, *Bhura Mal t Har Krishan Das*, *supra*, at pp 335, 336 the earlier decisions were of use.

(2) *Huro Krishno Dass t Motee Chand Baboo*, 8 W R 260, 261 (1867). Some of the defendants may not object, and, in fact, may have no ground for objecting, to the decree. *Dookhes Khan t Rajassuree Pance*, 15 W P 371 (1871), and see *Bhura Mal t Har Krishan Das* 24 A, at pp 390-391 (1902).

(3) See *Mahomed Hamidulla t Tohar ennessa Bibi*, 25 C 155 (1897) at pp 157, 159, and see, for instance, *Shanku Husam t Hub Husam*, 25 A 42 (1902).

thus the Court had power to set aside the whole decree against all defendants, the Court was not bound in every case to set aside the decree against all the defendants (1) It would do so where the decree was really one decree proceeding upon a common ground (2) and was indivisible, (3) but it might refuse to do so where the decree, though nominally one, really consisted of several decrees against several parties (4) Where the question involved in a case was whether the liability of the defendants was joint or several and in such case the *ex parte* decree was set aside, on the application of some of several defendants the entire decree was set aside (5) Similar conclusions were arrived at by Aikman, J, in whose opinion "*decree*" meant the *ex parte* decree referred to in the opening words of the section, and who held that when the decree was one and indivisible it must be set aside as a whole or not at all, and that the Court must be assumed to have the power to set aside the whole decree, if either the decree was from its nature one and indivisible or if in order to give to the defendants against whom an *ex parte* decree has to be pronounced the relief to which they are entitled, it must be set aside as a whole (6) The Calcutta High Court held that the Court might set aside the whole decree even where one or more of the defendants had appeared and contested the suit, while in the case of the remaining defendant or defendants the decree had been passed *ex parte* (7) A contrary view was taken in the Bombay High Court, (8) and Stanley, J, and Burkatt, J, in the Allahabad High Court (9) reserved their opinions on the point

The proper rule is that now enacted by the proviso, viz that relief is ordinarily to be given only to the party who is entitled to and applies for it. If, however, in order to give such relief or for other purpose it is necessary to set aside the decree as against others also, this will be done as in cases where

(1) *Jadubansa Narain v Mohunt Hari Charan* 6 C L J 226 (1907), *Kunjo Behari Ghose v Durgamoni Das*, 3 C L J 160 (1906), *Monmohuni Chowdhurani v Nara Narayan Roy Chaudhri* 4 C W N 456 (1899) at p 459 but see the words of the section 'shall pass' and if decree meant whole decree then the whole decree must have been set aside, and see *Gopala Chetti v Subbier*, 26 M 604 (1903) at p 606, *Valia Panga Achan v Marutha Veera Karun Ian*, 31 M 454 (1908)

(2) See *Dookhee Khan v Rajessurce Rane*, 15 W R 371 (1871), see *Gopala Chetti v Subbier* 26 M 604 (1903), see *Manaku v Sitaram* 18 B 142 (1893), it was held that the whole case there was a
however to be
the d

(3) *Mahomed Bibi*, 25 C 166

Chowdhurani v Nara Narayan Roy Chaudhri, *supra* at p 458, *Bhura Mal v Har Krishan Das*, 24 A 383 (1902), per Stanley, C J, *Mohini Chandra Gutra v Annada Charan Dutt* 6 C W N 109 (1901), *Gopala Chetti v Subbier*, 26 M 604 (1903), where the defence of the second defendant was peculiar to him, *Brigfalt Mahadeo Prosad* 17 C W N 133 (1911)

(4) *Id* This case it may be contended is not really an exception as there are in effect several decrees and the whole decree is as against the particular defendant set aside

(5) *In re Hari Das Karmakar*, 5 C L J 202 (1905)

(6) *Bhura Mal v Har Krishan Das* 24 A 383 (1902) at p 400

(7) *Mahomed Hamidulla v Tohurennassa Bibi* *supra*

(8) *Manaku v Sitaram*, 18 B 142 (1893)

Mal *n D s j r a*,
391.

word "decree" referred to is the decree described in the last sentence of the section, viz the decree passed *ex parte* against the defendant who has not appeared, and that the words "shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit" meant that a day is to be appointed for proceeding with the suit so far as the defendant, who has applied to the Court under the provisions of this section is concerned (1) No difficulty arose where there was only one defendant or where, if there were several defendants, an application was successfully made by all of them. In such cases the whole decree against the defendant, or all the defendants, was set aside. The question arose where there were several defendants, and one or more of several (but not all) applied successfully, whether the whole decree was or should be set aside against all the defendants, or only the decree so far as it affected the defendant or defendants who applied. In this connection two sets of circumstances required consideration, (a) where an application was made by one or more defendants to set aside a decree which had been made *ex parte* against all defendants, none having appeared, (b) where a similar application was made in a case where some of the defendants had appeared and contested the suit and some had not appeared, and a decree was passed against all the defendants. Any interpretation of the section which led to the conclusion that a Court must in all cases set aside the decree against all defendants, or could not in any case do so, led to difficulties. Some of the defendants might not object, and in fact might have no ground for objecting to the decree, and the Court would not be justified in such case in reopening the whole suit (2) On the other hand, if the Court's power was strictly limited to setting aside the decree as against the defendant who applied, difficulties equally arose (3) For instance, the relief given might be joint and indivisible.

It was therefore held that though "decree" meant "whole decree," and

Doysmasi Dasi v Sarat Chunder Mojumdar, 25 C 175 (1897), s c, 1 C W N 656, Ajodhya Pershad v Sheo Pershad, 6 C W N 58 (1900) d st Jadubansa Narain v Mohunt Hari Charan D C L J 226 (1907), Bhura Mal v Har Krishan Das, 24 A 383 (1902) per Stanley C J (ref to Gauri Sahai v Ashfaq Hussain 29 A 623, 625 (1907)).

(1) Huro Krishno Dass v Motee Chand Baboo, 8 W R 260 (1867) [and see Broj Nath burmah v Anund Moyce, 7 W R 237 (1867) a case under s 58, Act X of 1859 Doorga Persaud Ghose v Greenshunder Bose, 1 W R 222 (1864), Koroona Moyce Deba v Nuboo Krishen, 11 W R 18 (1869), ref to in Bholat Naskar v Alach Naskar 3 C L J 158 (1897), Keshoo Pershad v Huribay Narain 6 O L R 19 (1880)], Manaku v Sitaram 18 B 142 (1893) Bhura Mal v Har Krishan Das, 24 A 383 (1902) per Aikman J, at pp 396-399. As regards the citation of cases under the Code of 1854, Dwarkanath Mitter, J, in the

first mentioned case, pointed out that the language of s 58, Act X of 1853, and of s 119 of the Code of 1859 were very nearly similar, and except that the word "judgment" is used instead of "decree" in the Code of 1859, the provisions of s 119 of that Code are similar to those of the present section. Therefore, in accordance with the observation of Aikman, J, Bhura Mal v Har Krishan Das, *supra*, at pp 395-396, the earlier decisions were of use.

(2) Huro Krishno Dass v Motee Chand Baboo, 8 W R 260, 261 (1867). Some of the defendants may not object, and, in fact, may have no ground for objecting to the decree. Dookhee Khan v Rajessurce Pande, 13 W P 371 (1871), and see Bhura Mal v Har Krishan Das, 24 A, at pp 390-391 (1902).

(3) See Mahomed Hamudulla v Tohor ennessi Bibi, 25 C 155 (1897) at pp 157, 158, and see, for instance, Shula Hussain v Hub Hussain, 25 A 12 (1902).

thus the Court had power to set aside the whole decree against all defendants, the Court was not bound in every case to set aside the decree against all the defendants (1) It would do so where the decree was really one decree proceeding upon a common ground (2) and was indivisible, (3) but it might refuse to do so where the decree, though nominally one, really consisted of several decrees against several parties (4) Where the question involved in a case was whether the liability of the defendants was joint or several, and in such case the *ex parte* decree was set aside, on the application of some of several defendants the entire decree was set aside (5) Similar conclusions were arrived at by Aikman, J, in whose opinion "*decree*" meant the *ex parte* decree referred to in the opening words of the section and who held that when the decree was one and indivisible it must be set aside as a whole or not at all, and that the Court must be assumed to have the power to set aside the whole decree if either the decree was from its nature one and indivisible or if in order to give to the defendants against whom an *ex parte* decree has to be pronounced the relief to which they are entitled it must be set aside as a whole (6) The Calcutta High Court held that the Court might set aside the whole decree even where one or more of the defendants had appeared and contested the suit while in the case of the remaining defendant or defendants the decree had been passed *ex parte* (7) A contrary view was taken in the Bombay High Court (8) and Stanley, J, and Burdett J in the Allahabad High Court (9) reserved their opinions on the point

The proper rule is that now enacted by the proviso viz that relief is ordinarily to be given only to the party who is entitled to and applies for it. If however, in order to give such relief or for other purpose it is necessary to set aside the decree as against others also this will be done as in cases where

(1) *Jadubansa Narain v Mohunt Hari Charan* 6 C L J 226 (1907) *Kunjo Behari Ghose v Durgamoni Dassi* 3 C L J 160 (1906) *Monmohun Chowdhurani v Nara Narayan Roy Chaudhuri* 4 C W N 456 (1899) at p 459 but see the words of the section shall pass and if decree meant whole decree then the whole decree must have been set aside and see *Gopala Chetti v Subbier* 26 M 604 (1903) at p 606 *Vala Panga Achan v Maruthi Veera Karunika* 31 M 454 (1908)

(2) *S o Dookhee Khan v Rajessuree Rance* 15 W R 371 (1871) see *Gopala Chetti v Subbier* 26 M 604 (1903) see *Manaku v Sitaram* 18 B 142 (1893) it was held that the whole case was not reopened even though there was a common cause of action. It is however to be noted that in that case some of the defendants appeared

(3) *Mahomed Hamidulla v Tohurennassa Bibi* 25 C 100 (189) at p 100 *Monmohun*

Chowdhurani v Nara Narayan Roy Chaudhuri supra at p 458 *Bhura Mal v Har Kishan Das* 24 A 383 (1902) *per Stanley C J*, *Mohini Chandra Gutra v Annada Charan Dutt* 6 C W N 109 (1901) *Gopala Chetti v Subbier* 26 M 604 (1903) where the defence of the second defendant was peculiar to him *Brijlall Mahadeo Irood* 17 C W N 133 (1911)

(4) It is to be contended is not really an exception as there are in effect several decrees and the whole decree is set aside against the particular defendant set aside

(5) *In re Hari Das Karmakar* 6 C L J 402 (1900)

(6) *Bhura Mal v Har Kishan Das* 24 A 383 (1902) at p 400

(7) *Mahomed Hamidulla v Tohurennassa Bibi supra*

(8) *Manaku v Sitaram* 18 B 142 (1893)

(9) *Bhura Mal v Har Kishan Das supra* at pp 390 391

it is not possible to sever the decree into parts as separately affecting the parties respectively

"Terms"—The Court may set aside the decree upon such terms as it thinks fit (1) The Court has a full discretion in the matter. If the defendant is not at all in fault, and has a sufficient defence, there does not appear to be any reason why he should be put on terms. In other cases terms may be imposed. The Court may direct payment of all previous costs in the action as a condition precedent to setting aside the decree, it may order a party to give security for those likely thereafter to be incurred, it may direct him to pay the decretal amount into Court, (2) or it may make such other order as it thinks fit. So a decree may be set aside on condition that the defendant should find a surety who would be responsible for any amount that might be found due from the defendant by any decree which might subsequently be made (3).

When a judgment is ordered to be set aside upon terms the conditions must be complied with within the time fixed or the judgment will remain in force as if the order setting it aside had not been made. Where a decree was set aside upon terms of a certain payment by a given date, it was held on appeal that the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time for payment or pass a fresh conditional order setting aside the decree upon terms (4).

Effect of setting aside decree—If the decree is set aside this necessarily carries with it a reversal of any order previously made under it refusing to allow the party to appear and defend the suit (5). The position is the same as when the suit was first instituted. As regards proceedings subsequent to the decree set aside it is well settled that where in execution the decree holder is himself the auction purchaser the sale cannot stand if the decree be subsequently set aside (6). There is however, a distinction between this case and that where a third party is the auction purchaser (7). A sale having duly taken place in execution of a decree in force at the time cannot afterwards be set aside as to a bona fide purchaser not a party to the decree on the ground that, on further proceedings, the decree has been subsequently to the sale reversed by an appeal to the Court (8). And the same principle applies where the decree is set aside by

(1) Under the Code of 1859 it was held that terms could not be imposed. *Administrator General v Lala Dyram* 6 B 1 R 688 (1871).

(2) If the decree is finally unsatisfied money so paid into Court becomes the property of the decree holder, and an application to get out the money will not be governed by the provisions relating to the execution of decrees. *Mayal Ali v Lachman Singh* 1898 P R No 8.

(3) *Sonath Singh v Dinonath Shaha* 6 C 222 (1898), s c 3 C W N 228.

(4) *Jagirnath Sahi v Kanta Prasad Upadhyay* 36 A 77 (1913) distinguishing *Suranjan Singh v Iram Bahadur Lal* 35 A 582 (1913).

(5) *Bankaralal v Mulik v Raghavalla*

patil Mudali 21 M 324 325 (1897).

(6) *Setti Umedmal v Srinath Rao* 27 C 810 (1900) s c 4 C W N 602 and cases there cited (and see *Lala Jagat Narayan v Thakur* 1 B L R 1 C 71 (1868)). *Hawari Muller Janki Prasad* 6 C 1 J 92 (1907) [order setting aside reversed].

(7) *Ib*.

(8) *Zam ul Uddin Khan v Mahomed Alghar Ali* 10 A 106 (1887) s c 15 I 12 where however at p 172 the Privy Council point out that the party may be restored to the money for which the property was sold. Any claim which the judgment debtor might have for the balance would only be against the decree holder.

the Court of first instance under this rule. When a decree has been set aside under this rule it cannot be taken to be revived in any subsequent proceeding and the principle of sect 144 cannot be extended to it (1). As to whether the order setting aside the decree at the instance of one defendant reopens the case against all the others see notes to 'Decree'.

"Proceeding with the suit"—The case begins again in the ordinary way, as if no decree had been passed. The burden and mode of proof is just the same as it would have been if the decree had not been passed (2). The evidence should be recorded *de novo*, as that taken in the defendant's absence at an *ex parte* hearing cannot be used against him at the rehearing (3).

Appeal Revision Review—When an application under this rule is rejected an appeal lies by the defendant against the order of rejection (4). But the order passed on appeal is final (5) and therefore no second appeal lies (6). And if the defendant applies unsuccessfully under this rule and does not appeal against the order, he cannot on appeal against the original *ex parte* decree, obtain the relief which he might have got on an appeal from the order of rejection under this rule, but for which he did not apply (7). The defendant, however may appeal under sect 96 against the *ex parte* decree without previously taking any steps to have it set aside under this rule (8). Where however, an application under this rule is made and refused, the party may appeal from the order under O XIII r 1 (c) and the order made on such appeal is final. But if there is no appeal from the order refusing to interfere under this rule, and the party prefers an appeal against the original *ex parte* decree, the Appellate Court cannot remand the case on the ground that the party had not a proper opportunity of being heard. All that it can do is to deal with the case on the merits on the materials in the record (9). A Full Bench of the same High Court has however more recently held that when a suit is decided *ex parte* an Appellate Court to which an appeal from the decree is preferred under sect 540 (now sect 96) has jurisdiction to reverse the decree of the lower Court on the ground that such Court was wrong in proceeding to decide the suit *ex parte* and remand the suit for rehearing (10). It is not however, open to the plaintiff to prefer an immediate appeal from an order setting aside his decree (11). And though there is some authority to the contrary (12) the better and more recent opinion is that such an order (ordinarily

(1) Raghu Nan lan v Jagde 14 C W N 182 (1909)

(2) See Hukm Chand C P C 746

(3) Ram Baksh v Kishori Mohan 12 W R 130 (1869) though it was said to be doubtful if all the expenses of obtaining and serving fresh summonses on the witnesses should be thrown on the plaintiff. Bishen Parkash v Rattan Geer 20 W P 1 (1879)

(4) O XIII r 1 (c)

(5) S 104

(6) Anubash Chunder Mookerjee v Murli S C 832 (1882)

(7) Caussanel v Sources 23 M 260 (1899)

(8) Ashraffunnunissa v Lelareaux 8 C 272 (1882) Karuppan v Ayyathora 9 M 445 (1886)

(9) Caussanel v Sources *supra*

(10) Sadhu Krishna Ayyar v K J Ayyangar 30 M 54 (1906) J B

(11) Shama Dass v Harbansh 10 C 425 (1889)

(12) See Rang Lal M 1 2, W P 304 (1881) J

Kalce Kishen 22 W 1 1

monce Decca 131 1

R 147 (1884)

at least) is not one affecting the decision of the case under sect 99, and cannot be contested on appeal from the final decree (1) It is subject to attack under sect 115 if the conditions of that section are fulfilled (2) An *ex parte* decree is liable to review (3)

09.] 14. No decree shall be set aside on any such application
 No decree to be set aside without notice to opposite party. as aforesaid unless notice thereof has been served on the opposite party.

Notice.—In an application under r 13, the only parties entitled to notice are those that come under the description of "opposite party" in this rule. An auction-purchaser does not come under that description, and is not entitled to notice (4)

(1) Krishna Chandra Goldar v Mohesh Chandra Saha 9 C W N 584 (1905). Chintamony Dassi v Raghoonath Sahoo, 22 C 981 (1895), and a similar view was taken by Jackson J, in an early case Boro Khasia v Jata Sirdar 15 W R 315 (1871), s c, 8 B L R 78, the order, however, was successfully contested in appeal in Gopala Chetti v Subbier, 26 M 604 (1903) at p 605, Nand Ram v Bhopal Singh, 34 A 592

(1912)

(2) See judgment of Bannerjee, J, in Mahomed Hamidulla v Tokurenn ssa Bibi 2, C 155, at p 158 (1897)

(3) Haribur Pershad Narain v Buddu Pershad, 13 C L R 254 (1883), Bibi Mutto v Ilahi Begam, G A 65 (1883)

(4) Jotendra Mohun Poddar v Raja Snath Roy, 3 C W N 261 (1893), s c, 26 C 267

ORDER X.

Examination of Parties by the Court

1. At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain (s)
Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or denied from *each party* or his pleader whether he admits or demes *such* allegations of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The Court shall record such admissions and demals

2. At the first hearing of the suit, or at any subsequent (s)
Oral examination of party, or companion of party hearing, any party appearing in person or present in Court, or any person able to answer any material questions relating to the suit by whom such party or his pleader is accompanied, may be examined orally by the Court, and the Court may, if it thinks fit, put in the course of such examination questions suggested by either party

3. The substance of the examination shall be reduced to (s)
Substance of examination to be written. writing by the Judge and shall form part of the record

4. (1) *Where* the pleader of any party who appears by a (s)
Consequence of refusal or inability of pleader to answer pleader or any such person accompanying a pleader as is referred to in rule 1, refuses or is unable to answer any material question relating to the suit, which the Court is of opinion that the party whom he represents ought to answer, and is likely to be able to answer if interrogated in person the Court may postpone the hearing of the suit to a future day and direct that such party shall appear in person on such day

(2) If such party fails without lawful excuse to appear in person on the day so appointed, the Court may *pronounce judgment* against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit

Examination of parties—Rules 2 and 3 correspond with some alterations, with s 125 of the Code of 1859. As to these *vide post*. After the Court has ascertained what is admitted and denied under r 1 it may proceed to an oral examination under the next rule. This rule contemplates the case of a suit at the first or subsequent hearing in which a party has appeared at the proper time not a case where a party has not so appeared (1). Where however, a defendant appears by pleader or in person the fact that he is not

prepared to put in a written statement does not warrant the trial of a suit *ex parte*. The Judge should in that case ascertain what are the matters in issue by an examination of the defendant under this rule (1). The object of this examination is not to take evidence or to ascertain what is to be the evidence in the case but to see whether a cause of action exists, what are the matters in dispute, and, if necessary, to allow an amendment of the pleadings (2). Under the Code of 1859, provision was made for the examination of three persons, viz the party, pleader or companion of either. R 2 now excludes the pleader though 4 contemplates his examination. Under the Code of 1859, the examination was (unless the pleader was the person examined) to be on oath or affirmation. But as this provision has been omitted, the examination may now take place without oath or affirmation.

R 4 provides for the appearance of a party, not to give evidence in the ordinary way but to put the Court in possession of information necessary to the framing of issues or other points in the conduct of the case. The power given is discretionary the intention of the section being to enable the Court not only to get obscure points cleared up by obtaining information from either of the parties (3) but also if possible to get admissions so as to narrow down the issues (4). If the party does not appear, the Court may pass a decree (5) against the defaulting party but this can only be done if the pleader has previously thereto refused or been unable to answer a material (6) question (7). If the plaintiff is in default the Court may dismiss his suit. If it be the defendant the question arises whether the Court can or should decree the plaintiff's suit without any evidence in support of his claim (8). Apparently the Court has power to do so (9). The Court, however, is not bound to pass a decree it may pass any order it thinks fit. The amended section substitutes 'pronounce judgment' for "pass a decree". Apparently, however, the two phrases are meant to intend the same thing. R 4 is of a penal character and it is therefore incumbent on the Court which professes to act under it to take care that the contingency contemplated by it has in fact occurred (10).

(1) *Sinara; Shani Nilakantham v. Kuppasintulu Ramiah* 2 M H C R 311 (1865)

(2) *Ganga Narain Gupta v. Tiluckram Chowdhry* 15 C 533 537 (1888) a c, 15 I A 119 [examination of pleader] as to the manner in which verbal admissions of the pleader should be treated, see *Natha Singh v. Leelha Singh* 6 A 406 (1884)

(3) Discretion is given to the Court to decide which of the parties ought to answer the question. *Bhimarrao Gopal v. Venkatrao Narasingrao*, 5 B M I R 687 (1907)

(4) *Id.*

(5) See *Nidhan Singh Deo v. Ram Hurry* 2 W R 161 (1875) *Satu v. Hanumandrao* 23 B 316 (1899), *Bhimarrao Gopal v. Venkatrao Narasingrao* 5 B M I R 687 (1907)

(6) See *Bhimarrao Gopal v. Venkatrao Narasingrao* supra

(7) *Satu Hanumandrao* 23 B 316 (1899)

(8) Under s 170 of the Code of 1859 (which has not been re enacted) some evidence was required to be given by a plaintiff. *Damodar Bhooman v. Rughornath Panji*, 12 W P 242 (1869), *Ishan Chunder v. Harish Chunder* 12 W R 369 (1869), *Thakoor Lal v. Brohm* 12 W R 253 (1871), cases in which a party was summoned to give evidence by the opposite party.

(9) *Iaj Chookun Duiwanli v. Bant Tewari*, 20 W P 165 (1873), where J J I, said that apparently the Legislature had thought fit to empower the Court upon the occurrence of certain contingency on the part of a party to give a verdict against him irrespective of the merits of the case, and with reference to the merits apparent on evidence which might have been in a case coming under s 170 of the Code of 1859. *Id.* (10) *Id.*

ORDER XI

Discovery and Inspection

1. *In any suit the plaintiff or defendant by leave of the Court may deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the opposite parties or any one or more of such parties, and such interrogatories when delivered shall have a note at the foot thereof stating which of such interrogatories each of such persons is required to answer. Provided that no party shall deliver more than one set of interrogatories to the same party without an order for that purpose. Provided also that interrogatories which do not relate to any matters in question in the suit shall be deemed irrelevant, notwithstanding that they might be admissible on the oral cross examination of a witness.*

Discovery—The provisions as to discovery have been remodelled in conformity with the present English Rules, and the English decisions will be more closely applicable. This is O 31 r 1. It does not apply to rent suits in Bengal [sect 148, clause (a) Act VII of 1885]. The words “through the Court” have been omitted. Other amendments are noted, *post*. According to the former English practice actions were instituted to obtain discovery. Under the present practice these can be rarely necessary (1) Order 31 of the Judicature Act Rules following the extended principles of the Court of Chancery, now gives power to the Court in all suits to order discovery in aid of the action (2) This part of the Code closely follows the English Rules. The main object of administering interrogatories is to save expense by obtaining admissions from the opposite party (3) A plaintiff may interrogate with a view to obtain information or admissions in support of his own case and this right extends with proper qualifications not only to his original case but also to any answer which he has to make to the defendant’s case.

(1) See generally as to Bills for discovery Bray on Discovery 609-619, Ann Pr, notes 1 O 31, see Orr & Draper, 4 C. D. 92, 1 Amer & Salisbury, 2 C. D. 773.

(2) See Ann Pr *loc cit* ed (1905) p 384.

(3) Waghji Thackersey v. Khatri Rowji 10 B 167 at p 171 (1896).

But the right is always subject to the qualification that the interrogatories must be directed to a case on which the plaintiff has already determined and to which he has committed himself. He cannot be allowed to put fishing questions in order to try whether he can discover any flaw in the defendant's case or suggest any answer to it (1). Discovery is not limited to giving the party a knowledge of that which he does not already know, but includes the getting an admission of anything which he has to prove on an issue between himself and his opponent, (2) to facilitate proof or save expense, (3) and to diminish the burden of proof (4). So one party may be asked as to any admissions he may have made tending to support his opponent's cause of action (5). And discovery may be had of the names of persons to make them parties, and the names and securities of prior incumbrances (6). The interrogatory must be as to facts, and must not ask for conclusions of law, inference of facts, or construction of a document (7). In short, a party is entitled to discovery of every fact which makes out his own case or shows that he is in the right and this includes specific allegations in the nature of a replication to an anticipated defence. He is not however, entitled to discovery of matters which support his opponent's case or show that his opponent is right. It has been held that he cannot ask the opposite party by what evidence he intends to support his case (8). But in a suit for the recovery of the amount on a bond alleged to have been drawn and accepted by the defendant in consideration of a loan, it has been recently held in the Calcutta High Court that a party is entitled to interrogate on facts directly in issue in the pleadings and that therefore the defendant was entitled to discovery of all necessary details including the names and addresses of the persons by whom it was presented (9). In this country it was formerly held that interrogatories viewed as machinery for eliciting facts bearing upon issues arising in suits were intended only to save

(1) *Ali Lader v Gobind Dass* 17 C 610
518 (1890) and in *Bemolamoney Dass* :
Huledhur Bullath I Bonla 118

(2) Att Gen & Gaskill 20 Ch D 628,
Kennedy & Dalton (1895) 1 Ch 334 341

(3) *Grumbrecht v Parry* 32 W R (Eng) 204 Hall & L & N W P₃ Co 35 L T 850 So it is admissible to interrogate to facts which will inform the party as to evidence to be obtained *Att Gen v Giskill* *supra* the names of persons who may give evidence in his favour, *Hall v Llardet* W N 83 (1875) the names of persons present at an alleged slander and so forth.

(4) Att Cen & Gaskill, *supra* 527, 528

(5) Hodsdoll v. Taylor, 1 P. 3 Q. B. 79, and see Brink v. Walz, 1 C. B. N. S. 308, in respect as to admissibility of 22 and 23 of the Evidence Act.

(1) Union Bank of London & Manly 11

(1) 279 (acum.) ruces ad 1 m. (age 500)

Hancock: Lablache 3 C P D 202 [defendant's husband] West of England Bank: Nicholls 6 C D 613 [prior securities] Error: Rodgers 40 W R (Fng) 137 [names of not not one]

La
sought to obtain the opponent's views as to
the construction of a will]

(8) *Ali Kader v Golmd Das* 17 C. 810
817 (1890), *Aekram Dohi v Park of*
Bengal, 14 C 703 at p 706 (1897) { this is
matter relating exclusively to the point of
case 1

(9) Baijnath Kedua : Raghunath Prasad
- All Kaddur

last Code the provisions were not
as the English XXXI

a limited operation (1) So though English authorities establish that a plaintiff may interrogate the defendant in order that he may know what case he has to meet—not the evidence but what the defence is—such interrogatories are really framed to anticipate or supply defects of pleading But the system of procedure in this country, it was held, was different Two modes were held to be specially provided for meeting the difficulty in question If the pleading was too vague the Court might require a further and fuller written statement under the section corresponding with O VIII r 9 The other method referred to was that provided by the Code in the settlement of issues Interrogatories should not in such a case, it was held, be resorted to in this country (2) So again it was held that sect 131 of the last Code indicated that in a case falling within it a party should proceed not by way of interrogatories, but according to the procedure laid down in that section, and that the Code did not contemplate that a party should be compelled to give discovery of documents by means of interrogatories or otherwise the relevancy of which was denied (3) Further particulars may now be demanded under O VI r 5 but there can be no doubt that the framers of the present Code intended to approximate the two systems as far as possible

Time for delivery of interrogatories—The former Code contained the words "*at any time*" which have now been omitted In England a plaintiff is hardly ever allowed discovery before statement of claim, for from the earliest times the Court has set its face against allowing discovery for the purpose of fishing out a case (4) and this must always be so under the Code where a suit is not instituted until after the presentation of a plaint (5) In Common Law actions the proper time for discovery was not until after defence, for until then it was not usually possible to say what was really material But a plaintiff has been allowed to interrogate before defence and in the Chancery Division it is common practice to allow a plaintiff discovery before defence (6) And the Court has a discretion to allow this under this rule The same principles which prohibit discovery before the plaintiff has stated his case apply to a defendant As a rule therefore in England a defendant will not be allowed general discovery before putting in his defence (7) and this was laid down as an absolute rule in all cases by the second paragraph of the former section This portion of the former proviso has been omitted and the English

(1) *Nittomoye Dassie v Soolul Chunder Law*, 23 C 117, at p 124 (1893) where it was held that s 131 now r 17 indicated one direction in which the scope of interrogatories was intended to be limited just as *Ali Kader v Gobind Dass* 17 C 840 (1890) which it followed explained another direction limiting the scope of operation

(2) *Ali Kader v Gobind Dass* 17 C 840 (1890) it may however be considered questionable whether such differences as exist in the procedure are sufficient to deprive a party of the right to use all remedies O Xinealy v P C Notes to s 12 The circumstances of litigation in this country have undoubtedly

cast upon the Courts in regard to pleadings some responsibilities which do not find a counterpart in English practice but that is no reason for excluding the very material assistance which the parties can render in giving precision to the points in issue

(3) *Nittomoye Dassie v Soolul Chunder Law* 23 C 117 at pp 124 125 (1893)

(4) *Ann Ir* 1903 p 383 notes to O 31 r 1

(5) *Ides* 26 ante

(6) *Ann Pr* 1903 p 743 notes to O 31 r 1

(7) *Ann Ir* 1907 p 784 notes to O 31, r 1

practice will be followed. The same procedure may be adopted in miscellaneous proceedings after decree. Interrogatories as to accounts pending or to make the judgment available, or to find out how the property in cases of mesne profits has been managed, have been allowed and no doubt will be admitted under the Code (1).

Leave—Application should be made on petition in Chambers, the order being that the plaintiff be allowed to interrogate (2). It was held to be the duty of the Court to determine whether the applicant should be allowed to interrogate, but not to determine at that stage what questions the opposite party should be compelled to answer (3). But see now next rule. In giving leave the Court, as a rule, decides nothing as to the specific interrogatories but only that there is a case for interrogating the party, that the interrogatories may possibly be relevant, that their genuine character is not improper and that their administration is not sought for the mere purpose of annoyance. Where the party on being served refuses to answer them the Court enters upon a considered adjudication under r 11, *post*, and the resulting order may be enforced under r 21. The grant of leave to one party to deliver interrogatories to another does not amount to an order requiring the other party to answer them, for that party may perhaps have good ground for refusing to answer them or some of them (4, 6). Leave granted is, therefore, not an order to answer within the meaning of r 21 entailing a dismissal or striking out a defence (4).

"Interrogatories"—For form of interrogatories, see Schedule IV 123 of last Code and case cited, (5) and r 4, *post*. Interrogatories are only affidavits obtained in a particular way, and the party wishing to use them must put them in as his evidence (6). See as to their use, r 22, *post*.

"Opposite parties"—Primarily this is a party on the other side of the record to the applicants (7). A party opposite party within the meaning of there is some right to be adjusted in the case between two plaintiffs or two defendants (8). But defendants were

(1) See Ann Pr, O 31, r 1, "discovery after and for working out judgment or order," Bray, 567-569.

(2) Sham Kishore Mundle v Shoshi Bhoosun Biswas, 5 C 707 (1880), and as to service, see ib.

(3) Sham Kishore Mundle v Shoshi Bhoosun Biswas (1880), 5 C, at p 709.

(4) Prem Sukh Chunder v Indro Nath Baujerje, 18 C 420 (1891) F B, overruling Lallu Dabee Pershad v Santo Pershad 10 C 505 (1884), see notes to r 21, *post*.

(5) Nittomoye Dassee v Soobul Chunder Law, 23 C 117, at pp 118-120 (1895), and Chetty F 267-272, D C I 957, Ann Pr form 6 Appx B.

(6) Waghlji Thackersey v Khatau Rowji, 10 B 167, at p 171 (1886), Gosto Rikary

Pal v Johur Lall Pal, 4 C 836 (1879).

(7) In Spokes v Grosvenor (1897), 2 Q B 124, the Court held that such a party might be ordered to give discovery of documents of a necessary party though there might be no issue between him and the applicant.

(8) Shaw v Smith, 18 Q B D 193, Molloy v Kirby, 15 C D 162, Alcoy, etc, Co v Greenhill, 74 L T 345, where discovery of documents between co-defendants to counter claim was ordered, and in Flen v Weardale, 35 Ch D 287, it was said at pp 297, 298, to mean that a plaintiff might interrogate a defendant, and a defendant a plaintiff, and that the words were so wide as to include all persons who litigate one against the other in any proceeding, any question which the Court may properly decide.

refused leave to interrogate co defendants who had put in no defence, there being no issue between them (1)

In England formerly the decisions established that an infant by reason of incapacity, could not be interrogated (2) nor could he be made to give discovery of documents (3) nor could such orders be made against a next friend (4) or guardian *ad litem* (5) as such neither having the status of a party as that term is understood in the rules dealing with the subject. Now, however, r 23 makes the order applicable to infant plaintiffs and defendants and to the next friends and guardians *ad litem* of persons under disability (6)

The Bombay High Court (7) has however, in the case cited applying the present English rule, held that an affidavit of documents may be required from a minor defendant though the Judge stated that he did not decide that a next friend or guardian of an infant could be directly ordered to make an affidavit of documents. It has however, been pointed out (8) that the order as made was invalid (the guardian *ad litem* being willing to make an affidavit) and that the affidavit was in reality to be made by the guardian and the Calcutta High Court has in the case cited held that a minor cannot be compelled to give discovery under sect 129 of the former Code nor on the same principle (*viz*, his incapacity) could he be interrogated under the section corresponding to this rule, nor could his next friend or guardian be considered an "opposite party" upon whom such interrogatories can be served within the meaning of that section. It has however, been said that a guardian *ad litem* may under circumstances be made a party for the purpose of obtaining discovery from him (9). But even in this case which was an exceptional one it was held that where the guardian had been made a party defendant for purposes of discovery the discovery was not intended to include the right to administer interrogatories

(1) *Marshall v Langley* W N (89) 222

(2) *Ann Pr* notes to this rule which was introduced in 1893 in consequence of the decisions cited. As to lunatics see *Bray v Discovery* 63-67 and *Ann Pr v l n Part IV Lunatics*

(3) *Mayor v Collins* 41 Q B D 361 commented on in *1 Clerk v Redfern* (1891) P 139, where it was doubted whether in the old Chancery practice of refusing to make an infant give discovery obtained. See cases cited in *Waghji Thakkersey v Khatri Rowji* 10 B 167 (1886), *Nathmull Narasingh v Malharrao Holkar* 19 B 330 (1894), *Duncan v Bhoyro Prosad* 22 C 891 (1895)

(4) *Curtis v Mundy* 2 Q B 178 (1892) See Indian cases in last note

(5) *Lawton v Elwes* 48 L T 425 *Scott v Consolidated Bank* W N (93) 56 *Duke v Stephens* 30 Ch D 189 See Indian cases in last note but on

(6) *Ingram v Little* 11 Q B D 37 See

Indian cases in last note but two

(7) *Nathmull Narasingh v Malharrao Holkar* 19 B 330 (1894) per *Larrin J*

(8) *Duncan v Bhoyro Prosad* 22 C 891 (1895)

(9) *Ib*, at p 333 citing *Waghji Thakkersey v Khatri Rowji* 10 B 167 (1886) but see now *Berry v Keen* 26 Sol Jo 312 *Burchard v Macfarlane* 2 Q B 217 (1891) *Symon v City Bank* 79 L T J 175 *Burnell v Beyfus* 20 Ch D 40-42 disapproving the old practice establishing that a person should not be made a party solely for the purpose of discovery. *Ann Pr* 100 p 414 notes to O 31 r 12. In *Rahimboy v Turner* 17 B 341 318 (1892) a defendant having been irregularly made a party but only for the purpose of discovery to a prior suit brought by the plaintiff was held not a party to that suit, so as to make applicable to him the provisions of ss 13 or 43, corresponding with s 11 and O II r 2 of the present Code

to him (1) Now, however, r 23 makes the preceding rules of the Order applicable to minors and lunatics their next friends and guardians

2. On an application for leave to deliver interrogatories, the particular interrogatories proposed to be delivered shall be submitted to the Court. In deciding upon such application, the Court shall take into account any offer, which may be made by the party sought to be interrogated, to deliver particulars, or to make admissions, or to produce documents relating to the matters in question, or any of them, and leave shall be given as to such only of the interrogatories submitted as the Court shall consider necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs

Submission of interrogatories.—This rule, which is new is taken from O 31 r 2 Under this rule the Judge has not, it has been said, (2) to settle the interrogatories but to decide what should be administered. Allowing an interrogatory does not preclude any objection being taken in the answer under r 6 post (3) Where some have been allowed and some refused application may be made for leave to deliver further interrogatories (4) In the under mentioned cases defendant undertaking to make admissions leave was refused (5) and admissions having been refused, leave was given (6)

3 In adjusting the costs of the suit inquiry shall it the instance of any party be made into the propriety of exhibiting such interrogatories and if it is the opinion of the taxing officer or of the Court, either with or without an application for inquiry that such interrogatories have been exhibited unreasonably, vexatiously, or at an improper length, the costs occasioned by the said interrogatories and the answers thereto shall be paid in any event by the party in fault

Costs.—This is taken from O 31 r 3, and does not apply to rent suits in Bengal (vide r 1 ante)

4 Interrogatories shall be in the Form No 2 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require

5 Where any party to a suit is a corporation or a body of persons, whether incorporated or not empowered by law to sue or be sued whether in its own name or in the name of any officer or other person

(1) Wallis Thackersey v Khatso Rowji 10 B 167 (1886)

(2) Per Chitt J in Tye v Willou 11 v 38 Sol J 334

(3) 1 Ch R 145 (1844) 3 Cl 482

(4) Heller v Ellis W N (84) 9

any opposite party may apply for an order allowing him to deliver interrogatories to any member or officer of such corporation or body, and an order may be made accordingly.

Corporations and Companies—English O 31, r 5 Does not apply to rent suits in Bengal (*vide ante*, r 1) The English rule is practically the same except that instead of the word "*suit*," it uses the words "*cause or matter*," which also appear in O 31, r 1 of the English rules and is identical with that under the C L P Act except that "*member*" is added The old practice in Chancery was to make him a party for the purpose of discovery, but this can no longer be done (1) As to body corporate, or other body, Crown, (2) foreign sovereigns, (3) liquidator, (4) see cases cited (5) The secretary of a corporation or company is, as a rule, the proper person to answer and it was the practice of Jessel MR, not to direct a member to answer unless there was no officer who had a competent knowledge of the facts (6) The officer or member is the representative or *alter ego* of the body for the purposes of answering the interrogatories (7) It is not his answer but the answer of the body, and therefore, there is no obligation either to disclose his knowledge, or to obtain and disclose the knowledge of other servants or agents of the body acquired by him or them otherwise than in the course of his or their employment (8) As regards discovery and production of documents, this is obtained by an order against the body for an affidavit of documents in its possession to be made by the secretary clerk, or other proper officer on its behalf (9) It should if possible be made by some person who has personal knowledge as to documents in the possession of the body (10)

6 Any objection to answering any interrogatory on the ground that it is *scandalous or irrelevant or not exhibited bonâ fide* for the purpose of the suit, or that the matters inquired into are not sufficiently material at that stage, or on any other ground, may be taken in the affidavit in answer

"Any objection"—This rule is taken from O 31 r 6 It does not apply to rent suits in Bengal (see r 1 *ante*) Where interrogatories are scandalous

(1) Wilson v Church 9 C D 539

(2) Att Gen v Newcastle (1897) 2 Q B 384, discussing generally, the Crown's position in matters of discovery

(3) S A Rep v La Coup Franco Belge (1898) 1 Ch 190 [if a foreign sovereign brings an action here he must give discovery] Prudential v U S A L R 2 Eq 663 664 [on his own oath] *aliter* foreign republics Rep Costa Rica v Estange 1 C D 171 see post

(4) Who is under an obligation to give discovery *Per* Contract Corp 7 Ch 907 *Re* Burned's Banking Co 2 Ch 350, but not an affidavit of document as of course *Per*

Mutual Society 22 Ch 720 721 The liquidator has a reciprocal right of discovery *Re* Alcantra Co, 16 Ch D 58

(5) Bray's Digest on Discovery Art 3, and Ann Pr notes to O 31 r 6

(6) Berkeley v Standard Discount Co 13 Ch D 99

(7) *Ib* at p 101

(8) Welsbach Co v New Sunlight Co (1900) 2 Ch 1

(9) Ann Pr note to O 31, r 5, see forms in Chitty, F 247 248 s 54

(10) See Bray's Digest Art 24 *Per* of Liberman v Roze 1 App Cas. 139

or in any way an abuse of the process of the Court, the latter may interfere at any stage. Where an *ex parte* order is made giving leave to interrogate, the party ordered to answer has a right to come into Court to have the order set aside if the case is one in which interrogatories should not have been allowed. When an order for administration of interrogatories is properly made, a party objecting to them may at his peril omit to answer the interrogatories to which he objects but the more prudent course is to file his affidavit in answer stating in it his objections to answer such questions as he objects to (1). Then the interrogating party can apply under r 11, and the Court will make an order under that section enforceable under r 21 *post*.

"Irrelevant"—There is a distinction between discovery and cross examination (2). Interrogatories which do not relate to any matters in question in the suit are irrelevant notwithstanding that they might be admissible on the oral cross examination of a witness. The discovery must be directly relevant to the matters in issue (3). Questions going to the credit of a party as a witness are inadmissible (4) but the right to interrogate is not confined to the facts directly in issue but extends to any facts, the existence or non-existence of which is relevant to the existence or non-existence of the facts directly in issue (5). Under the old Chancery practice the discovery was material if it might be useful in obtaining any relief which the plaintiff might obtain. For the purpose of testing the relevancy to a particular issue, the case of the party making the discovery upon that issue may have to be assumed to be true (6).

"Not exhibited bona fide"—Even if the interrogatories are relevant they may be objected to on the ground that they have not been put *bona fide* for the purposes of the suit. All questions put *mala fide* with an ulterior object beyond that of helping the case of the party setting them should be disallowed.

"Not sufficiently material at that stage"—Material means more than relevant. A fact may be relevant but not material at a particular stage. The term means material as to the case made and the relief prayed for at the stage of the case when discovery is sought. What is material at one stage of a case may not be material at another. The question of materiality must be tested by reference to the case made by the plaintiff's pleadings, and to what will be in issue at the hearing. Thus where a person sued as an agent denied agency an interrogatory as to the names of the persons to whom he had sold was refused. For the question to be decided was agency or no agency and the right to an account would only arise if the agency were proved (7). Again discovery relating to the quantum of damage is clearly relevant although it may be postponed until the question of liability has been deter-

(1) *Sham Kashore Mundle v. Shoshibhoosun Bawa*, 5 C 707 (1880).

(2) *Att. Gen. v. Gaskill* 20 Ch D 539.

(3) *J. v. Howel Morgan*, 39 C. D 316, and see *Kennedy v. Dodson* (1830) 1 Ch 334.

(4) *Allhusen v. Labouchere*, 3 Q B D 93.

(5) *Marrott v. Chamberlain* 17 Q B D 163.

(6) *Ann. Pr.* 1900, p. 400, notes to O 11.

(7) *Bray*, 18.

(7) *Moore v. Craven* 1 B 7 Ch App 9 and see other cases in *Ann. Pr.*, notes to O 11, r 7.

mined Where, therefore, the parties were at issue as to the plaintiff being entitled to recover any damages at all, an interrogatory as to damages was held to be premature, as the question whether there had been any wrongful act committed and whether the plaintiff was entitled to any damages had first to be determined (1) Generally, the Court is unwilling before the right to relief is established to make an order for discovery which may be injurious to the defendant and will only be useful to the plaintiff if he succeeds in establishing his title to relief (2) In considering whether discovery ought to be given the Court must first consider whether it will help the plaintiff at the trial If it will not, but will only be of use if the plaintiff obtains a decree, then the Court will postpone discovery as being not sufficiently material at the stage at which it is sought (3)

"Any other like ground"—Documents which of themselves evidence exclusively the party's own case are clearly (4) protected He must swear that (to the best of his belief and after proper examination) they form or support or evidence or relate exclusively to his own case or title, and that they contain nothing impeaching his own case or title (5) Then there is the question of privilege The Evidence Act excludes certain questions, and what a party or a

as such, except by the order of a Superior Court, (7) communications made during marriage, except in suits between married persons, (8) affairs of State and official communications, (9) information given concerning the commission of an offence, (10) professional communications, (11) confidential communications with legal advisers (12) Sects 126-129 of the Evidence Act refer to communications between clients and their legal advisers alone There are certain cases however, for which the Act does not make specific provisions and in which the question of privilege generally arises in applications for discovery before trial in which communications made for the purpose of litigation between third persons and the adviser, or third persons and the client for the

(1) *Neekram Dohay v Bank of Bengal* 14 C 703 (1887), last case where the question was simply one as to amount of damages the defendant wishing to satisfy the demand

(2) *Fennessy v Clark* 37 Ch D 187

(3) *Parker v Wells* 18 C D 483 See *Sutherland v Singhee Churn Dutt*, 10 C 808 (1884) where the objection that the documents were then not sufficiently material was overruled, and *Secretary of State v Jehangir*, 4 Bom L R 342, 347 (1902)

(4) Ann. Pr., notes to O 31, r 1, p 399 *Budden v Wilkinson* (1893) 2 Q B 432 dissented from *Maclean v Jones*, 66 L T 653, limiting it to documents of title to land, and see *Frankenstern v Gavins Co* (1897) 2 Q B 62 and second part of r 15, post

(5) *Ib.*, *Bray*, Dig Art 23 The last assertion as to impeaching it need not be made by a defendant in ejectment for he having no title will not entitle the plaintiff

(6) See *Ryrie v Shivshankar*, 15 B 7, at p 10 (1890)

(7) Indian Evidence Act s. 124 On this and the following section see the Authors' Commentary on the Act 6th Ed

(8) *Ib.* s. 122

(9) *Ib.* ss 123, 124 (and see Ann. Pr., notes to O 31, r 1, citing cases where discovery has been refused if injurious to public interests)

(10) *Ib.* s. 125

(11) *Ib.* ss 126-128.

(12) *Ib.* s. 129

purpose of submission to the adviser, are protected (1) On the same principle as a witness cannot be examined so he cannot be interrogated as to questions of law (2) Nor is he bound to discover the evidence of his case, for this would enable his unscrupulous opponent to tamper with the witnesses and to manufacture evidence in contradiction and so shape the case as to defeat justice (3) But according to the English authorities a party must discover the nature of his case or the facts on which he relies in support of his case as distinguished from the evidence of his case or the way in which he is going to make out his case (4) According to the English rule a party is not compelled to give discovery which will tend to criminate him or expose him to the risk of any kind of punishment (5) But in this country a witness is not excused from answering on the ground that an answer will criminate (6) Though, therefore, a party may and should for his protection (7) claim privilege on this ground it would appear that he may be compelled to answer an incriminating interrogatory. Objectionable or oppressive interrogatories should be disallowed (8) The mere fact that questions would be admissible in cross examination will not make them good as interrogatories (9)

7 Any interrogatories may be set aside on the ground that they have been exhibited unreasonably or vexatiously, or struck out on the ground that they are prolix, oppressive, unnecessary or scandalous, and any application for this purpose may be made within seven days after service of the interrogatories

Setting aside of interrogatories — See notes to last rule The present rule is taken from O 31, r 7

8 Interrogatories shall be answered by affidavit to be filed within ten days, or within such other time as the Court may allow

Time for answer — Order 31 r 8 If defendant is out of the jurisdiction or there be other sufficient cause for allowing a greater length of time, a reasonable time will be given If ten days have been originally fixed the Court may upon an application supported by affidavit extend the time for filing the affidavit

(1) See the matter fully dealt with in Authors' Evidence Act 6th Ed notes to ss 126 129. Information obtained from third parties for the purpose of litigation and Vishnu Yeshawant v New York Life Assurance Co, 7 Bom L R 709 (1905)

(2) *Id* ante

(3) Ann Lr notes to O 31, r 1 Bray 415 see Barrow v Low, 16 C D 95, 12 Strachan, 1 Ch 445, 417, 418 (1895)

(4) Ann Lr O 31, r 1, p 397 (1900) But see Ali Kader v Golind Dass 17 C 810 (1880) note, which case has recently

been distinguished in Raghunath Behl v Raghunath Prasad, 41 C 6 (1913) in which it was held that a party may interrogate on all facts directly in issue in the pleadings

(5) *Ib*, at p 387

(6) Indian Evidence Act s 132

(7) See R v Gopal Das 3 V 271, and other cases cited in Authors' Evidence Act notes to s 132

(8) Winters v Dibley W. N. 21 (1876)

See Lockett v Lockett 4 Ch App 337

(9) Bhagwan Das Pundram v Harji Puttanji 37 B 317 (1912)

in answer As to objections and mode of stating them and as to answering sufficiently, see notes to rr 6 11, respectively The rule does not apply to rent suits in Bengal (see r 1 ante)

9 *An affidavit in answer to interrogatories shall be in Form of affidavit in Form No 3 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require*

10 *No exceptions shall be taken to any affidavit in answer, but the sufficiency or otherwise of any such affidavit objected to as insufficient shall be determined by the Court*

11 *Where any person interrogated omits to answer or answers insufficiently, the party interrogating may apply to the Court for an order requiring him to answer, or to answer further, as the case may be And an order may be made requiring him to answer or answer further, either by affidavit or by *voir dire* examination, as the Court may direct*

"Insufficiently — O 31 r 11 It does not apply to rent suits in Bengal (see r 1 ante) The same necessity for clear specific answers and absence of all evasion is required as in the case of pleading as to which see O VIII r 1 If the answer is evasive the usual practice is to require a further answer More over matter of supererogation should not be introduced It is of course legitimate to explain or qualify an answer But when an answer is couched in a form which makes it embarrassing that is to say which prevents the person who asks it from using it without having thrust upon him irrelevant matter as part of it it is insufficient (1) A party must answer to the best of his knowledge information and belief (2) He is bound therefore to state all the information he already possesses though he is not bound to state the information of his servants Of these he must state all the information he must also state (3) The question in all cases is whether the answer is insufficient The Court has not to go into the question of its truthfulness If the Court is clearly satisfied (from certain sources as to which see r 6 ante) that the oath of the party by which he claims his protection cannot be really available for the purpose for which he puts it forward a further answer may be ordered But the oath should not be disregarded on mere suspicion A substantial answer is sufficient under the present practice the substance and not the form being that at which the Court looks If looking at all the answers together the Court thinks that every question material to the case has been fairly and substantially

(1) See Lyell v Kennerly 27 C D 28 33
W R 44 Richards v Crawshaw 8 Times L
410 Ann. Pr notes to O 31 r 11

(2) Bray v A. Arts. 16 19 Ann. Pr
loc cit

(3) 11

answered, though some questions have not been answered accurately, it will not require a further answer (1) The Court may direct a viva voce examination instead of a further affidavit. A roving cross examination is not legitimate but the party should only be required to make such an answer as would have been sufficient if originally given in writing (2) See notes to r 6 ante

12 Any party may, without filing any affidavit, apply to the Court for an order directing any other party to any suit to make discovery on oath of the documents which are or have been in his possession or power relating to any matter in question therein. On the hearing of such application the Court may either refuse or adjourn the same if satisfied that such discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that stage of the suit, or make such order, either generally or limited to certain classes of documents, as may, in its discretion, be thought fit. Provided that discovery shall not be ordered when and so far as the Court shall be of opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.

13 The affidavit to be made by a party against whom such order as is mentioned in the last preceding rule has been made, shall specify which (if any) of the documents therein mentioned he objects to produce, and it shall be in Form No. in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

Discovery affecting documents—Up to r 11 the Code has dealt with the first branch of discovery—that of interrogatories. It then proceeds to deal with discovery as it affects documents. This latter discovery embraces two heads—first discovery simply—that is the power of compelling the opponent to disclose the documents he has in his possession, secondly, the power of compelling their production and inspection (3). The subject of discovery simply is dealt with by this rule which is taken from the English Order 31 r 12. Subsequent rules deal with production and inspection. The proper mode of ascertaining what documents the adversary has is by an affidavit of documents and not by interrogating him. An interrogatory, therefore asking generally as to documents is not permissible. Though according to English practice in interrogatory asking as to specific documents is not necessarily open to objection (4). The practice in the Calcutta High Court is that the party applies without any affidavit in support of his application, that the opposite

(1) Ann 1 r notes to O 31 r 11

(2) *Iitchfield v Jones* 51 L. T. 572

(3) Ann 1 r 190, p 499. But according to *Nittomoye Dutt v Seal & Chunder Law*, 21 C. 117 (1893) it would seem that the pro-

cedure to be followed is not by interrogating but by an application for inspection under r 17.

(4) *Dhappu Ram Pershad* 14 C. 788, at p 774 (1887).

documents relating to the matter in question in this suit set forth in the second schedule hereto

5 The last mentioned documents were last in my possession or power on (state when)

6 That (here state when and what has become of the last mentioned documents, and in whose possession they are now)

7 According to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, I have not now, and never had, in my possession, custody, or power, or in the possession, custody or power of my solicitors, pleaders, or agents, solicitor, pleader, or agent or in the possession, custody or power of any other person or persons on my behalf, any deed, account, book of account, voucher, receipt, letter, memorandum, paper, or writing or any copy of, or extract from any such document, or any other document whatsoever relating to the matters in question in this suit, or any of them, or wherein any entry has been made relative to such matters or any of them, other than and except the documents set forth in the first and second schedules hereto

The Advocate General is not called upon to make discovery on oath (1)

"Possession or power" —These words do not here bear the limited meaning which they bear for the purpose of an order for production. No order for production can be made against a party unless he has directly or indirectly admitted it to be in his possession or power. Possession or power for the purpose of justifying an order for production has a narrower meaning than for the purpose of inclusion in an affidavit of documents. For the purpose of an order for production it means sole legal possession, a right and power to deal with them, (2) the sole property in them, (3) joint possession with other persons being insufficient (4) Where the document is not in the party's sole legal possession it is sufficient for him to state the fact, it is not necessary to allege or show the refusal of the co owners, (5) but he must state their names and the nature of their ownership (6) But possession of the agent is possession of the principal (7) and one partner of a firm represents the other partners for the purposes of production of documents (8) But under the present rule all documents must be included in which the party has any possession or property jointly with others, or even in which he has no property at all if they are in his corporeal possession (9) Careful search must be made for all relevant documents in his own physical possession and proper inquiries and efforts made as to those which are not, for instance documents abroad, (10) and the affidavit must state not only the documents which are but those which have been in the party's possession (11)

(1) Advocate General Bombay & Adampur 30 B 474 (1905)

(2) *Kearshy v Phillips*, 10 Q B D 36 40 Cor C A 116 462

(3) *Murray v Walter, Cr & Ph* 114

(4) *Id* and see cases cited in *Haji Jakaria v Haji Casim*, 1 B 196 (1876)

(5) *Kearshy v Phillips supra*

(6) *Boyd v Cowan*, C L 5 Ch 105 See Ann Tr n text to O 31, r 14

(7) *Bray's Digest*, 195; where solicitor claims lien, see *Lewis v Powell* (1897) 1 Ch 478, *Re Hawkes* (1894), 2 Ch 7, and as to privilege, s 131, Evidence Act

(8) *Haji Jakaria v Haji Casim*, 1 B 4 (1876)

(9) See Ann Tr, notes to O 31, r 12 and cases there cited (10) *Id*

(11) See *Kallian Bibi v Saifur Husam* s A 213, at p 217 (1886)

"Relating to any matter in question therein"—The following interpretations have been given of these words—Documents containing information which may either directly or indirectly enable the party seeking discovery either to advance his own case, or damage that of his adversary, or which may fairly lead him to a train of inquiry which may have either of these two consequences (1) They are not confined to such as would be admissible in evidence (2) Every document which will throw any light on the case (3)

Objection to production—As to what documents are privileged from production, see notes to r 6 *ante*. The affidavit should set out the grounds on which privilege is claimed. But a party is not confined to the affidavit in which the claim is first set up. He is entitled to put in and use a further affidavit in support of his claim of privilege (4)

Sealing up—According to the Equity practice followed in the High Courts, a party may seal up such portions of otherwise material documents as he swears are privileged. A party must, however, specify what parts of the documents referred to he claims to seal up, and the grounds upon which the claim is based (5). If he does not, though the Court has allowed an application to consider the sufficiency of the affidavit, (6) yet technically the right way of raising the question is by taking out a summons for production and inspection (7). When the right of a party producing documents to seal certain portions of them is contested, the Court appoints an officer to whom the plaintiff states in confidence why he wants to inspect any portion of the documents sealed, and the officer, after looking at the documents, reports whether and in what way the part noted or desired to be noted is material to the case of the other party (8).

Objection to affidavit—When an affidavit is technically insufficient that is, in its terms, and fails to comply with the requirements of the Code a summons may be taken out to consider its sufficiency (9) and the party will be ordered to amend his affidavit or file a further affidavit (10) as where the description of documents is imperfect (11) or improperly verified, (12) or where the affidavit does not specify what the plaintiff claims to seal up and is not in the prescribed form (13). The only occasion where a party can be compelled to file a further

(1) *Compagnie Financière v Peruvian Guano Co*, 11 Q B D 63

(2) *Ib*, 62, *Jessell MR in Busby v White*, 1 Q B D 420, *Hutchinson v Glover* 1 Q B D 141

(3) *Ib* 141

(4) *Ambika Churn v Bengal Spinning Co Ltd*, 22 C 100 (1894)

(5) *Jadub Loll Shaw v Kanai Loll Shaw* 20 C 587, 589 (1893)

(6) *Ib*

(7) *Ib*, *Horendra Nath Mukerjee v Grendra Kumar Dutt*, 3 C W N 490 (1897)

(8) *Hera Loll Rukht v Ram Suran Loll*, 4 C 830 (1873), *Nittomajee Dasse v*

Soobul Chunder Law 23 C 117 at p 126 (1895)

(9) See *Oriental Bank Corporation v Brown* 12 C 265 (1885) *Kenelly v Wyman* 1 C 178 (1876) *Jadub Loll Shaw v Kanai Loll Shaw* 20 C 587 (1893)

(10) *Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v Kally Hussen Tagore* 2 C W N 17 (1897)

(11) *Oriental Bank Corporation v Brown supra*

(12) *Kahan Bibi v Safdar Hussain* 8 A 265 (1886)

(13) *Jadub Loll Shaw v Kanai Loll Shaw*, 20 C 587 (1893) but see *Horendra Nath Mukerjee v Grendra Kumar Dutt*, 3 C W N 495 (1899)

affidavit of documents, is when the original affidavit is insufficient that is in its terms, and fails to comply with the requirements of the Code. If it is not alleged that the affidavit is defective in that respect but that the affidavit contains statements which are untrue in fact the party so alleging should specify the documents which he requires to see, and which have been omitted from the affidavit and apply for an order of inspection under r 18, *post* (1). He must (as appears from that rule), in addition to the matters mentioned show that the documents of which he claims inspection are relevant to the matters in question in the suit (2). If he is then met by an affidavit of the other party denying possession, that is a risk which the party seeking inspection must take. For just as for the purposes of discovery an affidavit of documents denying possession is conclusive so for the purposes of production and inspection an affidavit denying possession of such documents would be equally conclusive (3). The Court however, in this decision distinguishing cases on the question of privilege which stand on a different footing was not prepared to assent to the broad proposition that as the oath of the party is conclusive on the question of possession so also in an application under r 18 the affidavit of the opposite party is conclusive on the issue of relevancy (4). An effective remedy may however, be obtained at the hearing where possession is denied. For if on cross examination or otherwise it appears that the party has failed to disclose or refused inspection of relevant documents in his possession the Court will then direct immediate inspection to be given adjourning the hearing at the cost of the person who has so evaded giving discovery (5). If the Court is clearly satisfied on a perusal of the affidavit the documents therein referred to and the pleadings, that the affidavit cannot be accepted the Court may according to the English practice order a further affidavit of documents. But these are the only sources to which the Court may look for this purpose (6). It is not clear upon the Indian cases what course should be taken in such a case. The case cited below (7) seems to suggest that a further affidavit will only be ordered where the affidavit is technically insufficient in its strictest sense and where a defendant in his written statement referred to documents not set out in his affidavit the Court discharged a summons to consider its sufficiency holding that as the omitted documents were sufficiently described in the written statement, an application could be forthwith made for inspection if inspection were needed (8).

Conclusiveness of affidavit—Where however a proper affidavit has been filed, either originally or as the result of an order for a further affidavit the oath of the party swearing the affidavit is conclusive upon the questions

(1) *Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v. Hall*
Kissen Tagore 2 C W N 17 (1897)
and see *Basanta v. Kumudini* 11 C W N
81 (1911)

(2) *Nittomoye Dasgupta v. Soobal Chandra*
Law 23 C 117 at p 125 (1899)

(3) *Ib.* at p 127

(4) *Ib.* at p 121

(5) *Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v. Hall*

Kissen Tagore supra

(6) *Ann Pr* 1903 Pl 385 386 notes to
O 21 r 1 *Ionas v. Montevideo* 4 C 5
Q B D 558 *Compagnie Financière*
Levassier v. Cuervo 11 Q B D 63 *Hall v.*
Truman 29 C D 319

(7) *Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v. Hall*
Kissen Tagore 2 C W N 17 (1897)

(8) *Kenelly v. Wynn* 1 C 178 (1870)

of possession, (1) privilege (2) and, according to English practice, relevancy (3) The Court cannot regard the opponent's oath, the general rule in all questions of discovery being that where you have the oath of the party claiming discovery challenging the oath of the party giving discovery, the oath of the latter is for this purpose conclusive. The party seeking discovery must rest upon the affidavit, and he cannot even examine upon it, nor adduce evidence to contradict it, nor can he do this in another form by administering general interrogatories.

14 *It shall be lawful for the Court, at any time during [s] the pendency of any suit, to order the production of any documents by any party thereto, upon oath, of such of the documents in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question in such suit, as the Court shall think right, and the Court may deal with such documents, when produced, in such manner as shall appear just*

"It shall be lawful"—This rule is taken from O 31, r 14. See, as to the discretion note **"Order the production"**. The rule enables any party who has obtained privately, by interrogatories or by affidavit of documents, knowledge of a document in the hands of his adversary to compel production. But no order for production can be made against a party unless he has directly or indirectly admitted it to be in his possession or power. See notes to r 13, *ante*.

"At any time"—Therefore even as late as in appeal. As regards the earliest point at which the order may be made, the Court will act upon the general principles governing the time or stage for discovery. *Vide ante* notes to r 1. An order under this rule may be made even before the issues have been framed (4).

"Order the production"—Under the Evidence Act in regard to certain documents where they are absolutely privileged the Court has no power whatever to order production. But under this rule the Court does possess the discretion and this discretion is to be exercised according to the practice of the Court (5). In the case cited the Court held that though a document might not be such as passed directly between the legal adviser and the client yet if it was of such a nature as to make it quite clear that it was obtained confidentially

(1) *Nittomoye Dasseo v. Soobul Chunder* Law 23 C 117, 125-127 (1895). Ann Pr p 385.

(2) *Ib.* at p 126. *Vinayakrao Dhunderaj v. Narotam Anandji* 17 B 581 (1893) [claim that documents privileged as relating solely to defendant's title and did not tend to prove or support plaintiff's title, held that Court could not go behind defendant's affidavit]. Ann Pr 1900 p 415. As to what is privileged see notes to r 6.

(3) Ann Pr 385-415, whether however the affidavit is conclusive on this point under

r 18 see *Nittomoye Dasseo v. Soobul Chunder* Law 23 C at p 125 (1895) and in *O'Kinealy, C.P.C.* notes to s 130 it is said that it is not possible to say how far this rule (conclusiveness of statement as to relevancy) will apply in other cases it being suggested that the Court should follow the rule laid down in s 162 of the Evidence Act.

(4) *Gobind v. Kunja* 10 C L J 407 (1909).

(5) *Vishnu Yeshawant v. New York Life Insurance Co.* 7 Bom L R 709 (1905).

for the purpose of being used in litigation and with a view to being submitted to legal advisers, then the Court will not compel the production of such a document (1) In an earlier case in the same Court it was held that a Judge has no discretion to refuse to allow inspection of documents relating to matters in question in a suit, provided that they are not privileged (2) This decision was based on *Bustros v White*, (3) at which time it was held that there was no discretionary power under this rule. But in England the Court has since been given a discretion by the amendment of O 31, r 18 (2) And this is so here also under the second clause of r 18, *post*. A party is entitled to production or inspection only when the books or papers are material and necessary to establish his cause of action. The exercise of the power under this rule cannot be delegated to a commissioner (4) Upon an application for inspection of documents, which is objected to on the ground of immateriality, the Court will if necessary, order them to be produced for its own inspection in order to judge of their materiality (5) The power of refusing inspection should be exercised with great caution, and the opposite party should be allowed to inspect and take copies of the documents when they relate to matters in issue, unless they are privileged in law, relate exclusively to the case of the party producing them and contain nothing supporting or tending to support the other side (6)

Party—Therefore the order should not issue against any other person, not even the party's solicitor (7)

"Possession or power"—See *ante* and notes to r 13, *ante*

"Relating to, etc"—As to the interpretation to be given to these words see notes to r 13 *ante*

Revision—In order under this section is not open to revision and can only be impeached in appeal from the final decrees (8)

15 Every party to a suit shall be entitled at any time to give notice to any other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document, to produce such document for the inspection of the party giving such notice, or of his pleader, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof, and any party not complying with such notice shall not afterwards be at liberty to put any such document in evidence on his behalf in such suit unless he shall satisfy the Court that such document relates only to his own title, he being a defendant to the suit, or that he had some

(1) *Vishnu Veshawant v New York Life Insurance Co*, 7 Bom L R 709 (1903)

(2) *Wallace v Jefferson* 2 B 453 (1878)

(3) 1 Q B D 426

(4) *Gobind Kunja*, 10 C L J 407 (1903) 14 C W N 147

(5) *Chitrak Boy v Tularam* 28 C 421 (1901)

(6) *Balan v J v Irtasim Chettar* 30

M 230 (1900) see 17 M L J 73, *ante* 14 may be taken during inspection: *Chobdar Kunja* 10 C L J 407 (1903) 14 C W N 147

(7) See *Cashier v Craiblock* 2 C D 141

(8) *In re Nizam of Hyderabad* 10 M 25 (1886) *Balamony v Ramasami Chettar*, 30 M 30 (1906)

other cause or excuse which the Court shall deem sufficient for not complying with such notice, in which case the Court may allow the same to be put in evidence on such terms as to costs and otherwise as the Court shall think fit

Notice to produce for inspection—This is r 15 of the English O 31. There is a distinction between an application for general discovery of documents and an application for production of a specified document that is a document referred to in the pleadings or affidavits. The order for production may be made at any early stage of the case and unlike the case of general discovery a defendant is entitled to inspection although he has not filed his written statement (1). As to form of application see No 124 Schedule IV of last Code and r 17. A Judge has no power under this rule or r 18 to direct inspection to be given of documents unless there be as an essential preliminary to the right of inspection either the specification of a document by the party seeking the inspection or its disclosure by the other side in the pleadings or otherwise (2).

“Other party”—A defendant may obtain discovery or inspection as against a co-defendant if the latter can be regarded as an opposite party (3). If the party on whom the notice is served should answer in the manner prescribed in the next rule he should object to produce such documents as he considers he ought not to be compelled to produce leaving his adversary to get in order for inspection under r 18 *post*.

“And any party not complying”—The concluding words of this rule give an express power to the Judge to allow the document to be used in evidence a power which the Judge was originally held to have by implication. As to documents referring to party's own title and sufficient cause see notes to rr 16 *ante* (4).

16 Notice to any party to produce any documents referred to in his pleading or affidavits shall be in Form No ~ in Appendix C with such variations as circumstances may require.

17 The party to whom such notice is given shall within ten days from the receipt of such notice deliver to the party giving the same a notice stating a time within three days from the delivery thereof at which the documents or such of them as he does not object to produce may be inspected at the office of his pleader or in the case of bankers' books or other books of account or books in constant

(1) *Quilt v Heatley* 23 Ch D 47 49 50 followed in *Ross v Dyal Saligrao v Nurbhury* Balkrishna 18 B 368 (1893)

(2) *Secretary of State v Jehan* 4 B L L 312 (1901)

(3) *Va drao Vithal v Budra Malla* 17

B 351 (1893)

(4) *And Webster v Whewall* 15 C D 10 *Quilt v Heatley* *per Dhap v* *la* 1 *Mad* 11 C 5 7 (188) *V na* *Jakrao Dh nura* *v* *Narotam Anand* 17 B 351 354 (1893)

use for the purposes of any trade or business, at their usual place of custody, and stating which (if any) of the documents he objects to produce, and on what ground. Such notice shall be in Form No 8 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

Notice for inspection—This rule is taken from O 31, r 17. If a party does not wish to produce documents for inspection he should refrain from delivering the notice under this rule and wait for the plaintiff to apply for an order under r 18, supported by an affidavit under that rule (1). In the under mentioned case (2) inspection was ordered to be given where the defendant kept his books a matter now specially dealt with by the rule.

31 18 (1) *Where the party served with notice under rule 1 omits to give such notice of a time for inspection or objects to give inspection, or offers inspection elsewhere than at the office of his pleader, the Court may on the application of the party desiring it, make an order for inspection in such place and in such manner as it may think fit. Provided that the order shall not be made when and so far as the Court shall be of opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.*

41 (2) *Any application to inspect documents, except such as are referred to in the pleadings, particulars or affidavits of the party against whom the application is made or disclosed in his affidavit of documents, shall be founded upon an affidavit showing of what documents inspection is sought, that the party applying is entitled to inspect them, and that they are in the possession or power of the other party. The Court shall not make such order for inspection of such documents when and so far as the Court shall be of opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.*

Application for order of inspection—This rule is taken from O 31 r 18. No order will be granted unless notice has been served under r 15 (3). The filing of an affidavit by one party under r 13 of this Order does not preclude the other party from applying for further discovery and inspection under this rule (4).

Affidavit in support of application—The rule applies to every case in which the party desiring inspection is able to state of his own knowledge that the other party is in possession of documents and that they are relevant (5).

(1) *Dhapti Ram Pershad* 14 C. 768 777 (1887) and as to when time begins to run see *ibid*.
(2) *Kavalbhai* 1st 5 B 467 (1881).
(3) *M. N. B. Nath* 1st 10 A 117, 127 (1893).
(4) *Basant* & *Kumudini*, 38 C. 4-5 (11).
(5) *Nattomoyo Das* & *Soobul Chund* 10 Law, 23 C. 117, 127 (1893).

The applicant must show *inter alia* that the documents of which he claims inspection are relevant to the matters in question in the suit. That appears under r 14, because it is that rule only which gives the Court power to order production of documents relating to any matter in question in the suit and the Court has no power to order the production of any other document (1). The second sub rule, which corresponds with s 131 of the last Code (2) is taken from O 31, r 18. The last sentence which is also new, is taken from the same English rule. It is open to the other party to file an affidavit denying possession or relevancy or claiming protection and it seems from the English decision on the rule cited that the statements in such affidavit as to possession must be accepted by the Court as no less conclusive than if they were contained in an affidavit of documents (3). The Court, however in the case last cited distinguishing questions of privilege was not prepared to accept the broad proposition that in an application under this rule the affidavit of the opposite party would also be conclusive on the question of relevancy (4).

19 (1) Where inspection of any business books is applied for the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of ordering inspection of
Verified copies
of any entries therein to be furnished

some person who has examined the copy with the original entries and such affidavit shall state whether or not there are in the original book any and what erasures, interlineations or alterations. Provided that, notwithstanding that such copy has been supplied the Court may order inspection of the book from which the copy was made.

(2) Where on an application for an order for inspection privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful for the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege.

(3) The Court may on the application of any party to a suit at any time, and whether an affidavit of documents shall or shall not have already been ordered or made, make an order requiring any other party to state by affidavit whether any one or more specific documents, to be specified in the application, is or are, or has or have at any time been, in his possession or power, and if not then in his possession, when he parted with the same and what has become thereof. Such application shall be made on an affidavit stating that in the belief of the deponent the party against whom the application is made has, or has at some time had in his possession or

(1) *Nittomoye Dassee v Soobul Chunder Law*, 23 C at p 125 (1893)

(2) See *Secretary of State v Jehangir & Bom L R* 342 350 (1902)

(3) *Annual Practice* 1903 p 42; *Wiedeman v Walpole L R* 24 Q B D 537, per

Williams J at p 542 s c in appeal at p 547 see *Nittomoye Dassee v Soobul Chunder Law* 23 C 117 at p 127 (1896)

(4) *Nittomoye Dassee v Soobul Chunder Law* *supra* at pp 125 126

power the document or documents specified in the application, and that they relate to the matters in question in the suit, or to some of them

"Verified copies"—This rule is new, and is taken from O 31, r 19a

"Privilege"—This word in the second sub clause includes any objection to inspection, for instance irrelevancy, (1) and the word "document" includes a sealed up portion of a document (2)

Power to call for affidavit—The documents referred to in the third sub clause are documents which can be named and specified (3) The statements are, it is conceived as conclusive as if they were in an affidavit of documents (4)

5] 20 Where the party from whom discovery of any kind or inspection is sought objects to the same, *Premature discovery* or any part thereof, the Court may, if satisfied that the right to the discovery or inspection sought depends on the determination of any issue or question in dispute in the suit, or that for any other reason it is desirable that any issue or question in dispute in the suit should be determined before deciding upon the right to the discovery or inspection, order that such issue or question be determined first, and reserve the question as to the discovery or inspection.

Premature discovery—This rule, which is taken from O 31, r 20 deals with the case where discovery or inspection is premature The intention is to give the Court the power of raising and determining an issue for the exclusive purpose of deciding the right to discovery of evidence which is to be used at the trial, and therefore from the nature of the case before the hearing of the cause (5) The provisions of this rule are not intended to come into operation until after an application has been made under r 18, ante (6) The practice is to take out a summons calling on the other party to show cause why an issue should not be framed (7) Where an order is made under this rule by the Judge in Chambers the suit should be set down for the trial of the particular issue as well as of the cause itself when it comes to a hearing before the same Judge (8) An order under this section is not a "judgment" and no appeal lies from it (9)

6] 21 Where any party fails to comply with any order to *Non compliance with answer interrogatories, or for discovery or order for discovery* inspection of documents, he shall, if a plaintiff, be liable to have his suit dismissed for want of prosecution,

(1) *Ishmann v Ishmann* (1896) 2 Ch 826
(2) *Id.*, *Answerth v Walling* (1900) 2 Ch 315

(3) *White v Spafford* (1901) 2 K B 241
and see *Graves v Heinemann* 18 Times R 115 following that case

(4) *Ann Pr*, notes to O 31, r 19a

(5) *Almedilloy v Null Alhoy*, 6 B 572
(1882) See *Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v*

Kally Kissen Tabor 2 C W N 17 at p 18
(1897), *Sutherland v Simcoe Chum Dutt*
10 C 808 at p 811 (1894)

(6) *Dhapa v Iam Prasad* 14 C 763 at p 776 (1887)

(7) *Id.* at p 707

(8) *Id.* at p 572

(9) *Secretary of State v Jehan*, 4 B M
1 R 312 (1902)

and, if a defendant, to have his defence, if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same position as if he had not *defended*, and the party interrogating or seeking discovery or inspection may apply to the Court for an order to that effect, and an order may be made accordingly.

Default—This rule, which is taken from English O 31, r 21, is a highly penal provision (1) It is not imperative (2) The party is only *liable* to, etc There must, in the first place, be an order which has been disobeyed, and, therefore, as regards interrogatories, no action can be taken under this section until an order has been passed under r 11, *ante* (3) A case will not be dismissed, or a defence struck out, except in extreme cases, and as a last resort (4) An order will not be made unless the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff is endeavouring to avoid a fair discovery (5) If the parties concerned are *pardanashin* ladies this should be taken into account (6) But the rule has been framed to prevent not merely contumacy but procrastination, (7) and the Court will not go on staying proceedings for ever, it may expel them altogether from the Court (8) The Court may dismiss the suit or strike out the defence And in the High Court the party in default is also liable to commitment for contempt (9) Where a defence is struck out and a decree is made, as in an undefended cause, the decree is not *ex parte* within the meaning of O IX r 13, so as to allow of an application to set it aside under that rule, (10) or in respect of the remedy of appeal (11) It has, however, been held that a party, against whom an order has been made striking out his defence, may come in and seek to set it aside on showing good grounds (12) This is because such an order is an interlocutory one as regards which the Court has a wide discretion It is, however a different matter when such interlocutory order not having been set aside, a final decree is passed (13) An order dismissing a suit under this rule is a decree, and is appealable (14) and an order purporting to be made under this rule has been revised (15) While there may be an appeal against an order dismissing a suit or a decree passed

(1) *Twyeross v Grant*, W N (75) 201 at p 229

(2) *Hartley v Owen* 34 1 T 702, *Kennedy v Lyell*, W N (82) 137

(3) *Prem Sukh v Indro Nath Bannorje* 18 C 420 421 (1891) *vide ante* p 787

(4) See *Shrim Kassar Mundlee v Shoothe Bhosoon Biswas* 5 C 707 (1880), *Khaja Assenoola Joo v Khaja Abdool Aziz* 9 C 923 (1883)

(5) *Danvillers v Myers*, W N (83) 58 *Wilson v Raffalovitch*, 7 Q B D 553

(6) *Kalan Bibi v Saifur Husam*, 8 A 26 (1886)

(7) *Twyeross v Grant*, W N 1875 229

(8) *Rep Liberia v Roye* 1 App. Cas. 143

(9) *Hassoniloy v Cawasji Jehangir* 7 B 1 (1891), see also *Narivaah v Narotam* 14 C 7

B 5 (1892)

(10) *Kesharia Accomar v Potoosh Sett*, 2 C W N 676 (1893) *Chunni Lal v Chaman Lal post*

(11) *Chunni Lal v Chaman Lal* 7 A 159 (1884) decided before the amendment of s 510 of the last Code, which gave an appeal from an *ex parte* decree As to appeal *vide post*

(12) *Khajah Assenoola v Khajah Abdool Aziz* 9 C 923 (1883) *id est* in next case

(13) *Kesharia Accomar v Potoosh Sett*, 2 C W N 676 at p 679 (1893)

(14) *Maharajadhiraj Mansingji v Mehta Harhararam*, 19 B 307 (1894), and in *Chunni Lal v Chaman Lal* 7 A 159 160 (1884)

(15) *Dhapi v Ram Persha* 14 C 708, at p 777 (1897)

after striking out a defence, if on such appeal it be held that the order was justified, it is not open to the appellant in the latter case to enter into his defence on appeal, for otherwise he would be placed in a better position in the appeal than in the first Court (1). The result of the defence being struck out and the order striking it out affirmed, is that the party is placed in the same position as if he had not defended or (to use the words of the last Code) appeared and answered. This rule is the only provision under which a defence can be struck out. The Court has no power to strike out a defence for failure of the defendant to appear in time (in pursuance of time given by him to the Court) for further examination (2).

22 Any party may, at the trial of a suit, use in evidence any answers to any one or more of the questions or any part of interrogatories at trial an answer of the opposite party to interrogatories without putting in the others or the whole of such answer. Provided always that in such case the Court may look at the whole of the answers, and if it shall be of opinion that any others of them are so connected with those put in that the last mentioned answer ought not to be used without them it may direct them to be put in.

Method of using answers—As regards this Cotton, L.J., said (3). Under the new rules the plaintiff can read one passage without referring to the whole even of the same paragraph and I think no Judge would allow a defendant where he had made an admission to read with it a passage which was not connected in sense or substance with that admission, even if he had put in a statement submitting that he was entitled to do so and claiming to do so. Of course when an admission is read everything ought to be read which is fairly connected with that admission but I think it would be wrong for the defendant and he would not be allowed to try to bring in matter which was not in any way connected with the matter admitted.

23 This Order shall apply to minor plaintiffs and Order to apply to defendants, and to the next friends of minors guardians for the suit of persons under disability.

Persons under disability—See notes to r 1, "Opposite parties" and cases there cited.

(1) See Guribala Debi v Upendra Nath
Nou Reg App Cal II C 44 of 1902 1 June
1904

60 (1911)

(3) In Jyell v Kennedy 27 L D 1* and
see Bowen J J, ibid.

(2) See Jyell v Kennedy 22 M I J

after striking out a defence, if on such appeal it be held that the order was justified it is not open to the appellant in the latter case to enter into his defence

he had not defended or (to use the words of the last Code) appeared and answered. This rule is the only provision under which a defence can be struck out. The Court has no power to strike out a defence for failure of the defendant to appear in time (in pursuance of an undertaking given by him to the Court) for further examination as a witness for the opposite side (2)

22 *Any party may, at the trial of a suit, use in evidence Using answers to any one or more of the answers or any part of interrogatories at trial an answer of the opposite party to interrogatories without putting in the others or the whole of such answer. Provided always that in such case the Court may look at the whole of the answers, and if it shall be of opinion that any others of them are so connected with those put in that the last mentioned answers ought not to be used without them it may direct them to be put in*

Method of using answers—As regards this Cotton, L.J. said (3). Under the new rules the plaintiff can read one passage without referring to the whole even of the same paragraph and I think no Judge would allow a defendant where he had made an admission to read with it a passage which was not connected in sense or substance with that admission, even if he had put in a statement submitting that he was entitled to do so and claiming to do so. Of course when an admission is read everything ought to be read which is fairly connected with that admission but I think it would be wrong for the defendant and he would not be allowed to try to bring in matter which was not in any way connected with the matter admitted.

23 *This Order shall apply to minor plaintiffs and Order to apply to defendants, and to the next friends and minors guardians for the suit of persons under disability*

Persons under disability—See notes to r 1. Opposite parties and cases there cited

(1) See Gribala Debti v. Upendra Nath
Scrip Reg App Cal H C 44 of 1902 1 J me
1904

60 (1911)

(3) In *Isyll v. Karchy* 27 C D 1 and
see *Boon v. J. J.* 29

(-) *Va. v. L. v. L.* 2 M I J

ORDER XII.

Admissions.

1. *Any party to a suit may give notice, by his pleading, Notice of admission or otherwise in writing, that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party*

Admissions generally—This is r 1 of English O 32. Admissions may be considered as being (A) On the record, which may be (a) *Actual* i.e. either on the pleadings (OO VI, VIII), or in answer to interrogatories (O XI) (b) *Implied*, from the pleadings or (B) *Admissions between the parties*, which may be (c) by agreement, (d) by notice (O XII) (1) As regards the first class, facts alleged positively in a pleading must be taken as admissions by the party alleging them or if such facts are admitted by the opposite party in his pleading or otherwise in writing they may be read as admissions against him unless in either case such party be an infant, lunatic or of unsound mind (2) Admissions of plaintiff's right may be obtained by him by means of interrogatories (3) As to what is a sufficient admission by affidavit in answer to interrogatories, see note (4) 'Any statement made by a man on oath may be used against him as an admission' (5) As regards (b) of class (1) these arise where one party has not specifically dealt with some allegation of fact in the opposite party's pleading (6) or has denied it evasively (7) As regards admissions by agreement between the parties see reference (8) A party intending to rely upon such admissions should be careful not to leave any fact to be merely inferred from them for if he does he will not, on appeal be allowed to adduce evidence as to such fact (9)

Costs—The object of obtaining admissions is to preclude the necessity of proving documents or facts admitted, and the party unreasonably refusing or neglecting to admit any documents or facts when called upon to do so may be ordered to pay the costs of proof (10)

2. *Either party may call upon the other party to admit any document, saving all just exceptions, and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid*

(1) Ann Pr note to O 32, r 1 see D C P 464-9, D C F 1 288, n (b) Seton 163 180-2, Chitty Arch. 477, Chitty F 234 7

(2) See D C P 464, 489, see O VIII

(3) Att Gen. v Caskill 20 C D 519 But see Clarke v C., W N (19) 130

(4) D C P 491

(5) Per Jessel MR *Ex parte Hall* 11 C D p. 553

(6) See O VIII

(7) *Ib.* r 4.

(8) See D C P 492.

(9) *Sanders v Sanders*, 19 C D 373.

(10) Rules 2, 4, & *infra*

after striking out a defence, if on such appeal it be held that the order was justified, it is not open to the appellant in the latter case to enter into his defence on appeal, for otherwise he than in the first Court (1)

order striking it out affirmed

he had not defended or (to use the words of the last Code) appeared and answered This rule is the only provision under which a defence can be struck out The Court has no power to strike out a defence for failure of the defendant to appear in time (in pursuance of an undertaking given by him to the Court) for further examination as a witness for the opposite side (2)

22. *Any party may, at the trial of a suit, use in evidence Using answers to any one or more of the answers or any part of interrogatories at trial an answer of the opposite party to interrogatories without putting in the others or the whole of such answer Provided always that in such case the Court may look at the whole of the answers, and if it shall be of opinion that any others of them are so connected with those put in that the last mentioned answers ought not to be used without them, it may direct them to be put in*

Method of using answers—As regards this Cotton, L.J., said (3) "Under the new rules the plaintiff can read one passage without referring to the whole even of the same paragraph, and I think no Judge would allow a defendant where he had made an admission to read with it a passage which was not connected in sense or substance with that admission, even if he had put in a statement submitting that he was entitled to do so and claiming to do so Of course when an admission is read everything ought to be read which is fairly connected with that admission but I think it would be wrong for the defendant and he would not be allowed, to try to bring in matter which was not in any way connected with the matter admitted"

23 *This Order shall apply to minor plaintiffs and Order to apply to defendants, and to the next friends and minors guardians for the suit of persons under disability*

Persons under disability—See notes to r 1, "Opposite parties" and cases there cited

(1) *See* Gurbala Devi v Upendra Nath
Sen Reg App Cal H C, 44 of 1902, 1 June,
1904

(2) *Vaudevill v Sankaran*, 22 M L J

60 (1911)

(3) *In* Jell v Kennedy 27 C. D. 15, and
see Bowen, I J, ibid. 29

ORDER XII.

Admissions.

1. *Any party to a suit may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise in writing, that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party*

Notice of admission of case
Admissions generally—This is r 1 of English O 32 Admissions may be considered as being (A) On the record, which may be (a) *Actual* i.e. either on the pleadings (OO VI, VIII), or in answer to interrogatories (O XI) (b) *Implied* from the pleadings or (B) *Admissions between the parties*, which may be (c) by agreement, (d) by notice (O XII) (1) As regards the first class, facts alleged positively in a pleading must be taken as admissions by the party alleging them, or if such facts are admitted by the opposite party in his pleading or otherwise in writing they may be read as admissions against him unless in either case such party be an infant, lunatic or of unsound mind (2) Admissions of plaintiff's right may be obtained by him by means of interrogatories (3) As to what is a sufficient admission by affidavit in answer to interrogatories, see note (4) Any statement made by a man on oath may be used against him as an admission (5) As regards (b) of class (1), these arise where one party has not specifically dealt with some allegation of fact in the opposite party's pleading (6) or has denied it evasively (7) As regards admissions by agreement between the parties see reference (8) A party intending to rely upon such admissions should be careful not to leave any fact to be merely inferred from them, for if he does he will not, on appeal be allowed to adduce evidence as to such fact (9)

Costs—The object of obtaining admissions is to preclude the necessity of proving documents or facts admitted and the party unreasonably refusing or neglecting to admit any documents or facts when called upon to do so may be ordered to pay the costs of proof (10)

2 *Either party may call upon the other party to admit any document, saving all just exceptions, and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid*

(1) Ann. Pr. note to O 32 r 1 see D C P 464 9, D C F P 288, n (6) Seton 163, 180-2, Chitty Arch. 477, Chitty F 231 7

(2) See D C P 464 489, see O VIII

(3) Att. Gen. v. Caswell, 20 C D 411 But see Clarke v. G. W. N. (93) 170

(4) D C P 491

(5) Per Jessel M.R. *Ex parte Hall* 13 C D p. 553

(6) See O VIII

(7) *Ib.* r 4

(8) See D C P 492

(9) *Sanders v. Sanders*, 19 C D 373

(10) Rules 2 4, 1 *infra*

by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense

Notice to admit documents—This rule, which has been considerably remodelled and is with some slight alterations, the same as the English rule is taken from O 32, r 2. For form of notice see No 127 in Schedule I Part II of the former Code and the next rule. A fuller form is given in the Annual Practice Vol II Appendix B No 11. The rule is enacted for the facility of proof and saving of costs. The rule has been held to extend to all documents which a party proposes to adduce in evidence, and whether in possession or otherwise and even though the opposite party has stated that he would not admit them (1). According to the English practice, if a party does not save all just exceptions he is precluded from objecting to the admissibility in evidence of the documents admitted (2). Though that may sometimes be the case here it would be necessary to consider in certain instances, e.g. a question of stamp and possibly in others whether the admission of the party could render that admissible which the law says should not be admitted. Further, an admission with the "saving" that a document is a copy merely dispenses with proof that it is a copy. It does not however dispense with proof of circumstances permitting secondary evidence being given. Admissions of documents between co-defendants to which the plaintiff is not a party cannot be entered as evidence against him (3). If the party having notice fails to prove the documents the party refusing to admit will not be made liable for the costs of the unsuccessful attempt (4). This also appears from the words of the rule which imply successful proof.

Notice to admit facts—This section is limited to documents. Under the English practice (5) however and that of the Calcutta High Court (6) notice may be given to admit specific facts, and in case of refusal to admit the party so refusing pays the costs of proving such facts unless the Judge certifies that the refusal was reasonable. The form of notice and answer are given in the Annual Practice, Nos 12 and 13 in Appendix B, and in forms 269 B (1) (2) of the Calcutta High Court Rules. See as to admissions for purpose of trial Authors Evidence Act 4th ed p 319. The Code now provides in r 4, *post*, for admission as to facts.

3 A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No 1 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require

Form of notice

(1) Rutter v Chapman 8 M & W 388
Spencer v Borough 9 M & W 425, as to
giving notice to admit proof of photograph, see
Last Statement to the Board at Victoria

to the insufficiency of the stamp and see
Taylor, Fv, § 724 A 9th ed
(1) Dida v Tuke 25 C D 617
(4) Stracey v Blake 7 C & P 404; Doe v
Peters 1 C & B 279 Freeman v Blakely
D & L 617
(5) O 32 r 4
(6) Cal H C rule 4, O 32 r 4

4. Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice. Provided also that the Court may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just.

"Not later than nine days before"—English O 32, r 4. This expression of time is unusual and might be construed to be identical with 'clear days,' i.e., exclusively of both the day of service of the notice and the day named for hearing. The day of service is in England excluded, and the word 'before' appears to exclude the day of hearing (1). A notice to admit facts should, where practicable, supersede interrogatories (2). This notice may be delivered with the statement of claim and the Court cannot set it aside as improper. The defendant's only course is to refuse to answer it which he would do at his peril as to costs (3). Where plaintiff disregarded a notice under this rule given by the defendant the latter was allowed to administer interrogatories (4).

"Any other party"—*Semble* these words mean any opposite party as in O XI r 11, ante (5).

5. A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No 10 in Appendix C and admissions of facts shall be in Form No 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

6. Any party may at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the

(1) Ann Pr., note to O 32, r 4.

(2) O 31, r 2 and see Clarke v. W. N.

(3) 170

(3) Crawford v. Charles W. N. (83) 118.

(4) Heller v. Ellis, W. N. (84) 9.

(5) See Brown v. Watkins 16 Q. B. D. 12.

by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, *unless the Court otherwise directs*, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, *except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense*

Notice to admit documents—This rule, which has been considerably remodelled and is with some slight alterations, the same as the English rule is taken from O 32 r 2. For form of notice see No 127 in Schedule I Part II of the former Code and the next rule. A fuller form is given in the Annual Practice Vol II Appendix B No 11. The rule is enacted for the facility of proof and saving of costs. The rule has been held to extend to all documents which a party proposes to adduce in evidence, and whether in possession or otherwise and even though the opposite party has stated that he would not admit them (1). According to the English practice if a party does not save all just exceptions he is precluded from objecting to the admissibility in evidence of the documents admitted (2). Though that may sometimes be the case here it would be necessary to consider in certain instances, e.g. a question of stamp and possibly in others whether the admission of the party could render that admissible which the law says should not be admitted. Further, an admission with the saving that a document is a copy merely dispenses with proof that it is a copy. It does not however dispense with proof of circumstances permitting secondary evidence being given. Admissions of documents between co-defendants to which the plaintiff is not a party cannot be entered as evidence against him (3). If the party having notice fails to prove the documents the party refusing to admit will not be made liable for the costs of the unsuccessful attempt (4). This also appears from the words of the rule which imply successful proof.

Notice to admit facts—This section is limited to documents. Under the English practice (5) however and that of the Calcutta High Court (6) notice may be given to admit specific facts and in case of refusal to admit, the party so refusing pays the costs of proving such facts unless the Judge certifies that the refusal was reasonable. The form of notice and answer are given in the Annual Practice Nos 12 and 13 in Appendix B, and in forms 269 L (1) (2) of the Calcutta High Court Rules. See as to admissions for purpose of trial without evidence Act 18th ed p 319. The Code now provides in r 4 *post*, for admission as to facts.

3 A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No 1 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require

Form of notice

(1) *Rutter v Chapman* 8 M & W 368
Spencer v Borough 9 M & W 425, as to giving notice to admit proof of photographer, see *East Stenhouse v Lorne Board v Victoria Brewery Co* (1897) 2 Ch 571

(2) *Van der Wilt v Wiltton* 2 Dowd N 9 757,
Chaplin v Levi 9 F & 531, in which a party was held not to be precluded from objecting

to the insufficiency of the stamp and see *Taylor v* § 724 19th ed

(3) *Dodd v Tike* 25 C D 617

(4) *Stracey v Blake* 7 C & P 404; see *Peters v C & A* 2nd Freeman & R 1st 6

D & L 617

(5) O 32 r 4

(6) *Cal H C* rul 4, O 4 269 D

4. Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice. Provided also that the Court may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just.

"Not later than nine days before"—English O 32 r 4. This expression of time is unusual and might be construed to be identical with clear days, i.e., exclusively of both the day of service of the notice and the day named for hearing. The day of service is in England excluded and the word "before" appears to exclude the day of hearing (1). A notice to admit facts should, where practicable supersede interrogatories (2). This notice may be delivered with the statement of claim and the Court cannot set it aside as improper. The defendant's only course is to refuse to answer it which he would do at his peril as to costs (3). Where plaintiff disregarded a notice under this rule given by the defendant the latter was allowed to administer interrogatories (4).

"Any other party"—See these words mean any opposite party as in O 31 r 11, ante (5).

5. A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

6. Any party may at any stage of a suit where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to without waiting for the determination of any other question between the

(1) Ann Pr note to O 32 r 4

(3) Crawford & Charles W N (83) 1 s

(2) O 31, r 2 and see Clarke & W N

(4) Heller & Ellis, W N (84) 9

(11) 170

(5) See Brown & Watkins 10 Q B D 124

by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense

Notice to admit documents—This rule, which has been considerably remodelled and is with some slight alterations the same as the English rule is taken from O 32 r 2. For form of notice see No 127 in Schedule I Part II of the former Code and the next rule. A fuller form is given in the Annual Practice Vol II Appendix B No 11. The rule is enacted for the facility of proof and saving of costs. The rule has been held to extend to all documents which a party proposes to adduce in evidence, and whether in possession or otherwise and even though the opposite party has stated that he would not admit them (1). According to the English practice if a party does not save all just exceptions he is precluded from objecting to the admissibility in evidence of the documents admitted (2). Though that may sometimes be the case here it would be necessary to consider in certain instances *eg* a question of stamp and possibly in others whether the admission of the party could render that admissible which the law says should not be admitted. Further an admission with the saving that a document is a copy merely dispenses with proof that it is a copy. It does not however dispense with proof of circumstances permitting secondary evidence being given. Admissions of documents between co-defendants to which the plaintiff is not a party cannot be entered as evidence against him (3). If the party having notice fails to prove the documents the party refusing to admit will not be made liable for the costs of the unsuccessful attempt (4). This also appears from the words of the rule which imply successful proof.

Practice Nos 12 and 13 in
Calcutta High Court Rules
I will see Act 4th ed p 319
as to facts

3 A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No 1 in Appendix G, with such variations as circumstances may require

Form of notice

(1) R. 11 r 1 (1) 11 r 8 M & W 388
Spencer v Borough D M & W 425; as to
giving notice to admit proof of photograph, see
East St. house Lott v Boar (1) v Etern
Brewery Co (189) 2 C 571

(2) Van v W. 11 r 11 r 2 D W 1 & 757
chap 11 r 11 r 31, in which a party
was held not to be precluded from objecting

to the insufficiency of the stamp and see
Taylor v v 724 1 11 r 11

(3) Dodds v Tule 25 C D 617

(4) Stracey v Blake 7 C & P 404; Doe v
Peters 1 C & A 210 Freeman v R 11 r 11
D & L 517

() O 32 r 4

(6) Cal H C 11 r 11, O 11 r 11

4 Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice. Provided also that the Court may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just.

"Not later than nine days before"—English O 32, r 4. This expression of time is unusual and might be construed to be identical with 'clear days' i.e., exclusively of both the day of service of the notice and the day named for hearing. The day of service is in England excluded and the word 'before' appears to exclude the day of bearing (1). A notice to admit facts should where practicable supersede interrogatories (2). This notice may be delivered with the statement of claim and the Court cannot set it aside as improper. The defendant's only course is to refuse to answer it which he would do at his peril as to costs (3). Where plaintiff disregarded a notice under this rule given by the defendant the latter was allowed to administer interrogatories (4).

"Any other party"—Seem these words mean any opposite party as in O XI r 11, ante (5).

5. A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

6 Any party may at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either in the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the

(1) Van Praet, note to O 32, r 4
(2) O 31, r 2 and see Clarke v. W. N. (31) 170
(3) Crawford v. Charles W. N. (33) 18.
(4) Heller v. Ellis, W. N. (84) 9
(5) See Brown v. Watkins 16 Q. B. D. 124.

by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense.

Notice to admit documents.—This rule, which has been considerably remodelled and is with some slight alterations, the same as the English rule is taken from O 32 r 2. For form of notice see No 127 in Schedule I Part II of the former Code and the next rule. A fuller form is given in the *Annual Practice* Vol II Appendix B No 11. The rule is enacted for the fact of proof and saving of costs. The rule has been held to extend to all documents which a party proposes to adduce in evidence, and whether in possession or otherwise, and even though the opposite party has stated that he would not dispute them (1). According to the English practice if a party does not give all the exceptions he is precluded from objecting to the admissibility in evidence of documents admitted (2). Though that may sometimes be the case here it would be necessary to consider in certain instances, e.g. a question of admissibility which the law says should not be admitted. Further, an admission with the saving that a document is a copy merely dispenses with proof that it is a copy. It does not however dispense with proof of circumstances permitting secondary evidence being given. Admissions of documents between co-defendants to which the plaintiff is not a party cannot be entered as evidence against him (3). If the party having notice fails to prove the documents the party refusing to admit will not be made liable for the costs of the unsuccessful attempt (4). This also appears from the words of the rule, which imply a successful proof.

Notice to admit facts.—This section is limited to documents. Unlike the English practice (5) however, and that of the Calcutta High Court (6) as to facts.

Practice Nos 12 and 13 in Appendix B, and in forms 269 E (1) (2) of the Calcutta High Court Rules. See as to admissions for purpose of trial with is Evidence Act 31st ed p 314. The Code now provides in r 4, post, for admissions as to facts.

3 A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No 1 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

Form of notice

(1) *Fuller v Chapman* 8 M & W 303, *Spencer v Borough*, 9 M & W 425, as to giving notice to admit proof of photographer, see *East Street v London & Lancashire Victoria Brewery Co* (1887) 2 Ch 571.

(2) *Van der Wilt v Wilt*, 2 Dowl N & 757, *Chaplin v Levy*, 9 F & 531, in which a party was held not to be precluded from objecting

to the insufficiency of the stamp and *Taylor v Fr.*, § 724 1 9th ed.

(3) *Dodd v Tule*, 15 C B 617.

(4) *Stracey v Blake* 7 C & P 404, *Boer Peters*, 1 C & K 379, *Freeman v Butler* 11 D & L 517.

(5) O 32, r 4.

(6) Cal H Ct. rule 4, O 3, 200.

4. Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice. Provided also that the Court may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just.

"Not later than nine days before"—English O 32 r 4. This expression of time is unusual and might be construed to be identical with clear days, i.e., exclusively of both the day of service of the notice and the day named for hearing. The day of service is in England excluded and the word 'before' appears to exclude the day of hearing (1). A notice to admit facts should where practicable supersede interrogatories (2). This notice may be delivered with the statement of claim and the Court cannot set it aside as improper. The defendant's only course is to refuse to answer it which he would do at his peril as to costs (3). Where plaintiff disregarded a notice under this rule given by the defendant the latter was allowed to administer interrogatories (4).

"Any other party"—*Semble* these words mean any opposite party as in O 31 r 11 ante (5).

5. A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No 11 in Appendix C with such variations as circumstances may require.

6. Any party may at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to without waiting for the determination of any other question between the

(1) Ann 1 r note to O 32 r 4

(2) O 31, r 1. See *Clarke v C. W. N.*

(3) 190

(3) *Crawford v Clorley* W. N. (83) 118

(4) *Heller v Ellis*, W. N. (84) 3

(5) See *Brown v Watkins* 16 Q. B. D. 123

by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense

Notice to admit documents—This rule, which has been considerably remodelled and is with some slight alterations, the same as the English rule, is taken from O 32 r 2. For form of notice see No 127 in Schedule I Part II of the former Code and the next rule. A fuller form is given in the Annual Practice Vol II Appendix B No 11. The rule is enacted for the facility of proof and saving of costs. The rule has been held to extend to all documents which a party proposes to adduce in evidence, and whether in possession or otherwise and even though the opposite party has stated that he would not admit them (1). According to the English practice if a party does not save all just exceptions he is precluded from objecting to the admissibility in evidence of the documents admitted (2). Though that may sometimes be the case here it would be necessary to consider in certain instances, *eg* a question of stamp and possibly in others whether the admission of the party could render that inadmissible which the law says should not be admitted. Further an admission with the saving that a document is a copy merely dispenses with proof that it is a copy. It does not however dispense with proof of circumstances permitting secondary evidence being given. Admissions of documents between co-defendants to which the plaintiff is not a party cannot be entered as evidence against him (3). If the party having notice fails to prove the documents, the party refusing to admit will not be made liable for the costs of the unsuccessful attempt (4). This also appears from the words of the rule, which imply successful proof.

Notice to admit facts—This section is limited to documents. Under the English practice (5) however and that of the Calcutta High Court (6) notice may be given to admit specific facts and in case of refusal to admit the party so refusing pays the costs of proving such facts unless the Judge certifies that the refusal was reasonable. The form of notice and answer are given in the Annual Practice Nos 12 and 13 in Appendix B, and in forms 269 B (1) (2) of the Calcutta High Court Rules. See as to admissions for purpose of trial without Evidence Act s 114 p 319. The Code now provides in r 4, *post*, for admission as to facts.

3 A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No 127

Form of notice Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>(1) <i>Batter & Chapman</i>, 8 M & W 388, <i>Spencer & Borough</i> 9 M & W 425, as to giving notice to admit proof of photographer see <i>Last Stonehouse Lorne Board v Victoria Brewery Co</i> (1891) 2 Ch 571.</p> <p>(2) <i>Vane & Wittington</i> 2 Dowd & S 757, <i>Chaplin & Lys</i>, 9 F & R 531, in which a party was held not to be precluded from objecting</p> | <p>to the insufficiency of the statement. <i>Taylor</i>, F & S 721 & 9th ed.</p> <p>(3) <i>Dodds & Tuke</i> 25 C. D 617.</p> <p>(4) <i>Stracey & Blake</i>, 7 C & P 404; <i>Peters</i> 1 C & K 270. <i>Freeman & Chubb</i> D & L 517.</p> <p>(5) O 32, r 4.</p> <p>(6) Cal H C rules O 5 269 D.</p> |
|---|---|

4. Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice. Provided also that the Court may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just.

"Not later than nine days before"—English O 32, r 4. This expression of time is unusual, and might be construed to be identical with "clear days" i.e., exclusively of both the day of service of the notice and the day named for hearing. The day of service is in England excluded and the word "before" appears to exclude the day of hearing (1). A notice to admit facts should, where practicable, supersede interrogatories (2). This notice may be delivered with the statement of claim and the Court cannot set it aside as improper. The defendant's only course is to refuse to answer it which he would do at his peril as to costs (3). Where plaintiff disregarded a notice under this rule given by the defendant the latter was allowed to administer interrogatories (4).

"Any other party"—*Seem* these words mean any opposite party as in O 31 r 11, ante (5).

5. A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

6. Any party may at any stage of a suit where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the

(1) Ann Pr., note to O 32, r 4.

(2) O 31, r 2, and see Clarke v. C. W. N.

(3) 170

(3) *Crawford v. Charles W. N.* (3) 113

(4) *Heller v. Ellis, W. N.* (24) J

(5) See *Brown v. Watkins*, 10 Q. B. D. 121.

by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense

Notice to admit documents—This rule, which has been considerably remodelled and is with some slight alterations the same as the English rule, is taken from O 32 r 2. For form of notice, see No 137 in Schedule I Part II of the former Code and the next rule. A fuller form is given in the Annual Practice Vol II Appendix B No 11. The rule is enacted for the facility of proof and saving of costs. The rule has been held to extend to all documents which a party proposes to adduce in evidence, and whether in possession or otherwise and even though the opposite party has stated that he would not admit them (1). According to the English practice if a party does not save all just exceptions he is precluded from objecting to the admissibility in evidence of the documents admitted (2). Though that may sometimes be the case here it would be necessary to consider in certain instances, e.g. a question of stamp and possibly in others whether the admission of the party could render that admissible which the law says should not be admitted. Further an admission with the saving that a document is a copy merely dispenses with proof that it is a copy. It does not however dispense with proof of circumstances permitting secondary evidence being given. Admissions of documents between co-defendants to which the plaintiff is not a party cannot be entered as evidence against him (3). If the party having notice fails to prove the documents, the party refusing to admit will not be made liable for the costs of the unsuccessful attempt (4). This also appears from the words of the rule which imply successful proof.

Notice to admit facts—This section is limited to documents. Unlike the English practice (5) however and that of the Calcutta High Court (6) no notice may be given to admit specific facts and in case of refusal to admit, the party so refusing pays the costs of proving such facts unless the Judge certifies that the refusal was reasonable. The form of notice and answer are given in the Annual Practice, Nos 12 and 13 in Appendix B, and in forms 269 E (1) (2) of the Calcutta High Court Rules. See as to admissions for purpose of trial by reference to the Evidence Act 1st ed p 319. The Code now provides in r 4, post, for admission as to facts.

3 A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No 1 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require

Form of notice

(1) *Ritter v Chapman*, 8 M & W 353, *Spencer v Borough*, 9 M & W 425, as to giving notice to admit proof of photograph, see *East Stonehouse Locomotive & Victoria Brewery Co* (1893), 2 Ch 774.

(2) *Vance v Wintington*, 2 Dowl N 8757, *Chapman v Levy*, 1 F & R 531, in which a party was held not to be precluded from objecting

to the insufficiency of the stamp and see *Taylor*, 15 5724 1 0th ed.

(3) *Dodd v Taylor*, 3 C D 617.

(4) *Stracey v Blake*, 7 C & P 404. See *Peters v C & K*, 270 *Pratt v R*, 1st ed D & L 517.

(5) O 32 r 4.

(6) Cal H C. r. 4, O 4, 269 D.

4. Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day fixed for the hearing, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the suit only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular suit, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice. Provided also that the Court may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just.

"Not later than nine days before"—English O 32, r 4. This expression of time is unusual and might be construed to be identical with "clear days" *i.e.*, exclusively of both the day of service of the notice and the day named for hearing. The day of service is in England excluded, and the word "before" appears to exclude the day of hearing (1). A notice to admit facts should, where practicable, supersede interrogatories (2). This notice may be delivered with the statement of claim, and the Court cannot set it aside as improper. The defendant's only course is to refuse to answer it, which he would do at his peril as to costs (3). Where plaintiff disregarded a notice under this rule given by the defendant, the latter was allowed to administer interrogatories (4).

"Any other party"—*Scmble* these words mean any opposite party, as in O XI r 11, *ante* (5).

5. A notice to admit facts shall be in Form No. 10 in Appendix C, and admissions of facts shall be in Form No. 11 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.

6. Any party may at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the

(1) Ann Pr note to O 32, r 4

(2) O 31, r 2, and see *Clarke v C, W & N*

(3) 170

(3) *Crawford v Chorley, W & N* (83) 198(4) *Hellier v Ellis, W & N* (84) 9(5) See *Brown v Watkins* 16 Q B D 125

parties and the Court may upon such application make such order, or give such judgment, as the Court may think just

Judgment—The rule is merely permissive, and the plaintiff by not availing himself of it and proceeding to trial in the ordinary way, does not thereby waive his right to rely at the trial, on the admission contained in the pleadings (1) "This rule (1875) enables the plaintiff or defendant to get rid of so much of the action as to which there is no controversy That is the meaning of it," (2) and the same learned Judge frequently decided that the former rule must be read as if the words 'if any' were inserted after the word "question" (3) The Court will not on motion give judgment on admissions contained in the defence of an infant defendant nor, *semble*, on default of infant in filing a defence (4) The plaintiff must have a clear case and the mere admission or non denial by the defendant of a right asserted by plaintiff, but which in fact has no existence in law is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment establishing the right (5) In any case the power of the Court is discretionary, and will not be exercised where the case cannot be conveniently tried on motion (6)

7 *An affidavit of the pleader or his clerk, of the due signature of any admissions made in pursuance of any notice to admit documents or facts, shall be sufficient evidence of such admissions, if evidence thereof is required*

8 *Notice to produce documents shall be in Form No. 1: Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require An affidavit of the pleader or his clerk of the service of any notice to produce, and of the time when it was served with a copy of the notice to produce, shall in all cases be sufficient evidence of the service of the notice, and of the time when it was served*

Object of rule—The object of this rule is to enable secondary evidence of documents to be given at the trial if they are not then produced pursuant to the notice (7) See English O 12 r 8

9. *If a notice to admit or produce specifies documents which are not necessary, the costs occasioned thereby shall be borne by the party giving such notice*

- (1) *Hildesley v Harper*, 7 C D 403
(2) *Per Jessel MR*, *Thorpe v Holdsworth* 3 C D p 640
(3) *Clutton v Lee* 24 W R 607 (Eng)
(4) *Byrne v B*, 5 L R 1r (Ch D) 134 and note thereto, p 136 *National Provincial Bank v Frans* 30 W R 177; but see *contra* *Etzweiler v Waterhouse* 52 L J, Ch 84
(5) *Clifton v Corporation of London* 74

- D 735 and see *Gilbert v Smith* 21 D 686 judgment of Mellish LJ, *Rafter v Tragent*, 12 C D 773, *Landergin v* 34 W R 611
(6) *Melton v Sidelbottom*, 5 C D 312
(7) *Dwyer v Collins* 7 F & 070 *Stuller v S*, 5 Sm 460, *Dry v L*, 1 P Act p 141
Taylor v Laid, pp 440-41

ORDER XIII.

Production, Impounding and Return of Documents

1. The parties or their pleaders shall produce, at the first ^[s. 1] hearing of the suit, all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power, on which they intend to rely, and which has not already been filed in Court, and all documents which the Court has ordered to be produced

(2) The Court shall receive the documents so produced ^[s. 1] provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs

Documents to be ready—If a plaintiff sues or relies on a document he must either produce it with his plaint or enter it on the list attached to it (O VII r 11). Any document which has not been produced or entered cannot be received in evidence without leave of the Court (O VII r 18 see notes thereto). And by this rule the parties must bring with them and have in readiness at the first hearing, all the documentary evidence in their possession or power, (1)

not to shut out true and valuable evidence merely because the party had, without good and assignable cause, abstained from bringing it before the Court at the first hearing, (4) or formal evidence beyond suspicion such as certified copies of public documents (5)

(1) See *Syed Ikram Hussain v. Ram Lochun Dutt*, 23 W. R. 29 (1875) [s. 123 of the Code of 1853, though it did not contain them, and was held to be so limited].

(2) *Mahbub Hussain v. Patasu Humari*, 1 B. L. R. 120 (1868).

(3) *Syed Ikram Hussain v. Ram Lochun Dutt*, 23 W. R. 29 (1874), per *h. ear. J* [s. 123 of Code of 1853], *Ranchhod Hirabai v. Secre*

tary of State, 22 B. 173 (1896), *Lalabati Musam v. Bishun Chobey* 6 C. L. J. 621 (1907).

(4) *Syed Ikram Hussain v. Ram Lochun Dutt*, *supra*.

(5) *Ranchhod Hirabai v. Secretary of State*, 22 B. 173 (1896), *Lalabati Musam v. Bishun Chobey*, 6 C. L. J. 621 (1907).

parties and the Court may upon such application make such order, or give such judgment, as the Court may think just

Judgment.—The rule is merely permissive and the plaintiff by not availing himself of it and proceeding to trial in the ordinary way, does not thereby waive his right to rely at the trial on the admission contained in the pleadings (1)

This rule (1875) enables the plaintiff or defendant to get rid of so much of the action as to which there is no controversy. That is the meaning of it (1) and the same learned Judge frequently decided that the former rule must be read as if the words 'if any' were inserted after the word question (2). The Court will not on motion give judgment on admissions contained in the defence of an infant defendant nor *semble* on default of infant in filing a defence (3). The plaintiff must have a clear case and the mere admission or non denial by the defendant of a right asserted by plaintiff but which in fact has no existence in law is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment establishing the right (5). In any case the power of the Court is discretionary and will not be exercised where the case cannot be conveniently tried on motion (C).

7 An affidavit of the pleader or his clerk, of the due signature of any admissions made in pursuance of any notice to admit documents or facts shall be sufficient evidence of such admissions, if evidence thereof is required

8 Notice to produce documents shall be in Form No 1 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require. An affidavit of the pleader or his clerk of the service of any notice to produce, and of the time when it was served with a copy of the notice to produce, shall in all cases be sufficient evidence of the service of the notice, and of the time when it was served

Object of rule—The object of this rule is to enable secondary evidence of documents to be given at the trial if they are not the primary evidence (1) the notice (7). See English (1) 32 r 8

9 If a notice to admit or produce specifies documents which are not necessary, the costs occasioned thereby shall be borne by the party giving such notice

(1) *Talldesley v Harper* 7 C D 403

(2) *Per Jesell M R Thorpe Holden* 3 C D p 640

(3) *Clifton v Lee* 24 W R 407 (Lug)

(4) *Byrne v B & I R Ir* (Ch D) 131 and note thereto p 130. *National Provincial Bank v Frans* 30 W R 177 but see *contra* *Frutwiler v Waterhouse* 52 L J Ch 23

(5) *Clifton v Corporation of London* 7 C

D 35 and see *Gilbert v South* 31 R 630 judgment of Mellal LJ. *Rutledge v Trigent* 12 C D 9. *Landerger* 34 W R 691

(6) *Mellon v S delotto* 3 C D 331

(7) *Dwyer v Collins* 7 F R 63. See also *5 T S m 460*. *Day v L* 11 v 141. *Saylor v F* 11 pp 430-4

ORDER XIII

Production, Impounding and Return of Documents

1 The parties or their pleaders shall produce, at the first hearing of the suit, all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power, on which they intend to rely, and which has not already been filed in Court, and all documents which the Court has ordered to be produced

(2) The Court shall receive the documents so produced provided that *they are* accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs

Documents to be ready—If a plaintiff sues or relies on a document he must either produce it with his plaint or enter it on the list attached to it (O VII r 14) Any document which has not been produced or entered cannot be received in evidence without leave of the Court (O VII r 18 see notes thereto) And by this rule the parties must bring with them and have in readiness at the first hearing all the documentary evidence in their possession or power, (1) and on which they rely, and file it But they need not file them unless they are

good and assignable cause, abstained from bringing it before the Court at the first hearing (4) or formal evidence beyond suspicion such as certified copies of public documents (5)

(1) See Syed Ikram Hossein v Ram Lochun Dutt 23 W R. 29 (1874) [s. 123 of the Code of 1859, though it did not contain them, and was held to be so limited].

(2) Mahbub Hossein v Patasumari, 1 B L. R. 120 (1868)

(3) Syed Ikram Hossein v Ram Lochun Dutt, 23 W R. 29 (1874), per Lord J [s. 123 of Code of 1859] Ranchhod Hirabai v. Secre

tary of State, 22 B 173 (1896), Lilabati Misra v Bishun Chobey, 6 C. L. J. 621 (1907)

(4) Syed Ikram Hossein v Ram Lochun Dutt, *supra*.

(5) Ranchhod Hirabai v Secretary of State, 22 B 173 (1896) Lilabati Misra v Bishun Chobey, 6 C. L. J. 621 (1907).

139]

2 No documentary evidence in the possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with the requirements of rule 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non production thereof, and the Court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing

Effect of non production — A party is bound to be prepared at all points with his documentary evidence (1) but they need not file them unless they are called for (2) The parties though not entitled as of right to adduce fresh documentary evidence after the issues on the case are settled, may yet tender such evidence stating the grounds upon which it was not tendered at an earlier stage and the Judge may receive or reject such evidence, but the grounds on which he acts should be stated on the record (3) If in the course of a trial something is brought to light which is entirely new, no doubt the Court framing a fresh issue would give the parties time to produce evidence in respect of that new matter (4) As to the manner in which these provisions should be applied see notes to last rule

140]

3 The Court may at any stage of the suit reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds of such rejection

“Reject” — The Court having called on the parties to produce their documentary evidence must receive and inspect every document tendered returning such as it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible (5) either under the Evidence Act or other Acts such as those relating to stamp and registration. If for want of time the Judge is then unable to inspect or consider them he may allow them to be filed and inspect and reject them afterwards (6) The documents returned by the Court cannot be used in evidence, or put in the record until proved or admitted *vide post*. No appeal lies from an order rejecting documents though the rejection may be impugned in the appeal from the final decree (7)

(1) *Gour Huroo v Pran Huroo* 21 W. R. 42 (1873) (s. 123 Code of 1859)

(2) *Milbud H. v. M. v. Lataji Kumar* 1 D. L. R. 120 (1868)

(3) *Watson v. C. v. Kanhya Baladour*, 9 W. R. 234 (1865) as to appellate Court throwing out document received by first Courts see *Bhoom Narain v. Kurnoon Ali*, W. R. 125 (1861)

(4) *Gour Huroo v Pran Huroo* 21 W. R. 42-43 (1873)

(5) *Hoshun Jehan v. Inayat Hossain*, Marsh. 127 (1867)

(6) *Soodukhina Chowdhury v. Raji M. Ban*, Bose 11 W. R. 350 (1861) (s. 129 of Code of 1859)

(7) *In re Erskine* 18 W. R. 511 (1874)

4 (1) Subject to the provisions of the next following *sub rule* there shall be endorsed on every document which has been admitted in evidence in the *suit* the following particulars, namely —

- (a) the number and title of the suit
 - (b) the name of the person producing the document
 - (c) the date on which it was produced, and
 - (d) a statement of its having been so admitted
- and the endorsement shall be signed or *initialled* by the Judge
- (2) *Where* a document so admitted is an entry in a book, account or record, and a copy thereof has been substituted for the original under the next following *rule*, the particulars aforesaid shall be endorsed on the copy and the endorsement thereon shall be signed or *initialled* by the Judge

Endorsements —The sections in the last Code corresponding with this and the following rules 6 7 and 8 were substituted by sect 13 Act VII of 1888 for sects 141 and 142 of the Code of 1882 As to admission in evidence see notes to rr 6 and 7 *post*

5 (1) *Save in so far as is otherwise provided by the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, where* a document admitted in evidence in the suit is an entry in a *letter book or a shop book or other account in current use*, the party on whose behalf the *book or account* is produced may furnish a copy of the entry

(2) *Where* such a document is an entry in a public record produced from a public office or by a public officer, or an entry in a book or account belonging to a person other than a party on whose behalf the book or account is produced, the Court may require a copy of the entry to be furnished—

- (a) where the record book or account is produced on behalf of a party, then by that party, or
- (b) where the record, book or account is produced in obedience to an order of the Court acting of its own motion, then by either or any party

(3) *Where* a copy of an entry is furnished under the foregoing provisions of this *rule*, the Court shall, after causing the copy to be examined compared and *certified* in manner mentioned in *rule 1. of Order VII*, mark the entry and cause

the book, account or record in which it occurs to be returned to the person producing it.

Stamp—This section was added to the last Code by Act VII under the

142.] 6 Where a document relied on as evidence by either party is considered by the Court to be inadmissible in evidence, there shall be endorsed thereon the particulars mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of rule 1, sub-rule (1) together with a statement of its having been rejected, and the endorsement shall be signed or initialled by the Judge

42A.] 7 (1) Every document which has been admitted in evidence, or a copy thereof where a copy has been substituted for the original under rule 3, shall form part of the record of the suit

(2) Documents not admitted in evidence shall not form part of the record and shall be returned to the persons respectively producing them

"Admitted in evidence"—The rules as to the admissibility of evidence will be found in the Evidence Act. Primary rules are that documents must be proved by the party relying on them (2) unless admitted (3). And it is not sufficient that they have not been denied by the opposite party (1). Secondary evidence should not be accepted without sufficient reason (5).

"Form part of the record"—The corresponding section in the last Code was added by Act VII of 1888, sect. 13. Documents which have not been proved but simply filed in accordance with a usage in the Mofussil should not be put up with the record. It is the duty of the Judge to pass over such

(1) *Kastur v Fakira*, 20 B 522 (1902).
s. c. 4 Bom L. R. 223

(2) *Kutcheeah Majettoo v Ramdhun Kloris* B L. R. F B 628 (1867), *Reazoon* s. c. *Bookoo Choudhram*, 12 W. R. 207 (1863)

(3) *Burporji v Umrajji v Munderji Kaverji*, 3 B 113 (1890)

(4) See cases in last note but one

(5) See *Ramalakshmi Ammal v Sona* *mautha Prumal*, 14 M I A 570 (1888) 17 W. R. 553, *Ram Gopal Roy v Gerdan Stuart* 14 M I A 403, 401 (1872), *Sund* *Abbas Ali v Sadram Ramji*, 3 M I A 34 (1843)

documents unproved but it is also the duty of the pleader of the party against whom they are intended to be used, to insist that they should not remain on the record at all (1) Where a document tendered in evidence in a Court of first instance, is rejected as inadmissible, but is nevertheless allowed to remain on the record of the case, the mere fact of the document remaining on the record does not make it evidence in the Appellate Court, but it must be tendered in evidence in that Court, and accepted thereby (2)

8. Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 5 or rule 7 [s 1

Court may order any document to be impounded. *of this Order or in rule 17 of Order VII, the Court may, if it sees sufficient cause, direct any document or book produced before it in any suit to be impounded and kept in the custody of an officer of the Court, for such period and subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit.*

Impounding document—Act XIV of 1882, sect 143 as amended (sect 14, Act VII of 1888) A claim was made under sect 278 of the last Code by one L G R in respect of property attached as that of H That claim was rejected The District Judge finding that the document under which L G R claimed executed in his favour by H, was a fraudulent preference, ordered the document to be impounded; and wrote across the document in red ink "declared to be fraudulent, D J" L G R obtained a rule for the return of the document do absolute, the Court ordering document returned, and holding, where that which is challenged is not the document itself, which was admitted to be genuine, but the transaction evidenced by the document (3)

9. (1) Any person, whether a party to the suit or not, [s 1
Return of admitted documents. desirous of receiving back any document produced by him in the suit and placed on the record shall, unless the document is impounded under rule 8, be entitled to receive back the same,—

- (a) where the suit is one in which an appeal is not allowed, when the suit has been disposed of, and
- (b) where the suit is one in which an appeal is allowed, when the Court is satisfied that the time for preferring an appeal has elapsed and that no appeal has been

(1) Kallala Pershad Dutt v Ram Hari (1892)

(Chuckerbutty, 5 C. 317 (1879).

(2) Har Gobind v Noni Bahu, 14 A 356

(3) Rule 820 of 1904, Cal H. C., 23 May, 1904.

further application was made, it was *held* that the applicant was not entitled to appeal on the ground that the record had not been sent for (1)

"May."—The Court has a discretion, and is not bound to send for the record,(2) though the discretion must be judicially exercised, and, as in other cases where the legislature uses the word "may," where a proper case for the exercise of the power arises, the Court should exercise it (3) The Court will see that the facts set out in the second paragraph are made out in the affidavit But if so the Court ought not to refuse the application merely because in its opinion the documents cannot be produced before the termination of the trial (4) The Court is not bound to send for the whole record, but only such papers as are mentioned in the application (5)

"Application"—This must show that the record is material, (6) that copies cannot be obtained or that if obtainable they are insufficient, the original being necessary, as where copies cannot be attested by subscribing witness (7) It was held that in all cases the party for whose benefit the documents have been used should be required to file copies in the record (8)

"Other Court"—As already stated, the Court cannot now, as under the Code of 1859, send for records from public offices (9) The record must be that of a suit or proceeding in another Court The proper means of obtaining the other records is by summons directed to the proper officer The Court to which the direction is issued has no discretion to refuse to send records which have been sent for by another Civil Court (10)

(1) *Chunda Churn Sashmul v Doorga Pershad Mirdha*, 12 C L R 81 (1882)

(2) *Heeramun Roy v Kazeo Tahoor*, 7 W R 103 (1867)

(3) *Rughoonath Bose v Oomed Ali*, W R, F B 177 (1864), at p 180, *per* Norman Off C J, where the Court had not sent for the papers or considered them the case was remanded *Ram Runjun v Gopee Bullah*, 18 W R 127 (1872)

(4) *Krishna Churn Baisack v Protap Chunder Surma*, 7 C 560 (1881) [the same rule applies as regards summons for witnesses, *ib*]

(5) *Mt Janokee Bebee v Shah Habeebul*, 1864, W R 272 (1864)

(6) *Mollwo, March and Co v Pertab Chunder*, 1 Ind Jur N S 283 (1886), *Rughoonath Bose v Oomed Ali*, W R, 1 B, 177 (1864)

(7) *See Louis Coraah v Gooroo Churn Ghose* 18 W R 13 (1872), where the Court

held that the party should first apply for return of original from the other Court, putting in a copy, and then, if refused, apply under this section

(8) *Narappa v Gapaya* 2 B H C R 341, 342 (1866)

(9) See *Juggernath Sahoo v Mahomed Hossein*, 15 W R 173 (1871) The Court of Wards was held not to be a Government Office in the ordinary sense of the term *Sobbes Jha v Sosheanath Jha*, 15 W R 150 (1870), where anything must be done to obtain a document it must be done by the party requiring it Thus, where the party requires the production of a telegram it is for him and not the Court to obtain the necessary sanction of Government to its disclosure *Lekhraj v Palto Ram*, 2 A H C R 210 (1870)

(10) *Golaup Coomary Dossee v Soonder Naram Doo*, 4 C L R 36 (1879)

preferred or, if an appeal has been preferred, when the appeal has been disposed of.

Provided that a document may be returned at any time *earlier than that prescribed by this rule* if the person applying therefor delivers to the proper officer a certified copy to be substituted for the original *and undertakes to produce the original if required to do so*

Provided also that no document shall be returned which by force of the decree, has become *wholly void or useless.*

(2) On the return of a document admitted in evidence, a receipt shall be given by the *person receiving it*

1371 10. (1) The Court may of its own *motion*, and may in its discretion upon the application of any of the parties to a suit, send for, either from its own records or from any other Court, the record of any other suit or proceeding, and inspect the same

Court may send for papers from its own records or from other Courts

(2) Every application made under this rule shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be supported by an affidavit showing how the record is material to the suit in which the application is made, and that the applicant cannot without unreasonable delay or expense obtain a duly authenticated copy of the record or of such portion thereof as the applicant requires, or that the production of the original is necessary for the purposes of justice

(3) Nothing contained in this rule shall be deemed to enable the Court to use in evidence any document which under the law of evidence would be inadmissible in the suit.

"The Court."—This rule, which corresponds with sect 138 of the Code of 1859, except that the latter section empowered the Court to send for records from public officer also, applies to Appellate Courts as well as those of original jurisdiction (1) The Judge should pass a distinct order on the application
inst
perh
ind

(1) *Jagannath Sahasr Mahomed Hassan*,
1 W R 173 (1871)

(2) *R mun Kishen Day r Shaikh Kadir*
Buksh 6 W R 79 (1866)

further application was made it was *held* that the applicant was not entitled to appeal on the ground that the record had not been sent for (1)

"May."—The Court has a discretion and is not bound to send for the record (2) though the discretion must be judicially exercised and, as in other cases where the legislature uses the word "may," where a proper case for the exercise of the power arises, the Court should exercise it (3) The Court will see that the facts set out in the second paragraph are made out in the affidavit But if so the Court ought not to refuse the application merely because in its opinion the documents cannot be produced before the termination of the trial (4) The Court is not bound to send for the whole record but only such papers as are mentioned in the application (5)

"Application"—This must show that the record is material, (6) that copies cannot be obtained or that if obtainable they are insufficient, the original being necessary, as where copies cannot be attested by subscribing witness (7) It was held that in all cases the party for whose benefit the documents have been used should be required to file copies in the record (8)

"Other Court"—As already stated the Court cannot now, as under the Code of 1859, send for records from public offices (9) The record must be that of a suit or proceeding in another Court The proper means of obtaining the other records is by summons directed to the proper officer The Court to which the direction is issued has no discretion to refuse to send records which have been sent for by another Civil Court (10)

(1) *Chundi Churn Basmul v Doorga Pershad Mirdha*, 12 C L R 81 (1882)

(2) *Heeramun Roy v Hazee Tahoor*, 7 W R 109 (1867)

(3) *Rughoonath Bose v Oomed Ali*, W R F B 177 (1864), at p 180, *per* Norman Off C J, where the Court had not sent for the papers or considered them the case was remanded *Ram Runjun v Gopee Bullub*, 18 W R 127 (1872)

(4) *Krishna Churn Baisack v Protah Chunder Surma*, 7 C 560 (1881) [the same rule applies as regards summons for witnesses, *ib*]

(5) *Mt Janokes Beebe v Shah Habeebul*, 1864, W R 272 (1864)

(6) *Mollwo March and Co v Portal Chunder*, 1 Ind Jur N S 283 (1886), *Rughoonath Bose v Oomed Ali* W R, F B, 177 (1864)

(7) See *Louis Coraah v Gooroo Churn Ghose*, 18 W R 13 (1872), where the Court

held that the party should first apply for return of original from the other Court, putting in a copy, and then if refused apply under this section

(8) *Narappa v Capaya*, 2 B H C R 341, 342 (1866)

(9) See *Juggernath Sahoo v Mahomed Hossein*, 15 W R 173 (1871) The Court of Wards was held not to be a Government Office in the ordinary sense of the term *Sobbee Jha v Sosheennath Jha*, 15 W R 150 (1870), where anything must be done to obtain a document it must be done by the party requiring it Thus where the party requires the production of a telegram it is for him and not the Court to obtain the necessary sanction of Government to its disclosure *Lekhraj v Palee Ram*, 2 A H C R 210 (1870)

(10) *Gelaup Coomary Dossee v Soonder Narain Doo*, 4 C L R 36 (1875)

Saving Clause—This embodies the ruling in the case under mentioned (1)

11 The provisions herein contained as to documents shall, so far as may be, apply to all other material objects producible as evidence

Provisions as to documents applied to material objects.

(1) Narappa v Gapayya 2 B H C R 341 (1866)

ORDER XIV

Settlement of Issues and Determination of Suit on Issues of Law or on Issues agreed upon

1 (1) Issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other

Framing of Issues.

(2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence

(3) Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue

(4) Issues are of two kinds (a) issues of fact, (b) issues of law

(5) At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall after reading the plaint and the written statements, if any, and after such examination of the parties as may appear necessary, ascertain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance, and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues on which the right decision of the case appears to depend

(6) Nothing in this rule requires the Court to frame and record issues where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence

2 Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined

Issues of law and of fact

3 The Court may frame the issues from all or any of the following materials —

Materials from which issues may be framed

(a) allegations made on oath by the parties, or by any persons present on their behalf, or made by the pleaders of such parties,

- (b) allegations made in the pleadings or in answers to interrogatories delivered in the suit ;
(c) the contents of documents produced by either party

148] 4 Where the Court is of opinion that the issues cannot be correctly framed without the examination of some person not before the Court or without the inspection of some document not produced in the suit, it may adjourn the framing of the issues to a future day, and may (subject to *any law for the time being in force*) compel the attendance of any person or the production of any document by the person in whose possession or power it is by summons or other process

149] 5 (1) The Court may at any time before passing a decree amend the issues or frame additional issues on such terms as it thinks fit, and all such amendments or additional issues as may be necessary for determining the matters in controversy between the parties shall be so made or framed
(2) The Court may also, at any time before passing a decree, strike out any issues that appear to it to be wrongly framed or introduced

Object and effect of issues—The object of pleading is that each side may be made fully aware of the questions which are about to be argued in order that each may bring forward evidence appropriate to the issues (1) The pleadings therefore are the first stage at which the differences between the parties are made to appear. They may contain an express admission. Pleadings however in this country have hitherto not been construed with the same strictness as in England where legal assistance of a highly expert character is always available. The Courts therefore, have refused to apply to Indian pleadings the strict rule that averments not traversed must be taken to be admitted (2) Orders VI and VIII now require a stricter practice which is itself justified by the increased professional efficiency. Where, however, issues have been framed, it was held prior to this Code that averments upon which no issue have been framed must be taken to be admitted (3) If or if parties intend

(1) Sayad Muhammad v. Latchi Muham
10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 (1894)

(2) M. Venkateswami v. S. S. Ch. under
R. v. J. M. 1 v. 24 at p. 101, 2 W. R.
P. 1 (1892) M. Venkateswami v.
D. S. Ch. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

see Chundoo Churn v. M. Churn, 12 W.
R. 409 (1870), Ma. Churn v. Churn, 12 W.
R. 111 (1870)

(3) M. Chundoo Churn v. M. Churn, 12 W.
R. 409 (1870), Ma. Churn v. Churn, 12 W.
R. 111 (1870)

to raise a question they should request the Court to frame an issue upon it. Where parties in a lower Court allow a suit to be conducted as if a certain fact was admitted, they cannot afterwards in appeal question it and recede from the tacit admission (1). It has been said that the duty of raising issues rests under the Code on the Court, and that an admission cannot be inferred from the omission to ask the Court to raise an issue (2). The Court no doubt frames the issues, but this is done after enquiring from the parties the propositions on which they are *at variance*. It is possibly the duty of a Court, if it perceives that a point which it is necessary to prove may be open to dispute, to draw the parties' attention to it, with a view to ascertain if it is contested or admitted, and if contested to raise an issue on it. If this is done and no issue is raised then the averment must be taken to be admitted otherwise these provisions are useless. As regards other cases, something may depend on the circumstances, but if the *dictum* cited was intended to be of general application, it is, with respect, submitted to be unsound.

"One party."—That is ordinarily the plaintiff on one side and the defendant on the other. An issue between co defendants is generally not allowable (3). In some cases, however, this may be done, as where the recording and determination of such issue is necessary to giving the appropriate relief to the plaintiff (4). No issue can be decided between co defendants if the suit is dismissed (5).

"Shall" Omission to settle issues—The Court is directed to do so and to omit to settle in order that the parties may before the trial know to what points they would have to address themselves is a great irregularity (6). At the same time, if it appears that the necessary points have been raised and discussed, the omission to settle issues is not fatal to the trial of the suit (7). The Code contemplates the settlement of issues whether there is a written statement or not, though it is not obligatory on the Court to frame issues if the defendant makes no defence (8). And where both parties invoked the decision of the Court upon a question raised by the pleadings and the question was argued

(1) *Mohana Chander v Ram Kishore* 15 B L R 142 155 (1876) but see *Madho persad v Gajudhar*, 11 C 111, 118 (1884). in this case however it is to be noted that it was not suggested that further evidence was obtainable.

(2) *Gano Hari Sawant v Shri Dev Sidheshwar*, 4 Bom L R 58 (1901).

(3) *Degumber Mitter v Khetter Mohun Mitter*, 2 W R 45 (1865).

(4) See s 11 as to *res judicata* in such cases, and *Madhavi v Kalu*, 15 M 264 (1892), *Kalee Kinkur v Kisto Mungul*, 11 W R 462 (1869).

(5) *Bevan v Crawford*, 6 C D 29.

(6) *Muttayan Chettiar v Sangili Vira*, 12 C L R 169, at p. 174 (1882), *Baboo*

Rewan Pershad v Jankee Pershad, 11 M I A 25, 27 (1860).

(7) *Katohekallyana v Kachivijaya*, 12 M I A 495 (1869), especially where the parties well knew what the question between them was, *Mt Mitna v Syad Fuzl Rub*, 13 M I A 573 (1870). 15 W R P C 15, and this procedure has been adopted without objection. *Mahomed Basiroollah v Ahmed Ali*, 22 W R 448 (1874), *Sayad Muhammad v Fattch Muhammad*, 22 C 324 (1894), where the questions though not formally stated in the issues had been sufficiently open upon the pleadings.

(8) *Rustun Gazi v Tara Prosanna Chowdhuri*, 11 C W N 571 (1907).

it was held that the judgment upon it was not *ultra vires* because

the issues arising and recording the points in dispute, (2) as also where the issue does not sufficiently direct the attention of the parties to the main question to be decided (3)

On what fixed—In the first place issues may be framed on the plaint and written statement which are the pleadings in the suit (4). When the issues come to be stated wider questions may be propounded (5). The Court is not bound to try the suit in the manner in which the plaint is framed for its object is merely to bring the matter in dispute between the parties before the Court but on the settlement of issues the Judge is to ascertain the question (6). In fact the issues fixed and not the pleadings ought to guide the parties as to production of evidence (7). The real points however are often missed or obscured by the inchoitous mode of drawing pleadings which sometimes prevails in the Mofussil. And it is therefore the duty of the judge to ascertain from enquiry of the parties on their pleadings the real points in dispute between them. The Court is not bound down to the language of the pleadings (8). Issues may be settled even where a plaint discloses no cause of action (9) though a Court has also in such case a discretion to reject it. A defendant is not precluded from setting up a defence which does not appear in his written statement (10). But the issues raised should not be inconsistent with the pleadings. Thus where the plaintiff sued alleging a deed purporting to be executed by himself to be a forgery the Court should not admit the inconsistent issue whether it was executed under undue influence (11). The Court may also look to interrogatories and contents of documents produced.

What should be subject of issues—As a general rule only such averments should be made the subject of issues as are essential to support the cause of

- (1) Soorjomonee Deyce v. Sattanand W. 11 B. R. 377 (1873)
- (2) Baboo Poonam Parahad v. Tinko I. r. 11 B. R. 11 (1871)
- (3) Oolagappa Chetty v. Arbitrator 11 B. R. 14 B. L. R. 116 (1873), 11 B. R. 268 (1873), 11 B. R. 116 (1873), 11 B. R. 268 (1873), 11 B. R. 116 (1873)
- (4) Kamen Lal v. Lalljemall 11 B. R. 361 (1876)
- (5) See 3m Kamin Debi v. Anthoni Moolerjee, 15 I. A. 163, 162, 163 (1880)
- (6) Arbitrator & Co. v. Betts 14 W. R. 191 (1870)
- (7) Huro Soonduree Debi v. Ameena Begum 3 W. R. 11 (1872)
- (8) Apaya v. Rama 3 B. 210, 213 (1879), Moulvie Abdoolah v. Shaha Mujewooddeen 15 W. R. 250 (1871), Mahomed Mahmood v. Safar Ali 11 C. 407 (1885), Mo. Ho. v. Dongre,

- 11 B. R. 609, (1881) H. H. Lal v. Lal Sahib 13 A. 53, 54 (1880) a general assembling the old Common Law of India or tenus Thakur Rohan v. Thakur Surat, 12 I. A. 56 (1884)
- (9) Man Gobind Sutar v. Chitika M. 11 B. R. 218 (1871)
- (10) Soond v. Nara v. Shakh Namlar 21 W. R. 407 (1874) G. M. Pershad Sahu v. Maharam Betti 12 I. A. 47, 50 (1884) Secretary of State v. D. P. 11 B. R. 300 (1880), where the objection though not taken in the written statement was raised in argument
- (11) Mahomed Bakh Khan v. H. M. Bibi, 15 I. A. 81 (1889) or failed to want of counsel v. 11 B. R. 300 (1880)

action and are denied by the defendant, or as are essential to support a plea and are denied by the plaintiff, and mere pieces of evidence which are to be adduced to enable the Court to infer the truth of a material statement ought not to be made the subject of separate issues (1) Where a fact is expressly or impliedly admitted no issue, of course, arises, nor is proof of that fact necessary. But where the proof given falls short of legal requirements, the mere default of a party to contest a point which also falls short of an admission will not avail to cure the actual want of evidence (2) If a plaintiff and its proof lead to particular issues the Court should raise them and give relief, provided they do not come by surprise on the defendant and are within the scope of and not inconsistent with the pleadings (3) But a plaintiff will not be allowed to set up one case, and having proved another, ask issues to be raised to suit the proof (4) See, however, notes on "Amendment of Issues," *post*. If a case not alleged by the plaintiff is disclosed on the evidence the Court can allow it to be set up, provided a specific issue is raised for it, and the defendant is given an opportunity of meeting it (5)

Some of the cases which have been cited in this connection are as follows —
Suit on lease, genuineness of which disputed, (6) suit for kabulyat, (7) rent, (8)

suit for malicious prosecution (17)

Where the parties accept issues laid down by the Court they are bound

(1) *Birch v Fuzund Ali*, 3 A H C R 303, 307 (1871)

(2) *Bhobhun Chunder Shome v Rani Dyal Shamunto*, 14 W R 55 (1870)

(3) *Obhoy Churn v Woomesh Chunder*, 2 H Jd, 263 (1864), *Kashin Pershad v Bhowance Deen*, 1 Agra (1860), 47 F B, *Kashin Chunder v Shamia Churn Bhutto*, 6 W R P C 57 (1866), *Sharoda Koomaroo v Mohun Mohun*, 20 W R 272 (1873), *Virasvami Gramani v Ayyasvami Gramani*, 1 M H C R 471 (1863)

(4) *Obhoy Churn v Woomesh Chunder*, *supra*

(5) *Parashram v Maraji*, 20 B 562 (1836)

(6) *Ishakoorance Dowsoo v Goluck Chunder*, 5 W R 167 (1866)

(7) *Radha Kishore v Goluck Chunder*, 11 W R 366 (1866)

(8) *Kutty Sabramaniam v Chenna Muttu*, 3 M H C R 25 (1866), *Parbooddeen Mullak v Molam Bibee*, 14 W R 143 (1870), *Miss Mack v Luchme Naram*, 17 W R 304 (1872), *Shorkoomar Singh v Cruise*, 6 W R 105 (1861)

(9) *Muzboot Singh v Mit Chunder Masha*

10 W R 44 (1871), *Nundo Lal Mitter v Prosunhomoyes*, 10 W R 333 (1873), *Khoob Chund v Uchul Singh*, 8 D N W, 1862, p 87

(10) *Bykant Nath Sandyal v Kales Churn Paul*, 17 W R 149 (1871), *Pransookh Khan v Ramzan Khan*, 8 D N W, 1863, p 300, account settled, *Kashin Pershad v Bhowance Deen*, 1 Agra F B 47 (1866), *Obhoy Churn v Woomesh Chunder*, 2 H Jd, 263 (1864)

(11) *Achul Mahla v Rajni Mahla*, 6 C 812 (1831), *Rajrup Koor v Abul Hossain*, 6 C 334 (1880)

(12) *East Indian Railway v Jordan* 14 W R 11 (1870), A O J

(13) *Avul Khadar v Andhus Set*, 2 M H C 1. 423 (1865)

(14) *Doorga Naram v Birjo Kishore*, 23 W R 172 (1875)

(15) *Rance Madhub Laboree v Biprodass Dey*, 15 W R 169 (1871)

(16) *Narayan Ganesh v Hari Ganesh*, 13 B 661 (1889)

(17) *Baboo Ram Budden v Sardar Dyal Singh*, 17 W R 101 (1872)

by them (1) Where a defendant pleaded limitation but placed that issue upon the simple fact that he himself had possession for twelve years and upward, which issue was found against him, held it was too late for the defendant in appeal to object that that finding did not dispose of the issue of limitation (2)

Order of disposal—A Court is not under any obligation as to the order in which it is to try the issues which are raised before it, but may dispose of them in the way which it considers most likely to conduce to the ascertainment of the truth (3) But issues should be tried separately, and not mixed up together (4) Issues of law may, under the circumstances stated in r. 2, be tried first (5)

"Nothing in this rule."—It was held under the Code of 1859, that if both parties appear, issues should be recorded, but if the defendant does not appear it is not possible to ascertain the points at which the parties are at variance. In such a case a Court does not frame issues, but hears the cases *ex parte* (6) The rule expressly excludes such a case

Amendment of issues—It will be observed that the word "may" occurs in the early part, and the word "shall" in the concluding portion of the first paragraph of r. 5. The power of amending issues is almost the same as that given by the Common Law Procedure Act, and it has been held that a Judge is not bound to make such amendments, except for the purpose of more effectually putting in issue, and trying, the real question in controversy as disclosed by the pleadings on either side. In some cases the Courts, in their discretion, have gone beyond this, and, where no injustice would be done to either party, have allowed issues to be raised on matters which do not strictly come within the scope of the pleadings. The power to allow such amendments is given by the first part of the rule, which gives a discretion, and not under the obligatory words of the latter part of the rule (7) The power which is given to the Court by r. 5 (corresponding with sect. 141 of the Code of 1859) to modify the issues in the course of the trial, is meant to enable it to bring out the questions really arising out of the counter averments of the parties. It is not intended that the Judge should take the case altogether out of the hands of the litigants and make for the plaintiff or defendant a case which he had no intention of making for himself (8) A Court's power of raising additional issues is co-extensive with

(1) *Shew Sukoy Lall v Wajed Ali Khan*, 13 W R 200 (1870), *Moondur Beebee v Hanooman Pershad*, 11 W R 277 (1869), *Bent Chunder v Tarnee Chunder*, 11 W R 20 (1869)

(2) *Kisto Mohun v Noyan Sara*, 10 W R 753 (1865)

(3) *Sitanath Doss v Doyadronath Doss*, 3 W R 54 (1871)

(4) *Umbika Doss Iutoo v Woodin*, 3 W R 240 (1865)

(5) *Sec. Secretary of State v Jehangir*, 1

Bom L R 342 (1902), where an application to this effect was refused on the ground that the issues of law and fact were not separate.

(6) *Ameer Ali v Imamooddeen*, 15 W R 145 (1871)

(7) *Nehora Roy v Radha Pershad Sengh*, 5 C 64 (1879). See *Shimul Palter v Abdul Kadir*, P. C., 16 C W N 1199 (1912).

14 *Bom L R* 1034, 331 A 218

(8) *Naro Hari v Anpurnabai*, 11 B 160 n. at p. 161 n. (1874)

its power of amending plaints, and is subject to the same restrictions. A Court therefore was held not authorized by the corresponding section to this rule to frame new issues which had the effect of altering the nature of the suit (1). A permission to a defendant to file a supplemental answer does not entitle him to make a new case or raise a fresh issue in contradiction of his former defence (2). Every matter fairly within the scope of the plaint, if important for the decision of the substantive difference between the parties, should be framed into an issue, and the duty of framing them is thrown on the Court in order to render substantial justice, and to prevent a party suing from being remitted to a new suit, when, by a suitable order as to terms upon which amendment shall be made the Court, by framing additional issues, can determine in the existing suit the real question in controversy between the parties (3).

The rule says "*at any time*" before decree. But when there has been a hearing and settlement of issues, the Court will, ordinarily, not exercise its discretionary power to raise a new issue except on clear proof of inadvertence, or mistake, or the discovery of new matters affecting the merits not within the knowledge of the parties at the date of the former settlement of issues (4). If the Court intends to frame an additional issue, it should do so and then fix a day for the further hearing upon such issue. It should not merely record its intention to do so and leave the actual framing for the time of giving judgment (5). A plaint has been amended in first appeal, and the suit remanded for the determination of a fresh issue arising upon such amendment (6). The form, however, of a suit may not allow of particular rights being declared in it (7). An amendment may be set aside in appeal (8).

Although, under certain circumstances, a Judge at a trial may allow amendments or raise issues other than those settled yet when a Judge at the settlement of issues, has refused to raise a certain issue, that question ought not to be reopened at the trial, and the Judge at the trial ought not to modify the issues so as to re-open any question which the Judge settling the issues has decided (9). When a Judge transfers a case to his own file he is at liberty to amend the issues first laid down, and to frame additional issues, and to go into the whole case, except upon any question upon which there has been a judicial finding (10). The first part of cl (1) of r 5 leaves it in the discretion of the Court to frame such

(1) *Narayan Ganesh v Hari Ganesh* 13 B 664 (1889), but see observations at p 614, in *Modho v Dongre*, 5 B 609 (1881), and as to amendments of plaints, see notes to O 11 r 17.

(2) *Douglas v Collector of Benares* 5 M 1 A 271 (1891).

(3) *Kishen Pershad v Bhawence Deen*, 1 Agra, 1st B 46.

(4) *Baboo Lall v Ram Narain Coryton*, 8 M (1865). In *Bolye Meah v Khetoo Gorai*, 20 W R 208 (1873), amendment was allowed after all the evidence had been taken as to new matter turning up during trial, see *Aga Syud Saduck v Hadjee Jackariah Mahomed*,

2 Ind Jur N S 309 (1867).

(5) *Kamul Kamince v Obhoy Churn Ghose*, 15 W R 151 (1871), *Sreeharree Mundul v Judoonath Ghose*, 10 W R 169 (1868).

(6) *Abdul Kadar v Mahomed*, 15 M 15 (1890).

(7) *Ameeroonissa Khatoon v Abdeoonissa Khatoon*, 21 A. 87, 112 (1875). See *Sharoda Koomar v Mohunto Mohun*, 20 W R 272.

(8) *Narayan Ganesh v Hari Ganesh*, 13 B 664 (1889).

(9) *Bolye Chund Sing v Moulard*, 4 C 572 (1878).

(10) *Tarucknath Mookerjee v Gouree Churn Mookerjee*, 3 W R 147 (1866).

by them (1) Where a defendant pleaded limitation but placed that issue upon the simple fact that he himself had possession for twelve years and upwards which issue was found against him held it was too late for the defendant in appeal to object that that finding did not dispose of the issue of limitation (2)

Order of disposal—A Court is not under any obligation as to the order in which it is to try the issues which are raised before it, but may dispose of them in the way which it considers most likely to conduce to the ascertainment of the truth (3) But issues should be tried separately, and not mixed up together (4) Issues of law may, under the circumstances stated in r. 2, be tried first (5)

"Nothing in this rule."—It was held under the Code of 1859 that if both parties appear, issues should be recorded, but if the defendant does not appear it is not possible to ascertain the points at which the parties are at variance In such a case a Court does not frame issues, but hears the cases *ex parte* (6) The rule expressly excludes such a case

Amendment of issues—It will be observed that the word "may" occurs in the early part, and the word "shall" in the concluding portion of the first paragraph of r. 5 The power of amending issues is almost the same as that given by the Common Law Procedure Act, and it has been held that a Judge is not bound to make such amendments, except for the purpose of more effectually putting in issue and trying, the real question in controversy as disclosed by the pleadings on either side In some cases the Courts, in their discretion have gone beyond this, and, where no injustice would be done to either party, have allowed issues to be raised on matters which do not strictly come within the scope of the pleadings The power to allow such amendments is given by the first part of the rule which give a discretion, and not under the obligatory words of the latter part of the rule (7) The power which is given to the Court by r. 5 (corresponding with sect. 141 of the Code of 1859) to modify the issues in the course of the trial is meant to enable it to bring out the questions really arising out of the counter averments of the parties It is not intended that the Judge should take the case altogether out of the hands of the litigants and make for the plaintiff or defendant a case which he had no intention of making for himself (8) A Court's power of raising additional issues is co exten

(1) *Shew Sukoy Lall v. Wajed Ali Khan*, 13 W. R. 205 (1870), *Moondur Beebo v. Hunooman Pershad* 11 W. R. 277 (1860), *Bena Chunder v. Farooq Chunder*, 11 W. R. 20 (1869)

(2) *Kisto Moh v. Nojan Tara*, 10 W. R. 103 (1868)

(3) *Sitanath Doss v. Dojadromath Doss* 3 W. R. 54 (1871)

(4) *Umbika Soondroo v. Woodin* 3 W. R. 26 (1865)

(5) See *Secretary of State v. Jehangir*, 1

Bom. L. R. 312 (1902) where an application to this effect was refused on the ground that the issues of law and fact were not separate

(6) *Amcer Ali v. Inanmoodde* 11 W. R. 145 (1871)

(7) *Nehora Roy v. 1 Adli Pershad Doss*, 3 C. 64 (1879) See *Shamu Laffer v. Abdul Kader*, P. C., 10 C. W. N. 1109 (11.), 14 Bom. L. R. 1034 33 F. 1 218

(8) *Naro Hiri v. Injurnat*, 11 B. 100 n at p. 161 n (1874)

its power of amending plaints, and is subject to the rule that it is therefore was held not authorized by the Court to frame new issues which had the effect of altering the substance of the case. It is a permission to a defendant to file a supplemental pleading to make a new case or raise a fresh issue in controversy. Every matter fairly within the scope of the plaint is within the scope of the substantive difference between the parties, and the duty of framing them is thrown on the Court to secure substantial justice, and to prevent a party suing first, and then, when, by a suitable order as to terms upon which the Court, by framing additional issues, can determine the real question in controversy between the parties (1).

The rule says "at any time" before decree. But after the hearing and settlement of issues, the Court will, in its discretionary power to raise a new issue except on the ground of mistake, or the discovery of new matters affecting the knowledge of the parties at the date of the former settlement. If the Court intends to frame an additional issue it should allow a day for the further hearing upon such issue. It should not have the intention to do so and leave the actual framing for the time of the trial. A plaint has been amended in first appeal and the suit is not a continuation of a fresh issue arising upon such amendment (2). The Court in a suit may not allow of particular rights being declared in it (3). An amendment may be set aside in appeal (4).

Although, under certain circumstances, a Judge at a trial may amend pleadings or raise issues other than those settled yet when a Judge at the trial of a suit

operates so as to alter the substance of the case, he is not authorized to do so. The first laid down, and to frame additional issues and to go into the merits, except upon any question upon which there has been a judicial finding (5). The first part of cl (1) of r 5 leaves it in the discretion of the Court to frame issues

(1) Narayan Ganesh v. Hari Ganesh, 13 B 604 (1880), but see observations at p. 614, in Modhe v. Dongre, 5 B 609 (1881), and as to amendments of plaints, see notes to O VI r 17.

(2) Douglas v. Collector of Benares 5 M I A 271 (1851).

(3) Kishen Pershad v. Bhimdeo Dain, 1 Agra, 1 B 40.

(4) Baboo Lal v. Ram Narain, Coryton, 8 B 1805. In B. L. v. Mehar v. Khatri & Co., 20 W R 203 (1873) amendment was allowed after all the evidence taken. As to new matter turning up during trial, see B. L. v. Syed Saduk v. H. J. v. Karlah Malhotra,

2 Ind Jur N 8 309 (1867).

(5) Kamul Kamins v. O'Byrne 11 Ind Jur, 15 W R 101 (1871), See also B. L. v. Judounath Ghose, 10 W R 169 (1865).

(6) Abdul Kadar v. Mahomed, 17 A 1, (1890).

(7) Amceeroonissa Khatoon v. Akbar & Co. Khatoon, 2 L. A. 87, 112 (1875). See also B. L. v. Koomare v. Mohomed Mohun, 20 W R 472.

(8) Narayan Ganesh v. Hari Ganesh, 13 B 604 (1880).

(9) Bolye Chund Sing v. Moulard, 4 C 272 (1878).

(10) Larnknath Mookerjee v. Gossain Churn Mookerjee, 3 W R 147 (1866).

6 Where the parties to a suit are agreed as to the question of fact or of law to be decided between them, they may state the same in the form of an issue, and enter into an agreement in writing that, upon the finding of the Court in the affirmative or the negative of such issue,—

Questions of fact or law may by agreement be stated in form of issues.

(a) a sum of money, specified in the agreement or to be ascertained by the Court, or in such manner as the Court may direct, shall be paid by one of the parties to the other of them, or that one of them be declared entitled to some right or subject to some liability specified in the agreement;

(b) some property specified in the agreement and in dispute in the suit shall be delivered by one of the parties to the other of them, or as that other may direct;

or

(1) *Shamji Patter v. Abdul Kadir*, P. C., 11 F. W. N. 1069 (1912), 11 Bom. L. R. 1074, 23 F. A. 213.

(2) *Jasah Kopp Singh v. Rani Laloni*, 11 F. A. 131, at p. 155 (1884), 7 A. J.

(3) *Moung Minor n Hlaw v. Mah Hpwah*, 11 F. A. 109, at p. 120 (1884), 10 C. 777, and see *Punchanan Roy v. Troylucko Mohunee*, 11 W. R. 164 (1870) [departure from case made in former Court].

(4) *Ganga Pershad Dahu v. Maharani Bibi*, 12 F. A. 17, 30 (1884).

(5) *Laloo Mandal v. Bhobun Mohun*, 17 W. R. 381 (1872). *Ram Persaud Dutt v. Keshito Mohun Shaw*, 18 W. R. 237 (1872), *Mahomed Basud v. Jadoo Mirtha*, 20 W. R. 191 (1872), but the party should move the Court to allow him to give evidence. *Lahan Chunder v. Shashi Dhonaye*, 11 W. R. 61 (1869).

- (c) one or more of the parties shall do or abstain from doing some particular act specified in the agreement and relating to the matter in dispute.

7. Where the Court is satisfied, after making such inquiry as it deems proper,—

Court, if satisfied that agreement was executed in good faith, may pronounce judgment.

- (a) that the agreement was duly executed by the parties,

- (b) that they have a substantial interest in the decision of such question as aforesaid, and

- (c) that the same is fit to be tried and decided,

it shall proceed to record and try the issue and state its finding or decision thereon in the same manner as if the issue had been framed by the Court;

and shall, upon the finding or decision on such issue, pronounce judgment according to the terms of the agreement; and, upon the judgment so pronounced, a decree shall follow.

from impugning the decree given by the Court in accordance with the finding of the Commissioner (1) In the absence of such an agreement the Court cannot go outside the allegations in the plaint to decide an issue as to whether the plaint discloses a cause of action (2)

- (1) *Bahir Das Chackravarti v Nobin Chunder Pal* 29 C 306 (1901) a c, 6 C W N 121
- (2) *Kshitish t Osmond Beeby*, 39 C 587 (1912) 15 C W N 516

ORDER XV

Disposal of the Suit at the first Hearing

1 *Where* at the first hearing of a suit it appears that the parties are not at issue on any question of law or of fact, the Court may at once pronounce judgment

Parties not at issue.

Parties not at issue—This rule corresponds with sect. 144 of the Code of 1853, and 152 of the last Code. If the defendants voluntarily appear in Court and confess judgment, no summons is necessary for their appearance, and the Court may at once give judgment for the plaintiffs (1). When the plaintiff sues the right person, but serves the summons on another person of a similar name, who appears and denies liability, the suit should be dismissed with costs (2).

2 *Where* there are more defendants than one, and any one of the defendants is not at issue with the plaintiff on any question of law or of fact, the Court may at once pronounce judgment for or against such defendant and the suit shall proceed only against the other defendants

One of several defendants not at issue

One defendant not at issue—In an action commenced against several joint debtors, judgment recovered against one of them who admits the claim does not bar the further prosecution of the suit against the others (3).

3 (1) *Where* the parties are at issue on some question of law or of fact, and issues have been framed by the Court as hereinbefore provided, if the Court is satisfied that no further argument or evidence than the parties can at once *adduce* is required upon such of the issues as may be sufficient for the decision of the suit, and that no injustice will result from proceeding with the suit forthwith, the Court may proceed to determine such issues, and, if the finding thereon is sufficient for the decision, may pronounce judgment accordingly, whether the summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only or for the final disposal of the suit

Parties at issue

Provided that, where the summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only, the parties or their pleaders are present and none of them objects

(1) *Bank of Bengal v Currie*, 3 B L R 403, s c 12 W R 432 (1869)

Bank v Mahomed Ibrahim 4 B 619 (1880)

(3) *Deek v Dhunji* 23 B 378 (1901)

(2) *London Bombay and Mediterranean*

(2) *Where* the finding is not sufficient for the decision, the Court shall postpone the further hearing of the suit, and shall fix a day for the production of such further evidence, or for such further argument as the case requires

Determination of issue—A Judge cannot dispose of a suit at the first hearing if a party appears and objects to the adoption of that procedure (1) When a summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only, a Judge should not proceed and try the cause unless under the circumstances laid down in this rule, for otherwise he might preclude a party from adducing evidence in support of his case, (2) but if the evidence adduced is decisive of the matter in dispute, then the Judge may dispose of the cause, unless either of the parties distinctly objects and asks for time to produce evidence in support of his case (3)

In the under mentioned case (4) the Privy Council observed "Before entering upon the particular questions raised by this appeal, it may be right to observe, that the Courts in India, in disposing of the case, were bound to proceed as the High Court appears to have proceeded, upon the facts alleged by the plaint, and upon the assumption of the truth of those facts. When a plaintiff, on certain alleged facts, asks relief, and is unable to obtain a trial of the facts, and a hearing on the facts that he may establish, by reason of the conclusions of law which the Judge forms on the case in its then condition, justice requires that the Court should proceed upon the plaintiff's allegations. The case must be determined as if it had arisen on a demurrer to a pleading or to evidence where such procedure exists. Courts cannot be justified in refusing to allow cases to go to proof upon any other assumption than that the facts alleged are capable of proof, and are proved. This assumption of the truth of the facts alleged must, however, be limited to the consideration of the legal effect of the facts alleged upon the bars raised against the trial of those facts"

4. *Where* the summons has been issued for the final disposal of the suit and either party fails without sufficient cause to produce the evidence on which he relies, the Court may at once pronounce judgment, or may, if it thinks fit, after framing and recording issues, adjourn the suit for the production of such evidence as may be necessary for its decision upon such issues

Failure to produce evidence—It was held under sect 145 of the Code of 1859, which corresponds to this rule, that although a case may have been set down for final disposal, yet if it be a case in which further evidence is required, the Judge is bound to adjourn the case, unless he is satisfied that the plaintiff has, without sufficient cause, failed to produce his evidence (5)

(1) *Krishnabhupati v Rama Murti*, 16 M 193 (1892)

(2) *Jeewun v Goolab Khan*, 1 N W P 147 (1869)

(3) *Soorendro Prasad v Jugolun Mo*, 22 W R 426 (1874)

(4) *Nuzur Ally v Ojoodhyaram Khan*, 10

M J A 540, 552, 553 (1866)

(5) *Moonahoo Syud Ameer Ali v Baboo Run Bahadoor Singh*, 7 W R 84 (1867)
Soo Bai Kashibai v Shudapa Annaji, 37 B 682 (1913) (case should not be adjourned for production of further evidence after the hearing is closed)

ORDER XVI.

Summoning and Attendance of Witnesses.

1. *At any time after the suit is instituted*, the parties may obtain, on application to the Court, or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf, summonses to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents.

Summons on witness — Where the evidence of a witness or the production of a document is material to a party's case, it is his business to move the Court to take the necessary steps in the matter (1) Application for summonses might under the 1st Code be made at any time before the day fixed for settlement or disposal as the case may be (2) To these the party was entitled as of right, (3) unless the application was not a *bona fide* one but made with the desire of obstructing the course of Justice, (4) the Court having an inherent power to prevent the abuse of its procedure (5) Now the application may be made at any time after

(1) *Nobin Chunder Roy v Anungo Munjoree*, 23 W R 83 (1874), where the Court added that parties who have the benefit of legal advice ought to be left to manage their own cases without interference from the Court

(2) *Bai Hain v Alarakh Purbhai* 15 B 56 (1890)

(3) *Ib v Kaji Ahmad v Kaji Mahamad*, 9 B 308 (1884), *Gori Chand Ghose v Raj Coomar Doss*, 5 W R 111 (1866), *Ram Phul Pandey v Wahed Ali Khan*, 14 W R 66 (1870) Under the Code of 1859 the Court had very little, if any, discretion at all in the matter and the present as well as the last Code show there is none except where there is abuse of procedure see *Rajendro Narain v Rajah Kumud Narain*, 3 C L R 569, as regards exemption from giving evidence in Court see s 401

(4) *Ram Phul Pandey v Wahed Ali Khan* *supra*

(5) Sect 151 Cf 257, Cr Pr Code, though there was no express provision of the same character in the last Code, the matter might have been dealt with under the inherent power stated

(6) *Kaji Ahmad v Kaji Mahamad*, 9 B 308 (1884), *Abdool Kadir v Shauk Ali Mirdha*, 24 W R 290 (1875) Under the Code of 1859 the Court had a discretion to refuse summonses if the application was made at a time which appeared to render it impossible that the witnesses should be brought *Rajenbro Narain v Rajah Kumud Narain* 3 C L R 569 (1878), *Indro Chunder v Dunlop* 9 W R 530 (1866), but see *Brojo Nath Mookhopadhyay v Pratap Chunder*, 22 W R 296 (1874), and now the Court should issue summonses at the applicant's risk, and unless proper cause is shown refuse to adjourn the hearing if the witness is not in attendance *Bhagwat Das Dhillon*, 16 A. 218 (1894)

Where the party had himself originally undertaken to bring the witnesses it was held that his failure to do so was no sufficient reason for depriving the party of his right to have subpoenas issued, although it might be a reason for not waiting for them if the plaintiff's case had been in other respects finished before they could be examined (1) In fact the question whether a Court should issue a summons or should adjourn, are two entirely distinct matters (2) The Court has, except in cases of manifest abuse of procedure, no discretion to refuse an application for summons Even after issues have been fixed or the hearing has commenced, the Court must grant summonses if applied for, though it may inform the party applying that it does not intend to adjourn the hearing for the attendance of the witness For it might happen that the hearing was not concluded before the witness appeared and that it would be right to hear the witness so summoned, (3) and a Court cannot tell beforehand what means a party may have for facilitating the attendance of his witnesses (4) If the Court wrongly refuses summons the High Court may interfere in revision (5) If summons has been granted and the witness does not appear, the Court will proceed unless an application is made to adjourn And it will not grant this unless good cause is shown The Court has a discretion either to issue a second summons when the first fails, or to take stronger measures, as to which see O XVI rr 10-12, 17, 18 It is, however, the business of the party to move the Court to do what is necessary, for his case (6) When, however, a witness has been summoned to give evidence in a case which is not reached, it is not necessary to issue a fresh summons to the witness He need only be warned that his attendance will be required on the day to which the hearing of the case may be postponed (7) The question of the issue of summons must also be distinguished from the question whether a party will be allowed to supplement his evidence after his case has been closed (8)

2 (1) The party applying for a summons shall, before the

Expenses of witness
to be paid into Court on
applying for summons.

summons is granted and within a period to be fixed, pay into Court such a sum of money as appears to the Court to be sufficient to defray the travelling and other expenses of the person summoned in passing to and from the Court in which he is required to attend, and for one day's attendance.

(1) Pandurang Anpai v Kishavji Jadhavji, 6 B 742 (1882)

(2) Abdool Kadir v Shaikh Abia Miriba, 24 W R 290, 291 (1870)

(3) Bai Kali v Alarakh Purbhai, 15 B 56 (1890), Krishna Churn Basak v Protap Chunder Surma, 7 C 560, 563 (1881) [Court should not refuse application merely because in its opinion the witness cannot be present or document cannot be produced before termination of the trial The application may in the

event prove fruitful]

(4) See Kaji Ahmad v Kaji Mal Ahmad, 9 B 303, at p 310 (1884)

(5) Ib

(6) Dowlut Munlar v Omro Singh, 14 W R 330 (1870)

(7) Subbarayadu v Chenchuramaya, 24 M 200 (1900), Vijayaraghava v Komurappa, 23 M L J 403 (1912)

(8) Syul Abdool Ali v Mulla Suleedoodien, 14 W R 403 (1870)

(2) *In determining the amount payable under this rule, the Court may, in the case of any person summoned to give evidence as an expert, allow reasonable remuneration for the time occupied both in giving evidence and in performing any work of an expert character necessary for the case.*

(3) *Where the Court is subordinate to a High Court, regard shall be had, in fixing the scale of such expenses, to any rules made in that behalf.*

Expenses of witnesses—See sect 151 of Act VIII of 1859 Before a witness is summoned a sufficient sum for his expenses in going to and from the Court and for one day's attendance must be deposited in Court (1) It was in an early case (2) held that the sum fixed must have reference to the travelling expenses or other charges of a similar nature, and where a witness who had incurred no expense in travelling asked for compensation for loss of time the application was refused A party need not pay any more into Court until it has fixed what is reasonable (3) Once sworn, a witness must give his evidence even though his expenses have not been paid But he does not cease on that account to be under the protection of the Court, and he is entitled to be paid his expenses though he has not applied for them before giving his evidence (4) The provisions relating to the payment of witnesses no doubt contemplate that the expenses should be paid by the party who asks the Court to summon the witness before he gives his evidence, but they do not declare that unless this is done the Court has no power to require their payment They are intended for the benefit of the person summoned, and there is nothing in them to protect the party who asks the Court to issue a summons from his liability to pay the expenses of the witness if the Court *per incuriam*, or in order to save delay, issues the summons without seeing that the party applying for it discharges the duty imposed on him by law If he partially fails in such duty, and deposits some part, but not the whole of the expenses, the Court may require him to pay a further sum, and may levy the amount summarily from him There is no reason why the party should be in a better position when he fails to deposit any part of the expenses, or if the witness has given his evidence than if he has not done so (5) A Court while bound to fix a reasonable amount to defray the expenses of a witness may allow only travelling expenses and charges of a similar nature not including compensation for loss of time It may be a question whether this is in all cases sufficient The case of expert witnesses is, however, recognized as exceptional, and the section has been amended to allow of a fee to such a witness

(1) See *Saran v Biswas*, 5 W R S C 127 (1868)

Ref 6 (1866), as to further expenses see r 4

(2) *Nawab Nazim v Prosono Naram*, 2 Hyd 236 (1864)

(3) *Mohun Mundur v Brij Bhoolan*, 9

(4) *London, Bombay & Mediterranean Bank v Mahomed Ibrahim*, 4 B 619 (1880)

(5) *Voleta Chenchuramaya v Annamraju Narasimhayya*, 17 M L J 435 (1907)

- 31.] 3. The sum so paid into Court shall be tendered to the
 Tender of expenses to person summoned, at the time of serving the
 witness. summons, if it can be served personally.

Tender of expenses to witness.—Act VIII. of 1859, sect. 151. After the list of witnesses have been filed and cost of service, etc., deposited, the Court's officers, and not the party, are responsible for the service and return of process (1)

- 32.] 4. (1) *Where* it appears to the Court or to such officer as
 Procedure where in it appoints in this behalf that the sum paid
 sufficient sum paid in. into Court is not sufficient to cover such
 expenses or reasonable remuneration, the Court may direct such
 further sum to be paid to the person summoned as appears to be
 necessary on that account, and, in case of default in payment, may
 order such sum to be levied by attachment and sale of the moveable
 property of the party obtaining the summons; or the Court may
 discharge the person summoned without requiring him to give
 evidence; or may both order such levy and discharge such
 person as aforesaid.

(2) *Where* it is necessary to detain the person summoned
 Expenses of witnesses for a longer period than one day, the Court
 detained more than one may, from time to time, order the party at
 day. whose instance he was summoned to pay
 into Court such sum as is sufficient to defray the expenses of
 his detention for such further period, and, in default of such
 deposit being made, may order such sum to be levied by attach-
 ment and sale of the moveable property of such party; or the
 Court may discharge the person summoned without requiring
 him to give evidence; or may both order such levy and discharge
 such person as aforesaid.

Levy and discharge.—Under the present section the Court can both order a levy and discharge Under sect 157 of the Code of 1859, the powers given were alternative (2)

- 33.] 5. Every summons for the attendance of a person to
 Time, place and pur give evidence or to produce a document shall
 pose of attendance to be specify the time and place at which he is
 specified in summons. required to attend, and also whether his

(1) *Mt Musutee Khanum v Hookoom Bibee*, 15 W R. 83 (1871)

(2) See *Bijoykishen v Joykishen*, 12 W R 430 (1869) In consequence of the provisions

of the section it was held that no action for the expenses of a witness will lie *Saran v Biswas*, 5 W R S C Ref 6 (1866)

attendance is required for the purpose of giving evidence or to produce a document, or for both purposes, and any particular document, which the person summoned is called on to produce, shall be described in the summons with reasonable accuracy.

Summons to give evidence—Sect 152, Act VIII of 1859 A written summons distinctly describing the nature of the document required must be issued on a party required to produce it, a verbal order to his pleader is not such a summons as is contemplated by law, and is not sufficient (1)

6. Any person may be summoned to produce a document, without being summoned to give evidence; and any person summoned merely to produce a document shall be deemed to have complied with the summons if he causes such document to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.

7. Any person present in Court may be required by the Court to give evidence or to produce any document then and there in his possession or power.

8. Every summons under this Order shall be served as nearly as may be in the same manner as a summons to a defendant, and the rules in Order V. as to proof of service shall apply in the case of all summonses served under this rule

Summons, how served—Act VIII of 1859 sects 154-157 The Code of 1859 contained separate sections dealing with service of summons on a witness. The rules of service both in the last as under the present Code are assimilated to those referring to service on defendants as to which see rules dealing with same

9. Service shall in all cases be made a sufficient time before the time specified in the summons for the attendance of the person summoned, to allow him a reasonable time for preparation and for travelling to the place at which his attendance is required

Time for service—The provision in this rule is one in favour of the witness and for enforcing diligence on the party. it does not give to the Courts any discretion as to granting or enforcing summonses in consideration of their being applied for at a late period. If, however there has been delay the Court may refuse to adjourn the case for the attendance of the witnesses (2)

(1) Doorgamone Dossee & Benode Monee Dossee, W R 1864, p 161

(2) Haji Ahmed & Haji Mahamad, J B 308, 310 (1854), see notes to r 1, ante.

- 161.] 3 The sum so paid into Court shall be tendered to the person summoned, at the time of serving the summons, if it can be served personally.
- Tender of expenses to witness

Tender of expenses to witness—Act VIII of 1859, sect. 151. After the list of witnesses have been filed and cost of service, etc., deposited in the Court's officers, and not the party, are responsible for the service and return of process (1).

- 162.] 4 (1) Where it appears to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf that the sum paid into Court is not sufficient to cover such expenses or reasonable remuneration, the Court may direct such further sum to be paid to the person summoned as appears to be necessary on that account, and, in case of default in payment, may order such sum to be levied by attachment and sale of the moveable property of the party obtaining the summons, or the Court may discharge the person summoned without requiring him to give evidence, or may both order such levy and discharge such person as aforesaid.
- Procedure where in sufficient sum paid in.

(2) Where it is necessary to detain the person summoned for a longer period than one day, the Court may, from time to time, order the party at whose instance he was summoned to pay into Court such sum as is sufficient to defray the expenses of his detention for such further period, and, in default of such deposit being made, may order such sum to be levied by attachment and sale of the moveable property of such party, or the Court may discharge the person summoned without requiring him to give evidence, or may both order such levy and discharge such person as aforesaid.

Expenses of witnesses detained more than one day.

Levy and discharge—Under the present section the Court can both order a levy and discharge. Under sect. 157 of the Code of 1859, the powers given were alternative (2).

- 163.] 5 Every summons for the attendance of a person to give evidence or to produce a document shall specify the time and place at which he is required to attend, and also whether his
- Time place and purpose of attendance to be specified in summons

(1) *Mt Musatte Khanum v. Hookeem Bibee*, 15 W R 88 (1871)

(2) See *Byoykshen v. Joykshen* 12 W R 430 (1869). In consequence of the provisions

of the section it was held that no action for the expenses of a witness will lie. *Saran v. Bawa*, 5 W R S C Ref 6 (1866)

attendance is required for the purpose of giving evidence or to produce a document, or for both purposes, and any particular document, which the person summoned is called on to produce, shall be described in the summons with reasonable accuracy.

Summons to give evidence—Sect 152, Act VIII of 1859 A written summons distinctly describing the nature of the document required must be issued on a party required to produce it, a verbal order to his pleader is not such a summons as is contemplated by law, and is not sufficient (1)

6. Any person may be summoned to produce a document, without being summoned to give evidence, and any person summoned merely to produce a document to be deemed to have complied with the summons by producing the document to be produced instead of giving evidence.

7. Any person present in Court may be required by the Court to give evidence or to produce any document then and there in his possession or power.

8. Every summons under this Order shall be served as nearly as may be in the same manner as a summons to a defendant, and the rules in Order V. as to proof of service shall apply in the case of all summonses served under this rule.

Summons, how served—Act VIII of 1859 sects 151-157 The Code of 1859 contained separate sections dealing with service of summons on a witness. The rules of service both in the last as under the present Code are assimilated to those referring to service on defendants as to which see rules dealing with same.

9. Service shall in all cases be made a sufficient time before the time specified in the summons for the attendance of the person summoned, to allow him a reasonable time for preparation and for travelling to the place at which his attendance is required.

Time for service—The provision in this rule is one in favour of the witness, and for enforcing diligence on the party. it does not give to the Courts any discretion as to granting or enforcing summonses in consideration of their being applied for at a late period. If, however, there has been delay, the Court may refuse to adjourn the case for the attendance of the witnesses (2)

(1) Doorgamonco Dossee v Benode Monco Dossee, W. R. 1861, p. 164

(2) *Kaji Ahmed v Kaji Mahamad*, J B 308, 310 (1894), see notes to r 1, *ante*.

10. (1) *Where a person to whom a summons has been issued either to attend to give evidence or to produce a document fails to attend or to produce the document in compliance with such summons, the Court shall, if the certificate of the serving officer has not been verified by affidavit, and may, if it has been so verified, examine the serving officer on oath, or cause him to be so examined by another Court, touching the service or non service of the summons*

(2) *Where the Court sees reason to believe that such evidence or production is material, and that such person has, without lawful excuse, failed to attend or to produce the document in compliance with such summons or has intentionally avoided service, it may issue a proclamation requiring him to attend to give evidence or to produce the document at a time and place to be named therein, and a copy of such proclamation shall be affixed on the outer door or other conspicuous part of the house in which he ordinarily resides*

(3) *In lieu of or at the time of issuing such proclamation, or at any time afterwards, the Court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant either with or without bail, for the arrest of such person, and may make an order for the attachment of his property to such amount as it thinks fit, not exceeding the amount of the costs of attachment and of any fine which may be imposed under rule 1'*

Provided that no Court of Small Causes shall make an order for the attachment of immovable property

Absconding witness—This section corresponds with sect 159 of Code of 1859. The words in first paragraph, "*shall . . . by another Court,*" were inserted in this section in the last Code by sect 16, Act VII of 1888. The present section has been reconstructed and the penultimate paragraph omitted.

If the return of service has not been verified, the Court must examine the serving officer on oath. In other cases it has a discretion. See notes to r 12. Before issuing a proclamation, the Judge must satisfy himself whether the evidence of the witness is material, and that there is no excuse for non attendance, or that he is keeping out of the way. Both these conditions must be fulfilled, and then the Court can act under this section and let the case stand over (1). When the return of service is made on the day of trial the party is entitled to some time to prove that the evidence is material, and that the witness is keeping away (2).

(1) Bhubin Moyee v Kishoree Dossee, 6 W R 235 (1866), Ajoodhya Doss v Bibee Misrun, 15 W R 176 (1871), Hales Dass Chuckerbutty v Lshan Chunder Chatterjee,

13 W R 416 (1870)

(2) Prem Chand Roy v Becharam, 6 W R 126 (1866)

Inasmuch as the Judge is given a discretion, he is not bound to act on an application, but the discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner (1) Where

having otherwise placed himself in such a position that it would be inequitable to grant it (2) If the Court refuses to issue process, it is advisable that it should tell its reasons for such refusal (3) It is for the party to produce his evidence, or, at all events, to exhaust all the means that the law gives him for its production. He should, therefore, it was held, on the expiry of the proclamation, apply for attachment. If he does not, but goes to trial upon the evidence which he has succeeded in getting, the Court must decide the case upon the evidence before it (1) The third clause is new, and gives the Court power to issue a warrant with bail instead of compelling a witness as was formerly the case to submit to the humiliation of production in custody before he could obtain an order for his release.

11. *Where, at any time after the attachment of his property, [s] such person appears and satisfies the Court,—*
 If witness appears, attachment may be with-
 drawn. (a) *that he did not, without lawful excuse, fail to comply with the summons or intentionally avoid service, and,*
 (b) *where he has failed to attend at the time and place named in a proclamation issued under the last preceding rule, that he had no notice of such proclamation in time to attend,*
 the Court shall direct that the property he released from attachment, and shall make such order as to the costs of the attachment as it thinks fit.

12. The Court may, *where such person does not appear, [s] or appears but fails so to satisfy the Court,*
 Procedure if witness fails to appear. impose upon him such fine not exceeding five hundred rupees as it thinks fit, having regard to his condition in life and all the circumstances of the case, and may order his property, or any part thereof, to be attached and sold or, if already attached under rule 10, to be sold for the purpose of satisfying all costs of such attachment, together with the amount of the said fine, if any :

Provided that, if the person whose attendance is required

(1) *Poran Chunder v Gopeenath Singh*, 8 W R 505 (1867)

(2) *Rajoo Singh v Balgobind*, 1 W R 26 (1864), see also *Shaukh Jafur v Gooroo Pershad*, 3 W R 97 (1865)

(3) *Ozeer Mahomed v Bydnath*, 5 W R Act X 5 (1866)

(4) *Luchman Singh v Chokowree Singh*, 25 W R 154 (1876)

pays into Court the costs and fine aforesaid, the Court shall order the property to be released from attachment.

Nazir's Report—The Nazir's report of service of summons, or issue of proclamation, is sufficient to admit of the Court taking steps to enforce the attendance of a witness, but when the Court proceeds to impose the penalty, the serving officers should ordinarily be examined and cross-examined on oath (1)

Sales—Such sales require confirmation by the Court (2)

Appeal—No appeal lies from an order releasing property from an attachment under this proviso (3)

13. *The provisions with regard to the attachment and sale of property in the execution of a decree shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to any attachment and sale under this Order as if the person whose property is so attached were a judgment debtor.*

Made of attachment

14. Subject to the provisions of this Code as to attendance and appearance and to any law for the time being in force, where the Court at any time thinks it necessary to examine any person other than a party to the suit and not called as a witness by a party to the suit, the Court may, of its own motion, cause such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence, or to produce any document in his possession, on a day to be appointed, and may examine him as a witness or require him to produce such document

Court may of its own accord summon as witnesses strangers to suit.

15. Subject as last aforesaid, whoever is summoned to appear and give evidence in a suit shall attend at the time and place named in the summons for that purpose, and whoever is summoned to produce a document shall either attend to produce it, or cause it to be produced, at such time and place.

Duty of persons summoned to give evidence or produce document

(1) *See Nilkant Bhattacharjee, 1864 W L Mac 94, but see now O XVI r 10, where a discretion is given where the certificate has been verified*

(2) *Badri Prasad v Tej Singh, 33 A 68 (1910)*

(3) *Badri Prasad v Tej Singh, 33 A 68 (1910)*

16. (1) A person so summoned and attending shall, unless [s]
When they may de- the Court otherwise directs, attend at each hear-
part. ing until the suit has been disposed of.

(2) On the application of either party and the payment through the Court of all necessary expenses (if any), the Court may require any person so summoned and attending to furnish security to attend at the next or any other hearing or until the suit is disposed of and, in default of his furnishing such security, may order him to be detained in the civil prison

Departure of witnesses—This section in the last Code got rid (1) of a difficulty felt in an early case (2) in which it was held that when a case was adjourned for further hearing before the witnesses had been examined the Court could not bind them down to attend again. The provision is now still further simplified, and power is given to enforce attendance by taking a recognizance as to the recall of a witness sec O XVIII r 17

17. The provisions of rules 10 to 13 shall so far as they relate to [s]
Application of rules 10 are applicable, be deemed
to 13. person who having attended
a summons, departs without lawful excuse, in contravention of
rule 16.

18. Where any person arrested under a warrant is brought [s]
before the Court in custody and cannot, owing [last]
to the absence of the parties or any of them,
Procedure where wit- give the evidence or produce the document
ness apprehended cannot give evidence or produce document.
which he has been summoned to give or pro-
duce, the Court may require him to give reasonable bail or other security for his appearance at such time and place as it thinks fit, and, on such bail or security being given, may release him, and, in default of his giving such bail or security, may order him to be detained in the civil prison

Enforcement of attendance—Every Court is bound in justice to render all reasonable assistance to a party to enforce the attendance of his witnesses (3) It is however, the duty of the parties themselves to move the Court when their

(1) See O Kinealy, Civil Pro Code, s 173
(2) Venkatappa v Papammah, 5 Mad H C R 132 (1870)
(3) Nilmonco Banerjee v Shurbo Monogola, 6 W R 14 (1866) Though the Court has been given a discretion, it should be exercised

properly, and not so as to encourage witnesses evading attendance Saroda Dossee v Buroda Kant Roy, 5 W R Act N 43 (1866), Ozeer Mahomed v Bydnath, 5 W R Act N 6 (1866) Cf s 168 of the Code of 1853

witnesses do not appear (1) This rule is of a penal character, and its provisions must be strictly complied with (2) Due service of summons is the foundation for an order under this rule, and, therefore, if the summons has not been duly served, the power under this rule is not exercisable (3) The rule contemplates the case of a person who has been served and failing to attend, has been arrested and brought before the Court, it does not apply to the case of a person who attends and says he has not the document required (4) The Court must, on an application, satisfy itself of due service and failure to attend or departure. It is, however, not necessary to institute a formal investigation and come to a determination on the evidence adduced. If service is proved, and the proof leads the Judge to believe that the summons had come to the knowledge of the witness, and he sees no reason to doubt that the witness might give material evidence and there is no one in attendance who can account for the absence of the witness, a warrant may issue (5) What is a lawful excuse must depend upon the circumstances of each case, but there is no obligation to issue a warrant when absence is due to non-payment or non-tender of the necessary expenses (6) The Court must, in all cases, pass some order on an application, (7) and should grant it where the witness is material, and there is no reason to believe that the applicant is responsible for his non-appearance, or has otherwise placed himself in such a position that it would be inequitable to grant his application (8) And if a case falls within the rule the applicant having done all that lay upon him to secure the attendance of the witness the attendance should be enforced, and the applicant should not be required to take out fresh summonses (9) The opinion of the Judge that the witnesses are not likely to benefit a party's case (10) or his belief that he could inflict no punishment under the Penal Code (11) affords no valid reason for refusing the application. A witness who has failed to appear on his summons can only be fined after he has been arrested and brought before the Court (12)

76] 19. No one shall be ordered to attend in person to give evidence unless he resides—

No witness to be ordered to attend in person unless he resides within certain limits

(a) within the local limits of the Court's ordinary original jurisdiction, or

(1) *Bachman v Lall Behari*, 13 W R 324 (1870), *Nand Mohan Chowdhry v Goluck Nath Neogee* 11 W R 99 (1869)

(2) *Kali Narain Roy v Shaikh Bajoo* 3 C W N 307 (1898)

(3) *Kali Narain Roy v Shaikh Bajoo* 3 C W N 307 (1898)

(4) *In re Prem Chand* 12 B. 63 (1887)

(5) *Perranna Chetty v Govinda Gounden* 5 M H C R 104 (1863)

(6) *Iadar Mal v Said Muhammad* 17 A 277 (1895)

(7) *Nilmoney Chowdhry v Hossain Ally* 5 W R 222 (1866)

(8) *Rajoo Singh v Balgobind* 1 W R 26 (1864)

(9) *Basambhur Sircar v Sooroodhunj*, 3 W R 21 (1865)

(10) *Ozeer Mahomed v Bydnath* 5 W R 12 (1866)

(11) *Nilmoney Banerjee v Shurbo Monogola*, 6 W R 14 (1866)

(12) *Kali Narain Roy v Shaikh Bajoo*, 3 C W N 307 (1898)

(b) without such limits *but at a place less than fifty or (where there is railway or steamer communication or other established public conveyance for five sixths of the distance between the place where he resides and the place where the Court is situated) less than two hundred miles distance from the Court-house*

20. Where any party to a suit present in Court refuses, ^{Consequence of refusal of party to give evidence when called on by Court.} without lawful excuse, when required by the Court, to give evidence or to produce any document then and there in his possession or power, the Court may *pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit*

21. Where any party to a suit is required to give evidence ^{Rules as to witnesses to apply to parties summoned.} or to produce a document, the *provisions as to witnesses shall apply to him so far as they are applicable*

Parties—The preceding rules deal with witnesses who are not parties. A party may appear by pleader or in person. In the former case if the pleader refuses or is unable to answer any material question the Court may direct the absent party to attend under O X r 1 and on his failure to do so may pronounce judgment against him. If a party, whether appearing by pleader or in person who is present in Court refuses without lawful excuse to carry out an order under r 20 the penalty is that stated therein. Under sect 170 of the Code of 1859 a party who being summoned to give evidence or to produce a document failed without lawful excuse to comply with the order was also liable to have judgment passed against him. But this section has not been re enacted and by sect 178 of the last Code and r 21 of this Code a party is to be dealt with in such a case on the same footing as any person summoned as a witness. The liability therefore, to judgment in case of default is limited to the specific instances mentioned in O X rr 4 and 20, *supra*. Contempt of Court may be punished by fine and imprisonment (1). This rule gives a further power which is one to be used with forbearance and is to be enforced generally in cases of contumacious refusal (2). What is or is not lawful excuse must depend upon the circumstances of each case. The decision in one case can scarcely be a guide in another unless the facts are precisely the same (3). R 20 applies to Probate cases but it will not justify the Judge in dispensing with proof of the execution of a will (4). It has

(1) See ss. 480-484 Cr I r Code

(2) See Jashta Ramji Awaker Mullandea gata, 3 M H C R 299 (1867) where, though the case was under the Code of 1859, the circumstances were similar to those of r 20

(3) See Baboo Durga Dutt v Jhengoor

Jha 18 W R 63 64 (18 4)

(4) Ravi Ranchod Naik v V Ranchod Naik, 9 B 41 (18 4) Mohinee Guha v Ranoo Chandra D 357 (1903)

been held by the Privy Council that even when no order is made by the Court under this rule it is incumbent on plaintiffs to give evidence in support of the claims, (1) and in a recent Privy Council decision where plaintiffs who had executed separate mortgages abstained from giving evidence to explain how this could be consistent with jointness it was held that this abstention helped to rebut the presumption of jointness (2).

(1) *Lal Kunwar v. Chiranjil Lal* 37 F. A. 111 (1909).

(2) *Ram Singh v. Musat Fursa Kunwar* 17 C. W. N. 1085 (1913).

ORDER XVII

Adjournments.

1. (1) The Court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them and may from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit

(2) In every such case the Court shall fix a day for the further hearing of the suit, and may make such order as it thinks fit with respect to the costs occasioned by the adjournment

Provided that, when the hearing of evidence has once begun, the hearing of the suit shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the hearing *beyond the following day* to be necessary for reasons to be recorded

"Grant time"—That is at the instance of the parties. It has been held that the sections in the last Code which correspond with this and the next rule did not apply to an adjournment which is not made at the instance of the parties but which is necessitated by the rules of Court which regulates the disposition of its own business (1)

"Sufficient cause"—This must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case, and precedents (2) are not generally of use. The Court however should act reasonably and with indulgence towards litigants where there is no ground for imputing a deliberate intention to delay. A party has a legal right to ask the assistance of the Court in obtaining summons to or a commission for the examination of a witness. But if he has delayed so long that he fails to get the process executed in sufficient time he, of course, must take the consequences of his delay. The Court will not adjourn the case to remedy his neglect (3)

Costs—This rule gives the Court ample discretion as to the particular directions to be given in the matter of costs occasioned by the adjournment

(1) *Sm Toolsey Monce Dassee v Sm Prosad Money Dassee* 2 C W N 490 (1898)

(2) See *Baboo Sectarium Shoo v Gollam Shoo*, 18 W R 725 (1872), *Sm Nilas v Forwar Mill* 24 W R 202 (1872)

Dadalhar v Sorabji 3 Bom H. C. R. 55 (1866) *Sm Toolsey Monce Dassee v Sm Prosad Money Dassee*, 2 C W N 490 (1898)

(3) *Hari Dass v Meer Moazzam* 15 W L 447 (1871)

Sufficient opportunity should be given to the party obtaining the adjournment to enable him to carry out the order of the Court and produce his evidence (1)

Review Appeal—Once an order for adjournment has been made it should not be rescinded on review unless on good and sufficient cause shown and in the presence of the other party (2) Orders under this rule are not open to appeal (3) Their propriety can be questioned in an appeal from the final decree An Appellate Court however is not generally inclined to interfere with inferior Courts in the exercise of the discretion allowed to them to grant or refuse an adjournment (4) An order made by a Judge of the High Court at settlement of issues fixing a distant date for the hearing of a suit is not an order under this rule and is appealable under the Letters Patent (5)

571 **2** *Where* on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear on day to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by *Order IX* or make such other order as it thinks fit

Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed

Applicability This rule is in application to adjourned hearings of the procedure prescribed for the first hearing The distinction between this rule and the next is that where there is a default in the appearance of the parties and their pleadings on the date fixed for the adjourned trial of the suit, a decree may be passed under this rule and subsequently the case may be revived under O IX r 9 but where time has been given to one of the parties to do an act and he fails the order is passed under the next rule and the matter cannot be revived but is only subject to review of judgment or to appeal (6) This rule, which speaks of the disposal of the suit includes cases in which there may not be any materials before the Court to enable it to pronounce a decision on the merits The next rule contemplates a case in which the Court has materials before it to enable it to proceed to a decision of the suit The contingency, however contemplated in this rule may happen in a case which falls within the letter of the next rule In such a case, if there are no materials on the record, the appropriate procedure to follow would be that laid down in this rule, whereas if there are materials the Court should proceed under the next rule (7) The effect of this rule is to make O IX r 8 applicable to adjourned hearings of cases (8) See notes to that rule

(1) *Dhaniram v. Verli Lal*, 13 C W N 525 (1909)

(2) *Bahen Pershad v. Rutton Geer* 20 W R 3 (1873)

(3) O XLIII r 1

(4) *Simon Elias v. Jorawar Mall* 24 W R 202 (1875)

(5) R v R 14 M 88 (1890)

(6) See *Ryall v. Sherman* 1 M 287 (1877) *Ambalavana v. Sibrarnania* 6 M H C R 262 (1871) [under the corresponding section

of the Code of 1859] *Sriraja Venkataramaya v. Anumukonda Rangaya* 7 M 41 (1883), *Alwar Ayyangar v. Sesshammal* 10 M 270 (1887), *Kader Khan v. Juggeswar*, 37 C. 1023 (1908)

(7) *Maranissay v. Ramkalpa Gori* 34 C 235 (1907) *discussed in Chandramati v. Narayanadasami* 33 M 241 (1909), *Enatulla Basunia v. Jibon Molan* 19 C I J 73 (1914)

(8) *Ib.*, at p. 237

"Any day."—That is the specific day to which the suit is adjourned. The rule does not apply unless a day has been fixed for hearing under the last rule (1). It is illegal to decide a case in the absence of any party without fixing a day for the hearing of the case, if the hearing had not taken place on the day originally fixed (2).

"Dispose."—This term in this rule refers not only to the disposal of the suit *ex parte*, but also to the final disposal of it, and includes therefore not only the procedure up to the passing of the decree, but also the procedure for setting aside that decree when made. A Court, therefore, which has rightly dismissed a suit on an adjourned hearing by virtue of the provisions of this rule and O IX r 8, may also restore it under r 9 of that Order (3).

"Other order."—The Court is not bound to proceed under the rules mentioned (4).

Appeal—It was held that an order dismissing a suit at an adjourned hearing for non appearance of the plaintiff and his pleader was an order under sect 157 of the last Code and its consequential sect 103 and not 158 and a refusal to consider an application under sect 103 of that Code was appealable (5). No appeal was held to lie from an order under the section corresponding with this rule read with sect 108 of the last Code setting aside a decree passed *ex parte* in default of appearance of the defendant on the day to which the hearing of the suit had been adjourned. Under O XLIII an appeal is given in the case of orders under rr 9 and 13 (6).

3. Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted

Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc

fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith.

Applicability.—This rule applies to a party to whom time has been given to do some act and who makes default (7). As to the distinction between it and

(1) Baboo Sektaram v Roy Baboo, 18 W R 325 (1872).

(2) Meer Mukhoo v Ameerun 5 S D N W 1865, p 197, O Knealy, a 157.

(3) Bangsi Ihari Ghose v Digamber Mitra Cal H C Rule 2032 of 1906, 18th July, 1906 referring to Janardhun Dobey v Ram dhone Singh, 23 C 738 (1896) [which was a case of a defendant applying under sect 108 and not of (as was the case in the decision first cited) a plaintiff applying under sect 103]. Alwar Vyngar v Seshanmal, 10 M 270 (1887) proceeds upon a similar view. Siraja Vinkataramaya v Annamakonda

Rangaya, 7 M 41 (1883), Shrimant Sagajirao v Smith, 20 B 736 (1890), in which two latter cases the subordinate Courts were directed to hear applications under sect 103 of the last Code.

(4) See Hira Dai v Hira Lal, 17 A 538 (1897).

(5) Shrimant Sagajirao v Smith, 20 B 736 (1890), dissented from in Naganada v Krishnamurti, 34 M 97 (1910), see a 568, clause (8) of last Code.

(6) Bhagwan Dai v Hira, 19 A 355 (1897).

(7) See Kader Khan v Jaggewar, 35 G 1023 (1904).

the last rule see notes to that rule and post. It was held under the last Code that the former section did not apply to proceedings in execution (1).

“Any party”—The rule does not refer to adjournments by the Court at its own motion, (2) and appears to apply, to a case where any one party and not both has had a case adjourned (3). Where, after issues had been settled the hearing was adjourned to a fixed date for final disposal and on that date plaintiff did not appear on which the suit was dismissed it was held that the former section did not apply as it had been adjourned in the ordinary way and not in favour of either party for the purposes mentioned (4).

“To whom time”—A date must be fixed within which the act must be done. The stringent provisions of the rule cannot be put in force unless the party has had distinct notice in respect of time of what is required of him and default in the matter of time is of the essence of the particular kind of default contemplated (5).

“Fails”—It must be shown that a specific order has been disobeyed either as regards time (*vide ante*) or otherwise. So as costs are ordinarily recoverable in execution there is no default to obey an order as to costs in the absence of a specific direction making the payment of costs a condition precedent to the hearing of the evidence of the party in default (6). Where the Court refused to

refused she had not committed default (7).

“Any other act.”—The rule while mentioning the production of evidence and the attendance of witnesses (8) says *any other act*, provided that that act is necessary to the further progress of the suit, such as the payment of costs for the issue of a commission (9) but not where the plaintiff fails to make up a deficiency in respect of stamp such matter having been provided for by sect. 54 now Cl. VII r. 11, *note* (10).

“To decide the suit”—Default does not lead to the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit, or the decreeing of the claim against the defendant if the plaintiff or defendant make default respectively, (11) nor is an order striking the case off

(1) *Ramaya v. Rangaya* 7 M. 41 42 (1883).
See *Tirthasami v. Annappiyya*, 18 M. 131 (1874). *Dhokal Singh v. Bhakkar Singh* 15 A. 84 (1893).

(2) *Lacree Mohun Bera v. Shama Churn Mytee* 19 W. R. 34 (1872).

(3) *Alvar v. Seshammal* 10 M. 270 271 (1884).

(4) *Ryall v. Smerin* 1 M. 287 (1877).

(5) *Bhad Sitch v. Mahomet* 13 M. 570 (1890).

(6) *Vairallalappa v. Chennamma* 21 M.

403 (1897).

(7) *Latchmana Rao v. Ragunatha Rao*, 6 M. H. C. R. 209 (1871).

(8) See *Comalammal v. Rangasawmy Iyengar* 4 M. H. C. R. 56 (1866). *Rangasamy v. Serangan* 4 M. H. C. R. 254 (1869).

(9) *Sitara Begam v. Tulshi Singh* 23 A. 462 (1901).

(10) *Mahamma l. Saikh v. Mulvan n. l. Jan* 11 A. J. l. (1888).

(11) *Sitara Begam v. Tulshi Singh* 23 A. 462 464 (1901).

the file regular (1) The words "*notwithstanding such default*" clearly imply that the Court is to proceed with the disposal of the suit, in spite of the default upon such materials as are before it. If in the case of a plaintiff such materials fail to substantiate the claim the suit will be dismissed for this reason and not for the default. If default be by the defendant the suit cannot be decreed without taking any evidence or without reference to the evidence which has already been adduced. In both cases the decree is on the merits (2) The effect of a decision, provided that the case comes within the terms of the rule (3) is to bar a second suit (4) Under the Code of 1859 the Court was bound to decide the suit "*on the record*" The effect of these latter words was that though the Appellate Court could remand a case for decision the Lower Court could not admit any evidence after the remand but was bound to decide it on the record as it stood when the case was remanded (5) These words were omitted in the former Code. Where a suit is dismissed under this rule on the merits the plaintiff's remedy is by way of appeal (6)

(1) *Alwar v. Seshaminal* 10 M 20 (1887)

(2) *Sitara Begam v. Tulsi Singh* 23 A 462 464 (1901) *Radam v. Nattu Singh* 2 A 194 195 (1902)

(3) *Shauk Saleb v. Mahomed* 13 M 10 (1890)

(4) *Venkatachalam v. Malalakshamma*

10 M 22 (1886)

(5) See *Paddo Lachin v. Sirdar Khan* 12 W R 23 (1869) *Lochin Mundal v. Wuzoor Paramanick* 13 W R 464 (1870)

(6) *Chandra Bhabha v. Ghosia* 34 A 123 (1911)

ORDER XVIII.

Hearing of the Suit and Examination of Witnesses.

79.
an] 1. The plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant
Right to begin. admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and
contends that either in point of law or on
some additional facts alleged by the defendant the plaintiff is
not entitled to any part of the relief which he seeks, in which
case the defendant has the right to begin

"Right to begin"—This rule is taken from the Explanation to sect 179
of the 1st Code, the remainder of the section being incorporated in the next
rule. The party on whom the *onus probandi* lies as developed by the record

79] 2 (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or
Statement and produc- on any other day to which the hearing is
tion of evidence adjourned, the party having the right to
begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of
the issues which he is bound to prove

180,
two
as] (2) The other party shall then state his case and produce
his evidence (if any) and may then address the Court generally
on the whole case

(3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the
whole case

180,
ara] 3 Where there are several issues, the burden of proving
Evidence where several some of which lies on the other party, the
issues party beginning may, at his option, either
produce his evidence on those issues or reserve it by way of
answer to the evidence produced by the other party, and, in the

(1) *Fatmabat v Aishabai*, 12 B 454 (1888)
[and two counsel may be heard]

(2) *Rustomji Barjorji v Kessowji Nalk*,
8 B 287 (1884)

latter case, the party beginning may produce evidence on those issues after the other party has produced all his evidence, and the other party may then reply specially on the evidence so produced by the party beginning, but the party beginning will then be entitled to reply generally on the whole case.

Statement and production of evidence—The first paragraph of r 2 is the first paragraph of sect 179 of the last Code. The third rule is taken from sect 180. The plaintiff and each of the defendants as support the plaintiff's case, wholly or in part, must address the Court and call their evidence first, and the other party (namely the persons opposed to the plaintiff's case and that of the defendants supporting it) must address the Court and call their evidence (1)

4. The evidence of the witnesses in attendance shall be taken orally in open Court in the presence of the parties and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge

Witnesses—The parties must select their witnesses, summon them, and if they do not attend, move the Court to secure their attendance and when a Commission has been issued the Court must be moved to wait for the return. It is not the business of the Court to determine what witnesses shall be examined. They should then call upon the Court to examine such of them as may be offered for examination (2). It is the duty of the Court to examine every witness tendered though he has not been summoned or his name has not been enlisted in the list, (3) unless it is clear that the intention of the party producing the witness is to delay or obstruct justice (4). He should not select a certain number only for examination, (5) nor send some away because he had examined as many on one side as on the other, (6) or because he thinks their evidence will probably not be of much value, (7) or because they would only prove the same facts as already deposed to (8). It is in the discretion of the Court of first instance to allow a party to call further evidence after he has closed his case (9). A plaintiff who does not care to be present to support his own case when he knows it is tried, cannot of

(1) *Hasan Bibi v Sultan Mahomed*, 32 B 599 (1908)

(2) *Nund Mohun Chowdhry v Goluck Nath Neogee* 11 W R 99 (1869), *Morno Moyee v Bheem Coomarr*, 6 W R 231 (1866), *Deen Dyal v Dance Roy*, 13 W R 185 (1870). In *Ramjiwan Singh v Radha Proshah Singh*, 10 W R 109 (1871), summons was not taken out as the Court considered the evidence unnecessary.

(3) *Rakhall Dass Mundal v Protap Chunder Hazrah*, 12 W R. 455 (1870)

(4) *Chowdhry Khooorga v Shub Tokul*, 17 W R 172 (1872), *Ramadhan Mundal*

v Rajballab Paramanik, 6 B I. R App 10 (1870)

(5) *Ramadhan Mundal v Rajballab Paramanik*, *supra*

(6) *Gopee Ojha v Hur Gobind Singh*, 12 W R 229 (1869)

(7) *Looloo Singh v Rajendur Laha*, 8 W R 364 (1867), *Shank Ibbram v Shank Suleman*, 9 B 147, 149, 150 (1884)

(8) *Jeswant Singhjee v Jet Singhjee*, 2 W I A 424, 427 (1841)

(9) *Rakhall Dass Mundal v Protap Chunder Hazrah*, 12 W R 455 (1870) [and there is no right of special appeal on that point]

ORDER XVIII

Hearing of the Suit and Examination of Witnesses.

[s 179,
explan]

1 The plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and contends that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief which he seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin

"Right to begin. —This rule is taken from the Explanation to sect 179 of the last Code the remainder of the section being incorporated in the next rule. The party on whom the *onus probandi* lies as developed by the record must begin. As to this, see the Authors' Evidence Act, 5th ed., pp 629-700. At the hearing of a case on a preliminary issue the defendant by whom the issue is raised has the right to begin, (1) and if in appeal the respondent objects that no appeal lies the appellant begins (2)

[s 179.]

2 (1) On the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove

[s 180,
first two
paras]

(2) The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (if any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case

(3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case

[s 180,
last para]

3 Where there are several issues, the burden of proving some of which lies on the other party, the party beginning may, at his option, either produce his evidence on those issues or reserve it by way of answer to the evidence produced by the other party, and, in the

(1) *Fatmabai v. Ashabai* 12 B 104 (1888)
[and two counsel may be heard]

(2) *Rustomji Barjorji v. Keshavnath*,
8 B 287 (1881)

latter case, the party beginning may produce evidence on those issues after the other party has produced all his evidence, and the other party may then reply specially on the evidence so produced by the party beginning, but the party beginning will then be entitled to reply generally on the whole case

Statement and production of evidence—The first paragraph of r 2 is the first paragraph of sect 179 of the last Code. The third rule is taken from sect 180. The plaintiff and such of the defendants as support the plaintiff's case, wholly or in part, must address the Court and call their evidence first and the other party (namely the persons opposed to the plaintiff's case and that of the defendants supporting it) must address the Court and call their evidence (1)

4 The evidence of the witnesses in attendance shall [s 18] be taken orally in open Court in the presence of witnesses to be examined in open Court and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge

Witnesses—The parties must select their witnesses, summon them and if they do not attend, move the Court to secure their attendance and when a

for examination (2). It is the duty of the Court to examine every witness tendered though he has not been summoned or his name has not been enlisted in the list, (3) unless it is clear that the intention of the party producing the witness is to delay or obstruct justice (4). He should not select a certain number only for examination, (5) nor send some away because he had examined as many on one side as on the other, (6) or because he thinks their evidence will probably not be of much value, (7) or because they would only prove the same facts as already deposed to (8). It is in the discretion of the Court of first instance to allow a party to call further evidence after he has closed his case (9). A plaintiff who does not care to be present to support his own case when he knows it is tried cannot of

(1) *Haji Bibi v Sultan Mahomed* 32 B 599 (1908)

(2) *Nund Mohun Chowdhry v Coluck Nath Neogee*, 11 W R 99 (1869). *Morno Moyce v Rheem Coomar* 6 W R 231 (1866). *Deen Dyal v Dance Roy*, 13 W R 185 (1870). In *Rampwun Singh v Radha Prashad Singh*, 10 W R 109 (1871), summons was not taken out as the Court considered the evidence unnecessary.

(3) *Rakhal Dass Mundal v Profap Chunder Hazrah*, 12 W R 455 (1870).

(4) *Chowdhry Khoorgo v Shub Tehal*, 17 W R 172 (1872). *Ramadhan Mundal*

v Rajballab Paramanik 6 B I R App 10 (1870).

(5) *Ramadhan Mundal v Rajballab Paramanik*, *supra*.

(6) *Gopce Ojha v Hnr Gobind Singh*, 12 W P 229 (1869).

(7) *Looloo Singh v Rajendur Lahy*, 8 W R 364 (1867). *Shah Ibrahim v Shah Saleman* 9 B 147, 149, 150 (1884).

(8) *Jeswant Singhjee v Jit Singhjee*, 2 W I 1 424, 427 (1841).

(9) *Rakhal Dass Mundal v Profap Chunder Hazrah* 12 W R 455 (1870) [and there is no right of special appeal on that point].

course be allowed to urge the plea that he had no opportunity of rebutting the defendant's evidence (1) New matter discovered after the plaintiff's case is closed ought not to be admitted unless it is such as would probably occasion a different determination (2) It was ruled that when a witness had been examined on behalf of the plaintiff he cannot be recalled as a witness for the defendant without leave obtained at the end of the first examination (3) As regards the examination of purdahashin women, see sect 132 There should be cogent reasons to necessitate the Court to order principals to leave the court room while the evidence of witnesses is being recorded But the other witnesses should not be present (4) Where the first Court did not consider it necessary to examine further witnesses whom the plaintiff adduced, it was held that the Appellate Court, if not satisfied with that evidence, should have given the party an opportunity of examining their other witnesses (5) The Court should, however, be satisfied that the witnesses were present, and that a *bona fide* application for their examination was made (6) In second appeal the Court has refused to interfere when the point was not taken in the first Appellate Court (7) It ought to be shown that the evidence would have been material to the case (8)

- [s 182.] 5. In cases in which an appeal is allowed the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing, in the language of the Court, by or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge, not ordinarily in the form of question and answer, but in that of a narrative, and, when completed, shall be read over in the presence of the Judge and of the witness, and the Judge shall, if necessary, correct the same, and shall sign it

Taking of evidence in appealable cases—This rule corresponds to part of sect 172 Act VII of 1859, and sect 103 of the last Code Under the last mentioned section, as under the present rule, the evidence had and has to be read in the presence of the parties and their pleaders and no provision is made for signature by the witness The deposition is to be read over in the presence of the Judge and the witness Evidence which has been received in the absence

(1) Radhajeelunt : Gries Chunder Roy, 8 W R 461 (1867)

(2) Kazi Gulam Ali : Aga Khan 6 Bom H C R 93, 97 (1869)

(3) Mackintosh : Nobin Money Dassee 2 Ind Jur N S 160 (1867)

(4) Buddrenath : Issoree Proshad, 2 Hyile, 249 (1864)

(5) Kurish Chunder Ghose : Gopal Chunder Ghose 20 W R 203 (1873)
Khula Buksh : Imom Ali Shah 9 A 37 (1866)

(6) Koonoo Singh : Eshan Chunder 6

W R 213 (1860), Surm Rye : Ullman Rye, 2 A H C R 209 (1870) as to proof of refusal by the Court to take evidence, see Ramessur Bhattacharjee : Shih Narain 14 W R 419 (1870) Gooroo Dass Akhooloo : Poran Mundli, 12 W R 363 (1869), Parmeshari Proshad : Mahomed Syed 6 C 608, 611 (1881)

(7) Gooroo Dass Akhooloo : Poran Mundli 12 W R 363 (1869) O man Singh : Chumman Mahtoon 15 W R 871 (1871)

(8) Nilanth Sarmah : Soora Debia 6 W R 321 (1870)

of the opposite party, will be rejected if objected to (1) Failure to comply with the provisions of this and the next rule will render the deposition inadmissible on a charge of giving false evidence based on such deposition, and under sect 91 of the Evidence Act no other evidence is admissible (2) In second appeal the case will be remanded to have the evidence properly recorded, provided that the objection has been taken in a regular appeal (3) Corrections in depositions

of 1879, Burmah Law or Burmah Courts Act It was held to apply to cases under Act X of 1870 (6) (Land Acquisition)

6. Where the evidence is taken down in a language [s. 18] When deposition to be different from that in which it is given, and interpreted. the witness does not understand the language in which it is taken down the evidence as taken down in writing shall be interpreted to him in the language in which it is given.

Interpretation of deposition—Act VIII of 1859, sect 171, clause 3 This rule does not apply to High Courts or the Punjab Chief Court in the exercise of their original civil jurisdiction See note to last rule As to Oudh, see Act XVIII of 1876, sect 19

7. Evidence taken down under section 138 shall be in the [s. 188] form prescribed by rule 5 and shall be read over and signed and, as occasion may require, interpreted and corrected as if it were evidence taken down under that rule para. (

8. Where the evidence is not taken down in writing by [s. 18] the Judge, he shall be bound, as the examination of each witness proceeds, to make a memorandum of the substance of what each witness deposes, and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Judge and shall form part of the record. Memorandum when evidence not taken down by Judge.

Memorandum of evidence—Act VIII of 1859, sect 172, sentence 8 This rule does not apply to High Courts or the Punjab Chief Court in the exercise

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Bommarauze Bahadur v Rangasamy, 6 M L A 232 (1880) | (4) 1 C O N W 183, cited in O Kuncaly v Cw Pr Code |
| (2) R v Mayadeb Gossami 6 C 762 (1881), retd Hari Churn Singh v R, 4 C W N 249 (1900) | (5) O ALLN r 3, post Punjab Courts Act, s. 16 (2), Act XVIII of 1884 |
| (3) Shaikh Lall v Shaikh Iker, 18 W N 112 (1872) | (6) Hayslam v Bhelnath Mullick, 17 W R 221 (1871) |

of their original Civil jurisdiction. See note to r 5. It is not in force in the Central Provinces (Act II of 1879). As to Oudh, see Act XVIII of 1876, sect. 19. A separate memorandum on each witness should be recorded at the time of the examination in the vernacular of the Judge, and it should contain every material answer made by the witness in the examination in chief, the cross examination, and in reply to questions put by the Court in the form of a narrative (1). The vernacular record and not the memorandum is looked upon as the deposition of the witness, and where there is any discrepancy, the vernacular record must be followed (2).

- [s. 185.] 9. Where English is not the language of the Court, but all the parties to the suit who appear in person, and the pleaders of such as appear by pleaders, do not object to have such evidence as is given in English taken down in English, the Judge may so take it down.

Evidence in English—Act VIII of 1859, sect. 172, sentence 1. This rule does not apply to High Courts or the Punjab Chief Court in the exercise of their original Civil jurisdiction. See note to r 5. The former section was not in force in the Central Provinces, Act II of 1879, sect. 2, modified in Oudh, Act XVIII of 1876, sect. 19.

- [s. 186.] 10. The Court may, of its own motion or on the application of any party or his pleader, take down any particular question and answer may be taken down. any particular question and answer, or any objection to any question, if there appears to be any special reason for so doing.

Taking down of question, answer, and objection—Act VIII of 1859, sect. 172, sentence 5, and sect. 186 of the last Code, which applied to High Courts, and was in force in a modified form in Oudh (Act XVIII of 1876, sect. 19). This is excepted by O XLIX r 3, *post*. The words "or cause to be taken down" have been omitted.

- [s. 187.] 11. Where any question put to a witness is objected to by a party or his pleader, and the Court allows Questions objected to and allowed by Court. the same to be put, the Judge shall take down the question, the answer, the objection and the name of the person making it, together with the decision of the Court thereon.

- [s. 188.] 12. The Court may record such remarks as it thinks material respecting the demeanour of any witness while under examination.

(1) *Subhoodeen v Luchmeeput*, 6 W R 112, in which the manner of recording evidence is laid down, 4 Crv O N W, 1866, cited in O Manual, s C P C.

(2) *Heeranath Kooeree v Burm Narain*, 15 W R 375 (1871) see also R v Beharoo Bose, 9 W R Cr 69 (1868).

Demeanour of witness—Act VIII of 1859, sect 172 sentence 7 and sect 188 of the last Code which applied to High Courts, but not to P & C C and was modified in Oudh, Act XVIII of 1876 sect 19 sect 3 *ante* This rule is not excepted in O XLIX r 3, *post*

13 In cases in which an appeal is not allowed, it shall not be necessary to take down the evidence of the witnesses in writing at length, but the Judge, as the examination of each witness proceeds, shall make a memorandum of the substance of what he deposes, and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Judge and shall form part of the record

Evidence in appealable cases—This rule does not apply to High Courts or the Punjab Chief Court in the exercise of their original Civil jurisdiction see O XLIX r 3, and note to r 5 It is not in force in the Central Provinces see Act II of 1879, sect 19 and sect 3 *ante* The rule is also applicable to suits for the recovery of rent in Bengal whether an appeal is allowed or not (sect 148 (f), Act VIII of 1885) For power to direct that evidence in suits between landlord and tenant in agricultural villages in Ajmere and Merwara be taken in the form prescribed by the rule see the Ajmere Courts Regulation (I of 1877) sect 29 In Bengal there is no fixed practice but as a rule the memorandum is written legibly in the vernacular of the Judge or in English if he is sufficiently acquainted with that language and signed by the Judge and dated (1) A Judge of a Small Cause Court is bound to take down in the language of the witness the substance of what each deposes (2)

14. (1) Where the Judge is unable to make a memorandum as required by this Order, he shall cause the reason of such inability to be recorded, and shall cause the memorandum to be made in writing from his dictation in open Court

Judge unable to make such memorandum to record reasons of his inability.

(2) Every memorandum so made shall form part of the record.

Inability to make memorandum—Act VIII of 1859, sect 172, sentence 9 This rule applies to all rent suits in Bengal (Act VIII of 1885, sect 143 (2)), but not to the Chartered High Courts or the Punjab Chief Court, in r 3, and Act XVIII of 1876, sect 19), and in the last Code, it was said, seemed to contemplate some personal inability Press of business should not, unless under exceptional circumstances, be accepted as a

reason for the inability of any officer to record his memorandum (1) In the present rule, however, the words "*is unable*" are substituted for "*rendered unable*" in the former section

- [s 191.] **15. (1)** Where a Judge is prevented by death, transfer or other cause from concluding the trial of a suit, *his successor may deal with any evidence or memorandum taken down or made under the foregoing rules as if such evidence or memorandum had been taken down or made by him or under his direction under the said rules and may proceed with the suit from the stage at which his predecessor left it*
- Power to deal with evidence taken before another Judge.*
- (2)** The provisions of sub rule (1) shall, so far as they are applicable, *be deemed to apply to evidence taken in a suit transferred under section 24.*

Evidence taken down by other Judges—This is sect 191 of the last Code remodelled. This proviso has been omitted. As to this, see sect 24, sub sect 2, ante. Where evidence has been taken in another Court and on another trial, the Judge cannot rely on it, but is bound himself to record the evidence which is to be the material for his decision (2). But the parties may agree to treat the former record as incorporated in the latter, (3) and where such an agreement has been entered into the witness should not be re-examined without some good reason being adduced (4). *Ad fortior*, where evidence had been taken in the same case by the predecessor or of the Judge, the parties may waive the retaking of evidence (5). Sect 191 of the last Code, with which this rule corresponds, was substituted for the former section by Act VII of 1888, with reference to the decisions noted (6). Exception is made to the general rule where the Judge has died, (7) or been transferred, or is prevented by other cause from concluding the trial of the suit, or the suit itself has been transferred (8). As to High Courts, see O XIX r 3.

- [s 192.] **16. (1)** Where a witness is about to leave the jurisdiction of the Court, or other sufficient cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court why his
- Power to examine witnesses immediately.*

(1) O'Keefe v. Civ. 1r Code, s 190

(2) Ali Buksh v. Shakh Sumarooddeen 12 W. R. 477 (1869). See R. v. Kalandar Dass, 2 A. H. C. R. 100 (1870) [reading over their previous depositions to the witnesses in a criminal case and asking them if they are true is wrong].

(3) Maharajah Jugatendur Bunwaro v. Din Dyal, 1 W. R. 310 (1864)

(4) Sreenath Ray v. Goluck Chundia Sen 15 W. R. 348 (1871)

(5) Syed Mahomed v. Omdah, 13 W. R. 184 (1870), Naranbhai v. Naroshankar, 4 B. H. C. R. A. C. J. 38 (1867)

(6) Jagram Das v. Naram Lal 7 A. 507 (1880), Mzal un nassa Begam v. Ali s. A. 35 (1885), Jadu Rai v. Kanizak Hussain s. A. 576 (1886)

(7) See Sukram v. Kalakabhar, 3 B. L. 1 A. C. J. 105 (1869), where the Judge died after hearing and deciding the case, but the only record of his decision was an entry in the Court Order Book.

(8) See Palanisami Gowndari v. Thondam Gowndari, 26 M. 590 (1902), Naranbhai v. Naroshankar, 4 B. H. C. R. A. C. J. 38 (1867)

evidence should be taken immediately, the Court may, upon the application of *any* party or of the witness, at any time after the institution of the suit, take the evidence of such witness in manner hereinbefore provided.

(2) Where such evidence is not taken forthwith and in the presence of the parties, such notice as the Court thinks sufficient, of the day fixed for the examination, shall be given to the parties.

(3) The evidence so taken shall be read over to the witness, and, if he admits it to be correct, shall be signed by him, and the Judge shall, if necessary, correct the same, and shall sign it, and it may then be read at any hearing of the suit

Power to examine witnesses immediately—This rule which deals with what is called examination *de bene esse* corresponds with sect 173 Act VIII of 1859. It does not apply (so far as relates to the manner of taking evidence) to the Chartered High Courts, or the Punjab Chief Court in the exercise of their Original Civil Jurisdiction. See O XLIX r 3 and Act XVIII of 1884, sect 16 (1). The necessity for the signature of the Judge is a new provision. An examination under this rule being on the same footing as the examination of a witness in a cause, must be conducted by counsel (1) and before the Court, not before a Commissioner unless by consent (2). Where a Subordinate Judge after reserving judgment, examined without notice to the parties or their pleaders a judgment-debtor who offered evidence concerning a point in dispute, it was held that this was not justified by sect 165 of the Evidence Act and was a material irregularity (3).

17. The Court may at any stage of the suit recall any [s. 19]
Court may recall and witness who has been examined and may
examine witness. (subject to the law of evidence for the time
being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit.

Recall of witness—This rule corresponds with sect 193 of the 1st Code, but the last paragraph of that section, which was added by Act VII of 1888, sect 19, has been omitted.

18. The Court may at any stage of a suit inspect any
Power of Court to property or thing concerning which any question
inspect may arise.

(1) Hoffman v Framjee, Coryton 7 to issue a commission to take evidence *de bene esse*.
(2) Edwards v Muller, 5 B L R 252
(3) Peary Lal Das v Peary Lal Dawn, 18 C L J 646 (1913).
See, however, the reporter's note to this case, in which it is pointed out that a Court of Equity has an inherent jurisdiction

ORDER XIX.

Affidavits

- [s. 194.] 1. Any Court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Court thinks reasonable

Power to order any point to be proved by affidavit
 Provided that where it appears to the Court that either party *bona fide* desires the production of a witness for cross examination and that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorizing the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit

Affidavits at the final hearing—Ordinarily witnesses at the trial of any action are examined *in voce* and in open Court. This rule, which is taken from English O. 37, r. 1, permits the Court to allow particular facts to be proved by affidavit subject to the proviso. Affidavits cannot in this case be used without an order of Court nor at all if the opposite party desires the production of a witness for cross examination (1). It is common practice to admit a witness at the hearing when there is no contention as to the facts, which however to be proved and cannot be admitted as against minor parties to the suit words "*of first instance and any Appellate Court*" after the words "*any Court*" have been omitted as doubtless redundant

- [s. 195.] 2. (1) Upon any application evidence may be given by affidavit, but the Court may, at the instance of either party, order the attendance for cross examination of the *deponent*

Power to order attendance of deponent for cross examination
 (2) Such attendance shall be in Court, unless the *deponent* is exempted from personal appearance in Court, or the Court otherwise directs

Affidavits in interlocutory proceedings—This rule is taken from English O. 3, r. 1. The practice here is the reverse of that which takes place at the hearing, affidavits being the rule and attendance for *in voce* cross examination the exception. There is no obligation on the Court to make an order for cross examination upon an affidavit filed in a motion (2). As a rule in interlocutory

proceedings, cross examination is not allowed because it would defeat the whole object of such proceedings, namely, despatch. The party moving has however, a right to file affidavits in reply. Ordinarily these affidavits are confined to rebutting the allegations of the opposite party and should not bring forward further direct proof of the applicant's case which should have been given in the original affidavits upon which the application is made. As to persons exempted, see sects 133, 135, *ante*.

3. (1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted provided that the grounds thereof are stated.

(2) The costs of every affidavit which shall unnecessarily set forth matters of hearsay or argumentative matter, or copies of or extracts from documents, shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be paid by the party filing the same.

Form and contents of affidavits—The affidavit consists firstly of the "title". Every affidavit should be constituted in the cause or matter in which it is sworn, giving the style of the Court, the matter or suit in which it is made and the names of the parties as given in the proceedings. Then follow the name and place of abode of the deponents, and after this the matter of the affidavit. This rule states what this should be (1) Evidence on information and belief generally admissible on interlocutory application as a matter of necessity. It has been held, admissible in a proceeding which, though interlocutory, finally decides the rights of the parties (2) But it is necessary that the facts for this belief should be shown (3) Though in practice this is frequently done, nevertheless a party against whom such an affidavit is made is entitled to the objection, and if it be one of substance the Court is bound to pay heed to it (4) And the English Court of Appeal has commented strongly on the irregularity of an affidavit founded upon information and belief merely without giving the source of such information and belief (5) The final part is the "jurat,"

the oath of the declarant. As to who are such persons, see sect 139.

(1) In *Gooroochurn v Goluckmoney, Iulton*, 164, 165 (1843) an affidavit to show that the certificate of an officer of Court was wrong was refused.

(2) *Per Woods V C*, in *Bird v Lake*, 111 & 112, *Gilbert v Endean*, 9 C D 259.

(3) See judgment of *Jessel, M.R.*, in *Quartz, etc., Co v Beall* 20 C D 508, and *Darnolar v Panatal*, 9 Bom L R 540 (1907) in which the Court drew attention

to the necessity of following the provisions of the rule, *Padmati v Rasik* 37 C 259 (1909) the provisions of this rule should be strictly followed.

(4) *Dudder v Bridges*, 26 C D 1, *Quartz Hill, etc., Co v Beall supra* *Bonnard v Perryman* (1891) 2 Ch. 269.

(5) *Re J L Young Manufacturing Co* (1900) 2 Ch 753 C. 11, and see *Lumley v Osborne* (1905) 1 K B 532.

ORDER XX

Judgment and Decree

- [s. 198] 1 The Court after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.

Judgment Act VIII of 1859 sect 183. It does not apply to High Courts (1) in their original jurisdictions. As to the taking of evidence, see Order XVIII. The meaning of the rule is (2) that judgment must be given upon evidence duly recorded before the Judge himself, except where the Code allows of such evidence being taken before another Judge or person, as in the case of O XVIII or 15 16 or commissions under Order XXVI. As to the meaning of the term *judgment* see notes to sect 2 ante. There is no objection to a Judge at the close of the hearing stating it once orally the judgment which he intends to record and deliver but he must afterwards pronounce his written judgment in open Court (3) It was held that the pronouncing of judgment out of Court—though an irregularity—was not a good ground of appeal (4) At the same time a failure to observe the provisions of the section in this respect has been strongly disapproved of, for apart from its being contrary to law the omission to pronounce judgment in open Court is highly inconvenient, and deprives the Court and litigants of a valuable safeguard against error. Pleaders should attend when judgment is pronounced and assist the Court by pointing out any error that may occur (5)

- [s. 199] 2 A Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor.

Power to pronounce judgment written by Judge's predecessor

(1) O XLIX r 3
(2) See *Naranbhai v Narashankar* 4 B H C R 98 102 (1867)
(3) *Madras H C R Rulings vnu* (1869)
(4) *Nulmoney Sing v Bhubany Churn Panda Marsh* 327 (1864), and see *Venka tesa Ivengar v Kamalammal* 22 M L J

212 (1911) open Court refers to the place and manner of the pronouncement and a judgment delivered on a 1st day is not on that account a nullity
(5) *Bai Dahi v Hargovandas* 30 B 405 (1900)

Predecessor's Judgment.—This rule adopts the decision in *Pirbutty v Higgis*,⁽¹⁾ which distinguished *Mutty Lall Sen v Desh Kar Roy*,⁽²⁾ where the written opinions were regarded as mere minutes, and not as judgments, on the ground that in order to there being a final judgment of the Court, there must have been a final meeting and consideration by all the Judges who heard the case as to what their judgment was to be⁽³⁾ An objection having been raised to the legality of a judgment on the ground that the Judge wrote it after he had been transferred, it was held that this section afforded an answer⁽⁴⁾ It is not necessary that the judgment should have been written by the Judge before he has taken leave or left the post which he was occupying when he heard the case⁽⁵⁾ This rule is not mandatory⁽⁶⁾

3 The judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge [s. 20]
 Judgment to be signed. in open Court at the time of pronouncing it
 and, *when once signed*, shall not afterwards be
 altered or added to, save *as provided by section 152* or on review.

"Altered"—Act VIII of 1859, sect 183 Rule does not apply to Chartered High Courts (O XLIX r 3) in their original jurisdictions Where a party dies after hearing, but before judgment, which is reserved, entry may be made *nunc pro tunc* ⁽⁷⁾ The judgment, which must be written, may be altered either before pronouncement, or after pronouncement, but before signature provided that in such latter case the alteration is itself pronounced This rule prohibits the Judge, subject to the exceptions stated, from adding to (or altering ⁽⁸⁾) his judgment after he has pronounced, dated, and signed it ⁽⁹⁾ Where a Court raises several issues, and records findings on some only of them it is not open to it subsequently to add to its judgment further findings on the remaining issues, although they may lead to the same conclusions as previously arrived at ⁽¹⁰⁾ In the High Court, where judgments are often delivered orally and taken down by the Assistant Registrar, the Judge may, and does usually, revise the judgment out of Court before signature, and then returns the judgment to the record

(1) 17 W R 475 (1872), as to the opinion of a Judge dying before judgment is delivered see R v Hough, 2 Ex D 65, 238, and 5 M H C R Rulings, viii (1869)

(2) 9 W R 1, 61 (1867)

(3) And see *Khetlat Chunder Ghose v Tara Churn Koondoo*, 6 W R 269 (1866), *Rohlfchand, etc. v Bank v Row*, 6 A 468, 474 (1884)

(4) *Cirjshankar v Gopalji*, 30 B 241 (1905), *Satyendra v Kastura Kumari* 35 C 756 (1 B) (1908), *Basant Bihari Ghoshal v Secretary of State*, 35 A 368 (1913)

(5) *Sunder Kumar v Chandreshwar Prasad*, 34 C 23 (1907)

(6) *Lachman v Ram*, 33 A 236 (1910).

(7) *Chetan Charan Das v Balbudhra*, 21 A 314 (1899), and cases there cited

(8) *Kashan Kunwar v Ganga Prasad*, 31 A 153 (1903)

(9) And therefore prohibits the practice referred to in *Madden v Todt Hurlay*, 7 W R 256 (1867) The P C, referring to another matter, said that reasons ought to be stated publicly at the hearing below, and should not be reserved to influence the decision of the Court of Appeal *Becher v Voyer*, 5 L R 1 C 481

(10) *Shedaya v Shivaya*, 4 Bom L R 129 (1902), such addition being, contrary to the provisions of the section.

[s. 203] 4. (1) Judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereupon

Judgments of Small Cause Courts.

(2) Judgments of other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision

Small Cause Courts—See sect 185 of Code of 1859. The rule does not apply to Chartered High Courts (O XLIX r 3). It is in conformity with the limited summary jurisdiction of Small Cause Courts that their judgments should also be of a summary character. The first paragraph applies also to Courts invested with Small Cause Court powers (1). Other judgments should state the reasons for the decision, and thus give the Appellate Court both a proof that the case has received such consideration, is also that instance which it is entitled to expect (2). As to judgments of Appellate Courts, see O XLI r 32, *post*, and in the case of appeals to the Privy Council, sect 12 of the Charter (3). A decree founded on a judgment not in accordance with this rule is not according to law, and therefore the High Court, under sect 23 of the P & C C Act (IX of 1887), has jurisdiction to pass such order in the matter as it thinks fit (4). In such a

the case, directing the Judge to record a decision on each issue, unless it elects to act under the new sect 103, *ante*

[s. 204] 5. In suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons therefor, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit

Court to state its decision on each issue.

Findings on issues—Act VIII of 1859, sect 186 does not apply to High

(1) *Nariyan v Bhagu* 31 B 314 (1907)

(2) See *Khajah Mohamed v Ashrofoonissa* 9 M I A 492 503 (1863)

(3) See *Katchekaleviana v Kachivijaya* 12 M I A 43, 502 (1869), *Ramvisam v Bhaskasami* 2 M at p 70 (1879), *Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad v Zubanda Jan* 11 A 460 470 (1889)

(4) *Bai Jasoda v Bamanshi*, 23 B 334 (1898)

(5) *Matik Rahmat v Shiva Prasad*, 13 A 533 (1881) *sed qd* as to decision stated in first

paragraph of headnote

(6) See *Katchekaleviana v Kachivijaya* 12 M I A at p 502 (1869)

(7) *Kamat v Kamat*, 8 B 368 (1884), *Shurbessur Ghose v Suckoo Churn Ghose*, 15 W R 130 (1871), but where Judge has been removed see *Kritna Reddi v Srinivasa Reddi* 5 M 11 C R 174 (1870) and died before giving his reasons for a decree said to have been made by him *Nobo Chunder Banerjee v Ishur Chunder Mitter*, 12 W R 254 (1869)

Courts (O XLIX r 3) This rule renders it imperative upon the Court to pronounce its opinion upon such issues as may be necessary for the disposal of the suit. It does not, however, disable the Court from determining the other issues also (1). In fact, it is convenient that this should be done where evidence has been allowed to be given on all the issues, since by omitting to do so a case may have to be remanded which might otherwise have been finally decided on appeal (2). The findings, however, on issues other than those upon the determination of which the decree is based ought not to form part of the Court's decree, and will on application for that purpose be struck out (3).

6. (1) The decree shall agree with the judgment. It shall (a) contain the number of the suit, the names and descriptions of the parties, and particulars of the claim, and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit.

(2) The decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the suit, and by whom or out of what property and in what proportions such costs are to be paid.

(3) The Court may direct that the costs payable to one (a) party by the other shall be set off against any sum which is admitted or found to be due from the former to the latter.

Applicability of rule.—Act VIII of 1859 sect 189. This rule does not apply to High Courts (4) in original jurisdiction. An opinion has been expressed that the section of the former Code by virtue of the operation of sects 582 and 632 of that Code, was applicable to the High Courts on the appellate side, but that if that was not so the Court had an inherent jurisdiction to bring its decrees in accordance with its judgments (5). As to decrees in appeal, see O XLI r 35 *post*. A judgment ordering a decree to be entered up in terms of a petition of

(1) *Dwarakonda v Dwarakonda*, 4 M 134, 136 (1881).

(2) *Id*, Tara Kant Banerjee v Puddo money Dossee, 3 W R P C 63, 66 (1866), s c, 10 M I A 476, *Baldeo Singh v Dharam Kunwar*, 26 A 234 (1903), and see observations of P C in *Muhammad Mumtaz Ahma I v Zubaida Jan*, 11 A 460, at pp 470-471 (1889), but see *Barhamdeo Naram Singh v Mackenzie*, 10 C 109, (1884). As regards this case, it is to be observed that the Court need not have tried the question of occupancy at all. The question referred to in the text is whether, if evidence is taken on an issue, the Judge should express his finding on it. The case cited, however, expresses an opinion in the negative.

(3) *Baldeo Singh v Dharam Kunwar*, 26 A 234 (1903), and see *Nanda Lal Rai v Bonomali Lahiri* 11 C 344 (1880), *sed quae* as to amendment of judgment.

(4) O XLIX r 3. See as to amendment by High Court, *Karim Mahomed v Rajooma*, 12 B 174 (1887) [inherent power to rectify record], *Pherozsha Pestonjee Randera v Sun Mills Ltd*, 22 B 370 (1897), and see *Advocate General v Muhammad Husein* 4 B 11 C R 203 at p 207 (1867) [order for substitution, minutes directed to be drawn up, before minutes matured into order, Court altered directions].

(5) *Muhammad Naim ul lah Khan v Ihsan Ullah Khan*, 14 A 226 (1892).

compromise is not such a judgment as is contemplated by this rule, there being no expression of judicial opinion on the merits of the case (1)

Contents of decrees—The decree must agree with the judgment, and under the next rule the Judge should be satisfied of such agreement before he signs it. The material findings in each case should be embodied in the decree, and if they are not, it is incumbent on the parties to avoid their being bound by decisions against which they have no right of appeal, to apply to the Court which passed the decree to amend it in accordance with the judgment (2) for evidence cannot be given in execution to clear up uncertainty in the decree (3). Decrees should be drawn up in such a way as to be certain and capable of execution (4) and as to be self contained and capable of execution without reference to any other document (5). But if on reference to the record the defect in the decree can be so far met as to render the decree capable of execution, it should be executed (6). For though Courts should be careful not to draw up imperfect decrees, it is also just that litigants should not be deprived of the fruits of their success owing to the carelessness of the Court or its officers in the preparation of the decree (7).

In order to see what an ambiguous decree really means, the Court may look both to the judgment, pleadings and the record, for the decree states only the relief or other determination of the suit but not the grounds of determination, nor does it afford any information as to the matters which were in issue (8). And the Judge passing the decree being the most suitable person to construe it a Superior Court will not ordinarily feel itself justified in pleading in any different construction (9). In a recent case in the Calcutta High Court a decree of a lower Appellate Court was set aside on second appeal not because it was erroneous but because its meaning was doubtful (10).

A person cannot get anything by execution other than that which the decree describes (11). No person takes anything under a decree unless it is given

(1) *Hameshwar Brosad v Chandreshwar Brosad* 7 C W N 880 (1903)

(2) *Niamut Khan v Phadu Bulda* 6 C 319 (1880)

(3) *Dwarkanath Haldar v Kamalakanth Haldar* 3 B L R App 128 (1869)

(4) *Ib*

(5) *Joytara Dassee v Mahomed Mobaruck* 8 C 975 (1882) *Lachmi Narain v Jwala Nath* 18 A 344 347 (1896)

(6) *Jawahir Mal v Kishur Chand* 13 A 343 (1891)

(7) *Lachmi Narain v Jwala Nath* 18 A 344 347 (1896)

(8) *Lachman Singh v Mohan Lal* A 497 498 (1879) *Lachmi Narain v Jwala Nath* 18 A 344 (1896) [dist and observing upon *Muhammed Sulaiman v Muhammad Yar* 6 A 30 (1893)] *Jawahir Mal v Kishur Chand* 13 A 340 (1891) *Sankara v Kulu* 14 M

29 31 (1863) *Radha Pershad Sing v Forab Ali* 18 C 108 (1890), *Kali Krishna Tagore v Secretary of State* 16 C 173 at p 183 (1888) s c 15 L A 186 *Bremabai v Yamunabai* 13 M 313 (1890) *Jagatjit v Sorabjit* 19 C 169 (1891) s c 13 L A 163 *Shivlal Kalidas v Jumaal Nathji* 18 B 542 (1893) *Sri Raja Rao Lakshmi v Sri Raja Inuganti* 20 L A 102 (1898) as to construction of judgment inconsistent in parts see *Bykunt Chunder v Dhunpat Singh* 11 W R 104 (1873)

(9) *Shahk Balarut Ali v Shah Giam Nuj* 4 W R 17 Mac (1865)

(10) *Davendra Nath Chowdhury v Anna Lal Had* 19 C L J 545 (1914) p 548 per *Jenkins CJ*

(11) *Dwarkanath Haldar v Kamalakanth Haldar* 3 B L R App 128 (1869)

to him in the ordering part, even though his name is mentioned in it elsewhere (1) What is intended to be ordered should be expressly declared (2) For anything which the party executing the decree is to recover must be found in the decree which he is executing, and *not elsewhere* and which decree must be executed as it stands, such as costs, (3) interest, (4) mesne profits, (5) or interest on mesne profits (6) The title-deeds of an estate, leases, and other documents of the like kind are necessary to the estate, and pass with it, whether the transfer is made by conveyance, certificate of sale, or decree for possession (7)

A decree "according to the terms of the judgment debtor's written statement," incorporates the terms of it (8) A decree for "the plaintiff's claim with costs," was held to mean the claim as laid in the plaint (9) The words "the plaintiff is to have judgment for his moiety with interest at the full legal rate and the costs of the proceedings in the Court below," have been held to give plaintiff a decree for the moiety claimed by him, *i.e.* the sum which he alleged to be due for principal *plus* interest, with interest from the date of suit up to realization (10) A decree declaring that the defendant has a right of occupancy on payment of a proper rent without defining the rent is defective, (11) and so is a decree for exclusive possession of land not in the sole possession of the judgment debtors, the shares of the different shareholders not having been defined, (12) as also a declaratory decree regarding the possession of an idol from time to time by contending parties which does not define the period of worship by each, and provide for the reconveyance of the idol (13) As to decrees for accounts, (14)

cancellation of instrument (1) contribution (2) of a declaratory character (3) maintenance (4) in mortgage (5) and in Hindu law cases (6) see cases cited below. Where the plaintiffs were entitled to ask for the performance of the part of a contract in which they were interested, and the defendant claimed execution of the whole to which the plaintiffs did not object the Court, it was held ought to have passed a decree directing execution of the whole contract instead of rejecting the claim (7).

In a suit against a legal representative the decree should state that it is against the defendant in that character (8).

During the pendency of a suit brought by A for immovable property, A died, and his only son was allowed to represent him. It was held that in the decree he should be described as "substituted appellant as representative of his father A" (9).

The relief granted must be clearly specified. It is not within the scope of this note to discuss what relief should be granted in any particular case, but certain principles of general application may be here referred to. The relief granted should be consistent with the pleadings (10). As a general rule a plaintiff should not be decreed more than or a relief different from, that

(1) *Ajit Singh v. Bhai Bala Lal Singh* 11 C 61 (1884).

(2) *Bhurut Panj v. Nannthori Koor* 23 W R 421 (1875). *Mahd v. Messer* v. *Lahori Messer* 24 W R 200 (1875). *Sujut Singh v. Imrit Tewari* 5 C 720 (1880). *Rash Munjoree v. Ralhasoon Juree* 23 W R 283 (1875). The liability is a vital in contribution suits. As to default where decrees are joint and several see *Saig Ram v. Ram Swak* 2 Agr. Misc. 14.

(3) *Pirithi Lal Kunwar v. Guman Kunwar*, 17 C 933 (1890). *Dhunput Singh v. Naram Pershad* 20 W R 94 (1873), *Rangacharian v. Yagna Dikshitar* 13 M 524 (1890). *Venayak Anant v. Alapi Halabray* 12 B 416 (1887). *Ram Soondur v. Taruck Chunder* 19 W R 28 (1872).

(4) *Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma* 9 M 108 (1884). *Ashutosh Banerjee v. Lukhmoni Debbya*, 19 C 139 (1881), *Mana Devi v. Jivan Lal* 9 A 33 (1886), *Sathimatha v. Subba Lakshmi* 7 M 80 (1883), *Abdool Fattch v. Zabunessa Hjatun* 6 C 631 (1881), *Mulla v. Virammal*, 10 M 283 (1886), *Rajah Prithvi Singh v. Ramee Raj Koor*, 2 A H C R 170 (1870).

(5) See *Gout's Transfer of Property Act*. *Rashbehary Ghose's Law of Mortgage*. A few cases will be found collected in O Kneally's notes to s. 206.

(6) See some cases collected in O Kneally's C P C notes to s. 206 on Hindu representative, father's debt, Kurta, Manager of infant's estate, Karmayau, Uralars, Hindu widow which are not heard with as to jurisdiction on the scope of the Commentary. See *Majumdar Hindu Law*.

(7) *Hari Rajahunath v. Krishnaji Anant* 13 B 516 (1894).

(8) *Gurdhara Krishnaji v. Bal Shiv*, 3 B 309 (1884) and as to decree sought to be executed against representative of joint family *Guruvappa v. Thimma*, 10 M 316 (1887), as to decree against wrong person as representative of a deceased debtor, see *Baswantapa Shindapa v. Ram* 9 B 86 (1884), *Alot v. Dada v. Sakharani*, id. 429 (1880), *Lamdro Deb Raikut v. Rani Jugudishwari* 14 C 316 (1887) [decree against executors acting under a will afterwards found invalid].

(9) *Ran Bijai v. Jagatpal Singh* 18 C 111 120 (1890).

(10) *Lshan Chunder v. Shunichuan* 11 M 1 A 7 s c 6 W R P C 57. *Mylajore Iyasami v. Leo Raj* 14 C 502 (1887) and with the evidence. So exclusive possession can only be decreed if exclusive possession is proved. *Parashram v. Mirarji*, 20 B 569 (1895). *Nana v. Appa* 20 B 627 (1895).

which he asked for, (1) though relief may be prayed for in the alternative (2) Where, however, the amount of mesne profits is directed by the decree to be ascertained in execution, the plaintiff is not limited to the amount claimed in the plaint (3) As to purchase by plaintiff during pendency of proceedings, see note (4) Where a plaintiff sued, while his lease was still running, to recover possession, and the term expired after action brought, but before decree held that the decree should have declared right to possession with mesne profits, but should not have declared actual possession to be given (5) The relief given must of course be one authorized by law So in decreeing a claim on a simple money bond a Court has no authority to direct the realization of the money out of any named property, and thus make it a charge upon such property (6)

Where a decree of a Lower Court is confirmed on appeal and that decree directs something to be done within a specified time the time is to be counted from the date of the appellate decree (7) But the rule does not apply if the appeal is withdrawn, (8) and the fact that an appeal has been presented does not enlarge the time for payment of the sum decreed or prevent the decree from being executed (9) The mention in a decree of a term when a particular right is to become enforceable is not a condition precedent but indicates a term from which limitation runs (10)

If the decree is not accurately and properly drawn up the party should apply to amend (*vide post*)

Costs—The actual amount of costs may not be settled in the judgment but, under the second paragraph of the rule, have to be determined subsequent to judgment for entry in the decree An order passed by the Court determining such amount must be treated as a continuation or completion of the judgment (11) The decree must state the amount of costs, and by whom and in what proportions they are to be paid No costs nor interest on costs, can be recovered unless they

(1) Ghyrullah v Kushorenath, 5 W R., Act A 60 (1866), Samat v Anura 6 B 394 (1882) Narasimha Charyalu t Appa Rao, 18 M 122 at p 124 (1894) Sambayya v Gajala Krishnamma, 15 M 489 (1892), Krishna Pillai v Rangasami Pillai, 18 M 462 (1895), Madava Naikan v Appaya Naikan, 2 M H C R 391 (1865) Palamjandi v Muttusami, 9 M H C R 441 (1865) as to whether in a suit for exclusive possession joint possession may be given see Antu Singh t Mandi Singh 15 A 412 (1893), as to accessory right see Haysagrevia v Sami 15 M 286 (1891), in Larahotam Bhasishankar t Rimal Zunjar 20 B 196 (1896) a suit for ejectment was turned into a redemption suit

(2) Perumal t Kaveri 16 M 121 (1894)

Nana v Appa, 20 B 627 (1896)

(3) Jadoomoney Dabee t Hafez Mahomed s C 235 (1881), Gauri Prasad Khondo v Ruffin, 9 C 112 (1882) Under the present

Code, however, mesne profits are determined in the suit and not in execution

(4) Wamanrao t Rustumji 21 B 701 (1896)

(5) Umanund Roy t Breekshun Bamerjee, 7 W R 248 (1867)

(6) Omroo Lal Sutar v Ramdhan Chakkar, 18 W R 503 (1872)

(7) Daulat t Bhukandas, 11 B 172 173 (1886) [time to redeem], Rupchand v Shamesh ul-Jehan 11 A 346 (1889), Kedar Singh t Jassi 13 A 376 (1889) [redemption] *contra* as to redemption Bhola Nath Bhuttacharjee t Kanai Chandra Bhuttacharjee 25 C 311 (1897)

(8) Palloji t Gahu, 15 B 370 (1890), Chudasama v Manabhai, 16 B 243 (1891)

(9) Annabai t Sahu, 17 B 547 (1892)

(10) Narayan Chitko v Nathul Parshotam, 12 B 23 (1887)

(11) Venkata Jagayya v Venkatasubhadri, 24 M 22, 26 (1890)

cancellation of instrument, (1) contribution, (2) of a declaratory character, (3) maintenance (4) in mortgage (5) and in Hindu law cases, (6) see cases cited below. Where the plaintiffs were entitled to ask for the performance of the part of a contract in which they were interested, and the defendant claimed execution of the whole to which the plaintiffs did not object, the Court, it was held, ought to have passed a decree directing execution of the whole contract instead of rejecting the claim (7).

In a suit against a legal representative the decree should state that it is against the defendant in that character (8).

During the pendency of a suit brought by A for immovable property, A died, and his only son was allowed to represent him. It was held that in the decree he should be described as "substituted appellant as representative of his father A" (9).

The relief granted must be clearly specified. It is not within the scope of this note to discuss what relief should be granted in any particular case, but certain principles of general application may be here referred to. The relief granted should be consistent with the pleadings (10). As a general rule a plaintiff should not be decreed more than or a relief different from, that

(1) *Ajit Singh v. Bhai Bhadur Singh* 11 C 61 (1884).

(2) *Bhurut Pandey v. Nanthoor Koor* 23 W R 421 (1874); *Mohade Mussur v. Lahori Mussur* 24 W R 206 (1875); *Suport Singh v. Inrit Jiwari* 5 C 720 (1880); *Rash Munjore v. Ralhi Sundure* 23 W R 283 (1875). His liability is several in contribution suits. As to default where decrees are joint and several see *Salig Ram v. Ram Swah* 2 Agra Misc 14.

(3) *Pirithi Pal Kunwar v. Guman Kunwar*, 17 C 933 (1890); *Dhunpat Singh v. Naratu Pershad* 20 W R 94 (1873); *Rangacharian v. Yegna Dikshatur*, 13 M 524 (1890); *Venayak Amrit v. Abaji Haibatray*, 12 B 416 (1887); *Ram Sundur v. Taruck Chundor*, 19 W R 28 (1872).

(4) *Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma*, 9 M 108 (1884); *Ashtotsh Bannergee v. Lakshmi Devi*, 19 C 139 (1891); *Manasa Devi v. Jivan Lal* 9 A 33 (1886); *Sathanatha v. Subbi Lakshmi*, 7 M 80 (1883); *Abdool Lutche v. Zulunnissa Khatun* 6 C 631 (1881); *Mulla v. Virammal*, 10 M 283 (1886); *Rajah Prithvi Singh v. Ranco Raj Koor*, 2 A H C R 170 (1870).

(5) See *Gour's Transfer of Property Act*. *Rashbehary Ghose's Law of Mortgage*. A few cases will be found collected in *O'Harney's notes to s. 206*.

(6) See some cases collected in *O'Harney's C. P. C. notes to s. 206* on "Hindu representative, Father's debt, Kurta."

Manager of infants estate *Karnaryan Ursars*, Hindu widow which are not here dealt with as being beyond the scope of the Commentary. See *Maynes Hindu Law*.

(7) *Hari Raghunath v. Krishnaji Anant*, 13 B 346 (1894).

(8) *Gurcharal Krishnaji Shik v. Bai Shiv*, 8 B 309 (1884), and as to decree sought to be executed against representative of joint family, *Gururappa v. Thimma*, 10 M 316 (1887), as to decree against wrong person as representative of a deceased debtor, see *Baswantappa Shidappa Ram*, 9 B 86 (1884); *Akola Dila v. Sakharam* id 429 (1885); *Laxmdeo Deb Raskut v. Pann Jugudishwari*, 14 C 316 (1887) [decree against executors acting under a will afterwards found invalid].

(9) *Ran Biyu v. Jagatpal Singh*, 18 C 111, 120 (1890).

(10) *Islan Chunder v. Shumachurn* 11 M F A 7, s. c. 6 W R P C 57; *Mylapore Iyasami v. Leo Kay*, 14 C 502 (1887) and with the evidence. So exclusive possession can only be decreed if exclusive possession is proved. *Parashram v. Miraji*, 20 B 563 (1895); *Nana v. Appa*, 20 B 627 (1895).

which he asked for, (1) though relief may be prayed for in the alternative (2) Where, however, the amount of mesne profits is directed by the decree to be ascertained in execution, the plaintiff is not limited to the amount claimed in the plaint (3) As to purchase by plaintiff during pendency of proceedings, see note (4) Where a plaintiff sued, while his lease was still running, to recover possession, and the loan expired after action brought, but before decree held that the decree should have declared right to possession with mesne profits, but should not have declared actual possession to be given (5) The relief given must of course be one authorized by law So in decreeing a claim on a simple money bond a Court has no authority to direct the realization of the money out of any named property, and thus make it a charge upon such property (6)

Where a decree of a Lower Court is confirmed on appeal and that decree directs something to be done within a specified time the time is to be counted from the date of the appellate decree (7) But the rule does not apply if the appeal is withdrawn, (8) and the fact that an appeal has been presented does not enlarge the time for payment of the sum decreed or prevent the decree from being executed (9) The mention in a decree of a term when a particular right is to become enforceable is not a condition precedent but indicates a term from which limitation runs (10)

If the decree is not accurately and properly drawn up the party should apply to amend (*vide post*)

Costs—The actual amount of costs may not be settled in the judgment but, under the second paragraph of the rule have to be determined subsequent to judgment for entry in the decree An order passed by the Court determining such amount must be treated as a continuation or completion of the judgment (11) The decree must state the amount of costs, and by whom and in what proportions, they are to be paid No costs nor interest on costs, can be recovered unless they

(1) *Ghyrullah v. Kushorenath*, 5 W. R., Act N. 60 (1866), *Samat v. Anra* 6 B. 394 (1882), *Narasimha Charyulu v. Appa Rau* 18 M. 122 at p. 124 (1894) *Sambayya v. Gopala Krishnamma*, 15 M. 489 (1892), *Krishna Pillai v. Rangasami Pillai*, 18 M. 462 (1896) *Madava Nalkan v. Appava Nalkan*, 2 M. H. C. R. 394 (1865) *Palaniyandi v. Muttusami* 2 M. H. C. R. 441 (1866), as to whether in a suit for exclusive possession joint possession may be given see *Antu Singh v. Mandal Singh* 15 A. 412 (1883), as to accessory right see *Hayagreeva v. Sami*, 15 M. 286 (1891), in *Parshotam Bhaubankar v. Rupal Zujar* 20 B. 196 (1896) a suit for ejectment was turned into a redemption suit

(2) *Perumal v. Kaveri*, 16 M. 121 (1894), *Nana v. Appa*, 20 B. 627 (1893).

(3) *Jadoomoney Daboo v. Hafiz Mahomed*, 8 C. 295 (1881), *Gauri Prasad Koondoo v. Locally*, 9 C. 112 (1882) Under the present

Code, however mesne profits are determined in the suit and not in execution

(4) *Wamanrao v. Rustomji* 21 B. 701 (1896)

(5) *Umanund Roy v. Breekishan Bannerjee*, 7 W. R. 248 (1867)

(6) *Omrato Lal Sircar v. Ramdhan Chakraborty* 18 W. R. 503 (1874)

(7) *Daulat v. Bhukandas* 11 B. 172, 173 (1856) [time to redeem], *Rupchand v. Shamsul-Jahan* 11 A. 346 (1889), *Kodai Singh v. Jasiri* 13 A. 376 (1889) [pre-emption], *contra* as to redemption, *Bhola Nath Bhattacharjee v. Kants Chundra Bhattacharjee* 22 C. 311 (1897)

(8) *Patloji v. Caru*, 15 B. 370 (1880), *Chudasama v. Manabhai* 16 B. 243 (1891)

(9) *Annamalai v. Sulu*, 17 B. 547 (1892)

(10) *Narayan Chitko v. Vithal Parshotam*, 12 B. 23 (1887)

(11) *Venkata Jagayya v. Venkatasubhadra*, 24 M. 25, 26 (1899)

are mentioned in the decree, though the judgment says they should be given (1) The mere specification of costs without an allotment of responsibility for them is not sufficient (2) But it was said to be not necessary that the specific sums which go to make up the costs should be set forth (3) Where an order denotes generally that costs should be paid, and then afterwards specifies a particular sum in respect of those costs, the specified sum comprises all the costs to which the party will be entitled (4) It is not the practice, where costs of an interlocutory proceeding have been disposed of, to consider that an award of the general costs of the suit interferes with the order disposing of those partial costs (5) If there is a set off on account of costs, interest should only run after the set off has been deducted (6) The third clause is taken from sect 221 of the 1st Code It has been held that a decree for the payment of money and for costs in the suit is indivisible, so that its benefit as regards costs cannot be transferred apart from the rest (7) See notes to sect 35, *ante*

Amendment of decree.—Every Court has inherent power over its own records so long as those records are in its power, and it can set right any mistake in them (8) A decree is the decree of the Court and not of the parties It is the bounden duty of a Court, of its own motion, to see that its decrees are in accordance with the judgments, and to correct them if necessary There is, therefore, no limitation for an application to amend the decree (9) R 3 prohibits the alteration of a signed and dated judgment save (except in the case of clerical errors) by review Sect 152, which embodies the third paragraph of the former sect 206, gives a power to amend the decree, it being a right incident

(1) *Nobo Kristo Mookerjee v Parbutty Churn Bhuttacharjee*, 13 W R 23 (1870), *Chowdhry Goluck Chunder v Chowdhry Gunga Narain*, 18 W R 111 (1872), *Muddun Thakoor v Morrison*, 18 W R 253 (1872), *Rajah Lalanand Singh v Court of Warda*, 14 W R 387 (1870), *Forster v Secretary of State*, 4 L A 137 (1877), but see *Rajah Rughoonundun v Arcott*, 19 W R 46 (1872), where the rate was not specified in the decree and the executing Court estimated the rate, *full Madhub Lal Khan v Noyan Ghose*, 6 C L R 231 (1880), *Synd Shah v Meer Reasut*, 17 W R 414 (1872)

(2) *Janokee Nath Mookerjee v Joy Kishen Mookerjee*, 15 W R 4 (1871)

(3) *Mothoora Mohun v Hury Keshore*, 18 W R 286 (1872), *Raghu v Rajendra*, 14 C W N 506 (1903)

(4) *Sharada Pershad v Luchmeeput Singh*, 18 W R 89 (1892), but as to costs of translation in appeals to P C, see *ib*, *Asgur Ali v Nugentio Chunder*, 23 W R 463 (1875), *Muddun Thakoor v Morrison supra*, *Ram Coomar Ghose v Prosunno Coomar Bannyal*, 10 C 106 (1883), *Nilmadhub Doss v Bis*

sumbur Doss, 21 W R 411 (1874), where even interest on these costs was given

(5) *Radha Pershad Singh v Ram Purano swar Singh*, 10 I A 113 (1882)

(6) *Amanat Ali v Mt Bindhoi*, 13 W R 138 (1870)

(7) *Ram Chandra v Abdul Hakim*, 30 A 204 (1913)

(8) *Karim Mahomed v Rapoona*, 12 B 174 (1887), and this power exists independent of the provisions of the Code *Muhammad Nam ul lah v Ihsan ul lah*, 14 A 226, 229 237 (1892) See cases cited in Ann Pr, notes to O 28, r 11

(9) *Kalu v Latu*, 21 C 259 (1893), *Jivraj v Praggi*, 10 V 51 (1886), *Shivapa v Shivpach*, 11 B 284 (1886), *Raghunath Das v Raj Kumar*, 7 A 276 280 (1884), *Tarsi Ram v Min Singh*, 8 A 492 (1886), *Darbo v Kesho Kai*, 9 A 364 (1887), *Muhammad Sulaman Khan v Muhammad Yar Khan*, 11 A 267, 290 (1888), *contra Gaya Prasad v Sikri Prasad*, 4 A 23 (1881), which is overruled, *Langat v Janki*, 14 C L J 481 (1911)

to any Court to correct its formal records in such way, if needed, as will make them represent truly the decision which was intended to be judicially expressed when the judgment was delivered (1) This may be done where there is clerical or arithmetical error, (2) or a variance with the judgment (3) The power is, however, limited to this, and should not be exercised except in accordance with the terms of r 3 or sect 152, *ante* (4) When a decree is in perfect accordance with the judgment, it cannot, subject to the provisions of sect 152, *ante* be altered, however erroneous the latter may be (5) The Code gives no power to alter or vary the decree A review of judgment or an appeal can alone do this (6) The High Court has no power to alter its own decrees except under the provisions of this rule or sect 114, *ante* (7) It has, however, been recently held that a party is not limited to the remedy given by these provisions, and that a suit will lie to rectify a mistake in a decree, (8) but in another case it has been stated that this can only be in special circumstances, and that as a general rule such a suit is not maintainable (9) An application to amend may be refused if made a long time after the date of the decree, and the latter should not be amended after execution is barred (10) A decree, however, has been amended subsequently to a Court sale (11)

Apparently according to one view under the last Code a decree might have been altered either by way of application under sect 206 or under sect 623 (12) If an application for review was made on several grounds and one of them referred to a clerical mistake, and if the other grounds were held to be untenable the Court might reject the application and refer the applicant to his remedy under sect 206 If it did not do so, but on the application for a review amended the clerical mistake the decree drawn up became the final decree and an appeal lay if it was brought within the prescribed time from such final decree (13)

Proceedings under sect 206 could not it has been said be regarded as of the same nature in any respect as proceedings under sect 623 corresponding with sect 114 In the former case the correctness of the judgment is not questioned

(1) *Lucas v Stephen* J W R 301 (1845)
Dhan Singh v Basant Singh 8 A 519 574 (1886), but see *Paghnath Das v Raj Kumar*, 7 A 276 278 (1884)

(2) See for instance *Dhan Singh v Basant Singh* 8 A 513 at p 574 (1886)

(3) I ven after the decree has been signed by the Judge and even if it does not fall within sect 152 *Brijratan v Jaynaram* 37 C 49 (1910)

(4) See *Abdul Hayat Khan v Chunda Kuar* 8 A 377 (1886) where the amendment was illegal, the decree being in conformity with the judgment and *Paramaswara v Seshagiriappa* 22 M 304 (1899) where this being the case, the added words were expunged *Raghnath Das v Raj Kumar*, 7 A 276 at p. 281 (1884) s.c., at p. 670.

(5) *Takko Bili v Salamat Ali*, 20 A 337 (1898)

(6) *Lachman Singh v Mehan* 2 A 497 at p 505 (1879) But see also note to sect 152 *ante*

(7) *Kotaguri Venkata v Vellanki Venkata* 4 C W N 725 (1900) s.c. 24 M 1 *Langat v Janki* 14 C I J 481 (1911)

(8) *Jogeswar Atha v Gangi Bala* 8 C W N 473 (1904)

(9) *Bhandi Singh v Dowlat Ray* 17 C W N 82 (1912)

(10) *Goluck Chunder v Cunga Narain* 20 W R 111 (1873) *Tarsi Ram v Man Singh*, 8 A 492 495 (1886)

(11) *Pidel v Chathappan* 14 M 150 (1890)

(12) See *Kali Iroanna Basu Roy v Lal Mohun Guha Roy* 2 C W N 19 at p. 222 (1897) discredited from *Ahsan ul Lah v Dakhim Dm*, 27 A 575 (1905)

(13) *Jor Haden Mookerjee v Alacur Ro* 6 C 22 (1880)

it is assumed, but the jurisdiction arises from the fact that the decree as drawn up and signed is not in accordance with the judgment. In the latter case not only the correctness of the decree but the correctness of the judgment is questioned, and if the application under sect 623 (now 111) is allowed a rehearing of the suit or appeal becomes necessary. In the former case there is no rehearing (1). It has however also been held that there may be a review not only where there is something faulty in the judgment itself, but in cases of amendment of decree which do not necessitate any alteration in the judgment, and that therefore an order passed on an application under the former section was substantially an order passed on review within the meaning of Art 179 of the Limitation Act (2).

There is a distinction between a case of amendment and one of novation or substitution. Where an instrument is intended so as to express the real intention which it was intended to express but which it did not completely express the transaction is not in substance varied but its inaccurate description is only rectified. Except therefore as specially provided for in sect 32 of the last Code (now O I rr 8-10 11) an amended decree is operative from the date of the original decree (3). Assuming however that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment and therefore the date of the decree is not the date of amendment when the date of the judgment remains unaltered the question arises whether an application for execution of a decree is affected by an application under this rule. It has been held that such an application is not a step in aid of execution (4) and therefore as such does not save limitation. It has however, also been held that an order passed upon an application under the former section was substantially an order passed upon review of judgment

Court (6). It was held by Subramania Ayyar, J. that where a decree is rightly amended the date of the rectification is immaterial with reference to the calculation of the time in which any appeal may be preferred against such decree. But where a decree is wrongly varied in part affected by such variation is entitled to calculate the time during which an appeal may be preferred as commencing

(1) *Daya Kishan v Nanhi Begam* 20 A 304 305 306 (1898)

(2) *Kali Prosanna Basu Roy v Lal Mohun Guha* 2 C W N 219 (1897), s c, 2 C 2 8 [though not for all purposes, as explained in *Nalinakshya Ghosal v Mafakshar Hossain*, 28 C. 177, 179 (1900)], and see *Venkata Jogayya v Venkatasumhadri* 34 M 20 26 (1900)

(3) *Pydel v Chathappan* 14 M 150 (1890) where a decree was amended after sale in execution, and was held to bind the party against whom the amendment was directed

(4) *Daya Kishan v Nanhi Begam*, 20 A

304 (1898); *Muhammal Umaman v Zinat Begam* 20 A 380 (1903); *Kali Prosanna Basu Roy v Lal Mohun Guha* 2 C W N 219 221 (1897)

(5) *Kali Prosanna Basu Roy v Lal Mohun Guha* 2 C W N 219 (1897), s c 2 C 208 *Venkata Jogayya v Venkatasumhadri* 34 M 20 (1900) *Kishan Sahai v Collector of Allahabad* 4 A 137 (1881)

(6) *Muhammad Umarjan Khan v Zinat Begam*, 25 A 380 (1903) [decree for mesne profits to be subsequently assessed—application for assessment application in the suit and not in execution]

from the date of the variation (1) The rest of the Court, however, apparently held that the time for appealing must be reckoned from the date of the original decree and not from the date of the amendment but that it could strike out the improper amendment, no petition for revision being necessary (2)

What Court may amend—Where a decree requires amendment the party aggrieved should apply to the Court in which it was granted and should not appeal on this ground as in default of such application an appeal is unnecessary (3) Where the decree was imperfect and could not be drawn up from the judgment, and the Judge who gave the judgment was no longer Judge of the district the High Court ordered a fresh trial (4) The decree of an Appellate Court supersedes the decree of the first Court, even where the appellate decree merely affirms the original decree and does not reverse or modify it Where a decree has been affirmed on appeal the only decree which can be amended is the decree to be executed viz that of the Appellate Court, and the only Court which has jurisdiction to amend the appellate decree is the Court of Appeal If, therefore, the Appellate Court reverses modifies or affirms by dismissal of the appeal the decree of the first Court, the Lower Court has after the appellate decree, no power to amend (5) The Bombay High Court has held (6) that an exception exists to this rule in the case of appeals dismissed under sect 551 (now O XLI r 11) it being said that such a dismissal leaves the decree of the Lower Court untouched neither confirmed nor varied nor reversed with the result that it remains the decree of the Lower Court which can amend it Practically, however the effect of such dismissal is to confirm the decree and it has also been held that the Lower Court cannot amend either in the case of appeals dismissed under sect 551 (now O XLI r 11) or tried after notice to the respondent (7) Where a decree after being affirmed on appeal is amended by the original Court and no step is taken to set aside the amended decree the latter is binding between the parties and its validity cannot be challenged in execution proceedings on the ground that the original Court had no jurisdiction to make the

(1) *Pirameshuaya v Shrigumaji* 22 M 314 (1889)

(2) See ib., at p 371

(3) *Binwaree C and Thakoor v Mudlen Mohun Chatteraj*, 21 W R 41 (1874)

(4) *Kishen Dyal Lall v Abdool Luteef* 19 W R 267 (1873)

(5) *Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v Muhammad Yar Khan* 11 A 267, F B (1888) [overruling in effect *Ram Saran v Persadhar Rai* 10 A 51 (1887)] *Tarsi Ram v Man Singh* 8 A 492 494 (1886) *Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v Fatima* 11 A 314 (1889), *Daya Kishan v Nanhi Begam* 20 A 304, 307 (1888) *Pichayayangar v Seshayyangar*, 18 M 214 (1882) [overruling *Sundara v Subramani* 1 M 304 (1880) which had been

previously followed in *Ram Saran v Persadhar Rai* 10 A 51 (1887) but doubted in 1891 in *Chathappan v Pydel* 15 M 403] *Shivlal Halidas v Jumaklal Nathip* 18 B 542 (1893) *Onact v Sunkur Dutt* 14 W R 26 (1870) s c 5 B L R App 60 (*Chowli v Wahid Ali v Mullick Enact Ali*, 14 W R 288 (1870), *Ram Churn Bysack v Luckie v hant Bornack*, 16 W R (F B) 1, 3 (1871) [no distinction between decree of affirmance and of modification]

(6) *Bapu v Vajir*, 21 B 548 (1896)

(7) *Munibami Naidu v Munibami Reddi*, 22 M 293 (1898) *Uma Sundari Devi v Bindu Bashini Chowdram*, 24 C 759 (1897)

amendment (1) The Court of first instance has no jurisdiction to amend a decree on the application of a non-applying defendant, when the decree has been confirmed on an appeal by the other defendants (2)

In executing a decree the Court of execution must take the decree as it finds it. It cannot amend the decree or alter it in any way, though it is bound, of course to construe the decree. The decree in execution may be the decree of the High Court and the proper Court to execute that decree may be the Court of the Munsif by whom the suit was first decided. The Munsif in respect of a decree made by an Appellate Court would be bound as the Court executing the decree to execute the decree whether he approved of it or not, even if the decree had been one made by himself (3). And no evidence can be given in execution to amend uncertainty in the decree sought to be executed (4).

Notice — The Court can only amend the decree after such notice as may be given to either party to prefer objections (5).

Erroneous order of amendment, how to be attacked — An order passed annulling a decree is a separate adjudication and is not merely a part of the original decree (6). Such an order is not appealable (7). It may, however, be revised under sect. 622 (now s. 115) (8) or it has been held sect. 15 of the Charter (9). As already observed the decisions are not entirely agreed upon the point whether a wrong order should be attacked by way of appeal from the decree as amended or by way of revision of the order of amendment. It is plain that if a decree is properly amended and exception is taken to the decree and not to the amendment then an appeal should be brought against the amended decree. If no objection is taken to the decree as originally framed but it is alleged that it has been improperly amended then, as what is complained of is the order of amendment, the remedy should be according to the weight of authority by way of revision of the order of amendment and not by way of appeal against the

(1) *Mentat Ali v. Amdar Ali* 9 C. W. N. 60 (1900) full on the question of the appealable character of an amended decree in *Brojo Lal Rai Chowdhury v. Tara Prasanna Bhattacharya* 3 C. I. J. 188 (1900).

(2) *Sri Gobind Singh v. Gangulu Pershai Singh* 6 C. L. J. 412 (1907).

(3) *Daya Kishan v. Nanhi Begam* 20 A. 304 307 (1898) and see *Pillai v. Pillai* 2 L. A. 219 (1875) *Forester v. Secretary of State*, 4 L. A. 137 (1877) *Seth Gokuldas v. Murlu*, 5 L. A. 78 (1878) s. c. J. C. 602.

(4) *Dwarkanath Halder v. Kamalakanth Halder* 3 B. L. R. App. 1-8 (1869) as to imperfect decrees involving necessity for further suit see *Kuloo Narain v. Chund Narain* 3 W. R. 28 (1871).

(5) *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar* 7 A. 271, at p. 279 (1889) and see *Abdul Hayat Khan v. Chumma Khan* 8 A. 377 (1886) where the preceding was held to be fatal for want of notice.

(6) *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar* 7 A. 84 (1884) s. c. at p. 278.

(7) Under O. XLIII r. 1, *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar*, *supra*; *Nalmakshya Ghosal v. Mafakshar Hossain* 28 C. 177 (1900) s. c., J. C. W. N. 192, *Narayanasaheb v. Natesa*, 16 W. 421 425 (1892) per Best J. but see *Visvanathan Chetti v. Ramanathan Chetti*, 24 W. 646 (1901) where it was held that an appeal would lie against the amended decree not to the Privy Council *Sunder Hoer v. Chanishwar Prasad* 70 C. 679 (1903) nor under the Charter, *Muhammad Naum ul lah Khan v. Husein ul lah Khan* 14 A. 2-6 (1892).

(8) *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar*, *supra* *Dhan Singh v. Basant Singh* 8 A. 519 (1886) *Ialmakund v. Sheo Jatan Lal* 6 A. 1-5 (1882) *Hasan Shah v. Sheo Prasad* 15 A. 121 (1892).

(9) *Muhammad Shuman Khan v. Fatuna* 9 A. 104 (1886).

amended decree The third case is where there is objection both to the original decree and to the amendment on the ground that it was not warranted, there being no variance or clerical error. It is not clear on the authorities what course should be taken, but it would appear reasonable to allow all questions in such a case to be raised in an appeal from the amended decree. An order amending can be objected to in execution of the decree (1) and an appeal lies from an order passed in execution (2).

High Court—Rules 1-8 of this Order do not apply. See O XLIX r 3.

Revision.—It was held that proceedings under sect. 206 of the last Code terminated in an order which could be dealt with on revision, as where the Court acted beyond its jurisdiction in making an addition to the decree not warranted by the judgment (3).

7. The decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree.

Decree—This rule does not apply to High Courts in exercise of original jurisdiction, O XLIX r 3. When a person has the judgment of the Court that he shall have a decree, it may be said that he then obtains his decree. The decree, when it is drawn up afterwards, relates back to that time (4). But a formal decree must follow judgment, and is a necessary part of the ultimate procedure in all suits, though inadvertently it is not in so many terms required by the Code as a necessary proceeding after judgment. Without a decree a judicial record does not speak and wanting it no proceeding subsequent to the judgment can with any certainty be taken. It is in substance as well as form the monthpiece of the suit in its immediate result (5). Whatever be the form of decree, a separate formal decree should be drawn up. A copy of the judgment with the schedule of costs appended is insufficient (6). A decree must be in a civil suit, (7) and differs from an order in that the former expresses the result of the judicial proceeding by way of suit or appeal, and so far as suits and appeals are concerned, the latter are confined to such orders as are given in the course of proceedings, and do not finally dispose of them. See generally notes to sect. 2, ante.

(1) Abdul Hayat Khan v. Chuma Kuar, 8 A 377 (1886); Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Fatima, 11 A 314 (1889).

(2) Ib., Nalinalahya Ghosal v. Mafakhar Hossain, 28 C 177 (1900), s.c., 5 C W N 192.

(3) Bai Shri Vaktuba v. Agarwalji, 31 B 447 (1907).

(4) Munghiram Marwarir v. Gurbahar Nand, 17 C 347, at p. 347 (1889).

(5) Ranjit Singh v. Hahi Baksh, 5 A 520, 526 (1883), but as to applications for partition under the N.W.P. Land Revenue Act, see Nasir Begam v. Abdool Karim Khan, 14 A 500 (1892).

(6) Purmossure Dutt v. Joy Nath Thakur, 15 W R. 326 (1871).

(7) Minalshi Naidu v. Subramanya, 11 M 263 (1887), 14 I A 160.

Date—The decree must bear the date on which judgment is delivered, and not the date on which it is drawn up (1) and a decree operates from this date and not from that on which it may be subsequently amended (2) Limitation thus runs from the date the decree bears that is the date of the judgment, (3) though a sutor is entitled in computing the period within which he can appeal, to deduct the time between the delivery of the judgment and the actual issuing of the decree (4)

"Satisfied himself"—It is the duty of the parties, or rather of their pleaders to see that a decree is drawn up in the proper form, and the signatures of the pleaders are generally obtained before the decree is finally signed (5) But though the duties of the pleaders remain as they were the Judge is not relieved by any action on their part from satisfying himself personally as to the correctness of his decree

"Sign"—After the decree has been duly signed it becomes and must be regarded as a decree of that date Once a judgment is pronounced and the decree signed it becomes a final decree which may become the subject matter of appeal or review It cannot be altered except under the provisions of Sect 152 or O XX r 3 or those relating to review (6)

8 *Where a Judge has vacated office after pronouncing judgment but without signing the decree, a decree drawn up in accordance with such judgment may be signed by his successor or, if the Court has ceased to exist by the Judge of any Court to which such Court was subordinate*

Procedure where Judge has vacated office before signing decree

2071 **9** *Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property, the decree shall contain a description of such property sufficient to identify the same, and where such property can be identified by boundaries or by numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the decree shall specify such boundaries or numbers*

Decree for recovery of immovable property

(1) See *Azul Hossain v Umda Bibi* 1 C W N 93 (1890), *Beni Madhub Mitter v Mitungini Dassi* 13 C 104 (1887), *Ramey v Broughton*, 10 C 602 (1884)

(2) *Raghunath Das v Raj Kumar*, 7 A 276, 279 (1884) see also notes to O XX r 6

(3) *Golam Gaffar Mandal v Goljan Bibi* 25 C 109 (1897), *Azul Hossain v Umda Bibi* 1 C W N 93 (1890)

(4) *Beni Madhub Mitter v Matungini Dassi* s. *pra* contra if the party has not

applied for a copy, *Yamaji v Antaji* 23 B 442 (1893), *Bechi v Ahsanullah Khan* 12 A 461 (1890)

(5) *Ram Lochan Doss v Munsoor Ali* 10 W R 96 (1868) *Goluck Chunder v Gungu Naram* 20 W R 111 (1873) *Tarsi Ram v Hari Singh* 8 A 492 495 (1886), *Prince Mahommed Ruhunoo Iddin v Beir Liotab* 18 W R 303 (1872)

(6) *Raghunath Das v Raj Kumar* 7 A 276 279, 280 (1884)

Decree for immoveable property—Act VIII of 1859, sect 190 Sect 207 of last Code The words '*can be*' have been substituted for '*is identified*' The decree should show distinctly and accurately what property it deals with giving the boundaries and details of the property which the Court intends shall be covered by the decree, for if these are not given the decree may be impossible of execution (1) Where this is not done the decree holder's remedy lies in an immediate application to the Court which made the decree to have it rectified, (2) Evidence cannot however, be given in the execution department to amend any uncertainty in the decree (3) Where a Judge decreed possession with *uasul* without declaring specifically that plaintiffs were to recover the share which they had purchased in an undivided estate or specific land representing that share, the plaintiffs were held not entitled to be put in possession of any specific lands (4)

10 Where the suit is for moveable property, and the decree is for the delivery of such property, the decree shall also state the amount of money to be paid as an alternative if delivery cannot be had

Suit for moveable property—Act VIII of 1859 sect 191 If there is a dispute as to the moveable property claimed the Court must of course determine it before passing its decree It cannot leave the matter to be settled in execution (5) If it then passes a decree for delivery it must state the amount to be paid as an alternative This is ordinarily the value of the property in question (6) The Court may also pass a decree for damages (7) This section is in accordance with English law which took away from the defendant the option to retain the goods or pay their value Now payment can only be made if delivery cannot be had If the goods are capable of delivery they must be delivered (8) An alternative prayer for value of goods as compensation does not alter the character of a suit (9)

(1) *Sishta Hur Bhuttacharjee v. Hake Doss Dey*, 24 W. R. 479 (1875) *Mahomed Ismail v. Lalla Dhundur* 20 W. R. 39 (1876) *Dwarkanath Roy v. Jannabee Chowdhram* 19 W. R. 81 (1873), *Darbaree Sayal v. Fatu Dhalce*, 23 W. R. 285 (1875), *Kamal Chandra Roy v. Kanyo Lall Roy* 4 C. 69 (1878) see *Ram Lochan v. Munsoor Ali* 10 W. R. 96 (1878), though where a question arises in a subsequent suit as to what was decreed in an earlier one, an ineffective definition may be cured by the acts of the parties Secretary of State v. Durbjoy Singh, 19 C. 312 (1891)

(2) *Darbaree Sayal v. Fatu Dhalce* *supra*
(3) *Dwarkanath Halder v. Kamalakanth Halder* 3 B. L. R. App. 128 (1869)

(4) *Ram Lochan v. Munsoor Ali* 10 W. R. 96 (1878)

(5) *Shoo Gobind v. Sham Narain* 7 A. B. C. R. 75 (1875), see observations on this

point of *Sir Barnes Peacock* & *J. D. Nath Halder v. Kamalakanth Halder* B. L. R. App. 128 at p. 129 & 130

(6) *Bomley Buntak* & *J.*

Mirza Mahomed 11 W. R. 37 (1872)

the defendants failed to prove the

timber, and the court ordered

plaintiff was entitled to

value without the

movable *Kashue* & *J.*

Ramanooj 16 W. R. 37 (1873)

the H. C. *supra*

calling a *regular* *supra*

(7) *Kashue* & *J.*

Kamalakanth & *J.*

(8) *Id.* & *J.*

(9) *Id.* & *J.*

(10) *Id.* & *J.*

210]

11. (1) *Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may for any sufficient reason at the time of passing the decree order that payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments, with or without interest, notwithstanding anything contained in the contract under which the money is payable*

(2) *After the passing of any such decree the Court may, on the application of the judgment debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder, order that payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments on such terms as to the payment of interest, the attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor, or the taking of security from him, or otherwise, as it thinks fit*

Decree for payment of money.—Act VII of 1859, sect 191 Ordinarily, if a party is entitled to relief he is also entitled to a decree awarding it to him at once. Therefore it was held that a Court in making a decree could not allow the defendant a period for payment of the amount decreed, for the effect of such an order is that the decree holder is debarred from executing his decree until the expiration of such period (1) This rule, however, authorizes the Court in a particular class of cases viz decrees for money, to give the debtor time to discharge the amount awarded by directing payment in instalments. But the authority given is strictly limited to these cases. Therefore the section is not applicable in a suit for the recovery of the amount of a bond debt by the sale of property hypothecated by such bond, such a suit not being merely one for money, (2) nor to a suit to enforce a lien or an annuity called *nankar* (3) It was, however held to apply to cases referred to in sect 58 of Act VII of 1869 and to give the Courts powers to make rent decrees payable by instalments (4) The former section it was held did not confer any authority on the Courts to relieve a contracting party from an express stipulation, in a bond payment by instalments, as to the consequence of default in punctual payment of the instalments (5) In the case cited the decree did not in compliance with the Code contain any direction as to the agreement to pay by instalments (6) It has been held that a decree for payment of money includes a decree made under O XXXIV r 6 (7)

(1) *Bachchu v Madad Ali*, 2 A 649 (1880)
See *Tata v Ramachandra* 7 M 152 (1883), where however, the decree holder took no steps to remedy what was alleged to be an illegal order in this respect. Agreements to give time were dealt with in s 257A of the last Code, which is now omitted

(2) *Hardeo Durr v Hukam Singh*, 2 A 320 (1879), *Shankarappa v Danappa*, 5 B. 604 (1881) [*Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act*] *Mahadaji Karandikar v Chikni*, 7 B 332 (1883)

(3) *Bachchu v Madad Ali*, 2 A 649 (1880)
(4) *Gareebullah Sirkar v Mohan Lal Shah*, 7 C 127 (1881)

(5) *Ragho Govind v Dipchand*, 4 B 96 (1879)

(6) *Kedar Nath Banerjee v Kulman Sardar*, 5 C L J 25 (1906)

(7) *Bidhu Sudbury v Mahatabuddin* 16 C W N 44 (1911) and see *Datto Atmaram v Shankar Dattatrya*, 38 B 32 (1913) (consent decree for instalments)

"The Court."—That is to say the Court which passed the decree (1) The order may be made in or at the time of passing the decree, or subject to consent after the decree. If the case is one in which the Court itself could not have made a decree for payment by instalments, much less can the Court of execution vary that decree so as to give it an illegal effect in carrying it into execution (2) On the other hand an order under this rule alters the decree, which can only be executed subject to such alteration (3) and therefore if the Court erroneously grants time to pay, the order if not corrected must be executed as passed (4)

"Sufficient reason"—The existence of this will depend upon the facts of the particular case. The Court will consider the circumstances under which the debt was contracted the conduct of the debtor his financial position and so forth, and instalments should be directed where the defendant shows his *bona fides* by offering to pay anything like a fair proportion of his debt at once (5)

"Postponed" "Instalments"—Payment by instalments means that the defendant is to be directed to pay the amount decreed by partial payments to be made at specified periods. The former section did not authorize a Court to say that the defendant has the option of paying the amount decreed within a particular period after the decree (6) Now the rule expressly provides for an order postponing payment of the decretal amount. A temporary postponement is a smaller concession than a scheme of instalments and in many cases such a discretion might be fitly exercised without waiting as under the former Code for a judgment debtor's arrest under sect 337A of that Code. The powers given should be exercised with a due consideration for the interests of the creditor as well as those of the debtor. Thus an order allowing nine years to pay a debt of Rs 440 was reversed, and the period reduced by half (7) The rule gives the Court a discretion, and it is not unusual to state in the order for payment by instalments that in default of payment of one instalment the whole debt shall become payable (8) The Court has a discretion to order or refuse interest, but if it be the intention to give interest this should be expressly declared (9)

(1) See *Gandharap v Sheodanshan* 12 A 571 (1890), which may be the High Court. *Ion v. Dongra v Gillespie* 31 B 348 (1907) as to orders under s 15B of the Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act see *Bhagi rathibai v Hari Ravi*, 19 B 318 (1894)

(2) *Mahadaji Karandakar v Chikne*, 7 B 332, 335 (1883)

(3) *Tata v Ramachandra*, 7 M 152, 154 (1883), see *Gandharap v Sheodanshan* 12 A 571 (1890)

(4) *Tata v Ramachandra*, *supra*

(5) See *Sabatollah Sircar v Thompson*, 1 H 13, 98 (1862-3), *Jafree Begum v Ahmed Ameen* 1 Agra 270. *Khoda Buksh v Abdool Rahman* S D N W 1863, p. 483, cited in

O Kinealy C P C

(6) *Bachchu v Madad Ali* 2 A 643, 651 (1890)

(7) *Kooveram v Kishun Lall*, S D N W (1861) p 650, cited in *O Kinealy*, C P C and see *Hur Gobind v Hurkho* 1 Agra 116

(8) See as to execution of such decrees, *Mon Mohun Roy v Durga Churn Goote*, 15 C 502 (1888), *Sitab Chand v Hyder Mulla* 24 C 281 (1896), and as to waiver of right to execute entire decree, see *Bir Narain v Durga Narain*, 20 C 74 (1892), *Kashiram v Pandu*, 27 B 1 (1902)

(9) See *Burno Moyce Dassce v Kishen Co omaree Babec*, 14 W R 324 (1870)

"Interest" in sect 20 of the Limitation Act of 1908 means the interest, or any part of the interest due (1)

Order after decree — As the effect of such an order is to alter the decree, this can only be done with the consent (2) of both parties. Where a debtor applied for time to pay and notice was served on the decree holder, who did not object the order was made absolute (3). In the under mentioned cases the question was considered whether the order passed was (4) or was not (5) an order under the second clause of this rule. The limitation for an application to pay in instalments by consent is six months from the date of the decree (6).

12 (1) *Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of*
Decree for possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne
and mesne profits profits the Court may pass a decree—

- (a) *for the possession of the property,*
- (b) *for the rent or mesne profits which have accrued on the property during a period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an inquiry as to such rent or mesne profits,*
- (c) *directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until—*
 - (i) *the delivery of possession to the decree holder,*
 - (ii) *the relinquishment of possession by the judgment debtor with notice to the decree holder through the Court, or*
 - (iii) *the expiration of three years from the date of the decree*

whichever event first occurs

(2) *Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent and mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry*

Application of rule — This rule embodies, with alterations, the substance of sects 211 and 212 of the last Code. The corresponding sections of the Act VIII of 1859 were sects 196, 197. The rule only applies to suits of the nature described where the plaintiff has a specific interest and not to a suit for partition where

(1) *Abdul Wahid v. Malatib Bibi* 35 A 378 (1913) distinguishing *Kallu v. Hukka* 18 A 295 (1896) and *Anwar Hussain v. Lalmu Khan* 26 A 167 (1903)

(2) See *Chandra Kuar v. Tukha Ram* 3 A 80J (1881)

(3) *Tata v. Ramachandran* 7 M 122 (1883)

(4) *Jhota Sahu v. Bhulun Gir* 11 C 143 (1884)

(5) *Abdul Rahaman v. Dullaram Marwari*, 14 C 348 350 (1886), *Jogobundhoo Dass v. Hori Rawoot* 16 C 16 (1888)

(6) *Abdul Rahaman v. Dullaram Marwari*, supra

the plaintiff has no specific interest until decree (1) A suit for mesne profits only is not within the section (2)

"Recovery of possession of immoveable property."—The section does not apply to other suits for damages, in which suits the question of damages must ordinarily be determined at the trial (3) O XXVI r 2, however, allows a commission to issue to ascertain the amount both of any mesne profits or damages (4)

"Mesne profits."—The Code of 1859 did not contain any definition of this term The Code of 1877 added an Explanation, which was the same as that attached to sect 211 of the last Code down to the word "*thereupon*" That section repeated that explanation with an addition, viz "*together with interest on such profits*" (5) The definition of mesne profits has now been removed to sect 2, clause (12)

Mesne profits are in the nature of damages which the Court may mould according to the justice of the case (6) There is no analogy between interest awarded under sect 34 and mesne profits claimed and awarded under this rule (7)

The object of a suit for mesne profits is to compensate the owner of land for being kept out of possession and deprived of the profits of the land The measure of the compensation is ordinarily the loss which he has suffered (8) Where a party is dispossessed of immoveable property, the cause of action as to *wasilat* accrues to him on the date on which he would, but for the fact of dispossession, have received such *wasilat* (9) Parties in possession are liable for *wasilat* to the legal owners whom they keep out of possession, even though there was no *mala fides* on their part (10) and whether the wrongdoer derived any profit himself from the possession of the land or not, (11) though, as the

(1) *Purhi Pal v Thakur Jawahir*, 14 I A 37, at p 59 (1886), *dist in Shankar Buxh v Hardeo Buxh*, 10 I A 71, at p 83, where the parties though joint were entitled to specific shares As to mesne profits in partition cases, see *Bhivray v Sitaram*, 19 B 532 (1894) For effect of this rule, see *Ramana v Babu*, 37 M 186 (1914)

(2) *Chaku v Dullabh*, 9 B 11 C R 7 (1872)

(3) *Bhacnuk Singh v Jugger Singh*, 10 W R 299 (1868), *Ramtulal Lal v Sheo Nath Singh*, 1 A 11 C R 22 (1869), and see *Dina Nath Chuckerbutty v Protap Chunder Goswami*, 4 C W N 79 (1893)

(4) In *Indurjet Singh v Radhey Singh*, 21 W R 269 (1874), the deputation of an inquiry to an Ameen was held, under the circumstances, unnecessary

(5) See *Grish Chunder Lahiri v Soshu Shikharishwar*, 2 Bom L R 704, 713 (1900), s c, 4 C W N 631, 27 C 951, *Radha Ramani v Surnamoyi Debi*, 7 C W N 473 (1903), s c, 30 C 600.

(6) *Grish Chunder Lahiri v Soshu Shikharishwar Roy*, 27 I A 110, 124 (1900), *Abdul Ghafur v Raja Ram* 23 A 252, 255 (1901)

(7) *Dwarkanath Biswas v Debendro Nath Jagore*, 33 C 1232 (1906)

(8) *Abdul Ghafur v Raja Ram*, 23 A 252, 255 (1901), *Moharab Ali v Bostub Churn* 11 W R 25 (1869) a suit for mesne profits is in the nature of an action of trespass for damages *Radha Churn v Zumroonissa* 11 W R 83, 84 (1868)

(9) *Luckhee Kant Doss v Duen Dyal Doss*, 14 W R 82 (1870), see *Thakoor Doss v Shoshee Bhooosun*, 17 W R 208 (1872)

(10) *Byjnath Pershad v Radhoo Singh*, 10 W R 486 (1868)

(11) *Ghoogly Bahoo v Chunder Pershad*, 21 W R 246 (1874), and see *Bheekumbhur Singh v Roy Chunder*, 15 W R 196 (1871) [lessee preventing ryots from paying rent to lessor], *Suroop Chunder Roy v Mohender Chunder*, 22 W R 539 (1874) [mortgagor not directing lessee to pay to mortgagee after foreclosure]

principle is that the defendant should make up to the plaintiff what he has lost, & the Court is right in excluding kinds of such a nature as would under ordinary circumstances yield no profit (1)

All persons in wrongful possession, irrespective of how they got in, are liable (2) such as a mortgagor from date of foreclosure, (3) an auction purchaser whose purchase is declared invalid, (4) a person in *bona fide* possession without knowledge of defect in his title, (5) an *iqaradar* together with his *amildar* (6) a body of intermediate holders combining to keep the true owner out of possession (7) a *sebau* claiming the land is such (8) In the under mentioned case the defendants were not all in possession yet as they had all combined to oppose the plaintiff's possession they were held all jointly liable for the *mesne* (9) But where a person is in rightful possession until a sale or decree is set aside, though he is bound to account for mesne profits the calculation of which is to be based on a proper discharge of the stewardship of the property he is not a trespasser and as such liable to make good any loss sustained by the rightful owner being kept out of possession (10) In the case moreover of any wrong the liability of a defendant is limited to damages for the wrong which he has himself done and if the defendant was excluded from possession he cannot be said to have actually or even impliedly received the profits nor could he with diligence have received them (11) So the Privy Council have held that a person who had not himself received the mesne profits having come into possession of a *taluk* upon its being released from management under the Oudh Talukdar's Relief Act 1870 would not be chargeable with sums which as it was alleged might have been received by way of mesne profits but had not been received in consequence of the manager's wilful default Whatever case might have been made against the manager of the estate, the *talukdar* could not be charged with anything more than was actually received by him (12) Mesne profits ought not to be estimated for any period during which the defendant who is to be made responsible for them was not active in keeping the plaintiff out of possession Therefore a defendant cannot be made to pay in respect of years when possession was in the hands of an officer of the Court (13) But where a defendant who had

(1) Becharani Doss v Brojonath Pal 9 W R 369 (1868)

(2) Bebes Pearun v Ahmed Ali Khan 4 W R 7 (1866), Suttia Nundo v Suroop Chunder, 14 W R 76 (1870)

(3) Suroop Chunder v Mohender Chunder 22 W R 539 (1874), but where the mortgagee was the tenant see Ramuddin Chowdhry v Khoda Nawaz 12 C L R 479 (1883) Woomesh Chunder Roy v Markund Mookerjee, 12 W R 35 (1869)

(4) Jey Naram v Torabun 4 Igra 216

(5) Mugun Chunder v Surbassur Chucker butty, 8 W R 479 (1867) Byjnath Pershad v Badhoo Singh 10 W R 486 (1868)

(6) Biddya Voyee v Ram Lal Masser 17 W R 148 (1872)

(7) Ram Chunder Burmah v Ram Chunder Pal 23 W R 226 (1875)

(8) Rancee Shubeshuree v Muthooranath Acharjee 5 W R 202 (1866)

(9) Shama Sunkur Chowdhry v Sreenath Banerjee 12 W R 354 (1869)

(10) Perumaladayar v Arasnam Chettyar, 17 W 251 (1894) and see Dakhina Mohun Roy v Sarola Mohun Roy, 20 I A 160

(11) Abbas v Fassihuddin 24 C 413 (1897) and see Haradhun Dutt v Joy Kuto Banerjee 11 W R 444 (1869) Indurjeet Singh v Radhey Singh 21 W R 269 (1874)

(12) Kishnanand v Kunwar Partab Narain, 10 C 758 (1884) s c 11 I A 85

(13) Indurjeet Singh v Radhey Singh 21 W R 269 (1874)

been in wrongful possession abandoned the land without notice to the decree holder, it was held that the land must be held to have continued in the judicial possession of the judgment debtor, who was liable for mesne profits (1). In a suit for damages against several persons for jointly combining to keep plaintiff out of possession they are all equally liable to him and none of them can restrict their liability for mesne profits to that portion only of which by their joint agreement, they were in possession (2). In some cases, however, the liability has been decided in proportion to the amount of profits that each has derived from his own individual wrongful possession (3). The Court is competent to apportion the damages in respect of the portions of land held by the defendants, *aliter* where the defendants have jointly taken possession of a particular portion of such land (4). It was held that a plaintiff must bring a suit against joint wrongdoers, though what he does in execution of his decree is another matter (5).

If the Court finds that a plaintiff has been dispossessed he is *prima facie* entitled to mesne profits in respect of the period of dispossession and it is not necessary for him to prove the actual collections made during this period, for this is proof which he would possibly be unable to supply. It is sufficient to show what is the annual profit which in ordinary years can be collected, as, for instance, the profits for the years preceding or subsequent to the period of dispossession (6).

Mesne profits include profits actually received or which might have been received. In other words if the mesne profits actually received are those which ought to have been received, the plaintiff gets them. If however, they are less than what the plaintiff could have got they must be assessed on the basis of his possible profits. The Court has to ascertain what the person in wrongful possession could have realized by ordinary diligence and not merely what he actually received (7). This really means what the plaintiff could have realized, for the person in wrongful possession may place himself in the position of, and for this purpose is taken to be in the position of the true holder so as to charge him with the profits which might have been made by the true owner (8).

(1) *Rajah Padmanund v. Madhu Singh*, 3 C W N 422xvii (1899).

(2) *Ajoodhya Doss v. Lalljee Paurty*, 19 W R 218 (1873).

(3) *Nawab Nazim v. Raj Coomartee Dulce*, 6 W R 113 (1866), *Bulwant Singh v. Sheo Sahoye*, 2 W R Misc 52 (1864), *Gunesh Dutt v. Bulwant Singh*, 14 W R 175 (1870).

(4) *Krishna Mohun Basak v. Kunjo Behari Basak*, 9 C L R 4 (1881).

(5) *Suttia Nundo v. Suroop Chunder*, 14 W R 76 (1870).

(6) *Bhawance Deen v. Mohun Sahoo*, 1 A H C R 273 (1869), and see *post*, 'Proof necessary'.

(7) *Grish Chunler Lahuri v. Soshi Shidha*

rishwar 4 C W N 631 (1900), s c, 2 Bom L R 703, 27 C 951, *Thakoor Doss Roy v. Nohun Krsto Ghose*, 22 W R 126 (1874) [the Court must see what it may reasonably be supposed the plaintiff could have collected], *Lucky Narain v. Kally Puddo*, 4 C 882 (1879), s c, 4 C L R 60, *De Silva v. Syud Teharjee*, 9 W R 374 (1868), *Doorga Soonduree v. Shibeshurce Debia*, 8 W R 101 (1867) [everything will be assumed against the wrongdoer]. As to the meaning of ordinary care and diligence, see *Dwarkanath Mitter v. Ram Dhun Biswas*, 8 W. R. 103 (1867).

(8) *Ib.*, *Lalljee Shahay Singh v. Walker*, 6 C W N 732, at p. 734 (1902).

It was said to be not clear whether a Court of Equity would earmark the profits of a trespasser invested in real property and follow them (1)

Wilful default is charged against persons in rightful possession, though accountable for their dealings with the property. Mesne profits are chargeable against those wrongfully (2) in possession. Indeed, the adoption of the principle of wilful default would be more favourable to the defendant than the principle of the Code, for there may be values recoverable by ordinary diligence which yet it would not be wilful default not to recover (3)

Mesne profits, how calculated.—There is no abstract principle independent of the particular facts which determines the assessment of mesne profits in every case. The Court ought first to ascertain the facts and the nature of the plaintiff's possession of the land before ouster, and then determine the principle applicable in the particular case (4). When the facts are disclosed, the determining principle is this—What was the character of the possession of the plaintiff before he was ousted? and what has the owner lost? (5). Mesne profits are thus whatever profits the wrongdoer might with ordinary diligence have received from an occupation or position similar to that of the party wrongfully dispossessed, whether it be that of a cultivating ryot, landlord or zemundar (6) or talookdar (7). Where a person claiming mesne profits was himself the cultivator before dispossession, he is entitled to the profits which he would have made cultivating the land if he had not been dispossessed. The measure of damages is the value of the crops (8). And there is no distinction in respect of assessment of mesne profits between *rayati* land held by a *rayat* and the proprietor's *zamt*, or private land ordinarily cultivated by him except as to the costs of cultivation (9). Where land is *rayati*, and the true owner is a rent receiver, assessment of mesne profits should be made on the basis of fair and reasonable rent (10). *Prima facie* it is fair to infer that a

(1) *Ran Bijai Bahadur v Jagjitpal Singh* 13 C 111, 119 (1890)

(2) See *Grish Chunder Lahiri v Shikharishwar* and *Dina Nath Chuckerbutty v Protap Chunder Goswami* 4 C W N 79, 81 (1899)

(3) *Grish Chunder Lahiri v Shikharishwar*, 3 Bom L R 709, 714 (1900), s c, 4 C W N 631, 27 C 551

(4) *Surja Pershad Narain v Reid*, 6 C W N 409 (1902)

(5) *Lalljee Shahay Singh v Walker*, 6 C W N 732, 734 (1902). *Chardon v Wyeet Singh* 12 W R 52 (1869)

(6) *Vile post*

(7) *Bhyrubi Chunder v Huro Prasunno*, 17 W R 257 (1872). *Bireswar v Baroda* 15 C W N 506 (1906)

(8) *Lalljee Shahay Singh v Walker* 6 C W N 732, 733 (1902). *Nursingh Roy v Anderson*, 16 W I 21 (1871). *Soudamneo*

Dabec v Anund Chunder 13 W R 37 (1870), *Shuteo Pershad Chuckerbutty v Kumla Kant Roy* 17 W R 348 (1872), *Watson v Pyari Lal Shaha*, 7 B L R 175 (1870), *Hurruck Lall v Sreenibash Kurmohar*, 15 W R 428 (1871), *Gooroo Dyal Mundur v Baboo Gopal Singh*, 24 W R 271 (1873). See *Bhuro Chandra v Bamundas*, 3 B L R A C 58 (1869) s c, 11 W R 461 and *contra*, *Madhub Chunder v Haradkun Paul* 14 W R 294 (1870)

(9) *Lalljee Shahay Singh v Walker*, 6 C W N 732 (1902). *Mt Rookmonee Kooer v Ram Tulul Roy*, 17 W R 156 (1872)

(10) *Lalljee Shahay Singh v Walker*, 6 C W N 732, 733 (1902). *Rinceo Asmed Kooer v Indurjeet Kooer*, 9 W R 445 (1868) 1 B, B L R, F B 1003, *Maharaja Luckmeswar Singh v Chairman Darbhanga Municipality*, 17 I A 90, at p 37 (1890). *Raghu Nandan Jha v Jalpa Pallaji*, 3

person in possession of land may by ordinary diligence get rent for it according to the prevailing rates for such land, and that the true owner wrongfully dispossessed has been a loser by that amount (1)

If the true owner is placed in the same position as if he had all along been in possession, that is all that he is ordinarily entitled to, and it is not reasonable that he should receive any additional benefit, or that the person in wrongful possession should not only make compensation but be fined as well. On this principle it has been held that ordinarily the collection and other expenses incurred by the trespasser will be allowed, and that it is only when the trespass is of a very aggravated character (2) that the Court, in its discretion, may refuse such expenses (3). The principle has been stated in another form, namely, that costs of collection and expenses should only be allowed when the trespasser entered the land in the exercise of a *bona fide* claim of right, but that when the trespass is malicious and without *bona fides*, though the trespasser may still claim all necessary payments, such as Government revenue or ground rent, it is not imperative on the Court to allow him even such charges as would ordinarily but voluntarily be incurred by an owner in possession (4). But though a person, when sued may be entitled to a deduction he has no right to sue to recoup himself for his losses against the true owner and must bear the burthen of his own wrong (5).

C. W. N. 748 (1907), *Rugbo Nath Dobey*, 1 Agra Misc. 17, *Chardon v. Ajay Singh*, 12 W. R. 52 (1869), *Thakoor Dass v. Nobin Krato*, 22 W. R. 126 (1874), *Di Silva v. Syud Teharano*, 9 W. R. 374 (1869).

(1) *Grahk Chundir Lahiri v. Soshi Shuk harshewar*, 4 C. W. N. 631 (1900), 27 C. 931, 2 Bom. L. R. 709.

(2) See *Altat Ali v. Lalji Mal*, 1 A. 518 (1877), where the trespass was "tortious and malicious", *Dungar Mal v. Jai Ram*, 24 A. 376 (1902).

(3) *Abdul Ghafur v. Raja Ram*, 23 A. 252 (1901), dissenting from *Shitab Das v. Ajudha Prasad*, 10 A. 13 (1887), if that decision means that a tortfeasor should never be allowed a deduction, and *dist in Dungar Mal v. Jai Ram*, 24 A. 376 (1902). See also *Gooroo Dass v. Anund Moyee*, 15 W. R. 203 (1871), *Dinobundhoo Sundee v. Keshub Chunder*, 3 W. R. Misc. 25 (1865), *Ram Dhal Singh v. Purneesuree Pershad*, 7 W. R. 78 (1868). See *Erfoomasa Chowdhrao v. Rukeebonussa*, 9 W. R. 457 (1868) [mesne profits are assets of estate minus costs of collection, Government revenue, losses by diversion, and death of ryots, by drought, etc.], *Thakoor Dass v. Shoshee Bhoosun*, 17 W. R. 208 (1872) [endowed lands, deduction of expenses of worship], *Palmer v. Mohunt Bal Gobind*, 7

W. R. 230 (1867) [judgment debtor left to recover Government revenue], *Erfoomasa Chowdhrao v. Rukeebonussa*, 9 W. R. 457 (1868) [*Suranjamee* allowed, and it was pointed out it was unreasonable that defendant should pay what the plaintiff could not possibly have collected], *Becharam Dass v. Brojonath Pal*, 9 W. R. 369 (1868), *Tiluck Chand v. Soudamini Dasi*, 4 C. 566, 569 (1878), *Dakhna Mohan Roy v. Sarodi Mohan Roy*, 21 C. 142 (1893) [allowance of revenue paid by claimant of estate holding under decree subsequently reversed], s. c., 20 F. 160, *Sharif ud din Kahn v. Fatchyab Khan*, 20 A. 208 (1897) [expenses of decrees for rent under circumstances disallowed], *Kachar Ala v. Sha Oghadhai*, 17 B. 35 (1892) [mesne profits can only be ascertained after making deductions from the gross earnings of all such payments made by the defendant as the plaintiff would have been bound to make if in possession].

(4) *Dungar Mal v. Jai Ram*, 24 A. 376 (1902). See also *Abdul Ghafur v. Raja Ram*, 22 A. 262 (1900), where it was held there was no *bona fides*. See, however, latter case in appeal in 23 A. 253 (1901).

(5) *Tiluck Chand v. Soudamini Dasi*, 4 C. 566 (1878).

The mode of calculation in cases of decrees for and against each of the parties, is to calculate and rateably divide them, and then to allow a set-off to the extent of the profits actually received by each sharer, the deficit in each year being made good by the party who received in excess of his share. (1)

Proof necessary.—In a suit for mesne profits it is, as in other cases, incumbent on the plaintiff to establish not only the existence of his right, but also the extent of it. The first he does by proof that the defendant has wrongfully deprived him of enjoyment (2) and the second by proof of the duration of the wrongful possession and it is for that period only that damages are claimable (3). Where, however, it is shown that a particular *jama* is payable in respect of a property, it lies upon the wrongdoer to show that the sum has not been realized (4). On him, as the party in possession and having the means of information, lies the onus of proving what is the actual amount of mesne profits (5). It cannot be laid down however, as a general proposition that the burden of proof in this respect is always on the defendant. It depends on the circumstances, according to which presumptions may or may not arise in favour of the plaintiff (6).

In calculating *wasilat*, evidence is usually taken of the rent paid. The party in possession is called on to produce his accounts, which are compared with the *potlaks* and *dakhilas* in the ryot's possession. *Jumabandi* papers filed by *patwaris* under the zemindar's supervision have been accepted as *prima facie* evidence of the profits of the estate (7). But settlement papers thirty years old without inquiry into the actual proceeds of the estate during the period of dispossession are useless as a basis to work on (8). When the amount of mesne profits demanded is merely approximately given, the plaintiff is not bound by what he has said in the plaint, but may be given more, though, of course, such statement may be used as evidence against him (9). The ordinary rule, however, being that a plaintiff cannot recover more than he claims in the plaint,

(1) *Byoy Gobind v. Kalso Prasnau*, 16 W. R. 294 (1871).

(2) *Ishan Chandra Burdhan v. Amuddin Mia*, 5 C. W. N. 720 (1901), as to possession and dispossession, *Duarkaram Messar v. Jogessar Lall*, 21 W. R. 276 (1874), *Radhia Churn v. Zumroonasa*, 11 W. R. 82 (1868), *Lep Singh Khasia v. Nisar Khasia*, 21 C. 244 (1893), *Kahdas v. Vallabhdas*, 6 B. 79 (1881).

(3) *Ishan Chandra Burdhan v. Amuddin Mia*, 5 C. W. N. 720 (1901).

(4) *Brojendra Coomarr Roy v. Madhub Chunder Ghose*, 8 C. 343, 351 (1882), every thing being assumed against the wrongdoer, *Doorga Soonduree v. Maharance Shubeshuree*, 8 W. R. 101 (1867).

(5) *Dunobundhoo Nundoo v. Keshub Chunder*, 3 W. R. Misc. 25 (1865).

(6) *Krishna Mohun Basak v. Kunjo Bchari*

Basak, 9 C. L. R. 1 (1881).

(7) *Rajsh Deonaram Singh v. Naek Pershad*, 2 A. H. C. R. 217 (1870).

(8) *Puran Chunder Roy v. Juggessur Wookerjee*, 17 W. R. 293 (1872).

(9) *Pearce Soonduree v. Eshan Chunder*, 16 W. R. 302 (1871); *Huro Gobind Bhukut v. Degumburee Debia*, 9 W. R. 217 (1868); *Jidoomony Dabee v. Hafez Mahomed Ali Khan*, 8 C. 295 (1881); *Gauri Prasad Koon-doo v. Reilly*, 9 C. 112 (1882), s. c., 12 C. L. R. 41; and see *Fakhruddin Mahomed v. Official Trustee*, 8 I. A. 197 (1881), where the schedule to the plaint estimated the *wasilat* then due, but it was given up to the date of possession. As to Court Fee, see *Ramkrishna Bhikaji v. Bhimabhai*, 15 B. 416 (1890); *Luckhee Kant v. Deen Dyal*, 14 W. R. 82 (1870).

he will be limited to it where the rate or amount is not stated approximately (1)

As regards mesne profits before suit as these have accrued due and the plaintiff has a cause of action in respect thereof a plaintiff suing for mesne profits is bound to put forward his whole claim. If he does not a subsequent suit for mesne profits prior to the first suit will not lie (2)

Mesne profits are demandable from the date upon which they become annually due (3). But a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of plaintiff's title has been held not liable for mesne profits from any date earlier than the institution of the suit where the plaintiff has been guilty of laches (4) and mesne profits were only allowed from the date of suit in other cases (5). Under Art 109 of the Limitation Act a defendant is liable for mesne profits received, or which might have been with due diligence received during the three years before date of suit and not before. This period has no reference to the time when rents fall due (6).

Accruing before suit—The assessment of mesne profits was held to be an essential part of the decree in the suit and not a proceeding in execution and therefore something which must be done by the Court trying the case which was authorized to make a decree in it. It cannot be left to another Court which, when the final decree is made may have to execute it (7). In a suit for recovery of possession and for mesne profits from the date of suit it was held that a Munsif could ascertain and award mesne profits even though they were in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court (8). The Court had either to determine the matter itself or direct an inquiry. But it must have done one or the other. Thus a decree awarding immediate mesne profits at the rate admitted by the defendant and larger mesne profits contingently on a higher rate being proved at the time of execution was held to be irregular (9).

(1) *Baboojan Jha v Bijnath Dutt Jha* 1 C 472 (1880), and see *Gooroo Dass Roy v Bungshee Dhar* 15 W R 61 (1871) where the party was held to be setting up a new and distinct claim.

(2) See O II r 2. *Ram Ruttan Ando v Ram Chunder Pal* 25 W R 113 (1876). As to whether a claim for possession and for mesne profits are distinct causes of action see notes to same rule and order. Meaning of cause of action. *Tort*. In *Rama bhadra v Jagannatha* 14 M 283, the mesne profits accrued since the decree in the former suit.

(3) *Maharaj Koer Ramput v Furlong* 3 W R 38 (1865).

(4) *Juggurnath Sahoo v Synd Shah Mahomed*, 14 B L R 386 (1874). Slight delay will be of no account. *Kaleenath Dass v Rajah Meah*, 22 W R 406 (1874).

(5) *Thakur Shero Bahadur v Thakuram Durao*, 3 C 645 (1877), *Sri Raghubadha v*

Sri Brozo Kishoro 3 I A 154 193 194 (1876) *Sarkar v Prosonnomojee Dass* 6 C 794 (1881) or from notice of claim. *Sumbhoo Chunder Surmah v Issur Chunder* 2 Ser 4.

(6) *Abbas v Farahuddin*, 24 C 413 (1897). *Kishnanand v Kunwar Partab Narain* 10 C 783 (1884).

(7) *Mt Bibee Meher Jan v Mt Bibee Gerda* 2 W R 270 (1876).

(8) *Ramawar Mahton v Ddu Mahton* 21 C 550 (1894). In this case no cause of action for mesne profits had arisen on the date of suit distinguished in *Bhupendra v Purna* 15 C W N 506 (1910).

(9) *Synd Lotfoolah v Mt Nuseebun* 10 W R 24 (1868). In *Hareeshur Mookerjee v Mollah Abdulbur*, 17 W R 209 (1872), it was held that the decree had left the matter to be determined in execution and see *Ishari Perahad v Ram Narain Saha*, 6 C W N 672 (1902).

Decree—A decree declaring the liability for mesne profits, but not determining the amount if worked out after the death of a defendant, did not, it was held, bind the heirs not parties (1)

Under the Code of 1859, the Court might reserve the inquiry "for the execution of the decree," a phrase which gave rise to difficulty (2) The Court under the last Code might *direct an inquiry*." The proceedings were part of and a continuation of the suit and no final decree existed to execute or appeal from until they were closed. That part of the decree which denoted possession to be given was final but the other part was interlocutory, and became final when the amount payable was fixed. An application to ascertain the amount of mesne profits was not an application for execution but an application by which the decree holder moved the Court in a pending suit to make a final decree regarding mesne profits (3) And for this reason an application to ascertain the amount of mesne profits awarded by a decree was not affected by limitation (4) The Bombay High Court however held that a decree under sect 212 of the last Code was necessarily subject to the limitation laid down in sect 211 of the same Code, and that mesne profits for more than three years from the date of the decree should not be awarded even though possession was not delivered during that period (5) The investigation into mesne profits, directed by the decree was nothing more than a continuation of the inquiry which was set on foot at the trial into the merits of the plaintiff's case against the defendant, only that it was limited to the matter of damages. It was therefore in the first place incumbent on the plaintiff to give the Court some evidence upon which it could form a reasonable conception of the amount of his loss. And the defendant was not called upon to answer the plaintiff's case until the plaintiff had given some evidence in support of it (6) The direction as to the inquiry into the amount of mesne profits need not it was held necessarily be contained in the decree, (7) as to the form of which see case cited below (8) Once the liability of a party was fixed in the Appellate Court the Lower Court had to confine its inquiry to the assessment of the amount of damages (9)

The language of the amended section makes the procedure plain. The

(1) *Radhakrishna Prasad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai* 13 A. 53 at p. 65 (1890), s. c., 17 I. A. 150

(2) *Dikhai Hossein v. Mujeebunnissa* 4 C. 629 (1878)

(3) *Ib. Mt. Lazoolun v. Keramut Hossein* 21 W. R. 212 (1874), *Krishnan v. Nilakanthan* 8 M. 137 (1884), *Anando Kishore v. Anando Kishore*, 14 C. 50 53 54 (1886), *Radha Prasad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rae*, 13 A. 53 at p. 65 (1890), s. c., 17 I. A. 150, *Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen*, 19 C. 132, at pp. 136, 137 (1891), *G. B. Dwarika Nath Misser v. Baranda Nath Misser*, 22 C. 425, 432, 433 (1895), *Pryag Singh v. Raju Singh* 25 C. 203 204, 205 (1897), *Gopal Chandra Chakravarti v. Preonath Dutt*, 32 C. 175 (1904), *Vythinaada v. Vythinada*, 33 M. 78 (1909), *Mad*

asapur Zomundary Co., Ltd. v. Parash Narain 39 C. 220 (1911), 16 C. W. N. 109

(4) *Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen*, 19 C. 132 (1891), 1 B. *Pryag Singh v. Raju Singh* *supra*, *Waltia Bibi v. Nazar Hasan* 26 A. 623 (1901)

(5) *Narayan Govind Manik v. Sono Sada shiv*, 24 B. 345 (1899), *Uttamrain v. Khordas* 24 B. 149 (1899)

(6) *Indarjeet Singh v. Radhey Singh* 21 W. R. 209 (1874)

(7) *Fatima Bibi v. Abdul Majid*, 14 A. 531 (1892), *Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz*, 19 A. 155 (1896)

(8) *Jagatjit v. Jarabjit*, 19 C. 159 173 18 I. A. 165

(9) *Dwarika Lal v. Nurun ler Narain* 22 W. R. 461 (1874)

Court may either determine the amount in the decree or may give a decree for possession, and then direct an inquiry into mesne profits etc. and dispose thereof in the final decree. In a recent case where a plaintiff had brought a suit for recovery of possession on declaration of his title which was granted and for mesne profits, which were disallowed it was held that sub-section (2) of this rule implies that the decision with regard to possession is a preliminary decree within the meaning of sect. 2 (1).

Accruing after suit.—Sect. 211 of the last Code which referred to mesne profits accruing subsequent to institution of suit, was held to be an enabling one, and it would, it was said (2) be neither unreasonable nor illegal to refuse subsequent profits up to date of decree and decree immediate possession leaving the party in whose favour the decree was made to his remedy by a regular suit if immediate possession was not had. The mere abstention therefore of the Court to award mesne profits after date of suit was held not to be a bar to any suit in respect thereof (3). A claim for mesne profits was held distinct from a claim for recovery of possession, and it was only under sect. 41 rule 1 of the last Code that such claims might be joined in one suit (4). In order to avoid multiplicity of suits the Court was empowered to assess damages not only so far as they accrued up to the commencement of the suit but also those accruing after suit and during the continuance of the trespass. But the section was not imperative or obligatory but discretionary (5). Where the decree was silent touching interest or mesne profits subsequent to the institution of the suit they could not be given in execution, but the plaintiff was still at liberty to assert his right to such mesne profits in a separate suit (6). Apart from the decisions cited the

(1) *Kumud Lal v. Ramani Mohan* 19 C. L. J. 346 (1914).

(2) *Ramabha Ira v. Jagannatha* 14 W. 328, 311 (1890).

(3) *Mon Mohun Sirkar v. Secretary of State*, 17 C. 968, 971 (1890).

(4) *Ib.*, 17 C. 968, 970, 971 (1890). For the opposite view holding that the claims are not distinct causes of action, see notes to O. II r. 2.

(5) *Ib.* at p. 970.

(6) *Sadasiva Pillai v. Ramalinga Pillai*, 21 A. 219, 228 (1875), a.c., 24 W. R. 193; *Lakharuddin Mahomed v. Official Trustee*, 8 I. A. 197, 207 (1881) a.c., 8 C. 178; *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Gonesh Chunder Doss*, 13 C. 283 (1880); *Mon Mohun Sirkar v. Secretary of State*, 17 C. 968 (1890) [neither ss. 13 nor 244 is a bar to a separate suit]; *Kalka Singh v. Paras Ram*, 22 C. 434 (1894), a.c., 22 I. A. 68; *Uttamram v. Kishordas*, 24 B. 149, 152 (1899), a.c., 1 Bom. L. R. 638, 640; *Bhuvray v. Sitaram*, 19 B. 632 (1894); *Ishari Pershad v. Ram Narain Saha*, 6 C. W. N. 672 (1902) [it does not appear for what period these mesne profits

were claimed] and for earlier cases see *W. & O. v. Rajenlur Coomar* 11 W. R. 200 (1863) [and the Court must fix the period in respect of which such profits are to be assessed]; *Lakowree Singh v. Bijoynath Chatterjee*, 11 W. R. 11 (1870) a.c. 4 B. I. R. A. C. 111; *Syud Shah Ameer v. Syul Shih Jameel* 18 W. R. 122 (1872); *Broughton v. Pichlaid Sen*, 19 W. R. 154 (1873); *Bhoobhnessuri v. Chowdhram v. Manson* 22 W. R. 160 (1874); *Ram Ghulam v. Dwarka Rai* 7 A. 170 (1884); *Gannu Lal v. Ram Sahai*, 7 A. 197 (1884); *Byjnath Pershad v. Baddhoo Singh*, 10 W. R. 456 (1863); *Shaikh Abdool v. Mt. Asruddin*, 25 W. R. 215 (1876); *Ram Roop Singh v. Sheo Golam Singh* 25 W. R. 327 (1876); *Janokee Nath Mookerjee v. Raj Kristo Singh* 15 W. R. 292 (1871) [and if mesne profits are given up to a particular time, Court of Execution cannot give any beyond it]; *Ram Lochun v. Munsoor Ali*, 11 W. R. 339 (1869); *Ram Manekya v. Jaggunnath Gope*, 5 C. 563 (1879), but see *Kaleenath Doss v. Rajah Meah*, 22 W. R. 406 (1873), where, though the decree said nothing about mesne profits, they were allowed.

matter was made clear by para 2 of sect 211 of the last Code (See, however, now *post*). But it had to be ascertained on a proper construction whether the judgment and decree was silent on the point. *Nasilat* by law is demandable up to possession and therefore a decree for "possession with *nasilat*" was held to give *nasilat* up to the date of possession and not merely up to the date of suit (1).

A judgment dismissing an appeal is in reality an informal mode of confirming the decree appealed against. Where, therefore, mesne profits were awarded from the institution of the suit until decree only, and the Appellate Court simply dismissed the appeal without providing for subsequent mesne profits it was held that these could not be recovered in execution (2). But where the original Court granted a decree for possession with "future mesne profits," and the Appellate Court approved that decree without expressly mentioning mesne profits it was held that mesne profits were granted by reference to the original decree (3). Where a decree was given for certain of the properties claimed and mesne profits and the suit was dismissed as regards the other properties and on appeal the Appellate Court reversed the decree of dismissal, it was held that the appellate decree imported an award of mesne profits on all property the possession of which was decreed to the plaintiffs (4).

As to Court fees (5) and form of decree under sect 211 of the last Code (6) see cases cited below.

Under sect 211 clauses (a) and (b) of the last Code the Court of execution determined questions relating to the execution. This is not so now under sect 47 of the present Code. The present rule enacts that the Court of trial shall in continuation of the suit inquire into the question (see notes to sect 17). The penultimate section of sect 211 of the last Code has not been enacted, and probably any claim made and not expressly granted in the decree will be deemed to have been refused within the meaning of Explanation V of sect 11.

"Relinquishment of possession"—This clause is new. With a view to the curtailment of delay and expense it is enacted that the claim for mesne profits should not continue till actual delivery of possession if the defendant prefers to relinquish the land with notice to the plaintiff.

"Three years"—In the Code of 1859 there was no time specified down

(1) *Fakharuddin Mahomed v Official Trustee*, 8 I A 197 (1881), s c 8 C 178, but see *Ram Manickya v Jaggunnath Gope*, 5 C 503 (1879), and see for other cases *Bunsee Singh v Mirza Nusuf Ali*, 22 W R 328 (1874), *Raesoonissa Begum v Sharada Soon*, 16 W R 25 (1871) [decree for possession construed to include mesne profits], *Bijai Bahadur v Bhup Indar*, 19 A 296 (1897).

(2) *Syud Shah Ameer v Syud Shah Zameer*, 18 W R 122 (1872).

(3) *Rajah Bhup Indar v Bijai Bahadur*, 5 C W N 52 (1900), s c, 29 I A 209.

(4) *Waliya Bibi v Nazar Hasan*, 26 A 673

624 (1904), but see *Eckowrie Singh v Bhojnath Chatterjee*, 13 W R 11 (1870), where 'appeal decreed' was held not to give mesne profits.

(5) *Ram Krishna Bhikaji v Bhumabhai*, 15 B 416 (1890), *Marden v Janakiramaya*, 21 M 371 (1898), *Mohini Mohan Das v Satish Chandra Roy*, 17 C 704 (1890), *Kewal Kisshan Singh v Sookhan*, 24 C 173 (1896), s c 1 C W N 243.

(6) *Haji Krishna Tagore v Secretary of State*, 16 C 173 at p 183 (1883), s c 15 I A 186.

to which mesne profits could be awarded short of that of obtaining possession. The Code of 1877 introduced the further limitation which now exists, and the rule thus restricts the time for which mesne profits can be allowed in a decree to three years from the date of the decree. Consequently where no period is mentioned the decree cannot be construed as giving the plaintiffs profits for a period longer than what the law allows the Court to give (1). So proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining mesne profits were held to be a continuance of the original suit, and the Court was bound by these provisions. Where, therefore, a decree directed that plaintiffs should get mesne profits from a certain date until delivery of possession the amount to be fixed in execution held that the decree was necessarily subject to the limitation laid down in sect. 211 of the former Code and that mesne profits for more than three years could not be awarded even though possession was not delivered during that period (2). In executing a decree which awards mesne profits and which is affirmed by a final Court of Appeal, the three years from the date of the decree until the expiration of which alone mesne profits are recoverable must be calculated from the date of the decree of the final Court of Appeal, and not from the date of the decree of the original Court (3).

Interest—The Code of 1859 provided that interest might be decreed, (4) but the Code of 1882 first included interest in the definition of mesne profits. There being no rule of law obliging the Court to allow interest upon mesne profits, it is a matter for the discretion of the Court upon consideration of the facts, whether to allow interest or not (5). No difference should be made as regards interest between *vasilat* paid in kind and paid in money (6). A decree for interest on mesne profits from the date they were ascertained was held to mean the date on which they were ascertained by the Court and not by the *lamin* (7).

The words '*together with interest on such profits*' in the definition of mesne profits (see sect. 2) do not refer to interest due after the ascertainment of the amount of mesne profits due under the decree, because the Courts have otherwise

(1) *Uttanram v. Kishordas*, 1 Bom. L. R. 38, 611 (1899), s. c., 24 B. 149, and see *Gursh Chunder Lahiri v. Soshi Shikharashwar*, 4 C. W. N. 631 (1900).

(2) *Narayan v. Sono* 1 Bom. L. R. 846 (1899), s. c., 24 B. 345, *Tridoljya v. Jogendra* 30 C. 1017 (1908).

(3) *Bhup Indir v. Bijai Bahadur* 2 Bom. L. R. 38 (1900), s. c., 23 A. 152, 5 C. W. N. 52.

(4) The right in a suit for mesne profits only, interest on mesne profits could not be recovered, such a suit being not for a debt but for unliquidated damages and interest not being allowable on such. *Chaku v. Dullabh Dwarka* 9 B. H. C. R. 7 (1872). *Gundo Anandav v. Krishnaswami*, 4 B. H. C. R. 35 (1867) but in *Lucky Narayan v. Kally Puddi* 4 C. 552 (1873) interest was given, and see

Hurrodurga Chowdhram v. Sharrat Soondery 4 C. 674 (1878), *Moharuk Ali v. Bostu Churn* 11 W. R. 25 (1869). *Bengal Coal Co. v. Daccaimbah*, Marsh. 105 (1862), *Hurro pensaud Roy v. Shamapensaud Roy*, 3 C. 654 (1878). It was also held that a sum found due for mesne profits was a judgment debt, and carried interest by its own force, *Kukhinda Modoolsonjee*, J. M. 1 A. 2-0 (1813) and interest was decreed in respect of a *toragoras* *K. L. Sumbhoolall v. Collector of Surat*, S. M. J. A. 1 (1859).

(5) *Kishnanand v. Hunwar Lartab*, 10 C. 755 (1884), s. c., 11 I. A. 88, 93.

(6) *Smt. Raj v. Ashoree v. Bonomally Churn Mytee*, 10 W. R. 209 (1868).

(7) *Doorga Soondaree Debia v. Shibesures Debia*, 10 W. R. 391 (1868).

matter was made clear by part 2 of sect 211 of the last Code (See, however, now *post*) But it had to be ascertained on a proper construction whether the judgment and decree was silent on the point. *Wastat* by law is demandable up to possession and therefore a decree for "possession with *wastat*" was held to give *wastat* up to the date of possession and not merely up to the date of suit (1).

A judgment dismissing an appeal is in reality in informal mode of confirming the decree appealed against. When therefore, mesne profits were awarded from the institution of the suit until decree only, and the Appellate Court simply dismissed the appeal without providing for subsequent mesne profits it was held that these could not be recovered in execution (2). But where the original Court granted a decree for possession with "future mesne profits," and the Appellate Court approved that decree without expressly mentioning mesne profits it was held that mesne profits were granted by reference to the original decree (3). Where a decree was given for certain of the properties claimed and mesne profits and the suit was dismissed as regards the other properties and on appeal the Appellate Court reversed the decree of dismissal, it was held that the appellate decree imported an award of mesne profits on all property the possession of which was decreed to the plaintiffs (4).

As to Court fees (5) and form of decree under sect 211 of the last Code (6) see cases cited below.

Under sect 214 clauses (a) and (b) of the last Code, the Court of execution determined questions relating to the execution. This is not so now under sect 17 of the present Code. The present rule enacts that the Court of trial shall in continuation of the suit inquire into the question (see notes to sect 17). The penultimate section of sect 214 of the last Code has not been re-enacted, and probably any claim made and not expressly granted in the decree will be deemed to have been refused within the meaning of Explanation V of sect 11.

"Relinquishment of possession"—This clause is new. With a view to the curtailment of delay and expense, it is enacted that the claim for mesne profits should not continue till actual delivery of possession if the defendant prefers to relinquish the land with notice to the plaintiff.

"Three years"—In the Code of 1859 there was no time specified down

(1) *Rakharruddin Mahomed v Official Trustee*, 8 I A 197 (1881), s c, 8 C 178, but see *Ram Manickya v Jaggunnath Gope*, 5 C 503 (1879), and see for other cases, *Bunsee Singh v Mirza Nusuf Ali*, 22 W R 328 (1874), *Racsoonissa Begum v Sharoda Soon darce*, 16 W R 25 (1871) [decree for possession construed to include mesne profits], *Bijai Bahadur v Bhup Indar*, 19 A 296 (1897).

(2) *Syud Shah Ameer v Syud Shah Zameer*, 18 W R 122 (1872).

(3) *Rajah Bhup Indar v Bijai Bahadur*, 5 C W N 52 (1900), s c, 29 I 1 209.

(4) *Wahya Bibi v Nazar Hassan*, 26 A 623,

624 (1904), but see *Ekowar Singh v Bhojnath Chatterjee*, 13 W R 11 (1870), where 'appeal decreed' was held not to give mesne profits.

(5) *Ram Krishna Bhikaji v Bhumabhai*, 15 B 416 (1890). *Marden v Janakramayya*, 21 W 371 (1896), *Mohini Mohan Das v Sata*, *Chandra Roy*, 17 C 704 (1890), *Kewal Kishan Singh v Sookhari*, 24 C 173 (1896), s c, 1 C W N 243.

(6) *Kali Krishna Tagore v Secretary of State*, 16 C 173 at p 183 (1888), s c, 15 I A 186.

to which mesne profits could be awarded short of that of obtaining possession. The Code of 1877 introduced the further limitation which now exists, and the rule thus restricts the time for which mesne profits can be allowed in a decree to three years from the date of the decree. Consequently where no period is mentioned the decree cannot be construed as giving the plaintiffs profits for a period longer than what the law allows the Court to give (1). So proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining mesne profits were held to be a continuance of the original suit, and the Court was bound by these provisions. Where, therefore, a decree directed that plaintiffs should get mesne profits from a certain date until delivery of possession, the amount to be fixed in execution held that the decree was necessarily subject to the limitation laid down in sect 211 of the former Code and that mesne profits for more than three years could not be awarded even though possession was not delivered during that period (2). In executing a decree which awards mesne profits and which is affirmed by a final Court of Appeal, the three years from the date of the decree until the expiration of which alone mesne profits are recoverable must be calculated from the date of the decree of the final Court of Appeal, and not from the date of the decree of the original Court (3).

Interest—The Code of 1859 provided that interest might be decreed, (4) but the Code of 1882 first included interest in the definition of mesne profits. There being no rule of law obliging the Court to allow interest upon mesne profits, it is a matter for the discretion of the Court upon consideration of the facts, whether to allow interest or not (5). No difference should be made as regards interest between *casalat* paid in kind and paid in money (6). A decree for interest on mesne profits from the date they were ascertained was held to mean the date on which they were ascertained by the Court and not by the *Amin* (7).

The words "*together with interest on such profits*" in the definition of mesne profits (see sect 2) do not refer to interest due after the ascertainment of the amount of mesne profits due under the decree, because the Courts have otherwise

(1) *Uttaramani Kishordas*, 1 Bom L R 38, 611 (1893), s c, 24 B 149 and see *Gurish Chunder Lahuri v Soshi Shikhareshwar*, 4 C W N 631 (1900).

(2) *Narayan v Sonu*, 1 Bom L R 846 (1893), s c 24 B 345, *Frulokya v Jigenra* 35 C 1017 (1908).

(3) *Blup Indar v Bhai Bahadur* 2 Bom J R 38 (1900) s c 23 A 152, 5 C W N 52.

(4) Though in a suit for mesne profits only, interest on mesne profits could not be recovered, such a suit being not for a debt but for unliquidated damages, and interest not being allowable on such. *Chaku v Dullabh Daarka*, 3 B H C R 7 (1872). *Gundo Anandray v Krishnasay*, 4 B H C R 55 (1867), but in *Lucky Narayan v Hally Puddo*, 4 C 552 (1871) interest was given, and see

Hurrodurga Chowdhram v Sharat Soondery 4 C 674 (1878), *Moharuk Ali v Bostu Churn* 11 W R 25 (1869). *Bengal Coal Co v Darembah*, Marsh 105 (1862), *Hurro persaud Roy v Shamapersaud Roy*, 3 C 654 (1878). It was also held that a sum found due for mesne profits was a judgment debt and carried interest by its own force. *Kukland v Modes Pestoujer* 3 M I A 100 (1843) and interest was decreed in respect of a *toras goras huk*. *Sumbhoolall v Collector of Surat* 3 M I A 1 (1859).

(5) *Kahmanand v Kunwar Partab*, 10 C 785 (1884), s c, 11 L A 88, 93.

(6) *Son. Rayo Babhorre v Bonomally Churn Mytee*, 10 W R 209 (1865).

(7) *Doorga Soondure Debia v Shibes suree Debia* 10 W R 391 (1865).

been given a discretion to award interest separately on the amount so ascertained. The words, therefore, contemplate that interest should form a separate item in the calculation of the amount due as mesne profits, and a decree holder is entitled to receive interest year by year on the amount found to be due, and not only on the amount actually ascertained and embodied in the decree (1). The Court has jurisdiction to give or refuse interest on mesne profits as it chooses. But if it does not intend to grant interest it should expressly refuse it, for, having regard to the additional words "*together with interest on such profits*," a decree which merely grants mesne profits, and is silent as to interest, must be taken to mean that the mesne profits shall carry interest on them (2). Where a decree granted mesne profits and said nothing about interest, the amount of mesne profits being left for determination in execution of the decree. *Held*, that the decree holder was entitled to interest upon the mesne profits due to him until such mesne profits were actually paid to him by the judgment debtors (3).

213.] 13 (1) *Where a suit is for an account of any property and for its due administration under the decree of the Court, the Court shall, before passing the final decree, pass a preliminary decree ordering such accounts and inquiries to be taken and made, and giving such other directions as it thinks fit*

(2) *In the administration by the Court of the property of any deceased person, if such property proves to be insufficient for the payment in full of his debts and liabilities, the same rules shall be observed as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and as to debts and liabilities proveable, and as to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities respectively, as may be in force for the time being within the local limits of the Court in which the administration suit is pending with respect to the estates of persons adjudged or declared insolvent, and all persons, who in any such case would be entitled to be paid out of such property, may come in under the preliminary decree, and make such claims against the same as they may respectively be entitled to by virtue of this Code*

Administration suit—Sect 10, 38 & 39 Vict c 77. In ordinary cases an administration decree is a matter of course on its being shown that the

(1) *Radhad Raman Munshi v Burnomoyi Debi*, 7 C W N 437 (1903), s c, 30 C 506

(2) *Grish Chunder Lahari v Soshi Shikharshwar Roy* 27 C 951 (1900) s c 4 C W N 631, and at 33 C 329 (1900), 2 Bom L R 709. But see *Abdul Ghafur v Raja Ram* 22 A 262 (1900) relying on *Hurro Durga Chowdhary v Surat Sundari Debi*, 8 C 332 (1881) [followed in *Brojendra*

Coomar v Madhub Chunder, 8 C 343 (1882)] which however, it is to be observed was [as pointed out in *Radha Raman Munshi v Burnomoyi Debi*, 30 C 506 507 (1903)] before the enactment of the present Code. The old law was different. *Becharam Doss v Broj Nath Pal* 9 W R 369 (1868)

(3) *Grish Chunder Lahari v Soshi Shikharshwar Roy*, 33 C 320 (1900)

plaintiff has an interest in the estate and that the defendant is an accounting party, and such a decree can only be averted by payment or the admission of assets and submission to a personal decree. But the Court has power to stay or dismiss frivolous or vexatious actions, and will see whether there is *bona fides*, whether real and substantial questions exist for determination and whether an administration decree is the necessary and proper relief (1). In such a case it is necessary to pass a preliminary decree directing all such inquiries to be made and accounts taken which cannot be conveniently done in Court but which have to be carried out before the Court is in a position to pass its final decree. The first paragraph provides for this. An order under the first paragraph is a decree, and is appealable as such. See sect 2 *ante* and notes thereto.

Insolvent estates—The second paragraph of this rule is taken from sect 10 of the Judicature Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vict c 77). Before the Judicature Act in administration in Chancery a secured creditor who had not realized his security, could prove against the assets for the whole debt and receive a dividend. He could then realize his security and if he received in the whole more than 20s in the £, he paid over the excess. In bankruptcy he had to realize his security and prove for the balance. The Act made the rule in bankruptcy applicable to administration actions. It did not (nor does this section) apply all the principles of bankruptcy to insolvent estates but established uniformity of administration in respect of the four heads which are specifically mentioned in this section (2). A decree for administration is a decree in favour of all creditors, and as all of them are included in the same decree it is inequitable that one should be in a better position than another under that decree and therefore the Court divides the assets amongst them (3).

14 (1) *Where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption* [s 21] in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall—

(a) specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid, and

(b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a) the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment but that, if the purchase money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs.

(1) See *Attorney-General v. Daboo & Begum Behari Durr*, Suit 870 of 1904 Cal. H. C., 3 Jan. 1906.

(2) See Annual Practice, 1905 vol. II, p. 457 and cases there collected.

(3) *Soobul Chunder Law & Usuck Mall Mitter*, 15 C. 202, 203 (1885) distinguished in the case where a creditor has obtained judgment before administration of an estate.

(2) Where the Court has adjudicated upon rival claims to pre-emption, the decree shall direct,—

- (a) if and in so far as the claims decreed are equal in degree, that the claim of each pre-emptor complying with the provisions of sub-rule (1) shall take effect in respect of a proportionate share of the property including any proportionate share in respect of which the claim of any pre-emptor failing to comply with the said provisions would but for such default, have taken effect, and,
- (b) if and in so far as the claims decreed are different in degree, that the claim of the inferior pre-emptor shall not take effect unless and until the superior pre-emptor has failed to comply with the said provisions

Pre-emption—Sect 214 Code of 1877 and 1889 amended is indicated in italics. The former section, which was frequently criticized as inadequate, has been considerably altered. In sub-clause (1) para (b) the day is fixed. As to the power of the Appellate Court to specify another day (1) see note. As regards delivery of possession in the same paragraph, the duty of executing and registering any necessary instrument (2) has been held to be upon the defendant. In sub-clause (2) provision has been made for the form of decrees in the case of claims decreed in favour of rival pre-emptors (3).

The Mahomedan law is the only system prevalent in India which provides substantive rules relating to the right of pre-emption in a systematic form, though local Acts and the Code recognize the existence of the right and lay down rules belonging to the remedy. In all cases in which the right of pre-emption is claimed, the Courts in administering equity will by analogy follow the rules of Mahomedan law, even in cases where the right is not claimed under that law but under local usage or custom. The rules of customary pre-emption no doubt depend upon the custom itself but where such custom is silent upon any particular point, the rule of Mahomedan law must by analogy be taken to be the rule of decision (4).

Rules in regard to decrees in pre-emption suits were formulated for the first time in the Code of 1877 and it is conceivable that in introducing these new rules the form which they took fell short of comprehending all the various cases that might arise in consequence (5). Sect 214 of the last Code thus laid down no rules as to the form of the decree in cases where rival pre-emptors possessing equal rights of pre-emption, came forward to enforce the right in

(1) See *Parshadi Lal v Ram Dial* 2 A 744 (1880), *Kodai Singh v Jaisri Singh* 13 A 376 (1889).

(2) See *Ramasami Pattar v Chinnan Asarie* 24 A 449 463 (1901).

(3) See *Kashi Nath v Nikta Prasad* 6 A 30 (1884), *Hulassi v Sles Prasad* 6 A 45 (1884), *Ajab Nath v Mathura Prasad* 11 A 164 (1888).

(4) *Zamir Husam v Daulat Ram* 5 A 110 113 (1882) *Rajjo v Lalman* 5 A 180 182 (1882). The substantive law not being within the scope of the work is not further discussed. A few cases will be found in the notes to s 214 of O'Keefe's Civ Pr Code.

(5) *Ishri v Gopal Sirin* 6 A 351 354 (1884) for an instance of omission to let purchase money

respect of the same sale, or where one of rival pre-emptors possessed superior right of pre-emption to the other. The Court had to deal with such cases upon general principles of equity suited to the exigencies of each case (1). The section again provided only for cases where costs have been decreed against a plaintiff, but not for cases where costs, instead of being awarded against the pre-emptor, were awarded in his favour by the decree. But it was held that there being no specific provision in the Code to meet this case, the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience were applicable, and that under the general rules of set off, which are so consonant with these, a plaintiff was entitled, when depositing the purchase money under the decree to deduct the sum awarded to him as costs (2).

The former section it was held contemplated cases where the party seeking to enforce a right of pre-emption is out of possession and was therefore inapplicable to instances in which parties setting up such a right were already in possession (3).

Payment of purchase money—If on the day on which the time for payment expires the Court is closed the pre-emptive price may be paid on the next day that the Court is open (4). If the pre-emptive price is not paid within the prescribed time, then as the right decreed is dependent on payment within such period the decree for pre-emption cannot be enforced (5). Where the plaintiff paid the money into Court, petitioning that it should be retained until mutation of names had taken place and the defendant refused to accept the money on the ground that the payment was clogged with a condition, it was held that the payment was not saddled with a condition precluding payment before mutation and the objection was disallowed (6). In making the payment the plaintiff may deduct his costs (7). The question whether the plaintiff has paid the purchase money in time is not a matter relating to the execution of a decree under sect 244, corresponding with sect 47 *ante* (8). A decree in a suit directed that the purchase money should be paid within a certain period from the date the decree became final. The period of limitation prescribed for an appeal from this decree expired on a day when the Court was closed. Held that the appeal could be filed on the first day it opened and that the decree did not become final till then (9). A plaintiff who has obtained a decree can appeal within the limitation period, whether or not he has made the payment on or before the day fixed (10).

(1) *Kashi Nath v Mukhta Prasad* 6 A 370 373 (1884). See *Hulari v Shro Prasad* 6 A 455 (1884), *Ajaib Nath v Mathura Prasad*, 11 A 164 167 (1888), *Arjun Singh v Sarfaraz Singh* 10 A 182 (1888).

(2) *Ishri v Gopal Saran* 6 A 351 (1884).

(3) *Krishna Menon v Kesaven*, 20 M 306, 310 (1897).

(4) *Mt. Muchal Koor v Lall* 2 N W P 112 (1870).

(5) *Jai Kishen v Bhola Nath*, 14 A. 529 (1882). *O Kincalya v C. P. C.* cites *Shah Ahmed Ali* petitioning S D Sam Dec. Dec 1840 (Carran v R 36) in which the decree holder having failed to deposit the purchase money within the time prescribed a subse-

quent application with a tender of the money was refused.

(6) *Ajoodhia Shookool v Jewbooth Shookool*, 6 A H C R 46 (1873).

(7) *Ishri v Gopal Saran*, 6 A 351 (1884), and *ante*.

(8) *Muhammad Ali v Debi Din Rai*, 4 A 420 (1882).

(9) *Ram Sahai v Gaya* 7 A 107 (1884) which also deals with the question of execution by the decree holder and the transference of a pre-execution decree.

(10) *Jaggar Nath Pandey v Jokhu Tewari* 18 A 223, at p 226 (1886), *Kolai Singh v Jauri Singh*, 13 A 376 (1883), *Wazir Khan v Hale Khan* 10 A 126 (1883).

But the mere appeal by a plaintiff or defendant will not of itself extend the time for payment (1) The Appellate Court may if it thinks fit extend the time for payment (2) But if the appellate decree says nothing about extending time, it has not the effect of giving the plaintiff whether appellant or respondent, the corresponding period of time from the date of the appellate decree for payment to that which he had from the date of the decree of the Court of first instance For this rule says that if the pre-emptive price is not paid the suit shall stand dismissed and the decree on the expiration of the time limited without payment by the plaintiff becomes a decree in favour of the defendant (3) (See first paragraph) If the pre-emptive suit has arisen and been decreed before the vendee has paid the whole or part of the purchase money to the vendor, the Court in disbursing the purchase-money deposited will make an order directing that the whole or part of the purchase money (as the case may be) should be paid to the vendor or vendee both of whom must necessarily be judgment-debtors, and as such be liable alike to payment of the costs awarded to the pre-emptor decree holder (4) It has been held that the profits of the property accruing between the date of the sale and the date when the pre-emptor, in accordance with the decree paid the pre-emptive price belonged not to the pre-emptor nor to the original vendor, but to the original vendee, (5) and that a suit could not be successfully maintained by a pre-emptor to recover profits accruing between the date of his decree and the time when he obtained mutation of names (6)

15 Where a suit is for the dissolution of a partnership, or the taking of partnership accounts, the Court, before passing a final decree, may pass a preliminary decree declaring the proportionate shares of the parties, fixing the day on which the partnership shall stand dissolved or be deemed to have been dissolved, and directing such accounts to be taken, and other acts to be done, as it thinks fit

Suit for dissolution of partnership—The usual forms of decree in such a suit were given in Nos 132 and 133 Schedule IV, of the last Code It was held that in a suit for an account of a dissolved partnership, a decree should be passed under sect 215 of that Code in accordance with form No 132, Schedule IV, and it should direct an account to be taken of the dealings and transactions between the parties and of the credits, property, and effects due and belonging to the late partnership and it should direct the appointment of a receiver of the

(1) Jaggar Nath Pande v Jeklu Iwar 18 A 223, at p 226 (1896)

(2) Ib 18 A 223, at p 226 (1896)

(3) Jaggar Nath Pande v Jeklu Iwar 18 A 223 (1896) apparently intending from the case of Jaggar Nath Pande v Jeklu Iwar 18 A 223 (1896)

(1889)

(4) Ilri Gopal v Saran G A 101, 102 (1884)

(5) Deokman Das v Sri Lallu, 12 A 231 (1889) F B

(6) Sri Kallen v Uma Ram, 19 A 261 (1897) F B

outstanding debts and effects (1) The italicized words have been added, as the preliminary decree should always contain a declaration of the rights of the parties

16. In a suit for an account of pecuniary transactions between a principal and an agent, and in any other suit not hereinbefore provided for, where it is necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of money due to or from any party, that an account should be taken, the Court shall, before passing its final decree, pass a preliminary decree directing such accounts to be taken as it thinks fit.

Suit for account between principal and agent—In a suit by a principal against an agent for an account on the fact of agency being established, it is the duty of the Court to direct an account to be taken of the defendant's dealings as agent. When once the plaintiff has shown that the defendant is an accounting party, it is then for the defendant to prove the amount of his receipts and disbursements (2) When an appeal is pending in the High Court against a preliminary order made by a Subordinate Court under this section the High Court having seisin of the appeal can, apart from the question whether the case falls within sect 545 of that Code, make an order staying the carrying out of such order pending the hearing of the appeal (3) These suits are not affected by section 10 (4)

17. The Court may either by the decree directing an account to be taken or by any subsequent order give special directions as to accounts special directions with regard to the mode in which the account is to be taken or vouched and in particular may direct that in taking the account the books of account in which the accounts in question have been kept shall be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained with liberty to the parties interested to take such objection thereto as they may be advised.

18. Where the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possession of a share therein, then,—
Decree in suit for partition of property or separate possession of a share therein (1) if and in so far as the decree relates to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to

(1) *Thirukumaresan v. Subbaraya*, 20 W 313 (1897), in which will be found observations on the procedure to be adopted and the burden of proof on the taking of the account

(2) *Rajhunath v. Ganpatji*, 27 A 374 (1901) For re-opening of settled accounts,

see *Kalanand Singh v. Sri Prasad*, 19 C L J 152 (1914)

(3) *Balkrishna Sahu v. Bhugno*, 8 C W N 572 (1904) F B . s. c., 31 C. 722

(4) *Chandra v. Pramatho*, 15 C W. N 930 (1911)

the Government, the decree shall declare the rights of the several parties interested in the property, but shall direct such partition or separation to be made by the Collector, or by any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf, in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions of section 54,

(2) if and in so far as such decree relates to any other immovable property or to moveable property, the Court may, if the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required

Suits for partition—The former Code contained no provision definitely prescribing the form of a decree for the partition of an estate or the separation of a share though a somewhat special procedure was rendered applicable in such cases. Sect 265 of the Code relegated the actual partition or separation of revenue paying estates entirely to the execution department, and entrusted it to the Collector. On the other hand sect 396 of the same Code contemplated in the case of other immovable property a preliminary order ascertaining the rights of the parties which was itself a decree but involved a final decree upon the report of the Commissioners. These sections have been in part modified and the present rule which is now inserted. Any local enactment by which jurisdiction to effect "imperfect partition" of revenue paying land is reserved exclusively to the Revenue Courts and which contemplates a procedure inconsistent with this rule will be saved by the terms of sect 4 ante. The Code contemplates one preliminary decree and no more. Thus where after the confirmation of a preliminary decree for partition on appeal the Court of first instance directed that actual partition should be made in accordance with certain directions then given by it it was held that no appeal would lie against such order but its propriety could be questioned in an appeal from the final decree (1)

61 19 (1) *Where* the defendant has been allowed a set off against the claim of the plaintiff, the decree shall state what amount is due to the plaintiff and what amount is due to the defendant, and shall be for the recovery of any sum which appears to be due to either party

(2) *Any decree passed in a suit in which a set off is claimed* shall be subject to the same provisions in respect of appeal to which it would have been subject if no set off had been claimed

(3) The provisions of this rule shall apply whether the set off is admissible under rule 6 of Order VIII or otherwise

Decree in case of set off—Act VIII of 1859 sect 195 The words

from "*if*" to "*plaintiff*" in the first paragraph of sect 216 of the last Code were substituted, and the whole of the last paragraph of that section was added, by Act VII of 1888, sect 7 (1). An amendment has been made to give effect

agent upon the finding that money was in fact due to him (2)

20 Certified copies of the judgment and decree shall be furnished to the parties on application to the Court, and at their expense (s. 217)

Certified copies of judgment and decree—Act VIII of 1859, sect 198. The parties are entitled to receive copies of the judgment and not merely translations of them (3). The practice of furnishing copies free of cost, on supplying the proper stamp, has been set aside (4).

(1) See *Tiluck Chand v Sowdamnee* (1864)
Dasseer, 25 W R 275 (1870)

(4) See *Nil Monce Singh v Chundash*,

(2) *Parmanand v Jagat*, 32 A 52, (1910) 20 W R 405 (1873)

(3) *Varjivan v Ali Daji* 1 B H C R 163

ORDER XXI

Execution of Decrees and Orders.

Payment under Decree

- 257 | 1 (1) All money payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely —
 Modes of paying money under decree (a) into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, or
 (b) out of Court to the decree holder, or
 (c) otherwise as the Court which made the decree directs
 (2) Where any payment is made under clause (a) of sub rule (1) notice of such payment shall be given to the decree holder

Payable under a decree—Costs ordered to be paid under sect 218 of the last Code (see now sect 35) it was held were not paid under a decree and should be paid under that section (1) An instalment due under a decree may under this rule be paid into Court (2) When an order has been made for the payment of money in a suit on a certain date and the Court is closed on that date a payment made on the following day would be a good payment for the purpose of that order (3) Payment into Court is a valid compliance with a decree even though the decree directs payment to the decree holder (4) On the death of a decree holder the debtor should either pay the debt into Court under cl (a) or ask for directions under cl (c) (5)

- 258 | 2 (1) Where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court, or the decree is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree holder, the decree holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, and the Court shall record the same accordingly
 (2) The judgment-debtor also may inform the Court of such

(1) Shanks v Secretary of State 12 M 120 (1889)

(2) Madhav Appa v Raju Vitl 1 Bo 1 I R 641 (1899)

(3) Aravind v Sanyappa 21 M 385 (1897) Shooshee Bhisan R. R. Chund

Chunder Roy 18 C 231 (1890) Dabee Rao v Heruman Malatoo 8 W R 223 (1867)

(4) Wana v Nitu 30 B 35 (1910)

(5) Narentra v Chari 14 C W N 116 (1908)

payment for adjustment, and apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree holder to show cause, on a day to be fixed by the Court, why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, and if, after service of such notice, the decree-holder fails to show cause why the payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, the Court shall record the same accordingly.

(3) A payment or adjustment, *which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid*, shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree.

Applicability — is to the principle upon which the rule proceeds and the cases to which the prohibition contained in it is applicable see notes *post*.
"Remedies of judgment debtor" The rule applies only to the case of parties who stand in the relation of judgment debtor and judgment creditor at the date of the transaction (1) It applies only to a question of payment or adjustment of a decree and does not recognize an application by the decree holder (2) The former section was held not to govern payments made in execution of decrees passed under Act X of 1859 in the Revenue Courts (3)

"Under a decree"—In Madras it was at one time held that the former section applied only to the execution of money decrees (4) and it was doubted whether the section applied to decrees for restitution of conjugal rights (5) In Calcutta, and latterly in Madras also it was held that the section dealt with the adjustment of any decree and not merely with the adjustment of a money decree (6) The amendment by the addition of the words *of any kind* adapts this latter view. The decree may be of any kind but money must be payable under it. As to instalment decrees see O 21 r 11. The rule presupposes that there is a decree in existence. So where A sued B and obtained a decree which was reversed in the first Appellate Court, and B was about to file a special appeal when A compromised the case and gave up the property it was held that the compromise having been effected after the decree in favour of B had been reversed, it need not have been certified to the Court (7). And if payment is made under a decree which is set aside on appeal the decree holder must make

(1) Rama Ayyan v Sreenivasa Iattar, 13 M 230 (1890), doubted in Ponnuswamy v Jathmanan 35 M 109 (1911), 22 M 1 J 170 by Rahim, J., but see judgment of Sundara Aiyar J., p. 178.

(2) Lodd Govindasa v Ramdasa, 24 M L J 88 (1912), and see Kalar v Shivar, 10 C W N 901 (1912).

(3) Rajah Lalal Chunder v Kanyo Lal Dasa, 1 W L A 7 (1865) Rain Chunder Rev v Lall Churn Bakshie, J W L 172 (1885).

(4) Sri Laxmi Nambiar v Kanara Kurup, 22 M 181 (1918) Mall Karjuna Sastri v

Narasimha Rao 24 M 412 (1901), but now see Vaidhunasamy v Somasundram 28 M 473 477 (1904).

(5) Keshavallal Gurtharallal v Ravi Irvati 18 B 327, at p. 331 (1893).

(6) Bala Mohamed v Webb, G C 766 (1881), Rajah Radmananl Singh v Madhu Singh 30 W N clxxxvii (1899), Vaidhunasamy v Somasundram 28 M 473, 477 (1904) Subburaya v Kuppaswamy 34 M 442 (1911).

(7) Hari Nalal v Ravi Ravi, 51 11 C L J 174 (1908).

restitution even though the payment has not been certified (1) Where rent was payable for a *mitasi* tenure and not under a decree, the provisions of the section were held inapplicable (2) The rule does not apply to the case of a surety who, having paid the amount due under the decree, afterwards sues the principal (3)

"Out of Court"—The rule relates to voluntary adjustments of a decree made between parties to a suit out of Court and not to a case where a debtor pays to the officer of the Court under the authority and pressure of the Court's process (4) When money is paid into Court the latter must pay it out immediately to the decree holder (5) or his ordinary legal heirs, (6) though if the payment is made by the debtor to prevent his arrest it is not a voluntary payment, and he is entitled to be heard before the money is paid out (7)

"Adjusted"—See as to the meaning of this term cases cited (8) It only applies to matters occurring during the course of execution (9)

"The decree holder shall certify"—One joint decree holder is not bound by the acts of another who has compromised or received payment out of Court (10) and a joint decree holder has ordinarily no power to give a discharge out of Court to a judgment debtor for more than his own share of the decree (11) The debtor should therefore not pay unless jointly or to the extent of the admitted shares (12)

The word **decree holder** therefore must be read as decree holder or decree holders The Court will not recognize a payment to one decree holder only in excess of that to which he is himself entitled One of two or more joint decree holders is not competent without being authorized by the other or others to certify satisfaction by payment out of Court of the entire decree, though he may certify satisfaction in respect of his own interest therein (13)

(1) Vasudev Govind v. Vashnu Nathal 11 B 724 (1887)

(2) Kedari v. Gajai 18 B 690 (1893)

(3) Balaji Lakshman v. Dada Jetti 12 B 273 (1887)

(4) B. Dhoo Beebee v. Krishnab Chunder 9 W R 462 (1868)

(5) Luchmun Pershad v. Sreeram 21 W R 271 (1874)

(6) See *In re Paramanee*, S D Sum Dec Sept 27 (1836) cited in O Kincely's notes to sect 258

(7) Prasannonath Mookerjee v. Benode Pam Sen 13 W R 29 (18 0), s c 4 B L R App 25

(8) Katch Muhammad v. Gopal Das, 7 A 424 (1885), Frusappa Mudaliar v. Commercial Bank, 23 M 377 (1899), Ra n Dojal

(9) Prainatha Chandra Roy v. Nigra Mahan Ghose, 29 C 631 (1902) [and there fore on this ground the section was held to be

no bar to an inquiry into a plea of payment raised by mortgagor but see on this point the cases there cited] Hatem Ali Khundkar v. Abdul Gaffar Khan 8 C W N 102 (1903) Mahomed Khan v. Mahomed Munawar 31 M 467 (1908)

(10) Balgobin v. Bhawanee Deen 1 Igri Misc 16

(11) Mt Bibee Budhun v. Mt Hafezah 4 C L R (1879) Tarruck Chunder Bhutta chargee v. Dwendro Nath Sanjal 9 C 831 (1883)

(12) Mahma Chandra Roy v. Pyari Mohan Chowdhry 2 B L R App 43 (1869)

(13) Moti Ram v. Hannu Prasad 26 A 334 (1904), Tarruck Chunder Bhutta chargee v. Dwendro Nath Sanjal 9 C 831 (1883), Sultan Moudien v. Savalayammal 15 M 343 (1891) Tamman Singh v. Lachhman Kunwari 26 A 318 (1904) On the other hand one joint decree holder cannot by foregone, brought to execute defeat the right of another to do so. Indrajit v. Sewaram 5 A H C R 16 (1873)

The ordinary way of certifying a payment or adjustment is by petition (1) made by the decree holder or judgment debtor to the Court whose duty is to execute the decree, (2) but it can also be certified under O XXI r 11, clause (c), on an application to execute the decree. It is for the party applying for execution to state any adjustment after decree (3). If, however, one of the parties is a minor, his guardian must first obtain leave to compromise under O XXII r 7 (4). Application may be made for a certificate of part satisfaction (5). To certify a payment or adjustment within the meaning of the section, it is sufficient for the decree holder to certify that money has been paid or that an adjustment has been arrived at without specifying the amount of the payment or mentioning the terms of the adjustment (6). Under this rule as there is no time fixed within which the decree holder is bound to certify a payment made out of Court, such payment may be certified at any time (7). Intimation to a Collector in charge of the execution under the provisions of the Third Schedule amounts to a due certifying of the adjustment under this rule (8).

It has been held that an application in 1905 for certifying payments in satisfaction of a decree sufficed to give a fresh start for limitation either as an acknowledgment within the meaning of Sect 19 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) or as a step in aid of execution (9).

"Judgment debtor"—This term includes persons claiming through the judgment debtor or in his right e.g. an assignee from the judgment debtor of the equity of redemption after decree (10).

Remedy
judgment
holder does
ninety days within which to take that step (13). Notice must issue to the decree holder to show cause. This does not mean merely to allege cause nor even to make out that there is room for argument but both to allege cause and to prove it to

-
- (1) Saadoollah Shaikh v Kaler Churn 12 W R 308 (1863), but not a letter from a decree holder to his vakil, Thakoor Lal Musce v Hanje Lal Tewari 7 W 1 510 (1867), directing him to certify. Bhobun Mohun Banerjee v Bidhoo Churn Dutt 10 W R 5 (1871) O.C. See notes to clause (3).
- (2) As to these words see Muhammad Ali v Khan v Lajug Sahni, 16 A 28 (1891).
- (3) Paupayya v Narasimiah 2 M 16 (1880).
- (4) Arunachellum v Ramanadham 2 M 309 (1906).
- (5) Rajendronath Roy Babad or v Chunnomal, 5 C 448 (1879).
- (6) Tulsiurappa Mudurajhi v Fakuraya Angli, 2 Bom L R 901 (1900).
- (7) Tukaram v Balaji, 21 B 122 (1890), 11 All India Law Reports 211 (1890).
- (8) B. L. R. v C. J. 320 at p. 322 (1869).
- (9) Khushalchand v Nandram 35 B 516 (1911).
- (10) Bacharaj Nyabalkhand v Bhaiji Lu Karam 38 B 47 (1913).
- (11) Panduranga Mudaliar v Vythilinga Reddi 17 M L J 417 (1907) s.c. 30 M 337.
- (12) Rajendronath Roy v Chunnomal 5 C 448 (1879).
- (13) See ib. Munimohandas Jaikisson Das v Vazir 13 B 171 176 (1888). Parcechut v Ragho Goordeo, 2 A 11 C R 48 (1890). Chango v Kalluram 4 B 11 C R, 1 C J 120, 124 (1867).
- (14) Alathour v Gulam Mordien, 24 M L J 541 (1911) in Buroo Goram v Jamourat, 16 C W N 923 (1911), it was doubted whether delay will take away the right to apply.

the satisfaction of the Court (1). If the judgment debtor applies to certify and the application is refused, then an order under this rule being appealable (2) under sect. 17 (formerly 211) he should appeal and not bring a separate suit. An application whether by a plaintiff or defendant, for a certificate, though decided under this rule, is none the less a question relating to the execution and satisfaction of the decree and an appeal being available, no separate suit lies. If however neither the creditor nor debtor apply to certify and the decree has in fact been satisfied in whole or in part and yet the creditor sues out execution, the debtor has a remedy by suit. As already observed, this rule prohibits recognition of an uncertified adjustment only by any Court executing the decree. But the right of suit is controlled by the provisions of sect. 17, as the operation of the latter section is not restricted by this (3). The subject has nowhere been more lucidly treated than by Pigot J (1). In considering whether a suit is prohibited by sect. 17 regard must be had to two points, viz., the cause of action and the relief claimed. Numerous cases establish (5) that a Court other than a Court executing the decree can recognize an uncertified payment or adjustment of a decree in a suit based upon such payment or adjustment. This goes to the cause of action. The principle upon which such cases are allowed has been that there is a cause of action arising from negligence, fraud (6), agreement, or trust (7). So suits have lain to recover the money paid or property delivered (8) or for damages (9). Where however the relief sought comes within the prohibition contained in sect. 17 then a suit is barred. That section is framed to prohibit in a separate suit between the parties to the decree, any relief being granted which shall interfere with the conduct of the execution proceedings by the Court executing the decree (10). As a general rule, questions relating to the satisfaction of the decree must be settled by an order made in the course of execution and not by a regular suit, but no Court can settle a question of satisfaction by an order made in execution unless such satisfaction shall have been duly certified (11).

(1) *Rung Lall v Harn Naram Gur*, 11 C 166 (1885).

(2) *Ranji v Bhanji Harjivan*, 11 B 57 (1885), *Lingayya v Narasimha*, 14 M 39 (1890), *Garavayya v Vardayappa*, 18 M 26 (1894), *Janna Prasad v Mathura Prasad*, 16 A 129 (1893).

(3) *Deno Bundhu Nundy v Hari Mata Dassie*, 31 C 480 (1904).

(4) *Azizan v Matuk Lal Sahu*, 21 C 437 (1893).

(5) *Azizan v Matuk Lal Sahu*, 21 C 456 (1893).

(6) *Venaraghava Reddi v Subbakka*, 5 M 397, 1 B (1881).

(7) *Gunamani Das v Prankshori Das*, 5 B L R 223, at p. 232, F B (1870), *Hoor masji Dorabji v Burjorji Jamsatji*, 10 B 155, at pp. 163, 164 (1886).

(8) *Shadi v Ganga Sahar*, J A 538 (1881), *Pinatambi Udayan v Vellayya Goundan*, 11

M 409 (1897), *Iswar Chandra Dutt v Haris Chandra Dutt*, 23 C 718 (1898), s. c., 2 C W N 247, *In re Medai Kaluani Annai*, 30 M 545 (1907), *Gundo v Nihal Kumar*, 30 A 464 (1908).

(9) *Gani Khan v Koonja Behary Sen*, 3 C L R 414 (1876), *Mallamma v Venamma*, 8 M 277 (1883), *Poromanan v Khasnabish v Khepoor Patamanchi*, 10 C 344 (1884), *Krishnasami Ayyangar v Ranga Ayyangar*, 30 M 369 (1896).

(10) *Azizan v Matuk Lal Sahu*, 21 C 137 at p. 438 (1893).

(11) *Venaraghava v Subbakka*, 5 M 337, at p. 398, F B (1881), see *Sellamayyan v Muthu*, 12 M 61 (1888), at p. 62. The principle on which these decisions proceeded (i.e. those limiting the prohibition to Courts of execution) was that sect. 208 introduced but a rule of procedure that the probable intention was that the adjustment of a decree

Thus a suit which interferes with the execution such as a suit seeking a declaration that the defendant is not entitled to execute a decree and an injunction restraining execution (1) or for a declaration that the decree has been satisfied (2) or a suit which seeks to set aside an execution sale, whether the purchaser be the judgment creditor (3) or a stranger (4) will not lie, being prohibited by the terms of sect 17, as also it has been held a suit to secure sums paid in execution in excess of what was due under the decree (5).

If the creditor fraudulently executes a satisfied decree and does not enter the satisfaction in his application to execute he may be proceeded against criminally, the provision as regards uncertified adjustments not affecting the substantive Criminal Law (6). In a recent case it was held that an application which did not recite the terms of an alleged adjustment could not be deemed to be an application of the kind contemplated by the second clause of this rule (7).

Clause (3).—This clause corresponds with amendments (*vide post*) with the last paragraph of sect 208 of the former Code (see sect 206 of Code of 1859) which was inserted by sect 27 of Act VII of 1888. The effect of this insertion was that uncertified adjustments could be recognized by other Courts than the Court executing the decree the prohibition only extending to Courts executing decrees (8) and to no others (9). So the rule does not deprive a Criminal

debtor like the decree itself, be a matter of record and that unless it is made a matter of record no Court having to determine whether the decree has been executed shall recognize it as evidence of a valid adjustment. But see *Ramayyar v Ramayyar* 21 M 306 (1897) where the Court went into the question of adjustment though not certified there having been a fraud committed.

(1) *Azizan v Matuk Lal Sahu*, 21 C 437 (1893) but in *Jwar Chandra Dutt v Hari Chandra Dutt* 10 C 718 (1898) *follo Dano Bandhu Nundy v Hari Mati Das*, 31 C 480 (1904), s.c., 8 C W N 39.

(2) *Bairagulu v Bapanna*, 15 M 302 (1892).

(3) *Jaikaran Bharte v Raghunath Singh* 10 A 204 206 (1898), *Irosmun Kumar Sanyal v Kali Das Sanyal*, 19 C 683 (1894) s.c., 19 I A 100. *Azizan v Matuk Lal Sahu* 1 C 437 433 (1893), *contra Ishan Chunder Bandopadhyay v Indro Narain Goswami* 3 C 783 (1883) which has been held in the previous cases to be no longer law.

(4) *Jaikaran Bharte v Raghunath Singh*, *supra* *Vellappa v Ramchandra*, 1 B 463 (1890), *Mothura Mohun Ghose v Akboy Kumar Miller* 10 C 507 (1888), *contra* *Lat Dutt v Sharup Chand Malia*, 14 C 36 (1887), which is no longer law. See last note.

(5) *Kasbee Kishore Roy v Kishen Chund* &

Sanyal 10 W R 100 (1871).

(6) *R v Bapuji Dayaram* 10 B 288 (1886), *Madhub Chunder Mozumdar v Novodeep Chunder Pundit* 16 C 126 (1888) and it was also held that even though the application might be barred and action could not be taken under this section, that did not vitiate the order of a Munsif sending a case for inquiry under the section corresponding with sect 613 of the last Code. *R v Muthuramau Chetti* 4 M 300 (1881).

(7) *Jogendra Nath Sarkar v Provath Nath Chatterjee* 13 C L J 126 (1914).

(8) See *Itam Doyal Baunrejee v Itam Hari Lal* 20 C 32 (1892), *Fatch Muhammed v Gopal Das* 7 A 424 (1880), *Bharat Chunder Roy v Nawab Nazir Ali* 10 W R 304 (1886), *Chedumbara v Ratna Anmal* 3 M 113 (1881). In *Chang v Kalaram* 4 B 11 C R L 0 (1897) [cf. *Bakhu v Lakshman* 4 B 594 at p. 601] the decree holder had removed the attachment and discharged the debtor from prison, and this was considered sufficient.

(9) *Swamirao Narayan v Krishnath Krishna*, 1 B 419 (1880), *Ghanesham Lakshmanadas v Krishnam Narola*, 16 B 553 (1891), *Bal Krishna Pandharinath v Bapu Yezaji* 13 B 291 (1891), the same view had been taken prior to the amendment. *Jalyan Singh v Banta Prasad*, 13 A 333

Court (1) from recognizing an uncertified payment, or a Civil Court which is not executing the decree (*vide ante*). An adjustment not certified cannot, however, be taken cognizance of under sect. 17 by a Court of execution, and the decree must be executed notwithstanding the adjustment (2). Prior to the addition of the last clause it was held that if the decree holder had been induced to compromise by fraud this was a matter which can be dealt with under the same section (3). It was subsequently held that the proviso did not stand in the way of the judgment debtor proving fraud (4). But this decision has been doubted (5) and it has recently been held by the Calcutta High Court that the executing Court cannot enquire even when the conduct of the decree holder has been alleged to be fraudulent (6). An objection that the provisions of the former section had no application to any payment made in pursuance of an invalid agreement not sanctioned by the Court was overruled the section making no reference to validity. Therefore a sum paid under an agreement void under the former section 257A cannot be recognized unless certified (7). It has been held that though uncertified payments could not be recognized as adjustments of the decree yet a creditor might give evidence of uncertified payments in order to defeat the plea of limitation (8). The former section ran "It shall not be recognized as a payment or adjustment of the decree." These words have been omitted in order to make it clear that the Court cannot recognize a payment or adjustment which has not been certified for any purpose whatsoever. It follows that an uncertified payment or adjustment cannot now operate to prolong the period of limitation for applying for execution under the Limitation

(1891) Pat Das v Sharup Chand Malla 14 C 376 (1887) Kunhi Moideen Kutta v Ramenhumai, 1 M 203 (1876), Shadi v Gunga Sahai 3 A 538 (1851), Ishan Chunder Bandopadhyay v Indro Narayan Gossami 9 C 788 790 (1883) Sellamayyan v Muthan 12 M 61 (1884). In other cases, mostly on account of the amending Act VII of 1879, a suit was held entirely prohibited Pitankar v Derji 6 B 146 (1882) Haji Abdul Rahuman v Khoja Khaki Truth, 11 B 6 (1886), Hormasji Dorabji v Burjorji Jamsetji, 10 B 100 (1886), Thirumallai v Sundara, 11 M 469 (1888). In consequence of the conflict of rulings the last paragraph of sect. 258 was altered by sect. 27 Act VII of 1888. Ram Doyal Banerjee v Ram Hari Pal, 20 C 32 at p. 36 (1892).

(1) R v Pillala, 9 M 101 (1890).

(2) Ram Doyal Banerjee v Ram Hari Pal, 20 C 32 (1892), Budrudeen v Gulam Moideen, 36 M 357 (1911), Gadadhar Panda v Shyam Churn Naik, 12 C. W. N 485 (1908), Trimbak v Hari Laxman, 34 B 705 (1910), Kamini Dasi v Aghore, 14 C. W. N 357 (1909).

(3) Ilangpoo v Kanade, 8 B 148 (1882),

Annan Banu v Annala 14 C. W. N 523 (1909).

(4) Ramayyar v Ramayyar, 21 M 356 (1877).

(5) Ganapathy Ayyar v Chenga Reddi, 29 M 312 (1905), Veerappa Chettiar v Pon nayy, 17 M. L. J 527 (1907), and see Annan Banu v Annala 14 C. W. N 523 (1909), Subbaraya v Ramasawmy, 22 M. L. J 166 (1911).

(6) Budrudeen v Gulam Moideen 36 M. 357 (1911), Liroo Gorain v Jamurait, 16 C. W. N 923 928 (1911).

(7) Durga Prasad Banerjee v Lalit Mohun Singh Roy, 20 C. 86 (1897).

(8) Roshan Singh v Mata Dm 26 A 76 (1903) Sham Lal v Anahra Lal 4 A 716 (1882), Zahur Khan v Bakhtawar 7 A 327 (1884), Asahan Singh v Iman Singh, 17 A 42 (1894), Hurri Pershad Chowdhry v Nasib Singh, 21 C. 542 (1894), Tukaram v Balaji 21 B 122 (1890), Rajeswara Rao v Hari Babandhu 19 M 162 (1890), contra Mutha Lal v Khauate Lal 12 A 569 (1890), Badri Narain v Kunj Bhatti, 30 A. 178 (1913).

Act, (1) neither can it give rise to an estoppel, for the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to nullify an express statutory provision (2)

Courts executing Decrees.

3. *Where immovable property forms one estate or tenure*
Lands situate in more than one jurisdiction situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Courts, any one of such Courts may attach and sell the entire estate or tenure.

"Forms one estate"—See notes to sect 36, *et seq*, *ante*

4. *Where a decree has been passed in a suit of which the*
Transfer to Court of Small Causes value as set forth in the plaint did not exceed
two thousand rupees and which, as regards
its subject-matter, is not excepted by the law for the time being
in force from the cognizance of either a Presidency or a Pro-
vincial Court of Small Causes, and the Court which passed it
wishes it to be executed in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or
Rangoon, such Court may send to the Court of Small Causes
in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or Rangoon, as the case may be,
the copies and certificate mentioned in rule 6, and such Court
of Small Causes shall thereupon execute the decree as if it had
been passed by itself.

[s
of
par

Small Cause Court—This is the fifth or penultimate paragraph of sect
flowing rule, and the
38 39, and 41, *ante*

her Court transferred
to it, has the same powers as it possesses in regard to its own decrees (3)

It was held that a Judge of a Small Cause Court when duly invested with the powers of a Subordinate Judge, had in the exercise of such powers general jurisdiction (4) But a doubt was expressed whether under sect 223 (d) of the former Code (corresponding with sect 39 clause (d) *ante*) a Subordinate Judge could transfer a decree from his Court to that of a Small Cause Court when the property attached was within the limits of his local jurisdiction (5) And a Mofussil Small Cause Court was required to adopt the machinery of the

(1) Monmohan t Dwarka, 12 C L J 312 (1910), Kutubullah t Durga Charan, 10 C W N 336 (1912), Rajrang t Lachma, 10 C L J 88 (1903), Tulochan t Baleswar, 15 C L J 423 (1910)

(2) Jogendra Nath Sarkar t Provat Nath Chatterjee, 13 C L J 1-8 (1914)

(3) Gunaakutty Roy Agarwallah t Thakurdye Thakurani, 34 C 23, 27 (1907)

(4) Gopal t Nanku, 1 A. 624 (1878) See Bhagban Dayalji t Balu, 8 B 230 (1883) [cf. to Ramchandra t Ganesh, 23 B 382 (1898)], Dharamdas Santaldas t Vaman Govind, 9 B 237 (1884), Kabanarama t Ranga, 8 M 8 (1884)

(5) Krishna Velji t Ibbu Mansaram, 18 B 61, 64 (1893)

former sect 223 in all cases where execution was sought against persons or property outside its local jurisdiction (1)

23, ra] 5. Where the Court to which a decree is to be sent for execution is situate within the same district as the Court which passed such decree, such Court shall send the same directly to the former Court. But, where the Court to which the decree is to be sent for execution is situate in a different district, the Court which passed it shall send it to the District Court of the district in which the decree is to be executed.

"Directly."—Where both Courts are in the same District one Court may send to the other direct (2). A District Court on receiving a decree transferred for execution can, under r 8, direct any Subordinate Court to execute it. When, and in whatsoever manner, the decree has been transferred for execution to another Court the holder of the decree must, under r 10, make due application for execution to the latter Court.

24] 6. The Court sending a decree for execution shall send—
 (a) a copy of the decree;
 (b) a certificate setting forth that satisfaction of the decree has not been obtained by execution within the jurisdiction of the Court by which it was passed, or, where the decree has been executed in part, the extent to which satisfaction has been obtained and what part of the decree remains unexecuted, and
 (c) a copy of any order for the execution of the decree, or, if no such order has been made, a certificate to that effect.

"Shall send."—Upon the maxim "*omnia præsumentur rite esse acta*," an attachment will in the absence of evidence be deemed in this respect to have been correctly made (3). The omission, however, to transmit to the Court executing the decree the certificate required by this rule is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the sale (4). If any order is passed on receipt of the report of service

(1) *Parbati Charan v Panchanand*, 6 A 243 (1884), *F B*, *Idol Abdul Gafur v Albyn*, 30 C 713 (1903), *Sayadkhan v Davies* 28 B 198 (1903) [attachment of salary]

(2) *See Kela v Vikrishna*, 15 M 345 (1891)

(3) *Sarada Prosoud Mullick v Lutch meeput Sing Doogur*, 10 B L R 214, 230 (1872). As regards Provincial Small Cause Courts, see s 34, Act IX of 1887, which modifies the rule.

(4) *Abdubaker Sahab v Mohidin Sahab*, 20 M 10 (1896)

Section 22 as copy (ital) shall be sent (1) The words in clause (c) "a copy of any order, etc., means a copy of any order, etc." (2) It has been held that the Court in sending the certificate need not call upon the holder to certify whether the decree is still capable of execution, it has only to certify that a specified part of the decree remains unexecuted (3)

7. The Court to which a decree is so sent shall cause such copies and certificates to be filed, without any further proof of the decree or order for execution, or of the copies thereof, unless the Court, for any special reasons to be recorded under the hand of the Judge, requires such proof.

"Filed."—The filing of the copies and certificate is quite distinct from executing the decree, for which an application should be regularly made.

Inquiry into jurisdiction—The former sect. 22 contained after the words "copies thereof" the following: "*or of the jurisdiction of the Court which issued it*," thus recognizing the right of the executing Court to inquire into the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree (1). These words however, have now been omitted, as it was considered that another Court ought not to go into any question as to the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it (5).

Sect. 38 enacts that a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution under the provisions contained in the Code. Sect. 39 provides that the Court which passed a decree (6) may, on certain conditions send it on the application of the decree holder for execution to another Court and may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court. There is no express provision as to whether the Court to which a decree may be so sent must be a Court having jurisdiction over the amount of the suit in which the decree was passed or whether the mere sending of the decree will confer jurisdiction on a Court for all the proceedings to be taken in its execution. On the ground however, that sect. 6 limits jurisdiction and that the word "suits" in that section include proceedings taken to execute the decree, the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts hold that a Court which has no jurisdiction to try a suit can have no jurisdiction to execute a decree made in that suit (7). So a Court has no jurisdiction to execute a decree

(1) *Srihari Mundul v. Murari Choudhary*, 13 C. 257, 362 (1886).

(2) *Hathibhat Nahansa v. Lalal Bechar Prasad*, 13 B. 371 (1888).

(3) *Sripati v. Belchambers*, 15 C. W. N. 611 (1910).

(4) See *Bhagwanlalji v. Vishwanath*, 28 B. 378 (1904), *Haji Musa v. Furmanand*, 15 B. 216, 219 (1890), *Mohan Ishwar v. Haku Rupa*, 4 B. 638 (1880).

(5) *Hari Govind Kalkundra v. Narsingrao*

Konherraoo Desaihande, 38 B. 104 (1913).

(6) As to execution of decrees passed on appeal see ss. 36, 37.

(7) *Gokul Krato Chunder v. Aukhil Chunder Chatterjee*, 16 C. 457 (1889), *Durga Charan Majumdar v. Umatare Gupta*, 16 C. 463 (1889), *Sri S. Dhevar Landit v. Shree Harhar Landit*, 12 B. 100 (1887), *dat.*, *Vajraji v. Ranchordji*, 16 B. 731 (1890) [execution against pension].

as to it for that purpose under sects 38, 39, when the decree has been passed in a suit the value or subject matter of which is in excess of the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction (1) The Madras (2) and apparently the Punjab Chief Court (3) held that the former sect 223 gave an extraordinary jurisdiction to a Court to execute a decree in a suit beyond its jurisdiction sent to it for execution. This is on the ground that the pecuniary and other limitations in regard to regular suits are altogether absent in the sections relating to execution proceedings. See however notes to sects 38, 39, *et seq.*, *ante*. Where the subject matter of a suit is within the jurisdiction of the Court, its jurisdiction continues whatever may be the result of the suit in all such matters in the suit as are within its cognizance, amongst which are matters in execution. The mere circumstance that the amount actually due under the decree by process of accumulation exceeds the pecuniary limits of the Court's jurisdiction does not oust it from the jurisdiction it has hitherto had over the suit (4) An application for the transfer of a decree for execution is a matter within sect 17, *ante* (5)

226]

8 Where such copies are so filed, the decree or order may,

Execution of decree or order by which it is sent.

if the Court to which it is sent is the District Court, be executed by such Court or be transferred for execution to any subordinate Court

of competent jurisdiction

"Transferred for execution"—Sect 226 of the former Code, with which this rule corresponds, had after the words 'subordinate Court' the words 'which it directs to execute the same'. Under that section it was held desirable that the District Judge's signature should appear on the order, but this is not required by the rule, and if the order is issued under his authority, the absence of his signature does not vitiate the proceeding (6). It is only by an order passed by the District Court that any subordinate Court in that district is empowered to proceed (7). Presumably an order for transfer is still to be made by the District Court. Where a decree was sent for execution to the Judge of G, who referred it to his Subordinate Judge, and that officer, finding that the land in dispute had been annexed to the district of S, transferred the same direct to the Judge of that district, who in turn referred it to his Subordinate Judge. *Held* that the proceedings were regular (8).

"Any subordinate Court"—See sect 3, *ante*

(1) *Gokul v Ankul*, 16 C 457 (1883)

(2) *Narasayya v Venkatakrishnayya* 7 M 397 (1884), *Shanmuga Pillai v Ramasathan Chettir*, 17 M 303 (1893), and see *Aclu v Vikramha*, 15 M 345 (1891)

(3) *Canga Ram v Gur Soran Das* F B. 1887, P R No 31, cited in *Hukm Chand, Res Judicata*, 316

(4) *Shamray Pandora v Nidori Ramagi* 10 B 200 (1884) as to transfer of jurisdiction.

see *Panduranga v Vythalunga Reddy*, 17 M L J 417 (1907)

(5) *Bhabani Charan Dutt v Pratap Chandra Ghosh*, 8 C W N 575 (1904)

(6) *Jogendra Chandra Ghose v Mohesh Chandra Datta* 23 C 480 (1896)

(7) *Debi Dal Sahu v Moharaj Singh* 22 C 764, 766 (1895)

(8) *Pulokdhar Roy v Radha Pershad Singh* 8 I 1 160, 170 171 (1881)

9. Where the Court to which the decree is sent for execution is a High Court, the decree shall be executed by such Court in the same manner as if it had been passed by such Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

"Is a High Court."—Ordinarily a decree would be sent for execution to a High Court only when it had been passed in a case recognized by a Small Cause Court from such a case would be sent to the local Court of Small Causes.

Application for Execution.

10. Where the holder of a decree desires to execute it he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf, or if the decree has been sent under the provisions herebefore contained to another Court then to such Court or to the proper officer thereof.

"Desires to execute it."—See notes to sect 36 *ante*. Where the decree can be executed in its entirety it should be though in some cases this is not possible, as where an immediate decree is given for possession and an order for the assessment of mesne profits (1) The effect of a compromise is to extinguish the decree, which can only be enforced by a fresh suit, and not by an application for execution of the former decree (2) Order 2 does not apply to an application under this rule (3) It is not open to the Court to refuse to execute a decree against which no appeal has been preferred and the time for appealing against which has expired (1) The second paragraph of sect 220 of the last Code is now O XXV r 20. A decree once passed cannot be questioned by any of the parties thereto when the decree is being executed (5)

"He shall apply"—As to who may apply for execution and against whom it can be had, see notes to sect 36 *ante* (6) As to form of application see

(1) *Sadho Saran v Hawal Pande* 19 A 38 (1843), *Haro Sanker Sandyal v Tarak Chandra Bhuttaclerjee* 3 B L R 114 (1869), *Fulchand v Bai Ichha* 12 B 98 (1887), as to the Land Acquisition Act see *Nilkanth v Collector of Thana* 22 B 502 (1897)

(2) *Hari Raghunath Joshi v Krishnaji Anant*, 19 B 546 (1891)

(3) *Radha Kishen Lal v Radha Petalad Singh*, 18 C 515 (1891), *Sadho Saran v Hawal Pande*, 19 A 98 (1893), *Thakur Prasad v Fakir Ullah*, 17 A 106 (1894) [which as well as *Bunko Behary Gangopadhy v Nd Madhab Chuttopadhy* 18 C 635 (1891) deal with sect 273 of the last

Code in respect of execution proceedings]

(4) *Ishan Chunder Roy v Ashanoolah Khan* 10 C 817 (1884) as to the right to execute against the person before B J hn 8 B L R 255 (1872)

(5) *Rambahar v Gaya* 7 A 107 111 (1884)

(6) And see *In re Ishur Kant Bhadooree*, 24 W R 233 (1870) *Antoo Marce v Bil boomookheo Dabee* 4 G 605 (1878) [application by Mooktear] *Dmonath Chucker butty v Lalit Coomr Gangopadhy*, 9 C 633 (1883), *Gour Sundar Lahuri v Hem Chunder Chowdhury*, 16 C 305 (1884), *Mau Khan v Idajya* 21 W 388 (1897) [by Benamilar] *Hari v Narayan*, 12 B 427 (1887) [minor]

O XXI r 11-14 It must be in writing except in the case provided for by O XXI r 11 (1) A person not a party to a suit is not entitled to object to the issue of an order for execution of the decree (1)

11 (1) Where a decree is for the payment of money the Court may, on the oral application of the decree holder at the time of the passing of the decree, order immediate execution thereof by the arrest of the judgment debtor, prior to the preparation of a warrant if he is within the precincts of the Court

(2) Save as otherwise provided by sub rule (1), every application for the execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, and shall contain in a tabular form the following particulars namely —

- (a) the number of the suit
- (b) the names of the parties,
- (c) the date of the decree,
- (d) whether any appeal has been preferred from the decree,
- (e) whether any, and (if any) what, payment or other adjustment of the matter in controversy has been made between the parties subsequently to the decree,
- (f) whether any and (if any) what, previous applications have been made for the execution of the decree, the dates of such applications and their results,
- (g) the amount with interest (if any) due upon the decree, or other relief granted thereby, together with particulars of any cross decree, whether passed before or after the date of the decree sought to be executed,
- (h) the amount of the costs (if any) awarded,
- (i) the name of the person against whom execution of the decree is sought, and
- (j) the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required, whether—
 - (i) by the delivery of any property specifically decreed,
 - (ii) by the attachment and sale, or by the sale without attachment, of any property,
 - (iii) by the arrest and detention in prison of any person,
 - (iv) by the appointment of a receiver,
 - (v) otherwise, as the nature of the relief granted may require

(3) The Court to which an application is made under sub rule

(1) *Juggabun Gupto v Geluck Monro Delia*, 22 W R 354 (1874); *Ponnamjath v Ponnamjath*, 3 M 79 (1880); *Judhoomath Roy v Ram Huksh Chuttangee*, 7 W R 635 (1867) a decree cannot be executed nor can it be seized and sold in portions. *Hare Shankar Sanhyal v Tarak Chandra Bhatta charjee*, 3 B L R 114 (1861) But see as to joint decree holders, r 15

(2) *Radha Kishen Lall v Radha Porsha Singh*, 18 C 515 (1891); *Sadhu Sarin v Hawal Parsi*, 19 A 38 (1893)

(3) *Jasoda Dyoo v Kirtilash Das*, 18 C 639, 641 (1891)

(4) *See Shaukh Al-dool v Syad Ism Ali*, 18 W R 55 (1872)

(5) *Shio Churn Lall v Ram Sarun Sahoo*, 16 W R 49 (1871), and see as to joint decree against two debtors, *Mt Purush v Khosro Misser*, 1 W R 14, Mue (1846); *Chawdhury Sheekh Wahed v Mullick Emayet*, 12 B L R

600 (1873); *Krishto Kishore v Ram Lakshun*, 2 W R 41 (1865)

(6) *Tranks v Nunch Mal* 1 A H O R 79 (1873); and cf *Protop Chunder Das v Piary Chowdhram* 8 C 174 (1891) *Shy kiram Chau* v *Ghelabhai*, 13 B 34 (1893)

(7) *See Asgar Ali v Prodokya Nath Ghouse*, 17 C 631, 635 (1890) *Puzloor Rahman v Altaf Hussain* 10 C 741 (1891)

(8) *See Mitra v Immattal*, 4th ed 1152 *et seq* and cases there cited.

(9) *Gunga Gubhai Gojton v Nakhun Lall Hattoo*, 9 W R 362 (1868); *M dhi v Dada v Nobun Chunder*, 16 W R 25 (1871); *Rumhun Rukht v Panchanun Chucker butty*, 19 W R 144 (1868); *Khatir M han v Jahur Chunder*, 11 W R 271 (1863); *Dhanpat Sing v Lal Chund Sing*, 2 B L R 51 p 18 (1864)

(10) *Bakar Bolla v Ujit Narain Singh*, 20 A 164 (1901)

Immediate execution—Ordinarily the application for execution is in writing. It is to be noted that under the former sect 256 application for immediate execution could not issue simultaneously against both the person and property or against any property except moveable property (1) within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the particular Court. In the case of a warrant of arrest this would only issue if the debtor was within the same limits. Moreover the section only related to decrees not exceeding Rs 1,000. The Legislature has now omitted this limitation imposed under the former Code on oral applications for immediate execution. As to exemption from arrest, see sect 135.

6.]

12 *Where an application is made for the attachment of any moveable property belonging to a judgment-debtor but not in his possession, the decree holder shall annex to the application an inventory of the property to be attached, containing a reasonably accurate description of the same*

Application for attachment of moveable property not in judgment debtor's possession

Not in judgment debtor's possession—This rule refers only to an application for the enforcement of a decree by attachment of moveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor (2) but not in his possession. Rules 12, 46, 51 prescribe the mode of attachment in such cases. Rules 43—45 deal with cases where the property is in the judgment debtor's possession. The inventory must be delivered into Court along with the application for execution (3). Under O 39 r 7 the Court has jurisdiction to make an order for preparation of an inventory (4).

7.

1.]

13 *Where an application is made for the attachment of any immovable property belonging to a judgment debtor, it shall contain at the foot—*

(a) a description of such property sufficient to identify the same and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, a specification of such boundaries or numbers, and

Application for attachment of immovable property to contain certain particulars

(1) As to what is, see notes to sect 2, and *Nazir Khan v Karamat Khan*, 3 A 168 (1880) [fruit upon trees], *Nara Pira v Nara Shidheswar*, 3 B 23 (1878) [baluta], *Nathu Meah v Nand Ram*, 3 B L R 508 (1872), *Deno Nath Batabyal v Nuffer Chunder Nandy*, 26 C 778 (1899) s c in appeal 4 C W N 470 (1900). Act X of 1872 s 7 clause 34 [tiled huts].

(2) As to the liability of the execution creditor, Shrivasth or Nazir, in respect of seizure of property belonging to third party see

Goma Mahad Patil v Gokaldas Khimji 3 B 74 (1878), *Kashori Mohun Rai v Hursook Das* 12 C 696 (1880), *Franki Besanji v Hormasji Pestanji* 2 B 258 271 (1877), *Kalees Coomar Chatterjee v Siddhessur Mundal*, 11 B L R 206 (1873).

(3) *Sreenath Gocha v Yusoff Khan* 7 C 556 at p 559 (1881) and see *Dhankul Singh v Phallkar Singh*, 15 A 84, at p 86 (1893).

(4) *Amjad Ali v Ali Hussain* 15 C. W N 353 (1910).

(b) a specification of the judgment-debtor's share or interest in *such property* to the best of the belief of the applicant, and so far as he has been able to ascertain the same.

Description.—Clause (2) has now been amended to expressly require boundaries and rat-holes to be given where such boundaries exist in a record of village or other survey (1). The Code has been passed to be observed and not to be treated as a dead letter as regards this or any other provision (2). Still the Court will set aside against a party a mere formal defect when the property which is sought to be attached can be identified (3) and in any case a defect of description can be remedied (4).

Specification.—In case of a joint family the application should state whether it is the judgment-debtor's share or the joint family property which is sought to be attached. It should also specify the family property (5). The former section which this rule replaces required that the description and specification should be verified in the manner of a plaint. This has however been omitted, but it was recommended that a verification separate from that provided by s. 31 record should be made. An omission to verify the inventory of property sought to be attached was held to be an irregularity only, not vitiating the application (6).

14. *Where an application is made for the attachment of any land which is registered in the office of the Collector, the Court may require the applicant to produce a certified extract from the register of such office, specifying the persons registered as proprietors of, or as possessing, any transferable interest in, the land or its revenue, or as liable to pay revenue for the land, and the shares of the registered proprietors.*

Extract from Collector's Register.—The sections which this and the last rule replace, as also sect. 213 of the Code of 1859 made it compulsory that the application should be accompanied by an extract. The rule has now been amended so as to give the Courts an option in requiring extracts since these did not in all cases appear to be required but had the effect of adding to the expenses of legal proceedings. The rule is not restricted to land registered in

(1) As to identification by boundaries, see *Lack Ram v Mohesh Dass* 12 W R 468 (1869), *Maharaj Dhuraj Mahtab Chund v Burodanath Mundul*, 18 W R 411 (1872), and as to Estates in the Collector's Rent Roll,

A 84 86 (1893)

(3) *Hurry Charan Boso v Subaydar Sheikh*, 12 C 161 (1885)

(4) *Macgregor v Tarun Churn Sircar*, 14 C 124 (1886)

(5) *Muhammad Husain v D p Chund* 14 A 190 (1892)

(6) *Nasir un nissa v Ghafar ud din* 28 A 244 (1903)

(2) *Dhokal Singh v Bhakkar Singh* 15

the Collectors Office in the name of the judgment-debtor, for it frequently happens that the actual proprietors are not so registered (1)

15 (1) Where a decree has been passed jointly in favour

Application for execution by joint decree-holder.

of more persons than one, any one or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or, where any of them has died, for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the deceased

(2) Where the Court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to be executed on an application made under this rule it shall make such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application

Joint decree holders—The decree holders must be joint (2) Ordinarily all the decree holders in a joint decree must join in an application for execution (3) This section in the Inst Code (4) allowed one or more to apply for execution of the whole decree unless execution is by the terms of the decree dependent upon a joint application (5) The ruling of the Privy Council (6) negatives decisions to the effect that a joint decree holder cannot apply for execution of a decree to the extent of his fractional interest (7) This can be done, provided that the interest is one determined by the decree itself. This is of course, a different thing from applying separately for execution limited to what the applicant considers his interest in it (8) The words "or his or their representatives" have been omitted as this will be covered by the general clause An order refusing to allow the decree to be executed by one joint decree holder

(1) O Kinealy C P C notes to section.

(2) Cf Ramasami v Andra Pillai 13 M 347 14 M 252 (1890)

(3) Ponnampilath v Ponnampilath 3 M 79, 81 (1880) cf Roy Gooda Roy v Dhuneshur Koor, 7 C L R 117 (1880)

(4) See cases passed and Teja Singh v Raj narayan Singh, 1 B L R A C 62 (1868) Azizunnissa Khatun v Shashi Bhusan Bose, 2 B L R, App 47 (1869), Harogobind Das Kourburto v Issuri Das, 15 C 187 (1887). Kamlatat v Baldeo, 22 A 222 (1900), and as to minor joint decree holder and limitation, Surja Kumar Dutt v Aran Chunder Roy, 29 C 465 (1901), Periasami v Krishna Ayyan, 25 M 431 (1901)

(5) Farzand v Abdullah, 6 A. 69 (1883)

(6) Hurriah Chun ler Chowdhry v Kahi Sunderi Debi 9 C 482 (1882), 10 I A 4, and see Brojeswari Choudhrance v Tipuora

Soonderee, 3 C L R 513 (1873)

(7) Banarsi Das v Maharani Kuar, 5 A 27 (1882), Collector of Shahjahanpur v Surjan Singh, 4 A 72 (1881), Dulehand Bhudar v Bar Shivkar, 15 B 242, at p 244 (1890) Thakoor Dass Sing v Luchmeput Doogur, 7 W. R 10 (1867) Haro Sanker Sandyal v Tarak Chandra Bhattacharjee, 3 B L R A C J 114, at p 117 (1869), Purna Chandra Mookerjee v Sarada Charan Roy, 3 B L R App 21 (1869), Ponnampilath v Ponnampilath 3 M 79 (1880), Prannath Mitter v Mothoornath Chuckerbutty, 6 W R 64 (1866)

(8) So in Muthusami Ayyan v Natesa Ayyar, 18 M 464 (1894) the decree did not award any specific sum as so due to the particular defendants and, therefore, the decree had to be executed as a joint decree or not at all

16. Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly (s. 2) in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it, and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree holder.

Provided that, where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution.

Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others.

(1) *Ratanlal Rangildas v Bai Gulab* 1 Bom L R 87 (1899), s c, 23 B 623. See also *Odhoja Pershad v Mohadeo Dutt*, 17 W R 415 (1872).

(2) *Lakshmi Ammal v Poonassa Menon*, 17 M 394 (1894).

(3) *Sheikh Ahmed Chowdhry v Shadzada Khatoon*, 7 C L R 537, 538 (1880), *Umrith Nath Chowdhry v Chunder Kishore Singh*, 21 W R 31 (1874).

(4) *Durga Das v Dewraj*, 33 C 306 (1905).

(5) *Tarasundari Burmon v Beharidol Roy*, 1 B L R A C 28 (1865), *Budradeen v*

Gulam Moudun, 36 M 357 (1911).

(6) *Maharajah Satish Chunder Roy v Saroda Pershad Mookerjee*, 5 W R Misc 53 (1866).

(7) *Tarasundari Burmon v Beharidol Roy*, 1 B L R 28 (1868), in *Gyamonee v Radha Romon*, 5 C 592 (1879), no appeal was held to lie under sect 244 of the Code of 1877, as the question was one between co decree-holders only, and in *Haragobind Das Koiburto v Issuri Das*, 15 C 187 (1887) a suit was held to lie.

the Collector's Office in the name of the judgment-debtor, for it frequently happens that the actual proprietors are not so registered (1)

31.1

15. (1) *Where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, any one or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or, where any of them has died, for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the deceased*

(2) *Where the Court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to be executed on an application made under this rule it shall make such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application*

Joint decree holders—The decree holders must be joint (2) Ordinarily all the decree holders in a joint decree must join in an application for execution (3) This section in the last Code (1) allowed one or more to apply for execution of the whole decree unless execution is by the terms of the decree dependent upon a joint application (5) The ruling of the Privy Council (6) negatives decisions to the effect that a joint decree holder cannot apply for execution of a decree to the extent of his fractional interest (7) This can be done, provided that the interest is one determined by the decree itself This is, of course, a different thing from applying separately for execution limited to what the applicant considers his interest in it (8) The words "or his or their representatives" have been omitted as this will be covered by the general clause. An order refusing to allow the decree to be executed by one joint decree holder

(1) O'Keefe, C P C notes to section

(2) Cf. *Ramasami v Anda Pillai* 13 M 347, 14 M 232 (1890)

(3) *Ponnampilath v Ponnampilath* 3 M 79, 81 (1880) cf. *Roy Goodai Roy v Dhuaneshur Kooer*, 7 C L R 117 (1880)

(4) See cases *passim* and *Teja Singh v Rajnarayan Singh*, 1 B L R A C 62 (1868), *Azizunnissa Khatun v Shashi Bhusan Bose*, 2 B L R, App 47 (1869), *Harogobind Das Koorburto v Isauri Das*, 15 C. 187 (1887), *Kamlapat v Baldeo*, 22 A 222 (1900), and as to minor joint decree-holder and limitation *Surja Kumar Dutt v Arun Chunder Roy*, 28 C 465 (1901), *Perasami v Krishna Ayyan*, 25 M 431 (1901)

(5) *Farzand v Abdullah*, 6 A 69 (1883)

(6) *Hurrah Chunder Chowdhry v Kahi Sunderi Debi*, 9 C 482 (1882), 10 I A 4, and see *Brojwar v Chowdhraee v Tripoota*

Soonderee, 3 C L R 513 (1878)

(7) *Banarsi Das v Maharani Kuar* 5 A 27 (1862), *Collector of Shajahanpur v Surjan Singh*, 4 A 72 (1881), *Dahchand Bhudar v Bar Shivkar*, 15 B 242, at p 244 (1890), *Thakoor Dass Singh v Luchmeeput Doogur*, 7 W R 10 (1867), *Haro Santer Sandyal v Taral Chandra Bhattacharjee*, 3 B L R A C J 114 at p 117 (1869), *Purna Chandra Mookerjee v Sarada Charan Roy*, 3 B L R App 21 (1869), *Ponnampilath v Ponnampilath*, 3 M 79 (1880), *Prannath Mitter v Mothooranath Chuckerbutty*, 6 W R Misc 64 (1866)

(8) So in *Muthusami Ayyan v Natesa Ayyar*, 18 M 464 (1894), the decree did not award any specific sum as so due to the particular defendants and, therefore, the decree had to be executed as a joint decree or not at all

"The interest of any decree-holder."—The additions are intended to remove any doubt (1) in regard to the power of the transferee of the interest of one out of several joint decree holders to apply for execution. One of several decree holders may assign his interest under the decree, and as regards joint decree holders, see last rule. The transferee of a portion of a decree is a transferee of the decree within the meaning of this section (2)

"Is transferred"—This excludes the owners of any interest in existence before decree. The section does not apply where the person seeking to execute is not a transferee from the original decree holder, or to cases where the right to an equitable interest in a decree is contested, and was not intended to enable the Court to try such a question as the legitimacy of an heir (3). And apparently if the decree holder's interest in the property itself and not the decree be assigned the decree should be executed by the decree holder (4). The transferee of a decree stands in the same position for getting execution as the transferor (5). If a decree is sold the purchaser as assignee of the decree is entitled to any moneys profits thereunder (6). A decree for the payment of a sum of money and for costs of the suit is one and indivisible and the decree so far as it may be only for costs cannot be separated from the rest of the decree and transferred (7). As for transfer of rent decrees in Bengal (8) and of village Munsiffs in Madras (9) see below.

"In writing"—An oral transfer is not recognized for the purposes of the rule (10). Where S obtained a decree against D, the owner in possession, and subsequently in a suit brought by J against S a decree was passed by consent that J should execute S's decree it was held that J was a transferee within the section (11).

"Operation of law"—The words *"by operation of law"* must be understood to mean the operation of law as administered in Indian Courts (12). Where

(1) See *Sectaput Roy v Syud Ali Hossain*, 24 W. R. 11 (1875), diss. from in *Kinhore Chand Bhakat v Gisborne & Co*, 17 C. 341 (1889). *Muthu Narayana Reddi v Balakrishna Reddi*, 19 M. 306 (1896), and as to effect of transfer of part *Banarsi Das v Maharani Kuar*, 5 A. 27 (1882). *Pogosa v Fukurooddeen*, 25 W. R. 343 (1876). *Kudhai v Sheo Dayal*, 10 A. 570 (1888). *Pasupathy v Kothanda*, 28 M. 64 (1904).

(2) *Endoori v Venkatachamala*, 33 M. 50 (1909).

(3) *Abdoonnissa Khatoon v Ameroon nissa Khatoon*, 2 C. 327 (1876), s. c., 4 L. A. 66, 73.

(4) *Rani Sahai v Gaya*, 7 A. 107 (1884). *Ayyan, Khushrobbhai Nasarwanji v Hormazsha*.

(5) *Faha*, 11 B. 727 (1887). As to the

(6) *Hui for registration* see *Cous Mahomed Sunderi Da Ali Khan*, 23 C. 450 (1896). *Koob* and see *Brojdhry v Nattjannung Singh*, 9 C.

839 (1883). *Abdul Majid v Muhammad Fazullah*, 13 A. 89 (1890). *Hansraj v Mukhrayi Kunwar*, 30 A. 23 (1907).

(6) *Gonesh Lal Tewari v Sham Narain*, 6 C. L. R. 533, 536 (1880).

(7) *Ram Chandra v Abdul Halim*, 35 A. 204 (1913).

(8) *Kodash Chunder Roy v Jodu Nath Roy*, 14 C. 350 (1887). *Karuna Moji Bannerjee v Surendra Nath Mookerjee*, 26 C. 176 (1893).

(9) *Kalandan v Pakrichi*, 9 M. 378 (1886).

(10) *Parvata v Digambar*, 15 B. 307 (1890). *Javermal Hirachand v Umaji Haya bati*, 9 B. 179 (1884).

(11) *Doorga Pershad v Lallah Juggunnath*, S. D. N. W. (1869) 34.

(12) *Purmanandas Jivandas v Vallabhdas Walli*, 11 B. 506 at p. 512 (1881) [assignment of decree in equity].

which transferred to an estate, which up to the date it fell into his hands had been in possession of the executor, it was held that there was a transfer by operation of law. (1) As to whether an order of sale made an adjudication passed the test under a decree for sale the Official Assignee to the applicant (2) The holder of a certificate of sale obtained under Reg. VIII of 1827 is a transferee by law of a decree obtained by the deceased (3)

"May apply."—Unless an application is made to it, all that the Court has to do is to look to the record. Unless, therefore, a decree holder applies to the Court to certify a transfer of his interest, the Court can take no notice of such alleged transfer (4) An application for the transmission of a decree has been treated as an application for execution under the former section under which notice has been issued to the assignee and judgment-debtor (5) Mere notice and nothing else has been held not to operate as a revival of the decree (6) A decree is not a debt within the meaning of sect. 131 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the notice required by this rule is, in every event, sufficient (7)

"To the Court which passed it."—An application by the transferee of a decree for execution after substitution of his name can be entertained only by the Court which passed the decree (8)

"May be executed."—It was formerly held that the transferee was not entitled to have execution as of right like the original decree holder for the matter was one within the Court's discretion (9) but that the discretion must be exercised reasonably. The mere fact of the existence of a cross claim against the assignor of a decree by his judgment-debtor was no reason for refusing issue of execution on the application of the assignee (10) Nor was the probability that the decree might be executed against some particular judgment-debtor sufficient ground for refusing a transfer (11) If there was no

(1) *Lingasoodury Dassay v Brojonath Bhattacharjee*, 10 C 317, 319 (1859), see *Sethurayar v. Shanmugam Pillai*, 21 M 353, 356 (1897)

(2) *Miller v. Abunash Chunder Dutt*, 4 C W N. 765 (1900)

(3) *Khanderao Wajapurav v Ganesh Shas*, 11 B 368 (1887)

(4) *Khetur Mohun Chuttopadhyas v Ishur Chunder Surma*, 11 W R 271 (1869)

(5) *Nanda Lal v Chatterput Sing*, 23 C 235 (1902)

(6) *Monohar Das v Tuteh Chand*, 30 C 979 (1903); see, 7 C W N. 793

(7) *Dagdu v Vaoji*, 24 B 602 (1900)

(8) *Amar Chandra Bannerjee v Guru Prosunno Mukerjee*, 27 C 488 (1900), *Jam Sahar Prasad v Thakur Prasad*, 25 A 433, 444 (1903), *Sheo Narayan Sing v Harbans Lal*, 5 B L R 497 (1870)

(9) *Parvata v Digambar*, 15 B 307

(1850), *Jayramal Hirachand v Umaji Hyabata*, 9 B 170 (1884), *Balkrishna Das v Bedmasti Koor*, 20 C 349 (1892), *Amar Chandra Bannerjee v Guru Prosunno Mukerjee*, 27 C 488, 491 (1900), *Shama Poddoo Dutt v Nobin Chunder Bose*, 15 W R, 283 (1871), *Vakulabharana v Hongalayan*, 3 M 357 [right of transferee *sub judice*] But see *Anad v Haular*, 38 C 13 (1910), post

(10) *Kashina Mohun Doss v Kedarnath Chuckerbutty*, 15 C 110 (1888); but see *Jodoonath Roy v Ram Bahad Chulungoo*, 9 W. R 202 (1867), the decree must be such as are capable of being dealt with as cross decrees: *Kusumoonissa Bibee v Hill*, 15 W R 127 (1871)

(11) *Bishtou Churn Bhosoon v. Kishen Gopal Misser*, 13 W. R. 207 (1870); see *Rughoo Nundun Ram v Soinsour Panday*, 22 W. R 235 (1874)

matter for the Court of execution (1) or it may be (as where there is an invalid assignment), a party may sue for refund of money paid by him (2)

Notice—The penalty imposed by the proviso is that there should be no power to execute if the proviso is not complied with (3). Where there are more transferees than one, all should be cited (4). If a decree is transferred by assignment after the death of the judgment-debtor, notice may be served on his legal representative. The death of the judgment-debtor does not render the transferred decree incapable of execution (5). As to the procedure in such a case, see case cited (6). If a transfer is made after notice to transferor and debtor and the decree partly executed, the representative of the judgment debtor cannot subsequently object (7). It is illegal (and not merely irregular) to execute the decree before hearing the objections (8).

Money decrees—This proviso applies only to decrees for money personally due by two or more persons, (9) and in cases coming within the proviso the assignee is left to a regular suit (10).

Appeal—Disputes as to share transferred arising between a judgment debtor and decree holder must be determined under sect. 47 by order of the Court executing the decree (11). There is no express appeal given from an order on an application made under this section, but if the Court in disposing of the transferee's application is acting under and determines a question of the nature referred to in sect. 47, then an appeal lies. Upon this there is a conflict of decision. In some cases it has been held that no appeal lies against an order dismissing an application for execution by a transferee either on the ground that as the Court had not recognized him and accepted him on the record as a representative, either such transferee did not become a representative within the meaning of sect. 47, or that the question as to whether such transferee should

(1) *Bommanaiah Veerappa v Chinta Kunta Srinivasa*, 26 M. 264 (1902)

(2) *Ramasami v Basayappa*, 16 M. 325 (1893), and the transferor may be liable to pay compensation if the assignee is prevented from recovering under the decree by an attachment of it in execution proceedings against the transferor. *Puthiandi Mammed v Ayalai Mordin*, 20 M. 157 (1896). In *Ram Gobind Singh v Ghenoos Singh*, 20 W. R. 406 (1873), a suit for a refund failed on the facts.

(3) *Gulzari Lal v Daya Ram*, 9 A. 46, 49 (1886) [where, however, the order appealed from was not an order for execution but merely for transfer].

(4) *Ib.*, at p. 50.

(5) *Khushroobhai Nasaryanj v Hormazsha*, 11 B. 727 (1887).

Mahalinga Moopanan v Kuppanacha, M. 541 (1907).

Ranchoddas v Chhagan

Naran, 10 B. 74 (1885).

(8) *Kassam Goolam v Dayabhai*, 36 B. 58 (1911).

(9) *Lalla Bhagun Pershad v Holloway*, 11 C. 393 (1885). *Laldhari v Manager of Bhabatpura Estate*, 14 C. L. J. 639, 642 (1911).

(10) *Yakob Ali Chowdhry v Ram Doolal*, 13 C. L. R. 272 (1893), see *Soroop Chunder Hazrah v Trollokhoonath Roy*, 9 W. R. 230 (1866), *Laldhari Singh v Manager, Court of Wards, Bhabutpura Estate*, 16 C. W. N. 132 (1911).

(11) *Kudhai v Sheo Dayal*, 10 A. 570 (1888), see *Lalla Bhagun Pershad v Holloway*, 11 C. 393, at p. 395 (1885). As to questions between co-decree holders only, see *Gyamonee v Radha Ramon*, 5 C. 592 (1879), and plaintiff and stranger to suit *Mohabur Singh v Ram Bhagawan Chowbey*, 11 C. 150, 152 (1884).

have execution was one to be decided under this section and not sect 47, *ante* (1) Most of these cases were decided prior to the amendment of sect 244 (now 47) by Act VII of 1888, according to which the Court determined who was the representative of a party. According to the contrary and more recent view, the order is made under sect 47, *ante*, (2) though this rule may afford the *ratio decidendi*, (3) and is therefore appealable, (4) and this appears to be the law now. And though an appeal may lie, the Madras High Court has held that the right of suit has not been taken away, as the words "and not by separate suit" in sect 244 (now 47) did not, it was said, apply (5). *See qu.* now after the amendment of clause 3 in that section.

5.] 17. (1) On receiving an application for the execution of

Procedure on receiving application for execution of decrees. a decree as provided by rule 11, sub rule (2), the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with; and, if they have not been complied with, the Court may reject the application, or may allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.

(2) Where an application is amended under the provisions of sub-rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented.

(3) Every amendment made under this rule shall be signed or initialed by the Judge.

(4) When the application is admitted, the Court shall enter in the proper register a note of the application and the date on which it was made, and shall, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, order execution of the decree according to the nature of the application.

Provided that, in the case of a decree for the payment of money, the value of the property attached shall, as nearly as may be, correspond with the amount due under the decree.

Amendment—An application, if perfect in form, is admitted, and in

(1) See remarks in *Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das*, 16 A 483, at pp 486, 490 (1894), on the cases there cited, and *Sobha Bibee v Mirza Sakhamut*, 3 C 371 (1878), *Sambasiba v Srinivasa*, 12 M 511 (1889), *Shcoraj Singh v Amin ud din Khan*, 20 A 539, 542 (1898), or substituting the assignee, *Megh Narayan Sing v Radha Prasad Sing*, 4 B L R A C 200 (1870).

(2) *Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das* 16 A 483, at p 490 (1894).

(3) *Lalla Bhagun Pershad v Holloway*, 11 C 386, at p 395 (1885).

(4) *Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das*, *supra*, *Ganga Das Seal v Yakub Ali Dubishi*, 27 C 670 (1900), *Brabnam Chariar v Appasami Mudaliar*, 25 M 545 (1901); *Bommanapati Veerappa v Chintakunta Srinivasa*, 26 M 264 (1902), *Hriday Kant v B. Hari Lal*, 11 C W. N 239 (1900).

(5) *Bommanapati Veerappa v Chintakunta Srinivasa*, 26 M 264 (1902).

order is immediately granted to execute the decree. Sect. 245 of the last Code, which the rule replaces, provided that the Court should reject such applications or allow their amendment. This might be done then and there, or the application might be returned for amendment within a time fixed. If the application was not amended it was to be rejected; but if it was not rejected there was nothing to prevent the Court from extending the time for amendment (1). If amended, the application was admitted and the Court proceeded to order execution according to the nature of the application. The rule, in the first place, substitutes for the term "*amended*" the phrase the "*defect to be remedied*," because the first term does not cover the remedying of a defect such as the omission to produce a copy as required by r. 11, third sub-section. As regards the subject-matter of the second sub-section of this rule it was originally (in order to meet various difficulties which were raised regarding defective applications) proposed to enact that until an application returned under this rule was presented with such amendments as the Court might have required it should not be deemed to be in accordance with law. This was proposed in view of a decision of the Calcutta High Court (2). The Select Committee, however, rejected this proposal and have relaxed the stringency of this rule and have allowed the application to date back to the time of its original presentation on the lines followed in connection with plaints. It was proposed to enact that when once an application had been admitted it was to be deemed to be in accordance with law for the purpose of limitation, even though it was eventually dismissed after hearing the parties. On the other hand to prevent dismissals for defect of form not affecting the merits, it was proposed to allow the Court even after admission to allow any amendment not converting an application into one of another and inconsistent character. The suggested additions, however, have not been made. Though under the previous Code, applications for execution were often allowed to be amended without objection as to the Court's competency to allow it (3) it was a matter of doubt whether the Court had any power to amend after admission and registration (4). In a recent case where within a short time of the expiration of the period of limitation a decree holder applied under this rule for leave to file a list of immoveable properties, and his application was granted but the list was not filed till after the period had expired it was held that the proceedings in execution were barred by limitation (5).

"Value of the property attached"—As a rule, the Court has *ex parte* applications little material on which to determine how much of the debtor's property should be attached. If more is attached than ought to be attached,

(1) *Kaminy Mohun Somoddar v Gopal*, 8 C 479 (1882).

(2) *Gopal Sah v Janki Koer*, 23 C 217 (1895), distinguished in *Mathura v Musst Anurago*, 14 C W N 481 (1910), and see *Musarraf v Amir*, 15 C W N 71 (1910).

(3) *Hukm Chand C P C* 643.

(4) See *Asgar Ali v Troulorkya Nath Ghosh* 17 C 631 636, 641 (1890), *Macgregor v Tarani Churn Sircar*, 14 C 124 (1887), *Sattappa Chetti v Jogi Soorappa*,

17 M. 67, 68 (1893) which deals also with the principle on which amendment should be made, *Jivat Dube v Kali Charan Ram* 20 A. 478 (1896), where it was also ruled that an application having once been admitted the date of a subsequent amendment would not, by reason of such amendment, become the date of the application.

(5) *Sahmullah v Samaddi Sarkar*, 18 C L J 538 (1913).

have execution was one to be decided under this section and not sect 17, *ante* (1) Most of these cases were decided prior to the amendment of sect 214 (now 17) by Act VII of 1888 according to which the Court determined who was the representative of a party According to the contrary and more recent view, the order is made under sect 47, *ante*, (2) though this rule may afford the *ratio decidendi*, (3) and is therefore appealable, (4) and this appears to be the law now And though an appeal may be, the Madras High Court has held that the right of suit has not been taken away, as the words "and not by separate suit" in sect 244 (now 47) did not, it was said, apply (5) *Sed qu* now after the amendment of clause 3 in that section

15.] 17. (1) On receiving an application for the execution of

Procedure on receiving
application for execution
of decrees,

a decree as provided by rule 11, sub rule (2), the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with, and, if they have not been complied with, the Court may reject the application, or may allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it

(2) Where an application is amended under the provisions of sub rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented

(3) Every amendment made under this rule shall be signed or initialed by the Judge

(4) When the application is admitted, the Court shall enter in the proper register a note of the application and the date on which it was made, and shall, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, order execution of the decree according to the nature of the application

Provided that, in the case of a decree for the payment of money, the value of the property attached shall, as nearly as may be, correspond with the amount due under the decree

Amendment—An application, if perfect in form, is admitted, and an

(1) See remarks in *Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das*, 16 A 483, at pp 486, 490 (1894), on the cases there cited, and *Sobha Bibee v Mirza Sakhamut*, 3 C 371 (1878), *Sambasiba v Srinivasa*, 12 M 511 (1889), *Sheora Singh v Amin ud din Khan* 20 A 539, 542 (1898), or substituting the assignee, *Megh Narayan Sing v Radha Prasad Sing* 4 B L R A C 200 (1870)

(2) *Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das*, 16 A 483 at p. 490 (1894).

(3) *Lalla Bhagun Pershad v Holloway*, 11 C 386, at p 395 (1885)

(4) *Badri Narain v Jai Kishen Das*, *supra* *Ganga Das Seal v Yakub Ali Dobaishi*, 27 C 670 (1900), *Krishnama Chariar v Appasami Mudahar*, 25 M 545 (1901), *Bommanapati Veerappa v Chintakunta Srinivasa*, 26 M 264 (1902), *Hriday Kant v Bahari Lal*, 11 C W N 239 (1906)

(5) *Bommanapati Veerappa v Chintakunta Srinivasa*, 26 M 264 (1902)

the judgment debtor can and ought to come in and ask that the attachment should be withdrawn from some particular portion of the property. Even if the order for attachment is wrong and excessive under this rule, the attachment as actually put is not without jurisdiction or null and void (1)

48]

18. (1) *Where applications are made to a Court for the execution in case of execution of cross decrees in separate suits for cross-decrees, the payment of two sums of money passed between the same parties and capable of execution at the same time by such Court, then—*

(a) *if the two sums are equal, satisfaction shall be entered upon both decrees, and*

(b) *the two sums are unequal, execution may be taken out only by the holder of the decree for the larger sum and for so much only as remains after deducting the smaller sum, and satisfaction for the smaller sum shall be entered on the decree for the larger sum as well as satisfaction on the decree for the smaller sum*

(2) *This rule shall be deemed to apply where either party is an assignee of one of the decrees and as well in respect of judgment debts due by the original assignor as in respect of judgment debts due by the assignee himself*

(3) *This rule shall not be deemed to apply unless—*

(a) *the decree holder in one of the suits in which the decrees have been made is the judgment debtor in the other and each party fills the same character in both suits, and*

(b) *the sums due under the decree are definite*

(4) *The holder of a decree passed against several persons jointly and severally may treat it as a cross decree in relation to a decree passed against him singly in favour of one or more of such persons*

Illustrations

(a) A holds a decree against B for Rs 1,000. B holds a decree against A for the payment of Rs 1,000 in case A fails to deliver certain goods at a future day. B cannot treat his decree as a cross decree under this rule.

(b) A and B co plaintiffs, obtain a decree for Rs 1,000 against C, and C obtains a decree for Rs 1,000 against B. C cannot treat his decree as a cross decree under this rule.

(c) A obtains a decree against B for Rs 1,000. C who is a trustee for B obtains a decree on behalf of B against A for Rs 1,000. B cannot treat C's decree as a cross decree under this rule.

(d) A, B, C, D and E are jointly and severally liable for Rs 1,000 under a

decree obtained by F. A obtains a decree for Rs 100 against F singly and applies for execution to the Court in which the joint-decree is being executed. F may treat his joint-decree as a cross-decree under this rule.

Applicability—The rule contemplates that where a decree is sought to be set off against another, the decree against which the set off is asked for must be before the Court for execution (1). A judgment debtor is entitled to set off a decree whether the judgment creditor may or may not intend to object on appeal to the judgment debtor's decree, for a decree is a decree till it is reversed whether it be appealed or not (2). Should either decree be reversed in appeal the decree of the Appellate Court can then be executed (3). The rule does not preclude a claim of set off of a sum due on a decree which is not under execution, the rule being inapplicable to such a case (4). The transferee of a decree holds subject to equities enforceable against original holder (sect. 49). The purchaser of a decree against which a cross-decree may be set off takes his decree subject to the set off (5). Where there were cross-decrees and one of the decree holders was, by an order of Court, made with the consent of both parties, bound in executing his decree to set off the amount of the decree against him held that it would be inequitable to allow the other decree holder to obtain execution in full without setting off the amount decreed against him (6). In the under-mentioned case a course was adopted which if not strictly in accordance with the letter, was in accordance with the spirit of this and the next rule and at all events should be allowed on principles of natural equity (7).

"To a Court"—That is the Court to which the application is made for execution and which is dealing with the case as to whether execution shall be issued or not (8). The former section contained the words "*produced to the Court*". This would seem still to be necessary as if all the decrees are not produced to the Court it will not have jurisdiction over them all.

"In separate suits"—The insertion of these words is intended to show that for the purposes of execution a counterclaim is not a separate action (9). This rule deals with cross-decrees and not with cross-claims under one decree. That is provided for by the next rule (10).

(1) Chajmal Das v Lal Dharam Singh 24 A 481 (1902), followed in Ponnusamy v Doraisamy, 32 M 336 (1909).

(2) Huro Pershad Roy v Shama Pershad Roy, 5 W R Misc 52 (1866), Sheo Prosunno Singh v Shub Lal Jha 1864, W R Misc 1.

(3) Sheo Prosunno Singh v Shub Lal Jha, *supra*, but where there has been consent see Gupmath Roy v Dinabandhu Nandi, 3 B L R app 62 (1869).

(4) Bharath Prosad v Ramchwar Koer, 8 C W N 118 (1903).

(5) Nundo Coomar Bakshee v Koonjo Kishore Roy, 6 W R Misc 73 (1866), and see Kristo Ramani Dassce v Kedar Nath

"For the payment of two sums of money."—A decree directing recovery of a certain sum of money by sale of land but not directing payment by the defendant was held to be for the payment of money (1)

"Capable of execution"—So where a decree declared that it should not be executed until *wasilat* had been ascertained, and this had not yet been done it was held that the decree was not in a position to be executed, and as it could not be executed it could not be set off against the other decree (2) The Code of 1859 only applied to decrees of the same Court or decrees sent to one Court for execution (3)

"Execution may be taken out"—Process should only issue for the difference. Where, however, process was allowed to issue for the smaller sum it was held that the irregularity did not render subsequent proceedings null and void, nor was it sufficient to justify the setting aside of a sale in execution (4)

Assignee.—It was for some time a subject of controversy, whether in the case of decrees, both of which were in existence but not yet set off one against the other upon the assignment of one of them the right to set off still subsisted as against the assignee. That question was finally decided in favour of the right to set off (5)

Parties must be the same and the sum definite.—See as an illustration of this cases cited (6). A strict adherence to the language of the section in the last Code was held to tend to simplify the rule, although it would contract its operation (7). The fourth sub clause, however, now makes it clear that the holder of a decree passed jointly and severally against several judgment debtors, one of whom holds a decree passed against such decree holder singly, may treat his joint decree as a cross decree (8)

19 Where application is made to a Court for the execution of a decree under which two parties are entitled to recover sums of money from each other, then,—

Execution in case of cross-claims under same decree

(a) if the two sums are equal, satisfaction for both shall be entered upon the decree, and,

(b) if the two sums are unequal, execution may be taken out only by the party entitled to the larger sum and for

(1) *Krishnan v Venkatapathi* 29 M 318 (1905)

(2) *Juddoo Nath Roy v Ram Bux Chut tangee* 7 W R 535 (1867)

(3) *Girish Chandra Lahuri v Fakir Chand* B L R, F B 503 (1866)

(4) *Rewa Mahton v Ram Kishan Singh* 13 I A 106 14 C 18 (1886)

(5) *Kristo Ramani Dass v Kedar Nath Chakravarty* 16 C 619, 621 (1889)

(6) *Moulvie Rezaooddeen v Fuzloomssa,*

5 W R 12 (1866), and see *Girish Chandra Lahoory v Koomaree Dabee* 1 W R Misc 23 (1864) *Bhagawant Kunwar v Lala Baij Nath*, 2 B L R 84 (1868) *Tara Chand Ghosh v Anand Chandra Chowdhry*, 2 B L R 110 (1868)

(7) *Hury Dojal Guho v Dun Dojal Guho* 9 C 479 (1883) see *Murli Dhar v Parsotam Das* 5 A 91 (1878)

(8) See *Ram Sukh Das v Tata Ram* 14 A 339 (1892)

so much only as remains after deducting the smaller sum, and satisfaction for the smaller sum shall be entered upon the decree.

Cross claims.—This rule proceeds on the same principle as the last, applying not where there are several decrees but one decree only. All that the decree-holder is entitled to enforce execution of is the difference between the amount found recoverable by him and the amount which the judgment debtor is entitled to recover against him (1). The rule is not limited in its application to cases in which the remedy of each party against the other is of precisely the same nature (2). This rule does not apply to a case of pre-emption but only to counter-claims in suits for money, but the principle on which it is based is applicable, and under an order to deposit the purchase money costs may be deducted (3).

20. *The provisions contained in rules 18 and 19 shall apply to decrees for sale in enforcement of a mortgage or charge.*
Cross-decrees and cross claims in mortgage suits

Mortgage suits—This rule is new. It is inserted in order to make it clear that the provisions as to cross decrees and cross claims apply to the case of mortgage decrees (4). The rule also incidentally makes it clear that the expression "decree for the payment of money" and other similar expressions in the Code do not include a decree for sale in enforcement of a mortgage or charge.

21. *The Court may, in its discretion refuse execution at the same time against the person and property of the judgment-debtor*
Simultaneous execution [s. 23 2nd para]

Execution against person and property—It is discretionary with the Court either to grant or to refuse execution at the same time against the person and property of the judgment debtor. An appeal, however, has been held (5) to lie on the question whether this discretion was properly exercised.

22. (1) *Where an application for execution is made—*
Notice to show cause against execution in certain cases [s. 24]
(a) *more than one year after the date of the decree, or*
(b) *against the legal representative of a party to the decree,*

(1) *Sm Giribala Debta v Sm Rani Mina*, 5 C W N 497 (1900), *Jugo Mohan Bukabce v Soorendronath Roy Chowdhry*, 13 W R 106 (1870), *Amjad Ali Khan v Syad Fazal Hossein*, 19 W R 187 (1873)

(2) *Bhagwan Singh v Ratan*, 16 A 395 (1894), *Sanhara Menon v Gopala Pattar*, 23 M 121 (1891), *diss from Kalla Prasad v Ramdin*, 5 A. 272 (1883)

(3) *Lahri v Gopal Saran*, 6 A 351 (1884)

(4) *See Nagar Lal v Ram Chand*, 33 A 240 (1910), in which it was held that a Court may set off a simple decree for recovery of money against a decree for recovery of money by enforcement of a charge

(5) *Chena Pemaji v Ghelabhai Narandas*, 7 B 301 (1883)

The Court *executing the decree* shall issue a notice to the person against whom execution is applied for requiring him to show cause, *on a date to be fixed*, why the decree should not be executed against him.

Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in consequence of more than one year having elapsed between the date of the decree and the application for execution if the application is made within one year from the date of the last order against the party against whom execution is applied for, *made* on any previous application for execution, or in consequence of the application being *made* against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, if upon a previous application for execution against the same person the Court has ordered execution to issue against him.

(2) *Nothing in the foregoing sub rule shall be deemed to preclude the Court from issuing any process in execution of a decree without issuing the notice thereby prescribed, if, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that the issue of such notice would cause unreasonable delay or would defeat the ends of justice*

Notice—This rule is materially altered. Clauses (a) and (b) are the same as in the last Code. The Explanation to the corresponding section (218) of the last Code has been omitted and the second sub section inserted, as it was represented that even in the cases referred to in clauses (a) and (b) issue of the notice may involve an unreasonable delay or defeat the ends of justice. The Courts have thus been given a discretion in the matter. Where a judgment debtor appears and contests the decree holder's right to execute his decree he cannot object that no notice was served on him (1). The notice should be addressed to the widow of a deceased Hindu who held joint undivided property along with his brothers for it must be as *quasi* separate property that the attaching creditor had a claim to it (2). As to proof of service of notice, see below (3). As to whether the issuing of notice acts as a revivor within the meaning of art 180 of the Limitation Act, (4) and as to the time provided for by art 179, (5) see cases cited. The judgment creditor should ask for the execution of the decree and not for the issue of a notice, it being the duty of the Court to issue the notice (6).

(1) *Grish Chandra Bhanerjee v Bhanoo Motee*, 11 W R 329 (1869). As to where the objection can be taken, see *Srihari Mundal v Murari Chowdhry*, 13 C 257 (1860), but see *Sripati v Belchambers*, 15 O W N 661 (1910) and cases there cited.

(2) *Nanabhai v Janardhan*, 16 B 637 (1892).

(3) *Bimola Soondurce v Kalee Kishen*, 22 W R 5 (1874), *Meer Looff Ali Aboo Bibee*, 15 W R 203 (1871).

(4) *Lalla Monohur Dass v Lutich Chand*,

7 C W N 793, 30 C 979 (1903), *Rameshwar v Ratishwar*, 17 C L J 125 (1912), *Khosal v Ukladdi*, 14 C W N 117 (1909), *Steepati v Shamaldone*, 15 C L J 123 (1910).

(5) *Damodar v Sonaji*, 27 B 622 (1903), *Kadaresur Sen v Mohun Chandra*, 6 C W N 556 (1903), *Goyind v Dada*, 28 B 416 (1904), *Ratan Chand v Deb Nath*, 10 C W N 303 (1906), *Cheruvath Thalungal v Norata Thalangal*, 30 W N 30 (1908).

(6) *Gooreo Dass v Modhoo*, 6 W R Misc 98 (1866).

If neither party appears on the day on which the notice under this rule is made returnable the application for execution can be dismissed (1). Under the last Code it was held that the issuing of notice was a condition precedent to the valid execution of a decree in cases falling within clauses (a) (2) and (b) (3). More recently, however, the Privy Council held that where the debtor and his estate were made properly subject to the decree, the fact that notice was given to the wrong person and sale took place without notice to the legal representative, though constituting a material irregularity did not render the judicial sale a nullity (4). Where a defendant respondent dies before judgment in appeal is pronounced, it may be entered *nunc pro tunc* and the decree may be executed under this and cognate sections against the heirs of the deceased without placing them on the record (5). An application to set aside a decree on the ground that the notice had not been served under this rule must be made under sect 17 and not under r 90 of this order and can only succeed on proof that the omission to serve the notice caused substantial injury to the owner of the property sold (6).

"Court executing the decree"—It was held under the last Code that though the notice under sect 218, corresponding with this rule must be issued by the Court to which the decree was transferred for execution, the application to execute against a legal representative should be made to the Court which passed the decree (7). But an omission to apply to the latter Court was held to be a mere irregularity (8). It has been held under the present Code that a notice under this rule is not required to be issued upon an application for transfer of a decree, and that such notice must be issued by the Court which has seized of the application for execution, whether it be the original Court which made the decree or the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution (9).

23 (1) Where the person to whom notice is issued under the last preceding rule does not appear or does not show cause to the satisfaction of the Procedure after issue of notice. [s 219]

(1) *Tularam v Bhawan*, 20 B 541 (1895) dissenting from in *Kumed v Prasanna* 40 C 45 (1912)

(2) *Sahdeo Pandey v Ghasoram Gajwal*, 21 C 19 (1893) [neglect to issue a notice under clause (a) vitiates the sale and it makes no difference that the auction purchaser is a third party and not the decree holder]

(3) *Gopal Chunder v Gunamoni Dassce*, 20 C 370 (1892), *Imam un nissa v Leelat Husain* 3 A 424 (1881), *Rameswari Dassce v Doorgadas Chatterjee* 6 C 103 (1880) *Erava v Sudramappa* 21 B 424 (1894) where, however *Farran C.J.*, considered the proceedings voidable and not void. In *Shree Prasad v Hira Lal*, 12 A 440 (1889) the case was distinguishable, because death took place after attachment and before sale and

the attachment did not abate

(4) *Malkarjun v Narhari* 25 B 337 s.c. 2 Bom L R 927 (1900) *Levina Ashton v Madhabmoni* 14 C W N 560 (1910) *Lalshmi v Sris*, 13 C L J 162 (1910) *Bepun Behary v Soma Bhujan* 18 C L J 628 (1913)

(5) *Ramacharya v Anantacharya* 21 B 314 (1895)

(6) *Kumed Bewa v Prasanna* 40 C 45 (1912), *Lalshmi v Sris* 13 C L J 162 (1910)

(7) *Hira Chand Harjivan Das v Hastur Chand Kasidas*, 18 B 224 (1893), *Swami natha v Vaidyanatha* 28 M 466 (1900)

(8) *Sham Lal Pal v Modhu Sudan Sircar*, 22 C 558 (1899)

(9) *Sreepati v Shamaldone*, 15 C L J 122 (1910)

Court why the decree should not be executed, the Court shall order the decree to be executed.

(2) Where such person offers any objection to the execution of the decree, the Court shall consider such objection and make such order as it thinks fit.

has contributed by his own conduct to his being placed in the position in which he finds himself (1)

"Offers any objection"—When a petition of objection (which, it has been held need not be verified (2)) is presented under this rule the Judge is bound whether a day for hearing has been fixed or not, to fix a day for consideration of it and (even if the petitioner is not present either personally or by a pleader) to consider those objections, and to pass such orders as may be just and proper for it might be that the grounds of objection raised would be of such a nature as that the Judge might *prima facie*, and without going further into the case see reason for not proceeding with the execution (3)

Process for execution

24 (1) When the preliminary measures (if any) required by the foregoing rules have been taken, the Court shall, unless it sees cause to the contrary, issue its process for the execution of the decree

(2) Every such process shall bear date the day on which it is issued, and shall be signed by the Judge or such officer as the Court may appoint in this behalf, and shall be sealed with the seal of the Court and delivered to the proper officer to be executed

(3) In every such process a day shall be specified on or before which it shall be executed

Issue of Process—This rule amalgamates with some alterations sects 250 and 251 of the last Code, the first of which sections was amended by sect 3 of Act VI of 1886 by the introduction of the words 'subject to the provisions of sect 245 A and 245 B,' which have been now omitted. Sects 245 A and 245 B are now sect 56 and r 37 of this order respectively. Probably the words "subject," etc., were omitted as unnecessary, as this or any other provision of the Code must be subject to other provisions contained in it. For the word 'warrant' the word "process" has been substituted as being more exhaustive and familiar. It was pointed out under the last Code (4) that though in cases

(1) *In re Samuel Cochrane*, 14 B L R 330 (1875)

(2) *Sant Gopal Chunder v Jugut Indur Duniawar* 8 W R 200 (1847)

(3) *Rajballub Saha v Ramsudoy Ghose* J B L R, App 60 66 (1870)

(4) *Dhokal Singh v Bhakkar Singh*, 10 A 84 (1833) at p 94

of the decree holder's default the Court might under s. 250 suspend the issue of its warrant, that course, if adopted would not have disposed of the application for execution which would still remain undisposed of in the register of pending cases. A distress warrant issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act, which has been extended beyond the original date of return but does not bear on the face of it the altered date, is not a legal warrant under this rule (1) See now as to default, r. 57, post.

It was held under the preceding section that a day had to be specified on or before which it was to be executed and after that date no lawful order was in force (2) If the process is not signed by the Judge or other officer it is bad (3) The execution of the process may be delegated to another by the officer to whom it is addressed the words *to be executed*, seeming to imply that it was not intended that the "proper officer" should himself execute all warrants sent to him (4) An officer cannot arrest without having the warrant in his possession (5) As to proof of execution (6) see below.

25 (1) The officer entrusted with the execution of the process shall endorse thereon the day on, and the manner in, which it was executed, and, if the latest day specified in the process for the return thereof has been exceeded, the reason of the delay, or, if it was not executed, the reason why it was not executed, and shall return the process with such endorsement to the Court.

(2) Where the endorsement is to the effect that such officer is unable to execute the process, the Court shall examine him touching his alleged inability, and may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine witnesses as to such inability and shall record the result.

Endorsement on process—Act VIII of 1859 sect. 272. The Nazir can delegate the execution to a subordinate officer by endorsing his name on the warrant. If the endorsement is irregular it does not invalidate the arrest (7) In a recent case in the Calcutta High Court it has been held that 'the officer entrusted with the execution' within the meaning of this rule is not the Nazir

(1) *Sheikh Nasir v. Emperor* 37 C 122 (1909)

(2) *Ananda Lal Bera v. R.* 10 C 18 (1883) and see *Abinash Chandra Aditya v. Ananda Chandra Pal* 31 C 424 (1904) and see *Sheikh Nasir v. Emperor* 37 C 122 (1909)

(3) *Ram Dayal v. Mahtub Chand* 7 A 506 (1885). It cannot however be said that because a signature was confined to initials it was not the duty of the officer to execute the warrant. *R. v. Janki Prasad* 8 A 293 (1886)

(4) *Abdul Karim v. Bullen* 6 A 380 (1884) *Dharam Chand Lal v. R.* 22 C 596 (1895) *Sheo Prakash Tewari v. Bhoop Naram Prasad* 22 C 709 (1895)

(5) *R. v. Amar Nath* 5 A 318 (1883) (6) *Mohunt Megh Lal v. Shib Pershad* Mad 7 C 34 (1881) and cases there cited.

(7) *Abdul Karim v. Bullen*, 6 A 380 (1884) *Dharam Chand Lal v. R.* 22 C 596 (1895), *Sheo Prakash Tewari v. Bhoop Naram Prasad* 22 C 709 (1895)

but the peon (1) In this case the peon had been directed by the Nazir to attach certain property within a certain time and had executed the warrant after the time had expired, and it was held that he had power to do this because his authority was derived from the Court

Stay of execution

26. (1) The Court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time, to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the Court by which the decree was passed, or to any Court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or the execution thereof, for an order to stay the execution, or for any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by such Court of first instance or appellate Court if execution had been issued thereby, or if application for execution had been made thereto.

(2) Where the property or person of the judgment debtor has been seized under an execution, the Court which issued the execution may order the restitution of such property or the discharge of such person pending the result of the application

(3) Before making an order to stay execution or for the restitution of property or the discharge of the judgment-debtor, the Court may require such security from, or impose such conditions upon, the judgment-debtor as it thinks fit

Stay of execution—Ordinarily a debtor once discharged after arrest cannot be re-arrested in execution of the same decree (2) Under the former (as under the present) Code, execution was stayed on the application or objection of the judgment debtor, to enable the latter to apply to the Court which passed the decree, or to a Court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or its execution This is necessary both to prevent precipitate execution when the decree itself or some order passed in execution is still under appeal, and also because the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution had no jurisdiction to decide certain matters It has been held that an applicant can exclude the period of stay (even if the order only relates to a part of the decree, as, for instance, recovery of costs) in computing the period of limitation (3)

Security and conditions—Where a condition precedent is infringed, execution must continue as a matter of course, whereas conditions subsequent may be enforced like decrees It has been held that an order for security in

(1) Subed Ali v R, 40 C 849 (1913), 657 (1886), *In re Bolye Chund Dutt*, 20 C 874 (1893)
distinguishing *Dharam Chand Lal v R*, 22 C 596 (1893)

(3) *Bai Uyam v Bai Ruxmani*, 38 B.

(2) *Secretary of State v Judah* 12 C 652, 153 (1913)

stay of execution is not appealable, for it is not an order determining the rights of the parties, and is neither an order within meaning of sect 17 nor a decree within meaning of sect 2 (1)

27. No order of restitution or discharge under rule 26 shall [s. 241.]
 prevent the property or person of a judgment-debtor from being retaken in execution of the decree sent for execution.

"Shall prevent."—The words "*order of restitution*" have been added to bring the rule in conformity with the wording of the second clause of r 26. Ordinarily a debtor once discharged after arrest cannot be re-arrested in execution of the same decree (2). It has, however, also been held, distinguishing the first and dissenting from the second of the cases cited, that though the Code specifically provides for retaking of the person under certain defined circumstances, it does not follow from this that a second arrest is in all circumstances forbidden (3). In any case this rule creates a specific exception.

28. Any order of the Court by which the decree was passed, [s. 242.]
 or of such Court of appeal as aforesaid, in relation to the execution of such decree, shall be binding upon the Court to which the decree was sent for execution.

Order of Court which passed decree or of Appellate Court to be binding upon Court applied to.

"Binding"—The transfer of a decree to another Court for execution amounts to a *qualified* delegation of the powers possessed by the Court that passed the decree, in discharging its functions relating to the execution of that decree. Such delegation is, however, not complete, nor does it entirely divest the Court which transfers the decree of its powers and functions "in relation to the execution of such decree," for under r 26 and the present rule the highest

See sect 42, ante

29. Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder [s. 243.]
 of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided

Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment-debtor.

(1) *Saraswati Barmania v Golap Das Barman*, 41 C 160 (1913). *Deoli Nandan Singh v Bansi Singh*, 14 C L J 35 (1911)

(2) *Secretary of State v Judah*, 12 C 653 (1886). *In re Boyle Chand Dutt*, 20 C 874 (1893), *dist. in Rajendro Narain Roy v*

Chunder Mohan Muser, 23 C 128 (1895) [the rule is conditional not only on arrest but also on imprisonment under arrest]

(3) *Shamji v Poona*, 26 B 652, 659 (1902)

(4) *Ghandin v Fakir Balsh*, 7 A. 73, 76, 77 (1884)

Stay pending suit—The provisions of this rule are limited to staying execution, and have no reference to a case in which execution has already been carried out and the decree holder placed in possession of the property decreed to him (1) It was held under the last Code that the section was not limited to a Court executing its own decree (2) An appeal lies from an order staying execution (3) The rule refers to the parties to the suits pending or about to be executed Execution cannot be stayed on the ground that a stranger to the decree impeaches it on the ground of fraud He should file a suit and obtain an injunction for the purpose (4) An award filed in Court under sect 11 of the Indian Arbitration Act is nothing more than an award, although it is enforceable as a decree, and execution of an award cannot be stayed under this rule (5)

Mode of execution

54] 30 Every decree for the payment of money, including a Decree for payment of money. decree for the payment of money as the alternative to some other relief, may be executed by the detention in the civil prison of the judgment-debtor or by the attachment and sale of his property, or by both.

Imprisonment—This rule, as it appeared in sect 254 of the Code of 1882, was a repetition of that in Act X of 1877, the latter being the same as sect 201 of Act VIII of 1859 though differently expressed and amplifying the expression “decree be for money” in the earlier Code In the Code of 1882 it commenced “Every decree or order directing a party to pay money as compensation, or costs, or as the alternative,” and included the terms “enforced” and “imprisonment” for the present “executed” and “detention in the civil prison”

“For the payment”—A decree for rent, without charging any property, against a *putnadar* may be executed as a decree for money, (6) while a decree for maintenance payable monthly stands on the same footing as a decree by instalments and may be executed from time to time as the instalments fall due (7)

“Alternative”—A decree for the delivery of moveable property shall state the amount of money to be paid as an alternative if delivery be not made (8)

“Some other relief”—An order directing refund of money, awarded as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and wrongly paid out, can be

(1) *Ghazidin v Fakir Baksh*, 7 A at pp 73, 78 (1884)

(2) *Ib*, at p. 77, *Kassa Mai v Gopi*, 10 A 389 (1888)

(3) *Ib*, *Steel v Itchamoy Chowdram*, 13 C 151 (1886), *Lingam Krishnabhupati v Kandula Snaramayya* 20 M 366 (1896), *Krustomohun Dossee v Bama Churn Nag*, 7 C W N 733, 735 (1881) [stay of sale pending administration suit]

(4) *Pureshottam Vithal v Pureshottam Ishwar*, 8 B 532 (1884)

(5) *Tribhuwandass v Jivanchand*, 35 B 196 (1910)

(6) *Taruniprosad v Narayan*, 17 C 301 (1889)

(7) *Pearcenath Brohmo v Juggessuree*, 15 W R 128 (1871)

(8) O X. r 10

executed under this rule (1) The Court executing a decree has no power to direct payment of interest on costs where the decree of the Privy Council is silent as to interest (2)

"May be executed."—A Court should execute the decree in the manner applied for by the decree holder, (3) but it has discretion to refuse execution at the same time against the person and property of the judgment debtor, (4) and may in a suit for money call upon the latter to show cause why he should not be imprisoned (5) A woman, however cannot be arrested on a money decree (6) As to costs of applications under this rule see sect 35

"Detention in the civil prison.—The High Court's power to commit for contempt is unaffected by this Code (7) An insolvent obtaining a protection order is not liable to imprisonment for arrears of maintenance included in his schedule (8) A suit to recover damages on account of injuries caused by wrongful arrest can only be maintained if the original suit has been finally decided in favour of the plaintiff if the arrest was made without reasonable or probable cause, and the injuries cannot be compensated by costs (9)

31. (1) Where the decree is for any specific moveable, or [s 259]
Decree for specific for any share in a specific moveable, it may
moveable property he executed by the seizure, if practicable, of
the moveable or share, and by the delivery thereof to the party
to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he appoints
to receive delivery on his behalf, or by the *detention in the civil*
prison of the judgment debtor, or by the attachment of his pro-
perty or by both.

(2) Where any attachment under sub rule (1) has remained
in force for six months, if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed
the decree and the decree holder has applied to have the attached
property sold, such property may be sold, and out of the pro-
ceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder, in cases where
any amount has been fixed *by the decree to be paid as an alter*
amount, and, in other
shall pay the balance
(if any) to the judgment debtor on his application

(3) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and
paid all costs of executing the same which he is bound to
pay, or where, at the end of six months from the date of the

(1) Nobin Kali Debi v Banalata Debi, 32
C 921 (1905), 2 C L J 59.

(2) Baron Forester v Secretary of State 4
I A. 137 (1877)

(3) O XXI r 17

(4) O XXI r 21

(5) O XVI r 37

(6) S 56

(7) Martin v Lawrence 4 C 655 (1879),
Hassanbhoj v Cowasji, 7 B 1 (1881) Navi
vahoo v Narotamdas, 7 B 5 (1882) In re
Bai Amrit, S B 387 (1884)

(8) Tokeo Bibee v Abdul Khan 5 C 536
(1879)

(9) Raj Chunder v Shama Soondari, 4 C
583 (1879)

attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made, or, if made, has been refused, the attachment shall cease.

Decree for specific moveable—In the Code of 1859, sect 200 included sects 259 and 260 of Act XIV of 1882. The words ‘or for any share in a specific moveable or for the recovery of a wife’ and the second clause were added by Act X of 1877. This clause was altered by Act XIV, and the words “and the decree holder has applied to have the attached property sold” and “in cases where any amount has been fixed under sect 208 such amount and in other cases,” were also added and the last clause appended. In the present rule the italicized words “executed,” “detention in the civil prison,” and “by the decree to be paid as an alternative to delivery of moveable property,” have been substituted for “enforced,” “imprisonment” and “under sect 208,” appearing in sect 259 of the Code of 1882 and the words “for the recovery of a wife,” have been omitted, as there can be no such decree, a wife not being a chattel to be delivered over to the husband. Where any third person prevents the wife from returning to her husband the latter may obtain an injunction against him, which may be enforced in case of disobedience either by the imprisonment of the defendant, or by the attachment of his property or by both. This rule is not applicable where the property sought to be attached is not in the possession of the judgment debtor (1). A decree being given for specific immovable and moveable properties and the Ameen directed to ascertain the extent of the moveables, an order was made in execution for the Ameen to give possession of such moveables as he could find, and to inquire into the nature, amount, and value of such as he could not find. On appeal it was held that this order was not one for alternative damages, but to enable the Court if necessary to make a sufficient and not excessive order for imprisonment or attachment of property in case of non delivery (2). A writ of attachment against the person of the judgment debtor will not be granted without notice to him (3).

601

32 (1) Where the party against whom a decree for the

Decree for specific performance, for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction

specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity

of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both

(2) *Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance or for an injunction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and detention*

(1) *Pudmanund Singh v Chund Dat Jha*, 19 W R 52 (1873)
1 C W N 170 (1896)

(3) *Troplukho Nath Dutt v Radharam*,

(2) *Bho lun Mohunee v Golind Chunder*, 3 C W N xxxix

(3) Where any attachment under *sub rule (1) or sub rule (2)* has remained in force for one year, if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and *shall* pay the balance (if any) to the judgment debtor on his application.

(4) Where the judgment debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all costs of executing the same which he is bound to pay, or where, at the end of one year from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made, or if made has been refused, the attachment shall cease.

(5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment debtor, and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree.

Illustration

A, a person of little substance erects a building which renders uninhabitable a family mansion belonging to B. A, in spite of his detention in prison and the attachment of his property, declines to obey a decree obtained against him by B and directing him to remove the building. The Court is of opinion that no sum realizable by the sale of A's property would adequately compensate B for the depreciation in the value of his mansion. B may apply to the Court to remove the building and may recover the cost of such removal from A in the execution proceedings.

Decree for specific performance—Sect 200 of Act VIII of 1859 was divided up by Act X of 1877 into two sections 259 and 260. To the latter section the Code of 1877 added "*or for restitution of conjugal rights*," altered "*it shall be enforced*" to "*has had an opportunity of obeying the decree or injunction and has wilfully failed to obey it the decree may be enforced*," deleted from the earlier section the words "*and keeping the same under attachment until further order of the Court*," and added the second clause. By the Code of 1882 were added the words "*or abstention from*" to the first clause, the words "*and the decree holder has applied to have the attached property sold*" to the second clause, and the whole of the last clause. The portions in italics, as also the Illustration, were added by the present Code, which also substituted "*an injunction has been passed*" for "*the performance of or abstention from any other particular act, has been made*," and "*detention in the civil prison*" for "*imprisonment*," and in clause 3 "*shall*" for "*may*," and in clause 4 "*or if made has been refused*"

for "*and granted*" This section is inapplicable to Parsees as far as restitution of conjugal rights are concerned (1)

"Restitution of conjugal rights"—These words were added to meet the objection raised in the case of *Gatha Ram v Moohita Kochin*, (2) though sect 200 of Act VIII of 1859, as it stood, was held to cover such a case (3) A person directed by a decree to refrain from preventing her daughter returning to her husband, and who permitted her daughter to reside in her house, is not thereby guilty of such interference as would justify execution under that section (4) The Court has now a discretion, under O XXI r 33, in executing decrees for the restitution of conjugal rights No provision is made for executing a decree for the recovery of a wife in this or the preceding rule, as no such decree can be made Where any third person prevents the wife from returning to her husband, the latter may obtain an injunction against him which may be enforced in the manner provided by this rule

"For an injunction"—A decree directing the removal of certain obstructions in a pathway can only be enforced as directed by this rule and not by directing the Court Ameen to remove the obstructions, (5) similarly in regard to a decree directing the removal of a building, (6) or one for removal of obstruction to light and air, (7) but see sub clause (4) and the Illustration to this rule Each breach of a perpetual injunction may be enforced under this rule (8) A decree settling a scheme for the future management of a temple should be executed in accordance with this rule, (9) so where the decree directed certain property to be jointly managed by the plaintiff and defendant and both their names to appear in all papers connected with the same, on the defendant disobeying, the Court can direct attachment of his property (10) A decree ordering delivery of certain moveables and declaring title to certain rights is not incapable of being executed under this rule as being merely a declaratory decree, (11) but a decree ordering that payment in kind accruing after the decree be from time to time given is too indefinite for execution (12) An order for the refund of money, awarded under the Land Acquisition Act and wrongly paid out, should be executed under sect 145 rather than under this rule (13)

"An opportunity of obeying"—All a Court has to see is whether the party bound by the decree has had an opportunity of obeying the decree or

(1) *Ardesar Jahangir v Avabai* 9 B H C 290 (1872) This was decided under sect 200 of Act VIII of 1859

(2) 23 W R 179 (1875), 14 B L R 298

(3) *Yamunabai v Narayan*, 1 B 164 (1876), see also *Chotun Bibco v Ameer Chund*, 6 W R 105 (1866)

(4) *Ajnasi Kuar v Suraj Prasad*, 1 A 501 (1877)

(5) *Bhoobun Mohun v Nobin Chunder*, 18 W R 282 (1872)

(6) *Protap Chunder v Peary Chowdhram*, 8 C 174 (1881) 9 C L R 453

(7) *Sakaral v Bai Larvatibai*, 26 B 283

(1901)

(8) *Venkatachallam v Veerappa*, 29 M 314 (1905)

(9) *Shakaram v Ghelabhai*, 19 B 34 (1893), *Damodarbhat v Bhogulal*, 24 B 45 (1899)

(10) *Gouri Prosad v Bholanath*, 8 C L R 487 (1881)

(11) *Kishore Bun v Dwarkanath*, 21 B 764 (1894 P C)

(12) *Tata Charar v Singara*, 4 M. 219 (1881)

(13) *Nobin Kali v Banalata*, 32 C 921 (1905), 2 C L J 535

injunction and has wilfully failed to obey it (1) The proper course when an application is made to execute a decree for the removal of a building is to serve notice upon the judgment debtor calling upon him to comply within a time to be fixed by such notice, with the order in the decree and on his failure to do so to make an order in terms of this rule, (2) but that is not a general rule, the rule does not require notice to issue and it is discretionary with the Court (1)

'May be enforced'—When an application was dismissed on the ground that the defendant had not been afforded an opportunity of obeying, a second application after such opportunity was not barred as *res judicata* (3)

Limitation—Failure to enforce prior breaches of a perpetual injunction will not bar the enforcement within three years of a subsequent breach Art 178, Sched II, of the Limitation Act applies to such a case (1) Art 179 is inapplicable (5)

33 (1) *Notwithstanding anything in rule 32, the Court, either at the time of passing a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights or at any time afterwards, may order that the decree shall not be executed by detention in prison*

Discretion of Court
in executing decrees for
restitution of conjugal
rights

(2) *Where the Court has made an order under sub rule (1), and the decree holder is the wife, it may order that, in the event of the decree not being obeyed within such period as may be fixed in this behalf, the judgment debtor shall make to the decree holder such periodical payments as may be just, and, if it thinks fit, require that the judgment debtor shall, to its satisfaction, secure to the decree holder such periodical payments*

(3) *The Court may from time to time vary or modify any order made under sub rule (2) for the periodical payment of money, either by altering the times of payment or by increasing or diminishing the amount, or may temporarily suspend the same as to the whole or any part of the money so ordered to be paid, and again revive the same, either wholly or in part as it may think just*

(4) *Any money ordered to be paid under this rule may be recovered as though it were payable under a decree for the payment of money*

Decrees for restitution of conjugal rights—Under the last Code a Court could not refuse to execute a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights by the

(1) *Durga Das v Dowraj* 33 C 306 (1905), 3 C L J 112 10 C W N 297
Bhagwan Das v Sukhdei 28 A 300 (1905), 2 A L J 836

(2) *Protap Chunder v Peary Chowdhram* S C. 174 (1881).

(3) *Kishore Bunt Dwarakanath* 21 C 784 (1894 P C), 21 I A 89

(4) *Venkatachallam v Veerappa* 23 M 314 (1905)

(5) *Bhagwan Das v Sukhdei* 28 A 300 (1905) 2 A L J 836

attachment of the person or property of a recalcitrant judgment debtor, but in England this mode of execution has been put an end to by the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884, 17 & 18 Vict c 68 (of sects 2-4). It has been considered that some relaxation of the provision in force in India is desirable, but that it was doubtful whether it should go as far as this. For the present Courts have been given a discretion in the matter, and they have been enabled to follow a procedure slightly adapted from the English practice in cases in which attachment and imprisonment appear inappropriate.

62]

34 (1) *Where a decree is for the execution of a document or for the endorsement of a negotiable instrument and the judgment debtor neglects or refuses to obey the decree, the decree holder may prepare a draft of the document or endorsement in accordance with the terms of the decree and deliver the same to the Court.*

Decree for execution of document or endorsement of negotiable instrument

(2) *The Court shall thereupon cause the draft to be served on the judgment debtor together with a notice requiring his objections (if any) to be made within such time as the Court fixes in this behalf.*

(3) *Where the judgment debtor objects to the draft, his objections shall be stated in writing within such time, and the Court shall make such order approving or altering the draft, as it thinks fit.*

(4) *The decree holder shall deliver to the Court a copy of the draft with such alterations (if any) as the Court may have directed upon the proper stamp paper if a stamp is required by the law for the time being in force, and the Judge or such officer as may be appointed in this behalf shall execute the document so delivered.*

62]

(5) *The execution of a document or the endorsement of a negotiable instrument under this rule may be in the following form, namely—*

“C D, Judge of the Court of (or as the case may be), for A B, in a suit by C F against A B,” and shall have the same effect as the execution of the document or the endorsement of the negotiable instrument by the party ordered to execute or endorse the same.

(6) *The Court, or such officer as it may appoint in this behalf, shall cause the document to be registered if its registration is required by the law for the time being in force or the decree holder desires to have it registered, and may make such order as it thinks fit as to the payment of the expenses of the registration.*

Execution of instrument and endorsement—Sub rule (6) has been

extended to cover optional as well as compulsory (1) registration, and an order for the payment of expenses of either kind may presumably be summarily enforced in the execution department. The Registrar of the High Court can, if directed by that Court, execute a conveyance on behalf of a party refusing so to do, so as to pass his estate, but he cannot enter into a covenant on his behalf. (2) Objections to draft conveyances or draft endorsements can be made the subject of appeal under O XLIII r 1 (c).

35. (1) *Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property.* [s 263]

(2) *Where a decree is for the joint possession of immovable property such possession shall be delivered by affixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming by beat of drum, or other customary mode, at some convenient place, the substance of the decree.*

(3) *Where possession of any building or enclosure is to be delivered and the person in possession, being bound by the decree, does not afford free access, the Court, through its officers, may, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public according to the customs of the country to withdraw, remove or open any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other act necessary for putting the decree holder in possession.*

"Decree"—The decree should describe the land accurately so as to avoid any objection (3) in execution as regards the lands covered by it. Possession should not be given unless it is so ordered by the decree. (4) If the plaintiff is entitled to possession it should be given him. He cannot be compelled to accept compensation against his will. (5) When a decree is obtained for possession that decree should be executed and a second suit will not lie for the purpose. (6) Where an adverse title is unsuccessfully set up the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for *khas* possession under this rule. (7) and having set up only an adverse title

(1) See *Kanahia Lal v. Kali Dm* 2 A 392 (1879), as regards however the ground of Spankie, J's judgment, see *Prakash Chunder Dass v. Tara Chand Dass* 9 C 52 (1862) F B.

(2) *Ram Chunder Dutt v. Dwarkadnath Bysack*, 16 C. 330 (1889).

(3) See *Dwarka Nath Halder v. Kumola Kant*, 12 W R 99 (1869), *Zeenat Ali v. Ram Doyal Poddar* 18 W R 25 (1872), *Kaleo Debee v. Modhoo Soodun*, 16 W R 171 (1871), *Radha Gobind Shaha v. Bro-*

jendro Coomar Roy, 18 W R 527 (1873), *Ananda Pershad v. Troyluckonath* 13 W R 123 (1870).

(4) *Ameerounissa Khatoon v. Abedoonissa Khatoon*, 16 W R 307 (1871).

(5) *Gowind Venkaji v. Sadashiv Bharna* 17 B 721 (1892).

(6) *Ramsurn Mahton v. Jinonauth Bhugut*, 10 W R 396 (1868).

(7) *Raj Mungal Roy v. Sm Anundmoyee* 11 W R 63 (1869).

in the suit, the defendant cannot be allowed for the first time when the decree is being executed to plead his occupancy as a tenant (1) As to growing crop see below (2) It was held that if the decree was silent as to a building situated on the land, it was not within the province of the executing Court to direct that the building be pulled down (3)

Possession—Possession may be actual or formal or, as it is often called, symbolical possession The delivery of possession which is directed to be given by this rule is the placing of the decree holder in actual possession, which act may involve the dispossession of some other Whilst this rule relates to the delivery of what is known as *khas*, or immediate or direct possession, the following rule provides for the case where the immoveable property is in the occupancy of a

Formal delivery
of the order for p

him Whether what occurs on the occasion of giving delivery has the effect of dispossession is a question which must be decided on the evidence (4) It has been held that the delivery of formal possession in execution of a decree for possession gives a cause of action against a defendant who remains in occupation of the possession which may be enforced in a regular suit (5) Rules 97 and 98 provide for any resistance or obstruction to the delivery of possession complained of by the decree holder and r 100 to any complaint on the part of a third party as to his being dispossessed in execution of the decree Where in execution of a decree a person not a party to the suit is dispossessed his dispossession does not give him a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar Rule 100 (formerly sect 332) applies (6)

Joint possession—A plaintiff who is entitled to possession jointly with other persons can be granted a decree for joint possession, whether he had been originally in joint possession or not (7)

"Bound by the decree"—This includes not only the judgment debtor but persons taking from him and affected by the *lis pendens* A person who purchases during the pendency of the suit is bound by the decree that may be made against the person from whom he derives title So one who takes title or possession from a defendant in ejectment pending the suit is bound by the judgment and can be evicted by the process which shall issue therein although he is not a party thereto (8) *Lis pendens* continues during the pendency of

(1) Banes Mahton v Gopee Bhuggut 12 W R 285 (1869)

(2) Udit Narain Singh v Shub Rai 20 A 198 (1898)

(3) Radha Gobind Shaha v Brojendra Chowdhry 18 W R 527 (1873)

(4) Ramchandra Subrao v Ravji 20 B 351 (1895), and for meaning of dispossession in Bengal Tenacy Act Sch III, Art 3, see Rudra Narain Maiti v Natobar Jana 41 C 52 (1913)

(5) Shama Charan Chatterji v Madhub

Chandra Mookerjee, 11 C 93 (1884), see Hari Mohun Shaha v Baburahi, 27 C 715 (1897), for effect of formal possession on limitation, see *post*, notes to O XXI, r 97, and Mahadeo v Janu 36 B 376 14 Bom L R 115 (1912)

(6) Ramchandra Subrao v Ravji 20 B 351 (1895)

(7) Jagannath v Ram Phal 34 A 150 (1911)

(8) Hukra Chand, Res Jud 636 where the subject will be found fully discussed.

an appeal (1) There has been some conflict whether the rule of *lis pendens* applies to a sale in execution But the weight of authority appears to be in favour of the view that a purchaser at a sale in execution pending a suit is bound by the result in that suit (2) Where sons living with their father had no independent juridical possession, the possession which was obtained through the Court against their father was held to operate as well against his dependents as against himself (3) Decree holders seeking to obtain *khās* possession of property which is already in possession of a *surburakar* under order of Court, should apply for his removal to the Court which appointed him in the matter of the suit in which he was appointed (4)

Undivided share.—Difficulty was often felt (5) in executing a decree obtained by the proprietors of an undivided share in immoveable property for *khās* possession The second sub clause of this rule now regulates this matter Thus where a decree holder in execution of her decree purchased an undivided share in a house which the judgment-debtor owned jointly with a third person, and the judgment debtor resisted her attempt to get possession, it was held that on the construction of this rule with r 95 of this Order the decree holder was entitled to have him removed from the premises (6)

“Break open”—See cases cited below (7)

36. Where a decree is for the delivery of any immoveable property in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy, the Court shall order delivery to

Decree for delivery of immoveable property when in occupancy of tenant.

The doctrine of *lis pendens* first received statutory recognition in sect 223 of the Code of 1859 The rule, however, is now contained in sect 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

(1) Gobind Chunder Roy v Guru Churn Kurmoker, 15 C 94 (1882) Radhika v Radhamani, 7 M 96 (1883)

(2) Hukm Chand Res Jud 713, 714. Raj Kishen Mookerjee v Radha Madhub Holdar, 21 W R 349 (1874), Lala Kali Prosad v Buli Singh 4 C 759 (1878), Jharoo v Raj Chunder Dass, 12 C 299 (1880), Gobind Chunder Roy v Guru Churn Kurmoker, 15 C 94 (1887), Dinomath Ghose v Shama Bibi 28 C. 23 (1900), Parvati v Jusaning 6 B 567 (1882) In Nilakant Bannanje v Suresh Chandra Mullick 12 C 414 (1885), the P C. expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the judgment of the High Court on the question of *lis pendens*

(3) Pandharinath v Mahabub Khan, 21 B 98 (1895), dist. Lakshman v Moru, 16 B 722 (1890), where the son who was a

Hindu was in actual and apparently in juridical possession of the land of which he took the crop

(4) Hurriah Kishto v Motee Chand, 10 W R 445 (1868)

(5) See O Humealy's notes to sect 263, citing Brohmoy Moyee Debba v Raj Chunder, 5 W R Misc 15 (1866), Ranees Shama Soondoree v Jardine, Skinner & Co, 7 W R 376 (1867), Koonwar Bijoy Keshub v Shama Soondoree, B L R Sup Vol 172, 2 W R Misc 31 (1866) Rajani Kanth v Ramnath Nogy 10 C 244 (1883), Ram Chandra v Damodhar Trimbak, 20 B 467 (1895), Krishnaji v Vithu 18 B 500 (1893) Bhau v Dade Krishnaji, 21 B 777 (1896), Watson & Co v Ram Chand Dutt 18 C. 10 (1890), Yuchmeswar Singh v Manowar Hossein 13 C. 203 (1891), and generally as to the position of co sharers, see Woodroffe's In junctions 2nd ed. p 400 et seq

(6) Sarvi Begam v Taj Begam, 36 A. 181 (1914)

(7) Gunesh Chunder Shah v Ram Dhunoo

be made by affixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property, and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode, at some convenient place, the substance of the decree in regard to the property

Occupancy of tenant—In order to a legal possession being given under this rule it is essential that all its requirements should be carried out (1) But if the party in possession when the decree is being executed admits to the Court that the decree holder has formally obtained possession he cannot afterwards plead a title by adverse possession denying that the decree holder ever received possession (2) "*The substance of the decree in regard to the property*" which must be proclaimed to the occupant may or may not be a declaration that the decree holder is the immediate landlord of the occupant and as such entitled to receive rent directly from him as there may be an intermediate holder Probably both the intermediate tenant as well as the cultivating tenant or actual occupant would come within the terms of the rule (3) In executing a decree under this rule the Court should confine its action strictly to the terms of the law and should not add to the decree an order directing the ryots to pay rent to the decree holder (4)

Arrest and detention in the civil prison

5B] 37 (1) Notwithstanding anything in these rules, where an application is for the execution of a decree for the payment of money by the arrest and detention in the civil prison of a judgment-debtor who is liable to be arrested in pursuance of the application, the Court may, instead of issuing a warrant for his arrest, issue a notice calling upon him to appear before the Court on a day to be specified in the notice and show cause why he should not be committed to the civil prison

(2) Where appearance is not made in obedience to the notice, the Court shall, if the decree holder so requires, issue a warrant for the arrest of the judgment debtor

of 18

and substituted for 'imprisonment' and 'jail in execution of the decree' respectively This rule applies to cases under O XXI r 11 (5) where in respect of decrees for the payment of money the Court may order immediate execution against the judgment-debtor on the oral application of the decree holder

Dassee 22 W R 283 (1874), Radia Gobind

v Brojendro Chowdhry 18 W R 527 (1873)

(1) Court of Wards v Oopendronath Deo
15 W R 99 (1871)

(2) Bindobashinee Dossce v Renney, 15

W R 307 (1871)

(3) O Kinealy C P C, notes to sect. 204

(4) Gibbon v Shea Purshun Misser, 17

W R 236 (1872)

(5) O XXI r 21

"The Court may"—It has discretion to refuse execution at the same time against the person and property of the judgment debtor (1) It is the practice of the Calcutta High Court to issue notice to the party whose arrest is sought in execution in all cases Even after a vesting order has been made the Court may under this rule direct execution by arrest and imprisonment where protection has been refused by the Insolvent Court (2)

"Issue a notice"—Notice may issue against a judgment-debtor who in other execution proceedings has made an application to be declared an insolvent (3)

38. Every warrant for the arrest of a judgment-debtor shall direct the officer entrusted with its execution to bring him before the Court with all convenient speed, unless the amount which he has been ordered to pay, together with the interest thereon and the costs (if any) to which he is liable, be sooner paid.

Warrant for arrest of judgment debtor—Act VIII of 1859, sect 222 For form of warrant, see Schedule IV No 154, of former Code The executing officer is only empowered to arrest the defendant and detain him for such a reasonable time as is sufficient to allow of his being brought before the Court, and having an opportunity of applying for his discharge, the detention of a defendant after such reasonable time and without further authority of law is illegal (4) So where a sheriff's officer of his own motion took a prisoner in custody under a warrant directed to the Superintendent of the Presidency Jail to the Alipore Jail and delivered her there, it was held that the imprisonment was unlawful and that she was entitled to her discharge (5)

39. (1) No judgment-debtor shall be arrested in execution of a decree unless and until the decree holder pays into Court such sum as the Judge thinks sufficient for the subsistence of the judgment debtor from the time of his arrest until he can be brought before the Court

(2) Where a judgment debtor is committed to the civil prison in execution of a decree the Court shall fix for his subsistence such monthly allowance as he may be entitled to according to the scales fixed under section 57 or, where no such scales have been fixed, as it considers sufficient with reference to the class to which he belongs

(3) The monthly allowance fixed by the Court shall be

(1) O XXI r 21

(2) Bhaaker v Shudhar, 9 Bom L R 898

(1904)

(3) Ganpat v Mahadev, 22 B 731 (1897)

(4) In re Shambhoo Chunder Halder, Bourke, 69 (1865)

(5) Shamsunnessa Begum v Anne Love, 11 C 537 (1885)

supplied by the party on whose application the *judgment debtor* has been *arrested* by monthly payments in advance before the first day of each month

(4) The first payment shall be made to the proper officer of the Court for such portion of the current month as remains unexpired before the judgment debtor is committed to the *civil prison*, and the subsequent payments (if any) shall be made to the officer in charge of the *civil prison*

40] (5) Sums disbursed by the decree holder for the subsistence of the judgment debtor in the *civil prison* shall be deemed to be costs in the suit

Provided that the judgment-debtor shall not be detained in the *civil prison* or arrested on account of any sum so disbursed.

Subsistence money—This rule amalgamates sects 339 and 340 of the last Code, which correspond with sects 276 and 279 of the Code of 1869, which, with the exception of the first paragraph of sect 339 were somewhat similar (1) An order by the Court for subsistence allowance is necessary under the second clause, and the sum so fixed must be paid in advance (2) under the third clause It is of course, for the officer of the Court and not for the prisoner to see that the money is paid (3) The judgment debtor must be released on the omission by the person on whose application he has been detained to pay the subsistence allowance See sect 58, clause (iv), *ante*

7A] 40 (1) Where a judgment debtor appears before the Court in obedience to a notice issued under rule 37, or is brought before the Court after being arrested in execution of a decree for the payment of money, and it appears to the Court that the judgment-debtor is unable from poverty or other sufficient cause to pay the amount of the decree or, if that amount is payable by instalments, the amount of any instalment thereof, the Court may, upon such terms (if any) as it thinks fit, make an order disallowing the application for his arrest and detention, or directing his release, as the case may be

(2) Before making an order under sub rule (1), the Court may take into consideration any allegation of the decree holder touching any of the following matters namely —

(1) See *Aga Ali Khan v Joydoyal Lall* (1865), *Bourke*, 52 (1865), *Speyer v Janssen*, *Bourke* 28 (1865), *In re Shamboo Chunder Malda*, *Bourke*, 59 (1865). *In re Thomson*, *Bourke*, 421 (1865)

(2) See *Dutt v Cornelius*, 5 B L R App 79 (1870), *Haladhar Dey v Ambika Charan Bose*, 5 B L R App 80 (1870), *In re Koney Lall Doss* *Bourke*, 51 (1865)
(3) *In re Thomson* *Bourke*, 421 (1865)

- (a) the decree being for a sum for which the judgment debtor was bound in any fiduciary capacity to account,
- (b) the transfer, concealment or removal by the judgment-debtor of any part of his property after the date of the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, or the commission by him after that date of any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the decree-holder in the execution of the decree;
- (c) any undue preference given by the judgment-debtor to any of his other creditors,
- (d) refusal or neglect on the part of the judgment debtor to pay the amount of the decree or some part thereof when he has, or since the date of the decree has had, the means of paying it,
- (e) the likelihood of the judgment-debtor absconding or leaving the jurisdiction of the Court with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the decree-holder in the execution of the decree

(3) While any of the matters mentioned in sub-rule (2) are being considered, the Court may, in its discretion, order the judgment debtor to be *detained in the civil prison*, or leave him in the custody of an officer of the Court, or release him on his furnishing security, *to the satisfaction of the Court*, for his appearance *when required by the Court*

(4) A judgment-debtor released under this rule may be re-arrested

(5) Where the Court does not make an order under sub rule (1), it shall cause the judgment-debtor to be arrested if he has not already been arrested and, subject to the other provisions of this Code, commit him to *the civil prison*

Proceedings on appearance of judgment debtor.—Act VI of 1888, sect 4 The power to order the judgment debtor's arrest is discretionary. The lunacy of a judgment debtor is a good cause for disallowing an application for his arrest (1) If no cause is shown why the decree should not be executed, under this rule a Court is bound to cause the arrest of the judgment-debtor at once (2) A judgment debtor who had been arrested in execution of a decree of a District Munsif, made an application for his release under the former section, and his application was granted held that an appeal lay against the order granting the application (3)

(1) Bhanabhai v Chotubhai, 22 B 961 C. W. N 588 (1897)
(1897)

(2) Gubboy v Ramdoyal Chawbay, 2 21 Mad. 29 (1897)

(3) Abdul Rahman v Mahomed Hassan,

Attachment of property

- 7.] 41. Where a decree is for the payment of money the decree holder may apply to the Court for an order that—

Examination of judgment debtor as to his property.

(a) the judgment debtor, or

(b) in the case of a corporation, any officer thereof, or

(c) any other person,

be orally examined as to whether any or what debts are owing to the judgment debtor and whether the judgment-debtor has any and what other property or means of satisfying the decree; and the Court may make an order for the attendance and examination of such judgment debtor, or officer or other person, and for the production of any books or documents.

Examination of judgment debtor—This rule is an amplification of the provisions of sect 219 of Act VIII of 1859, modified by sect 267 of Act X of 1877, but none of the decisions hereinafter referred to are based on any particular wording appearing in the earlier forms of this rule under which the examination then was “in respect to any property liable to be seized in satisfaction of the decree”

“Any other person”—This includes the mortgagee of the property attached (1)

Examination—In executing a decree for possession all the Court has to do is to put the decree holder in possession of the property described in the decree, if the description is so uncertain that it is impossible to ascertain what is decreed execution cannot be given. The examination cannot be to ascertain what is decreed, (2) but it may be to ascertain what is the subject upon which the decree operates. When a judgment debtor maintains that the property which the judgment creditor specifies is not the subject of the decree an inquiry should be held and the judgment debtor is at least in honesty bound to point out the actual subject of the decree (3). For the purpose of ascertaining the subject of the decree, the executing Court is not precluded from considering other decrees between the same parties for the purpose of explaining and supporting the subject of the decree (4). In execution of a decree against two or several co sharers the Court should give possession of the shares of the two judgment debtors, but is not authorized to hold any inquiry into the extent or amount of those shares in relation to the remaining co sharers. This can be done by separate suit (5).

“Means of satisfying”—Under the Code of 1882 the words “liable to

(1) *In re Premji Trikumdas*, 17 B 514 (1893)

(2) *Dwarkanath Halder v Kumola Kant*, 12 W R 99 (1860)

(3) *Bhugobai Singh v Ram A Bhu*, 22 W

R 330 (1874)

(4) *Rajendra Kashore v Hyabul Singh* 17

W R 379 (1872)

(5) *Ananda Pershad v Troyluckhonath Paul*, 13 W R 123 (1870)

be seized" were held to mean any property which is attachable under the decree (1)

"For the production."—On an application for execution of a decree by attachment of debts the Court can require the judgment debtor to produce his books in Court (2)

42. Where a decree directs an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits or any other matter, the property of the judgment-debtor may, before the amount due from him has been ascertained, be attached, as in the case of an ordinary decree for the payment of money

Attachment in case of decree for rent or mesne profits or other matter, amount of which to be subsequently determined

profits or any other matter, the property of the judgment-debtor may, before the amount due from him has been ascertained, be attached, as in the case of an ordinary decree for the payment of money

Attachment where decree directs inquiry—This section was introduced into the Code by sect 255 of Act X of 1877, which then ran "*If a decree be for mesne profits,*" etc. It embodies the decision in *Sharoda Moyee Burmonce v Wooma Moyee Burmonce*, 8 W R 9 (1867). The decree, however, will not be binding on the representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor, after whose death the amount of the decree was determined, unless they be parties to the suit (3)

43. Where the property to be attached is moveable property, other than agricultural produce, in the possession of the judgment debtor, the attachment shall be made by actual seizure, and the attaching officer shall keep the property in his own custody or in the custody of one of his subordinates, and shall be responsible for the due custody thereof

Attachment of moveable property, other than agricultural produce in possession of judgment-debtor.

other than *agricultural produce*, in the possession of the judgment debtor, the attachment shall be made by actual seizure, and the attaching officer shall keep the property in his own custody or in the custody of one of his subordinates, and shall be responsible for the due custody thereof

Provided that, when the property seized is subject to speedy and natural decay, or when the expense of keeping it in custody is likely to exceed its value, the attaching officer may sell it at once

Attachment of moveable property—The first clause of this rule corresponds with sect 233 of Act VIII of 1859. The words "*other than the property mentioned in the first proviso to sect 266*" were added by sect 269 of Act X of 1877, and these words have been altered to "*other than agricultural produce*" by the present Code, by which also the words "*is likely to*" and "*attaching*" were substituted for "*will*" and "*proper*" respectively, while the last clause (as to the power of the Local Government to make rules for maintenance of attached live stock), appearing in sect 269 of the Codes of 1877 and 1882, has been omitted. The next two rules deal with the attachment of agricultural produce, and rr 47 and 49 with the attachment of shares in moveables and of partnership property respectively

(1) *In re Pramp Trikumdas*, 17 B 514 (1893)
(2) *Adjoodya Parshad v Middleton*, 3 N.

W P H. C. 334 (1871)

(3) *Radha Prasad v Lal Sahel*, 13 A 53, p. 65 (1890 P. C.)

"Moveable property."—Standing crops are not moveable property, (1) nor trees, (2) nor mango trees, (3) but fruit upon trees is moveable, (4) but as to the attachment of agricultural produce, see O XXI r 44 and 45 Tiled huts are immovable, (5) so are machinery fixtures, (6) but stone sugar mills are not (7) Thatch, especially when severed from a house, is moveable (8)

"Actual seizure"—Thus, it has been held, may include such constructive seizure as is provided by O XXI r 46, (9) or the affixing of the Court seal to the outer door of the warehouse containing the goods to be attached, without breaking open the door and gaining physical possession (10) Under sect 269 of the Code of 1882 the Local Government had power to make rules for the maintenance of attached live stock

Under the corresponding section of the previous Code, rules were made for Bengal, (11) Assam, (12) Burma (13) Central Provinces, (14) Bombay, (15) Madras (16) Punjab (17) and the N W P and Oudh (18) in regard to the maintenance of attached live stock This provision has now been omitted, presumably because the High Courts have now power under Part X to make rules The effect of this omission was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court and though it was said that the point is not free from doubt it was held that until rules were framed under this Code the rules made under sect 269 of the last Code were in force even though they might be inconsistent with this rule (19) The new rules framed by the High Courts under this Code are collected in the Appendix

44. *Where the property to be attached is agricultural produce, the attachment shall be made by affixing a copy of the warrant of attachment,—*

Attachment of agricultural produce
(1) *Tofail Ahmud v Bance Madhub* 24 W R 394 (1875), *Sadu v Sambhu* 6 B 592 (1882), *Madayya v Yenkata*, 11 M 193 (1887), *Cheda Lal v Mulchand*, 14 A 30 (1891)

(2) *Umed Ram v Daulet* 5 A 564 (1883), *Salharam v Vishram* 19 B 207 (1893)

(3) *Krishnarao v Babaji* 24 B 31 (1899)

(4) *Nasir Khan v Karamat* 3 A 168 (1880)

(5) *Raj Chunder v Dhurmo Chunder*, 10 W R 416 (1868), 2 B L R, A J 77, *Nattoo Meah v Nnnd Rameo*, 17 W R 309 (1872), s. c., 8 B L R, 1 B, 508, *Deno Nath Adhor v Chunder*, 4 C W N 470 (1900), *Amrita Lal v Nibaran*, 31 C 340 (1904)

(6) *Millar v Brindaban*, 4 C 248 (1879)
(7) *Hurramungal v Athul*, 4 N W P H. C R 15 (1872)

(8) *Raj Co mar v Pran Nath* 15 W R 11 (1871), 7 B L R App 41

(9) *Isules Goolal v Antone*, 11 B 448

(1887)

(10) *Multan Chand v Bank of Madras*, 27 M 346 (1903)

(11) *Calcutta Gazette* 16th April, 1879, Part I, p 356, 18th July, 1883, Part I, p 621

(12) *Assam Manual of Local Rules and Orders*, Ed 1893, pp 192-4

(13) *Lower Burma Court Manual*, Ed 1905, para 558

(14) No 3470, dated 8th Sept, 1877, Judicial Commissioner's Civil Circular, 1-34

(15) *Bombay Manual of Local Rules and Orders*, Ed 1896, Vol I, p 397

(16) *Madras List of Local Rules and Orders* Ed 1898, Vol L, p 195

(17) *Rules and Orders of the Civil Courts, Punjab*, 2nd Ed, Vol I, p 2

(18) *N W P and Oudh List of Local Rules and Orders*, Ed 1894, rules 121 and 122

(19) *In re District Munsif of Tiruvallur*, 1 B (1914) 37 M 17

(a) where such produce is a growing crop, on the land on which such crop has grown, or

(b) where such produce has been cut or gathered, on the threshing floor or place for treading out grain or the like or fodder stack and in which it is deposited

and another copy on the outer door or on some other conspicuous part of the house in which the judgment debtor ordinarily resides or, with the leave of the Court, on the outer door or on some other conspicuous part of the house in which he carries on business or personally works for gain or in which he is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, and the produce shall thereupon be deemed to have passed into the possession of the Court

45 (1) Where agricultural produce is attached, the Court shall make such arrangements for the custody thereof as it may deem sufficient and, for the purpose of enabling the Court to make such arrangements, every application for the attachment of a growing crop shall specify the time at which it is likely to be fit to be cut or gathered

(2) Subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the Court in this behalf either in the order of attachment or in any subsequent order, the judgment debtor may tend, cut, gather and store the produce and do any other act necessary for maturing or preserving it, and if the judgment debtor fails to do all or any of such acts, the decree-holder may, with the permission of the Court, and subject to the like conditions, do all or any of them either by himself or by any person appointed by him in this behalf, and the costs incurred by the decree holder shall be recoverable from the judgment debtor as if they were included in, or formed part of, the decree

(3) Agricultural produce attached as a growing crop shall not be deemed to have ceased to be under attachment or to require re attachment merely because it has been severed from the soil

(4) Where an order for the attachment of a growing crop has been made at a considerable time before the crop is likely to be fit to be cut or gathered, the Court may suspend the execution of the order for such time as it thinks fit, and may, in its discretion, make a further order prohibiting the removal of the crop pending the execution of the order of attachment

(5) A growing crop which from its nature does not admit of being stored shall not be attached under this rule at any time less than twenty days before the time at which it is likely to be fit to be cut or gathered

Agricultural produce.—See notes to sect 61, ante

268] 46. (1) In the case of—

Attachment of debt,
share and other property
not in possession of
judgment-debtor.

(a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument,

(b) a share in the capital of a corporation,

(c) other moveable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, except property deposited in, or in the custody of, any Court

the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting,—

(i) in the case of the debt, the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until the further order of the Court,

(ii) in the case of the share, the person in whose name the share may be standing from transferring the same or receiving any dividend thereon,

(iii) in the case of the other moveable property except as aforesaid, the person in possession of the same from giving it over to the judgment-debtor

(4) A copy of such order shall be affixed on some conspicuous part of the court house, and another copy shall be sent, in the case of the debt to the debtor, in the case of the share, to the proper officer of the corporation, and, in the case of the other moveable property (except as aforesaid), to the person in possession of the same

(5) A debtor prohibited under clause (i) of sub rule (1) may pay the amount of his debt into Court, and such payment shall discharge him as effectually as payment to the party entitled to receive the same

Debts, shares and other property not in possession—This rule enacts in different language the provisions contained in sect 236 and partly in sect 239 of Act VIII of 1859. The clause commencing "A debtor prohibited" was added by sect 268 of Act X of 1877. That Act also provided—"No attachment under this section shall remain in force for more than six months, at the end of which time, if the judgment debtor has not obeyed the decree, the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and pay the balance, if any, to the judgment debtor on his application." This provision was repealed by Act XIV of 1882, which Act also added three clauses affecting the salary of a public officer or the servant of a Railway Company, and which matter is now dealt with by O XXI r 48. The only other alteration made by the present Code is to substitute "a" for "any public Company or" and "affixed" for "fixed". The term "debt" has been used in this rule in its legal sense of a debt either due or accruing due, (1) that is, a sum

of money which is either now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation (1) A sum payable upon a contingency does not become a debt till the contingency has happened (2) An allowance payable as an annuity is not a debt, and cannot be attached under this rule until it has fallen due (3)

A Provincial Small Cause Court cannot directly attach a debt due to the judgment debtor payable outside its local jurisdiction (4)

"Debt not secured by a negotiable instrument"—Includes a decree of a Revenue Court (5) If a debt under a deed of hypothecation is intended to be sold alone or jointly with immovable property in order to recover it by personal remedy, it should be attached under this rule, but where the interest under such a deed was attached under O XXI r 54, the absence of an attachment under this rule did not affect the right of the purchaser to realize the amount due under it (6) The rights and interests under his mortgage of a mortgagee out of possession should be attached under this rule and not under sect 274 of the former Code and O XXI r 54 of the present Code (7) In a recent case in the Madras High Court, the effect of the words "debt not secured by a negotiable instrument" was considered, and it was held that they are undoubtedly wide enough to cover a debt secured by an hypothecation bond or a simple mortgage, and that r 54 of this order is not applicable to such cases, though the General Clauses Act and Transfer of Property Act speak of such a debt as an interest in immovable property (8) The form of prohibitory order is given in the First Sched App E No 10 If such a debt be attached a claim may be preferred by a third party and investigated under O XXI r 58 (9) The corresponding section in the Code of 1877 provided that an attachment under this rule could not remain in force more than six months, but the property could then be sold Under such section it was held that bonds which would be barred in the mean time could not be made available for satisfaction of a decree in execution by the Small Cause Court (10)

"Share in the capital"—The form of prohibitory order is given in the First Sched App E No 11

"Other moveable property"—The form of prohibitory order is given in the First Sched App E No 5 Money deposited as security for performance of duties of servant may be attached under this rule subject to the employer's

(1) *Bancharan v Adyanath*, 36 C 936 (1909), 13 C W N 966

(2) *Padmanund v Ramaprasad* 14 C L J 127 (1911)

(3) *Padmanund v Ramaprasad*, *supra*

(4) *Hossein Ally v Ashotosh Gangooly*, 3 C L R 30 (1878), *Begg Dunlop and Co v Jagannath Marwari*, 39 C 104 (1911)

(5) *Aula Bibi v Abu Jafar*, 21 A 405 (1899)

(6) *Sami Ayyar v Krishnasamu*, 10 B 169 (1886)

(7) *Karim unnessa v Phul Chand*, 15 A 134 (1893), *Tarvadi v Bai Kashi*, 26 B 305 (1901)

(8) *Nataraja Iyer v South Indian Bank of Tinnevely*, 37 M 51 (1914), following *Tarvadi Bholanath v Bai Kashi*, 26 B 305 (1902), not following *Sami Ayyar v Krishnasamu*, 10 M 169 (1887)

(9) *Chudambara v Ramasamy*, 27 M 67 (1903)

(10) *Nurungdas v Tulsaram*, 2 B 553 (1878)

lien, but cannot be sold or realized until the deposit is at the disposal of the judgment debtor freed from the lien (1)

"Not in the possession"—When the moveable property of the judgment debtor is in the hands of a third party, the decree holder must proceed under this rule. He cannot sue the third party, (2) but it would be otherwise if the decree declared the decree holder entitled to the immoveable property (3)

"The creditor from recovering"—An attachment under this rule does not prevent the debtor suing for the debt, (4) but he cannot realize it (5)

"Copy of such order shall be affixed."—Non compliance with this provision vitiates the attachment and makes it invalid as against a subsequent assignment (6)

"May pay the amount of his debt into Court"—He cannot be ordered to pay or to show cause why he should not pay, (7) nor can he be ordered to pay into Court a debt he denies is due (8). In Bombay, however, it has been held that clause (1) of this rule implies that the Court may make an order for payment of the debt which the garnishee is to obey including an order for payment to the judgment creditor (9). Where instead of paying into Court, the debtor paid the money to the only person who had it been paid into Court, would have been entitled to withdraw it and the payment was certified by the Court, it was held the payment amounted to a sufficient compliance with the former section (10). Money paid into Court under the former section was held to be assets realized in execution under sect 295 corresponding with sect 73 (11). In the Calcutta High Court after the attachment of a debt, an order can be made giving liberty to the debtor to pay the amount attached into Court, and appointing a Receiver to sue for and realize the debt if it be not paid in within a time to be fixed by the order. A voluntary payment by a debtor of his own choice and at his own risk made in a Court of inferior jurisdiction, with full knowledge of an attachment by a higher Court was held not to discharge him (12)

Effect of attachment—An attaching creditor is not in the same position as an assignee for value without notice of a prior assignment, but stands in respect of prior assignments in no better position than his judgment-debtor (13). An order for attachment gives the judgment creditor certain rights in execution

(1) *Haruthan v. Subramanya*, 9 M 203 (1885)

(2) *Mirza Mahomed v. Widow of Balma kund*, 3 L. A. 241 (1870)

(3) *Padmanund Singh v. Chundi Dat Jha*, 1 C W N 170 (1896)

(4) *Shub Singh v. Sita Ram* 13 A 76 (1890)

(5) *Collector of Etawah v. Beti Maharsan* 14 A 162 (1892), s. c., 17 A 198 (P C 1894), 22 I A 31

(6) *Satya Charan v. Madhub Chunder*, 9 C W N 603 (1905)

(7) *Smah v. Muckanachary*, 10 M. 194

(1887)

(8) *Kishen Pertaub v. Bhowja Dehya*, 18 W R 40 (1872)

(9) *Tootala Goolal v. Antone*, 11 B 448 (1887)

(10) *Fida Husain v. Maula Bakhsh*, 21 A 145 (1897)

(11) *Sorabji Edulji v. Govind Ramji*, 16 B

.

.

M. L. J. 438 (1907)

(13) *Megi Hansraj v. Ramji Jotia*, 8 B 11 C. 169 (1871)

bound to pay his judgment creditor, and it is no part of his duty to inquire whether his creditor is or is not entitled to receive the money (2) The payment of a cheque given before notice of attachment cannot be stopped (3) In England an order for attachment does not give the judgment creditor a charge until it is served, (4) and there is no difference between the service of an order nisi and of an order absolute (5)

47. *Where the property to be attached consists of the share or interest of the judgment debtor in moveable property belonging to him and another as co-owners, the attachment shall be made by a notice to the judgment-debtor prohibiting him from transferring the share or interest or charging it in any way.*

48. (1) *Where the property to be attached is the salary or allowances of a public officer or of a servant of a railway company or local authority, the Court, whether the judgment debtor or the disbursing officer is or is not within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction, may order that the amount shall, subject to the provisions of section 60, be withheld from such salary or allowances either in one payment or by monthly instalments as the Court may direct; and, upon notice of the order to such officer as the Government may by notification in the Gazette of India or in the local official Gazette, as the case may be, appoint in this behalf, the officer or other person whose duty it is to disburse such salary or allowances shall withhold and remit to the Court the amount due under the order, or the monthly instalments, as the case may be.*

(2) *Where the attachable proportion of such salary or allowances is already being withheld and remitted to a Court in pursuance of a previous and unsatisfied order of attachment, the officer appointed by the Government in this behalf shall forthwith return the subsequent order to the Court issuing it with a full statement of all the particulars of the existing attachment.*

(3) *Every order made under this rule, unless it is returned in accordance with the provisions of sub rule (2), shall, without further notice or other process, bind the Government or the railway*

(1) *Krishnaswamy v. Official Assignee of Madras*, 26 M. 673 (1903)

(2) *Thakoor Dass v. Luchmeepat*, 7 W. R. 10 (1867)

(3) *Bhagandas v. Abdul Husam*, 3 B. L.

(1876)

(4) *In re Stanhope Silkstone Collieries Co.*, 11 C. D. 160 (1879)

(5) *Ex parte Jocelyne*, L. R. 5 C. D. 337

company or local authority, as the case may be, while the judgment-debtor is within the local limits to which this Code for the time being extends and while he is beyond those limits if he is in receipt of any salary or allowances payable out of His Majesty's Indian revenues or the funds of a railway company carrying on business in any part of British India or local authority in British India; and the Government or the railway company or local authority, as the case may be, shall be liable for any sum paid in contravention of this rule

Attachment of salary, etc—In the Report upon the Bill it was pointed out that the provisions here enacted are not altogether a novelty in the history of execution. Officers of the Army serving in this country, whether they do or do not belong to the Indian forces, are public officers within the meaning of the Code. Under sect 151 (3) of the Army Act (44 & 45 Vict c 58) such officers were liable to stoppage of one half of their pay in execution of decrees, and such orders remained in force wherever the judgment debtor was in India. When this provision was repealed as a sequel to the abolition of the Courts of Request, an addition was made to sect 136 by the Army (Annual) Act, 1895, to legalize deductions authorized by any law passed by the Governor General of India in Council. This provision, in view of the definition of "public officer," placed military and civil officers on the same footing for the purposes of attach

which, to a greater or smaller extent, is experienced in connection with the various branches of the public services in India. A public officer, whatever the amount of his indebtedness, remains, by virtue of statutory exemption, in enjoyment of one moiety of his salary, while his creditor, by reason of the application of the provisions relating to local jurisdiction, must follow him from Court to Court all over the country with troublesome and expensive applications for transfer and attachment. It has, moreover, been represented that a tradesman at a distance ought not to be burdened with responsibility for tracing out the actual officer disbursing the salary, and it is possible in practice for a public servant acting as his own paymaster to place the most serious obstructions in the way of execution. In these circumstances a revision has been made, in substance, to the provisions of sect 151, sub sect (3), of the Army Act, which have been extended to all public officers, railway servants, and servants of local authorities, and the responsibility is cast on the Government, or the company or authority concerned, for making its arrangements for receiving notice and for effecting the proper deduction. As a corollary to these provisions it is believed that the order may reasonably be declared effective, not merely while the judgment debtor is in India, but while he is in receipt of emoluments from the Indian revenues, or from the funds of an Indian local authority, or of a Railway Company carrying on business in British India.

Salary or allowances—This rule is new, though it partly includes the

provisions in the last three clauses of sect 268 of Act XIV of 1882 There is no inconsistency between it and the explanation to sect 64 (1)

"Within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction"—Under the earlier Codes, which contained no such provision as this it was held that a Provincial Small Cause Court could not directly attach the salary of a public officer disbursed outside its jurisdiction, (2) nor that of a railway servant when not actually due disbursed outside such jurisdiction (3) This rule provides a special rule in the case of certain judgment debtors because r 46 does not entitle the execution Court to attach a debt payable by a non resident outside the jurisdiction (4)

"May order that the amount shall be withheld"—The order should also prohibit the public officer or servant from receiving the amount of the salary attached (5)

49 (1) *Save as otherwise provided by this rule, property belonging to a partnership shall not be attached or sold in execution of a decree other than a decree passed against the firm or against the partners in the firm as such*

(2) *The Court may, on the application of the holder of a decree against a partner, make an order charging the interest of such partner in the partnership property and profits with payment of the amount due under the decree and may, by the same or a subsequent order, appoint a receiver of the share of such partner in the profits (whether already declared or accruing) and of any other money which may be coming to him in respect of the partnership, and direct accounts and inquiries and make an order for the sale of such interest or other orders as might have been directed or made if a charge had been made in favour of the decree holder by such partner, or as the circumstances of the case may require*

(3) *The other partner or partners shall be at liberty at any time to redeem the interest charged or, in the case of a sale being directed, to purchase the same*

(4) *Every application for an order under sub rule (2) shall be served on the judgment debtor and on his partners or such of them as are within British India*

(5) *Every application made by any partner of the judgment debtor under sub rule (2) shall be served on the decree holder and on the judgment debtor, and on such of the other partners as do not join in the application and as are within British India*

(1) Valchand t Musson 14 Bom L R 33 (1912)

(2) Iarbat t Iarhanant 6 V 43 (1884)

(3) Abdul Gafur t Ally 30 C 713 (1903), 7 C W N 8-1, Sayadkhan t

Davis 23 B 106 (1903)

(4) Beg Da 1-1

Marwari 19 V 1

(5) Waller t 1 (1878).

(6) *Service under sub rule (4) or sub rule (5) shall be deemed to be service on all the partners, and all orders made on such applications shall be similarly served*

Partnership property—This section has been introduced in consequence of representations that, for the protection of commercial enterprise, the rules relating to the attachment of any interest in partnership property should be assimilated to the English practice. It has been thought that, at any rate in the commercial centres the time has arrived for introducing the provisions of sect 23 of the Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict c 39), but how far they are likely to be useful when applied to the family business forming portion of the joint estate of Hindus is a matter which remains to be seen. The enactment in question has, therefore, been tentatively adapted, as sub clauses (1) to (3), to which sub clauses (4) and (5) embodying the simplified procedure directed by O 46 rr 1a and 1b of the Rules of the Supreme Court, are merely ancillary.

50 (1) *Where a decree has been passed against a firm,*

Execution of decree execution may be granted—
against firm

(a) *against any property of the partnership,*

(b) *against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner,*

(c) *against any person who has been individually served as a partner with the summons and has failed to appear*

Provided that nothing in this sub rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of section 247 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872

(2) *Where the decree holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined*

(3) *Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub rule (2), the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree*

(4) *Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not release, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless he has been served with a summons to appear and answer*

Cross references —As to actions by or against partners in the name of the firm, see O XXX rr 1-3, *supra*. Action against the person trading under an assumed or trading name, r 10 of same Order. Actions between co partners, execution not to issue without leave, O XXX r 9. As to issue directed under this rule to try question of liability of retiring partners, see note (1).

"Where a decree has been passed against a firm."—Where a writ has been issued against a firm and served on a partner according to O XXX. r 3, *supra*, judgment must be signed against the firm. It cannot be signed against one partner separately for default of appearance (2). But it has been held in England that where judgment has been recovered against the firm, the plaintiff is not confined to the remedy given by this rule but may still bring an action on the judgment against the individual members of the firm without any special leave of the Court (3). A plaintiff having obtained judgment against a firm cannot by subsequent service of the writ render the person served liable as a partner hereunder. He must apply under this rule (4).

Infant partner —It has been held by the House of Lords (5) (a) that an

be applied in payment of the liabilities of the partnership, and until this is done the infant partner has no claim on them, (d) that a judgment against a firm containing an infant partner, and bankruptcy proceedings based upon such

On a judgment so worded, execution issues as of course on the property of the firm, irrespective of the question of infancy of any member thereof, and *semble*, even if the sole member of the firm were an infant the right of the plaintiff to issue execution against the goods of the firm would not be affected. But no execution can issue against the private property of the infant partner. It would seem to follow from the above that an infant partner could not be served as a partner, though, *semble* the firm might be served by service on him as the person in control of the business. It would seem also to follow that an infant partner can neither appear nor defend as a partner (8).

"Execution may be granted"—See also O XXX rr 6-8, *supra*, as to subsequent proceedings. No execution can issue against any partnership property except on a judgment against the firm. Where a partnership was dissolved as to A, and afterwards an action was instituted against the firm for a debt contracted before the dissolution, but A was not served with the writ and had no notice of the action till after judgment, it was held that his liability must

(1) Worcester Banking Co v Trotter, 3 Times Rep 708. Cf also Davis v André, 24 Q B D 598, and Davies v Morris 10 Q B D 436.

(2) Jackson v Lichfield, 8 Q B D 474.

(3) Clark v Cullen 9 Q B D 355. See also Davies v Morris, 10 Q B D 436.

(4) See O XXX, r 3, *supra*.

(5) In Lovell v Beauchamp A C 1007 (1894).

(6) Cf also Harris v Beauchamp 2 Q B 534 (1893).

(7) Ann Pr, notes to Q 484 r 5.

(8) Ann Pr 26.

be determined before the judgment could be enforced against him, and a debtor's summons founded on the judgment was dismissed (1). A partner so situated cannot now be made liable unless he has been served with the writ (2). But where there had been a dissolution under an order by consent in the Chancery Division and a receiver appointed of the partnership property and subsequently a judgment in the King's Bench Division was recovered for a debt accruing due after dissolution it was held that a charging order on the property of the firm in the hands of the receiver was valid and could not be set aside by partners who had not been served with the writ (3). Where the action is between a firm and one or more of its members or between firms having one or more members in common no execution can issue without an order (4). Where a judgment is recovered by a firm suing in the firm name and afterwards one of the partners dies the surviving partner may issue execution by leave hereunder (5).

Against any property of the partnership—"As already stated execution will not issue against any partnership property except on a judgment against the firm:

Against any person who has appeared," etc.—As to effect of entry of appearance under O XXX r 6-8 see that rule *supra* and respective notes thereto. They shall appear individually and Unless he is a partner of the firm sued. If in an action against a firm in the firm name a partner who has appeared as such dies before judgment his estate is not liable except so far as it consists of property of the partnership (6).

Has failed to appear—Where one person is trading as a firm execution cannot in England issue against him under clause (c) of this rule unless he has been individually served (either personally or by substituted service) or leave has been obtained under the rule (7). As to a case where the writ is served first on the person in charge of the business of the firm and afterwards on a partner see below (8).

Claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed—"This does not include a partner who has left the firm to the knowledge of the plaintiff before action brought. If he has been served with the writ as provided by O XXX r 3 *supra* he becomes liable under clause (b) or (c) of this rule. The proviso to that rule is imperative and if he has not been served with the writ no order can be made against him hereunder (9). Where the Master ordered an issue. Whether the said S M H was or had held himself out to be a partner and the Judge varied the issue by limiting it to whether the person sought to be

(1) *Ex parte Young* 19 C D 124 and see *Davies v Morris* 10 Q B D 470

(2) *Wigram v Cox & Co* 1 Q B 792 (1894)

(3) *Brand v Sandground* 8 J T 517

(4) See O XXX r 9 Cf also note Act on Let n partners

(5) *Davies v Andrews W N* (84) 94 see also *Daniells (h Pr* 872

(6) See *Ellist v Waterson* 1 Q B 714 (1899)

(7) See O XXX r 10 note Cases

(8) See *Alden v Bookley & Co* 2 Q B

D 543 O XXX r 13 r fed *supra* note

Several services and see O XXX r 5

note Deemed to be served as a partner

See also *Dashnab Charn Sahu Bank v Bengal* 19 C 1 J 581 (1914) (service on an alleged partner who failed to appear)

(9) *Wigram v Cox & Co* 1 Q B 792 (1894)

made liable was a partner at the time the cause of action arose, the C A reversed the Judge's order, and held that the issue directed by the Master was right (1)

"Shall not release, render liable or otherwise affect"—These and the preceding and following words of the rule limit in England the operation of a judgment against a firm to (f) partnership property within the jurisdiction, (2) (B) the private property of any partner who was within the jurisdiction when the writ was issued and has become liable to execution under (a), (b) or (c) of this rule, (C) the private property within the jurisdiction of any partner who was out of the jurisdiction when the writ was issued, but who has become liable to the jurisdiction of the Court 1st by appearing to the writ, or 2ndly, by failing to appear after being duly served outside the jurisdiction, or having been served with the writ within the jurisdiction and having failed to appear. The present rule omits reference to jurisdiction in clause (a) and clause (4) has been simplified in the manner appearing.

The rule in England as regards joint contractors has been thus stated (3): "An action and a judgment against some of several joint contractors is a bar to subsequent proceedings against the remainder of them on the same contract (4). And this holds good when the joint contractors are partners in a firm (5) sued, not in the firm name but as individuals. A judgment against a firm sued in the name of the firm is a judgment against all the partners in the firm (6). And even where partners are sued together by their names and not in the name of the firm judgment against one is no bar to continuance of the action against the others (7). But a judgment entered by consent against one joint contractor, if pleaded, is a bar to further proceedings against others (8). And it has been held that where one of two joint contractors gave a cheque for the amount of the joint debt, and was sued to judgment on the dishonoured cheque, the action and judgment were no bar to a subsequent action against the other joint contractor on the original contract (9). Sect 43 of the Contract Act alters the rule of English law, that all joint contractors must be sued jointly. The promisee may, in this country sue any one or more of the joint promisors (10). The applicability moreover of the principle of bar for jointness (11) in this country has been the subject of considerable discussion. It was considered applicable

(1) *Davis v Hyman & Co*, 1 K B 804 C A (1903)

(2) Cf note "Infant partner, *supra*"

(3) Ann Pr notes to O 48a r 8

(4) *King v Hoare* 13 M & W 494

(5) *Hendall v Hamilton* 4 App. Cas 504

(6) See judgment of Lindley, L J *Western National Bank & Co v Perez* 1 Q B p 314 (1891)

(7) See Ann Pr, note to O 48 r 8
"Joint Contractors, and Weall v James, 68

, 2 Ch 29 (1898),
10 App Cas 650

cited O XXX rr 6-8 *supra* and notes as to Action against firm and 'Appearance by one, etc

(9) *Wegg Prosser v Evans* 2 Q B 101 (1894), 1 Q B 108 (1895)

(10) *Lakmdas Khumji v Purshotam Hardas* G B. 700 701 (1882), though a defendant might apply to the Court to have his co contractor added as a party. Pollock's Indian Contract Act p 188

(11) See *Hulm Chand, Rea* Jud 734 where the subject is fully discussed, and Pollock, p 41, and p 186, and Cunningham & Shepherd's Contract Act, notes to a 43

in the cases undermentioned (1) The Allahabad High Court, (2) however, has held that the effect of s. 43 of the Contract Act being to exclude the right of a joint contractor to be sued along with his co contractors, the English rule is no longer applicable in India, at all events in the Mofussil. Since the passing of that Act a judgment obtained against some only of the joint contractors, and remaining unsatisfied is no bar to a second suit on the contract against the other joint contractors (3).

Unless summons has been served — Partners carrying on business within the jurisdiction may be sued in the name of the firm (O XXX r 1), service within the jurisdiction is to be deemed good service on the firm whether any members are out of the jurisdiction or not (ib 2, 3).

51 Where the property is a negotiable instrument not deposited in a Court, nor in the custody of a public officer, the attachment shall be made by actual seizure, and the instrument shall be brought into Court and held subject to further orders of the Court.

52. Where the property to be attached is in the custody of any Court or public officer, the attachment shall be made by a notice to such Court or officer, requesting that such property, and any interest or dividend becoming payable thereon, may be held subject to the further orders of the Court from which the notice is issued.

Provided that, where such property is in the custody of a Court, any question of title or priority arising between the decree-holder and any other person, not being the judgment-debtor, claiming to be interested in such property by virtue of any assignment, attachment or otherwise, shall be determined by such Court.

Act .

is

27.

in italics The rule does not apply to a case where the property sought to be attached has, under the decree being executed, been declared the property of

(1) Hemendro Coomarr Mullick v Rajendro Lal Moonshoe, 3 C 353 (1878), Gurusami Chetti v Samurta Chetti, 5 M 37 (1881), Luckmilas Khimji v Purshotam Haridas, *supra* Lakshminankar v Vishnuram, 24 B 77 (1893)

(2) Muhammad Askari v Radhe Ram Singh, 22 A 307 (1900), and see Mathura

Prasad v Ramchandra Rao 25 A 57 (1902)

(3) Sir F Pollock in his Indian Contract Act, p 187, expresses an opinion in the same sense, but states that until it has been adopted by the other High Courts or confirmed by the Privy Council the point must be regarded as open

decree holder (1) The form of attachment is given in the First Sched App E No 7

"Where the property."—This does not include the life interest of a beneficiary in a trust estate in the hands of the Official Trustee (2)

"In the custody of"—This means actual custody, (3) and not in anticipation of property coming into custody (4) If it be in the custody of a Receiver appointed by Court, sanction to attach must first be obtained from the Court, and will only be granted on such terms as would ensure equality between the creditors, (5) such an attachment without sanction will not be recognized (6) Letters containing money addressed to the judgment debtor can be attached in the hands of the Post Office (7) The Official Trustee is a public officer (8)

"Shall be made by a notice"—A Court has no discretion to refuse an application for attachment under this rule (9) A notice sent to a Court is sufficient to make an effectual attachment of moveables in its hands even though the Court refuse to receive it (10)

"May be held subject to the further orders"—A Collector in whose hands moneys are attached cannot pay away the same without orders of the attaching Court (11)

"In the custody of a Court"—The second clause does not cover the custody of a Collector, and no determination of any question can be made (12)

"Any question of title or priority"—Where one Court attaches and then makes an order directing another Court to pay certain moneys to A and before payment the amount is attached by B the second Court has ceased to have a disposing power over the money and cannot try any question of title or priority (13) A and B obtained a decree against X and Y Z obtained a decree against A and B for a lesser sum and attached the first decree whereupon A and B paid the money into Court and alleged Z's decree was really that of X it was held that, though such allegations had not been raised in Z's suit it could be raised in execution and, on its being substantiated that A and B were entitled to enforce for the purpose of satisfying their decree any claim that X could have done, and Z's claim to the money in Court was disallowed (14)

(1) Padmanund v Chundi Dat Jha 1 C W N 170 (1896)

(2) Al Lal Lateef v Doutr 12 M 200 (1889)

(3) Muttukaruppan v Mutturamalinga " M 47 (1883)

(4) Tulaji Fatesing v Balabhai 22 B 39 (1896), followed in Padmanund v Rama prasad 16 C W N 14 (1911) 14 C I J 127

(5) J Khan v Allu Mahomed 16 B 577 (1892)

(6) Mahommed Zohuruddeen v Mahomed Nooroddin 21 C 85 (1893)

(7) Narasimulu v Adappa 13 M 112

(1890)

(8) Abdul Lateef v Doutr 12 M 200 (1889)

(9) Noor Jehan v Mashetty 8 C L R 17 (1880)

(10) John Tiel & Co v Abdool Hye, 19 W R 37 (1872)

(11) Saefollah v Luchmeeput 13 W R 58 (1870)

(12) In matter of Brojonath Mitter, 13 W R 301 (1870)

(13) Copee Nath v Achcha Bibee 7 C 503 (1891)

(14) Achaya v Bangarayya, 16 M 117 (1881)

"Shall be determined by such Court."—That is, the Court in whose custody the property is. Thus, where such Court is the Small Cause Court and an attachment is made under this rule by the High Court, the Small Cause Court is still the Court to adjudicate on questions raised by a claimant (1). The mode of investigating is provided for in O XXI rr 58-63 (2). A suit, it has been held, lay to set aside an order made under the former section (2).

731

53 (1) *Where the property to be attached is a decree, either for the payment of money or for sale in enforcement of a mortgage or charge, the attachment shall be made,—*

(a) *if the decrees were passed by the same Court, then by order of such Court, and,*

(b) *if the decree sought to be attached was passed by another Court, then by the issue to such other Court of a notice by the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed, requesting such other Court to stay the execution of its decree unless and until—*

(i) *the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed cancels the notice, or*

(ii) *the holder of the decree sought to be executed or his judgment debtor applies to the Court receiving such notice to execute its own decree.*

(2) *Where a Court makes an order under clause (a) of sub rule (1), or receives an application under sub-head (ii) of clause (b) of the said sub rule, it shall, on the application of the creditor who has attached the decree or his judgment debtor, proceed to execute the attached decree and apply the net proceeds in satisfaction of the decree sought to be executed*

(3) *The holder of a decree sought to be executed by the attachment of another decree of the nature specified in sub rule (1) shall be deemed to be the representative of the holder of the attached decree and to be entitled to execute such attached decree in any manner lawful for the holder thereof*

(4) *Where the property to be attached in the execution of a decree is a decree other than a decree of the nature referred to in sub rule (1), the attachment shall be made, by a notice by the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed, to the holder of the decree sought to be attached, prohibiting him from transferring or charging the same in any way, and, where such decree has been passed by any other Court, also by sending to such other Court a notice to abstain from executing the decree*

(1) Joyarayan Meghraj : Ismail Kuri
mal, 12 B 710 (1895)

(2) Tikum Singh : Sien Ram 13 C 250
(1891)

sought to be attached until such notice is cancelled by the Court from which it was sent.

(5) The holder of a decree attached under this rule shall give the Court executing the *decree* such information and aid as may reasonably be required

(6) *On the application of the holder of a decree sought to be executed by the attachment of another decree, the Court making an order of attachment under this rule shall give notice of such order to the judgment debtor bound by the decree attached; and no payment or adjustment of the attached decree made by the judgment-debtor in contravention of such order after receipt of notice thereof, either through the Court or otherwise, shall be recognized by any Court so long as the attachment remains in force*

Attachment of decrees—This rule corresponds with sect 273 of Acts X of 1877 and XIV of 1882, though the arrangement has been altered. The third and sixth clauses are new. The particular procedure by this rule in the previous Code was confined to money decrees. A money decree cannot be sold (1) Under the Code of 1859 however, a decree for money could be sold (2) A decree for dissolution of partnership can be regarded as a money decree and cannot be sold (3) But a decree declaring a person entitled to recover possession of immoveable property with mesne profits is not a decree for money, (4) nor was a decree on a mortgage, (5) and it could be sold (6) so also might a decree for redemption (7) Under the present Code the procedure in regard to the attachment and realization of a decree for sale in enforcement of a mortgage or charge is regulated by this rule (8) This rule applies to cases of attachment before judgment (9)

Clause (a)—Under the wording of the first clause of sect 273 of Act X of 1877, which ran, "*If the property be a decree for money passed by the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed the attachment shall be made by an order of the Court,*" etc, it was held that this also applied to cases where the decrees were passed by different Courts but were being executed by one Court (10)

(1) Copal Nanashet v Joharmal, 16 B 522 (1891), Sultan Kuar v Gulzari Lal, 2 A 290 (1879) Thiruvengada v Vythilinga G M 418 (1883), Jotin Iro Nath v Dwarka Nath, 20 C 111 (1891)

(2) Golam v Indro Chand 15 W R 31 (1871), 7 B L R 318

(3) Sidlingappa v Shankarappa, 27 B 556 (1903)

(4) Vasudeva v Narayana 24 M 341 (1900)

(5) Baij Nath Lohia v Bmoyendra Nath Palit 6 C W N 5 (1901), Jogendra v Hiranyakumar, 2 C. L. J 499 (1904),

Macnaghten v Surja Prasad 4 C W N xxxv (1899), Delhi & London Bank v Partab Singh 28 A 771 (1906)

(6) Jogendra v Hiranyakumar, 2 C L. J 499 (1904)

(7) Naugar Tamapa v Bhaakar, 10 B 444 (1886)

(8) Kuppasami v Subbaraja, 22 M. L. J 161 (1911)

(9) Venkayya v Lakshmiiah 22 M L. J 394 (1912)

(10) Sultan Kuar v Gulzari Lal, 2 A 290 (1879)

Clause (b) "Passed by another Court"—This does not include a decree for money passed by a Revenue Court (1) The other Court on receiving the order is bound to comply therewith, and is debarred from proceeding with the execution unless the bar is removed in one of the ways specified in the section, and a sale notwithstanding the order attaching the decree is invalid (2)

— "Shall proceed to execute"—The Court has no power after receipt of notice to sanction an adjustment, (3) nor can it return the notice to the Court which sent it as the amount for which the attachment was issued was not stated, and then proceed to execute its own decree The Court on receiving the notice is bound to comply with it (4)

Sub rule (4)—This refers to decrees other than money decrees, (5) and under the previous Code, where the wording of this clause ran, "*In the case of all other decrees,*" it was held to include decrees for redemption (6) and decrees for sale of immovable property under sect 88 of the Transfer of Property Act (7) The present rule, however, excludes decrees for sale in enforcement of a mortgage or charge as well as decrees for the payment of money from the operation of this clause When "the Court which passed the decree" attaches its own decree, it may execute such decree on the application of the attaching creditor (8) In the previous Code this clause concluded with the words, "Every Court receiving such notice shall give effect to the same until it is so cancelled", that is, to abstain from executing the decree The Court receiving the notice cannot substitute in the record of the decree being attached the judgment creditor for the judgment-debtor in the decree being executed (9)

54 (1) *Where the property is immovable, the attachment of immovable property shall be made by an order prohibiting the judgment debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge*

(2) *The order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous*

(1) *Aulia Bibi v Abu Jafar*, 21 A 405 (1899)

(2) *Manik Lal Seal v Banamali Morkeyee*, 32 C 1104 (1905), s c, 10 C W N 193

(3) *Gopal Nanashet v Joharimal*, 10 B 522 (1891)

(4) *Manik Lal Seal v Banamali*, 32 C 1104 (1905), 10 C W N 193, 3 C L J 27 It was said by Maclean C.J., in *Adhar v Jal Mohun* 24 C 778 (1897) (under the last Code), that attachment of a decree did not prevent a holder from executing it, but the Madras High Court has held that the only person competent to execute is the attaching creditor who will be liable in damages if he

allows the decree to be barred by limitation *T Unni Koya v A P Umma*, 35 M 622 (1911)

(5) *Sultan Kuar v Gulzari Lal* 2 A 290 (1879)

(6) *Naigar Tunapa v Bhaskar* 10 B 444 (1886)

(7) *Delhi & London Bank v Partap Singh* 23 A. 771 (1906), 3 A L J 585 (F B)

(8) *Peary Mohun v Romesh Chander* 15 C 371 (1888) *Rangasami v Periasami* 17 M 58 (1897)

(9) *Barma Din v Baji Lal*, 26 A 91 (1907)

part of the property and *then upon a conspicuous part* of the court house, and also, *where* the property is land paying revenue to the Government, in the office of the Collector of the district in which the land is situate

Mode of attachment of immoveable property—The first clause of the present rule corresponds with sect 235 of Act VIII of 1859, the wording being practically the same. The present form was adopted by sect 274 of Act X of 1877, save that the words "*taking any benefit from such transfer or charge*" have been substituted for "*receiving the same from him by purchase, gift, or otherwise*". The remaining clause corresponds with portions of sect 239 of Act VIII of 1859. In that section the words were "*the written order shall be read out*". This was altered by sect 274 of Act X of 1877 to "*the order shall be proclaimed*," which Act added the words "*by beat of drum or other customary mode*" and "*paying revenue to Government*". Certain verbal alterations have been made as shown in italics.

"Where the property is immoveable"—Decrees for money charged on land are immoveable property (1). A decree for redemption cannot be attached under this rule, but under O XXI r 53 (2). A debt secured by mortgage of immoveable property should be attached under this rule and not under O XXI r 46, (3) later cases have however, held that such a debt, especially if the mortgagee is not in possession is not immoveable property and need not be attached under this rule, (4) at most omission to attach under this rule is an irregularity (5).

It has been recently held that in the case of a purely usufructuary mortgage where there is no debt payable by the mortgagor the procedure should be by attachment (under this rule) of the interest in immoveable property (6). An attachment is not necessary in execution of a mortgage decree where the decree contains a direction for sale (7). When this point was raised before the Privy Council they would not go into it and held a sale, without attachment in execution was good on the ground that the properties had been attached under a previous decree arising out of the same mortgage transaction (8). The sale of a mortgage debt, in execution of a decree carries with it the security without

(1) Appasami v Scott J M. 5 (1884) Sami v Krishnasami, 10 M 16J (1886), Bhawan v Gulab Bai, 1 A 348 (1877), but see Abdul Majid v Muhammad Faizulla 13 A 89 (1890).

(2) Nagar Tumapa v Bhaskar, 10 B 444 (1886).

(3) Srinath Dutt v Gopal Chandra 9 C 511 (1883).

(4) Debendro Kumar v Rup Lal, 12 C 546 (1886), Hasinath v Sadasiw, 20 C 500 (1893), Karim un nissa v Phul Chand, 15 A 134 (1893), Nataraya Iyer v South Indian Bank of Tanjavelly 37 M 51 (1914). — M L J 100 (1911), Farvadi Bholanath v

Bai Kashi, 26 B 300 (1902), Abdul Majid v Muhammad Faizulla 13 A 89 (1890), Bagnath Lohia v Binoyendra Nath Palit, 6 C W N 5 (1901) Baldeo Danrup v Ramchandra Balvant, 19 B 121 (1890), Munivappa Naik v Subrahmanya Ayyar, 18 M 437 (1895).

(5) Muniappa v Subramania 18 M 437 (1894).

(6) Mandal v Motibhai, 35 B 208 (1911).

(7) Dayachand v Hemchand, 4 B 515 (1880).

(8) Dosibai v Ishwardas, 15 B 222 (1891) P C, 18 1 A 22.

attaching the mortgaged property under this rule (1) The equity of redemption of a mortgagor can be attached under this rule, the attachment being by order prohibiting the judgment debtor from dealing with it in any way and all persons from receiving it, such order being proclaimed and notified as therein directed (2) The execution of mortgage decrees are now governed by O XXXIV, but prior to the present Code they were governed by the rules made under the Transfer of Property Act in Bengal and Assam (3) The life interest of a Hindu widow under her husband's will in the income of his immoveable estate is immoveable property and is attachable (4)

"By an order prohibiting"—This should be the procedure where the property sought to be attached is a factory in the possession of a prior mortgagee, and not by putting *peons* in possession (5) The prohibitory order does not have the effect of dispossessing the judgment debtor (6) For form of prohibitory order, see the First Sched App E No 8

"The property"—Where an attachment was made of the debtor's share without specifying the share, it was held only to cover the share and not the whole property (7)

"Proclaimed"—Omission of the beat of drum was held to be a material irregularity, and the sale was cancelled (8) Objections as to irregularities in the proclamation cannot be taken on appeal to the P O for the first time (9)

55. Where—

Removal of attachment
after satisfaction of
decree

(a) the amount decreed with costs and all charges and expenses resulting from the attachment of any property are paid into Court, or

(b) satisfaction of the decree is otherwise made through the Court or certified to the Court, or

(c) the decree is set aside or reversed,

the attachment shall be deemed to be withdrawn, and, in the case of immoveable property, the withdrawal shall, if the judgment-debtor so desires, be proclaimed at his expense, and a copy of the proclamation shall be affixed in the manner prescribed by the last preceding rule.

Removal of attachment—This rule corresponds with sect 215 of Act VIII of 1859 and down to the words "*otherwise made*" was practically as it

(1) Baldeo Dhanrup v Ramchandra 19 B 121 (1893)

(2) Parashram v Govind Ganesh, 21 B 226 (1895)

(3) Calcutta Gazette, Pt I, p 414 dated 13th April, 1892, Assam Gazette, Pt III, p 272 dated 16th April, 1892

(4) Nath Kura v Dhanrup, 3 B 1 (1898)

(5) Mudhun Mohun v Gokul Dass, 10 Moo I A 563, p 571

(6) Narayanrao v Balkrishna, 1 B 523 (1880)

(7) Suroop Narain v Ram Tahul, 18 W R 106 (1872)

(8) Trimbal v Nana, 10 B 504 (1880)

(9) Ramkrishna v Surfannessa, G C 129 (P C 1880), 7 I A 157

now stands. It then continued "*an order shall be issued for the withdrawal of the attachment; and if the defendant shall desire it and shall deposit in Court a sum sufficient to cover the expense, the order shall be proclaimed or intimated in the same manner as heretofore prescribed for the proclamation or intimation of the attachment, and such steps shall be taken as may be necessary for staying further proceedings in execution of the decree*" This was repealed by sect 275 of Act X of 1877, which concluded with the words "*an order shall be issued on the application of any person interested in the property for the withdrawal of the attachment*" For this has been substituted the last clause in italics by the present Code, which also added the words in italics in clause (b). But where property has been attached, an order dismissing an application for execution but not specifically withdrawing the attachment or declaring the decree incapable of execution, did not, it was held, raise the attachment. If on appeal such order were set aside the decree holder was entitled to the full benefit of his attachment (1). The striking off of execution proceedings from the file of a Court did not, it was held, interfere with the continuance of an attachment (2). A sale in pursuance of an attachment being set aside does not displace the attachment, (3) nor does the death of the judgment debtor, (4) even though he be a Mitakshara coparcener and his interest in the property attached passed to the surviving coparceners (5). An attachment nine years old in execution of a decree twelve years old in the absence of other information must, it was held be assumed to have been removed (6). See, however, now as to striking off on default of prosecution of execution proceedings the notes to r 57, post. Sums paid into Court under this rule are not assets within the meaning of sect 73 (7).

56. *Where the property attached is current coin or currency [s 27 notes, the Court may, at any time during the continuance of the attachment, direct that such coin or notes, or a part thereof sufficient to satisfy the decree, be paid over to the party entitled under the decree to receive the same*

Order for payment of coin or currency notes to party entitled under decree

57. *Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease*

Determination of attachment

- (1) Bank of Upper India v Shro Prasad 19 A 482 (1897) Golam Yabeya v Sham Soon duree, 12 W R 142 (1899)
 (2) Syud Nadir v Pearoo Thovildarmee, 14 B L R 425 note
 (3) Gossain Munraj v Deen Dyal, 20 W R 20 (1873)
 (4) Shro Pershad v Hira Lal, 12 A 440

- (1883)
 (5) Bent Pershad v Iarbat, 20 C 835 (1892)
 (6) Goujessur v Luchmee, 20 W R 418 (1873)
 (7) Sorabji Coovary v Kala Raghunath 36 B 156 (1911)

"Decree-holders' default."—It was pointed out (1) that the last Code did not contain anything like a complete procedure for proceedings in execution. It did not suggest what procedure should be adopted in cases analogous to those which might occur during the hearing of a suit and which were provided for by Chapter XIII of that Code. Further, it was clear, both from the Code itself and from the provisions of the Limitation Act, that the Legislature contemplated that there might be a succession of applications for execution (2). Where final orders adjudicating upon the right to have execution have been made, the principle of *res judicata* is applicable (see sect. 11) (3). But under the former practice an application for execution might be made but might not be proceeded with. The Code did not prohibit an application for execution where a former application to that effect had been withdrawn without liberty to present a fresh one (4). Nor, as stated, did it provide for cases where the application could not proceed for default of the decree-holder. In such cases a practice arose, with the object of disencumbering the files of the Court, of "striking off" applications. It was frequently pointed out that this practice was not justified by the Code, (5) and that there were (apart from the question of adjournment) only two ways of judicially disposing of any application, that is, by granting or dismissing it in whole or in part (6). The effect of an order "striking off" was discussed in numerous cases. An attachment was not necessarily at an end because the execution case was struck off the file. The effect of such an order depended on the circumstances of the case (7). There was no general rule as to the effect of striking off an execution case from the file (8). Such an order did not necessarily put an end to the attachment, and it was competent for the Court to make such an order and at the same time continue the attachment (9). It was open to the decree holder to revive the execution proceedings and continue it from the point where it had previously stopped (10). Where by a mistake of the Court

(1) See Edge, C.J., in *Dhokal Singh v Phakkar Singh*, 15 A. 64 (1893), at p. 94.

(2) *Thakur Pershad v Sheikh Fakirullah*, 22 I. A. 44, 50 (1894).

(3) *Ram Kirpal Shukul v Rup Kumar*, 11 I. A. 27 (1883), followed in *Sajba Charan v Muthaveer in Palai*, 36 M. 553 (1912).

(4) *Thakur Pershad v Sheikh Fakirullah*, 22 I. A. 44, 50 (1894).

(5) *Dhokal Singh v Phakkar Singh*, 15 A. 64 (1893), at p. 96; *Baroda Sundari v Fergusson*, 11 C. L. R. 17 (1882); *Biswa Sonan v Binanda Chunder*, 10 C. 416 (1884), and cases cited, *post*.

(6) *Dhokal Singh v Phakkar Singh*, *supra* at pp. 94, 95.

(7) *Zahuran v Tyler*, 2 B. L. R. 56, 92 (1865); *Srinivasa Sastri v Sami Rau*, 17 M. 180, 182 (1893); *Chintaman Damodar v Balhasthi*, 16 B. 294 (1891).

(8) *Mohunt Bhagwan Das v Khutler Moni Dass*, 1 C. W. N. 617 (1896).

(9) *Perry Lal Sinha v Chandi Charan*

Sinha, 11 C. W. N. 163 (1906), but see *Ram Newaz v Ram Charan*, 18 A. 49 (1894).

(10) *Perry Lal Sinha v Chandi Charan Sinha*, 11 C. W. N. 163 (1906); *Shrih Kumaruddin v Jawahar Lal*, 32 I. A. 102, 9 C. W. N. 601 (1905), and see generally as to the effect of striking off an execution case, *Rajah Mulesh Narain v Kushanand Misr*, 9 M. I. A. 328, at p. 337 (1862); *Bagram v Wise*, 1 B. L. R. 91 (1868); *F. B. v. Puddomonee Doss v Roy Mothooranath*, 12 B. L. R. 411 (1873) P. C. [it may be presumed that an execution long neglected and finally struck off has ceased to be operative, and in that case a judgment-creditor's title will only date from any subsequent attachment which he may obtain. *Dist. in Maharajah Induraj Koor v Lachman Singh*, 24 W. R. 56 (1875)]. *Jhata Sahu v Ramacharan Lal*, 3 B. L. R. app. 68 (1869) [if property is once attached the attachment will subsist if not expressly abandoned until an order is issued for its withdrawal, even though no further steps are

in application for execution against attached property was dismissed, but there was no order removing the attachment, and the decree-holder obtained a review, and the executing Court was directed to proceed, it was held that the attachment subsisted as against a sale made by the judgment-debtor previous to the review (1).

The "striking off" or shelving of an execution application thus admitted of different interpretations according to the circumstances. It might have the effect of killing the particular application without any adjudication on the merits. So if such an order was passed in consequence of some default of applicant not going to the merits of his right to have satisfaction of his decree (e.g. default in appearance, failure to pay process fees, or to put in copies of papers called for, etc.), in such cases though the order might put an end to the particular application in which it was passed, it did not bar a subsequent application for execution if it were made within the period of limitation (2). Further, as sect. 158 of the Code of 1882 did not apply to execution proceedings, there was no statutory provision for cases of decree holder's default (3). If on the other hand, such an order was passed on the merits of the application e.g. by a finding that the decree had been satisfied or that execution was barred by some previous order which would operate as *res judicata*, then so far as the Court executing the decree was concerned, the application was taken to have been finally disposed of in a manner adverse to applicant's right to have the decree executed, and no further application for execution could be entertained unless in pursuance of a successful appeal (4). In these cases the effect of the order was to render the decree dead and incapable of execution or further execution.

Further, as pointed out by Edge, C.J. in the case cited, (5) it is necessary

taken on the attachment within a reasonable period], *Sheikh Golam t. Mit Shama Sundari*, 3 B L R 134 (1869) [mere striking off does not release attachment], *Binda Bibhee t. Lalla Gopee Nath*, 14 B L R 323 (1874) [striking off in this case extinguished attachment], *Chaman Lal t. Domun Lal*, 9 W R 203 (1867), *Syud Nadir Hossain v. Pearoo Thovldarinee*, 14 B L R 425 n (1873) [striking off affects only the files of the Court, and application for sale not attachment], *Baroda Sundari v. Fergusson*, 11 C L R 17 (1882) [striking off is not in accordance with the Code, but for convenience of Court], *Biswa Sonan t. Binanda Chunder*, 10 C 416 (1884) [proper course is not to strike off but to dismiss, a case so dismissed may be restored], *Surdharoo Lal t. Girindar Chunder*, 1 C L R 473 (1877), *Mungul Pershad Dhot t. Gria Kant Lahuri*, 8 C 51 (1881), *Syam Singh v. Baidya Nath Rai*, 13 C L R 176 (1883), *Soodur Singh t. Buhooru Alum*, 24 W R 76 (1875), *Gungagotti Pal t. Ram Sunder Dul*, 8 C L R 153 (1881) [attachment held

removed], *Rangasami v. Periasami* 17 M 58 (1893), *Raghubans Gir v. Sheosaran Gir*, 5 A 243 (1882), *Venkatray Bapu t. Bheesing Vithabing* 10 B 108 (1885), *Lakshmi t. Atchanna* 15 M 240 (1891) [a decree holder whose application is struck off for failure to pay process fees may apply again], *Dhonal Singh t. Phakkar Singh*, 15 A 84 (1893), *Jitmal t. Jivala Prasad*, 21 A 155 (1898) [struck off because application infructuous], *Ram Newaz v. Ram Charan*, 18 A 19 (1893) [order striking off and maintaining attachment illegal], *Raitanji v. Hari Har Dat*, 12 A 243 (1895) [appeal from order striking off], *Krishna Subudhi v. Janaki Ram*, 19 C L J 348 (1914) [attachment terminable by order of dismissal].

(1) *Aziz Baksh v. Kaniz Fatima*, 31 A. 420 (1912).

(2) *Dhonal Singh v. Phakkar Singh*, 15 A 84 (1893), at p. 103, *Mandhyan Sheikhya t. Badram Dalai*, 17 C W N 201 (1912).

(3) 16, at p. 93.

(4) 1b, at p. 102, 103.

(5) 1b, at p. 95.

that the Courts should have power to dispose of applications for execution when the parties fail to appear or when a party to whom time has been granted to do a particular act necessary to the progress of the application fails to do so

This rule is apparently designed to cure this defect

It was said in the statement of Objects and Reasons of the first Bill that the necessity for some definite procedure in these matters was generally admitted and one of the principal objects of the draft suggested was to prevent delay and uncertainty by compelling creditors to put the Court in a position to proceed until their claims were satisfied and by prescribing more clearly what classes of orders operated as a bar to applications and objections. No doubt a decree holder who has from time to time to trace and identify his judgment debtor's property cannot be expected to prosecute the execution proceedings with the regularity and continuity exigible in a suit. At the same time the former practice, by encouraging the decree holder to drop successive applications without informing the Court, tended to throw proceedings into confusion and uncertainty and encumbered the files of the Court. It was moreover, apprehended that the want of any inducement to press on the execution to a conclusion resulted in the practice of merely keeping alive the decree with the object of harassing the judgment debtor by allowing interest and costs to accumulate (1). It was therefore considered desirable (and with this view the first draft was prepared) to declare that execution proceedings once started must be continuous and to impose penalties for default but on the other hand to afford a decree holder reasonable facilities for staying proceedings and having them removed from the file. With this object elaborate provisions were proposed in the original draft.

The Select Committee while adopting in the main the principles of the draft omitted some provisions and shortened or modified others. The original draft provided that unless the order of dismissal was set aside, the decree holder should be precluded from proceeding further with the execution of the decree. The Select Committee, however, considered that this was too severe a penalty for an error of procedure, and the rule was by them limited to the disability to preclusion from assistance of the same nature as that sought from the Court in the application dismissed for default. The original draft provided that dismissal on the merits should, unless such dismissal was reversed in appeal, be a bar to further execution. This was omitted, as the *res judicata* clause of the original Bill expressly extended to proceedings other than suits and thus dispensed with this.

amended as proposed

See notes to sect 11

an application for execution is dismissed for default on the part of the decree holder, the Court executing the decree may direct him to bear all costs incurred by him in the execution proceedings (2)

The provisions of these rules if adopted would have affected the previously existing practice with regard to 'striking off' applications and renewal of applications, and have met several deficiencies in the preceding Code and enacted *Shastri* procedure in matters of execution

8) Mohun Chandra Ghosh v. The Collector of Calcutta (1903) 30 Cal 1001 (1903)
 9) See Dhondal Singh v. Bhakkar Singh (1903) 30 Cal 1001 (1903)
 10) See Dhondal Singh v. Bhakkar Singh (1903) 30 Cal 1001 (1903)
 11) See Dhondal Singh v. Bhakkar Singh (1903) 30 Cal 1001 (1903)

Under these rules the Court was required to proceed with execution if it was in a position to do so. If it was not in such a position by reason of the decree holder's default, the Court might require him to put it in a position to proceed, and allow time for such purpose, and thereafter or at once dismiss the application. The effect of such an order, unless set aside, was that above stated. If, being in a position to proceed it dismissed the application on the merits (in the sense stated), whether upon the judgment debtor's objection or otherwise, any further application was barred unless the order of dismissal was set aside on appeal. Where an order for execution was made *ex parte*, the judgment debtor might, on the analogy of decrees (1) apply to set aside the order. In all these cases definite orders granting, dismissing or setting aside suits should have been made which would have had the effect stated.

Provision was finally made for withdrawal (but only with the leave of the Court) of the application. This leave was required in order to put an end to capricious and harassing withdrawals. The effect, however, of this "striking off" of the application from the list differed from what was held to be in effect in cases the effect of a similar order under the preceding Code. The attachment was no longer existed, all processes in execution of the decree coming to an end. A fresh application for execution could subsequently be made unless it was barred by limitation. The provisions proposed by the Select Committee have been adopted, and in their place has been substituted the present rule, which provides that if the Court does not adjourn the proceedings it shall dismiss the application upon which the attachment ceases. There is to be no "striking off" of applications. If the proceedings are not adjourned the application must be dismissed. There is no doubt that a dismissal after hearing on the merits is final, and on appeal, a bar to further execution. The present rule does not say whether a dismissal for default can, and if so on what grounds, and whether if not set aside a fresh application for execution, if made within the period of limitation, is or is not barred. This provision does not say in which an order for attachment before judgment was obtained, and of execution proceedings will not revive the attachment so as to affect the rights of strangers who have in the interval acquired an interest in the property. It is not open to the Courts to consider what the Judge or the Court intended. After the dismissal of an application under this rule, the attachment is at an end, if the Judge intended to continue it (4). Default in this sense has a restricted meaning, but must have its ordinary meaning. One is legally bound to do

(1) See *Biswas Sonan Chunder v. Binanda Chunder*, 10 C at p 422 (1884), where by virtue of s. 647 of the last Code s. 108 was held applicable to execution proceedings. But the view expressed was no longer correct after the passing of Act VI of 1892. See *Dhenkal Singh v. Phakkar Singh*, 15 A 81, at pp. 92, 93 (1893).

(2) *See* 1
1937 (1112)

(3) *See*
333 (1111)
J 21 (1111)

(4) *See*
131 J 1

Investigation of claims and objections

- [s 278] 58. (1) *Where* any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a decree on the ground that such property is not liable to such attachment, the Court shall proceed to investigate the claim or objection with the like power as regards the examination of the claimant or objector, and in all other respects, as if he was a party to the suit.

Investigation of claims to, and objections to attachment of, attached property.

Provided that no such investigation shall be made where the Court considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed

(2) *Where* the property to which the claim or objection applies has been advertised for sale, the Court ordering the sale may postpone it pending the investigation of the claim or objection.

Postponement of sale

- [s 279] 59. The claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in, or was possessed of, the property attached.
- Evidence to be adduced by claimant.

- [s 280] 60. *Where* upon the said investigation the Court is satisfied that for the reason stated in the claim or objection such property was not, when attached, in the possession of the judgment debtor or of some person in trust for him, or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, or that, being in the possession of the judgment debtor at such time, it was so in his possession, not on his own account or as his own property, but on account of or in trust for some other person, or partly on his own account and partly on account of some other person, the Court shall make an order releasing the property, wholly or to such extent as it thinks fit, from attachment
- Release of property from attachment.

- [s 281] 61. *Where* the Court is satisfied that the property was, at the time it was attached, in the possession of the judgment debtor as his own property and not on account of any other person, or was in the possession of some other person in trust for him, or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, the Court shall disallow the claim
- Disallowance of claim to property attached.

62. Where the Court is satisfied that the property is subject to a mortgage or charge in favour of some person not in possession, and thinks fit to continue the attachment, it may do so, subject to such mortgage or charge.

Continuance of attachment subject to claim of incumbrancer.

63. Where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive.

Saving of suits to establish right to attached property.

Applicability—R 58 states that the investigation is to take place as if the claimant or objector "was a party to the suit." That is it assumes that the claimant is not a party. Claims of third parties only are dealt with under that rule. This rule gives a statutory right of suit to the unsuccessful party in claim proceedings (1). Questions between the parties to a suit are dealt with under sect 47 (2). The cases just cited establish the principle, though as regards its application in the instances dealt with by them reference must now be made to the amendments made in sect 244 of the last Code by sect 47 of this. Where the case falls under sect 47 there is an appeal otherwise not. Where a judgment debtor alleged that he was in possession of attached property only as *Shelut* of a debt it was held that the case did not fall within sect 47 (3). A judgment debtor who is not in fact a party to the claim proceedings does not in the eye of the Law become such by reason solely of his being the judgment debtor (4). These provisions apply only where the property sought to be sold has been attached in execution, but not where the decree has ordered its sale (5).

The provisions of the Code are permissive. They do not impose an obligation on persons having claims to prefer to property attached to prefer them during execution and annex in case of failure to do so forfeiture of their right

(1) Annapuram: Subramanian 31 M 347 (1908)

(2) Mukarrab Husain v Hurmat un nissa 18 A 32 (1895), Rahimuddin Sarkar v Lall Meah, 29 C 696 (1902), Ram Pershad v Jagannath Ram, 30 C 134 (1902), Ramnathban Chettiar v Levari Marakayar 23 M 195 (1898), Bhajahari Pal v Ram Lal Das 6 C W N 63 (1901) Mohamed Kahmaddin v Lall Meah 6 C W N 27 (1902) Beg Raj Narwar v Sri Kundali Debya 8 C W N 353 (1902), Dayaram v Govardhandas, 28 B 408 at p. 459 (1904), but see Benode Lal Lakrashee v Gireedhar Chuckerbutty, 22 W R 392 (1874) Sundar Singh v Ghazi, 18 A 410 412 (1896) Panchann Bundo padhya v Rabia Bibi, 17 C 711, at p. 719 (1890) Maharajah Mahatab Chand v Mt

Peareo Dossee 6 W R 61 (1866) [claim by alleged representative of property as his own] contra Shankar Dial v Amir Haidar 2 A 752 (1880) Matthu Amah v Parame swaran 17 M L J 377 (1906) [decree against karnavan objection to execution by members of *tarwad*] s c, 30 M 215, Hara Dhan kalia v Purna Chandra Mondul, 11 C W N 145 (1906)

(3) Kartick v Ashutosb 14 C. L. J 425, 428 (F B) (1911)

(4) Krishnasami v Somasundaram, 30 M 335 (1909) 17 M L J 618, distinguished in Ramu Aiyer v Palanappa, 30 M 75 (1910)

(5) Hukam Singh v Raghubar Saran, 27 A. 700 (1905)

to establish their title to the property by a regular suit (1) These provisions do not deprive a claimant of his remedy by suit but give him a more speedy and summary remedy (2) If he avails himself of it the Court is bound in a proper case where the claim is made at a proper time, that is before sale, (3) to make an inquiry, and can be compelled by application in revision to do so (4) His remedy by suit is also optional, and if he does not choose to avail himself of it, a sale will give him a fresh cause of action with a new period of limitation (5)

These provisions were held not to apply to the case where a person served with a prohibitory injunction sought to set aside the order of the Official Assignee.

these provisions (7) If the debtor is declared insolvent and a receiver is appointed this does not prevent a person claiming (8) It was held that sect 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act bars a claim under these provisions to a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due thereon, in all cases, and its operation is not confined merely to claims to the tenure or holding, but extends to claims based on the ground that the property claimed does not form part of the tenure or holding attached (9) The word "suit" in sect 55 of the Court of Wards Act includes miscellaneous proceedings, and therefore if a claim is preferred by the Manager of the Court of Wards without the sanction of the Court of Wards, the order disallowing the claim is not binding upon the Ward of Court (10) As to whether the amendment of sect 28 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act by Art IV of 1906 affects these provisions in relation to claims to tiled huts, see case cited (11)

An objector may raise an objection to an attachment not only on the ground that he is in possession of the property attached, but also on the ground that he has an interest in it, and it has been held that where an executing Court disallows a claim under sect 281 of the last Code (now represented by r 61 of this Order) it has jurisdiction to do so, notwithstanding that it erroneously refrains

(1) *Krishnabhupati Devt v Vikrama Devt* 18 M 13 17 (1894), see *Rani Indomati v Jagdishar*, 28 A 644 (1906), but see *Man Kumar v Tara Singh*, 7 A 583 (1886), *Sanhar v Madan*, 14 C W N 298 (1909)

(2) *Sundar Singh v Ghasi*, 18 A 410 (1896), *Raghubunath Mukund v Sarosh Kama*, 23 B 266 (1898), *Kanbhaya Lal v National Bank of India*, 17 C W N 541 (1913), P C, 40 C 593 (1913)

(3) *Maharajah of Burdwan v Heemallal Sait*, 11 W R 54 (1869)

(4) *Mt Jameela v Luckmann Panday*, 4 C L R 74 (1879) As to the extent of the investigation, see *Sardhari Lal v Ambika Pershad*, 15 C 521, 526 (1888)

(5) *Anant Brazu Garu v Narayanuraru Garu*, 36 M 363 (1911)

(6) *Haridai Anthabhai v Abhesang Meru*,

4 B 323 (1880)

(7) *Hashi Prasad v Miller*, 7 A 752 (1885), *Saidarmal Jagonath v Aranyajal Sakhapathy*, 21 B 205, 212 (1898), but see notes on representatives in sect 47

(8) *Paras Ram v Karim Singh*, 9 A 232 (1887)

(9) *Amrita Lal Bose v Nemat Chand Mukhopadhyay*, 5 C W N 474 (1901) P B, overruling *Jagabandhu Chattopadhyay v Deenu Pal*, 4 C W N 734 (1887) But see *Bipra Das v Rajaram*, 13 C W N 208 (1909), *Nanda v Kalachan*, 15 C W N 820 (1910)

(10) *Ram Chandra Mookerjee v Raja Rangit Singh*, 4 C W N 403 (1899)

(11) *Gunaputty Roy Agarwalla v Bhakur Das Thakuram*, 34 C 823 (1907)

from going into the question of possession and disallows the objection on some other ground (1) Rules 53 and 60 of this Order speak of claims to attached property and the release of property from attachment, but they do not justify the conclusion that if moveable property of a perishable nature has been attached and a claim has been preferred to it, the claim must prove nugatory if the decree-holder can induce the Court to sell the property before the claim has been investigated (2) The true aim of an attachment is to place the property in the custody of the Court so as to make it available for the realization of the decree. If by reason of the dismissal of the suit or the default of the decree holder the Court dissolves the attachment, the property ceases to be in its custody. The Court cannot take it back into its custody so as to prejudice a title acquired in the interval (3)

Property.—The rules relate to claims preferred to and objections made to the attachment of "*any property*" attached. Sect 266 of the last Code (now 60) specifies a debt as one species of property which is liable to attachment, and sect 268 of that Code (now O XXI r 46) prescribes the mode in which a debt is to be attached. Debts and other species of intangible property are therefore not excluded (4) such as an equity of redemption (5)

The word "*property*" as applied to land does not simply mean land but the share or interest in land attached. It includes undivided shares in land. So where property belongs to two persons jointly, and in execution against one anything more than his right and interest in the property are attached, the other joint holder has a right to come in and claim that the attachment may be removed *quoad* his share (6)

The section in the last Code was held inapplicable to claims to property directed to be sold by a mortgage decree (7) and provision was made in sect 282 of that Code (now r 62) for the continuance of attachment subject to claim of

(1) Bhagwan Das v Raj Nath 34 A 365 (1912)

(2) Rasik v Jitendra, 15 C L J 167 (1910)

(3) Patunga v Madhavanand, 14 C L J 476 (1911)

(4) Chidambaram Patter v Ramasamy Patter, 27 M 67, 71 (1903), diss from Basa vayas v Syed Abbas, 24 M 20 (1900). The Code of 1859 was held to apply only to immoveable property or to specific moveable property and not to a debt due. Mt Ram butty Koor v Kamessar Pershad 22 W R 36 (1874), Kunzil Parkum Putbukkaya v Varana Kot Illoth, 35 M 168 (1911)

(5) Amrata v Pandharinath, 2 Bom L R 134 (1900). As to sale of equity in execution of decree see Mt Saraswati Debt v Nabad wip Chandm Gossain, 5 B L R 350 (1870)

(6) Cowar Rajkumar Roy v Kadambini Deb, 4 B L R 175 (1870). See Khub lal v Ram Lochun, 17 C 260 (1889), Ram

Dajal v Durga Singh, 12 A 209 (1890). Ramanadan v Rajagopala 12 M 309 (1889) and the Court should investigate the claim, Issur Chunder v Mohlnee Mohun 17 W R 74 (1872), however the title is derived, Hurrah Chunder v Brojo Soondur, 6 W R 164 (1866) and whether the property is moveable or immovable, Deanuth Biswas v Issur Gine, 14 W R 52 (1870)

(7) Deetholts v Peters 14 C 631 (1887). Himatram v Khushal, 18 B 98 (1893), Joy Prokash Singh v Abhoy Kumar Chund 1 C W N 701 (1897), and if the Court did apply a procedure which was inapplicable there was no statutory bar excluding a suit by either party. Joy Prokash Singh v Abhoy Kumar Chund, 1 C W N 701 (1897). As to sale subject to mortgage, see Sha Nagundas v Halal Koro Nathwa, 5 B 470 (1881), Dul chand v Ramkulen Singh, 7 C 648 (1881). Shantappa Chedambaraya v Subrao Ram chandra 18 B 175 (1893)

incumbrancer Though the execution of mortgage decrees is expressly incorporated in the Code the Select Committee were of opinion that claims and objections arising out of the execution of such decrees should not be the subject of summary procedure under these rules, but should be determined in the ordinary course This, however, does not imply that the procedure under the later rules as to resistance to possession or dispossession does not apply A mortgagee who was in possession of the mortgaged property when it was attached in execution of a decree against the mortgagor, was held entitled to claim that the attachment should be withdrawn (1) Where certain property was attached under sect 13 (3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907 before the petitioner was declared an insolvent, and a receiver appointed it was held that under s 58 the Court was bound to hear and adjudicate upon any claims preferred by persons alleging themselves to be the owners of such property (2)

The Court—As to jurisdiction (3) and Small Cause Court (4) cf cases cited

"Shall proceed to investigate"—Under the Code of 1859 the Court was to investigate with the like powers as if the claimant had been originally made a defendant to the suit words which were held to mean that the Court was to have the same powers of investigation as if the claimant was a party to a suit which would give it power to summon the claimant and to dispose of the case against him if he should refuse to attend (5) Sect 278 of the last Code did not provide expressly for the judgment debtor being summoned (6) but directed the Court to investigate with the like power as regards the examination of the claimant or objector and in all other respects as if he were a party to the suit R 58 expressly provides that no investigation shall be made where the Court considered that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed Where the order was that the plaintiff come in too late for inquiry, (7) or the property was simply released without inquiry, (8) there was held to be no order under the section Before any claim can be investigated it is necessary to ascertain whether the claim was heard in a suit originating before or after the attachment made by the decree holder (9) Where there are several independent claims each must be heard separately (10) The application ought either to be dismissed or numbered and registered as a suit (11) In an investigation the

(1) *Kassisa v Vithaldas* 10 B H C R 100 (1873), *Ganesh v Purshotom* 33 B 311 (1908)

(2) *Hashmet Bibi v Bhagwan Das* 36 A. 65 (1913)

(3) *Indur Chunder Doogur v Gopal Chunder Sanha* 11 W R 557 (1869) *Vishnu D Kashit v Narsingrao*, 6 B 584 (1882)

(4) *Deno Nath Batabyal v Nafu Chunder Nundy*, 3 C W N 590 (1899), 26 C 778, s c, in appeal 4 C W N 410 (1900)

(5) *Naga Iha v Burn*, 11 W R 1 B 8 (1868), *1 in 1 unan B in 1 ap 113 v Ral a* 1 A 17 C 711 at pp. 719-720 (1850)

(6) *Shivapa v Dod Nagaya* 11 B 117, 118 (1881) And as to *res judicata* vide ib

(7) *Roghoonath Doss v Bydonath Doss* 14 W R 364 (1870)

(8) *Jagobundhoo Boso v Sachya Beber* 16 W R 22 (1871), 8 B L R app 39 *Sa Sah Mukhun v Sah Koondun* 21 A 210 (1876)

(9) *Beber Sahab Jehan v Syal Shah*, 9 W R Misc 28 (1866)

(10) *Sharada Moyee v Nobin Chunder*, 11 W R 25 (1869), 2 B I R 333

(11) *Sahoo Gokul v Mt Zynul A H C R 27 (1869)*

Court has to determine the question of possession only, and cannot go into the question of title with respect to the property taken in attachment (1). If the possession of the person holding the property is on his own account the fact that the judgment-debtor may have a beneficial interest or some title in it cannot be gone into (2). The words 'possession and possessed' in the last Code were held not to be used in a restricted sense as relating to mere tangible or physical possession, but to include constructive possession or possession in law of debts and other intangible property (3). The onus is on the applicant to prove his claim, and he must begin (4). His evidence which may be of any kind sufficient for the purpose (5) and must be received (6) should be confined to his own claim and not to establish the right of a third party (7). Where an objection has been made and disallowed it cannot be renewed by the same person in the same attachment (8).

Order of Court—Rules 60 and 61 specify the cases in which the Court is to allow or disallow a claim. R. 59 deals with the evidence to be adduced by the claimant, and it was held that to reconcile the sections the words 'some interest' were to be taken to imply such an interest as would make the possession of the judgment-debtor possession not on his own account but on account of or in trust for, the claimant. The rules relating to claims to attached property provide for a summary investigation into possession. The question of title is required to be gone into only so far as may be necessary to determine whether the person in possession was so as agent of or as trustee for another (9). Sect. 280 of the last Code (now r. 60) was held to refer to cases in which the possession of a claimant as trustee was of such a character as to be really the possession of the debtor, and not to cases in which intricate questions of law might arise as to whether or not valid trusts might result in particular instances: the real question to be determined being that of possession (10).

(1) *Monmohney Dass v Radha Kusto Dass* 29 C 543 (1902). *Khelat Chunder v Bhuggobutty* 14 W R 144 (1870).

(2) *Monmohney Dass v Radha Kusto Dass* 29 C 543 (1902). See *Sabhapathi Chetti v Narayanasami Chetti* 25 M 550 (1901), where it was held that a beneficial interest was as much an interest within the meaning of sect. 279 of the last Code as a legal interest in the property attached.

(3) *Chedambara Patter v Ramasamy Patter*, 27 M 67 (1903) diss. from *Basavayya v Syed Abbas* 24 M 20 (1900), and in *Amrta v Pandharnath* 2 Bom L R 134 (1900) the section was held not limited to physical possession. See *Kunjal Parkum Puthukkay v Varanakot Illoth* 35 M 163 (1911).

(4) *Nga Tha v Burn* 11 W R F B 8, 2 B L R 31 (1868). *Lanchanun Bundopadhy v Rabia Bibee* 17 C 711, 719 720 (1890).
(10) *Doss Roy v Siva Monee Doss*

20 W R 345 (1873). *Hurrah Chunder v Bhoobun Moyo* 4 W R 99 (1860).

(5) *Benode Lal Pakrashee v Gireedhur Chuckerbutty* 22 W R 392 (1874).

(6) *Bhoatarnee Dabee v Nil Monee Singh*, 24 W R 422 (1875).

(7) *Nga Tha v Burn supra*.

(8) *Khelat Chunder Ghose v Bhuggobutty Churn Mookerjee*, 14 W R 144 (1870). See *Kunjal Parkum Puthukkay v Varanakot Illoth*, 35 M 163 (1911).

(9) *Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v Khetter Momi Dass* 1 C W N 617 622 (1896).

(10) *Hamid Bakht Mozumdar v Buktear Chand Mahto* 14 C 617 (1887) full in *Sheonaj Nandan Singh v Gopal Saran Narain Singh* 18 C 290, 290 (1891) [possession of person in trust for judgment-debtor], and see *Burjorji Dharaji v Dhunbai*, 16 B 1, at p. 12 (1891).

Under r 60 the conditions upon which the property is to be in whole or in part released are: (a) that the property was not when attached in the possession of the judgment debtor, or of some person in trust (1) for him, or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, or (b) that being in the possession of the judgment debtor at such time it was so in his possession, not on his own account or as his own property, but on account of or in trust (2) for some other person or party (3) in his own account and partly on account of some other person. It is not necessary (to defeat the claim) to prove that the trust is one capable of enforcement by law (4). The claim is disallowed under r 61 if the property was in the possession of the judgment debtor as his own or was in the possession of some other person in trust for him, or in the occupancy of his tenant.

The Court has to "*make an order for releasing the property wholly or to such an extent as it thinks fit from attachment*" The order is passed after investigation of the claim of the objector (5). It must be made before the sale has taken place, for upon the sale the application terminates *ipso facto* (6). When the property of the insolvent judgment debtor, which was attached, had vested in the Official Assignee during the pendency of claim proceedings, it was held that the latter was not a necessary party and that the decree ought only to declare that the property belonged to the judgment debtor and not to declare it liable to attachment (7). Where the claimant paid the amount of the decree and got the property released, the Court was held to have no jurisdiction to make an order for repayment (8). Where the Court was, after such investigation, of opinion that the property attached ought not to be sold, the proper order was one simply releasing the property from attachment, (9) the order being one made with reference merely to the particular claimant who has obtained the order (10). The rule contemplates

(1) *See Hureshur Mookerjee v Nobin Chunder Doss*, 20 W R 202 (1873) [claimant alleged to be benamidar of debtor], *Ahella Chunder Ghose v Gour Churn Mozoomdar*, 18 W R 402 (1872), *Kassirav Saheb Holkar v Vithaldas Mangalji*, 10 B H C R 100 (1873) *Velji Hirji v Bharmal*, 21 B 287 (1896). As to position of Administrator General, *see Bhajji Bhumi v Administrator General*, 23 B 428 (1898).

(2) *See Bishen Chand Basawat v Nadir Hossein*, 15 C 329 (1887) [property held by judgment debtor in trust for a specific purpose—attempt to attach surplus after fulfilment of trust], *see*, 15 I A 15, *Bhajahari Pal v Ram Lal Das*, 6 C W N 63 (1901) [property held as *sebau*] *Kartick v Ashutosh*, 16 C W N 26 (1911), *F B*, *McIntosh v Bidhu*, 16 C W N 959 (1912).

(3) *Sitanath Koer v Land Mortgage Bank*, 9 C 888, 893 (1883) [joint family property], *Rama Krishna v Samrasivaya*, 7 W 235

(1884), *Timmappaya v Lalshminarayana*, 6 M 284 (1883), *Usree Begum v Pannoo Singh*, 8 W R 302 (1867).

(4) *McIntosh v Bidhu*, 16 C W N 959 (1912).

(5) *Bishen Chand Basawat v Nadir Hossein*, 15 C 329 (1887). As to the amount of inquiry which constitutes an investigation, *see Koyyana v Doosy*, 29 M 225 (1903), *Rahim Bux v Abdul Kadir*, 32 C 537 (1904), *Bibi Altman v Dakeshwar*, 1 C L J 296, 300 (1904).

(6) *Gopal v Nitobar*, 16 C W N 1029 (1912).

(7) *Annapurani v Subramanian*, 31 M 347 (1903).

(8) *Varajlal Motchand v Kachia Garbad*, 22 B 473 (1896).

(9) *Bhyrub Lal Bhukut v Meer Abdul Hossein*, 8 W R 93 (1876).

(10) *Mt Imam Bando v Mirza Mahomed Takeo*, 8 W R 27 (1867).

not only the entire release of the property, but also the retention of the attachment to such extent as the Court thinks fit (1) The person against whom an order is passed is the decree holder (2) It depends upon the facts of each case whether the judgment-debtor is a party against whom an order was made so as to be bound by the special rule of limitation prescribed for suits by such a party (3)

Where, on the other hand the claimant does not appear in support of his claim (1) or failed to adduce evidence (5) or evidence not worthy of credit, (6) and the Court is satisfied of the existence of the conditions mentioned in sect 281 (now r 61), the proper order to make is that the claim be disallowed. It has been, however, more recently in some cases held that these provisions contemplate an investigation of the merits of the claim, and that an order is not conclusive where the decree has been disallowed for default (7) or withdrawn (8) An order of disallowance cures only to the benefit of the person in whose favour it was passed, that is, the attaching creditor (9) Where the claimant was in actual possession the effect of an order disallowing his claim was held to be that he was in possession without title (10) The effect of an order disallowing the claim is to give the auction purchaser a title as against the claimant unless the claim is established by suit brought within the period of limitation from the date of the order (11) Where intervenors claim a share of attached property, the Court should define the respective shares of the debtor and the intervenor and sell the debtor's definite share only (12) An order in favour of one of several decree holders on an objection was held not to enure for the benefit of other decree holders who

(1) *Yashwant Shenvi v Vithoba Sheti* 12 B 231 235 (1887)

(2) *Sardhari Lal v Ambika Pershad* 15 C 521, at p 525 (1888)

(3) *Gurava v Subbarajadri* 13 M 366 (1890), *Shivapa v Doli Nagaya* 11 B 114 118 (1880), *Kedar Nath Chatterji v Rakhal Das Chatterji* 15 C 676 680 (1888) *Apbal Narasinha v Shirekoti Timapa* 17 B 620 (1892) *Ambalathulakathi v Ambalathulakathi*, 20 M 721 (1902)

(4) *Bibi Alunan v Dikeshwar Pershad* 1 C L J 296 (1904), *Tripoora Soondaree v Ijjatoonussa* 24 W R 411 (1875), *Karsan Ganpatram* 22 B 875 883 (1897), *Sreemunto Hajiah v Tij oddeen*, 21 W R 409 (1874) *Lalla Goolur Lal v Hubeeboonussa* 15 W R 311 (1871), see *Bhuput Singh v Juler Chunder Dookur* 13 W R 121 (1870) but see *Mohi Lal Mun Lal v Mohoo Mun Lal*, 16 W R 53 (1871), *Jugal Kashore v Ambika*, 16 C W N 882 (1912)

(5) *Karsan v Ganpatram*, 22 B 875, 883 (1897), *Sreemunto Hajiah v Tijooddeen*, 21 W R 409 (1874) *Kamince Datta v Koor Chundar Roy*, 22 W R 11 (1874)

(6) *Karsan v Ganpatram supra* *Gooroo Dass Roy v Sona Monee* 20 W R 345 (1873)

(7) *Kallar Singh v Tori Mahton* 1 C W N 24 (1850) [dist in *Rahim Bux v Abdul kader* 32 C 537 (1904)] see *Karsan v Ganpatram* 22 B 875 882 (1897) *Mohadeb Mandal v Modhoo Mandal*, 16 W R 69 (1871)

(8) *Munisami Reddi v Arunachala Reddi*, 18 M 265 (1894) In *Gooroo Das v Kainat Kant* 20 W R 456 (1873) it was held that if a claim was withdrawn it could not be revived, in *Kumarasamy v Panna Soona* 7 M H C B 309 (1874), a withdrawal was held not to be a consent to the sale

(9) *Boohroonussa Behee v Kureemoon msa Khatoor* 21 W R 230 (1873), *Khub Lal v Ram Lochun Koer*, 17 C 260 (1889), *Kanay Naram Ghose v Haradhun Ghose* 6 W R 107 (1866)

(10) *Brijo Kashore Nag v Ram Dyal Bhudra* 21 W R 173 (1874)

(11) *Khub Lal v Ram Lochun Koer*, 17 C 260 (1889)

(12) *Udit Naram Singh v Murtaza Khan*, 27 A 461 (1900)

were not parties to the proceedings (1) An order for release being only provisional and liable to be set aside by a regular suit has not the effect of putting an end to an attachment duly made (2)

"May institute a suit"—A party to an investigation is excluded from any other remedy than that expressly provided for him by rule 63 by a regular suit brought within the period of limitation (3) Where however, a claim was rejected but the decree holder withdrew his attachment, it was held that the parties were restored to the *status quo ante* and the claimant was not required to bring a suit (4) though a party may proceed to clear his title by suit even though the attachment has ceased to exist (5) The special right of suit conferred is not controlled by the proviso to sect. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (6) The right to be established in a suit instituted after an adverse order must be substantially the same right as that for which the party has contended in the execution (7) and the suit should be determined by ascertaining the rights of the parties at the date of the order (8) Where the same property is attached in execution of different decrees and all the attachments are removed it is not necessary for each attaching creditor to bring a separate suit A decree obtained in a suit brought by one enures to the benefit of all (9) The right of suit is not a personal right confined to the original claimant and therefore a suit will lie by the purchaser of the rights of a person who had unsuccessfully filed an objection (10) The attachment constitutes the cause of action, and different purchasers of the attached property may be properly joined as defendants in the same suit (11)

The decree holder may sue to have his right to attach, and sell the property declared (12) All that he has to prove is that on the date of the attachment the

(1) Jagan Nath v Ganesh 18 A 413 (1881) ; Vadapalli Narasimham v Dronamraju 31 M 163 (1927)

(2) Ram Chandra Marwari v Madeshwar Singh 33 C 113 (1900) ; Ali Ahmed v Bansdhar 31 A 367 (1939)

(3) Settiappan v Sarat Singh 3 M H C R 220 (1866) ; Phul Kumari v Ghanshyam 35 C 202 (1907) ; Annapurani v Subramanian 31 M 347 (1908)

(4) Gopal Purdshotam v Bai Divali 18 P 241 (1893)

(5) Sreeputty Mutha v Kartick Singh 11 C 1 R 151 (1882)

(6) Krishnam Sooraya v Pathma Bai, 29 M 151 (1900)

(7) Calvin v Ellis 2 B L R 212 214 (1811), 11 W R 40

(8) Harshankar Jilani v Naranbhai 14 B L R (1893)

(9) Chintamoni Sen v Issur Chunder 12

W R 221 (1869)

(10) Ganesh Prasad v Kashi Nath Jivan 23 A 83 (1933)

(11) Dorasamy Pillai v Muthusamy Moppan 27 M 94 (1903)

(12) See Mitchell v Mathura Das 12 I A 150 (1880) ; Tofail Ahmad v Banco Madhub Mookerjee 24 W R 394 (1875) ; Dattu Mal v Hari Das 23 A 263 (1901)

(13) Vasudeo v Eknath 30 B 79 (1910)

(14) Narayanrao Damodar v Balkrishna Mahadev, 4 B 529 (1880) ; Rangovithal v Rukhiradas 11 B H C R 174 (1874) ; Kolashetti Ilath v Kolashetti Ilath 4 M 131 (1881) ; Sukhdeo Prasad v Jamna 23 A 60 (1900) ; Bank of Hindustan v Premchand Raichand 5 B H C R O C J 83 (1868) with a prayer for consequential relief ; Kunhanna v Kunhim 16 M 140 (1812) ; Sadaiyappa v Ramani Govind 18 B 608 (1812) The object is to have the right

relief to which he may be entitled, (1) and need not wait until his possession is actually disturbed (2) and as long as a decree is operative a temporary cessation of the execution proceedings under it does not deprive the execution creditor of his rights to sue to set aside the order (3) There is nothing in these provisions which limits the plaintiff's right to compensation for his loss or the defendant's responsibility for his wrongful act, and if the existence of the summary procedure leads to delay, and that delay to further loss, the consequences must fall upon the defendant (4) It has been held that a suit by a claimant under sect 283 of the last Code (now represented by this rule) should be decreed if it is found that the claimant was in possession after a purchase for valuable consideration but that the defendant in such a suit can set up the defence of fraud annulling the transfer (5) In a suit by a judgment creditor to establish his debtor's title a claimant has no right to set up any irregularities there may be in the execution proceedings, a matter with which he is not concerned, (6) or to impeach the decree as collusive, (7) though this last decision has been dissented from on the ground that the section does not introduce an exception to the rule that a defendant is bound and entitled to set up every defence available to him (8) When a person fails to establish a prescriptive title in a suit in which he is plaintiff, it does not follow that the defendant is entitled to recover the subject of such suit in an action brought by him (9)

The suits though brought to establish rights negatived in execution proceedings are not appeals from orders but substantive suits to all intents and purposes, and must be tried like any other suits subject to the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence (10) The Judge is bound to find the facts upon the evidence rendered and taken in the suit and not upon any evidence taken in the summary proceeding, (11) nor is the judgment in the claim case admissible (12) Where a suit is brought by an intervenor the onus is on him to prove his title and not on the purchaser to prove that of the judgment debtor (13) In a suit

established not to have the order in the claim proceeding set aside *Bibi Ahman v Daleshwar Pershad*, 1 C L J 296 (1904)

(1) *Sadu bin Raghu v Ram bin Govind* 16 B 608 (1892)

(2) *Shrivram Chintaman v Jivri*, 13 B 34 (1888)

(3) *Balaji v Moroba*, 21 B 58 (1890)

(4) *Kashori Mohun Rai v Hursook Das*, 12 C 696 (1886), 17 C 436 (1889)

(5) *Abdul Kader v Ali Nis* 16 C W 717 (1912), 15 C L J 649

(6) *Tofail Ahmad v Bance Madhub Mookerjee*, 24 W R 394 (1875)

(7) *Gulbai v Jagannath Galvaikar*, 10 B 659 (1885)

(8) *Naranayyan v Nagaswarayan*, 17 M 389 (1893)

(9) *Shradhar Vinayak v Babaji*, 6 B H C R 20 (1863)

(10) *Kashori Mohun Rai v Hursook Das*, 12

C 696 (1886) 17 C 436 which also deals with the question of damages

(11) *Lekhraj Roy v Mutty Madhub Sen* 14 W R 90 (1870)

(12) *Kashori Mohun Rai v Hursook Das* 12 C 696 701 (1886), 17 C 436, 439

(13) *Nathu Sadashiv v Ramchandra Annaji* 5 B H C R A C J (1868), *Shukh Adam v Jannadas Ranchordas*, 17 B 94 (1891), *Sreenarain Chuckerbutty v Miller*, 15 W R 7 A O C (1871), *Govind Atmaram v Santai*, 12 B 270 (1887), *Mitchell v Mathura Das*, 12 I A L O (1885) As to the onus and evidence required see *Amjad Ali v Hunkoo Shaw*, 17 W R 304, s c, 9 B L R app. 28 (1872), *Tulsee Money v Peary Mohun* 20 W R 79 (1876), *Digumburce Domico Bance Madhub Ghose*, 15 W R 153 (1871), *Naffur Dass v Nil Madhub*, 11 W R 467 (1869), *Mothoorai Landey v Ram Ruchya*, 11 W R 452 (1869), *Toofance Dass v Mun*

brought by the owner against the purchaser, the execution creditor is properly made a party, the object being to restore all parties to the position which they occupied previously to such attachment and sale, (1) and if the claimant further desires relief by partition all the owners should be made parties (2) As to the position of the debtor in a suit by the creditor, see *ante*

Whether the suit is to be brought in the Ordinary or Small Cause Court depends upon the nature of the claim and the right sought to be enforced (3) The judgment debtor is not a necessary party (4) Where an application was decreed with costs to be paid by the decree holders, and the latter were declared in a subsequent suit to be entitled to sell the property, but no relief was asked in regard to the costs, it was held that they could not be refunded by the Court executing the decree (5) The effect of a successful suit at the instance of an attaching creditor is to set aside the order of release and to restore the state of things which it had disturbed (6) An application to revive a previous application for execution, which has been temporarily suspended by an order under these provisions, is according to the Calcutta, Bombay, and Allahabad High Courts governed by Art 178 of the Limitation Act (7) A Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that the valuation of the subject matter of the suit is the amount for which the attachment was made (8) The Privy Council have recently determined that a suit under r. 63 falls within clause 1, Art 17, Sched II, Court Fees Act, and a Court fee of Rs 10 is payable thereon (9)

"The right which the plaintiff claims to the property in dispute," means the right which is claimed in the proceeding in respect of the property that is the right to have it sold or the right to have it released from attachment They do not mean the right or title to the property When, therefore, a claimant, being unsuccessful in a claim, has got the property released from attachment by coming to terms with the decree holder, without notice to the judgment debtors, a suit subsequently brought by him against the judgment-debtors for recovery of possession is not barred (10)

Rakhsun 15 W R 202 (1871), Penraj v Natayan 6 B 215 (1882), Ram Dayal v Durga Singh 12 A 209 (1830) [decree against Hindu father—attachment of joint family property] Radha Pershad v Ram Khelawan 23 C 302 (1895) [decree against member of Mitakshara family] Nannu Jani v Karam Ali 30 A 321 (1908)

(1) Bank of Hindustan v Ahmedbhai, 5 B H C R 83 (1868)

(2) Sadu bin Rajhu v Ram Bin Govind, 16 B 608 (1892)

(3) See Shiboo Narain v Mudden Ali, 7 C 608 (1881), Akbar Ali v Jezuddin 8 C 309 (1882), Mahomed Koya v Kasim, 9 M 206 (1885), Chhaganlal Nagardas v Dal Sukhram, 4 B 503 (1879), Godha v Nank Ram, 7 A 152 (1883), Hahit Baksh v Sita, 5 A 112 (1883), Makund Lal v Nasiruddin, 1 A 116 (1882), Pooi Partap Hamir v

Vuajlal Mulchand, 8 B 209 (1884), David Beg v Kullappa 11 M 264 (1887)

(4) Ghazi Ram v Mangal Chaud, 23 A 41 (1905)

(5) Ragho Nath Das v Balji Prasad, 6 A 21 (1883)

(6) Mahomed Wairat v Pitambur Sen 21 W R 435 (1874), Bonomali Rai v Pro sunno Naram Chowdhury, 23 C 829 (1896)

(7) Mitras Limitation Act, 4th ed 1115, *cf. seq.*, where also the different view of the Madras High Court is given

(8) Krishnaswami Naidu v S masundaram Chetti

Devi v

(9) — — —
17 M L J 618 (1907)

(10) Morliu Barajal v Lathi Bux Khan, 3 C L J 381 (1900)

'Subject to the result of such suit'—When property has been released from attachment and subsequently declared liable to attachment by a decree against which an appeal is pending, a sale of such property before the final result of the appeal is not illegal (1)

'The order shall be conclusive'—Where an order has been passed unless a suit is brought, the unsuccessful party cannot assert his right in any capacity, whether as plaintiff or defendant, (2) and he is prevented from pleading adverse possession at the date of the order (3) The conclusiveness exists only as regards the particular property in dispute (4) The order is conclusive subject to the other provisions of the Code, such as those relating to review (5) and revision (6) On the same principle matters finally heard and decided cannot be reopened on a second application, (7) but it has been held that where there is no investigation of a claim which is dismissed for default a fresh claim may be made (8) The discharge of the order of attachment cannot be properly asked for in such suit The intervenor having established his title by declaratory decree, should then carry the decree to the Court by which the attachment was issued, when such Court, being bound to recognize the adjudication will govern itself accordingly (9) An order is not appealable (10) An order passed by a Judge on the Original Side of the High Court dismissing a claim preferred by mortgagees of immoveable property which was attached in execution was held subject to appeal under the Letters Patent (11)

Attachment before judgment—By O XXXVIII : 9 (formerly 487) this rule applies to attachment before judgment (12)

Mortgage—The distinction between r 62 and r 66 is that in the former

- (1) *Fathula v Muniyappa*, 6 M 98 (1882)
- (2) *Nilo Paudurangi v Rama Pattoji* 9 B 35 (1884), *Badri Prasad v Muhammad Yusuf* 1 A 381 (1877), *Bapu Khandu v Baji Jivaji*, 14 B 372 (1889), *Achuta v Mamavu* 10 M 307, 361 (1886), *Burnamoyi Dasi v Ashutosh Goswami*, 27 C 714 722 (1900)
- (3) *Velayuthan v Lakshmana*, 8 M 506 (1886), *Burnamoyi Dasi v Ashutosh Goswami* 27 C 714 721 (1900), [*dist* *Gend Lal Tewari v Denoth Rai Tewari*, 11 C 673 (1885)]
- (4) *Dinkar Ballal v Hari Shridhar*, 14 B 206 (1889), cf *Radha Prasad Singh v Lal Sahab Rai*, 13 A 53 at p 62 (1890)
- (5) See *Cochrane v Hector Lal Seal*, 7 W R 79 (1867)
- (6) Although in *Ittiachan v Velappan* 8 M 484 493 (1885) the Court appeared to consider that it had not the power *ad qu.*
- (7) See *Khelat Chunder Ghose v Bhuggo butty Churn Mookerjee* 14 W R 144 (1860)
- (8) See cases cited, *ante*, at p. 940, and see *Sarala Subba v Ramsala Timmayya*, 31

- M 5 (1907)
- (9) *Kolashetti Illath v Kolashetti Illath*, 4 M 131 (1881) See *Narayanav Damodar v Balkrishna Mahadev* 4 B 529 (1880)
- (10) *Dayaram v Govardhandas* 28 B 453 (1904), *Salharam Krishna v Gadya*, 2 Bom L R 241 (1900), *Bhajahari Pal v Ram Lal Das* 6 G W N 63 (1901), *Abdul Rahman v Muhammad Yar*, 4 A 190 (1880) *Nunayo Churn v Jogendro Nath Banerjee* 21 W R 365 (1874), *Rash Behary Mookerjee v Burnamoye*, 9 G L R 79 (1881) [sect 244 of old Code inapplicable as interest was acquired prior to suit], *Urjoon Sahoy v Nil Monoo Singh* 20 W R 90 (1873)
- (11) *Sabhapathi Chetti v Narayanasami Chetti*, 25 M 500 (1901)
- (12) See *Jaya Ramji v Jadavji Natha*, 1 B H C R 221 (1864), *Ex parte Gamble*, 2 B H C R 142 (1866), *In re Coccol Dass Sounderjee*, Bourke, 240 (1866), *Kartick Chunder Mookerjee v Mookta Ram Surar*, 10 W R 21 (1863)

case the Court after being satisfied of the existence of the mortgage sells only the judgment debtor's right of redemption so that the purchaser does not acquire any greater rights than those of redeeming the mortgage. In the latter the Court decides nothing as to the existence of the mortgage. The purchaser buys the property with notice of the mortgage and subject to such risks as the notice might involve (1). A person who purchases a property in execution of his own decree apparently subject to a mortgage lien as declared by the Court under r 62 without however acquiescing in the order made in favour of the mortgagee is entitled to question the mortgage if done so within a year of the order in the claim case by way of defence in the suit brought against him by the mortgagee to enforce his lien although he may not have instituted any suit under r 63 to establish the right which he claims in the property in dispute (2).

Sale generally

- 4] 64 Any Court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it and liable to sale, or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and that the proceeds of such sale, or a sufficient portion thereof, shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive the same.
- Power to order property attached to be sold and proceeds to be paid to person entitled

Order for sale—This rule corresponds with sect 242 of Act VIII of 1859 but that section provided only for the sale of such attached property as did not consist of money or bank notes. The present wording save the words in italics was introduced by sect 281 of Act X of 1877. The words in italics are additions made by the present Code. Where the same property is under attachment by two Courts of different grades a sale effected by the Court of lower grade is not a nullity. Sect 63 *ante* is a directory section dealing with procedure and does not take away the jurisdiction to sell conferred on the Court by this rule (3). Sect 89 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates a certain state of things but where such state does not exist that section does not exclude other ways of enforcing a decree and a Court has general jurisdiction to direct a sale if not under that section then under this rule (4).

"May"—It is however unperpetive on the Court to act when an application is duly made by a party interested and having the right to apply but when property has been sold in execution of a decree it cannot be sold again at the instance of another decree holder who attached it prior to the attachment under the decree under which it was sold (5).

-
- (1) *Shub Kunwar Singh v. Shree Prasad* 31 C. 838 (1906)
Singh 23 A. 418 (1908)
 (2) *Shah Ziauddin v. Kailash Chandra* 6 C. L. J. 90 (1907)
Shah 2 C. L. J. 509 (1900)
 (3) *Gopi Chand Bothra v. Kasmir Das* 317 (1880)
 (4) *Abul Karamanik v. Jahar Mahomed*
 (5) *Hashi Nath v. Durbanand Shah* 1 C.

"Any property attached"—This does not include a decree for money which cannot be sold (1)

"Shall be sold"—When a sale takes place all previous attachments effected upon the property sold fall to the ground (2) As to payment of proceeds to party entitled, see case cited (3)

Appeal—An appeal lay under sect. 588 (j) of Act X of 1877 from an order refusing the judgment debtor's application that the property be sold in successive shares the question being one between the parties in respect of the execution of a decree (4) But see now O XLII r 1

65 Sale as otherwise prescribed, every sale in execution [s 236]

Sales by whom conducted and how made. of a decree shall be conducted by an officer of the Court or by *such* other person as the Court may appoint *in this behalf*, and shall be made by public auction in manner *prescribed*

Sales—A sale in execution is a sale by the Court which has a statutory power conferred on it of transferring the interest of the judgment debtor to the purchaser, and to that end a certain course of procedure is prescribed terminating with the sale certificate (5) As to sales of agricultural produce see rr 74, 75 In order that the sale be good it must have been held under a good decree (6) and it must have been conducted by a person duly authorized The words '*whom the Court may appoint*' in the former section were held to apply not only to the words '*any other person*' but also to the officers of the Court (7) When a Court postponed a sale, but information not reaching the Nazir in time he sold the property, it was *held* that the sale was void (8) In sales under the direction of the Court it is incumbent on the Court to be scrupulous in the extreme and very careful to see that no taint or touch of fraud or deceit or misrepresentation is found in the conduct of its ministers (9) Where a sale was conducted by two officers of the Court one a chief clerk and officiating bailiff and the other his deputy, being the auctioneer and the purchaser made a bid on the representation of the latter in the presence and hearing of the former that he was selling the land at the instance of the mortgagees though a proclamation was read in English (which the purchaser did not understand) to the effect that only the

(1) Gopal Nanashet v Joharnmal 16 B 522 (1891) Sultan Hussar v Gulzari Lal 2 A 290 (1879) Tiruvengala v Vythilinga 6 M 418 (1883) Jotindro Nath v Dwarka Nath, 20 C. 111 (1891) Kashi Nath v Surbanand Shaha 12 C 317 (1885)

(2) Kashi Nath v Surbanand Shaha, 12 C 317 (1885)

(3) Gajanoda v Butlo Kanto 33 C. 1040 1046 [payment to Crown].

(4) Chandhari Sital v Jhumah Singh, 4 C. L. R. 27 (1879)

(5) Baroda Kanta Bose v Chanier Kanta Chav 29 C. 522 (1902)

(6) Jadu Nath Kundu v Braja Nath Kundu 1 C B L. App. 90 (1871) Colam Asgar v Lakshman D 5 B L R 78 (1870) *Isi* in Najabat Ali Chowdhry v Sheikh Buzeeoolah 11 B L R 42 (1873)

(7) Judoonath Roy v Ram Bala Chatterjee 12 W R 233 (1869) In Omur Chunder Doss v Soormunnissa Khatoon W R 44 (1864) the sale by the Nazir was by direction of the Munsif who was ill

(8) Sant Lal v Umrao un nasa, 12 A 90 (1889)

(9) Mahomed Kala Mia v Harperink, 30 L A 22

interest of the judgment debtor was being sold, it was held by the Privy Council that as the interest of the judgment debtor was a mere equity to redeem property mortgaged far beyond its value the Court could not enforce a bargain so illusory against a purchaser misled by its agents. And it was also held that the chief clerk was right in referring the matter to the Court for direction and also in not proceeding under sect 306 of the last Code (now represented by r 84 of this Order) (1)

[s 287] **66** (1) *Where any property is ordered to be sold by public Proclamation of sales auction in execution of a decree the Court by public auction shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made in the language of such Court*

(2) *Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the decree holder and the judgment debtor and shall state the time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately as possible—*

- (a) *the property to be sold,*
- (b) *the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate, where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the Government*
- (c) *any incumbrance to which the property is liable,*
- (d) *the amount for the recovery of which the sale is ordered, and*
- (e) *every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property*

[s 237
last para]

person making the verification, the matters required by sub rule (2) to be specified in the proclamation

[s 287] (4) *For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified in the proclamation, the Court may summon any person whom it thinks necessary to summon and may examine him in respect to any such matters and require him to produce any document in his possession or power relating thereto*

Proclamation—It has been held that the object of issuing a proclamation is to give notice to intending purchasers of what is sold and not to the judgment debtor (2) The Court should be careful to specify in the proclamation the

(1) *Malio I Kaly Mha t Harpurink*
36 I A 3.

(2) *Lakha Raji M I sh D sa, L W R*
193 (1899) *Shikh Al bolet SyulJa n M*

details given in this rule, for an omission causing substantial injury may form ground for setting aside the sale under r 90, *post* (1) Under r 69 the Court may adjourn the sale. It is necessary in such case to mention the date and hour of sale (2) If this is done for a longer period than seven days a fresh proclamation (3) must issue unless the judgment debtor waives it (4) Where there is a series of short postponements less than seven days, which taken together in the aggregate amount to more than seven days, a fresh proclamation is necessary (5) Another date should be fixed. Where a sale did not take place on the day fixed in the original notice, it was held that an indefinite postponement could not be regarded as an adjournment from day to day (6) Proceedings mentioned in this rule have been held to be of an administrative and not judicial character. They are not therefore orders within sect 47 (formerly 244) or appealable. But if a sale does take place objection may be taken on any of the grounds mentioned in r 90 (formerly sect 311), some of which may relate to the contents of the proclamation (7) It has been said that the sales contemplated by the rule

18 W R 55 (1872) [on one point dissented from in *Mt Nuzeran v Moulvie Amee rooddeen*, 24 W R 3 (1875), see as to declaratory portion of proclamation *Dwarka Nath v Aloke Chunder*, 9 C 641 (1883), and as to discrepancy between proclamation and certificate, *Uma Churn Sen v Gobind Chunder*, 1 C L R 460 (1878)]

(1) See notes to section cited and *Arunachellam v Arunachellam* 12 M 19 (1888) *Bhoop Singh v Gourree Mull*, S D N W 537 (1860) [omission of jumma and name of decree holder, sale upheld as no injury] *Thakoor Das v Hardeo*, S D N W (1862) 104 [application of same decree holder in five separate cases, entire right of all sharers sold, failure to specify right of each judgment debtor or his liability in each case—no injury, sale upheld], *Nun keput v Urgubart*, 13 W R 209 (1870) [two lots sold as one though proclamation treated them as separate], *Babu Lachmjeeput v Lekraj Roy*, 8 W R 415 (1867) [proclamation not specifying numbers and values of promissory notes sold] As to misdescription in the case of a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act, see *Ram Taruk Hazra v Mosahab Ali Khan*, 6 C W N 246 (1901)

(2) *Bhikari Mura v Rani Surjamoni* 6 C W N 48 (1901), *Mahabir Pershad v Dhanuk dhari Singh* 8 C W N 685 (1904), a.c. 31 C. 815, 816 (1904), *Surnomoyee Dibi v Dakhna Ranjan Sanval* 24 C 291 (1896)

(3) See as to necessity for a fresh proclamation after postponement, *Noshlee W Khoo*

v Dwarka Nath Biswas, 6 W R Misc 84 (1866) *Sanwal Singh v Nakhu Panday*, 2 A II C R 143 (1870) *Okhoy Chunder Dutt v Erskine & Co* 3 W R Misc 11 (1865), *Tekait Rai v Mirza Bandeh*, S D N W. (1856) 322 [sale taking place on day originally fixed after an order for postponement had been passed] *Jhoomuck Chowdhry v Rajah Radha Pershad* 25 W R 328 (1876) *Roy Gourree Nath v Fukeer Chund* 18 W R 347 (1872) *Sri Amutoonnusa Bibee v Khudeemoom v Bilce* 17 W R 278 (1872) The omission to issue a fresh proclamation is an irregularity only. *Bagal Chunder v Rameshwar Mundal* 18 C 496 (1891)

(4) See *Noorul Hossain v Oomatul Fatima*, 25 W R 74 (1875) *Baboo Hardeo Narain v Giridhari Singh*, 19 W R 227 (1873) *Bagal Chunder v Rameshwar Mundal* 18 C 496 (1891) *Preo Lal Paul v Radhika Prosad Paul* 6 C W N 42 (1901)

(5) *Janunt Mohun Nundy v Chandra Kumar Roy*, 6 C W N 44 (1901)

(6) *Jhoomuck Chowdhry v Rajah Radha Pershad*, 25 W R 328 (1876)

(7) *Sivagami Ache v Subrahmanya Ayyar* 27 M 259 (1903), F B, dissenting from *Sivagami Naicker v Ratnasami Naicker*, 23 M 533 (1900), *Lachman v Ganga*, 15 C W N 713 (1910), *Sakhi Chand v Kuland* 14 C L J 607 (1911), *Ganga Prosad v Raj Coomar Singh* 30 C 617 (1903) In *Rajah Rameswar Pershad v Rai Sham Arseen*, 5 C W N 267 (1901), it was also held that there was an appeal

interest of the judgment debtor was being sold, it was held by the Privy Council that as the interest of the judgment-debtor was a mere equity to redeem property mortgaged far beyond its value, the Court could not enforce a bargain so illusory against a purchaser misled by its agents. And it was also held that the chief clerk was right in referring the matter to the Court for direction, and also in not proceeding under sect 306 of the 1st Code (now represented by r 84 of this Order) (1)

s. 287.]

66. (1) *Where any property is ordered to be sold by public Proclamation of sales auction in execution of a decree, the Court by public auction.* shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made in the language of such Court.

(2) Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the decree holder and the judgment-debtor and shall state the time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately as possible—

[s. 237,
last para.]

- (a) the property to be sold,
- (b) the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate, where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the Government,
- (c) any incumbrance to which the property is liable,
- (d) the amount for the recovery of which the sale is ordered, and
- (e) every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property.

(3) *Every application for an order for sale under this rule shall be accompanied by a statement signed and verified in the manner hereinbefore prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings and containing, so far as they are known to or can be ascertained by the person making the verification, the matters required by sub rule (2) to be specified in the proclamation.*

[s. 287.]

(4) For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified in the proclamation, the Court may summon any person whom it thinks necessary to summon and may examine him in respect to any such matters and require him to produce any document in his possession or power relating thereto

Proclamation—It has been held that the object of issuing a proclamation is to give notice to intending purchasers of what is sold and not to the judgment-debtor (2). The Court should be careful to specify in the proclamation the

(1) *Mahomed I. Kaly v. Mrs. J. Harpurnik*
16 I. A. 32

(2) *Lach Ram v. Mohesh Dass*, 12 W. R.
458 (1869), *Shahk Ali d. I. Syul Jan v. Ali*

details given in this rule, for an omission causing substantial injury may form ground for setting aside the sale under r 90, *post* (1) Under r 69 the Court may adjourn the sale. It is necessary in such case to mention the date and hour of sale (2) If this is done for a longer period than seven days a fresh proclamation (3) must issue unless the judgment debtor waives it (4) Where there is a series of short postponements less than seven days, which taken together in the aggregate amount to more than seven days, a fresh proclamation is necessary (5) Another date should be fixed. Where a sale did not take place on the day fixed in the original notice, it was held that an indefinite postponement could not be regarded as an adjournment from day to day (6) Proceedings mentioned in this rule have been held to be of an administrative and not judicial character. They are not therefore orders within sect 47 (formerly 244) or appealable. But if a sale does take place objection may be taken on any of the grounds mentioned in r 90 (formerly sect 311), some of which may relate to the contents of the proclamation (7) It has been said that the sales contemplated by the rule

18 W R 55 (1872) [on one point dissented from in *Mt Nuzeran v Moulvie Amee rooddeen*, 24 W R 3 (1875), see as to declaratory portion of proclamation *Dwarka Nath v Alol Chunder*, 9 C 641 (1883) and as to discrepancy between proclamation and certificate, *Uma Churn Sen v Gobind Chunder*, 1 C L R 460 (1878)]

(1) See notes to section cited and *Aruna chellam v Arunachollam*, 12 M 19 (1888) *Bhoop Singh v Gourree Mull S D N W 33* (1860) [omission of jumma and name of decree holder, sale upheld as no injury], *Thakoor Das v Hardeo*, S D N W (1862) 104 [application of same decree holder in five separate cases, entire right of all sharers sold, failure to specify right of each judgment debtor or his liability in each case—no injury, sale upheld], *Nun leeput v Urquhart*, 13 W R 209 (1870) [two lots sold as one though proclamation treated them as separate], *Babu Luchmichut v Lekraj Roy*, 8 W R 415 (1867) [proclamation not specifying numbers and value of promissory notes sold] As to re-description in the case of a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act, see *Ram Taruk Hazra v Mosahab Ali Khan*, 6 C W N 246 (1901)

(2) *Bhikari Mera v Rani Surjamma*, 6 C W N 48 (1901), *Mahabir Pershad v Dhanuk Jhari Singh*, 8 C W N 685 (1904), *s. c.*, 31 C 815, 818 (1904), *Surnomoyee Debi v Dakshina Rangan Sanyal* 24 C 291 (1896)

(3) See as to necessity for a fresh proclamation after postponement, *Shoshoo Mookhee*

v Dwarka Nath Biswas, 6 W R Misc 84 (1866), *Banwal Singh v Makhu Panday*, 2 A H C R 143 (1870), *Okhoy Chunder Dutt v Erskine & Co* 3 W R Misc 11 (1865), *Tekait Rai v Mirza Bandeh S D N W* (1856) 322 [sale taking place on day originally fixed after an order for postponement had been passed] *Jhoomuch Chowdhry v Rajah Radha Pershad* 25 W R 328 (1870) *Roy Gouroo Nath v Bucker Chund* 18 W R 347 (1872) *Sm Asmutoonnissa Bibee v Khudemoonissa Bibee* 17 W R 278 (1872) The omission to issue a fresh proclamation is an irregularity only. *Bagal Chunder v Rameshur Mundal* 18 C 496 (1891)

(4) See *Noorul Hossain v Oommatul Fatima*, 25 W R 34 (1875) *Bal v Hardeo Naram v Girdhari Singh*, 19 W R 227 (1873) *Bagal Chunder v Rameshur Mundal*, 18 C 496 (1891), *Preo Lall Paul v Radhika Prosad Paul* 6 C W N 42 (1901)

(5) *Jamini Mohun Nundy v Chundra Kumar Roy*, 6 C W N 44 (1901)

(6) *Jhoomuch Chowdhry v Rajah Radha Pershad*, 25 W R 328 (1870)

(7) *Sivagami Ache v Subrahmanya Ayyar*, 27 W 259 (1903), *F B*, dissenting from *Sivasami Naicker v Ratnasami Naicker*, 23 W 593 (1900), *Lachman v Ganga*, 15 C W N 713 (1910), *Sakhi Chand v Kulanand* 14 C L J 607 (1911), *Ganga Prosad v Raj Coomar Singh*, 30 C 617 (1903) In *Rajah Rameshur Pershad v Rajsham Krishna*, 8 C W N 257 (1901) it was also held that there was an appeal

the sales in execution of decrees, and the procedure and the rules laid down regarding them are framed on the assumption that the property to be sold has been already attached (1) It has been held therefore that property not attached and not proclaimed cannot be sold, (2) and where plaintiff attached before judgment and the suit was dismissed but decreed in appeal, it was held that a sale without further attachment was void (3) It has, however, also been held that though the absence of attachment is an irregularity, a sale is not to be considered as a nullity merely by reason of the absence of any attachment (4)

a claimant objected that the property had previously been sold to him at a private sale (6) An order of sale after attachment on a money-decree may create a valid charge on the property (7)

"After notice"—The proclamation was in the Mofussil usually prepared without notice to the judgment debtor and behind his back, and he was not therefore likely to receive any intimation of its contents until it was fixed up in the Court house or Collectorate or was published upon the property The faultiness of this practice was held therefore to excuse objection by the judgment-debtor (8) The Code has therefore been altered to give effect to a practice followed in Calcutta with great advantage of drawing up the proclamation after notice to the parties who are thus afforded an opportunity of settling the contents correctly, and in a great measure are restrained from subsequently raising obstructive and dilatory objections If objections are not taken they may be deemed to have been waived (9) The original Bill proceeding on the ground that the object of those proceedings was to give notice to intending purchasers rather than the judgment debtor (10) required a notification at the time of sale of any information coming after issue of the proclamation to the knowledge of the parties or of the Court executing the decree And it was at first considered that as the rejections of a claim preferred or an objection under rule 58, opened up the prospect of litigation, the intending purchaser should have notice of the matter

(1) *Deno Nauth Bhatt v. Mulla Lal Paul*
1 Hyd 159 (1862 3)

(2) *Ram Onoogroh v. Mt. Montornu*, 6 W R 323 (1860) *Fida Husain v. Kutub Husain*, 7 A 38 (1884)

(3) *Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal*, 10 A 506 (1888)

(4) *Kashory Mohun Roy v. Mahomed Mujaffar Hossein*, 18 C 188 (1890), 22 C 909 (1895), distinguished in *Sastrama v. Meherban*, 13 C L J 243 (1911)

(5) *Jamini Mohun Nundy v. Chandra Kumar Roy*, 6 C W N 44 (1901)

(6) *Humatram v. Khashal Jetharam*, 18 B 38 (1893)

(7) *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Pershad*

Singh, 5 C 148 (1879), s. c., 6 F A 88 *Rai Balkish v. Rai Dita Ram*, 7 A 771 (1885) see *Madho Parshad v. Mohrian Singh*, 18 C 157 (1890)

(8) *Rajah Ramessur Parshad v. Rai Shun Kissen*, 9 C W N 257, 262 (1901)

(9) See as to waiver of misstatements in proclamation *Girdhari Singh v. Hurdeo Naram*, 3 F A 230 (1876), *Arunachellam Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti*, 15 F A 171 (1888), *Pero Lal Paul v. Radhika Prosaul Paul*, 6 C W N 42 (1901), *Pran Singh v. Janardan*, 14 C L J 541 (1911)

(10) *Lack Ram v. Mohesh Das*, 12 W R 483 (1864), *Sandatanwar Khan v. Ptu Kuar*, 20 A 412 (1893), s. c., 2 C W N 550

The Select Committee, however, cancelled the proposed clause which provided for information likely to be useful to the public in bidding and as above stated proposed to require the proclamation to be settled after notice to the parties

"Time and place of sale"—Property cannot be sold before the expiry of the period mentioned in r 68. The proclamation should fix a day for the sale which is not a holiday, or a day on which the Courts are closed by order of the High Court (1). Both the proclamation of the time and place of sale and the holding of such sale at such time and place are conditions precedent to the sale being a sale under the Code (2). It was held under the last Code that it was intended that a sale of moveable property should ordinarily be held in some place within the jurisdiction of the Court ordering the sale. Good and sufficient reason must be shown for directing otherwise (3).

"The property to be sold"—The judgment debtor has the right to have the property to be sold described with reasonable accuracy (4). As this is to be expressly stated, where the proclamation set out particulars of the property but subsequent to such proclamation a portion of the property was released to a third party, it was held that a fresh proclamation must be made (5). If a Court directs the sale of property not warranted by the decree the person aggrieved may follow the property in a regular suit (6). In a recent case where decree holders had applied for execution by attachment and sale of a certain encumbered share of a *mahal* which was fully described in the Schedule and the share was attached and sold but the Subordinate Judge granted a certificate stating that a different and unencumbered share had been purchased, it was held by the Privy Council that there was no power to sell the latter share since this was not a case of a mere misdescription but of a mistake as to identity (7). The sale of a decree partly executed only enables the purchaser to execute what remains to be carried out (8). In the under mentioned case (9) it was held that the sale of a decree for possession of land did not carry the mesne profits to the debtor. An application to set aside a sheriff's sale or for compensation on the ground of deficiency in the area of land sold was refused (10).

"The revenue assessed"—Not stating the revenue is an irregularity but

(1) Haro Jemadar v. Jadub Chunder Holdar, 3 W B Misc 24 (1865)

(2) Basharatulla v. Uma Churn Dutt, 16 C 794 (1883), as to place of sale see Govind Sahakar v. Bank of India, 4 B H C R A C J 164 (1867)

(3) Lakshminbai v. Santapa Riwapa, 13 B 22 (1880)

(4) Rajsh Ramessur Ibrahad v. Rai Sham Kissen, 8 C W N 207 (1901)

(5) Shih Prakash Singh v. Sardar Doyal Singh, 3 C 244 (1878)

(6) Assamathum Nissen v. R. J. I. Chnee

put 4 C 142 (1878), see Dorab Ali Ali v. Khajash Mohecodeen, 3 C 800 (1883) to purchaser's right to receive back his money, see r 23, dastghar al ul humar v. Ram Gour 37 C 27 (1899)

(7) Raja Thakur Jemad v. (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

(8) Chund v. Chund (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

(9) Chund v. Chund (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

(10) Chund v. Chund (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

(11) Chund v. Chund (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

(12) Chund v. Chund (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

(13) Chund v. Chund (P C) 13 C 1 J 101 (1883)

this objection should be taken in the first Court when seeking to set aside a sale (1) The words 'part of an estate' mean an aliquot part of an estate (2)

"Any incumbrance"—In the case of a mortgage the amount of the mortgage debt unpaid should be stated (3) An absence of the specification of the incumbrance may amount to a material irregularity avoiding the sale (4) If a decree holder knowing of the existence of an incumbrance does not notify it the land passes free from it (5) *Semble* a third person purchasing mortgaged property *bona fide* at a sale in execution of a money decree obtained by the mortgagee against the mortgagor obtains a good title free from the mortgage lien unless the sale is made subject to it (6) Where the holder of two decrees attached property in execution of one of them, he was held to have a right to state in the notification of sale that he likewise claimed the same property in satisfaction of his second decree (7) It was held that claims admitted by the parties or established by decree of Court should be entered in the proclamation as charges upon the property though they came to the knowledge of the Court in an inquiry under this rule only and have not been made the subject of an order under sect 282 of the former Code It was also held that mortgages noted in the proclamation as claims upon the property sold, should not necessarily be entered in the certificate of sale or be computed as part of the purchase money unless they had been admitted by the parties or established by decree, or unless they had been declared under that section to be charges on the property and the Court has seen fit to sell it subject to them but they should be so entered and computed if they have thus been admitted or established or if they had been declared under that section and the sale was held subject to them (8)

"Every other thing"—It has been held that the proclamation should specify as fairly and accurately as possible the value of the property, inasmuch as it was a material fact for the purchaser to know in judging of the nature and value of the property (9) It was proposed to amend the rule to the effect that no valuation was to be entered in the proclamation But this proposal

(1) *Macnaghten v Mahabir Kishad* 9 C 26 (1882) *Madarshah v Garotayast v Palam* 11 B L R 23 (1900)

(2) *Kally Prasanna Boso v Dina Nath Mullick*, 11 B L R 56 (1873)

(3) *Mohant Mehl Lall v Shub Kishad* 11 B L R 34 41, 42 (1881)

(4) *Moti Lall Roy v Bhawanee Kumari Devi*, 6 C W N 536 (1902)

(5) *Kasturi v Venkata Chalapathi* 12 M 112 (1892), and see *Narsing Narain Singh v Raghobur Singh* 10 C 609 (1884) but in Bombay registration was held to be binding in *Ravi* 20 B 290 (1890), which was doubted in *Ram Chandra v Jaram* 22 B C 101 (1897) As to stoppage on real estate see *Baswantappa Shitappa* 11 B 50 at p 11 (1881)

(1) *Husain v Shankar Gori* 11 B 112

(1898) *Sahab Manaji v Deriya Jiba* 14 B 1 R 204 (1911)

(7) *Balakrishna Lall v Khurukdhar Singh* 12 W R 70 (1869) where mortgagee sells under separate decrees for instalments of same debt see *Dosibai v Ishwar Das*, 15 B 222 (1891)

(8) *Shantappa v Subbar* 18 B 175 (1893)

(9) *Saadatunnd Khan v Ishul Kuar*, 2 C W N 500 (1894), see also *1412*, *1413*, *1414*, *Rajah Ramcharan Kishore v Ram Shrin Kishore*, 8 C W N 207 (1901), *Ganga Prasad v Raj Chandra Singh* 30 C 617

Singh v Jamuna Prasad Singh 31 C 92 (1904) see also *1414*

has not been judicially sold. If the property of which the sale is sought is a debt and the Court receives notice from the alleged debtor that no debt exists, the Court should satisfy itself as to the existence or otherwise of the debt, and if it comes to the conclusion that no debt exists should abstain from proceeding to sale (1). Should the Court have reason to believe that the property the sale of which was asked for was held by occupancy tenure, it is its duty to notify that fact in the proclamation as a warning to prospective bidders (2).

"Every application," etc., sub rule (3) — The Code has thus adopted a practice stated to have obtained in the *Madras presidency* (3) under which the decree holder is required to assist the Court by ascertaining and communicating the particulars to be specified in the proclamation of sale.

"For the purpose of ascertaining," sub rule (4) — An objection raised in the course of an inquiry under this rule cannot be treated as a claim under r. 53 (formerly 37), the latter rule having reference to claims to and objections to attachment (4). Where a person came forward in response to a notice issued under this rule, and claimed a mortgage lien over the property, which was allowed and entered in the proclamation of sale, and the property was sold, it was held that the plaintiff (whose proper remedy was indicated) could not sue to have the sale set aside and a re-sale ordered of the property freed from the alleged incumbrance (5). The enquiry under this rule should be of the most summary character (6). An order by an executing Court under this rule, determining the valuation of immovable properties attached and sought to be sold in execution of a decree is not appealable as a decree (7).

67. (1) Every proclamation shall be made and published *as nearly as may be, in the manner prescribed by rule 54, sub rule (2)* (s. 288)
Mode of making proclamation.

(2) Where the Court so directs, such proclamation shall also be published in the local official Gazette, or in a local newspaper, or in both, and the costs of such publication shall be deemed to be costs of the sale.

(3) Where property is divided into lots for the purpose of being sold separately, it shall not be necessary to make a separate proclamation for each lot, unless proper notice of the sale cannot, in the opinion of the Court, otherwise be given.

(1) *Haridai Amthathbhai v. Abhisang Wru* 4 B 323 (1880), *Srinath v. Muckanachary*, 10 W 194 (1887).

(2) *Basdeo Prasad v. Juthan Ram* 27 A 684 (1905).

(3) In *Sri Gurbala Debbar v. Mina Kumari*, 5 C W N 497 (1900), it was pointed out that there was no express provision requiring the decree holder to notify incumbrances, though under the High Court rules he had to notify the existence of arrears. In *Ram Chandra v. Jairam*, 22 B 686, 691 (1897), it

was held that the applicant was bound to disclose his own liens.

(4) *Bhiku Bal Patil v. Hjemchand Kulkarni* 14 B 369 (1890).

(5) *Parshotam Manji v. Ganesh Vinayak* 23 B 759 (1899).

(6) *Iran Singh v. Janardan* 14 C L J 541 (1911).

(7) *Deoki v. Banai*, 16 C W N 124 (1911). *Panch Dwar v. Mani Raut* 16 C W N 970 (1912).

"Shall be made"—See notes to last rule and to r 5, and as to fixing in Court House note (1) The words "*as nearly as may be*" have been inserted because the provision applies generally to sales of both kinds of property, and in the case of moveables the provisions of r 5 relating to immoveables cannot be applied in their entirety. An omission to carry out the provision of this rule is an irregularity, but does not render a sale void (2)

Advertisement.—It is right that the Court should permit any advertisement reasonably required which might have the effect of giving notice to all possible purchasers (3) The power of advertisement is now still further extended, and an option is given not to publish in the Gazette, which is not commonly read by the classes most affected. The costs are as under the last Code costs in the sale (4) A want of correspondence between the advertisement and the schedule of the proclamation is an irregularity which might need to be set right by the Court if the sale was otherwise regular (5)

"Lots"—The substance of the decision (6) on the subject of the division of a joint area into lots has been incorporated. It had been previously held, prior to the amendment of the last Code by sect 29 of Act VII of 1888, that where several separate properties are attached there must be a separate proclamation (7)

68. *Save in the case of property of the kind described in the proviso to rule 43, no sale hereunder shall, without the consent in writing of the judgment-debtor, take place until after the expiration of at least thirty days in the case of immoveable property, and of at least fifteen days in the case of moveable property, calculated from the date on which the copy of the proclamation has been affixed on the court house of the Judge ordering the sale*

"Consent"—An application made on the day of sale by the judgment debtor that a part only of the property should be sold, instead of the entirety, is not a consent under this rule (8)

Sale in contravention of rule—There has been a difference of opinion on the question whether contravention of the provisions of the section (290) which this rule replaces, is an illegality vitiating the sale, (9) or as is the case

(1) Mohunt Megh Lal Pooroo v Shub Pershad Madi, 7 C 34 (1881)

(2) Nana Kumar Roy v Golam Chunder Dey, 18 C 422 (1891), Jagernath Saha v Dip Ram Koer, 22 C 871, 876 (1895)

(3) Rai Monindra Bahadoor v Luchmeshwar Singh, 1 C W. N. clv (1897)

(4) Thus removing the difficulty dealt with in Kristo Kashore v Soorjonath Sircar, 10 W. R. 354 (1868)

(5) Raja Thakur Barmha v Jiban Ram (P. C.) 19 C. L. J. 161 (1913), p. 165

(6) Pedro de Penha v Jalbhoy Ardeshir, 12 B 368 (1887)

(7) Tripura Sundari v Durga Churn Pal, 11 C 74 (1884)

(8) Harbans Sahai v Bhairu Pershad, 5 C 250 (1879)

(9) Balshi Naud v Malak Chand, 7 A 283 (1885), Sadhusaran v Panchideo, 14 C 1 (1886), Jasoda v Mathura Das, 9 A 511 (1887), Gunga Prasad v Jag Lal Rai, 11 A 353 (1889)

4 more irregularity (1) which did not avoid the sale in the absence of proof of substantial injury

69. (1) The Court may, in its discretion, adjourn any sale s. 291
Adjournment or stop hereunder to a specified day and hour, and
page of sale. the officer conducting any such sale may in his discretion adjourn the sale, recording his reasons for such adjournment.

Provided that, where the sale is made in, or within the precincts of, the court house, no such adjournment shall be made without the leave of the Court

(2) Where a sale is adjourned under sub rule (1) for a longer period than seven days a fresh proclamation under rule 67 shall be made, unless the judgment debtor consents to waive it.

(3) Every sale shall be stopped if, before the lot is knocked down, the debt and costs (including the costs of the sale) are tendered to the officer conducting the sale, or proof is given to his satisfaction that the amount of such debt and costs has been paid into the Court which ordered the sale

"The Court."—That is the Court executing the decree. A Judge cannot order a Subordinate Judge to postpone a sale in a case pending before the Court of the latter officer (2)

Adjournment.—This is a matter of discretion. Whether it should be granted must be determined upon the particular facts and precedents (3) are not profitable. The Court must consider not only the interests of the judgment-debtor but also the possibility of prejudice to the decree holder. When, however, a sale is adjourned, the provisions of the rule should be followed with exactitude (4). See notes to r 66 ante Proclamation. It is the practice to place all properties intended for sale on a list and to proceed with the sales from day to day, commencing on an appointed day. As each property is taken up in its turn, an adjournment of the sale of a particular property which is the

(1) *Kokil Singh v. Edal Singh*, 31 C 385 (1904). *Tasadduk Rasul Khan v. Ahmad Husain*, 21 C 66 (1893). *AOI A 176 Abdul Nasir v. Doobal Dass* 11 C L R 302 (1882). *Mohunt Megh Lal Pooroo v. Shib Pershad Madi*, 7 C 34, 39 (1881). *Venkata v. Sama*, 14 M 227 (1890). *Bagal Chunder v. Ramoobur Mundal*, 18 C 496 (1891), held also that it was not necessary that sect 290 of former Code must be equally followed when adjournment under sect 291 of that Code unless all the judgment debtors waived fresh proclamation]. *Rajchandar Bahadur v. Kamta Prasad* 4 A 300 (1882)

(2) *Jautee Ram v. Bijai Koor* 5 A H C R 177 (1873)

(3) *Janakoo Nath Mookerjee v. Radha Mohun Chatterjee* 20 W R 130 (1873). *Ahmed Reza v. Khujooroonissa*, 13 W R 281 (1870). *Venkata Narasimha v. Venkata Krishna* 5 M H C R 410 (1870). *Govind Valchar v. Bank of India* 4 B H C R A C J 164 (1867) [sale need not be closed on first day]. *Jautee Ram v. Bijai Koor*, 5 A H C R 177 (1873)

(4) *Venkata Subbaraya v. Zundal of Kartetmagar*, 20 M 159 (1890)

consequence of such procedure is not an adjournment within the meaning of this rule (1)

"Any sale"—The rule applies to mortgage sales (2)

"Specified day and hour"—See notes to r 66, "Proclamation" Assuming that a fresh proclamation is necessary, an omission to issue it is only an irregularity, and if it involved no loss to the judgment debtor, it cannot be set aside. Thus where a sale was postponed and a fresh proclamation was issued directing it to be held on a certain date, but owing to the absence of the presiding officer on that date it took place some days later, the Privy Council held that it was not in contravention of sects 289 and 291 of the last Code (now represented by rules 66 and 69 of this Order) and that even if there had been any irregularity in it, it could not be set aside in the absence of substantial injury (3). In such case the judgment debtor should object to the confirmation of sale and not seek to impeach it by suit (4).

"Fresh proclamation"—See notes to r 66, "Proclamation"

"Knocked down"—A bid may be withdrawn until the lot is knocked down (5)

Payment—An assignee after decree in a mortgage suit is entitled to deposit, and where this was refused and the judgment creditor bought himself the sale was set aside (6). A payment made to prevent a sale is not a voluntary payment whether made by the debtor or a third party claiming the property (7).

87, ara] **70.** Nothing in rules 66 to 69 shall be deemed to apply to *Saving of certain any case in which the execution of a decree sales has been transferred to the Collector*

93] **71.** Any deficiency of price which may happen on a re sale by reason of the purchaser's default, and all expenses attending such re sale, shall be certified to the Court or to the Collector or subordinate of the Collector, as the case may be, by the officer or other person holding the sale, and shall, at the instance of either the decree holder or the judgment debtor, be recoverable from the Defaulting purchaser answerable for loss on re-sale.

(1) Lal Mohun Chowdhry v Nunu Moha med, 17 C 152 (1889)

(2) See Rajah Ram Singhi v Chunn Lal, 15 A 205 (1897), Harjas Rai v Rameshwar, 20 A 354 (1898), see Bibi Jan Bibee v Bachu Bawa 8 C W N 684, s. c., 31 C 573, Bipin v Latindra, 37 C 817 (1910)

(3) Thakur Rang Lal v Rameshwar Lachud, P C, 10 C W N 1 (1911), 38 J A 200

(4) Gajrajmati Teetain v Akbar Hossain, 17 M L J 112 (1906), s. c., 9 Bom L R

83, 34 I A 37, 20 A 106, 11 C W N 393

(5) Agre Bank v Hamlin 14 M 235 (1890) Krenarari v Kachash Chandra, 16 C L J 53 (1913)

(6) Bihari Lal v Ganpat Rai, 10 A 1 (1887)

(7) Omard Lal Sugar v Ram Ilhun Chakce 18 W R 503 (1872) Fatima Khatoun v Mahomed Jan Chowdhry, 12 M L A 65 (1868), Act IX of 1872, sect 63

defaulting purchaser under the provisions relating to the execution of a decree for the payment of money

"Purchaser's default."—Sec 201 of Act VIII of 1853, so far as it relates to the subject matter of the present rule, ran "*If the proceeds of the sale which is eventually ordered be less than the price bid by such defaulting purchaser the difference shall be leviable from him under the rules for enforcing the payment of money in satisfaction of a decree of Court*". The present wording was adopted by sec 293 of Act X of 1877, save as indicated in italics. Of the alterations so indicated the only important ones are the addition of the words "*or to the Collector or subordinate of the Collector as the case may be*" and "*or other person*" which were made by the present Code.

The rule applies to re-sales in consequence of default in payment of deposit under O XXI r 81, or in payment of purchase money under O XXI r 85 and O XXI r 86, (1) and under O XXI r 77, (2) and whether the property be movable or immovable (3) even when the property is re-sold forthwith owing to the judgment-creditor repudiating the bid of his agent, (4) also where the purchaser refuses to pay the purchase money owing to the same property being sold the next day in execution of a decree of another party who had a previous lien on the property, (5) but the re-sale must be of the same property as first sold and under the same description and any substantial difference in matters required by O XXI r 66 disentitles the decree holder to recover any deficiency of price (6). It does not apply to a case where the purchaser makes default and a re-sale is ordered but does not take place owing to the property being sold in execution of another decree at the instance of another judgment creditor at a lower price (7).

"Any deficiency of price"—Does not include interest on the price (8).

"Shall be certified"—The absence of a certificate will not prevent the decree holder or the judgment debtor from recovering the deficiency from the defaulter (9).

"At the instance of either the decree holder or the judgment debtor."—The judgment debtor is not bound to proceed under this rule and it does not debar him from having the re-sale set aside on the ground of irregularity, (10) nor does it debar the judgment creditor from proceeding upon his decree against any other property of the judgment debtor than that originally

(1) *Javherbhai v Haribhai* 5 B 575 (1881)

(2) *Ramdhani v Rajrani* 7 C 337 (1881)
Rajendra Nath v Ram Churan, 2 C W N 411 (1898)

(3) *Ramdhani v Rajrani*, 7 C 337 (1881)

(4) *Vallabhan v Pannunni*, 12 M 454 (1883)

(5) *Sooraj Buksh v Bree Kushen*, 6 W R 126 (1866)

(6) *Bajjnath Sahai v Mohcep Narain*, 10

C 535 (1869) *(Y Gangadas v Bai Suraj*, 36 B 329 (1911), 14 Bom L R 200

(7) *Bisokha Moysa v Sonatun* 16 W R 14 (1871)

(8) *Soorj Buksh v Breekushen* 9 W R 500 (1868)

(9) *Tapesa Lal v Deoki Nandan*, 19 A 22 (1896)

(10) *Bepin Chunder v Modhoo Sudan*, 12 C L R 316 (1882)

Bidding by decree holder—This rule is similar to sect. 291 of Act X of 1877 save that the last clause has been added by Act XIV of 1882, and the words in italics by the present Code. Of these the words '*subject to the provisions of sect. 73*' have been substituted for '*subject to decrees*' and the words '*whose interests are affected by*' for '*interested in*'.

"Holder of a decree."—An assignee of a decree under an oral agreement the consideration of which was not paid till after the sale is not a decree holder and it is unnecessary for him to obtain permission to bid (1).

"Where a decree holder purchases."—He is bound to exercise the most scrupulous fairness, if he or his agent dissuades others from purchasing, or openly disparages the property (2) it is sufficient ground to set aside the sale (3). The Privy Council have held that that is too sweeping in its terms and leave to bid puts him in the same position as any other purchaser (4). It would be different if the disparaging remarks were made by a purchaser who was not the decree holder (5). If the decree be reversed the sales under it to decree holders fall through, but not the sales to *bona fide* purchasers who were not parties (6). A decree holder purchasing with leave to bid and set off must pay the deposit required by sect. 206 (O XXI r 81) in cash but the sale ought not to be set aside for default where all parties (including the Government as represented by the officer conducting the sale) waive their right to the deposit in cash (7).

"With such permission"—The decree holder is absolutely bound to obtain permission before he can purchase (8). Leave to bid puts the decree holder in the same position as any other purchaser (9).

"Be set off"—This was not allowed where the provisions of sect. 295 of the former Code applied (10) the set off being intended to prevent trouble and inconvenience and not to alter the substantial nature of the transaction (11) and the set off can only be accepted for so much of the judgment debt as the assets applicable to its discharge may suffice to satisfy (12). The purchaser can only be compelled to refund the rateable amount due to the other attaching creditor, either by summary process in execution or by suit or he may be given the option of electing a re-sale (13). The terms of the present rule make the set off subject to the provisions of sect. 73. A mortgagee decree holder, with

(1) *Dakshina Mohun v Basumati* 4 C W N 474 (1900)

(2) *Rukhmee Bullah v Brojonath*, 5 C 308 (1879)

(3) *Woopendro Nath v Brojendro Nath* 7 C 346 (1881)

(4) *Mahomed Mira v Savvasi Viraya* 23 M 227 (1899), 27 I A 17, 4 C W N 228
Dakshina Mohun v Basumati, 4 C W N 474 (1900)

(5) *Lalmohun v Nunu Mohamed* 17 C 152 (1889), *Gunga Naram v Annada Moyee*, 12 C L R 404 (1883)

(6) *Zain ul Abidin v Muhammad Asghar*, 10 A. 166 (1887) 15 I A 12. See *Umeimal*

v Srinath, 27 C 810 (1900) 4 C W N 632

(7) *Copal Singh v Roy Bunwari*, 5 C L R 181 (1879)

(8) *Rukhmee Bullah v Broj Nath* 5 C 308 (1879)

(9) *Mahabir Pershad v Macnaghten* 16 C 682 (1889 P C), 16 I A 107, 114, *Mahomed Mira v Savvasi* 23 M 227 (1899 P C)

(10) *Shrinivas v Raibhat*, 6 B 1 (1882)

(11) *Tapondil v Matlous* L R 1 C 1 (1885)

(12) *Viratagaya v R L A* 123 (1882)

(13) *Madhu v C J J* 117

permission, purchasing the mortgaged property in execution of a decree, and setting off the price, which was insufficient to satisfy his decree, was not bound in subsequent execution proceedings to give credit for the market value of the mortgaged property, but only for the actual purchase price, (1) but where the property sold was the equity of redemption, and after purchase the mortgagee decree holder applied for execution of the balance of his decree against the assignee of the mortgagor, he had to give credit for the price set off, plus the mortgage debt, that being what an independent person would have had to pay if he had purchased (2) It would be otherwise if he had sold the mortgaged property (3) The mortgagee decree holder purchasing does not stand in a fiduciary position towards his mortgagor, (3) and is only obliged to give credit for the amount of his bid (4) In the Mofussil the purchaser may give a receipt for the amount due under his decree, instead of paying cash into Court (5)

"By himself or through another person."—A purchase by the undivided son of a decree holder is presumably with joint funds and is the purchase of the decree holder (6)

"The Court may"—It is discretionary with the Court to set aside a sale, and it will not do so if no substantial injury has resulted (7)

"On the application of the judgment debtor"—This cannot be done by suit as the dispute falls within sect 47, (8) even where the sale was procured by fraud, and purchased by a person who was not a party, a suit will not lie, at all events as against the judgment creditor, (9) likewise where the sale was brought about secretly and the purchasers were *benamedars* of the decree holders, (10) nor will a suit for possession lie after the sale has been set aside (11)

"By order set aside the sale."—A purchase by a decree holder, without permission, is not *ipso facto* void, it is a good sale until set aside, (12) but where he applied for permission and it has been refused and yet he purchased *benam*, the sale was set aside (13)

Appeal—An appeal lies from an order under this rule under O XLIII r 1 (f) But it was held that no appeal lay from an order refusing permission

(1) Muhammad Husen v Thakur Dharani, 18 A 31 (1895)

(2) Krishnasami v Janakiammal, 18 M 151 (1893)

(3) Sheonath Das v Janki Prasad, 16 C 132 (1888), Mahabir Pershad v Macnaughten, 16 C 652 (1889 P C), 16 I A 107, p 114

(4) Gunga Pershad v Jowahir, 19 C 4 (1891)

(5) Khellat Chunder v Keshub Chunder, 16 W R 46 (1871) This decision was before there was any provision for set off in the Code

(6) Narayan v Anaji, 5 B 130 (1880)

(7) Mathura Das v Nathum Mall, 11 C 711 (1880)

(8) Viraraghava v Venkatacharyar, 5 M

217 (1882), Genu v Sakharani, 22 B 271 (1896)

(9) Sakharani v Dhanodar, 9 B 468 (1887), Mohendro Narain v Gopal Mondal, 17 C 761 (1890)

(10) Durgachunwar v Balwant Singh, 21 A 478 (1901)

(11) Viraraghava v Venkata, 16 M 287 (1892)

(12) In the matter of Veerapah Chetty, 14 W R 405 (1870), s c, 6 B L R App 37, Javerba v Haribhai, 5 B 575 (1881), Chintamanray v Vithalji, 11 B 588 (1887)

(13) Mohamed Gaz v Ram Lal, 16 C 757 (1884), followed in Thakur Nank v Kailash Reddy, 12 M 242 (1900)

to a decree holder to bid, but it did against an order confirming or setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale (1). No second appeal lies from an order on appeal under this rule, notwithstanding that sect. 47 bars a separate suit in such a case (2).

73 No officer or other person having any duty to perform (s. 292,) in connection with any sale shall, either directly or indirectly, bid for, acquire or attempt to acquire any interest in the property sold

Restriction on bidding or purchase by officers
Bidding by officers.—This rule corresponds with sect. 292 of Act X of 1877, save that the words "or other person" have been added by the present Code which also substituted "*the property sold for any property sold at such sale*"

"No officer"—The pleader of a party is not an officer, (3) but where such a pleader acted improperly, a sale to him was set aside (4). The Calcutta High Court have, however, held it was improper for a pleader acting in execution proceedings to make himself in any way interested in the purchase, (5) and in the North West, pleaders are directed by circular orders not to purchase property sold in execution of decrees in which they are concerned and it was inexpedient that they should by purchase become the persons entitled to execute decrees in such suits (6). The words added give the rule a much wider scope. No legal practitioner or officer connected with any Court is allowed to deal in actionable claims by sect. 136 of the Transfer of Property Act (7).

Sale of moveable property

74 (1) Where the property to be sold is agricultural produce, the sale shall be held,—

Sale of agricultural produce
(a) if such produce is a growing crop, on or near the land on which such crop has grown, or,
(b) if such produce has been cut or gathered, at or near the threshing floor or place for treading out grain or the lile or fodder stack on or in which it is deposited

Provided that the Court may direct the sale to be held at the nearest place of public resort, if it is of opinion that the produce is thereby likely to sell to greater advantage

- (1) Durga Sundari v Govinda Chandra 10 C 368 (1883). Jodoonath v Brojo Mohan 13 C 174 (1886). Ho Tha Hnyin v Ma Hnin 15 C W N 862 (P C 1911). 38 C 717 14 C 1 J 241, 38 I A 126.
(2) Bhagbut Lal v Narku Roy 21 C 789 (1894).
(3) Alagrasami v Ramanathan 10 M 111 (1880).
(4) Subbrarayulu v Kotayya 15 M 389

- (1892).
(5) Nundceput v Urquhart 13 W R 209 (18 0). 4 B L R 181 see also Wajed Hossein v Hafiz Ahmed 17 W R 480 (1872).
(6) Gosham Jag Roop v Chingm Lal 2 N W P H C R 45 (1870).
(7) See also Rathnasami v Subramanya, 11 M 56 (1887), and Sangarachari v Sivabai, 11 M 498 (1888).

(2) *Where, on the produce being put up for sale,—*

(a) *a fair price, in the estimation of the person holding the sale, is not offered for it, and*

(b) *the owner of the produce or a person authorized to act in his behalf applies to have the sale postponed till the next day or, if a market is held at the place of sale, the next market day,*

the sale shall be postponed accordingly and shall be then completed, whatever price may be offered for the produce

75 (1) *Where the property to be sold is a growing crop and the crop from its nature admits of being stored but has not yet been stored, the day of the sale shall be so fixed as to admit of its being made ready for storing before the arrival of such day, and the sale shall not be held until the crop has been cut or gathered and is ready for storing*

(2) *Where the crop from its nature does not admit of being stored, it may be sold before it is cut and gathered, and the purchaser shall be entitled to enter on the land, and to do all that is necessary for the purpose of tending and cutting or gathering it*

Sale of agricultural produce—With reference to sub rule (1) of r 71 it has been considered that agricultural produce should, on the analogy of the Bengal Tenancy Act 1885 sect 129 ordinarily be sold at the place where they are attached, unless a better price is likely to be realized by sale at the nearest place of public resort. In sub rule (2) a discretion has been allowed on the analogy of sect 131 of the same enactment, to postpone the sale of agricultural produce where such a course is necessary or desirable to prevent the property from being purchased at an inadequate figure

76. *Where the property to be sold is a negotiable instrument or a share in a corporation, the Court may, instead of directing the sale to be made by public auction, authorize the sale of such instrument or share through a broker*

"May."—The sale through a broker is permissive and not obligatory (1)

77. (1) *Where moveable property is sold by public auction the price of each lot shall be paid at the time of sale or as soon after as the officer*

or other person holding the sale directs, and in default of payment the property shall forthwith be re sold

(2) On payment of the purchase-money, the officer or other person holding the sale shall grant a receipt for the same, and the sale shall become absolute

(3) Where the moveable property to be sold is a share in goods belonging to the judgment debtor and a co owner, and two or more persons, of whom one is such co owner, respectively bid the same sum for such property or for any lot, the bidding shall be deemed to be the bidding of the co owner

"Where moveable property," etc.—That is other than negotiable instruments or shares sold through a broker The sale of arms by a Nazir is excluded from the operation of the Indian Arms Act (1)

"Purchase money"—The provisions of this rule give the officer or other person holding the sale a discretion to allow the purchase money to be paid at a reasonable time after the sale has been made (2) The provisions of r 71 making a defaulting purchaser liable for any deficiency apply to a re sale under this rule (3)

"Co owner"—It was originally proposed to check the litigation attendant upon the sale of moveables belonging to the judgment debtor and a co owner It was considered that where the property was not of the nature referred to in r 76, the fairest solution was to concede to the co owner a right of pre-emption analogous to that conferred by r 88, and at the same time debarring him from any remedy other than participation of the proceeds where he has failed to purchase, and is unable to show that in spite of due care and diligence he had notice of the sale The Select Committee, however while retaining the right of pre-emption, considered that they did not feel justified in penalizing a third part for the indebtedness of a judgment debtor who happened to be a co owner in joint property

78 No irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale of moveable property shall vitiate the sale, but any person sustaining any injury by reason of such irregularity at the hand of any other person may institute a suit against him for compensation, or (if such other person is the purchaser) for the recovery of the specific property and for compensation in default of such recovery

Irregularity in sale of moveable property—This rule corresponds with

- (1) *Wala Hiraji v Hira Patil*, 9 B 518 (1885) *Ram 4 A II C R 37* (1872)
 (2) *Shah Fareed Alum v Sheo Charun* (3) *Ramdhani Sahai v Rajrani Koor* 7 C 337 (1881)

sect 232 of Act VIII of 1859 By sect 298 of Act X of 1877, the words "*publishing or conducting*" were inserted, and instead of the words "*by reason of such irregularity may recover damages by a suit in Court,*" the words "*by reason of such irregularity at the hand of any other person may institute a suit against him for compensation or (if such other person be the purchaser) for the recovery of the specific property and for compensation in default of such recovery*" were substituted

"Irregularity"—The omission in the sale proclamation of the amount of the decree is not an irregularity, (1) nor the omission of the service of the notification of sale on the judgment-debtor or in his village (2) The fact that the amount really due is overstated will not invalidate a sale in execution, (3) but if the sale proclamation warrants a title the injured party may apply to set the sale aside, (4) it not being a mere irregularity (5) and the owner can follow the property in the hands of the purchaser (5)

'Any person'—If a person sues to recover possession of what was taken in excess of the interest of a judgment debtor without seeking to interfere with the sale in execution of the interest of the judgment debtor, he need not sue within the period of limitation prescribed by law for a suit to set aside a sale (6)

"At the hand of any other person"—A decree holder is liable to be sued by the rightful owner for the value of property not belonging to the judgment debtor sold in execution (7) The latter part of this rule codifies the decision in *Mohanund Halder v Akmal* (8)

99.] 79 (1) Where the property sold is moveable property of which actual seizure has been made, it shall be delivered to the purchaser

00.] Delivery of moveable property, debts and shares

(2) Where the property sold is moveable property in the possession of some person other than the judgment debtor, the delivery thereof to the purchaser shall be made by giving notice to the person in possession prohibiting him from delivering possession of the property to any person except the purchaser

01.] (3) Where the property sold is a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument, or is a share in a corporation, the delivery thereof shall be made by a written order of the Court prohibiting the creditor from receiving the debt or any interest thereon, and

(1) *Kassoo Nath v Haffo Har* 2 W R 60 (1860)

(2) *Bomesh Chunder v Jadob Chander*, 6 W R Civ Ref 14 (1860)

(3) *Chatter Singh v Dhurum* 1 N W P R C R 1 (1860)

(4) *Framji Bazaarji v Hormaji*, 2 B 252 (1877)

(5) *Mohanund Halder v Akmal*, 9 W R 118 (1868)

(6) *Bharat v Lachmi Narain*, 8 N W P H C R 248 (1870)

(7) *Kanayo Lersha v Har Chand*, 14 W R 120 (1870)

(8) 9 W R 118 (1868)

the debtor from making payment thereof to any person except the purchaser, or prohibiting the person in whose name the share may be standing from making any transfer of the share to any person except the purchaser, or receiving payment of any dividend or interest thereon, and the manager, secretary or other proper officer of the corporation from permitting any such transfer or making any such payment to any person except the purchaser.

Notice—Sub rule (2) has been slightly remodelled. For form of notice under this section, see Form No 116, Schedule IV, of former Code.

Delivery of debts and shares, sub rule (3)—In the under mentioned case (1) the Court said, 'No question has been raised as to whether the order required by sect 301 of the Code was served. The presumption, therefore, is that this order was served, and it may be a question whether, if the order after sale required by sect 301 were served the service of the prohibitory order, which is the form of attachment before sale required by the Code is material or is wholly immaterial.' See Schedule IV, Forms 117, 118 of last Code. In this as in other parts of the Code the reference to public companies in connection with shares has been omitted, it being presumably considered that the word "corporation" sufficiently covers the case.

80. (1) Where the execution of a document or the endorsement [s. 301]

Transfer of negotiable instruments and shares. *ment of the party in whose name a negotiable instrument or a share in a corporation is standing is required to transfer such negotiable instrument or share, the Judge or such officer as he may appoint in this behalf may execute such document or make such endorsement as may be necessary, and such execution or endorsement shall have the same effect as an execution or endorsement by the party*

(2) Such execution or endorsement may be in the following form, namely—

A B by C D, Judge of the Court of (or as the case may be) in a suit by E F against A B

(3) Until the transfer of such negotiable instrument or share, the Court may, by order, appoint some person to receive any interest or dividend due thereon and to sign a receipt for the same, and any receipt so signed shall be as valid and effectual for all purposes as if the same had been signed by the party himself

Transfer of negotiable instruments and shares—[s. 301]
with sect 267 of the Code of 1859 and (with slight alterations)

As to reference to corporation see notes to last rule. A held shares in a company which were duly seized and sold in execution of a decree against him to B. The Judge, acting under the corresponding section of the Code of 1859, executed deeds of transfer to the purchaser, and the company was ordered to register the transfer in their books, but refused to comply with the order. The purchaser was unable to obtain from A the certificates of the shares. Held that, although the company's deed of settlement (under which the Act of Parliament declared f Directors power of iad no option as to and that they were bound to grant him, under the circumstances new share certificates (1)

3] 81. In the case of any moveable property not herein Vesting order in case before provided for, the Court may make an of other property. order vesting such property in the purchaser or as he may direct, and such property shall vest accordingly

Sale of immoveable property.

1] 82 Sales of immoveable property in execution of decrees What Courts may order may be ordered by any Court other than sales a Court of Small Causes

"Sales of immoveable property."—This rule is similar to sect 304 of Act X of 1877. A decree charging land is an interest in immoveable property (2). Huts are immoveable property (3). A decree declaring a decree holder's lien on property without distinctly declaring his right to sell the same may be executed against that property either by attachment and sale or by attachment and management (4). A debt secured by a mortgage lien upon immoveable property, more especially if the mortgagee is not in possession, is not immoveable property (5). A Munsif cannot sell property lying outside his jurisdiction (6).

"Court of Small Causes"—If such a Court sells immoveable property the purchaser acquires no title (7). The rights and interests under a mortgage of immoveable property is not saleable by a Court of Small Causes (8).

(1) Toolsee Dass Nundy v. East Indian Railway Co., 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 258 (1862)

(2) Bhawani Kuar v. Gulab Rai 1 A 348 (1877), Sami Ayyar v. Krishnasami, 10 M 169 (1886)

(3) Nattoo Meah v. Nund Rance, 17 W. R. 309 (1872)

(4) Nuddyabashce v. Reza, 15 W. R. 337 (1871)

(5) Debendra Kumar v. Rup Lal, 12 C 546

(1886) See Nataraya Iyer v. South Indian Bank of Tanjore, 37 M. 51 (1914) and notes on O 21, r 46 and 54 a etc

(6) Syud Nowab Ali v. Shaikh Uzir, 23 W. R. 233 (1875)

(7) Nattoo Meah v. Nund Rance, 17 W. R. 309 (1872)

(8) Buddoo Mulla v. Maharoop, C. N. W. P. H. C. R. 129 (1874)

83. (1) Where an order for the sale of immoveable property has been made, if the judgment-debtor can satisfy the Court that there is reason to believe that the amount of the decree may be raised by the mortgage or lease or private sale of such property, or some part thereof, or of any other immoveable property of the judgment-debtor, the Court may, on his application, postpone the sale of the property comprised in the order for sale on such terms and for such period as it thinks proper, to enable him to raise the amount. [s. 305.]

(2) In such case the Court shall grant a certificate to the judgment-debtor authorizing him within a period to be mentioned therein, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 64, to make the proposed mortgage, lease or sale

Provided that all moneys payable under such mortgage, lease or sale shall be paid, not to the judgment-debtor, but, *save in so far as a decree-holder is entitled to set off such money under the provisions of rule 72, into Court.*

Provided also that no mortgage, lease or sale under this rule shall become absolute until it has been confirmed by the Court.

(3) *Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to apply to a sale of property directed to be sold in execution of a decree for sale in enforcement of a mortgage of, or charge on, such property*

Postponement of sale—The first clause of this rule corresponds with part of sect 243 of Act VIII of 1859. The rest save the last proviso in the second clause, and the portions in italics, was added by sect 305 of Act X of 1877. That Act also appended a clause "*When such certificate has been granted and so long as it remains in force the provisions of section 243 shall not apply*". This was repealed by Act XIV of 1882, which added the last proviso in the second clause, and also added the words, "*and notwithstanding anything contained in sect 276 [sect 64]*" to the second clause. The words in italics have been added by the present Code. The Bombay High Court held that the corresponding section to this rule applied to a mortgage decree declaring that certain properties be sold in satisfaction of the mortgage debt, (1) but the Calcutta High Court held otherwise, (2) and by notification such section was made applicable to proceedings after decree in mortgage suits but now the third clause of the rule distinctly excludes such proceedings, so far as Bengal and Assam were concerned (3). The rule does not apply to suits for rent in Bengal (4).

(1) *Krishnaji v Mahadev*, 25 B 104 (1900)

(2) *Womda Khanum v Rajroop*, 3 C. 335 (1877), 1 C L R 295

(3) See *Calcutta Gazette* of 13th April, 1892

Part I p. 414, *Assam Gazette* of 16th April, 1892, Part III p. 272

(4) Bengal Tenancy Act, VIII of 1885, s. 148 (a)

"Sale of immoveable property."—This was held to include all sales of immoveable property, the decision being given in reference to a decree on mortgage, (1) but property directed to be sold in execution of a decree for the enforcement of a mortgage or charge is now excluded by the third clause of the present rule

"The amount of the decree"—That is, the whole amount due on the decree. No mortgage will be sanctioned, or certificate granted, or the mortgage confirmed, unless the decree can be fully paid off (2)

"The Court may postpone the sale."—This is an enabling rule, and qualifies the prohibitions contained in sect 64. On compliance with the conditions of this rule a private alienation, notwithstanding sect 64, becomes absolute, even against all claims enforceable under the attachment (3). Postponement is discretionary with the Court (4). It should exercise its discretion, and if it finds that a fair case has been made out, it should postpone the sale, (5) but the judgment-debtor must most distinctly show that the money due can be well raised in some way other than by immediate sale, and that the creditor will not be put to loss, (6) and that the debt will be paid off in a reasonable time, (7) twenty years, (7) two or three years, (8) and even one year are unreasonable, (9) but six months has been considered reasonable (7). Where, however, the property has been put up to auction in execution and bids have been made, the Court cannot postpone the sale merely on the representation of a judgment-debtor that he can obtain a higher price by private transfer, there being no reasonable ground to believe that the judgment debt would be realized thereby (10).

"Authorizing him."—The authority is only to the judgment debtor to whom it is granted, and the sale in pursuance thereof does not affect the share of another judgment debtor (11). Where the defendant is the guardian of a minor under the Guardian and Wards Act of 1890, the authority under this rule will not give him power to mortgage unless he also gets the permission of the Court which appointed him guardian (12). The Court cannot itself give a lease or mortgage. It can only grant the debtor time to do so himself (13). The rule is enabling, and qualifies the provision contained in sect 64. On compliance with

(1) *Krishnaji v Mahadev*, 25 B 104 (1900)

(2) *Gurusami v Venkatesami*, 14 M 277 (1890)

(3) *Shalingappa v Chanbasappa*, 30 B 337 (1900), 8 B L R 16

(4) *Bashanmurti Land Mortgage Bank*, 11 C 244 (1881), 12 L A. 7, p 10

(5) *Kishen Coomaraswami v Golab Coomaraswami*, 15 W R 477 (1871)

(6) *Ram Rutton v Land Mortgage Bank*, 17 W R 103 (1872)

(7) *Mohun v Mohun v Ram Kant*, 15 W R 322 (1871), see also *Rednum v Khaja Mahomed*, 5 M H C 272 (1870)

(8) *Suhaj Naram v Pam Pershad* 21 W R 146 (1874)

(9) *Ram Rutton v Land Mortgage Bank*, 17 W R 103 (1872), *Fazloddin v Gaudh Singh*, 2 N W P H C R 1 (1870)

(10) *Luchmee Naram v Bhyroo*, 1 N W P H C R 11 (1860)

(11) *Danappa v Yaumappa*, 26 B 373 (1902)

(12) *Dattaram v Gangaram*, 23 B 287 (1893)

(13) *Luchmeeput v Jugul Indur*, W R 1864 Vis 5

the conditions of the rule, a private alienation, notwithstanding sect 61, becomes absolute, even against all claims enforceable under the attachment (1)

"Until it has been confirmed."—When in pursuance of a certificate to sell granted by two Courts the attached property was sold, and the sale confirmed by the superior of the two Courts, confirmation by the other Court was unnecessary (2)

Appeal—See sect 47

84. (1) On every sale of immoveable property the person [s 30]
Deposit by purchaser declared to be the purchaser shall pay immediately after such declaration a deposit of
and re-sale on default. twenty-five per cent on the amount of his purchase money to the officer or other person conducting the sale, and, in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be re sold

(2) Where the decree holder is the purchaser and is entitled to set off the purchase money under rule 72, the Court may dispense with the requirements of this rule

"Deposit."—The officer conducting the sale cannot insist upon a deposit being made before acceptance of a bidding, but if it appears that persons without means have been put forward to make sham biddings and fraudulently frustrate the sale, he would be justified in inquiring into the trustworthiness of the bidder before accepting his bid (3) A decree holder of the party to whom the lot is knocked down is equally bound to make the prescribed deposit as any other auction purchaser (4) But where all parties interested waived their right to a deposit, it was held the sale should not be set aside (5) A relaxation of the rule is now made in the case mentioned in the second sub rule If there is any dispute as to whether the deposit was offered or not it should be decided by the Judge before commencing a second sale (6) There has been a conflict of opinion whether, if the deposit is not made as required, the sale is no sale at all, (7) or whether this circumstance is an irregularity only (8) The first opinion is no longer law (9) But it has been recently held that if the balance of purchase

(1) Shivelingsappa v Chanbasappa 30 B 337 (1905)

(2) Andanapa v Bhimrao, 19 B 539 (1894)

(3) Rajah Mohesh Naram v Kshanund Maw, 9 M I A 324 328 341 (1862), and the sham bidder would be liable under sect 228 of the Penal Code for obstructing the sale In the matter of Mohesh Chunder Mookerjee 1864 W R Misc 3

(4) Chulkoo Dutt Jha v Leelanand Singh 1864 W R Misc 30

(5) Gopal Singh v Roy Bunwaree Lall 5 C L R 181 (1879)

(6) Kuppayyan v Ramasami Ayyan, 6 M

197 (1883)

(7) Intizam Ali Khan v Naram Singh 5 A 316 (1883)

(8) Venkata v Sama 14 M 227 (1890) In Beepoon Chunder Shickdar v Pureshnath Biswas 9 C 98 (1882), it was held that there was such substantial injury that the sale should be set aside Bhim Singh v Sarwan Singh 16 C 33 (1888)

(9) Ahmad Baksh v Lalita Prasad 28 A 238 (1905) overruling Intizam Ali Khan v Naram Singh, *supra* In Amir Begum v Bank of Upper India, Ltd, 30 A 273 (1908) in which the latter case was followed, the former was not cited

money is not paid, there is no sale under the Code (1) The mere making of the last bid does not conclude the sale for the conclusion of a sale it is necessary for the sale officer to accept the final bid and to make a declaration who is the purchaser and to order him to pay him the deposit under this rule (2)

"Default"—The sale is to be held "*forthwith*," so a fresh proclamation or statement of the hour of sale is not necessary (3) The sale is not to be adjourned The putting up of the property again, and soliciting fresh bids is a continuation of the original sale, a part and parcel of the proceedings which had their origin in the first putting up of the property, and which do not come to an end until the property has been knocked down to a purchaser, and that purchaser has made the statutory deposit (4) An officer conducting a second sale is not bound to commence from the next highest bid below that made by the defaulter He may do so if the next highest bidder is willing to abide by his bid, otherwise he should commence the sale *de novo* (5)

to pay the difference between the first and the second sales (6)

85. The full amount of purchase-money payable shall be paid by the purchaser into Court before the full of purchase money Court closes on the fifteenth day from the sale of the property

Provided that, in calculating the amount to be so paid into Court, the purchaser shall have the advantage of any set off to which he may be entitled under rule 72

"Shall be paid"—The provisions of the rule are imperative and must be given effect to (7) In default of payment the deposit is forfeited, if the Court thinks fit, under the next rule (8) and the property re sold under r 85, and the defaulting purchaser is answerable for loss by re sale (9) The proviso to the rule is new

(1) *Munshi Mahomed Ali v Kibria* 15 C W N 350 (1911)

(2) *Munshi Lal v Ram Narain* 30 A 65 (1912)

(3) *Vallabhan v Panguani*, 12 M 454 (1889)

(4) *Bhim Singh v Sarwan Singh* 10 C 33, 38 (1888), but see *Vallabhan v Panguani*, 12 M 454, at p 458 (1889) where it was held that for the purposes of r 71 there is a resale

(5) *Gour Mookh Singh v Lalla Gour Sunkar*, 1 W R Misc 11 (1864)

(6) *Ramdhan Sahai v Rajrani Koor* 7 C

337 (1881) *Vallabhan v Panguani* 12 M 454 (1889)

(7) *Sambasiva Ayyar v Vydinadasami* 25 M 535 (1901), *Munshi Mahomed Ali v Kibria* 15 C W N 350 (1911)

(8) See *Mathura v Gauri Shankar*, J2 1 360 (1910) (this Code gives the Court a discretion as to forfeiting deposit) and notes to r 86

(9) *Jayherbai v Haribhai*, 5 B 575 (1881) *Ramdhan Sahai v Rajrani Koor*, 7 C 337 (1881), *Vallabhan v Panguani*, 12 M 454 (1889)

"Into Court."—These words have been inserted to render it clear that the purchaser is bound to see that the money reaches the Court in time. The post office is not the agent of the Court (1).

Date of payment.—Sect. 107 of the 1st Code, which the rule replaces, runs, "before the Court closes on the fifteenth day after the sale of the property exclusive of . . . , then on the first . . . : and "exclusive . . . have the same effect. The provisions relative to the occurrence of a Sunday have been omitted because the matter is sufficiently covered by sect. 10 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. In these two respects therefore, the former section and the present rule are the same. Under the 1st Code, however it was held that days (as during the vacation) when the Court was closed but the office was open were not holidays within the meaning of the former section (3). The practice of the Original Side of the High Court is that payment of interest follows as a matter of course, when the purchaser of property at a Registrar's sale is out of time in paying into Court the balance of his purchase money (4).

86. In default of payment within the period mentioned [s. 308]
Procedure in default of in the last preceding rule, the deposit *may*,
payment. if the Court thinks fit, after defraying the
expenses of the sale, be forfeited to the Government, and the
property shall be re-sold, and the defaulting purchaser shall
forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for
which it may subsequently be sold.

Default.—This rule corresponds with a portion of sect. 254 of Act VIII of 1859 and with sect. 308 of Acts X of 1877 and XIV of 1882 save that the words in italics have been substituted for the word "*shall*" appearing in the earlier Codes. The former section has been applied to proceedings in execution under a mortgage decree in Bengal and Assam (5).

"In default of payment"—Under the rules of the Madras High Court payment into the Government Treasury is sufficient payment, (6) likewise, it is a sufficient compliance with the decree, if the judgment-debtor bring the money into Court within the specified time and diligently take the necessary steps required by departmental rules for the actual payment into the Treasury (7).

(1) *Ram Chandra Krishnapa v Subrao Vithoba*, 22 B 415 (1895)

(2) *See Amanco v Koorban Ali*, 3 Agra 204

(3) *Motiram Baghumath v Biryaj*, 10 B 745 (1895)

(4) *Kanyo Lall Dass v Shama Churn Datta*, 21 C. 506 (1894), which deals also with costs as against the purchaser when

there has been delay on the part of the party having carriage of the proceedings

(5) *Calcutta Gazette* of 13th April, 1892, Part I p. 414, *Assam Gazette* of 16th April, 1892, Part III p. 272

(6) *Srinivasa v Malayacha*, 7 M 211 (1883)

(7) *Gupadhar v Naik Paurce*, 8 C. 528 (1882)

"Be forfeited to Government"—This is imposed in order to prevent waste of the Court's time in conducting re sales. The fact that the decree holder and the judgment debtor do not ask for a re sale was held to be no reason why Government should forego the forfeiture, (1) but the wording of the Code was then imperative, "*shall be forfeited*" The modification introduced by the present Code makes it discretionary with the Court to direct the forfeiture or not, and has been inserted to prevent hardship caused in such cases as the last mentioned (2)

Appeal.—An appeal under the last Code lay from an order under the corresponding section where the defaulting purchaser attached the decree in execution of which the property was sold to him and a petition for revision was held not to be maintainable (3). According to this decision an appeal lies under sect 47 *ante*

309] 87. Every re sale of immoveable property, in default of payment of the purchase-money within the period allowed for such payment, shall be made after the issue of a fresh proclamation in the manner and for the period hereinbefore prescribed for the sale

"Fresh proclamation"—This rule is sect 309 of the last Code. A fresh notification is not prescribed in the case of every re sale but only when the re sale is in default of payment of the purchase money within the time allowed for such payment (4). The rule does not apply to a postponed sale (5) or to a case in which the property is put up again and sold forthwith under r 84, *ante* (6)

310] 88 Where the property sold is a share of undivided im-
moveable property and two or more persons,
Bid of co-sharer to have preference. of whom one is a co sharer, respectively *bid*
the same sum for such property or for any lot, the bid shall be
deemed to be the bid of the co sharer

Bidding by co sharer.—This rule modifies the terms of sect 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, which provided that where "a share of a pottcedaree estate paying revenue to government was sold "if the lot shall have been knocked down to a stranger, any co sharer other than the judgment debtor, or any other member of the co parcenary, may claim to take the share sold at the sum at which the lot was knocked down. Provided that the claim be made on the day of sale and that the claimant fulfil all the conditions of the sale". The rule was altered to its present form by sect 310 of Act X of 1877, save that this rule omits the words "in execution of a decree" after the words "property sold," and substitutes the words "bid the same sum for

(1) Sambasiva v Vydinadasami, 20 M 535 (1901)

(2) Mathura v Gauri Shankar, 32 A 380 (1910)

(3) Bah Man Mull v Kanagasabapatil 10 M 20 (1892)

(4) Vallabhan v Pangunni, 12 M 154-453 (1889)

(5) Budree Nath Bhutt v Lajah Chunder Sekhur, 1 W R Misc 3 (1864)

(6) Rajendra Nath Roy v Ram Charan Sinha, 2 C W 411 (1898)

such property or for any lot, the bid shall be deemed to be the bid for "advance the same sum at any bidding at such sale, such bidding shall be deemed to be the bidding" as it appeared in the Code of 1877

"Is a share of undivided immoveable property"—This does not include the interest of a mortgagee in such a share, and this rule does not apply to the sale of such interest (1) Sect 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 was held not to apply to land sold in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court (2)

"Co-sharer"—In officer conducting a sale of land which was a share of a *putteedar* estate had to take notice of a claim made by a person under sect 14 of Act XXIII of 1861 and to receive the purchase money as a fulfilment of the conditions of sale, subject to any question which might be raised by any party interested as to the claimant's title (3) If his right were clear the sale might be confirmed in his favour, if doubtful, the sale might be confirmed in favour of the other bidder, leaving the co-sharer to his remedy by suit, (3) he ought not to have been substituted for the actual purchaser His position was that he could advance his claim to pre-emption, which would be adjudicated on later (4) Under that Act a co-sharer having preferred his claim to pre-emption, the sale could not be held as void merely by the failure of the person to whom the property was knocked down to make the deposit (5) The right of pre-emption can only be claimed by those who are co-sharers or members of the coparcenary at the time the auction sale takes place (6) A title which is still defeasible at the date of the sale is not sufficient to support a claim under this rule (7) A decree holder, who under Mahomedan law would be entitled to pre-emption, is not entitled to that right on sale in execution of his decree (8) Where the judgment-debtor's rights in a *putteedar* estate were sold and purchased by his son in the name of his father in law, who was not a co-sharer and who after the sale waived his rights in favour of the judgment debtor, held that a co-sharer who had fulfilled requirements was entitled to pre-emption (9) A suit by a person claiming pre-emption for possession is premature and unmaintainable He should sue to set aside the order confirming the sale in favour of the auction purchaser, and to have himself declared entitled to pre-emption and to be substituted for the auction purchaser (10) Where a revenue sale has been caused by the default of a co-sharer and the property is purchased at that sale by him, there may be such relations between him and his co-sharer as would justify the Court in treating such sale as for the benefit of both (11)

(1) *Jayram Das v. Beni Prasad* 3 A 15 (1880)

(2) *Naram Singh v. Muhammad Faruk*, 1 A. 277 (1866)

(3) *Tasuduk Ali v. Maksud Ali*, 6 N W P H. C. R. 272 (1874)

(4) *Syud Abdool v. Kallee Hoomar*, 6 W R Muz 3 (1866)

(5) *Daboo Pershad v. Bisheshur*, 6 N W P H. C. R. 289 (1874)

(6) *Dwarka Pershad v. Ram Antar*, 7 N W P H. C. R. 281 (1875)

(7) *Abdul Ghafur v. Ghulam Husain*, 3 A

296 (1913), *Hamta Prasad v. Mahan Bhat*, 32 A 45 (1909), *Nabihah Bibi v. Kaukshar Rai* A L J 361 (1907)

(8) *Sheik Nuzmoodden v. Kanye Jha Marsh* 5-5 (1863)

(9) *Gunga Ram v. Moola* 2 N W P H C R 200 (1870)

(10) *Shub Sahai v. Thaka Ram*, 7 N W P H C R 97 (1875)

(11) *Fazur Rahman v. Mimansa Khatun* 18 C L J 111 (1913), *Ram Prasad v. Pawan Singh*, 18 C L J 97 (1913)

"Be forfeited to Government."—This is imposed in order to prevent waste of the Court's time in conducting re sales. The fact that the decree holder and the judgment debtor do not ask for a re sale was held to be no reason why Government should forego the forfeiture, (1) but the wording of the Code was then imperative, "*shall be forfeited*" The modification introduced by the present

Appeal.—An appeal under the last Code lay from an order under the corresponding section where the defaulting purchaser attached the decree in execution of which the property was sold to him, and a petition for revision was held not to be maintainable (3). According to this decision an appeal lies under sect 47, *ante*.

309] 87. Every re sale of immoveable property, in default of payment of the purchase-money within the period allowed for such payment, shall be made after the issue of a fresh proclamation in the manner and for the period hereinbefore prescribed for the sale.

"Fresh proclamation"—This rule is sect 309 of the last Code. A fresh notification is not prescribed in the case of every re sale, but only when the re sale is in default of payment of the purchase money within the time allowed for such payment (4). The rule does not apply to a postponed sale, (5) or to a case in which the property is put up again and sold forthwith under r 84, *ante* (6).

310] 88. Where the property sold is a share of undivided immoveable property and two or more persons, of whom one is a co sharer, respectively *bid* the same sum for such property or for any lot, the *bid* shall be deemed to be the *bid* of the co sharer.

Bidding by co sharer.—This rule modifies the terms of sect 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, which provided that where "a share of a *pultcedarce* estate paying revenue to government" was sold, "if the lot shall have been knocked down to a stranger, any co sharer other than the judgment debtor, or any other member of the co parcenary, may claim to take the share sold at the sum at which the lot was knocked down. Provided that the claim be made on the day of sale and that the claimant fulfil all the conditions of the sale." The rule was altered to its present form by sect 310 of Act X of 1877, save that this rule omits the words "*in execution of a decree*" after the words "*property sold,*" and substitutes the words "*bid the same sum for*"

(1) *Sambasiva v Vydinadasami*, 20 M 535 (1901)

(2) *Mathura v Gauri Shankar*, 32 A 350 (1910)

(3) *Sah Man Mull v Kanigasalapati* 16 M 20 (1902)

(4) *Vallabhan v Langunni*, 12 M 454, 458 (1889)

(5) *Dudrao Nath Bhutt v Rajah Chunder Sekhur*, 1 W R Mac 3 (1864)

(6) *Rajendra Nath Roy v Ram Charan Sinha*, 2 C W N 411 (1898)

such property or for any lot, the bid shall be deemed to be the bid' for "advance of the same sum at any bidding at such sale, such bidding shall be deemed to be the bidding" as it appeared in the Code of 1877.

"Is a share of undivided immoveable property"—This does not include the interest of a mortgagee in such a share, and this rule does not apply to the sale of such interest (1) Sect 14 of Act XXIII of 1861 was held not to apply to land sold in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court (2)

"Co-sharer."—An officer conducting a sale of land which was a share of a *putteedaree* estate had to take notice of a claim made by a person under sect 14 of Act XXIII of 1861 and to receive the purchase money as a fulfilment of the conditions of sale, subject to any question which might be raised by any party interested as to the claimant's title (3) If his right were clear the sale might be confirmed in his favour, if doubtful, the sale might be confirmed in favour of the other bidder, leaving the co-sharer to his remedy by suit, (3) he ought not to have been substituted for the actual purchaser His position was that he could advance his claim to pre-emption, which would be adjudicated on later (4) Under that Act a co-sharer having preferred his claim to pre-emption, the sale could not be held as void merely by the failure of the person to whom the property was knocked down to make the deposit (5) The right of pre-emption can only be claimed by those who are co-sharers or members of the coparcenary at the time the auction sale takes place (6) A title which is still defeasible at the date of the sale is not sufficient to support a claim under this rule (7) A decree holder, who under Mahomedan law would be entitled to pre-emption, is not entitled to that right on sale in execution of his decree (8) Where the judgment-debtor's rights in a *putteedaree* estate were sold and purchased by his son in the name of his father-in-law, who was not a co-sharer and who after the sale waived his rights in favour of the judgment debtor held that a co-sharer who had fulfilled requirements was entitled to pre-emption (9) A suit by a person claiming pre-emption for possession is premature and unmaintainable He should sue to set aside the order confirming the sale in favour of the auction purchaser, and to have himself declared entitled to pre-emption and to be substituted for the auction purchaser (10) Where a revenue sale has been caused by the default of a co-sharer and the property is purchased at that sale by him, there may be such relations between him and his co-sharer as would justify the Court in treating such sale as for the benefit of both (11)

(1) *Jaram Das v Beni Prasad* 3 A 15 (1880)

(2) *Naram Singh v Muhammad Faruk*, 1 A. 277 (1876)

(3) *Tasduk Ali v Muksud Ali* 6 N W P H C R 272 (1874)

(4) *Syud Abdool v Kaleo Koomar*, 6 W R M. 3 (1866)

(5) *Dabee Pershad v Bisheshur*, 6 N W P H C R. 269 (1874)

(6) *Dwarika Parshad v Ram Autar*, 7 N W P H C R 281 (1875)

(7) *Abdul Ghafur v Ghulam Husam*, 3.

A 236 (1913), *Kamta Prasad v Mahan Bhagat*, 32 A 45 (1905), *Nabhan Bibi v Kaleshar Rai*, A L J 351 (1907)

(8) *Sheik Nuzmoodeen v Kanyo Jha*, *Marah* 555 (1863)

(9) *Gunga Ram v Moola* 2 N W P H C R 200 (1870)

(10) *Shib Sahai v Thika Ram*, 7 N W P H C R 97 (1875)

(11) *Faizur Rahman v Mimansa Khatun*, 18 C L J 111 (1913), *Ram Prasad v Pawan Singh*, 18 C L J 97 (1913)

"Bid the same sum"—Even when the section ran "*advance the same sum*" it was held that this contemplated a distinct bid by the co sharer in the ordinary manner. It was not sufficient if he asserted his right of pre-emption and offered a sum equal to that bid by the purchaser (1)

Appeal—No appeal lies under O XLIII r 1. It was held that the auction bidder not being a party could not appeal from an order confirming the sale in favour of a co sharer (2) and that a co sharer aggrieved under the former section not being a person mentioned in sect 311, now O XXI r 90, could not appeal objecting to the sale being confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser and ask its confirmation in his own favour, and an application for revision was also refused (3)

310A] 89 (1) *Where immoveable property has been sold in execution of a decree, any person, either own-sale on deposit or holding an interest therein by virtue of a title acquired before such sale, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court,—*

(a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, and

(b) for payment to the decree holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree holder

(2) *Where a person applies under rule 90 to set aside the sale of his immoveable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws his application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule*

(3) *Nothing in this rule shall relieve the judgment-debtor from any liability he may be under in respect of costs and interest not covered by the proclamation of sale*

Object of rule—This rule affords a special indulgence to the judgment debtor. It gives him yet one more chance of saving his property (4). It also confers a right upon certain persons other than the judgment debtor. See *post*, note, "Who may apply." A Court has no power to set aside a sale under this rule unless the applicant has strictly complied with its provisions (5). It

(1) *Hira v Unas Ali* J A 827 (1881), *Tel Singh v Gobind Singh* 2 A 850 (1880)

(2) *Muniruddin Khan v Abdul Rahim*, 3 A 674 (1881)

(3) *Bahadur Kuar v Hari Singh* 5 A 42 (1882)

(4) *Chunli Charan Mandal v Banko Behary Mandal* 26 C. 443, 452 (1899),

Lakshmi Ammal v Sankaran Nair, 24 M L J 205 (1913), *Ishar Das v Asaf Ali* 34 A 186 (1911), *Banko Behary v Krishna Chandra*, 18 C L J 170 (1913)

(5) *Trimbak Narayan v Ramchandra Narasingrao*, 1 Bom L R 215 (1890), *Rahim Bux v Nundo Lal Gosami*, 11 C 321 (1887).

was the subject of conflict under the last Code whether the former section did (1) or did not (2) apply to sales of mortgaged property under the Transfer of Property Act. The section was held to apply to sales of holdings in execution of decrees for arrears of rent, (3) but not to sales under the Public Demands Recovery Act (I B C of 1895) (4). The former section was held to apply even if the execution proceedings be referred to the Collector, who had no power to set aside a sale under the provisions of the Code. It was also held that there was nothing which precluded the Court from setting aside the sale merely because it had been confirmed (5). When money has been deposited under this rule it is not liable to rateable distribution under sect. 73 (6).

Who may apply—Under the last Code any person might have applied *“whose immovable property has been sold under this Chapter”*. A benamdar of a person whose immovable property was sold could apply (7). These words gave rise to a conflict of decision. It could hardly be that these words referred to the judgment-debtor alone or the Legislature would have said so. The question then arose to whom else the section did apply. It was not even every judgment debtor who could apply but only those whose property had been sold under the Code (8). It was held that a simple mortgagee of a tenure or holding sold for arrears of rent such sale being with right to purchaser to avoid incumbrances, could apply (9) but not a second mortgagee not a party to the suit whose interest had not passed under the sale (10). The purchaser of a share of an occupancy holding transferable by custom could apply (11) as also a judgment debtor who has effected a private sale of his property during the

(1) *Krishnaji v Mahadev Vinayek* 25 B 104 a c 2 Bom L R 635 (1900) *Mallikarjunadu Setti v Lingamurti Pantulu* 25 M 244 (1900) *Tirumal Rao v Syed Dastaghi* M yah 22 M 280 (1898) *Raja Ram Singha v Chunnai Lal* 19 A 205 (1897). The point was queried in *Shiam Lal v Bashir ud din* 38 A. 778 (1906).

(2) *Kedar Nath Raut v Kali Churn Ram* 25 C 703 (1898) 17 B a c 2 C W N 353.

(3) *Janardhan Ganguli v Kali Krsto Thakur* 23 C 393 (1895) *Bungshodhar Halder v Kedar Nath Mandal* 1 C W N 114 (1896) *Benodini Dassi v Peary Mohan Halder* 8 C W N 50 56 (1903) *Hamedal Huq v Matangini Dassi* 2 C W N 26 (1898) dist in *Nitya Nanda v Hira Lal*

(6) *Hara Saha v Fazlur* 17 C W N 636 (1913).

(7) *Basi Poddar v Ram Krishna Poddar* 1 C W N 135 (1896) doubted by *Rampai J in Pares Nath Singha v Nobogopal Chattopadhyaya* 29 C 1 (1901) at p 16.

(8) *Ram Singh v Salg Ram* 28 A 84 85 (1905).

(9) *Pares Nath Singha v Nobogopal Chattopadhyaya* 29 C 1 a c 5 C W N 821 (1901) [see *Abdul Rahaman v Matiyar Rohaman* 30 C 425 427 (1902) *Maha leo Chintaman v Vasudev Kirtikar* 23 B 181 at p 184 (1893)] In *Nitya Nanda Patra v Hira Lal Karmakar* 5 C W N 63 (1900) it was held that a simple mortgagee could not apply.

(10) *Mallikarjunadu Setti v Lingamurti* 26 M 332 (1902) In *Srinivasa Iyyangar v Ayyathurai Lallai* 21 M 416 it was held that a mortgagee who was affected by the sale could apply *Alimiah v Ramjan* 13 C W N 224 (1908).

(11) *Benodini Dassi v Peary Mohan Halder* 8 C W N 55 (1903) *Kunja Behary Mondal v Sambhu Chandra Roy* 8 C W N 232 (1903).

sent from in *Cha tan v Kunja* 15 C W N 863 870 (1911) 14 C L J 284.

(4) *Bepun Behary Bera v Sosa Bhusan Datta*, 18 C L J 628 (1913) p 632.

(5) *Pita v Chuni Lal* 31 B 207 (1905) a c 9 Bom L R 15.

pendency of the attachment proceedings, (1) or a donee under a gift made while the property was under the attachment, or a *durmohararidar* where the *moharari* tenure was sold for arrears of rent, (2) a purchaser subsequent to attachment and prior to sale (3) In short, any one whose interest is bound by a sale might apply though he be no party to the suit or to the decree under which the sale took place (4) An application by a person entitled, together with a person not entitled was received, and payment made jointly by those persons was held to be a sufficient payment (5) Where under sect 310A of the former Code a reversionary heir applied for and obtained leave to make a deposit, it was held that he made it as a person interested in the payment of money within the meaning of sect 69 of the Indian Contract Act (6)

It was held that the following could not apply —An under raiyat (7) but this has since been dissented from, (8) *houladar* under tenure holder, (9) a purchaser at a private sale from the judgment-debtor after the sale in execution, (10) a purchaser prior to sale in execution of decree against his vendor, (11) nor on the same principle a person claiming a share in immoveable property sold in execution of a decree against his co sharers, (12) nor a person who has contracted to purchase land such contract not creating in itself any interest in or charge upon the property, (13) an attaching creditor, (14) nor an owner or holder of an interest who has parted with his title since the sale or has acquired such title since the sale (15) Even before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1907, this rule did not apply to a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears (16)

It is not quite clear what the effect of the amendment is (17) The words

(1) *Maganlal Mulji v Doshi Mulji*, 25 B 31 (1901) for the private sale would not become operative unless and until the auction sale was set aside *Omar Ali v Moonshi Basirudeen* 7 C L J 282 (1908)

(2) *Narain Mandal v Sourindra Mohan Jagore* 32 C 107 (1904)

(3) *Mulchand Dagadu v Govind Gopal* 30 B 575 (1906) but see post

(4) *Iroie Manikkoth v Puthudeth Chem Lakshmi* 26 M 365 (1902)

(5) *Cal H C R* 1038 25th May 1904

(6) *Pankhabati Chowdhurani v Nani Lal* 19 C I J 72 (1913)

(7) *Abid Mollah v Diljan Mollah*, 29 C 4 J (1902)

(8) *Chanira Kumar Nath v Kamini Kumar Ghose*, 11 C W N 712 (1907)

(9) *Abid Mollah v Diljan Mollah supra* at p 460

(10) *Hazari Ram v Badai Ram*, 1 C W N 79 (1897) for at the time of the sale the property was not the property of the applicant, dissented from in *Appayya Mettl v Kumbhali Bhatt* 17 M L J 1-7 (1906), s c, 30 M 114 *Manikka Odayan v Raja*

gopala Pillai 17 M L J 291 (1907), s c, 30 M 507

(11) *Ram Chandra Dhondo v Rakhmabai* 23 B 450 (1898) for his interests were not affected by the execution sale, fell *Arjun Mollah v Jadu Nath Roy Chowdry*, 7 C W N 243 (1902) and in case in next note, but see *Mulchand Dagadu v Govind Gopal* 30 B 575 (1906)

(12) *Abdul Rahaman v Matiyar Rahaman*, 30 C 425 (1902)

(13) *Mahadeo Chintaman v Vasudev Kurti* kar, 23 B 181 (1898)

(14) *Kedar Nath Sen v Uma Charan*, 6 C W N 57 (1900) but see notes to sect 187

(15) *Ishar Das v Isaf Ali Khan* 34 A 186 (1911)

(16) *Asiruddin Mokha v* 35 C 543 (1908), and see *Muhammad v Ahmad* 33 A 481 (1911) a mortgagee who is also the holder of a decree for money and has had a part of the property sold

(17) *Solekshmi Anmal v Sankaran Nair*, 241 M J 205

"owning such property or holding an interest (1) therein" (the latter term no doubt applying to cases of interest in the property itself as distinguished from personal claims against others relative thereto) are by themselves clear enough. It must, however, be remembered that "such property" is property sold in execution of a decree. It is only the judgment debtor's interest in any property or the interest therein of any other person bound by the decree that can be sold in execution of a decree (2). A question therefore arises whether the rule applies only to persons whose interests are affected by the execution sale: the point is not clear, as the word "sold" may refer, not to what can, in law, be sold and passes, but what, in fact, is sold in the sense of purported to be sold. Perhaps the latter is the case, for the Select Committee say "words have been added so as to make it clear that a purchaser acquiring a title before the sale in execution can claim the benefit of the sale. In other respects the Committee consider it advisable to adhere to the wording of the section."

The date of sale is the date when the property is actually sold (3).

"Depositing"—If the applicant does not make the deposit within the prescribed period the Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the sale (4). If the judgment debtor has been misled by a mistake of the Court the consequences of that mistake ought not to fall upon him, as where the amount was fixed by an order of the Munsif himself in the presence of and with the assent of the pleaders of both parties, (5) but an application has been refused where the Court did not declare the amount to be paid, and it did not appear that the officer of the Court from whom the applicant was said to have received certain information in regard to the amount to be deposited, was the officer who was charged by the Court with the duty of supplying that information (6). When the petitioner, owing to the fact that the presiding officer left the Court earlier than usual, could not make the deposit that day it was held that the deposit was made validly on the following day (7). Where the owner of immoveable property applies he is under a liability to deposit a sum equal to 5 per cent on the purchase money, for payment to the purchaser even where the land has been purchased by the decree holder (8). An applicant who had fulfilled the requirements of

(1) In *Poresh Nath Singha v Nabagopal Chattopadhyaya*, 29 C 1 at p 13 (1901), *Dulhun Mathura v Bansidhar*, 16 C W N 904 (1911).

(2) *Ram Chandra Dhonlo v Rakhmabai*, 23 B 450, 451 (1898).

(3) *Chowdhry Kesha Sahay v Giam Roy*, 29 C 626, s c, 6 C W N 776 (1902). This is now enacted by sect 65, but in another case under the former Code, *Banko Behary v Krishna Chandra* 18 C L J 170 (1913), it was recently held by Chatterjee, J. that the words "date of sale" in the Bengal Tenancy Act mean the date on which the sale is confirmed. But see *Yusuf Gazi v Payaranesa Bewa*, 16 C L J 131 (1912).

(4) *Chundi Charan Mandal v Banko Behary Mandal* 26 C 449, 452 (1899) ordinarily at least for see also at p 457.

(5) *Makboot Ahmed Chowdhry v Barle Sabhan Chowdhry*, 25 C 609 (1898).

(6) *Chundi Charan Mandal v Banko Behary Mandal*, 26 C 449, 459, s c., 3 C W N 233 (1899).

(7) *Dulhun Mathura v Bansidhar*, 16 C W N 904 (1911), 15 C L J 83, and see *Mahomed v Sukhdeo*, 13 C L J 407 (1911).

(8) *Turmal Rai v Syed Dastaghir Miyah*, 22 M 286 (1898), and see *Chundi Charan Mandal v Banko Behary Mandal*, 26 C 449, 451 (1899).

clauses (a) and (b) of this section of the last Code, was held (1) entitled to have the sale set aside even though something more on account of the poundage was recoverable from him, under the head of costs provided for in the last clause of that section. A deposit under this rule must be unconditional (2). Where the applicant prayed that the money should be kept in deposit until the disposal of an appeal, and the money therefore could only be received on the condition expressed in the application, the deposit was held not to be good under sect 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (3). But where money was duly deposited under the former section and a petition which might have been refused was made later, it was held a good deposit (4). A mere application without an actual deposit is not sufficient compliance with the law (5). Where there was only an offer to pay, but no actual deposit, and the prayer to set aside the sale was joint with another which could not be entertained under the Proviso, it was held that no second appeal lay (6). A mortgagee making payments to save the mortgaged property from being sold in execution of a rent decree has an additional lien on the property for the sums so paid by him (7).

The deposit under this rule must be made within thirty days from the date of the sale. But it is not necessary that the notice under r 92 should be made within that time (8).

"For payment to the purchaser"—It has been said that 5 per cent is given partly as a solatium to the purchaser for the loss of his bargain (9). It makes no difference that the purchaser is also the decree holder (10).

"For payment to the decree holder"—These words mean that the decree holder is the person solely entitled to the money paid into Court (11). Sect 295 (now 73) does not apply to a deposit made by a judgment debtor under this rule (12). It was also, therefore, held that it was sufficient to deposit only the amount of the decree for the satisfaction of which the sale was proclaimed and took place (13). In this rule the term decree holder means only the person for satisfaction of whose decree the sale has been ordered, and does not include other persons who would have a right to claim rateable distribution out of the sale proceeds under sect 73 (14).

Under the rule the amount deposited is that *'specified in the proclamation*

(1) *Mutha Ayyar v Ramasami Sastrial* 20 M. 163 (1898)

(2) *Dulhan Mathura v Bansudhar* 16 C W N 904 (1911), 15 C L J 83

(3) *Mt Shakoti v Jotindra Mohun Tagore* 1 C W N 132 (1896)

(4) *Hanooman Singh v Luchman Sahoo* 8 C W N 355 (1904)

(5) *Mahomed Akbar v Sukhdeo* 13 C L J 467 (1911)

(6) *Narajena v Rasul Khan*, 1 Bom L R 33 (1899)

(7) *Rakkohari Chatteraj v Bijra Das Dey* 31 C J 75 (1904)

(8) *Ganesh v Vithal*, 15 Bom L R 214 (1912);

(9) *Chundi Charan Mandal v Banko Behary Mandal*, 26 C 441, 451, 452 (1899)

(10) *Ib*, *Tirumal Rai v Syed Dastighur Miyab*, 22 M 236 (1898)

(11) *Ganesh v Vithal* 37 B 387 (1912)

(12) *Roshun Lall v Ram Lall Mullick*, 30 G 262, s c, 7 C W N 341 (1903), see

Behari Lall Paul v Gopal Lal Seal, 1 C W N 695 (1897), and next note. *Hari Sahai*

Fazlur Rahman 40 C 619, 16 C L J 144 (1913)

(13) *Hari Sundari v Shashi Bala* 1 C W N 195 (1896)

(14) *Ganesh v Vithal*, 15 Bom L R 214 (1912)

of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder."

It has been held that the word "received" ought to be construed to mean sums of money either actually received by the decree holder, or which he was in a position to credit to his account, and that this was not the case as regards amounts deposited by other purchasers (1). It has been held also that the payment to the decree holder need not be in cash, and that it is enough if he is satisfied with regard to the whole of the amount due to him (2). The Bombay High Court held that what the former section contemplated was an actual receipt by the decree holder, and that nothing else would satisfy its requirements (3).

"Or prosecute."—The addition of the words "or prosecute" was intended to give effect to the undermentioned ruling (4).

Impleading parties.—It was proposed, in order to give effect to two rulings of the Allahabad High Court (5) in applications under the following rule, to enact a clause declaring that an applicant under this rule should be bound to implead the purchaser and decree holder as parties to the application which should in their absence be dismissed. It had been also held in the Calcutta High Court that an auction purchaser is entitled to notice before an order is made under this section (6). The proposed clause has not been enacted.

"Unless he withdraws"—This rule prevents a person who has preferred an application under r. 90 from making or prosecuting an application under this rule, until he has withdrawn the other, but the converse is not provided for (7). This rule and r. 90 permit of applications by persons who could not have applied under sects 310 and 311 of the last Code.

Appeal—Sect. 588 of the Code of 1882 did not provide for an appeal against an order under sect. 310A, corresponding with this rule (8). It was, however, held that if and when an order under that section fell under sect. 244 (c) (now 17) it was appealable (9) and where it did not fall within that section,

(1) *Kripa Nath Pal v. Ram Lakshmi Dasya*, 1 C W N 703, 703 (1897).

(2) *Lakshmi Ammal v. Sankaran Nair*, 24 M. L. J. 200 (1913). *Vedala Lakshminarayana Sinha v. Pacha Lakshmi Uma*, M W N 756 (1912).

(3) *Grunbak v. Ramchandra*, 23 B 723, s. c., 1 Bom. L. R. 215 (1899).

(4) *Rajendra Nath Haldar v. Nidattan Mitter*, 23 C 958 (1896). As to application under next section after rejection under this section, see *Ashraf Ali Chowdhry v. Aet Lal Saha*, 23 C 682 (1896).

(5) *Gauhar Ali Khan v. Bansidhar*, 15 A. 407 (1893), *Karamat Khan v. Mir Ali Ahmed*, W N 1891, p. 121, see next section.

(6) *Bungshidhar Haldar v. Kedar Nath*

Mondal, 1 C W N 114 (1896), *Nitya Nunda Patra v. Hira Lal Karmakar*, 5 C W N 63, 64 (1900), *contra*, *Bhairab Pal v. Prem Chand Ghose*, 1 C W N clxx (1897).

(7) *Basaruddin v. Tamulla*, 17 C W N 476 (1911).

(8) *Asmauddi v. Pran Mohini*, 15 C W N 844 (1911).

(9) *Pita v. Chumilal*, 31 B 207 (1906), *Magan Lal Mulji v. Doshi Mulji*, 25 B 631, s. c., 3 Bom. L. R. 255 (1901), *Murli Dhar v. Anandrao*, 25 B 418, s. c., 3 Bom. L. R. 100 (1900), *Pandurang Govind Parandaro v. Krishnabai*, 1 Bom. L. R. 74 (1899), *Phul Chand Rani v. Nurshing Parshad Measir*, 28 C 73 (1900) [full in *Imtiaz Begam v. Dhumani Begam*, 29 A. 275 (1907)], *Kedar*

as in the case of an auction purchaser stranger, the order was subject to revision (1) It was held that no appeal lay from an order refusing to restore to the file an application dismissed for default of appearance (2) And it has been recently held that an order on an application to set aside a sale under this rule is not a decree within the meaning of sect 2 (3) The true nature of the order must be examined and the character of the parties affected by it must be ascertained before it can be determined whether the order falls within the scope of sect 47 (4)

11] 90 (1) *Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree holder, or any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it.*

Provided that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud unless upon the facts proved the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud

"May apply set forth in it and which have not been to a Full Bench of the Madras High Court applied to sales of mortgaged property in execution of mortgage decrees (6) It was held that there was no provision in Act X of 1859 entitling a party to have a sale set aside on the ground of non attachment and non proof of publication of sale proclamation (7) Apparently, the application should be made to the Court executing the decree It was held

Nath Sen v Uma Charan, 6 C W N 37 (1900) Srinavasa Ayyangar v Ayyathoras Pillai, 21 M 416, 417 (1897), Bungshadhar Haldar v Kedar Nath Mondal, 1 C W N 114 (1896) Kripa Nath Pal v Ram Lakshmi Dasgupta 1 C W N 703, 704 (1897), Manikka Odayan v Rajaopala Pillai, 17 M L J 291 (1907) In Huber Singh v Shib Lal, 27 A 263 (1904), the Allahabad High Court dissented from the view that there was an appeal under s 244, Hari Har v Rama Pandu, 33 B 638 (1903), Anandi v Ajudha 30 A 373 (1903)

(1) Kedar Nath Sen v Uma Charan, 6 C W N 37 (1900), Bashur ud din v Jhori Singh 10 A 140 (1896), where the case was held not to fall under s 211, now 17, the question being between the judgment debtor and the purchaser, Anur Rai v Basdeo

Singh, 5 C L J 204 (1900) See, however, last case but one in last note

(2) Ghasiti Bibi v Abdul Samad, 29 A 596 (1897)

(3) Asmuddi v Pran, 15 C W N 844 (1911)

(4) Mahomed Akbar v Sukhdeo, 13 C L J 467 (1911)

(5) Harbans Lal v Kundan Lal, 21 A 140 (1898)

(6) Mallikarjunadu Setti v Lingamurti Pantulu, 25 M 214 (1900)

(7) Patel Shahu v Hari Mahanti, 27 C 763 (1900), Bibi Sharifan v Mohamed, 13 C L J 633 (1911); 15 C W N 685 Lakshmi v Sri, 13 C L J 162 (1910), Livinia v Madholmoni, 11 C L J 163 (1910)

that where execution of the decree had been transferred to the Collector, application had to be made to him, (1) but that decision had reference to the Rules of the N W P and was not followed in Bombay (2) A beneficial owner is not a necessary party to a proceeding for setting aside an execution sale It is competent to the Court to set aside the sale finally and conclusively, as against the beneficial owner, although his *benamdar* only and not he is made a party to the proceeding (3) The decree holder is a necessary party to an application under this rule, (4) as also the auction purchaser (5) and judgment debtor (6) The issue which arises when a petition is referred under this rule is a judicial proceeding and ought to be carried out with regularity, the Court fixing a day for the hearing of the matter of the petition, and giving reasonable notice to all parties, *et c.*, such as would afford to each party fair and reasonable opportunity of bringing the necessary evidence on or before that day (7) If an application is made within time it must be dealt with, and cannot be summarily rejected on the ground that it might have been made earlier (8) When the application has been duly presented, framed and heard each objection should be taken up separately on each has been

166 of the Limitation Act, be made within thirty days of the date of sale Where, however, irregularities affecting the sale have by the fraud of the judgment creditor or other parties to the sale been kept concealed from the judgment debtor, he is entitled, whether the sale has been confirmed or not, to apply, the time for making the application being computed from the date when the fraud first became known to him (10) But if proceedings to set aside a sale were under sect 47 (formerly 244), then the period of thirty days does not apply but the three years' limitation (11) Fraud with regard to the knowledge of the

(1) *Kachabdeo v Radhe Prasad* 11 A J 4 (1888)

(2) *Narayan v Rasul Khan* 23 B 331 (1899)

(3) *Baroda Kanta Bose v Chunder Kanta Ghose*, 29 C 682, *s c*, 6 C W N 706 (1902)

(4) *Ali Gauhar Khan v Bansidhar*, 15 A 407 (1893)

(5) *Karamat Khan v Mir Ali Ahmad Ali* W N (1891) p 121, cited *ib*, *see* *Gopal Singh v Dular Kuar*, 2 A 352 (1879), *Kanta Ram v Bankey Lal* 2 A 396 (1879), *Gangathara v Ruthabai*, C M 37, at p 238 (1882)

(6) *Ali Gauhar Khan v Bansidhar*, *supra*

(7) *Brojo Mohun Thakoor v Shah Amreen ooddeen*, 20 W R 424 (1873), *see* *Sanari Singh v Makhun Pandey*, 2 A H C R 143, 144 (1870) [necessity of allowing evidence in support of injury], *Rethbunjun Singh v Mitturjeet Singh*, 4 W R Misc 9 (1866) [same as to irregularity], *Khodja Bibee v*

Ram Narain Dass, 12 W R 511 (1869) [same] *Sookh Raj Singh v Mooftee Tuffozzool* 2 A H C R 142 (1870) [the Court should take evidence and not merely rely on report of the Nazir]

(8) *Syud Najmooddeen Ahmed v Abdul Aziz* 15 W R 95 (1871), *Kaloo Sahay v Makoond Lal*, 24 W R 216 (1875)

(9) *Sookh Raj Singh v Mooftee Tuffozzool* 2 A H C R 142 (1870) *Mt Parbutty v Gndharee Lal*, 6 W R 125 (1866)

(10) *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v Gopal Mondul*, 17 C 769, 776 (1890) *F B* [diss from *Gobind Chandra Majumdar v Charan Sen* 14 C 679 (1887)] followed in *Raj Chandra De v Badar Rahaman*, Rule 124, of 1914, 7th May, 1915 [Woodroffe, J, and Mullick, J], *Kadash Chandra Halder v Bissonath Paramanic*, 1 C W N 67 (1896)

(11) *Luchmpat v Mt Mandul Koer*, 3 C W N 333, 336 (1899)

judgment-debtor may be before the sale, for fraud is a continuing influence (1) As to sect 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, see cases cited (2) An application to set aside a sale on the ground that no notice had been served as required by O XXI r 22, cannot be made under this rule but must be made under sect 47 (3)

Immoveable property—The section is limited to sales of immoveable property It has been held that a decree upon a mortgage is incapable of being so described and regarded, and an application under the former section with regard to the sale of such a decree was incompetent (4)

Who may apply.—As to this, the section in the last Code ran, "*the decree holder, or any person whose immoveable property has been sold under this Chapter*" There was a conflict upon the meaning to be attached to the term "*decree-holder*," as also as to the meaning of the other words As regards the first term, the question was whether it was limited to the decree holder, at whose instance the lands were first attached, the decree holder who brings the property to sale, (5) or any decree holder entitled to share in the assets, and also having an interest, to see that the sale which produces those assets was regularly conducted (6) The present rule adopts a series of decisions to the effect that a person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets (and presumably his representative) is entitled to apply under this provision (7) The phrase italicized obviously included the judgment-debtor or his representative (8) A question however arose as to who else was included, it being admittedly not restricted to the judgment debtor It was held that any person might apply to set aside a sale if his interests were affected by the sale in the sense that it would pass by the sale, (9) and, therefore, a person claiming to be beneficial owner was held to have a *locus standi*, (10) as also the mortgagee of the judgment-debtor (11) and a transferee of portion of an occupancy holding (12) but not a

(1) Raj Chandra De v Badar Rahaman (Rule 1249 of 1914, 7th May 1915), following Narayan Sadhu v Mohareth Damodar Das, 10 Cwn 394

(2) Kali Mandait Ram Sarbajya, 1 C L J 476 (1905), s c, 9 C W N 721, Kalar Ali v Raj Mohun Guha, 1 C L J 454 (1902), Ganga Charan Bhattacharya v Sashi Bhushan Roy, 1 C L J 205 (1900)

(3) Humed Bawa v Prasanna 40 C 45 (1912), Lakshmi v Seta, 13 C L J 162 (1910)

(4) Baij Nath Lohia v Bireyendra Nath Palit, 6 C W N 5 (1901)

(5) Matunams Dass v Monmotho Nath Bose, 1 C W N 542 (1900)

(6) See post

(7) Lakshmi v Kuttunni, 10 M 57 (1880), Sorabji Lalji v Govind Ramji, 16 B 91, 101 (1891), Apudhis Prasad v Nand Lal Singh, 15 A 318 (1893), Chattrapat Singh v Jadukul Prasad Mukherjee, 20 C 673 (1892) [person not so entitled cannot come in], Birey Singh Dauluria v Hukum Chand, 23 C 518 (1900).

Chakrapani Chettiar v Dhanje Satter, 24 M 311, 315 (1900)

(8) Shoo Prasad v Hira Lal, 13 A 140 (1889), followed in Begun Behary Bera v Soti Bhushan, 18 C L J 628 (1913) For the case of a judgment debtor whose right in the property in dispute was put up for sale under a previous execution, see Baboo Hect Bhanjun v Baboo Meeturjeet Singh, 6 W R Misc. 31 (1866)

(9) Abdul Gani v Danno, 20 C 418, it p 425 (1892), Jammanna Banta v Mahabala Bhatta, 19 M 167 (1895)

(10) Ib In this case the applicant's con

(11) Rakhai Chunder Bose v Dwarka Nath Mitter, 13 C 315 (1885), Asmutunnissa Begum v Ashraf Ali, 15 C 488 (1888), 1 B at p 192

(12) Argar Ali v Akabuddin, 9 C W N 131 (1901)

person claiming by title paramount to the judgment debtor inasmuch as his title to the property is not affected by the sale, whether it be regular or irregular (1) A plaintiff who has attached immoveable property before the judgment has no present interest in such property and therefore cannot apply under this rule (2) It was, of course, held that persons whose property had not been sold could not apply, (3) such as a co sharer in undivided property where the share of his co-

him, he can appeal (7) It was held under the last Code that where an occupancy holding was sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, obtained against the riyat, a person who claimed to have purchased the holding from the latter could not apply (as the representative of the judgment holder) to have the sale set aside under sects 244 or 311 of that Code (now represented by sect. 47 and this rule) if the holding was not transferable by custom or usage (8)

Material irregularity.—An application under this rule is limited to the ground set forth in it (9) Where a Court has no jurisdiction to make a decree, then any sale which takes place under such decree is void, and a nullity (10) Where, again, the Court of execution has no jurisdiction the sale is void (11) This rule, however, assumes that a valid decree is being executed by a Court of competent jurisdiction It assumes regularity in this respect (12) The words "*set aside*" show that the section is inapplicable to the case of a sale which is by reason of want of jurisdiction null and void, as distinguished from a sale which is merely voidable for irregularity That which is a nullity cannot from its very nature

(1) *Asmutunnissa Begum v Ashraf Ali*, 15 C 488 (1888), F B [overruling *Abdul Huq Mozumdar v Mohini Mohun Shaha*, 14 C 240 (1887), foll in *Sheo Prosad v Hira Lal*, 12 A 140 (1889)], *Subbarayadu v Pedda Subbarazu*, 10 M 470, 478 (1892) See *Ram Chandra v Rakhmabai*, 23 B 450 (1899), the first case was distinguished in *Abhaya Dass v Pudmo Loebun*, 22 C 802, where a tenure itself was sold for its own arrears. A stranger whose property is sold behind his back without authority does not need to have a sale set aside *Narasimha Naidu v Ramasami*, 18 M 478 (1895)

(2) *Jogendra v Monmotho*, 17 C. W. N 80 (1912). *Sewdut v Sreecanto*, 33 C 639 (1906). 10 C. W. N 634. *Basuram v. Kattiyam Debi*, 38 C 448 (1911). 16 C W N 795

(3) *Baheshar Kuar v Hari Singh*, 5 A 42 (1882). *Man Kuar v Tara Singh*, 7 A 583 (1885). *Brij Mohun Thakur v Rai Uma Nath Chowdhury*, 20 C. 8 (1892)

(4) *Baheshar Kuar v Hari Singh*, *supra* As to sale of undivided shares, see *Mathura Dasi v Fatma Ulka*, 7 B H C R A C F 63

(1898)

(5) *Brij Mohun Thakur v. Rai Uma Nath Chowdhury*, *supra* *Bhagabati Churn Bhutta*. chargee v *Baheshwar Sen*, 8 C 307 (1882) *supra*.

(6) *Ante*

(7) *Kantha Ram v Bankey Lal*, 2 A 396 (1879) See notes to s 189

(8) *Prosunno v Bannacharan*, 13 C W N 654 (1909)

(9) *Harbans Lal v Kundan Lal* 21 A 140 (1898)

(10) *Lalla Coondur Lall v Hubeeboonissa*, 15 W R 311 (1871)

(11) *Sukhdeo Rai v Sheo Chulam*, 4 A 382 (1882). *Sant Lal v Umrao un nassa*, 12 A. 96 (1889). *Manjha Singh v Jhow Lall*, 6 A 11 C R 354 (1874). *Nonadh Singh v Sohun Koor*, 4 A 11 C R 135 (1872). *Moulvee Abdool Hye v Macrao*, 23 W R. 1 (1874). *Badri Prasad v Saran Lal*, 4 A 309 (1882). *Aghore Nath v Shama Sundari* 5 A 15 (1883). *Raja Thakur Barmha v Jiban Ram* (P C), 19 C L J 161 (1913)

(12) *Net Lal Sahoo v Sheikh Karim Bix*, 23 C. 686, at p 689 (1895)

be set aside, while in the cases to which the rule does apply the sale is merely

the particular incidents of execution following a valid decree, which are mentioned in it. Where the whole suit is attacked another suit is maintainable, notwithstanding unsuccessful applications under O IX r 13 (formerly sect 108) and this rule, and omission to appeal against orders on such applications, for the existence of a real suit is assumed (2). A Court, however, may, to use the language of sect 115 (formerly 622), act illegally, or with material irregularity, in the exercise of a jurisdiction which it does possess. The present rule refers in express terms to irregularity only. It has, however, been said (3) that though the term "illegality" does not include "irregularity," the latter word as used in this section is wide enough to include illegality. The question is not one of importance unless the illegality is held to be of such a character as to affect the validity of a sale in a manner making it absolutely void. This has been held to be the result in the case of certain illegalities (4). The view taken in some of

(1) *Shirin Begam v Agha Ali Khan*, 18 A 141, 145 (1895) ref *Behari Singh v Mukat Singh*, 28 A 273 (1905), dissenting from *Sukhdeo Rai v Sheo Ghulam*, 4 A 382 (1882). In *Moulvie Abdool Hye v Macrae*, 23 W R 1 (1874) and other cases cited in last note other than *Sant Lal v Umrao un nissa* (where the case was held to be without the section) and *Badri Prasad v Saran Lal* (where the Court interfered in revision), the question of jurisdiction appears also to have been dealt with under this section.

(2) *Khagendra Lath Mahata v Pran Nath Roy*, 29 C 393 (1902) P C, s e, 6 C W N 473, 4 Bom L R 303, and see *Radha Raman v Pran Nath Roy*, 5 C W N 757 (1901).

(3) *Per Brodhurst, J* in *Ganga Prasad v Jag Lal Rao*, 11 A 333, at p 342 (1889). A distinction is drawn between illegality and irregularity, at p 337, see remarks in *Narayana Kothan v Kalanasundaram*, 19 M 219, at p 207 (1895). The distinction has not always been kept to. A sale has been set aside on the ground of irregularity, where it was held to be null and void. *Manjha Sing v Jhow Lal*, 6 A H C R 354 (1874). *Nomdh Singh v Sohan Kooer*, 4 A H C R 135 (1872). *Radha Charan Das v Sharfuddin Hosain*, 17 C W N 1135 (1913).

(4) *Ida Husain v Kutub Hosain*, 7 A 38 (1884). *Ram Chand v Pitam Mal*, 10 A 506 (1888). *foli Mahadeo Dubey v Bhola Nath Dicht*, 5 A 86 (1882) F B, where it was

held that as an attachment is an essential preliminary to sale, a sale of property without a previous attachment is void, cf *Raja Thakur Barmha v Jiban Ram*, P C, 10 C L J 161 (1913) (only the attached property can be sold) [*contra* *Kashory Mohun Roy v Mahomed Mujaffar Hossein*, 18 C 188 (1890), *Tincouri Debya v Shih Chandra Chowdhury*, 21 C 639 (1894), *Sheodhyani v Bhola Nath*, 21 A 311 (1899)] *Velayutha Muppan v Subramanian*, 24 M L J 70 (1912), also where no notice was given to legal representative *Rameswari Dassie v Doorga Dasa Chatterjee*, 6 C 103 (1880), where property was sold before the advertised time, *Chedani Lal v Amir Beg*, 7 A 676 (1885), and where sale took place before expiry of thirty days, *Balshu Nand Kishore v Malah Chand*, 7 A 289 (1885). *Ganga Prasad v Jag Lal Rai*, 11 A 333 (1889) [*contra* *Venkata v Sana*, 14 M. 227 (1890), *Tassaduk Rasul v Ahmad Husain*, 20 I A 176 (1893)], *Sathavayyan v Muthusama*, 12 M 325 (1888) [sale contrary to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act]. The Privy Council have, however, pointed out that a sale is a sale and not a nullity, whether there be an irregularity or a direct contravention of express provisions. *Gobind Lal Roy v Ram Janam Misur*, 21 C 70 (1893). *Kokil Singh v Edal Singh*, 31 C 385, 391 (1904), *Radha Charan Das v Sharfuddin Hosain*, 17 C W N 1135 (1913).

these cases that the act or omission was an illegality vitiating the sale was dis-
sented from in others. In certain cases there was probably nothing more than
an irregularity. It is clear that where a party professes to apply under this rule,
then by such application he admits that the case must be treated as one of
material irregularity to be redressed pursuant to its provisions only upon proof
of injury (1). Ordinarily at least such irregularity will make the sale voidable
only. Assuming, however, that there may be an illegality, which *ipso facto*
renders the sale void, then it must be held either that the rule covers such a case,
in which event injury must be established, or the case is one without the rule. In
the latter case it has been held that the Court has apart from the former section,
an inherent right to set aside all illegal proceedings provided that the interests
of third parties are not affected (2) or it might have refused to confirm a sale
on grounds other than those on which a party may apply to set it aside under
this rule (3). The case being *ex hypothesi* outside the section it has been held
that no proof of injury is necessary (4). The tendency, however, of modern
decisions is to check judgments holding sales to be nullities on account of what
are really mere irregularities in procedure (5). And unless it can be established
that the sale is for want of jurisdiction or other cause absolutely void, the case
will, when there is an irregularity of the kind described, fall within and be subject
to the provisions of the rule.

As the former section was confined to cases of mere irregularity of the
nature described, it did not apply where the sale was sought to be set aside on
another ground such as fraud (6). Where, however, fraud in the execution
proceedings was alleged and attempted to be substantiated and the question
arose between parties (7) an application lay under sect 47 (formerly 244) and

(1) See *Tassadduk Rasul v Ahmad Husain*,
20 L. A. 176 at p 182 (1893), *Venkata v*
Sama, 14 M. 227, at p 228 (1890).

(2) *Rameswari Dass v Durgadas Chat-
terjee*, 6 C 103, at p. 106 (1889), see *Nana*
humar Roy v Golam Chunder Dey, 18 C
422 at p 423 (1891), *Bir Mohun Thakur v*
Roy Uma Nath Chowdhry, 20 C. 8 at p 9
(1892), *Sant Lal v Umrao un nissa*, 12 A
96 (1889).

(3) *Sant Lal v Umrao un nissa*, *supra*
Ganga Prasad v Jag Lal Rai, 11 A. 333, at
p 337 (1889).

(4) *Ram Chand v Pitam Mal*, 10 A. 506
(1888) [it was also inconsistently held that
there was a material irregularity]. *Ganga*
Prasad v Jag Lal Roy 11 A. 333 (1889),
Bakshi Nand v Malal Chand, 7 A. 289
(1885). The judgment in *Harbans Lal v*
Kundan Lal, 21 A. 140 (1898) misses the
point. The earlier decisions referred to did
not hold that a sale could be set aside under
a. 311 without proof of loss, but that illegality
of the character referred to was outside the
section and therefore not affected by its

limitations.

(5) See *Malkarjun v Narhari* 25 B. 337,
346 (1900), *ref Khurajmal v Daim*, 32 C
296 (1901) *dist* case of want of jurisdiction,
a. c., 5 C. W. N. 10. 2 Bom. L. R. 927
Tassadduk Rasul Khan v Ahmad Husain, 21
C. 66 (1893) the principle of *Gobind Lal Roy*
v Ram Janam Misser, 21 C. 70 (1893) equally
applies to execution sales. *Kokil Singh v*
Edat Singh 31 C. 385, at pp 391, 392 (1904),
Begun Behary v Soti Bhusan, 18 C. L. J
628 (1913).

(6) *Umbala Churn v Dwarka Nath Ghose*,
8 W. R. 506 (1867). *Subbaji Rau v Srinadasa*
Rau 2 M. 264 (1880). *Nund Lal v Dilawar*
Ali 11 W. R. 244 (1869), *Virsingappa v*
Shadashivappa, 7 B. 11 G. R. Ac. 974 (18-0),
Raghubans Sahai v Phool Humari, 32 C
1130, 1140 (1905), or that the decree itself
has been set aside, *Ramyaad Sahu v Binde*
awari, 6 C. L. J. 102 (1907).

(7) See *Roy Luchmeeput Singh v Adeyto*
Churn Mullick 24 W. R. 452 (1875) where
the application was by a third person not a
party.

no separate suit would lie (1) And an application was held maintainable under that section after a sale had been confirmed (2) A purchase by the decree holder *benami* at a price less than that at which he was permitted to bid constitutes fraud (3) If the decree itself which is the real basis of the title was fraudulently and collusively obtained, the sale at which a purchase was made never became absolute (4) See, however, now as to fraud the next paragraph

The following have been considered material irregularities —

Delay in making the deposit required by sect 300 of the last Code, (5) the adjournment of the sale from time to time without sufficient ground, (6) non publication or improper publication of sale proclamation, (7) such as an omission to state the amount of revenue, (8) or to put up a copy of the proclamation in the Collector's office, (9) a sale subsequent to insanity of the judgment-debtor, (10) omission to state or misstatement of Government revenue in notification of sale, (11) misstatement of the value of the property in the sale proclamation calculated to mislead intending bidders, (12) selling before thirty days have expired after notice of proclamation, (13) or without a fresh proclamation where there has been a postponement, (14) or after a portion of the property has been released to a third party, (15) or issuing a sale notification without notifying in it that the property would be sold on a day named or as soon thereafter as it

(1) *Kokil Singh v Edal Singh* 31 C 385 (1904), *Rojoni Kanta Bagchi v Hossain Uddin Ahmed* 4 C W N 538 (1899) See notes to s 4, as to pleading fraud, see *Mahomed Mira Ravuthar v Savvasi Vijaya Raghunadha*, 23 M 227 (1894), and as to the necessity of the auction purchaser being a party to it, *Abdubaker v Mohidin*, 20 M 10 (1896), and effect of fraudulent sale on rights of third parties *Sidhee Nazzer Ally v Ojoodhyaram Khan*, 10 M I A 540 (1866)

(2) *Golam Ahad Chowdhry v Jadhuter Chundra Shaha* 30 C 142 (1902), s c 7 C W N 305.

(3) *Sm Sarat Kumari v Nimali Churn Dey*, 5 C W N 265 (1900)

(4) *Banke Lal v Jagat Narain* 22 A 168, 179 (1900), *Nanda Kumar v Ram Kashore*, 10 C L J 457 (proof of fraud vitiating decree)

(5) *Venkata v Sama* 14 M. 227 (1890)

(6) *Venkata v Sama*, *supra*

(7) *Macnaghten v Mahabir Pershad Singh*, 9 C 656 (1882), *Krishna Prasad v Motchand*, 40 I A 140 (1913) 17 C L J 573

(8) *Ib*

(9) *Nana Kumar Roy v Golam Chunder Dey*, 18 C 422 (1891)

(10) *Narayan Kothan v Kallian Sun daram*, 19 M 219 (1895)

(11) *Madarsah Maracayar v Palanappa Chetti*, 23 M. 628 (1900), *Gridhar Singh v Hardeo Narain*, 3 L A 230 (18,6), s c, 26 W R 44 *Olpherts v Mahabir Pershad*, 10 I A. 25 (1882), 9 C 650

(12) *Saadetmand Khan v Mt. Phul kuar*, 2 C W N 550 (1898), 25 L A 146, 20 A 412 Cal H. C Appeal from order 439 of 1901, 17 March, 1903 *Siradurga v Rajono han* 15 C W N 577 (1910), *Pran Singh v Janardan*, 14 C L J 441 (1911), dissenting from *Abdul Kashim v Benode*, 12 C W N 757 (1903)

(13) *Tasadduk Rasul Khan v Ahmad Hovam*, 21 C 66 (1893), *Abdul Nossia v Doolal Doss* 11 C L R 303 (1882), *Harbuns Sahai v Bhauru Pershad* 4 C L R 23 (1879), *Venkata v Sama*, 14 M 227 (1890)

(14) *Goopee Nath Dobey v Roy Luchmee put Singh*, 3 C 542 (1877), *Shoshee Mukhee v Dwarka Nath Biswas*, 6 W R Misc. 84 (1866), *Kashen Prosunno v Narduma Dossee*, 17 W R 339 (1872), *Mohunt Megh Lal v Shub Pershad*, 7 C 34 (1881), *Sanwal Singh v Mahbun Pandey*, 2 A H C R 143 (1870) [no order of postponement or fresh proclamation], see *Jamini Mohan Nundy v Chandra Kumar Roy*, 6 C W N 44 (1901)

(15) *Shub Prokash Singh v Sardar Dejal Singh* 3 C 544 (1878)

might come up in the list, (1) or advertising property of A and B for sale, and subsequently and without fresh proclamation selling A's rights and interest only, (2) omission to beat drum at time of sale, (3) notifying that the decree-holder held a charge for a greater amount than was the fact, (4) sale of half the property after whole was proclaimed, (5) or not affixing copy of sale proclamation

form, and does not state the extent of the property and the revenue assessed on it or the amount of income derived from it and omitting an order of the High

of the property as to be misleading (12) publication of sale proclamation upon decree holder's property at a distance of some half mile from the judgment debtor's property, (13) non specification of adjourned hour of sale, (14) absence of specification in sale proclamation of incumbrances and statement of value

of sale without notice (19) selling properties in one lump advertised to be sold in lots, (20) selling without previous attachment (21) refusal by the Court upon waiver of fresh proclamation by judgment debtor to issue such proclamation if applied for by the judgment creditor (22) omission to bring on the record

(1) Bykunt Nath Sandyal v Jaggut Mohun Shaha 24 W R 240 (1870)

(2) Mohun Mohun Dass v Bloobunjoy Shah 6 C L R 237 (1880)

(3) Trimbak Ravji v Nana 10 B 504 (1886)

(4) Kanji Mal v Bibi Sado 8 A 116 (1886)

(5) Pannab Lal v Sri Ram Bannerjee 1 Shome 10

(6) Kalyata Chowdhry v Ramcoomar Goopla 7 C 466 (1881)

(7) Srinath Dutt v Gopal Chandra Mittra 9 C 511 (1883) dist Sami Ayyar v Krishna Sami 10 M 169 (1886)

(8) Surno Moyee Deb v Dakhna Ranjan Sanyal 24 C 291 (1896)

(9) Athappa Chetti v Rama Krishna Nayakan 21 M 51 (1897)

(10) Mohunt Megh Lal v Sh b Prashad Maiti 7 C 34 (1881)

(11) Malkarjun v Narhari 20 B 337 (1900)

(12) Banke Lal v Jagat Narain, 22 A 168 10 (1900)

(13) Jamini Mohun Sanyal v Chandra

Kumar Roy 6 C W N 44 (1901)

(14) Bhukari Muri v Pani Surja Moni 6 C W N 48 (1901)

(15) Moti Lal Roy v Bhawani Kumari Deb 6 C W N 836 (1902)

(16) Mahabir Pershad Singh v Dhannukhari Singh 8 C W N 680 687 (1904) s c 31 C 815 818

(17) Jhoomuck Chowdhry v Rajah Radha Persad 20 W R 328 (1876)

(18) Khodeja Bibee v Johad Roheen 14 W R 320 (1870)

(19) Pokhraj Singh v Gossain Munraj Pooree 12 W P 281 (1869)

(20) Sreekunt Dass v Ramjeebun Roy 18 W R 342 (1873) Urquhart v Nandeeput Mahaputtar 12 W R 492 (1869) as to selling property in lots though attached and proclaimed in its entirety see Abdool Hye v Macrae 23 W R 1 (1874)

(21) Sheolhyan v Bhola Nath 21 A 311 (1899)

(22) Chakrapani Chattar v Dhanji Sahu 24 M 312 (1900)

the legal representative of a judgment-debtor who has died after attachment and before sale, (1) basing a decision on evidence not taken in accordance with the law (2)

The irregularity, however, if any, must be material (3)

The following have been held to be either not irregularities or material irregularities —

Issuing notices of attachment and sale together, (4) holding a sale for a larger sum than was actually due, (5) omission to deposit 2½ per cent of purchase money at date of sale, (6) entering the wrong pergunnah in the proclamation if it be served in the right village and the estate has been identified, (7) publishing the notification of the sale at an inferior *cutclerry* the *sudder cutclerry* of the zemindar being beyond the Court's jurisdiction, (8) omitting to state the rent of a tenure brought to sale, (9) selling at an inadequate price, (10) subdividing one of the lots advertised for sale, (11) a District Judge postponing a sale in obedience to an injunction issued by a Subordinate Judge, (12) sale of immoveable property on a close holiday, (13) or without issue of fresh proclamation, (14) selling portion of estate within jurisdiction although the greater part falls within another district (15)

“Or fraud.”—These words have been added Under the previous law fraud was not within the rule (See page 1016) As to this amendment the Select Committee said ‘We think that the existing law as contained in sect 311 of the

under sect 311, a decree and open to second appeal (16) This result which often involves a considerable prolongation of these proceedings is in our opinion

(1) Bepin Behary Bera v Sosa Bhusan 18 C L J 628 (1913)

(2) Peary Lal Das v Peary Lal Dawn 18 C L J 646 (1913)

(3) Dakshina Mohun Roy v Sm Basumati Debi 4 C W N 414 at p 477 (1900)

(4) Huro Soondurce Debeo v Brojo Gobind Shaha 4 W R Misc 12

(5) Chuttur Singh v Dhurrum Moonwar 1 A H C R 61 (1899)

(6) Ahmad Baksh v Lalita Prasad 28 A 38 (1903)

(7) Nooral Hossain v Ram Coomar Sahee 20 W P 326 (18 6)

(8) Hubeebool Hossein v Allender 14 W R 44 (1870)

(9) Mohendro Coomar Dutt v Ishaneswary Dasee 7 C 23 (1881)

(10) Lakshmi v Krishnabhat 3 B 424 (1884)

(11) Sami Pillai v Krishnasami Chetta, 21 M 417 (1897)

(12) Amir Dalhant Administrator General

23 C 351 (1893)

(13) Baram Mahton Sahib un nasa 3 A 333 (1880) *sed qu* the observation was *obiter* as no inquiry was proved *Co tra Haro Jemadar v Jadub Chunder Halder* 3 W P Misc 24 (1863) as to proceedings on closed holidays see *Ram Das Chakrabarti v Official Liquidators* 9 A 366 (1881)

(14) Gajrajmal Teorani v Akbar Husain 29 A 106 (1906)

(16) Shub Naram Singh v Gobind Dasa Bhukut 23 W R 134 (18 3) See notes to s 110 and *Kalee Prosunno Bose v Dmonath*

the present Code came into force but the order on the application was passed after it came into force it was held that there was no second appeal under the provisions of the last Code *Raj Mohan v Gobinda* 17 C. W N 34 (1912).

undesirable. We think that applications for the setting aside of sales should, so far as the procedure applicable to them is concerned, stand on the same footing, whether they are based on the ground of irregularity or on the ground of fraud" (1).

"In publishing or conducting."—It was proposed to amend the section by adding irregularity in attachment, as to which there was previously doubt (2). But this has not been done, as such irregularity cannot affect the price. The expression "*conducting the sale*" was held not to include any proceedings unconnected with the actual carrying out of the sale, but to refer to the action of the officer who makes the sale, and not to anything done antecedent to the sale. Therefore an objection that the property attached and sold was not by law saleable, was held not to be an objection contemplated by this section, but one which the judgment debtor might have taken at the time of attachment prior to the sale (3). So again, an objection by a representative of a judgment-debtor that he had inherited nothing from him must be raised before the sale in execution (4). So, too, an objection that execution is barred must be taken before the sale (5). All that the Court can decide under this rule is whether the sale shall be set aside upon the ground of irregularity in publishing or conducting it—not whether execution was granted after the judgment had been satisfied (6) or should go at all (7). The words "*conducting the sale*" embrace all acts which the Court is required to perform down to the close of the sale which terminates when the lot is knocked down to the highest bidder. The irregularity must not, therefore, be anything which takes place after the sale such as the receipt of payment by the Court after the fifteenth day from the date of sale (8). The irregularity must be in conducting the sale and the whole responsibility of conducting the sale is in the Court. An agreement between parties not to bid or dissuading others from bidding is not an irregularity within the meaning of the section, and unless the acts done amount to fraud is no ground for otherwise setting aside a sale (9).

Substantial injury.—Under the present, as under the last Code there must have occurred substantial injury, that is, loss which is wrongful, (10) by reason of the irregularity complained of. There has however, been considerable conflict as to the manner in which the connection between the two had to be established and inferred. The Privy Council held that there must be

(1) Benode v Ram Sarup, 16 C W N 1015 (1912)

(2) See MacNaghten v Mahabur Pershad Singh, 9 C 656, at p 660 (1882). Patil Shahu v Hari Mahanti, 27 C. 789, 792 (1900)

(3) Ramchhaibur Mir v Bechu Bhagat, 7 A 641 (1885)

(4) Chowdhry Wahed Ali v Jumaye, 6 W R Misc 116 (1866)

(5) Gangathara v Rathabai Ammal, 6 M 237 (1882)

(6) In re Digumburee Dabee, R. L. R.,

F B 938, at p 945 (1868)

(7) Hubhal v Kanhai Lal, 7 A 365 (1885)

(8) Binda Debee Dossee v Gopee Soonduree Dossia, 6 W R Misc. 82 (1866)

(9) Mahomed Mira Ravuthar v Savvasi Vajaya Raghunadha, 23 M 227 (1899), a. c., 4 C W N 228, nor of course are disparaging remarks of bystanders "irregularities". Lal Mohan Chowdhuri v Nunu Mohamed, 17 C 152 (1839). But see Rukhnee Bullubh v Brojonath Sircar, 5 C. 303 (1879).

(10) Shori Bhusan Sadhur Ahmed Hussein, 7 C. W N 439 (1903).

evidence,(1) and that that evidence must be direct,(2) and that a Court could not without evidence, and upon a mere supposition, find that an irregularity did cause an injury by causing an inadequate price to be bid at the sale. The amount or nature of the evidence required in any case depended upon its own circumstances (3). Difficulty was felt as to what was meant by "direct" evidence. Sometimes it was considered that this meant that persons should be called to testify that had it not been for a particular set of circumstances they would have done so and so, would have given a greater price, that they were willing to bid but were deterred and misled, and so forth. In other cases it was considered sufficient that there should be evidence of circumstances which would warrant the necessary, or at least the reasonable, inference that the sale was the result of the irregularity complained of (4). The Select Committee stated that the language of the rule has been altered in order to meet the doubts raised as to the evidence upon which the Court can act, and they refer to the Privy Council decision *Tasadduk Rasul Khan v Ahmad Husain*. Apparently it is intended to affirm that ruling, but the difficulty hitherto has been as to its construction. Proof of course, will be required and this proof may, it is submitted on a true construction of the Privy Council decisions consist of "direct" evidence in the narrow sense stated, or of evidence of facts which warrant an inference that the irregularity was the cause of the inadequate price. It has been held that where the property is sold at an inadequate price owing to irregularities in the conduct and publication of the sale there is substantial injury within the meaning of this rule (5).

Appeal—An order dismissing an application under this rule on the ground of the non appearance of the applicant is appealable (6). If a judgment debtor has made an application under this rule, he can (if he withdraws it) apply under sect. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (7).

91. The purchaser at any such sale in execution of a decree
Application by purchaser to set aside sale on ground of judgment-debtor having no saleable interest may apply to the Court to set aside the sale, on the ground that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold.

Application by an auction purchaser—The rule is limited to the case stated. Therefore a purchaser cannot apply to set aside a sale on the ground of deficiency in area in the land sold (8) or of misrepresentation or concealment in the sale notification inducing purchase at a price more than the property is really worth (9). If the purchaser knew that the debtor had no saleable

(1) *Olpherts v. Mahabir Pershad Singh*, 10 I A 25, 30 (1882), s c, 9 C 656

(2) *Tasadduk Rasul v. Ahmad Husain*, 21 C 66, s c, 20 I A 176 (1893)

(3) See *Ismail Khan v. Abdul Aziz Khan*, 32 C 502 (1905)

(4) *Mohabir Pershad Singh v. Dhanu Lohari*, Singh 8 C W N 686 (1904), s c 31 C 816

Bhikari Misra v. Rani Surja Mont, 6 C W N 48 (1901) where earlier cases will be cited

(5) *Santo Prosad v. Shew Naram* 16 C W N 1022 (1912)

(6) *Brāja v. Moti*, 14 C W N 573 (1910)

(7) *Sital Rai v. Nanda Lal* 13 C W N 91 (1909)

(8) *Ram Naram v. Dwarka Nath Khattri*, 27 C 264 s c 4 C W N 13 (1899)

(9) *Idi* at

interest the sale should not be set aside (1) The second paragraph of sect 313 of the last Code, which this rule replaces, has been transposed to the next rule.

"No saleable interest."—The words "*no saleable interest*" have been said to refer to cases where a purchaser buys a property which turns out to have no existence at all or to be of no saleable value whatever (2) It may be questioned whether the substitution here of the word "*value*" for interest is correct The words mean "*nothing to sell*," and are not intended to confine the cases in which the application may be made to those in which the judgment-debtor though having an interest such interest is by prohibition of law or other wise unsaleable (3) After a vesting order the debtor has no interest (4) The rule does not apply where the judgment debtor has no saleable interest in a portion only of the property, (5) nor is the fact that the property is subject to a mortgage sufficient to support an application (6) or the fact that one of two judgment debtors has no interest if the other debtor owns the entire interest (7) Although default has been made in the payment of revenue, ownership of the property continues in the defaulter until a revenue sale takes place A purchaser, therefore, of an estate in execution of a decree, after default has been made in paying revenue for it, cannot, in the event of a subsequent revenue sale, seek to set aside the sale under which he had made the purchase on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest (8) See also notes to r 93, *post* Under the Code of 1859 a sale under a second attachment was valid and would prevail over a sale subsequently held under a prior attachment and passed all the interest of the judgment debtor (9) Now however, when property is sold in execution it cannot be sold again, and when a judicial sale takes place all previous attachments effected upon the property sold fall to the ground (10)

92. (1) *Where no application is made under rule 89, rule 90 or rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.* [ss. 314]

(1) Mahabir Prasad v Dhumani Das, 3 A 527 (1881)

(2) Durga Sundari Devi v Govinda Chandra Addy, 10 C 368 (1883) In Kunhi Moidin v Terayil Moidin, 8 N 101 (1884) the judgment debtor was found to have no interest In Sant Lal v Rampi Das, 9 A 167 (1889), it was pointed out that the fact that the property may fetch little or nothing if sold does not affect the question.

(3) Munna Singh v Gajadhar Singh, 5 A. 577 (1883)

(4) Ram Soondur Dey v Shosha Mohun Pal Chowdhry, 11 C L R 389 (1882), Dinobundhoo Pal v Shoshee Mohun Pal, 9 C 217 (1882)

(5) Ram Coomar Dey v Shushoo Bhoochun Ghose, 9 C 626 (1883), Muhammad Rahmat

ullah v Bachcho, 27 A 537 (1902)

(6) Protah Chunder Chuckerbutty v Pamioty, 9 C 506 (1883), even if the incumbrance covers the probable value of the property, Sant Lal v Rampi Das 9 A 167 (1889)

(7) Fazluddin Ali Khan v Tuncouri Sahia, 23 C 565, 573 (1890)

(8) Hari Charan Boso v Haridas Roy, 2 C L J 508 (1903)

(9) Obhoy Chura Coondoo v Golam Ali, 7 C 410, 413 (1881), Narharmul Marwari v Sadut Ali, 8 C L R 468, 470 (1881),

and Shaha, 12 C 317 (1885)

(2) Where such application is made and allowed, and where, in the case of an application under rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from the date of sale, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale

Provided that no order shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby

(3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made

"Where no application is made"—The Court is bound in such case to confirm the sale (1) The former section was held inapplicable to proceedings in execution of certificates under the Public Demands Recovery Act (2)

"Disallowed"—This word has no reference to an order passed on an appeal, but refers to the disallowance of the objections by the Court before which the proceedings under sect 311 (now r 90) are taken (3)

"Absolute"—Though a proposal was made for its abolition, it will be observed that the Court is still required to pass an order confirming the sale (4) — an order which was held to be more than a mere ministerial Act, and which was a judicial determination that none of the objections on which it could have been sought to set aside the sale existed (5) It is also to be observed that whereas sect 312 of the last Code referred only to applications under sect 311 the present rule deals with applications under all the three preceding rules The words 'as regards the parties to the suit and the purchaser' have been omitted, probably as being unnecessary

Thirty days—The period of thirty days under this rule will not begin to run against a person applying under r 89 if for any reason the final bid remains for a time unaccepted by the sale officer (6)

"Order setting aside"—If the conditions of the rule are fulfilled, the sale will be set aside unless the applicant has by his conduct of waiver or estoppel

(1) Umesh Chandra Dass & Shri Naram Mandal, 31 C 1011, 1013 (1904), s o, 9 C W N 193

(2) Girish Chandra Chaudhary v Golam Karim 33 C 451 (1906), s c, 3 C L J 235, but see Hari Charan Singh v Chandra Kumar Dey, 31 C 787 (1907), s c, 11 C W N 745, followed in Bangachandra & Tara Ramkar 16 C W N 973 (1912)

(3) Mahomed Hossein v Purundur Mahto, 11 C 287 (1885)

(4) S 312 of the last Code ran after the word *disallowed*, *the Court shall pass an order confirming the sale*, and s 314, which is embodied in the present rule, enacted that no sale was absolute until it was confirmed See Mahomed Hossein v Purundur Mahto, 11 C 287, at p 292 (1885), Iota Ram

& Khub Chand, 7 A 253, 255 (1884), Baldeo Singh v Kishen Lal 9 A 411 (1887), Broj Mohun Thakur v Rai Uma Nath Choudhury, 20 C 8 (1892), Hardeo Naram &

Jan Ali, 24 C 682 (1897)

(5) Narayana Kothari v Kahanasundari Pillai 19 M 219, at p 228 (1890)

(6) Munshi Lal v Ram Naram, 30 A 65 (1912), and see Dulhaz Mathura v Bansidhar, 16 C W N 904 (1911) 16 C L J 83, and Mahomed v Sukhdeo, 13 C L J 467 (1911) (deposits tendered on thirtieth day valid though officer absent) And see also Musst Bhawani v Mathura Prasad 16 C W N 983 P C (1912)

precluded himself from setting up the irregularity (1) When a sale is set aside the effect of it is to remit the parties to the position in which they stood immediately before the sale, without prejudice to any other proceedings in execution which have legally been performed. Thus an attachment once legally made is revived upon the reversal of the sale in execution (2) An application by a purchaser to set aside the sale of immoveable property sold by the sheriff or for compensation on the ground of deficiency in the area of the land sold is not entertainable under the Code (3) Before a sale has become absolute objection can of course be taken under this rule but after that and when a certificate has issued when the defendant is a *bona fide* purchaser at a Court sale any irregularity in the proceedings leading to the sale cannot be relied on to set it aside (4) If the Court ordering the sale has jurisdiction a purchaser of the property sold is not bound to inquire into the correctness of the order for execution any more than into the correctness of the judgment on which the execution issues (5) The Limitation Act (Art 13) protects *bona fide* purchasers at judicial sales who are not required to inquire into their accuracy or legality by providing a short limit of time within which suits may be brought to set them aside (6) All irregularities if they existed are cured by the certificate of sale (7) And if a purchaser who is not a party to the suit satisfies himself as to the jurisdiction of the Court to order a sale an obligation which continues until the sale is completed (8) his title is not affected by irregularities of procedure which are cured by the certificate of sale The accuracy therefore of some decisions (which hold (9) that in certain cases a sale is void against a purchaser) is in question in any case where the illegality complained of does not really amount to an absence of jurisdiction It cannot it was held be laid down as a general proposition that under no circumstances can a sale be set aside as against a *bona fide* purchaser The Court must determine in each case whether it will be in accordance with the principles of justice equity and good convenience that the sale ought to be set aside or not (10) The circumstance alone that a decree under

(1) Arunachellam Chetti v Arunachellam Chetti, 15 I A 171 12 M 19 (1888) Gir dharee Singh v Hurdeo Narsim Singh 3 I A 230 (18 6) dist. in Thakoor Mahatab Deb v Leelanand Singh 7 C 613 (1887) which last case was followed in Raman v Kunhayan 17 M 304 (1893) Jaganatha v Gang Reddi 15 M 303 (1892) Aba v Dhondu Bai 19 B 2 6 (1894) Prem Lal Paul v Radhika Prosad Paul 6 C W N 42 (1901) Bhikari Nisra v Rani Surja Moni 6 C W N 48 (1901) As to the necessity for drawing up a decree see Kherode Sundari Devi v Jnanendra Nath Lal 9 C W N 283 (1901) dist. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti v Preonath Dutt 32 C 175 177 (1904)

(2) Thakoor Chund v Muddan Mohun Singh W R Sp No 20 (1864)

(3) Ram Narsim v Dwarika Nath Khattray 4 C W N 13 (1899)

(4) Narayana Kothan v Kallanasundaram 19 M 219 at p 2 0 (1890)

(5) Rewa Mahton v Ram Kishan Singh 14 C 18 (1886) s.c. 13 I A 106 [execution of cross decrees?]

(6) Malkarjun v Narhai 25 B 337 301 302 (1900) s.c. 5 C W N 10

(7) Balakrishna v Masuma Bibi 11 142 107 (1882) s.c. 9 I A 189 at p 196

(8) Basappa bin Malappa v Dundaya bin Shrivangaya 2 B 540 541 (18 8)

(9) *I vide ante* p 1015 and Palani v Siva Linga 8 M 6 (1884) and as regards Ram Chand v P tam Mal 10 1 006 (1887) cited *ante* see remarks in Sheo Charan Lal v Sheo Sewak Singh 18 1 469 (1896)

(10) Abdul Hye v Nawab Raj B L R F B 911 (1895) Junco Lal v Shama Lal Misar 20 W R 120 (18 3) where the auction purchasers had notice as to which

which a sale has taken place has itself been set aside is not sufficient (1) Nor where a stranger to the proceedings purchases property *bona fide*, can the sale to him be set aside on the ground that the decree had already been satisfied out of Court at the time the sale was held (2) Nor is there a distinction between sales in execution of money and mortgage decrees (3) Where there is fraud on the part of the plaintiff, the validity of the sale is not affected, if the purchaser is not implicated in the fraud, (4) *aliter* where the purchaser is so implicated (5) The reason for this rule is that a purchaser is not bound to inquire into the correctness of the order for execution or of the judgment on which it issues. If he were, there would be little inducement to buy (6) There is, however, a distinction between decree holders who purchase under their own decree which is afterwards reversed, and *bona fide* purchasers at a sale in execution of a valid decree to which they were no parties. As regards the latter the rule is as just stated, but a judgment creditor who is also a purchaser, purchases subject to the result of the litigation (7) The reason for this is that the person purchasing is, at the time he purchases, a party to the proceeding which may get rid of the authority for the sale. When he is not a party to such proceeding the sale is not set aside (8) A sale cannot be set aside because the judgment debtor has applied to be declared an insolvent (9)

“Notice”—The second paragraph of sect. 313 of the former Code referred only to the judgment debtor and decree holder. Notice must now be given

see also *Ram Jewan Lall v. Sham Lall* 20 W R 123 (1873)

(1) *Chunder Kant Sarmah v. Bussessar Surmah* 7 W R 312 (1867), *Pearce Moneo Dassoe v. Collector of Beerbhoom*, 8 W R 300 (1867), *Jan Ali v. Jan Ali Chowdry* 1 B L R A C 56 (1868), *Jugal Kishor Bannerjee v. Abhaya Charan Sarma*, 1 B L R A C 84, 86 (1868), *Assamatthem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchemput Singh* 4 C 142, 171 (1878), *Behares Lall v. Rajah Ram*, 6 A H C R 291 (1874), *Murari Singh v. Prayag Singh* 11 C 362 (1885), *Mackintosh v. Kalce Dass Mullick* 19 W R 234 (1873), *Basappa Malappa v. Dundaya Shivlingaya* 2 B 540 (1878) [where Courts sale under decree reversed in appeal before confirmation, *folli Mul Chand v. Mukta Prasad*, 10 A 83 (1887)], *Mahomed Hossein v. Hohl Singh*, 7 C 91 (1881), *Banke Lal v. Jagal Naram*, 22 A 168, at p. 175 (1900), *Conesh Pershad v. Fazul Emam Khan*, 23 C 857, 861 (1896) As to sale under decree unreversed, see *Kishen Sahai v. Bakhtawar Singh*, 20 A 237 (1898)

(2) *Vellappa v. Ramchandra*, 21 B 463 (1896)

(3) *Mukhoda Dass v. Gopal Chunder*

Dutta, 26 C 734, 737 (1899)

(4) *Vobesh Chunder Bagchee v. Dwarka Nath Moutro*, 24 W R 200 (1875)

(5) *Jugal Kishor Bannerjee v. Abhaya Charan Sarma*, 1 B L R A C 84, 86 (1868), *Gobind Chunder Mookerjee v. Ram Komal Chatterjee*, 25 W R 364 (1870), *Kishore Chunder Sen v. Kally Lunkur Paul*, 20 W R 333 (1873), *Lall Bunsedhur v. Koonwar Bindeserre*, 10 M I A 454, 473, 474 (1866)

(6) *Mukhoda Dass v. Gopal Chunder Dutta*, 26 C 734, 737 (1899)

(7) *Zain ul Abidin Khan v. Muhammad Asghar Ali*, 10 A 106, 172 (1873), s. c., 15 L. A. 12, *Sadasiva v. Sabapathi*, 5 M 106 (1881) *Chaudan Singh v. Ramdeni Singh*, 31 C 439, 501 (1904), as to purchase by creditor with notice of previous proceeding between him and the debtor, see *Pettachi v. Chinnatambiar*, 10 M 241, 250 (1886), *Damoodar v. Iswar*, 15 C W N 78 (1910)

(8) *Conesh Pershad v. Fazul Emam Khan*, 23 C 857, 861 (1896), where the judgment creditor was held not to be a party as he was not made a party to the appeal

(9) *Ishwar Lakshmidat v. Harjivan Ramji*, 21 B 681 (1896)

to all persons affected (1) In the event of the death of the judgment debtor application must be on notice to his representative (2) It is not necessary that the notice under this rule should be given within thirty days of the date of the sale (3)

Sub rule (3)—This clause in the last Code ran *“no suit to set aside, on the ground of such irregularity, an order passed under this section shall be brought by the party against whom such order has been made”* The words *“on the ground of such irregularity”* are omitted as the rule applies to all the three preceding rules If an application has been made and disallowed under this rule the order subject to appeal under O XLIII r 2 is final, and cannot be the subject of a suit

The preceding law may be summarized as follows—A sale of land being a proceeding in execution, a question which arose as to the setting aside of such a sale was a question relating to execution which if it arose between the persons mentioned in sect 241 (now sect 17) had to be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit (4) As to the procedure to be followed in such cases in execution, that depended upon the grounds which were put forward to impeach the sale If the sale was impugned on the ground of irregularity (5) then the decree holder judgment debtor or other person whose property was affected by the sale applied under sect 311 (now r 90) If the sale was sought to be set aside for any other cause than irregularity, such as fraud (6) or want of jurisdiction (7) in the executing Court (8)

(1) *Surendra Mohini v Animesh Chandra* 39 C 887 (1912), *Bibi Sharifan v Mahomed* 13 C L J 535 (1911), *Menajuddi v Toam Mandal* 39 C 881 (1911)

(2) *Bala Kadar v Gulam Mohidin* 7 B 424 (1883) and generally as to notice to judgment debtor *Kuppaiyan v Ramasami Ayyan* 6 M 197 (1883)

(3) *Cancesh Bab v Vithal Vaman* 10 Bom L R 244 (1912)

(4) *Saroda Churn Chuckerbutty v Mahomed Isuf Meah* 11 C 376 378 (1880) *Mohendro Narain Chatuaj v Gopal Mondal*, 17 C 769 (1890) *Siva Pershad Maity v Nando Lal Har* 18 C 139 (1890) *Verasaglava v Venkata Charyar* 5 M 217 (1882) [all cases of fraud] But see *Ganga Pershad Sahu v Gopal Singh* 11 C 136 (1884), *Chunni v Lala Ram* 16 A 5 (1893)

(5) See *Raghubar Dayal v Ilahi Bakhsh* 7 A 450 452 (1885) [suit only lies if sale invalid for cause other than irregularity], *Abdul Haje v Nawab Raj* B L R F B 911, 913 (1868)

(6) See cases in last note but one In *Prangour Mozoomdar v Hemanta Kumari Debva* 12 C 927, 600, a separate suit was held to lie as it was not possible to raise the

question in execution proceedings *Raghubans Sahas v Tulakumari* 1 C L J 544 549 (1900) [the only suit barred by s 311 is one to set aside a sale on the ground of irregularity]

(7) *Chunni v Lala Ram* 16 A 5 (1893) *Prem Chaud Dey v Mokhada Debi* 17 C 603 (1890) *Gopi Mohan Roy v Doybaki Nundun Sen* 13 C 13 (1891) *Tincouri Debja v Shib Chandra Pal* 21 C 639 (1894) *Sukhai v Daryal* 1 A 374 at p 30 (1877)

(8) An order for sale and a sale under such order by a Court of execution which has no jurisdiction is void *Chunni v Lala Ram* 16 A 5 (1893) [order for sale under decree previously satisfied and see *Digambaroo Debia v Eshan Chunder Sen* 15 W R 372 (1871)] *Balwant Rao v Mahammad Husam* 15 A 324 (1893) [no court fees due for which sale held] *Subbaya v Yellamma* 9 M 130 (1880) [order for possession made after order in appeal] *Sant Lal v Umrao* 12 A 95 (1889) [sale held after order of postponement] *Narayanasaawmy Naick v Saravana Mudaly*, 6 M H C R 58 (1871) [territorial jurisdiction and see cases in last note]

or non liability of property to sale, (1) or other ground, then an application lay under sect 214 (now 47) If objection came from the purchaser on the ground of want of saleable interest in the judgment debtor, then he applied under sect. 313 (now r 91) Though the auction-purchaser could not apply under sect 311 (now sect 90), if the sale was confirmed under the following section the order of confirmation bound both the parties and the purchaser (2) The result of this was that these persons could not, alleging irregularity, sue to set aside an order of confirmation whether such order was passed without (3) or after an application under sect 311 An auction-purchaser might, however, alleging that there was no irregularity, have sued to set aside an order setting aside and refusing to confirm a sale (4) While, therefore, a suit would not lie to set aside a sale on the ground of existence of irregularity, a suit would lie to confirm a sale on the ground that there was no irregularity Suits also lay to impeach the validity of sales on a ground other than that of mere irregularity, provided that the question did not arise between parties within the meaning of sect 244 (now 47) Subject to the remarks made in this and the allied sections, the law appears to be the same now In cases where sales are sought to be impeached on grounds other than those of mere irregularity, proceedings under sect 47 must be taken As regards irregularities, if no application has been made under r 90, then this rule applies If an application has been made to set aside a sale and refused, then, subject to an appeal against such order, the same result would seem *a fortiori* to follow If, on the other hand, the sale is set aside, then the auction-purchaser may appeal, but subject to such appeal the order would appear to be final The same rule applies to orders made on applications under r 91 As regards orders under sect 47 they are decrees, (5) and subject to appeal A separate suit can only lie in such cases as are outside the scope of sect 47

Appeal Revision—An appeal lies against an order on an application under this rule, O XLIII r 1 (g), setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale (6) No appeal lies from an order refusing an application to restore to the file an application which has been dismissed for default (7) No second appeal lies (8)

(1) *Durga Churan Mandal v Kali Prosunno Sircar*, 3 C W N 586 (1899), s. c., 26 C 721, *Basti Ram v Fattu*, 8 A 146 (1880)

(2) *Azun ud din v Buldeo*, 3 A 554, 559 (1881)

(3) *Damodar Bhanshet v Vinayak Trimbak*, 26 B 40 (1901), s. c., 3 Bom L R 463

(4) *Azun ud din v Buldeo*, 3 A 554 (1881), *Sukhai v Danjai*, 1 A. 374 (1877), *Bandi Bibi v Kalka*, 9 A 602 (1887), *Mathura Das v Panhalal*, 19 B 216 (1894), and in *Amrit Misir v Gurka Perran*, 7 A H. C R 183 (1875)

(5) *Murari Singh v Prjag Singh*, 11 C 362 (1885)

(6) As to the question whether the only order appealable is that confirming the

sale, see *Tota Ram v Khush Chand*, 7 A 253 (1884), *Gudhari Singh v Hurdeo Narain Singh*, 31 A 230, at p 233 (1876), or as to the point mentioned in *Ganga Prasad v Jag Lal Rai*, 11 A 333, at p 337 (1889).

(7) *Suja uddin v Rezauddin*, 27 C 414 (1899) See *Jang Bahadur v Mahadco Pershad*, 8 C W N 160 (1903), *Raja v Srinivasa*, 11 M 319 (1883), *Ningappa v Gangawa*, 10 B 433 (1885)

(8) S 104, *Narayan v Rasul Khan*—J B 531 (1899), *Luchmipat v Mt. Mandal Koer*, 3 C W N 333 (1899), *Nana Kumar Roy v Galam Chander Dey*, 18 C 422 (1891), *Gopi Koeri v Gopi Lal*, 21 C 799 (1894), *Aubhoja Dass v Pudmo Lochun Mondul*, 22 C 802 (1895), *Asimu Idi v Pranamohini*, 15 C W N 844 (1911), 14 C L J 221

If, as he should be, the auction purchaser is made a party to the proceedings he can appeal if the sale is set aside (1) Where a sale is sought to be set aside on some ground other than those mentioned in these rules, and the matter is dealt

or refuses to set aside a sale its order may, if the circumstances fall within the terms of sect 115, be the subject of revision (5)

93 Where a sale of immoveable property is set aside under rule 92, the purchaser shall be entitled to an order for repayment of his purchase money, with or without interest as the Court may direct, against any person to whom it has been paid

"Where a sale."—The corresponding section in the last Code was "when a sale of immoveable property is set aside under sects 312 or 313, or when it is found that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest, etc., and the purchaser is for that reason deprived of it" (6) The auction purchaser under the last Code might have applied under sect 313 (now r 91), and the Court might have set aside the sale under the same section (see now r 92), adjudicating upon the question raised, viz, the absence of all saleable interest The section was enabling and not prohibitive of an independent action (7) Such an application might not however, be made, and it might yet become known and found (8) either by the Court of execution (9) or in another suit (10) that the property did not belong to the judgment debtor In this case also the purchaser was upon the fact being found entitled to recover back his purchase money It was held that the words in sect 315 of the last Code "*when it is found,*" etc must be taken in connection

(1) Gopal Singh v Dular Kuar, 2 A 302 (1879), Kanthi Ram v Bankey Lal, 2 A 395 (1879)

(2) Provided an attempt is made to substantiate the allegation Umakanto Roy v Dink Nath Sanyal, 28 C 4 (1900) s c 5 C W N 124

(3) Kokil Singh v Eddal Singh, 31 C 385 (1904), Rajani Kant Bagchi v Hossain Uddin Ahmed, 3 C W N cclxxxviii (1899) In Sami Pillai v Krishnasami Chetti, 21 M 417 (1897), the case was held not to be within s 115, as the question was not between parties to the suit

(4) Macnaghten v Mahabir Pershad, 9 C 606 (1882)

(5) See Burj Mohun Thakur v Rai Lma Nath Chowdhry, 20 C 8, 11 (1892), distinguished in Shew Prosad Bungsbadhur v Ram Chunder Haribux, 41 C 323 (1913), Lalshmana v Najmuddin, 9 M 145 (1881),

Chakrapani Chettian v Dhanji Settu 24 M 311, 315 (1900) Ishvar Lakhmidat v Harpran Ramji 21 B 681 (1896), Sookoo mar Singh v Kashoo Singh, 13 W R 200 (1879) [cl 15, charter], Radhasyam Kar v Dinobundhoo Biswas, 18 C L J 535 (1913)

(6) See as to purchaser being unable to obtain possession Surama v Rama, 8 M 99 (1884), and see Nityanund Roy v Juggut Chandra Guha, C W N 105 (1902)

(7) Surendra Nath Ghose v Beni Madhab Misa, 10 C W N 274 (1900)

(8) See Munna Singh v Gajadhar Singh, 5 A. 576, 583, 596 (1883) [i.e. found in some previous proceeding or "when it has been ascertained or become known"]

(9) Sivarama v Rama, 8 M 99 (1884)

(10) See Benode Bihary Nandi v Mohesh Chunder Ghose, 12 C. L. R. 331 (1883) [found in suit to which decree holder was a party]

with a finding in a separate suit to mean "*when it is found in some proceeding by which the judgment creditor is bound*" For to compel the judgment-creditor to refund merely because in some proceeding between other parties a Court had decided that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest would be contrary to principles of justice (1) The finding must have been in some proceedings to which a judgment creditor was a party or at any rate of which he had notice (2) It is to be observed that the present rule omits "*where it is found,*" etc., as also the last paragraph of the former section Nothing has been said as to the reason for the first omission, but as regards the second the Committee stated that they added words at the commencement of the rule, "in substitution of the last paragraph of the section which thus becomes unnecessary" Presumably this observation refers to the italicized words "*an order for repayment*" Such an order being due for money may be enforced in execution under the rules providing for the execution of decrees and orders for money

As regards absence of saleable interest in private sales there is under sect 55 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, an implied covenant for title by the vendor In the case of execution sales there is no warranty of title either by the decree holder or by the Court The purchaser buys the property with all risks and defects in the judgment debtor's title In the absence of fraud his only remedy is to apply to set aside the sale and to recover back his purchase money when the judgment debtor had no saleable interest at all He cannot obtain a refund in proportion to the extent to which the judgment debtor had no interest (3) The right of
be put
1 or did

"Is set aside"—See notes to preceding sections

"The purchaser shall be entitled"—When a sale is set aside the purchaser's right to recover the purchase money is not limited to an application under this rule to the Court executing the decree, but he may bring a suit for the purpose (5) He may sue to cancel the sale, (6) to establish his claim to the

(1) Nilakanta v Imam Sahib, 16 M 361, 363 (1892)

(2) Vithoba v Esat 18 B 594 (1893) and S C S 189 provides in the case of an application under s. 188 for notice to the judgment creditor and the decree holder

(3) Shanto Chandar Mukerji v Nam Sukh 23 A 355, 356, 357 (1901), Sundara v Venkata Venkata 17 M 228 (1894) in private sales the buyer is recouped for any loss he may have sustained Munna Singh v Gajadhar Singh 5 A 577, 580 (1883) See Rustonji v Vinayak 35 B 29 (1910) (he may sue the judgment creditor for recovery of possession of the property and in the alternative for return of the purchase money on the footing of total failure of consideration)

(4) Brojendra Roy Chowdhury v Jugur Nath Roy, 6 W R 147 (1866)

(5) Nityanund Roy v Juggat Chandra Guha 7 C W N 105 (1902), Hari Doyal Singh v Sheikh Samsuddin, 5 C W N 240 (1900) [in which it was also held that s. 244 (now 115) did not apply], followed in Ram Kumar v Rani Gour 13 C W N 1080 (1909), Shanto Chandar Mukerji v Nam Sukh, 23 A 355, 356 (1901), and cases there cited, and in following notes as to suit for interest See Raghubar Dayal v Bank of Upper India 5 A 364 (1883) *et seq.*, and jurisdiction of Small Cause Court, 1 Ramesh Kumar Khan v Uma Charan Hazra, 1 C W N 140 (1896) Pachayappan v Narayana 11 M 269 (1884)

(6) Virasami v Aithi, 7 M 333 (1881)

land where possession has not been obtained (1) and to recover the purchase-money (2). A person was not a party precluded from suing because an order under sect 313 of the last Code was refused where, subsequent to such refusal, it appeared that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest (3). If the judgment debtor has any saleable interest in the property, the Court has no jurisdiction to order a refund, and an order made can be set aside on revision (4). The former section was held to empower the auction purchaser to require repayment of the purchase money, but did not impose upon the decree holder the duty of tendering the money as soon as the sale was set aside. He was bound to pay the purchase money only if called upon to do so, but not otherwise, and until he was so compelled to refund the purchase money he had no right to call upon the judgment debtor to pay his debt a second time (5). In a recent case under sect 315 of the last Code, it was held that an auction purchaser seeking to recover the purchase money on the ground that he has been deprived of the property owing to the failure of the debtor's title had no remedy outside the provisions of the Code, and the remedy given is not a suit for money had and received under Art 62 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act of 1908 but is a suit within Art 120 of that Act (6).

"Interest"—Thus the Court may refuse interest (7) as when a person claims more than he is found entitled to, (8) or if it is proved that the purchaser has contributed to the loss he has sustained (9). He should not however be charged with the expenses of the sale (10). Where a sale has been set aside the purchaser has been allowed the money laid out by him for the benefit of the property, accounting for the rent and profits (11).

94 Where a sale of immoveable property has become absolute (s 31 Certificate to purchaser absolute, the Court shall grant a certificate specifying the property sold and the name of the person who at the time of sale is declared to be the purchaser. Such certificate shall bear date *the day on which the sale became absolute*

(1) Kunhi Moidin v Terayil Moidin, 8 M 101 (1884)

(2) Kushun Lal v Mohammad Safdar Ali 13 A 353 (1891), Gurnidawa v Gangaya 23 B 753 (1897), Nityanund Roy v Juggat Chandra Guha, 7 C. W. N. 105 (1902) Premraj v Javarimal 15 Bom L R 41 (1913)

(3) Pachayappan v Narayana 11 M 269 (1887)

(4) Kunhamed v Chathu, 9 M 437 (1886)

(5) Venkata appa Row v Ayanna, 17 M L J 194 (1906)

(6) S. Ishwar Prasad Narain Singh v Goshain Mavanand 35 A 419 (1913), follow ing M Muldeen Ibrahim v Mahomed Mura

Lwar 23 M. L. J 487 (1912), and Munna Singh v Tajadhar Singh 5 A 577 (1883)

(7) See Moulvie Abdool Hye v Macrae 23 W R 15 (1874) [rate], Nafar Chandra v Gopal Chandra 19 C L J 358 (1914)

(8) Kushun Lal v Muhammad Safdar Ali 13 A. 353 356 (1891)

(9) Kunhi Moidin v Terayil Moidin 8 M 101, 103 (1884)

(10) Hardie Beebee v Surjooy Choudhury A H C R 309 (1864), Hubert v Lulland v Agra Misc, 1

(11) Morjan v Moulvie Abdul Hye 23 W R 393 (1877), see also Morjan v Singh v Hays v W L R 11 (1841)

"Immoveable property"—See notes (1)

"Has become absolute"—See notes to sect 65 and r 92, ante (2)

Sale certificate—See notes to sect 65, ante It was held that when a sale had become absolute the Court would grant a certificate to the representative of a deceased purchaser (3) A Court should not make an *ex parte* order amending a certificate, (4) and there is no appeal from an order amending a certificate on review inasmuch as the decree having been already executed the matter is not one relating to execution under sect 244 (now 47), ante (5)

Stamp Registration—Under sect 35 of the Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899) a sale certificate cannot be registered unless it has been duly stamped The sale certificate should not be granted until the auction purchaser has furnished the requisite stamp paper for its engrossment Attention is directed to the circumstance, which is often overlooked, that the stamp duty is payable, not by the deposit of the sum required to purchase stamps, but by the stamps themselves (6) Under the provisions contained in the second paragraph of sect 89 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), a copy of the certificate is to be sent by the Court to the Registering Officer Although sects 17, 32 58, 61, and 89 of that Act except sale certificates from the ordinary procedure in Registration, it was said in the Notes accompanying the first draft of the Bill that, "They leave it doubtful whether the action of the Court does or does not complete the registration of the certificate The procedure laid down in the case of sale certificates would seem sufficiently to meet the requirements contemplated by registration" It was accordingly proposed in the first draft to declare by an addition to sect 89 of the Registration Act on the lines of sect 81 of that enactment, that the "filing of such copy or copies shall have the same force and effect as registration" But this proposal has not been adopted (7) The stamp is required for the sale certificate itself The Court does not require an application for a certificate in writing, and if in writing it need not be stamped (8)

"Property sold"—Property not attached and not advertised for sale cannot be sold (9) No property can be sold except that which belongs to the defendants in the suit (10) What interest of the defendant passes is a mixed

(1) Hari Govinda Ramchandra, 9 B H C R 64 (1872), and see M M Mahatana Patch Sangi v Desai hallunrayaj, 10 B H C R 281 (1873) (Hindu Law as to immoveables)

(2) Musst Bhawan v Mathura Prasad, 16 C W N 985 (P C 1912)

(3) Vinayak Narayan v Dattatraya Krishna 24 B 120 (1899)

(4) Rajah Rughoo Nundan v Wilson, 23 W R 301 (1875)

(5) Boojha Roy v Ram Kumar Prasad 3 C W N 374 (1899)

(6) See *In re* Ram Krishna, 9 B 47 (1884)

(7) It was formerly a question of doubt

whether a sale certificate was compulsorily registrable under sect 17 of the Registration Act See Prokash Chunder Dass v Fara Chand Dass, 9 C 82 (1882), Shivram Narayan v Ravji Sakharam 7 B 254, 255 (1882).

under sect 89 of the Registration Act

(8) Hira Ambadas v Tekohan Ambadas, 13 B 670 (1889)

(9) Ram Onongroho v Mt Mentorun 1 W R 222 (1866)

(10) Kshen Chun lei v Annooran Marsh, 147 (1867)

question of law and fact depending on the questions what could be sold and what was in fact sold. To ascertain this the decree and the whole execution proceedings must be looked at. The question what legally passed by a sale cannot depend altogether upon the form of the sale certificate (1). See the notes to sect 65, *ante*, where this matter is more fully considered (2) as also the question whether any title to the thing sold is warranted. Sect 316 of the last Code dealt with the date of the vesting of the title, a matter which is now governed by sect 65, to which refer. This provision replaces that in the old Code, that the title should vest from the date of the certificate.

95. Where the immovable property sold is in the occu-

Delivery of property in
occupancy of judgment-
debtor

pancy of the judgment debtor or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the judgment debtor subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under rule 94, the Court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser, or any person whom he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf in possession of the property, and, if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same.

Delivery of possession—This rule corresponds with sect 263 of Act VIII of 1859. The words ‘and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under sect 316’ and ‘on application by the purchaser,’ were added by sect 318 of Act X of 1877. The present Code altered ‘sect 316’ to ‘rule 94’ and made the additions noted in italics: the words ‘the application of the purchaser’ being substituted for ‘application by the purchaser.’ As to trespass on land of which actual possession has been given to the purchaser under this rule see case cited (3).

‘Subsequently to the attachment’—A purchaser cannot get summary possession under this rule from the lessee *pendente lite* of the judgment debtor and must bring a suit for possession (4).

“On the application of the purchaser”—A judgment debtor in spite of confirmation of sale may oppose an application for possession on the ground that the sale was illegal, his occupancy holding not being transferable by

(1) *Assamathem Nema v. Hutchmeeput Singh* 4 C 142, at p 154 (1878). As to discrepancy between sale notification and sale certificate, see *Uma Churn Sen v. Gobind Chunder Mozumdar* 1 C L R 460 (1878), *Gowree Kumal v. Sarat Chunder Dass* 22 W R 403 (1874), and *Raja Thakur Ramnaha v. Jiban Ram* (P C), 13 C L J 111 (1913).

(2) *And see O. K. M. A. v. C. P. 1 v. 1 s. 1.*

sect 316, where some cases on Hindu Law will be found collected. As this matter involves a discussion of the substantive law it is not dealt with.

(3) *Kailash Chandra Jugal Das, et al v. J. J. 104* (1900).

(4) *Santomoney James v. J. J. 1 v. 1* C W N 21 (1878).

custom, (1) but he cannot oppose on the ground that the sale of a permanent tenure was confirmed without previous payment of the landlord's fee under sect 13 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (2)

"Order delivery"—A purchaser of an undivided share of a Hindu estate acquires only a right to sue for partition and for delivery of what may be allotted as that share. Such proceedings cannot be taken under this rule, and the dismissal of such an application under this rule will not bar a purchaser's suit for partition (3). For form of order, see the First Sched App E No 24.

Putting the purchaser in possession—A purchaser can obtain possession although in the first instance he obtained possession under r 96, (4) and a plaintiff obtaining symbolical possession can maintain a fresh suit for real possession (5) so can the assignee of the purchaser whose possession has been resisted by the judgment debtor, (6) as also a purchaser whether legal delivery has been given or not, (7) but he must have endeavoured to get possession under this rule first (8). By a later decision it was held a suit was maintainable even if he had not applied for possession under this rule, the remedies by suit and under this rule being concurrent (9). Possession being given fifteen years after the sale does not entitle the judgment debtor to recover possession by suit unless he shows twelve years' possession before he was dispossessed (10).

Limitation—An application for possession must be within three years of the grant of the sale certificate under Art 178 of Act XV of 1877 (Limitation Act) (11) even where the assignee of the purchaser applies, (12) the date being reckoned from when the certificate has been granted, that is, when it has been issued to him (13). The Madras High Court, however, held that in respect of a suit for possession the date from which time begins to run is that of the sale, and the Article applicable being 138 (14). This rule now expressly provides that in respect of an application for possession the three years run from the date of the certificate. A purchaser may sue for possession within twelve years of symbolical possession being given him (15). Symbolical possession as against

(1) Durga Charan v Kali Prasanna, 26 C 727 (1899). Arman Sardar v Satkhira Joint Company 18 C L J 564 (1913).

(2) Mohun Chandra v Ram Lochan 7 C W N 591 (1903).

(3) Ichumalai v Srinivasa 29 M 294 (1906). For case where judgment-debtor resisted taking possession of a house jointly owned by him, see Sarvi Begam v Taj Begam 36 A 181 (1914).

(4) Hur Kashore v Sudoy Chunder 17 W R 80 (1872).

(5) Shankar v Narasingrav, 22 B 667 (1897).

(6) Nagureddi Ramanna, 7 M 594 (1884), Sri M hun v Bilagoban 9 C 603 (1882).

(7) Sova v Muttusami 10 M 73 (1886).

(8) Iswar Pershad v Jai Narain 12 C 169 (1887).

(9) Kishori Mohun v Chunder Nath, 14 C 644 (1887), Krishna Satapathi v Sarasvati 31 M 177 (1903).

(10) Attoiram v Balunkee Doss, 14 W R 357 (1870).

(11) Hanmantrav v Subaji, 8 B 257 (1884).

(12) Arumuga v Chockalingam, 15 M 331 (1892). Pullayya v Ramayya 18 M 144 (1891).

(13) Kashinath v Duming Zuran, 17 B 228 (1892), see also Asudoolah v Akbar Ali, 7 W R 60 (1867).

(14) Venkatalingam v Veerasami 17 M 69 (1893).

(15) Joggobandhu v Purnanuni 16 C 530 (1889), Hari Mohan v Baburahi 24 C 715 (1897), Nasiruddin v Sayu Mir Ralman 19 C L J 201 (1913).

the grantors of a perpetual lease will not be effective against the lessee, so as to save limitation on a suit for possession (1) The Allahabad Court have, however, held that a purchaser cannot bring a suit for possession, even if his application for possession under this rule is barred, as the matter comes under sect 47 (2) In another case the same Court has held that the fact that an application under this rule has been rejected as being made beyond time is no bar to a suit by the auction purchaser for the property purchased (3) And there are other decisions holding that sect 47 is inapplicable (4)

Appeal—An appeal was held to lie from an order rejecting the application of the purchaser, who was the decree holder, the order being appealable as one under sect 244 (now 47) for possession (5) But the Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts have held otherwise, sect 244 of the last Code not being applicable, (6) but where the application for possession was resisted by the legal representative of the judgment-debtor on the allegation that portions of the property belonged to him and not to the judgment debtor, the Calcutta High Court held the application to be one within that section and therefore appealable (7)

96 *Where the property sold is in the occupancy of a tenant* [s 31] or other person entitled to occupy the same and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under rule 91, the Court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by affixing a copy of the certificate of sale in some conspicuous place on the property, and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode, at some convenient place, that the interest of the judgment debtor has been transferred to the purchaser

Delivery of possession—This rule corresponds with sect 264 of Act VIII of 1859, with the exception of the words "*and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under sect 316*" which were added by sect 319 of Act X of 1877, and the words in italics by the present Code which also altered 'sect 316' into "*rule 91*" This rule does not prevent the purchaser obtaining possession, if he can, without the intervention of the Court (8)

"Certificate in respect thereof"—It was not incumbent on the Court

(1) *Gossain Dalmar v Bepin Behary*, 18 C 520 (1891), *Nasiruddin v Sayyidur Rahman*, 19 C L J 209 (1913)

(2) *Kalyan Singh v Thakur Das*, 3 A L J 234 (1906)

(3) *Sheo Narain v Nur Muhammed* 29 A 463 (1907), *Bhagwati v Banwari Lal*, 31 A 82 (1 B) (1908)

(4) *Bhumal v Ganesh Koer*, 1 C W N 638 (1897), *Mahomed Mosraf v Habib Mia*, 6 C. L. J 749 (1904), *Chulam v Dwarka Prasad*, 18 A 36 (1897)

(5) *Muttia v Appasami*, 13 M. 504 (1893)

(6) *Bhumal v Ganesh Koer*, 1 C W N 638 (1897) [dissenting from *Muttia v Appasami*, 13 M. 504 (1893)], *Mahomed Mosraf v Habib Mia*, 6 C. L. J 749 (1904), and see *Kastura Kunwar v Gava Prasad*, 29 A 207 (1906), *Bhagwati v Banwari Lal*, 31 A 82 (F B) (1908)

(7) *Mathuraman v Gobinda*, 27 C 34 (1899)

(8) *Oblaya Churn v Pajeniro* (1854) 22 W R. 406 (1874).

under Act VIII of 1859, to put a purchaser into possession until he had his certificate of sale (1)

"Order delivery"—The Courts in this country do not give possession by removing the possession of one who is in possession under an apparent *bona fide* title. If the debtor can assert his title in possession by suit only, the purchaser can have no higher claim (2). Formal possession under O XXI r 36 given by a Court in execution operates as between the parties in point of law and fact, as a complete transfer of actual possession from one party to another, (3) and where land which had been given by a father to his son, a minor, was subsequently attached and sold in execution of a decree against the father, formal possession under this rule to the purchaser completely dispossessed the father whether he held on his own account or that of his son, (4) but such possession will not take effect as actual possession as against persons who are not parties to the suit, (5) nor against a purchaser, in execution of the rights of the judgment debtor, who had previously obtained actual possession (6). The delivery of possession to the purchaser under this rule does not cause dispossession of a person not the judgment debtor, found in possession by receipt of rent from tenants so as to entitle the latter to complain under O XXI r 99 (7). Symbolical possession as against the grantors of a perpetual lease, without reservation to the grantors and with no rights reserved and only a nominal rent, will not be effective against the lessee to save limitation against a plea of adverse possession (8). The rightful owner dispossessing the other is not a trespasser, and may rely for the support of his possession on the title vested in him (9). An order under this rule can only be made by the presiding officer of the Court and is a judicial Act (10).

Limitation—The period of limitation for an application under this rule, viz three years under Art 178, Sched I of the Limitation Act, is reckoned from the date when the sale becomes absolute. If formal possession be infructuous a suit against the judgment debtor for possession is good within twelve years of the sale under Art 138 of Sched I of the Limitation Act (11). It has been held that Art 138 of the Limitation Act only applies to suits in which the auction purchaser is the plaintiff and the judgment debtor, or a person claiming through him, the defendant (12). Where a purchaser is resisted in obtaining possession by a person claiming under a mortgage from the judgment debtor and sues for possession the suit is governed by the same article, even though he alleges the

(1) *Dukaram v Satvaji* 5 B 206 (1881)
(2) *Tarakant v Puddumoney* 10 Moo L A 483 (1866)

(3) *Lokeswar v Purgun* 7 C 418 (1881), but see *Mahadeo v Janu*, 35 B 376 (1912) 14 Bom. L R 115

(4) *Devu t Ramamurti* 18 M 405 (1894)
(5) *Ranjit Singh t Bunwari*, 10 C 993 (1884), *Tiggobundhu t Ram Chander* 5 C 584

(6) *Naran Das v Lalla Prasad* 21 A 26 (1859).

(7) *Kisori Lal v Lala Shub Lal*, 1 C W N 343 (1897)

(8) *Gossain Dalmar v Bepin Behary*, 13 C 520 (1891)

(9) *Bandu v Naba* 15 B 238 (1890)

(10) *Prem Krishna v Jaramoni* 13 C W N 694 (1909)

(11) *Krishna Lal v Radh t Krishna*, 10 C 402

(12) *Bhagwant Singh v Bholi Singh*, 35 A 473 (1913)

mortgage to be collusive and fraudulent (1) and sues to set it aside (2). It has been held that if the purchaser be dispossessed by a third party subsequent to formal possession he has twelve years from dispossession to bring a suit; (3) while, if the judgment-debtor be in possession and formal possession be given under this rule instead of under r 95, a suit for possession against him lies within twelve years of the date of formal possession, (4) as formal possession under either r. 95 or this rule forms a fresh starting point for limitation as against the judgment debtor, (5) whether actual possession be obtained or not (6). But a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has recently held that a mere formal possession of immoveable property by a purchaser at a Court-sale cannot prevent limitation running in favour of the judgment-debtor where the latter remains in actual possession, for symbolical possession is neither real possession nor equivalent to it under this Code except where the Code expressly or by implication so provides (7).

Appeal.—It was held that no appeal lay from an order for possession under the former section (8).

Resistance to delivery of possession to decree holder or purchaser

97. (1) *Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction*

(2) The Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same

98. *Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment debtor or by some other person at his instigation, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may*

(1) *Uma Shankar v. Balka Prasad*, 6 A 75 (1883)

(2) *Ikram Singh v. Intizam*, 6 A. 200 (1884)

(3) *Juggobundhu v. Ram Chunder*, 5 C 544 (1880), *Juggobundhu v. Purnanund* 16 C. 530 (1889), *Nasruddin v. Sayadur Rahman*, 19 C. L. J. 209 (1913)

(4) *Gopal v. Krishnarao* 23 B 275 (1900), *Maha Rao v. Parashram*, 23 B. 359 (1900),

Hari Mohan v. Baburahi, 24 C 715 (1897) the two former cases have recently been overruled in *Mahadeo v. Janu*, 36 B. 376 (1912), *post*

(5) *Mangli v. Debi Das*, 19 A. 488 (1897)

(6) *Umbela Churn v. Madhub Ghosal* 4 C. 670 (1879), 4 C. L. R. 55.

(7) *Mahadeo v. Janu*, 36 B. 376 (F. B.) (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 115.

(8) *Ghulam v. Dwarka*, 18 A. 36 (1895)

also, at the instance of the *applicant*, order the judgment debtor, or any person acting at his instigation, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days

Obstruction of decree holder or purchaser—These and the following rules have been remodelled. These two rules applied under the last Code to applications made by the decree holder (1) only but now to applications both by decree holder and purchaser thus embodying the provisions of sect 334 of the last Code. The preceding Code did not make it obligatory on a decree holder who was obstructed to pursue his remedies under these provisions. And it was accordingly held that the failure on the part of plaintiff to avail himself of this summary remedy did not bar a suit (2). Moreover it was held that there was nothing to prevent the decree holder or purchaser who had been obstructed from making a fresh application for delivery (3). The omission to have recourse to the provisions of the former Code did not it was held preclude a person from instituting a suit to recover possession or making a fresh application for delivery. An order under the former section passed against a person who had at the instigation of the judgment debtor obstructed a decree holder has been held not to bar a suit (4). A decree for partition is a decree for possession and the rule is not rendered inapplicable by the fact that the person obstructing claims to be a *mulgani* tenant (5). Every obstruction must be caused either by the judgment debtor or claimants at his instigation by persons who have no real interest in the property or by third parties claimants. The present rules deal with the first two cases and the next with the third (6). The effect of the remodeling of the rules is as follows. Sects 328-330 of the last Code applied to decree holders only and sect 334 to obstruction of purchasers. The provisions of these sections are incorporated in rr 97 and 98 which apply in favour both of the decree holder and purchaser and against the judgment debtor. R 99 applies in favour of the same persons but against persons other than the judgment debtor. This rule which incorporates the portion of sect 335 which dealt with the purchaser modifies sect 331. The provisions as to trying the claim as a suit with the resultant appeal are omitted. But all parties except the judgment debtor have a right of suit under r 103. Lastly rr 100 101 and 103 which incorporate sects 332 and 335 deal with the dispossession of third parties. The former section dealt with dispossession at the instance of the decree holder and the latter with dispossession by the purchaser. Both are now dealt with together. The Judge should fix a day make an inquiry on taking evidence and if he directs that the property should be delivered in whole or in part should order that posses

(1) *Itire Bheo Mahtab Koomaree* 19 W 1 62 (18 3)

(2) *Balvant Santaram v Babaj Naick*, 8 B 602 (1884) see *Jugnoo un Towaree v Baloo Naick* 3 *Agra* 16° *Trimbak v Narayan* 8 B 481 (1884)

(3) *Muthia v Appasami* 13 M 504 506 (1880) w/c also *Ida v Ilfi* s l ject of appeal as to l cl see also *Govinda Naick*

Kesava 3 M 81 84 (1880)

(4) *Bashen Dyal Singh v Sagar Singh* ° C W N 311 (1896)

(5) *Gopala v Iernandes* 16 M 127 (189°)

(6) *Govinda Naik v Kesava* 3 M 81 84 (1880) approved in *Radhika Gobind v Raghunath* 18 C L J 138 (1913) *Salam v Marthava* 18 B n 711 (188) *I connath Roy v Clo Hry* 8 W R 398 (1887)

sion be given in one or other of the ways mentioned in the Code (1) It has been held that this rule should be read with r 95 (2) These and the following sections in the former Code have been held not to apply to proceedings under the Mamlukdar s Act (3)

"Is resisted"—There is of course no indication as to the nature of the resistance or obstruction, but there must be some overt act of opposition to the Court's officers on the part of some one who is actually present (4)

"Possession"—*This term in this and the next rule has been held to include constructive and symbolical as well as actual physical possession* Possession of immoveable property is not the less real or actual because it is enjoyed through tenants, servants, or members of one s family (5) The same was held as regards sect 335 of the last Code, (6) the provisions of which are incorporated in rr 97, 99, and 100

Limitation—The resistance or obstruction referred to is that mentioned as forming the subject of the complaint, and limitation is not necessarily to be computed from the date of first obstruction (7) For the limitation is one which governs a cause of action arising out of a particular resistance or obstruction (8) Further, the period mentioned is important only as the limit prescribed within which the judgment creditors may by virtue of this rule bring what is in effect an action of ejectment against a stranger without the expense of a regular suit Other proceedings may be taken against a judgment debtor in execution within the period prescribed from the last application of the kind even though not instituted within thirty days after a wrongful obstruction (9) An application must be brought within thirty days of the obstruction but where according to the former procedure under sect 331 the application was converted into a suit, the rights of the parties had to be decided as if an ordinary suit for possession had been instituted by the decree holder against the defendant (10) When litigation under that section was pending, the proceedings in execution were

(1) See *Brojo Mohun Sutputty v Shooda Monce*, 8 W R 79 (1867), *Shadhoo daran t Bhuggoo Lall*, 12 W R 98 (1869)

(2) *Huppans v Kumara*, 34 M 450 (1910)

(3) *Hasam Sahib t Maruti*, 13 B 552 (1888)

(4) *Mancharam t Fakirchand*, 20 B 478 485, 486 (1901) See *Mahabir Prasad t Parma*, 14 A 417 (1892)

(5) *Mancharam v Fakir Chand*, 3 Bom L R 69 (1900) *per cur Whitworth, J*, dissent. holding possession in the next rule is limited to actual physical possession, and does not extend to the possession of a landlord through his tenants.

(6) *Brabajala Devi t Gurudas Mundle*, 33 C 457 (1907)

(7) *Ramaswara Pillai t Dharmasava*, 3

M 113 (1881) as to the meaning of term month and exclusion of days of dispossession see *Dad t Balganda* 5 Bom. H C R 1 C J 39 (1869)

(8) *Narain Das t Hazari Lall* 18 A 33 (1895)

(9) *Hunkur Singh t Madho Lall*, 21 W R 147 (1874)

(10) *Nandev v Ramchandra* 18 B 37 (1892)

(11) *Narayan v Dono*, 24 B 340 (1899), s. c., 1 Bom. L R 846.

(12) *Shivram t Sarasvatibai*, 20 B 175 (1894) As to adverse possession see *Krishnaji t Kashiabai*, 30 B 115 (1905), and dismissal for default, *Sarat Chandra t Taram Prasad Pat*, 4 C. 491 (1907), *Kunj Behari t Khandi Prasad*, 6 C. L. J 302 (1907)

did not, it was held, prevent the losing party from bringing a regular suit (1) As regards, however, the present amended procedure, see next rule A suit lies under r 103 *post*

"Detained in the civil prison"—It was thought that the previous expression, "*commit the judgment debtor or such other person to jail,*" was misleading as raising questions of diet money as in the case of civil imprisonment for debt The language has, therefore, been altered to render it clear that the provision relates to conviction of an offence in contempt of justice The words "*without prejudice to any proceedings,*" etc., in the former sect 330, have been omitted, though presumably the law remains the same in this respect

99 *Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by any person (other than the judgment-debtor) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application*

Resistance or obstruction by bona fide claimant

Object of rule—The object of the corresponding and similar provisions in the last Code was so far as possible, to prevent the originating of a succession of suits It was desired that a right should be determined finally in continuation of an original proceeding and not by fresh proceedings (2) This section, as the last, was limited to application by the decree holder (3) but now includes orders made on the application of a purchaser against a person other than the judgment debtor (4) A person in whose favour an order under sect 335 had been made could not claim the benefit of the former section (5) As to the amendments, *vide post*

"Court"—A Superior Court might, it was held, for sufficient cause transfer a claim registered under the former section to a Subordinate Court for trial (6)

"In possession"—See next paragraph

"An order dismissing the application"—Under the last Code the claim was registered as a suit, and the Court investigated the claim as such It then ordered or stayed execution of the decree The order had the force of a decree, and was appealable as such No question of title between the plaintiff and his

(1) Beni Prasad v Lachman Prasad 4 A 131 (1881)

(2) Sithalakshmi v Vythilinga 8 M 548 (1884) In Gonesh Pershad v Jykesun 1 A H C R 218, the section was held inapplicable to the case of a person put in possession of land under a decree

(3) Buhai Singh Chowdhry v Bihari Lal, 1 B L R 206 (1868) See Mahabir Pershad v Parmo 14 A 417 (1892) in which the scope of the section is commented upon

(4) See as to this and s 47, Jathavandan v Kunchu 30 M 72 (1906), and as to the same

account, see Jugol Kishore v Ambika Devi 16 C W N 882 (1912)

(5) Srinath Ghosh v Ananda Prasad Roy, 1 C W N 192 (1896)

(6) Sithalakshmi v Vythilinga 8 M 548 (1884)

judgment debtor requiring the decree against them to be reopened could be adjudicated upon. The issues which properly arose in an inquiry were whether the person obstructing was in possession on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment debtor (1). The word "possession" was not limited to actual physical possession, but included also constructive, such as by a tenant (2). The issue which arose was one between the decree-holder as plaintiff and the claimant, that is a person other than the judgment-debtor.

Under the Code of 1877 the claim had to be investigated as if a suit had been instituted under sect 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The powers of the Court were thus strictly limited to an inquiry into the question of possession (3).

The Code was amended by sect 52 of Act XII of 1879, the provisions of which were re-enacted in the Code of 1882, and the power of investigation was enlarged. The investigation was not limited to the fact of possession. Any question of title arising between the contending parties in connection with their right of possession might be finally determined in such investigation as in an ordinary action of ejectment. The order, whether for executing or for staying execution, had the force of a decree determining the title and the right of possession. The plaintiff was not forced to a fresh suit or had a right to bring a fresh suit if the decree was against him (4). Where possession was shown to have been with the plaintiff the defendants were not, without showing title in themselves, at liberty to impeach the plaintiff's title or to set up a *jus tertii*. The onus of proving a better title than the plaintiff's rested with them, and they might prove their title as a defence (5). A Court executing a decree was thus given a special jurisdiction which enabled it to try a claim of which the value of the subject matter fell below the pecuniary limits of its ordinary jurisdiction (6).

It will be observed that considerable amendments have been made in the present rule. Under the first paragraph of the former sect 331 the claim was to have been "numbered and registered as a suit between the decree holder as plaintiff and the claimant as defendant." Paragraph 2 under which the Court had power in investigation of 'the like powers' as if a suit for the property had been instituted by the decree holder against the claimant is omitted, as also the third and fourth paragraphs under which the Court passed an order executing or staying execution which had the force of a decree, and was subject to the same conditions as to appeal. The words 'with the like powers' were

(1) *Mahomed Isah v Bahotappa* 27 B 302 (1903), s. c., 5 Bom L R 201, dist *Moulakhan v Gori Khan*, 14 B 627 (1890) which was a case between a decree holder and a person resisting execution claiming under a title adverse to the judgment debtor, where obviously the question of title as between those parties necessarily required decision in that case.

(2) *Mancharam v Fakirchand*, 25 B 478, s. c., 3 Bom L R 58. As to nature and terms of tenancy, see *Tahb Hossain v Gooroo Pershad* 20 W R 57 (1873).

(3) *Moula Khan v Gori Khan*, 14 B 627,

632 (1890). *Chinnasami Pillai v Krishnai Pillai* 3 M 104 (1881).

(4) *Mahip Rai v Dwarka Rai* 27 A 403 (1904), *Moula Khan v Gori Khan* *supra*, *Bapujirao v Fateasing Shahaji* 22 B 967 (1890), *Mancharam v Fakirchand* 25 B 478, 481 (1901).

(5) *Bapujirao v Fateasing* 22 B 967 (1890). See as to onus, *Rajhal Chunder Mundul v Watson*, 10 C 50 (1883). *Mancharam v Fakirchand*, 25 B 478 (1901).

(6) *Sathalakami v Vythilinga*, 8 M 549 (1884). See *Kalma v Naman Katti*, 13 M 520, 522 (1890).

held to mean that the Court has the same powers for enforcing the attendance of parties and witnesses, etc., as it has in a suit (1) as regards appeal. A refusal to number and register the claim was held to amount to the rejection of a plaint,

seen dissented

but the order

the force of a

sect 9 of the

Specific Relief Act, were in the nature of a fresh suit, and, therefore, an appeal lay (5). The Court to which an appeal lay depended on the value of the claim and not that of the original suit (6).

Now the Court, under the second clause of r 97, *ante*, is to investigate "the matter." If the obstruction is caused by the judgment-debtor, the order under r 98 is that the applicant be put in possession. If the obstruction is due to the *bona fide* claim of a third party, the application is dismissed under this rule. It is not stated what the scope of the inquiry in the latter case is to be. Presumably, however, it is to be of a summary character, even if it is not limited to the question of possession. For now a right of suit is given by r 103 to persons against whom orders are made under the present rule. Their position is therefore assimilated to that of parties against whom orders are made under r 98, 100 and 102 to whom a right of suit is given by r 103 of this Order.

s 332,
35]

100 (1) Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder or purchaser holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession.

(2) The Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same.

332
35]

101 Where the Court is satisfied that the applicant was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment debtor, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property.

Scope of rules.—The preceding rules refer to a resistance offered in the course of delivery of possession in execution, whilst these rules refer to a subst-

(1) *Sithalaksmi v Vythilinga*, 8 M 548 500 (1884)

(2) *Fonandro Deb Raikut v Rani Jugodah wari*, 14 C 234 (1886), *Gopala v Fernandes*, 16 M 127 (1892), *Baranagore Jute Factory, Ltd v Raj Kumar*, 13 C W N 724 (1900)

(3) *Vishnu v Ramchandra*, J Bom L R

936 (1907)

(4) *Lala v Narayan*, 21 B 392 (1890)

(5) *Nasir Ali Fakir v Meher Ali*, 22 C 830 (1890)

(6) *Mo lakhhan v Gori Khan*, 11 B 67

(1890) *Kalmay v Nann Kuttu*, 13 M 520 (1890)

quent stage, viz to the extent which may arise as to the result of the delivery of possession, (1) and give an applicant a right of contesting, without instituting a separate suit, the decree holder's or purchaser's right to dispossess him (2) As to dispossession by purchaser, the rule thus incorporates that portion of sect 335 of last Code. It was held that if in execution of decree a claim made by a third party in possession is rejected, he should either bring a regular suit or wait until he is dispossessed, and then apply under the former section or bring a separate suit, or he might do both (3) See as to regular suit, which is now dealt with by r 103, post, of this Order, cases cited (4) In a suit instituted under that rule the judgment and the decree in the original suit are not admissible in evidence (5) Where the judgment creditor obtained an order for possession prior to the death of the judgment debtor, it was held that there was no necessity for him to bring any other person on the record between the date of that order and the date on which the order was executed (6) The rule applies to possessory actions (7) Where in execution a person not a party to the suit is dispossessed, his dispossession does not give him a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the mamlatdar. This rule applies (8) This rule does not apply where sect 47 does (9) It does not apply to a case where the execution of the decree has been transferred to the Collector and he has acted under the powers conferred on him by the Local Government Board under sect 70 (10) A person is none the less a judgment debtor because he may have acquired an interest subsequent to the date of the decree passed against him (11)

Procedure—The Court should first examine the applicant in order to determine whether proceedings under this rule will lie or not, (12) and if it appears that the applicant was a party to the decree, (13) or that he is still in

(1) *Bishen Dyal Singh v Sagar Singh*, 2 C W N 311, 314 (1896). See *Ram Chandra Subrao v Ravji*, 20 B 301 303 (1895), which deals with the subject of dispossession, as also does *Mancharam v Fakir Chand* 3 Bom L R 58 (1900)

(2) *Mahomed Ansur v Prokash Chunder Sha* 8 W R 8 (1867). As to limitation, see Art. 165, Sch. II, Act XV of 1877, and transfer where the Court is deprived of jurisdiction pending proceedings, *Kaleo Dass Neogy v Huro Nath Roy Chowdhury*, 3 W R 5 (1865), and withdrawal of application, *Sabbaramen v Ponnasawmy Chetty*, 5 M. H. C. R 298 (1870)

(3) *Fergusson v Nulomul Labaree*, 23 W R. 270 (1875), *Bishen Sundar v Fukeer ooddeen*, 1864 W R 61 (1864), *Gulabhai v Jinabhai*, 13 B 213 (1888)

(4) *Ayyasami v Saranya*, 3 M 32 (1884) [limitation], approved in *Mandi Sardar v Gorachand*, 16 C W N 971 (1912), and *Maula Baksh v Bhaba Sundari Dasya*, 19

C L J 187 (1913), *Ram Narain Dutt v Annoda Prosad Joshi*, 14 C 681 (1887) [mis joinder]

(5) *Dhani Kalwar v Burj Bhukan Roy*, 1 C W N clxxxv (1897)

(6) *Bayyalla v Fakira*, 12 M. 211 (1889)

(7) *Brahmo Moyee Dabee v Burknt Sardar*, 13 W R 264 (1870)

(8) *Ram Chandra Subrao v Ravji*, 20 B 351 (1895)

(9) *Imdad Ali v Jagin Lal*, 17 A 478 481 (1895)

(10) *Ragho v Hanmati*, 15 Bom L R 389 (1913), 37 B 488.

(11) *Shripati v Piraji*, 9 Bom. L R 1018 (1907)

(12) *Obhoy Churn Dey v Rajendro Coomar Ghose*, 16 W R 288 (1871)

(13) *Ram Gopal Chuckerbutty v Poorno Chunder Bannerjee*, 12 W R. 475 (1869). See *Huree Kishore v Kaleo Kishore*, 8 W R 114 (1867)

held to mean that the Court has the same powers for enforcing the attendance of parties and witnesses, etc., as it has in a suit (1) as regards appeal. A refusal to number and register the claim was held to amount to the rejection of a plaint, and was, therefore, appealable, (2) though these decisions have been dissented from (3). Where a claim was registered out of time no appeal lay, but the order could be objected to in an appeal from the final order which had the force of a decree (4). Proceedings taken after a decree for possession under sect 9 of the Specific Relief Act, were in the nature of a fresh suit, and, therefore, an appeal lay (5). The Court to which an appeal lay depended on the value of the claim and not that of the original suit (6).

Now the Court, under the second clause of r 97, *ante*, is to investigate "the matter". If the obstruction is caused by the judgment debtor, the order under r 98 is that the applicant be put in possession. If the obstruction is due to the *bona fide* claim of a third party, the application is dismissed under this rule. It is not stated what the scope of the inquiry in the latter case is to be. Presumably, however, it is to be of a summary character, even if it is not limited to the question of possession. For now a right of suit is given by r 103 to persons against whom orders are made under the present rule. Their position is therefore assimilated to that of parties against whom orders are made under rr 98, 100 and 102 to whom a right of suit is given by r 103 of this Order.

332, 100. (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor
] Dispossessed by decree-holder or purchaser is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession.

(2) The Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same.

332, 101. Where the Court is satisfied that the applicant was in
] *Bona fide* claimant to be restored to possession possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property

Scope of rules.—The preceding rules refer to a resistance offered in the course of delivery of possession in execution, whilst these rules refer to a subse-

(1) *Sthalaksmi v Vythilinga*, 8 M 548 550 (1884)

(2) *Fonndro Deb Raikut v Rani Jugodish wari*, 14 C 234 (1886), *Gopala v Fernandes*, 16 M 127 (1892), *Baranagore Jute Factory, Ltd v Raj Kumar*, 13 C W N 724 (1900)

(3) *Vishnu v Ramchandra*, 9 Bom L R

936 (1907)

(4) *Lala v Narayan* 21 B 392 (1890)

(5) *Nasir Ali Fakir v Meher Ali*, 22 C 830 (1890)

(6) *Moulakhan v Gori Khan*, 14 B 627 (1890), *Kalima v Naman Kuti*, 13 M 520 (1890)

quent stage, viz to the event which may arise as to the result of the delivery of possession, (1) and give an applicant a right of contesting, without instituting a separate suit, the decree holder's or purchaser's right to dispossess him (2) As to dispossession by purchaser, the rule thus incorporates that portion of sect 335 of last Code It was held that if in execution of decree a claim made by a third party in possession is rejected, he should either bring a regular suit or wait until he is dispossessed, and then apply under the former section or bring a separate suit, or he might do both (3) See as to regular suit, which is now dealt with by r 103, *post*, of this Order, cases cited (4) In a suit instituted under that rule the judgment and the decree in the original suit are not admissible in evidence (5) Where the judgment creditor obtained an order for possession prior to the death of the judgment debtor it was held that there was no necessity for him to bring any other person on the record between the date of that order and the date on which the order was executed (6) The rule applies to possessory actions (7) Where in execution a person not a party to the suit is dispossessed, his dispossession does not give him a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the mamlatdar This rule applies (8) This rule does not apply where sect 47 does (9) It does not apply to a case where the execution of the decree has been transferred to the Collector and he has acted under the powers conferred on him by the Local Government Board under sect 70 (10) A person is none the less a judgment debtor because he may have acquired an interest subsequent to the date of the decree passed against him (11)

Procedure—The Court should first examine the applicant in order to determine whether proceedings under this rule will lie or not (12) and if it appears that the applicant was a party to the decree (13) or that he is still in

(1) *Bishen Dyal Singh v Sagar Singh*, 2 C W N 311, 314 (1896) See *Ram Chandra Subrao v Ravji*, 20 B 351 353 (1895), which deals with the subject of dispossession as also does *Mancharam v Fakir Chand* 3 Bom L R 58 (1900)

(2) *Mahomed Ansur v Prokash Chunder Sha*, 8 W R 8 (1867) As to limitation, see Art 165, Sch. II, Act XV of 1877 and transfer where the Court is deprived of jurisdiction pending proceedings, *Kaleo Dass Neogy v Huro Nath Roy Chowdhury* 3 W R 5 (1866) and withdrawal of application, *Sabbaramen v Ionunsawmy Chetty*, 5 M H C R 298 (1870)

(3) *Fergusson v Nilkomul Laharee*, 23 W R 270 (1875), *Kishen Sundar v Fuheer ooddeen* 1864 W R 61 (1864), *Gulabhai v Jinabhai*, 13 B. 213 (1888)

(4) *Ayyasami v Saraniya*, 8 M 82 (1884) [limitation], approved in *Maindi Sardar v Gorachand*, 16 C W N 971 (1912), and *Maula Balah v Bhaba Sundari Dasta* 19

C L J 187 (1913), *Ram Narain Dutt v Anoda Prasad Joshi* 14 C 681 (1887) [mis-joinder]

(5) *Dhani Kalwar v Birj Bhukan Roy* 1 C W N clxxxv (1897)

(6) *Biyyakha v Fakira*, 12 M. 211 (1889)

(7) *Brahmo Moyee Dabcei Burkut Sirdar*, 13 W R 264 (1870)

(8) *Ram Chandra Subrao v Ravji*, 20 B 351 (1895)

(9) *Imdad Ali v Jagin Lal*, 17 A 478 481 (1895)

(10) *Ragho v Hanmati*, 15 Bom L R 389 (1913), 37 B 488

(11) *Shripati v Piraji*, 9 Bom L R 1018 (1907)

(12) *Obhoy Churn Dey v Rajendro Coomar Ghose*, 16 W R. 283 (1871)

(13) *Ram Gopal Chuckerbitty v Poorno Chunder Bannerjee*, 12 W R 475 (1869) *Hureo Kishore v Kaleo Kishore*, 8 W P (1867)

possession, (1) or in receipt of rent from the judgment debtor, (2) the application should be rejected, but not on the ground of possession if the parties are agreed that the applicant has been dispossessed (3) nor on the ground that the applicant had not originally obtained possession in a strictly legal manner (4) It is sufficient if it should appear that the party, though not in personal occupation, was in possession by receipt of rent, (5) or as mortgagee, or as mortgagor through a mortgage in possession (6) and has been dispossessed under the decree or under colour of it. A mortgagee from a tenant is in possession on his own account (7) A member of a joint Hindu family, however, cannot say that he is in possession of any particular portion of the joint family on his own account, his possession being that of the family (8) A party dispossessed under colour of a decree to which he was no party is entitled to an investigation and to an order if his title is established (9) If the claimant was in possession, though without a good title, he cannot be dispossessed in execution of a decree against a third party to which he was no party. On the other hand if the party against whom the decree was obtained was in possession, though without a good title no person not in actual possession or receipt of rent can resist execution (10) The onus is on the applicant (11) The order under r 101 decides the question of possession and is made dependent on the result of the suit to establish the right. It is therefore unnecessary to sue to have it cancelled (12) If there are several applications each application should be tried separately (13) It is incumbent on the applicant to prove whether or not the judgment-debtor was in possession at the date of the sale and the onus is not discharged by mere proof that he was in possession at some time antecedent to twelve years before the suit (14)

(1) *Kalke Narain Singh v Protap Chunder Burmah* 12 W R 231 (1869), *Rutton Krieger v Tussauds & Co*, 22 W R 103 (1874)

(2) *Brabajala v Gurudas* 33 C 487 (1906)

(3) *Julio Kapalce v Issur Chunder Roy* 17 W R 375 (1872)

(4) *Obhoya Churn Dev v Rajendro Chandra Ghose* 22 W R 406 (1874)

(5) *Bhyrab Sircar v Sham Manjee* 15 W R 70 (1871) *Banee Mahub Dutt v Sund Lal Mehermal* 22 W R 123 (1874)

(6) *Asgur Ali v Asgur Ali*, 20 W R 373 (1873) distinguished in *Kedar Nath v Saday Chandra*, 11 C L J 13 (1914), *post*, *Shafiuddin v Lochan Singh* 2 A 94 (1878), as to recovery of possession by mortgagee see *Bhikaji v Vallabh Das*, 2 Bom H C R 209 (1864) and dispossession by mortgagee of joint tenancy see *Tarakant Bannerjee v Pur*

476, 485 (1866)

(7) *Radhakrishnan v C I J* 13 (191)

(8) *Coover v* 718 (1877)

293 (1909) The former case has been recently distinguished in *Radha Gobind v Raghu Nath*, 18 C L J 133 (1913), following *Gorinda Nair v Kesava*, 3 M 91 (1880) And see *Sheik Abdul v Jadunandan*, 18 C L J 344 (he cannot alienate a particular share)

(9) *Hassan Ali v Nair Ahmed*, 11 W R 148 (1869)

(10) *Sharada Moyce v Nobin Chunder*, 11 W R 255 (1869)

(11) *Mahomed Anwar v Prokash Chunder Sha* 8 W R 8 (1867), *Woodley Tara Chowdhury v Khajah Abdul Ganee*, 12 W R 16 (1869), *Judoo Nath Singh v Kalee Pershad*, 14 W R 358 (1870), *Brindaban Chunder Roy v Tara Chand Bannerjee*, 20 W R 114 (1873), as to objection that decree is barred, see *Mohesh Chunder v Chandra Monee*, 9 W R 486 (1868)

(12) *Ayyasami v Samiya*, 3 M 52, 53 (1864)

(13) *Sharada Moyce v Nobin Chunder*, 11 W R 255 (1869)

(14) *Nasuruddin v Sayadur Rahman*, 19 C L J 209 (1913), *Mohima Chunder v* 473 (1868)

possession, (1) or in receipt of rent from the judgment debtor, (2) the application should be rejected, but not on the ground of possession if the parties are agreed that the applicant has been dispossessed, (3) nor on the ground that the applicant had not originally obtained possession in a strictly legal manner (4) It is sufficient if it should appear that the party, though not in personal occupation, was in possession by receipt of rent, (5) or as mortgagee, or as mortgagor through a mortgagee in possession (6) and has been dispossessed under the decree or under colour of it A mortgagee from a tenant is in possession on his own account (7) A member of a joint Hindu family, however, cannot say that he is in possession of any particular portion of the joint family on his own account, his possession being that of the family (8) A party dispossessed under colour of a decree to which he was no party is entitled to an investigation and to an order if his title is established (9) If the claimant was in possession, though without a good title he cannot be dispossessed in execution of a decree against a third party to which he was no party On the other hand, if the party against whom the decree was obtained was in possession though without a good title, no person not in actual possession or receipt of rent can resist execution (10) The onus is on the applicant (11) The order under r 101 decides the question of possession and is made dependent on the result of the suit to establish the right It is therefore unnecessary to sue to have it cancelled (12) If there are several applications each application should be tried separately (13) It is incumbent on the applicant to prove whether or not the judgment debtor was in possession at the date of the sale and the onus is not discharged by mere proof that he was in possession at some time antecedent to twelve years before the suit (14)

(1) *Kaleo Narain Singh v Protap Chunder Burooah* 12 W R 231 (1869), *Ruttun Kooer v Tussuduck Hossein* 22 W R 103 (1874)

(2) *Brajabala v Gurudas*, 33 C 487 (1906)

(3) *Judoo Kapalce v Issur Chunder Roy* 17 W R 375 (1872)

(4) *Obhoja Churn Dey v Rajendro Coowar Ghose*, 22 W R 406 (1874)

(5) *Bhyrab Sircar v Shani Manjee*, 15 W R 70 (1871) *Banee Madhub Dutt v Nund Lal Mojoomdar* 22 W R 123 (1874)

(6) *Asgur Ali v Asgur Ali*, 20 W R 373 (1873) distinguished in *Kedar Nath v Saday Chandra*, 11 C L J 13 (1914), *post*, *Shafi ud din v Lochan Singh*, 2 A 94 (1878), as to recovery of possession by mortgagee, see *Bhikaji v Vallabh Das*, 2 Bom H C R 209 (1864), and dispossession by mortgagee of *jotedar* in execution, *Tarakant Bannerjee v Puddumouey Dossee*, 10 M I A 476, 485 (1866).

(7) *Kedar Nath v Saday Chandra* 19 C I J 13 (1913)

(8) *Cooverj Hirji v Dowsey Bhikja*, 17 B 718 (1893) *Sanlar v Madan*, 14 C W R

208 (1903) The former case has been recently distinguished in *Rajha Gobind v Raghu nath* 18 C L J 138 (1913), following *Govinda Nair v Kesava*, 3 M 81 (1890) And see *Sheik Abdul v Jadunandan*, 18 C L J 344 (he cannot alienate a particular share)

(9) *Hassan Ali v Naib Ahmed*, 11 W R 146 (1869)

(10) *Sharada Moyee v Nobin Chunder*, 11 W R 255 (1869)

(11) *Mahomed Ansur v Prokash Chunder Sha* 8 W R 8 (1867), *Woodoy Tara Chow dhuran v Khajah Abdool Gunce* 12 W R 16 (1869), *Judoo Nath Singh v Kalee Pershad* 14 W R 358 (1870), *Brindaban Chunder Roy v Tara Chand Bannerjee*, 20 W R 114 (1873), as to objection that decree is barred, see *Mohesh Chunder v Chandra Nonce*, 9 W R 486 (1868)

(12) *Ayyasami v Samiya*, 8 M 82, 83 (1884)

(13) *Sharada Moyee v Nobin Chunder*, 11 W R 255 (1869)

(14) *Nasruddin v Sayudur Rahman*, 19 C I J 209 (1913), *Mohima Chunder v Mohesh Chander*, P C, 16 C 473 (1888)

No question of title can be investigated in a proceeding under r 101 (1) It has been recently held that O IX r 13 is not applicable to a proceeding under these rules (2)

102 Nothing in rules 99 and 101 shall apply to resistance [s 333.]
Rules not applicable to or obstruction in execution of a decree for the
transferee lite pendente possession of immovable property by a person
 to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person

103 Any party not being a judgment debtor against whom [s 335, second para.]
Orders conclusive sub an order is made under rule 95, rule 99 or
ject to regular suit rule 101 may institute a suit to establish the
 right which he claims to the present possession of the property, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be *conclusive*

Object and scope of rules—Rule 103 is the second paragraph of sect 335 of the last Code. The disposition of the rest of the section is as follows. Obstruction of the purchaser is dealt with by rr 97 and 99 and dispossession of a claimant other than the judgment debtor by r 100 *ante*. A power is thus given where an attempt has been made to deliver possession (3) and there is obstruction or resistance, (4) to give, after inquiry (5) a summary decision which shall protect the public peace, prevent obstruction and terminate the execution proceedings by determining what should be immediately done subject as regards claimants other than the judgment debtor, to the result of a regular suit (6). The rules are designed for the protection and assistance of decree holders purchasers (7) and third parties dispossessed, (8) rr 97 and 98 dealing with resistance by the judgment debtor (as to which see r 97 *ante*) r 99 with resistance by third parties, and rr 100 and 101 with third parties dispossessed. A person it has been held is not bound to proceed under the former sect 335. He might if he chose at once bring a regular suit within the ordinary period of limitation. But if he did choose to apply for a summary decision and it was against him he had to sue within one year from the time of the order (9). It was also held there

(1) Kedar Nath v Saday Chandra, 19 C L J 13 (1913)

(2) Hari Charan Ghose v Mammotha Nath Sen, 41 C 1 (1913)

(3) Sharada Prasad Mallick v Roy Dhun put Singh 19 W R 219 221 (1873)

(4) Mt Zahoorun v Syad Mahomed, 19 W R 87 (1872), for if the purchaser has been put in possession peaceably the Court has nothing more to do in execution, *Seva v Muthusami*, 10 M 53 56 (1886), *Srinath Ghosh v Annoda Prasad Roy*, 1 C W N 192 (1896)

() See Huro Prasad Roy v Ramasur Misry Mha 21 W R 461 (1875), *Mt Zahoorun v Syad Mahomed supra*

(6) *Mt Zahoorun v Syad Mahomed* 18 W R 87 (1872)

(7) *Hera Lal Bannerjee v Rajah Buroda Kant*, 13 W R 466 (1880).

(8) *See Govind Balvant v Lakshman*, 18 B. 522 (1893) [application for restoration of possession by joint manager].

(9) *Protap Chunder Chowdhry v Broj Lal Shaha*, B L R F B 638 (1867) *Seva Muttusami*, 10 M 53 (1886), *Mad*

was nothing to prevent a decree holder or purchaser who has been obstructed or resisted from making a fresh application for delivery without making any complaint under sects 328-330, 334 (1) That case was, however, subsequently distinguished on the ground that it was one in which the purchaser was resisted not by a third party but by the judgment debtor (2) The application must be made within thirty days of the resistance or obstruction (3) The Court was held not bound under sect 335 to pass any particular order, but only such order as may be proper in the circumstances of the case (4) A purchaser at a Court sale of the interest of one member of an undivided Hindu family ought not to be put in exclusive possession of the whole undivided land by virtue of a decree against one co parcener only, (5) but only in joint possession with the others (6) It has been held that symholical possession does not amount to dispossession within the meaning of the former section (7)

"May institute a suit"—See note, *post*, "Conclusive," and as to limitation (8) for such a suit, which is one year and Court fee, (9) see cases cited

"Conclusive"—The rule contemplates an order against one party or the other and if an application is withdrawn, an order allowing the withdrawal is not an order under this rule (10) The order is one which becomes final and conclusive unless the party against whom it is passed institutes a suit within a year and obtains an adjudication in his favour Where the Court declined to pass an order, deeming it best that the purchaser should be referred to a separate suit to enforce his purchase Article 11 of the Limitation Act had no application (11) If a regular suit is not brought within a year the order acquires the form of a final decree (12) Though an order under this section is not appealable (13) it may be made the subject of revision (14)

Bulloo Kooeree, 2 A H C R 450 (1870)
Muthia v Appasami, 13 M 504, 506 (1890)
Where the purchaser has merely obtained formal possession he may sue for possession within twelve years Joggobundhu Mitter v Puri anund Gossami 16 C 330 (1889)

(1) Muthia v Appasami 13 M 504, 506 (1890) [and see also same case where purchaser is decree holder]

(2) Kesri Narain v Abul Hasan 26 A 365 (1904), Knox, J, *dubitante*

(3) Limitation Act Art 107 Vinayakrao Amrit v Deorao Govind 11 B 473 (1887) [minor]

(4) Zahooran v Mahomed Wajid 18 W R 87 (1872)

(5) Kallappa Venkatesh 2 B 676 (1878)

(6) See Dugappa Shetti v Venkatramnaya, 5 B 493 (1880) [explained in Balaji Anant v Ganesh Janardan 5 B 499 (1881)] Patil Hari Pranjy v Hakam Chand 10 B 363 (1884)

(7) Ibrahim Millick v Ramjadar Ralsht,

30 C 710 (1903) Kisori Lal Goswami v Lala Shib Lal 1 C W N 343 (1897)

(8) Bhiku v Shujat Ali, 29 C 25 (1901), Mahadev v Bal, 26 B 730 (1902) [assignee from minor] Bhimappa v Irappa, 20 B 146 (1901) s c, 3 Bom L R 594, Meerudin Saib v Ramesa Bibi 27 M 25 (1903), Rango Vithal v Rukhnadas 11 B H C R 174 (1874)

(9) Priya Das v Vilayat Khan 22 A 354 (1900)

(10) Bhikha v Sakarlal 5 B 440 (1881)

(11) Meerudin Saib v Ramesa Bibi 27 M 25 (1903)

(12) Achutav Mammavu, 10 M 307 (1886)

(13) In Ram Narain Sahoo v Bandi Pershad, 31 C 737 (1904), at p 41 the matter was held to fall under s 244 (now 47) and was therefore appealable

(14) Sheoran Singh v Banwari Das 6 A 172 (1884), Subhant v Sri Gopal 17 A 222 (1894), Mt Zahooran v Syud Mahomed 18 W R 87 (1872) [delay]

ORDER XXII.

Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties.

1. The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the [s. 361.]

No abatement by party's death, if right to sue survives.

Abatement—It has been pointed out (1) that the practice in respect of abatement under the Code is different from that which prevailed in the English Courts. A suit, though perfect in its institution, became defective by the death, marriage, or transmission of interest or liability of some of the parties. In such case the suit was said to have abated or become defective, and as a general rule no proceeding could be taken in it until an order to revive the suit or carry on the proceedings had been made. When the abatement was total—that is, caused by the death, bankruptcy, or insolvency of a single plaintiff or the marriage of a single female plaintiff—the case was completely suspended, and could not be proceeded with until it had been revived or the defect cured. Where the abatement was partial merely as when it was caused by the death of the defendant, it prevented those proceedings only by which the interest of the deceased might be affected for the death of a defendant made an abatement *quoad* himself alone. Thus abatement though it suspended the proceedings in a case, did not put an end to them. But it had not the effect of being a bar to a further suit upon the same cause of action. One of the essentials of *res judicata* being that the matter must have been determined and when a suit abated before judgment nothing had been determined in such suit. Under however, r 9 of this Order (formerly sect 371) when a suit abates no fresh suit can be brought upon the same cause of action unless and until the order of abatement is set aside. The provisions of this Order are substantially those of the last Code. Rules 6 and 12 have been added and sub rule (2) has been added to r 10 (formerly sect 372). The last paragraph of sect 582 of the last Code has been made r 11. The provisions of this Order apply to appeals and the words “plaintiff,” “defendant” and “suit” include an appellant a respondent, and appeal respectively (2). They did not however under the last Code apply to proceedings in execution between the judgment creditor and judgment debtor, (3) nor to proceedings in a Mamlatdar’s Court (4). As regards execution proceedings, see now r 12 *post*.

(1) *Benode Mohini Choudhriani v Shrasat Chunder Dey Chowdhury*, 8 C 837, at 1p 832, 833 (1882)

(2) R 11, *post*.

(3) *Hira Chand v Hastur Chand*, 18 B 24 (1834)

(4) *Ganpatram Jebhai v Ranchod Haribhai*, 17 B. 645 (1893)

Applicability.—This rule is the same as sect 99 of Act VII of 1859, save that the words “right to sue” was substituted for “cause of action” by sect 60 of Act XII of 1879. See also Rules of Supreme Court, 1883, O 17, r 1. The rule is the same as under the last Code. The illustrations have, however, been omitted. Illustrations (a) and (b) to sect 361 of the last Code have been omitted as founded upon an antiquated decision (*Anderson v Martindale*, 1 East 497) which is not very intelligible to practitioners in this country. Illustration (d) of the section was correct only under the Dayabhaga system, and the word “minor” was not of the essence of the example. The Select Committee expunged also the other illustrations, considering them too obvious to serve any useful purpose. This rule applies to proceedings on appeal, (1) to cases where under an order of Court a reference has been made to arbitration, (2) even after an award has been made but before decree, (3) and under the Delhian Agricultural Relief Act to proceedings in respect of a conciliation agreement (4).

“Right to sue.”—Under the Code of 1859 “Cause of action” in the corresponding section was held to mean the right to bring an action (5). “Right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings (6). It is a vested right (7). The cause of action in the original and revived suits must be the same (8).

“Survives.”—All demands whatsoever, and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators, save certain causes of action mentioned below, (9) and promises bind the representatives of the promisor in case of the death of such promisor before performance unless the contrary intention appear from the contract (10). A suit for malicious prosecution does not survive on the death of the plaintiff (11) but after a decree for damages for defamation it does survive on appeal after the death of the appellant to whose estate injury has occurred, for where a claim has been perfected by a judgment, the nature of the relief claimed on appeal stands on a different footing, and it does not follow that the right to appeal against a decree partakes of the nature of the original decree (12). So also on second appeal (13). The position in such cases has been enunciated as follows:—“The only cases in which, apart from questions of breach of contract, express or implied, a remedy for a wrongful act can be pursued against the estate of a deceased person who has done the act, appear to us to be those in which property,

(1) R 11, *post*(2) *Perumalla v Perumalla*, 27 M 112 (1903)(3) *Denomoyee Dass v Chooney Money*, 4 C W N 280 (1899)(4) *Narayandas v Khondri*, 19 B 202 (1894)(5) *Chandramohan Dutt v Biswambhar Laha*, 1 B L R, O C J 42 (1868)(6) *Gopal v Ram Chandra*, 26 B 587 (1902), 4 B L R 325(7) *Gopjeswar Pal v Jiban Chandra (F B)*, 10 C L J 315 (1914)(8) *Sham Chand Giri v Bhayaram Panday*, 22 C 92 (1891)

(9) S 268 of Act X of 1865

(10) S 37 of Act IX of 1872

(11) *Krishna Bihary v Corporation of Calcutta*, 31 C 406 (1904), *Joslam v Sawma Iyengar*, 34 M 70 (1910)(12) *Gopal v Ram Chandra*, 26 B (1902), 4 B L R 325(13) *Paramen Chetty v Sundara Iyengar*, 46 M 493 (1902)

or the proceeds or value of property, belonging to another, have been appropriated by the deceased person and added to his estate or moneys. In such cases, whatever the original form of the action, it is in substance brought to recover property, or its proceeds or value, and by amendment could be made such in form as well as in substance. In such cases the action, though arising out of a wrongful act, does not die with the person. The property or the proceeds or value which

he, can
owner the

benefits that falls under this head, if the benefit does not consist in the acquisition of property or its proceeds in value. Where there is nothing among the assets of the deceased that in law or in equity belongs to the plaintiff, and the damages which have been done to him are unliquidated and uncertain the executors of a wrong doer cannot be sued merely because it was worth the wrong doer's while to commit the act which is complained of and an indirect benefit may have been reaped thereby (1). The right to sue will survive to an executor on an action on breach of contract or a tort if on the face of the proceedings it is shown an injury has accrued to the personal estate (2). It will survive when a Hindu widow sues to recover her husband's estate, (3) to the sons of a Hindu mother who sued to restrain encroachment on the share allotted to her on partition and agreed to sell her interest to the defendants at the value to be found on arbitration, and then died after the award but before the decree, (4) and for the purposes of appeal to the mother of a Vitakshara son who obtained a decree setting aside his father's alienations, (5) to the representatives of a minor who, on attaining majority, sued to have his rights declared respecting property which by a consent decree and conveyance to which he was no party his grandmother, father and uncle conveyed to the defendants and who died pending suit (6). It also survived against the other defendants when a defendant's interest ceased before he died, without his representatives being added (7). Where an agent suing on behalf of an undisclosed principal dies pending the suit the suit should after the death of the agent be continued if it can be continued at all, by the agent's representatives and not by the principal (8).

Not survive.—Causes of action in respect of defamation, assault as defined by the Indian Penal Code, and other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and cases where after the death of the party the relief sought could not be enjoyed or the granting of it would be nugatory, e.g. (a) where a passenger was injured but not fatally in a railway collision and died without

(1) Phillips v Homfray, 24 C D 439, p. 454. See also Haridas v Ramdas 13 B 677, and Peck v Gurney, L R 6 H L 377.

(2) Twycross v Grant, 4 C P D 40.

(3) Parbutty v Higgin, 17 W R 475, 8 B L R App, 98.

(4) Denomoyee Dassee v Chooney Money Dassee, 4 C W N 280 (1839).

(5) Padarath Singh v Raja Ram, 4 A.

235 but see Muhammad Hussain v Khushalo, 9 A 131 (1886).

(6) Dharamsi v Narotam, 5 Bom L R 1041 (1903).

(7) Moung Khmo v Burn, 6 W R Rcl 2 (1866).

(8) Periamann Chettiar v Rengachari Reddy, 17 M L J 116 (1900).

bringing any action, and (b) divorce, do not survive, (1) nor a suit by a reversioner to set aside alienation by a Hindu widow (2)

2] **2** *Where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants.*

Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives.

Applicability.—This rule is the equivalent of sect 100 of Act VIII of 1859, save for certain formal amendments made by Act X of 1877, and the words “right to sue” substituted for “cause of action” by Act XII of 1879. Except for three verbal alterations it is the same as that of the last Code. It applies to proceedings on appeal (3). Thus if one of the appellants dies and the application to revive is dismissed as being time barred, the appeal should be ordered to abate so far as the deceased is concerned, and may proceed at the instance of the remaining appellants, (4) it cannot have the effect of causing the whole appeal to abate (5). Again on the death of one of the respondents, the proper course is to proceed under r 4, and either to declare that the appeal has abated as against him, and proceed against the other respondents, or to direct the legal representatives of the deceased respondent to be placed on the record (6). It has been held that a suit does not abate under this rule until the representative of the deceased plaintiff has failed to apply within the time allowed by law (7).

“Right to sue”—See notes to last rule. The rule is not limited in its application to cases where the right to sue or appeal survives against the surviving defendants or respondents not as the legal representatives of the deceased, but by reason of a right vested in them antecedent to the suit (8).

“To the surviving plaintiff alone.”—On the death of one of two joint owners, suing for damages in respect of trespass, the cause of action survives to the other alone, (9) also where the interest of a defendant ceases in the subject matter of the suit before his death (10).

(1) S 268, Act X of 1865

(2) Sakyaiah Ingle Rao v Bhavani Bozi, 27 M 588 (1904), see also Ramjun v Lachee, 1 Agra, 49 (1866), Channa Yecrayya v Lakshminarasimma, 22 M L J 375 (1912)

(3) R 13, *post*

(4) Chandarsang v Khumabhai, 23 B 718 (1898), see also Chintaman Nulkant v Gangabai, 27 B 284, 5 Bom L R 90 (1903)

(5) Ram Dewak v Lambar Pande, 25 A 27 (1903) (partition suit) overruling Hamapat

v Baldeo, 22 A. 222 (1900)

(6) Chandarsang v Khumabhai, 23 B 718 (1898)

(7) Goda Coopooramiah v Soondaramall, 33 M 167 (1909)

(8) Chowdhry Shamanund v Rajnarain Das, 11 C W N 186 (1906)

(9) Chandramohan Dutt v Bawambhar, 1 B L R, O C J, 42 (1868)

(10) Moun, Khino v Burn v W R, Ref 2 (1866)

3 (1) *Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.* [ss. 363, 365.]

(2) *Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub rule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and; on the application of the defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.* [s. 366, first para.]

Applicability of clause (1).—This rule amalgamates sects 363 and 365 of the last Code and a portion of sect 366. Sect 363 dealt with the case of several plaintiffs, and sect 365 with that of a sole plaintiff. These are now dealt with together in the first clause of the rule. The second clause is the first paragraph of sect 366 of the last Code. The second paragraph has been omitted, as also the Explanation to that section. As to the definition of "legal representative," see now sect 2, clause (11). The section corresponding with sect 363 of the last Code, as originally enacted by Act VIII of 1859, sect 101, required the legal representative to make the application to revive, but by Act VII of 1888, this provision and the latter portion of the former section from the words "*the Court may cause*" as it formerly stood were substituted. The words "*right to sue*" were substituted for "*cause of action*" by Act XII of 1879. The rule applies to proceedings on appeal, (1) and on revision, (2) but not under the last Code to proceedings in execution of a decree, (3) or to the case of a plaintiff dying after decree, (4) as to execution proceedings, see now r 12, *post*. Where there is only an application for leave to sue *in forma pauperis*, but no suit pending in Court, and the applicant dies before the leave is granted, the right to sue as a pauper, being a personal right, cannot survive in the legal representatives of the deceased applicant (5).

Sect 365 in the last Code corresponded with sect 102 of Act VIII of 1859, but underwent much modification. Under sect 102 it was optional with the Court to make an order on the application of the legal representative, and it was not until Act VII of 1888 that the mandatory form came into force. The words "*where the cause of action survives*" were inserted by Act X of 1877, the words "*cause of action*" being changed to "*right to sue*" by Act XII of 1879.

(1) R 11, *post*.

(2) *Anandamoyi Dasi v Rudra Mahanti* 18 C L J 141 (1913), *Deosaran v Syadu nessa*, 16 C L J 521 (1912).

(3) *Gulabdas v Lakshman Narhar*, 3 D 221 (1879), *Dulari v Mohan Singh*, 3 A 759 (1881).

(4) *Ramanada v Minatchi Ammal*, 3 M. 236 (1881). It refers to death before decree. *Bhugwan Das Bhettry v Nal hanta Ganguli*, 9 C W N 171 (1904).

(5) *Isht Mohan Mandal v Satish Chandra Das*, 33 C. 1163 (1906).

The former section was held to have reference only to proceedings before decree, (1) and not to a suit in which a decree had been made, (2) not, under the last Code, to proceedings in execution of decree, (3) nor to an application to obtain permission to sue as a pauper (4) But as to execution proceedings, see now r 12, *post*

“Dies”—This refers to death before decree (5)

“Survives”—See notes to r 1, *ante*

“Legal representative”—The legal representative need not, since the passing of Act VII of 1889, if not under sect 50 (of the last Code), take out administration to continue a suit, but must do so before decree (6) An executor under Act V of 1881 is the legal representative of the deceased before probate has been obtained, but one of several executors cannot carry on a suit without proving the will (7) The rule presupposes the applicant is the legal representative. If the representative character is denied, or where two or more claim it, the procedure under r 5 should be followed, (8) but where a decree has been made in favour of the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff, the Appellate Court should not go into the question of the representative's right to represent the deceased or dismiss the suit on finding that he or she had no right (9) The words “Legal representative” must, where there are more legal representatives than one, be read in the plural, thus where the appellant died and only one of his three representatives was brought on the record the appeal abated, (10) but in *Bomhay* it has been held that an application by one of the heirs of the appellant is sufficient, and the respondent is entitled to have the names of the others brought on the record to have them bound by the decree (11) All the legal representatives must be brought upon the record, (12) as far as is possible, (13) if any refuse to be joined as appellants they should be made respondents, (14) or any who cannot or are unwilling to be joined as applicants should be added as defendants (15) and in such a case the application should not be construed as no application by the legal representative so as to cause an appeal to abate (16) The sons of a deceased plaintiff, members of a joint Mitakshara family, may apply to revive without obtaining administration or a

(1) *Blugwan Das v Nil Kanta Ganguli*, 9 C W N 171 (1904)

(2) *Cally Churn Mullick v Bhuggobutty Churn*, 5 C L R 108 (1879), decree directing turns of worship and their carrying out, *Ramanada v Minatchi Ammal*, 3 M 236 (1881)

(3) *Gulabdas v Lakshman Narhar*, 3 B 221 (1879), *Dulari v Mohan Singb*, 3 A 759 (1881), *Abdoonnissa v Amceeroonnassa*, 2 C 327 (1877)

(4) *Lalit Mohan v Satish Chandra*, 33 C 1163 (1906), 4 C L J 234

(5) *Blugwan Das v Nil Kanta Ganguli*, 9 C W N 171 (1904)

(6) *Forregrosa v Pragi*, 16 B 513 (1892)

(7) *Moosa v Essa* 8 B 241 (1884), *Janal v Dhanu* 14 M 454 (1891)

(8) *Onla v Beepathee*, 17 M 209 (1893)

(9) *Balabai v Ganesh*, 27 B 163 (1902)

(10) *Ghamandi v Amir Begam*, 16 A 211 (1894), *Musala Reddi v Ramayya*, 23 M 125 (1899), *Haidar Husain v Abdul Ahad* 30 A 117 (1907)

(11) *Bhukaj v Purshotam* 10 B 520 (1880)

(12) *Ghamandi v Amir Begam*, 16 A 211 (1894)

(13) *Musala Reddi v Ramayya*, 23 M 125 (1899)

(14) *Ghamandi v Amir Begam*, *supra*

(15) *See Musala Reddi v Ramayya*, *supra*

(16) *Id*

certificate under Act VII of 1853 (1) In a suit by a Hindu widow to recover property belonging to her deceased husband, the heirs of the husband are the legal representatives, (2) and not the widow's personal heirs (3) But in the case of a Hindu wife governed by the Vyavakara Mayukha, who obtained a decree for maintenance against her husband, her daughters as heirs of her "stridhan improper" are her legal representatives (4) Again, on a plaintiff who obtained a decree against his father for partition dying pending appeal, his mother is his legal representative entitled to maintain appeal (5) Where an appellant gave the property in suit by deed of gift, the donee was allowed to carry on appeal as heir but not as donee (6) but this was before there was any section corresponding to sect 372 of the last Code or r 1 of this, and the deed he set up was post dated to the deed from the appellant under which the respondents claimed An executor is the legal representative for the purposes of an appeal of a plaintiff who sued for possession of *tanwad* property and to set aside an adoption made by the deceased *Karnatan* and obtaining a decree for possession only, appealed and died (7) An administrator however appointed under sect 10 of Reg VIII of 1827, without leave being granted him to sue is not the legal representative nor is he entitled to continue an appeal, (8) nor can the representative of a deceased pauper continue an application for leave to sue as a pauper such right being only a personal one (9) Again, where the judgment-debtor in a suit for malicious and wrongful conduct sold a share of his property liable to be attached in execution and died the purchaser could not carry on the appeal as his representative as the purchase deed did not make him liable for the deceased's personal debts (10) Further a claim based on personal trust cannot survive to a representative (11)

"The Court, on an application"—This application is not necessarily confined to all the legal representatives, but one or more may apply and ask that those unwilling to join be added as defendants (12) This is only in a case where the person is admitted to be the legal representative or where no dispute is raised, (13) but the Court is bound to grant the application, even where an appeal has been heard and decided without the appellant's knowledge, the appellant being aware of the appellant's death, and the representative applying in his name placed on the record and the appeal reheard the decree being a nullity (14) See now as to this, r 8, post

(1) *Boojraj v Bhyopernaud* 23 C 912 (1886)

(2) *Premmoy Choudhrai v Preonath Dhar*, 23 C. 636 (1896)

(3) *Tribhuwan v Sri Naram*, 20 A 341 (1838)

(4) *Manilal Rewadat v Bai Rewa*, 17 B 738 (1892)

(5) *Subbaraya Mudali v Manika Mudali*, 19 M 345 (1895)

(6) *Luteefoonissa v Rajaoor Rahman*, 8 W R. 84 (1867)

(7) *Payyath v Thiruthipalli*, 20 M. of (1836).

(8) *Malapa v D. v. D. v. D.*

(9) *Lalit Mohan v D. v. D.*

1163 (1906) 4 C. J. 101

(10) *Madood v D. v. D.*

(1868)

(11) *Gangabai v D. v. D.*

(1899)

(12) *M. v. D.*

(1899), 4 C. J. 101

(1834)

(13) *D. v. D.*

(14) *D. v. D.*

1000

The former section was held to have reference only to proceedings before decree, (1) and not to a suit in which a decree had been made, (2) not, under the last Code, to proceedings in execution of decree; (3) nor to an application to obtain permission to sue as a pauper (4) But as to execution proceedings, see now r 12, *post*

"Dies"—This refers to death before decree (5)

"Survives."—See notes to r 1, *ante*

"Legal representative."—The legal representative need not, since the passing of Act VII of 1889, if not under sect 50 (of the last Code), take out administration to continue a suit, but must do so before decree (6) An executor under Act V of 1881 is the legal representative of the deceased before probate has been obtained, but one of several executors cannot carry on a suit without proving the will (7) The rule presupposes the applicant is the legal representative If the representative character is denied, or where two or more claim it, the procedure under r 5 should be followed, (8) but where a decree has been made in favour of the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff, the Appellate Court should not go into the question of the representative's right to represent the deceased or dismiss the suit on finding that he or she had no right (9) The words "*Legal representative*" must, where there are more legal representatives than one be read in the plural, thus where the appellant died and only one of his three representatives was brought on the record the appeal abated, (10) but in Bombay it has been held that an application by one of the heirs of the appellant is sufficient, and the respondent is entitled to have the names of the others brought on the record to have them bound by the decree (11) All the legal representatives must be brought upon the record, (12) as far as is possible, (13) if any refuse to be joined as appellants they should be made respondents, (14) or any who cannot or are unwilling to be joined as appellants should be added as defendants (15) and in such a case the application should not be construed as no application by the legal representative so as to cause an appeal to abate (16) The sons of a deceased plaintiff, members of a joint Mitakshara family, may apply to revive without obtaining administration or a

(1) Bhugwan Das v Nil Kanta Ganguli, 9 C W N 171 (1904)

(2) Cally Churn Mullick v Bhuggobutty Churn, 5 C L R 108 (1879), decree directing turns of worship and their carrying out; Ramanada v Minatchi Ammal, 3 M 236 (1881)

(3) Gulabdas v Lakshman Narhar, 3 B 221 (1879), Dulari v Mohan Singh, 3 A 759 (1881), Abedoonissa v Amceroonissa, 2 C 327 (1877)

(4) Lalit Mohan v Satish Chandra, 33 C 1163 (1906), 4 C L J 234

(5) Bhugwan Das v Nil Kanta Ganguli, 9 C W. N 171 (1904)

(6) Forregrosa v Pragli, 16 B 519 (1892)

(7) Moosa v Essa, 8 B 241 (1884), Janahi v Dhanu, 14 M 454 (1891)

(8) Oula v Beepatheo, 17 M 209 (1893)

(9) Balabai v Ganesh, 27 B 162 (1902)

(10) Ghamandi v Amir Begam, 16 A 211 (1894), Musala Reddi v Ramayya, 23 M 125 (1899), Hardar Husam v Abdul Ahad, 30 A 117 (1907)

(11) Bhulajir v Purshotam, 10 B 540 (1885)

(12) Ghamandi v Amir Begam, 16 A 211 (1894)

(13) Musala Reddi v Ramayya, 23 M 125 (1899)

(14) Ghamandi v Amir Begam, *supra*

(15) See Musala Reddi v Ramayya, *supra*

(16) *Id*

certificate under Act VII of 1853 (1) In a suit by a Hindu widow to recover property belonging to her deceased husband, the heirs of the husband are the legal representatives, (2) and not the widow's personal heirs (3) But in the case of a Hindu wife governed by the Vyavakara Mayukha, who obtained a decree for maintenance against her husband, her daughters as heirs of her "stridhan improper" are her legal representatives (4) Again, on a plaintiff who obtained a decree against his father for partition dying pending appeal, his mother is his legal representative entitled to maintain appeal (5) Where an appellant gave the property in suit by deed of gift, the donee was allowed to carry on appeal as heir but not as donee, (6) but this was before there was any section corresponding to sect 372 of the last Code, or r 1 of this, and the deed he set up was post dated to the deed from the appellant under which the respondents claimed An executor is the legal representative for the purposes of an appeal of a plaintiff who sued for possession of *lunar* property and to set aside an adoption made by the deceased *lunar*, and, obtaining a decree for possession only, appealed and died (7) An administrator, however appointed under sect 10 of Reg VIII of 1827, without leave being granted him to sue, is not the legal representative, nor is he entitled to continue an appeal, (8) nor can the representative of a deceased pauper continue an application for leave to sue as a pauper, such right being only a personal one (9) Again, where the judgment debtor in a suit for malicious and wrongful conduct sold a share of his property liable to be attached in execution and died, the purchaser could not carry on the appeal as his representative as the purchase deed did not make him liable for the deceased's personal debts (10) Further, a claim based on personal trust cannot survive to a representative (11)

"The Court, on an application."—This application is not necessarily

is raised, (13) but the Court is bound to grant the application, even where an appeal has been heard and decided without the appellant a pleader or the Court being aware of the appellant's death, and the representative applies to have his name placed on the record and the appeal reheard, the decree being a nullity (14) See now as to this, r 8, *post*

(1) *Beejraj v Bhyroperaud* 23 C 912 (1886)

(2) *Premmoyi Choudhrani v Preonath Dhur*, 23 C 636 (1896)

(3) *Tribhuwan v Sri Narain*, 20 A 341 (1898)

(4) *Manlal Rewadat v Bai Rewa*, 17 B 758 (1892)

(5) *Subbaraya Mudali v Manika Mudali*, 19 M 345 (1895)

(6) *Luteefoonissa v Rajaoor Rahman*, 8 W R 84 (1867)

(7) *Payyath v Thuruthipalli*, 20 M 51 (1896).

(8) *Malapa v Devi*, 21 B 102 (1895)

(9) *Lalit Mohan v Satish Chandra*, 33 C 1163 (1906) 4 C L J 234

(10) *Macleod v Kunhoje*, 9 W R 271 (1868)

(11) *Gangabai v Bhashabai*, 23 B 719 (1899)

(12) *Musala Reddi v Ramayya*, 21 M 125 (1899), *Ghamandi v Amir Begam*, 16 A 211 (1894)

(13) *Balabai v Ganesb*, 27 B 102 (1902)

(14) *Janardhan Krishna v Ram Chandra*, 28 B 317 (1901), see *Anandamoyi Das v Rudra Mahanti*, 18 C L J 141 (1913), (a

"Proceed with the suit"—Objection to the applicant being added as a legal representative should be raised at the earliest opportunity, and failure to object precludes the opposing party from raising it at a later stage (1) So where a decree has been made in favour of the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff, the Appellate Court should not go into the question of the representative's right to represent, or dismiss the suit on finding that he or she had no right (2)

Applicability of clause (2)—The section in the last Code (366) corresponded with the latter part of sect 102 of Act VIII of 1859, with certain slight alterations made by Acts X of 1877, and XII of 1879, the explanation being added by the former Act and the words "*within the time limited by law,*" and "*shall on the application of the defendant*" by the latter Act. The second paragraph of sect 366 has been omitted. The Explanation appended to this section in the last Code has been also omitted, having regard to the definition of "legal representative" in sect 2, *ante*. This rule applies to proceedings on appeal, (3) but it does not apply to a suit in which a decree has been made, (4) nor under the last Code to proceedings in execution of decree, (5) as to this, see now r 12 *post*

"Within the time limited"—That is, six months (6) If no application is made by the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff and the suit is ordered to abate it may yet be revived under r 9 (7)

"No application"—Where two defendants appealed against a decree and one died, and no application was made to revive and the decree was reversed, held the decree remained good as against the estate of the deceased defendant (8) If an application is made within time and is dismissed, the suit cannot be ordered to abate (9) If an application be made by one of the heirs of the deceased appellant the respondent is still entitled to have the other heirs put on the record (10) Where an application for revival has been made, an order rejecting an application that a suit might be declared to abate and that the application for revival is invalid is not an order under this rule (11) The words "any person" under the former section did not confine the application to an application by all the legal representatives, but for sufficient reasons any one or more might apply (12)

rule issued at the instance of a person who is dead when the application is made is a nullity)

(1) *Meenatchi v Anathanarayana*, 26 M 224 (1902)

(2) *Balabai v Canesh*, 27 B 162 (1902)

(3) R 11, *post*

(4) *Cally Churn v Bhuggobutty*, 5 C L R 108 (1879)

(5) *Abedoonnissa v Amceeroonnissa*, 2 C 327 (1876), 4 J A 66, *Dulari v Mohan*, 3 A 75J (1881)

(6) Art 175, Sched I, Act IX. of 1908, *Debi Bilash v Habib Shah*, P C., 35 A 331

(1913), 40 I A 151, 17 C W N 829, 18 C L J 9

(7) *Bhojrab Doss Johuray v Doman Thakoor*, 4 C L R 374, 5 C 139 (1880). *Julvahu v Cocildas*, 9 B 275 (1885)

(8) *Natesa Ayyar v Annasami Ayyar*, 23 M 426 (1901)

(9) *Subbayya v Saminadayyar*, 18 M 406 (1895)

(10) *Bhikajiv Parashotam*, 10 B 220 (1886)

(11) *Bhagwan v Maharaja of Bharatpur*, 17 A 236 (1890)

(12) *Mussala Reddi v I m ayya*, 23 M 120 (1899)

"Shall abate"—The section in the last Code ran, "*The Court may pass an order that the suit shall abate*." It was proposed to be amended so as to give effect to the principle that abatement results from the operation of law and does not depend upon the making of an order. It was, therefore, suggested that the Court should merely *declare* that the suit had abated. The Select Committee, however, struck out the provisions that the Court might make an order declaring the abatement, as in its opinion it was unnecessary, and was likely to give rise to difficulty. If no application is made by the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff and the suit is ordered to abate, it may yet be revived under r 9, and the order for revival may be made immediately after the order for abatement (1).

"On the application of the defendant."—"Defendant" here includes plaintiff respondent and defendant respondent, (2) but a respondent in a special appeal cannot require the legal representative of the deceased appellant to be substituted and the appeal to proceed. He should file a cross appeal, (3) though if one of the heirs of the deceased appellant has applied to revive the respondent is entitled to have the names of the other heirs put on the record so as to have them bound by the decree (4). The application must be within six months of the death of the plaintiff (5).

Appeals.—The Allahabad High Court held that no appeal lies from an order passed under the first paragraph of the former sect 366 directing a suit to abate, (6) such an order not being a decree, (7) but both the Bombay and Madras High Courts have held such an order to be a decree (8). No appeal lies from an order rejecting an application for a declaration that a suit had abated by reason of the death of the plaintiff and the invalidity of an application for revival by the representatives of the deceased plaintiff (9). Where the special appellant dies and no representative applies to be substituted the respondent cannot require the appeal to proceed. He should file a cross appeal (10).

4 (1) *Where one of two or more defendants dies and the* [s 368.]

Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant.

right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit

(1) Bhoyrub Doss Johurry v Doman Thakoor, 4 C. L. R. 374 (1879), 5 C. 139. Fulrahu v Goculdas, 9 B. 275 (1885). Ram Protap Chowdhury v Lal Chand 9 C. W. N. 360 (1904).

(2) R. 11.

(3) Jaita v Balu, 3 Bom. H. C. 81 (1866).

(4) Bhikaji v Purshotam, 10 B. 230 (1886).

(5) Art. 177, Sched. I., Act IX. of 1903.

(6) Ahmad Ata v Mata Badal Lal, 3 A. 844 (1887).

(7) Hamida v Ali Husen, 17 A. 172 (1893).

(8) Bhikaji v Purshotam, 10 B. 220 (1885); Subbayya v Saminadayar, 18 M. 496 (1895).

(9) Bhagwan v Maharaja of Bharatpur, 17 A. 286 (1895).

(10) Jaita v Balu, 3 Bom. H. C. 81 (1866).

(2) *Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.*

(3) *Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.*

Applicability—This rule as originally enacted as sect 104 of Act VIII of 1859 was considerably modified and added to Act X of 1877, besides making certain verbal alterations, confined the scope to cases of the death of the defendant taking place before decree, and added a paragraph commencing "*Provided that the person so made defendant*" Act XII of 1879 added the next clause in the last Code from "*When the plaintiff fails*" to "*the suit shall abate*" and substituted the words "*right to sue*" for "*cause of action*" Act XIV of 1882 added the further words from "*unless he satisfies*" to "*within such period*", and the last paragraph was added by Act VII of 1888. New amendments are italicized. See *post*.

The section is applicable to a suit for dissolution of partnership where two of the defendants died and the plaintiff applied to revive (1). It also applies to proceedings on appeal (2). Hence on appeal by the plaintiff against a decree of dismissal the defendant died, on the death being notified to the Court it could not proceed to make a decree against the deceased's estate without revival (3). It further applies to second appeals (4). It however, only applies to the case of a defendant dying before decree, and not to an application of the representatives of the defendant who died after an *ex parte* decree, to be made parties for the purpose of setting aside the decree (5).

The section under the last Code did not apply to execution proceedings, (6) as to this see now r 12 *post* nor to investigations in *forma pauperis* under sect 107 (7) of the last Code corresponding with O XXXIII r 5 of this Code. Under the proviso to sect 232 of the last Code (O XXI r 16), the transferee of a decree could not obtain execution without notice to the judgment debtor and where the judgment debtor was dead no such notice could be sent until his representatives were brought on record. There was nothing in that section to prohibit the transferee from applying under the former section corresponding with this rule (8).

"Defendants"—The term here includes a respondent (9). Where it

- (1) *Jamna Das v Sorali*, 16 B 27 (1891)
 (2) R 11, *Raj Chunder v Ganga Das*,
 31 C 487 (1904) 8 C W N 422, 31 L A
 71, followed in *Imam ud Din v Sadarath*,
 32 A 301 (1910)
 (3) *Monce Lall v Fuzul Hossain*, 14 W R
 337 (1870)
 (4) *Vakkalagadda v Valizulla*, 28 M 403,
 15 M L J 404, *Madhuban Das v Narain*
Das, 23 A 535 (1907), *Upendra Kumar*
Chuckerborty v Sham Lal Man Lal, 6 C L J

- 715 (1907)
 (5) *Sambasiva v Veera Perumal*, 28 M 361
 (6) *Stowell v Ajudha*, 6 A 255 (1884),
Krishnayya v Unnisa, 16 M 309 (1891)
 (7) *Janardan v Anant*, 7 B 373 (1883)
 (8) *Mahalinga Moopnar v Kuppanacha*
rar 30 M 541 (1907), *ac*, 17 M L J 485
 (9) R 11. As to the law prior to act
 582 of the last Code being amended see
Rameshar v Bishashar, 7 A 738 (1885),
Soshi Bhusan v Grish Chunder, 11 C 191

turned out that the defendant had died before the presentation of the plaint, the Court had no jurisdiction to substitute the representatives of the deceased as defendants and allow the suit to proceed as against them (1)

"Right to sue does not survive"—In a suit for redemption against two defendants, the second being the sub mortgagee of the first, on the death of the first, held on second appeal that no cause of action survived to the plaintiff against the second defendant, and the suit had abated, although the suit had been allowed to proceed against the second defendant (2)

"On an application"—On the death of a respondent, the right to have his representatives added vests jointly and not severally in the appellants (3)

"Legal representative of the deceased defendant"—In an appeal by contributories against an order dismissing with costs an application against certain officers of a company under sect 214 of the Indian Companies Act 1882 on the death of one of the respondents his legal representatives cannot be brought on the record in his place, in view of Explanation 2 to such section (4) A Hindu defendant died, leaving a will of which no probate was taken and his property came into the possession of his divided brothers who were brought on the record as representatives and a decree for the plaintiff made by consent The mother of the deceased who apart from the will was the legal representative sued to set aside decree, having previously obtained a declaration that she was entitled to the property as against the brothers held she was not entitled to maintain the suit as the persons in possession were the proper representatives and the defendant could prove the will to show that she was not the representative (5) See also the notes to r 1 under "Legal representative"

"To be made a party"—Though the Court is bound to place on the record the person named by the plaintiff yet it was held that (acting under sect 32 of the last Code) it could also add the name of any person who had a good *prima facie* claim to be considered the legal representative of the deceased (6) This section as amended by Act VII of 1883 allowed the legal representative of the defendant to apply and now the Court may proceed on an application by either side, so the question of the applicability of that or the corresponding section has now little practical value *vide post* In a recent case under the last Code it was pointed out that sect 368 (now represented by this rule) did not lay on the Court the duty of choosing the representative but that it was for the plaintiff to choose against whom he proposed to proceed, and that if some one else with an adverse claim to the nominee wished to be made the representative he should be added as a party (7)

(1880), *Lakshminarayana v. Balkrishna*, 5 B. 654

(1880), *Baldeo v. Bismillah* 9 A. 118 (1886)

This last decision was overruled on another point by *Debi Din v. Churna Lal* 10 A. 264 (1888)

(1) *Venrajpa Chetti v. Lonnar*, 17 M. L. J. 531 (1907)

(2) *Tagaya v. Raju*, 20 B. 549 (1880)

(3) *Iaru v. Varangattil* 38 M. 309 (1904)

(4) *Wall v. Howard*, 18 A. 156 (1890)

(5) *Janaki v. Dhanu* 14 M. 404 (1891)

(6) *Athappa v. Ayanna*, 8 M. 300 (1854), but see *Muhammad v. Khushalo*, 10 A. 223 (1888).

(7) *Rameshwar v. Janeshwari*, 19 C. 1 J. 19 (1913) p. 26

"And shall proceed."—A person whom the plaintiff alleges is the legal representative of a deceased defendant being brought on the record, the decree will bind the estate of the defendant in the absence of fraud on the part of the plaintiff (1) Where the sole defendant died before decree, a decree passed against him on the supposition he was alive could not, it was held, be executed (2) So an appeal dismissed in ignorance of the death of the respondent who had lost in the first Court must be heard *de novo* after revival (3)

"The suit shall abate."—This applies to proceedings on appeal (4) So when two of the four appellants appeal through a guardian and the respondent dies and the appeal abates, no application for revival being made, the minors cannot apply to revive through another guardian (5) Where one of four respondents died and no application to revive was made within six months, the appeal, being one for the possession of land to which the four respondents claimed to be jointly entitled and in which the right to appeal did not survive against the surviving respondents alone, abated, (6) but where the liabilities of the respondents are joint and several, the death of respondents without revival cannot exonerate

respondents died and no application was made to revive, the appeal did not abate (9) An appeal does not abate by reason of the failure of an appellant to bring on record the representatives of a deceased respondent if the appeal can proceed in the absence of such representative to a final and complete adjudication (10) On the contrary, where the decree could not be reversed without the representatives of the deceased being placed on the record, the appeal was held to abate (11) Again, in a mortgage suit where the second defendant was merely a surety personally, and on his death no application was made to revive, held the plaintiff was not precluded from continuing the suit against the mortgagor and that the suit did not abate (12) An order for abatement was held to be absolute (13) The former Code provided that the suit should abate unless the plaintiff satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the specified period Where for want of sufficient information of the grant of probate, the plaintiff obtained substitution of the heirs of deceased defendant and applied beyond time to substitute the executor, held that was

(1) Kadir Mohideen v Muthu Krishna Ayyar, 26 M 230 (1902), distinguished in Rameshwar v Janeshwar, 19 C L J 19 (1913) (party not bound by the decree when removed from the record on plaintiff's application on the understanding that she would not be so bound)

(2) Roop Narain v Ramayte, 3 C L R. 192 (1878)

(3) Shama Puddoo v Dino Nath, 25 W. R. 108 (1876)

(4) Jamnadas v Sorabji, 16 B 27 (1891)

(5) Paru v Varangattil, 23 M. 369

(6) Hem Kunwar v Amba Prasad, 22 A.

430 (1900)

(7) Joy Gobind v Venmotha Nath, 33 C 580

(8) Bai Full v Adesang, 26 B 203 (1901)

(9) Alla Baksh v Madho Ram, 23 A 22 (1900)

(10) Renga Srinivasa v Gnanaprkasa, 10 M. 67 (1906)

(11) Dharanajit Narayan Singh v Chandeshwar Prasad Singh, 11 C W N 504 (1907)

(12) Mahdi Husain v Sughra Begam, 25 A. 206 (1902)

(13) Paru v Varangattil, 23 M 369

sufficient cause for the delay under this section, and that the case came under sect 32 of the last Code (1) Some Courts were wont to take a strict view of what was "sufficient cause," excluding a plea of ignorance of the law It was found by experience that a number of suits and appeals had been held to abate somewhat unfairly through the ignorance of suitors and appellants as to the fact of the decease of a party and as to the procedure necessary in such a case It was proposed, therefore, to amend this rule so as to enable the Court in its discretion to allow the plaintiff in a suit to apply to add the name of the legal representative of a deceased defendant at any time before the passing of the decree But this has not been done, as possibly it was considered that sect 5 of the Limitation Act as applied by r 9, met the case

Legal representative of a deceased defendant may apply—Before the amendment made by sect 32 of Act VII of 1888 it was held that the Court could not act save on the application of the plaintiff or appellant, (2) and the representative of a sole defendant could not apply to be made defendant (3) unless the application came within sect 372 (now r 10) (4) The legal representative can apply under this rule (see sect 146) If there be two claimants the Court should decide between them and not put both on the record (5) Where a party defended a suit on alternative defences his legal representative may rely on either (6)

Limitation—An application to have the legal representative of a defendant, plaintiff respondent, or defendant respondent placed on the record must be made within six months from the death of the deceased (7) In a recent case it has been held that sect 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under this rule, and that where such an application is made after time the suit or appeal must be declared to have abated and the remedy for the plaintiff or appellant is to proceed under r 9 of this Order (8)

Appeals—An order of abatement under the penultimate clause of the last Code was held to be an order and not a decree and appealable under sect 588 of that Code (9) See now O XLIII r 1

5. Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant such question shall be determined by the Court

Determination of question as to legal representative.

is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant such question shall be determined by the Court

Applicability—This section in the last Code corresponded with sect 103

(1) *Hossein Ali v Abdur Rahim* 7 C W N 529 (1905)

(2) *Sadhu Sarun Singh v Dwarka Singh*, 12 C L R 45 (1882), *Lakshmitai v Bal Krishna*, 4 B 634 (1880)

(3) *Raj Javere Hathu Singh* J B 50 (1884)

(4) *Rajaram Bhagwat v Jilai*, 9 B 151 (1884)

(5) *Muhammad v Khushalo*, 10 A. 223

(1883)

(6) *Balmukund v Bhagvandas*, 15 Bom L R 309 (1912)

(7) Art 177, Sched. I, Act IV of 1903

(8) *Secretary of State v Jawahar Lal*, 30 A. 235 (1914)

(9) *Medha Hussain v Sughra Begum*, 25 A. 208 (1902)

of Act VIII of 1859, save for a mere verbal alteration by Act X of 1877 Under the former section the words were "the Court may either stay the suit until the fact has been determined in another suit, or decide at or before the hearing of the suit, who," etc Now no alternative is given The Court must determine the question As to execution proceedings, see r 12, *post*

This rule applies to proceedings on appeal (1) and to a case of an agreement to refer a question of partition to arbitration, (2) but not under the last Code to proceedings in execution of decree (3)

"A question"—Such as where the representative character is denied by the defendant (4) It need not be between persons claiming to represent the deceased plaintiff (5)

"Legal representative"—See notes to r 1, *ante*

"Such question shall be determined"—Under the last Code it was held that the adverse claimants to represent a deceased party must not be brought on the record but the Court should follow one or other of the procedures laid down in the section (6) And that if the heirship was not established the Court cannot dismiss the suit but should stay it (7) The Court must now determine the question *vide ante*, 'Applicability' It is irregular to make two adverse claimants co plaintiffs but the defect may be cured by the consent of the parties (8) Two rival claimants should not be placed on the record, and after the hearing their claims decided in the final decree (9) The Court has not to decide who is the heir of the deceased plaintiff, but who shall be admitted to be such legal representative for the purpose of prosecuting the suit (10) The appointing of a legal representative for such purpose does not determine any issue properly raised such for instance as in a partition suit, the vital issue whether the deceased plaintiff was joint or separate from the rest of the family (11)

"The Court"—This must be the Court trying the suit A District Judge has no power to act under the section when the cause is before a Subordinate Judge although the latter may not be in Court on the day of the application (12)

Appeals—It was held that the order might be set aside on an appeal from the decree even though no appeal has been preferred from the order, (13) but not if the party complaining was not a party to the decree (14)

(1) R 11

(2) Perumalla v Perumalla, 27 M 112 (1903)

(3) Abedoonissa v Ameeroonissa 41 A 66 2 C 327 (1896)

(4) Oula v Beepathe, 17 M 209 (1893)

(5) Subbayya v Saminadayyar 18 M 496 (1890), Hanwant Singh v Ram Gopal, 30 A 748 (1903)

(6) Har Narain v Kharag, 9 A 447 (1887)

(7) Balabai v Ganesh 27 B 162 (1902), 4 Bom L R 950

(8) Parbitty v Higgins 17 W R 475

(1872), 8 B L R App 98

(9) Vithu v Bhima 15 B 145 (1893)

(10) Balabai v Ganesh 27 B 162 (1902) 4 Bom L R 950

(11) Parasotam v Janki Bai 28 A 109 (1900) 1 W N (1905) 208

(12) Biproo Chunder v Ramlal chun Doh, W R 1864, 121

(13) Har Narain v Kharag, 9 A 447 (1887),

Vithu v Bhima 15 B 145 (1890), Balabai v

Ganesh, 27 B 162, 4 Bom L R 950 (1903)

(14) Bankalal v Maridhar, 20 A 200 (1890)

6. *Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, whether the cause of action survives or not, there shall be no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the conclusion of the hearing*

Death of party after hearing—This is new. It was considered that the legal effect of proceedings taken in ignorance of the death of a party was uncertain, and it has therefore been enacted that the mere circumstance of a death among the parties did not invalidate judicial action. The English practice has been followed as to the validity of a judgment where a party has died between the conclusion of the hearing and the delivery of the decision (1). The death of a plaintiff before hearing does not justify a dismissal of the suit for default of appearance under O 9 r 8 (2).

7. (1) The marriage of a female plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate, but the suit may notwithstanding be proceeded with to judgment, and, where the decree is against a female defendant, it may be executed against her alone.

(2) Where the husband is by law liable for the debts of his wife, the decree may, with the permission of the Court, be executed against the husband also, and, in case of judgment for the wife, execution of the decree may, with such permission, be issued upon the application of the husband, where the husband is by law entitled to the subject-matter of the decree.

Husband and wife—This section corresponded with sect 100 of Act VIII of 1859, save for slight amendments made by Act X of 1877. It is the same now as in the last Code but for one verbal amendment. It applies to proceedings on appeal (3). Where a person died pending suit and his wife was brought on the record and judgment given against her which was affirmed on appeal, and between the original and final judgment she married again the decree, it was held, could not be executed against the second husband (4).

8. (1) The insolvency of a plaintiff in any suit which the assignee or receiver might maintain for the benefit of his creditors, shall not cause the

When plaintiff's insolvency bars suit.

(1) Chetan Charan Das v. Balbhadra Das 21 A 314, Ramacharya v. Ananta Charya, 21 B 314, Sundra Hoshub v. Durgasoon dery, 19 C 513

(2) For case of death of party before hearing see Debi Baksh Singh v. Habub Shah,

1 C. 35 A 331 (1913), 40 I A 151, 17 C. W. N. 529

(3) R 11

(4) Boodabun Chunder v. Mackintosh 2 W R 442 (1866).

suit to abate, unless such assignee or receiver declines to continue the suit or (unless for any special reason the Court otherwise directs) to give security for the costs thereof within such time as the Court may direct

(2) Where the assignee or receiver neglects or refuses to continue the suit and to give such security within the time so ordered, the defendant may apply for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of the plaintiff's insolvency, and the Court may make an order dismissing the suit and awarding to the defendant the costs which he has incurred in defending the same to be proved as a debt against the plaintiff's estate

Insolvency—This rule corresponds with sect 106 of Act VIII of 1859 as modified by Act V of 1877 which (*inter alia*) extended the section to receivers appointed under sect 351 of the last Code and substituted the last portion of the section as it now stands commencing from the words 'apply for the dismissal'. The words *shall not cause the suit to abate* have been substituted for *shall not bar the suit* and an option is given as to taking security. The rule applies to proceedings on appeal (1). It does not declare that the assignee shall be made a party to the suit as the Act does in the case of persons representing a deceased party. The practice in India was to add or substitute the assignee's name and he might be called upon to deposit the costs of an appeal, (2) but now the Official Assignee should give security before the order is made making him a party (3). The form of the order should be one giving the Official Assignee a time within which to elect and give security for costs. If that is not done within the time specified the defendant may apply for dismissal (4). The defendant cannot plead abatement without giving the Official Assignee an opportunity of prosecuting the suit (5). This rule does not apply to a case where there has only been an application to declare the plaintiff an insolvent and a vesting order has been made but the proceedings are subsequently annulled and the plaintiff is not declared an insolvent (6). It only applies to the case of an insolvent plaintiff not to that of an insolvent defendant. The Assignee has no power to continue the defence of a suit pending at the time the vesting order was made or to get himself made a party to a suit with a view of moving for a new trial or for any other purpose whatsoever. He may apply to stay the suit under sect 19 of the Indian Insolvent Act (7).

1] 9 (1) Where a suit abates or is dismissed under this Order, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action

- (1) R 11
(2) Hoeralall Seal v Carapca, 13 W R. 431 (1870)
(3) Ibrahim v Abdur Rahman 12 B H C 27 (1875)
(4) Lektra v Shamlal 16 B 401 (1880)

- (5) Ibrahim v Abdur Rahman 12 B H C. 257 (1875)
(6) Amrita Lal v Rakhali Das 27 C 217 (1899) s c 4 C. W N 204
(7) In re Hunt, Monnet & Co v Bholar 1 B H C 251 257 (1864)

(2) *The plaintiff or the person claiming to be the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or the assignee or the receiver in the case of an insolvent plaintiff may apply for an order to set aside the abatement or dismissal, and if it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit, the Court shall set aside the abatement or dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit*

(3) The provisions of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, (1) shall apply to applications under *sub rule (2)*

Effect of abatement or dismissal.— This rule corresponds with sect 371 of Act X of 1877, save that the word "or" between 'deceased' and 'bankrupt' (subsequently "insolvent") was inserted by Act XII of 1879. The present amendments are verbal only. Sect 372A has, however, been introduced into the rule as sub rule (3).

This rule applies to proceedings on appeal (2). Before the amendment of sects 368 and 370 of the last Code it was thought the corresponding section referred only to orders passed under the last paragraph of sect 368 and the second paragraph of sect 370 of that Code (3). This opinion, however, which was obiter, was no longer correct after the amendment, for sect 370 of the last Code as amended had no provision for abatement, and under sect 368 as amended the abatement was under the penultimate clause, while the first clause of sect 366 also provided for abatement and to such orders of abatement this section was applicable (4). The former section was not applicable to an application by a plaintiff when the defendant is dead, and his representatives ought to have been brought in, (5) nor to a case where a plaintiff, who after obtaining an order for substitution of the representative of the deceased defendant and issue of summons, took no steps, and the suit was dismissed (6).

Practice—A Court may make an order for abatement under r 3 (formerly sect 366), and then revive the suit under this rule, (7) and the order for abatement may be coupled with an order under this rule (8). When applications for abatement and for revival were set down for hearing together, the proper order to pass was held to be to declare the suit to have abated and then at once to pass an order under this section on sufficient cause being shown (9). The cause of action in the original and revived suits must be the same, no fresh cause of action can be imported into the revived suit (10).

(1) Now repealed and replaced by Act IX of 1908

(2) R II

(3) *Bessacaur Bhugut v Murlu*, 9 C 163 (1882)

(4) *Bhojrab Dass v. Doman*, 5 C. 139 (1879), 4 C L R 374, *Fulvahu v Goculdas*, 9 B 279, *Ram Protap v Lal Chand*, 9 C. W N 369 (1904)

(5) *Benode Mohini v Sharat Chander*, 8 C. 842 (1882)

(6) *Bessacaur Bhugut v Murlu*, 9 C 163 (1882)

(7) *Bhojrab Dass v Doman*, 5 C 139 (1879), 4 C L R 374

(8) *Fulvahu v Goculdas*, 9 B 275 (1885)

(9) *Ram Protap v Lal Chand*, 9 C W N 369 (1904), *Goda Coopersamier v Soon daramall*, 33 M. 167 (1909)

(10) *Shani Chand Giri v Bhayaram Panday* 23 C. 22 (1894).

'Sufficient cause'—Such as the delay caused by the representative taking steps to obtain representation. So where there is difficulty in obtaining probate of a deceased plaintiff's will the mere neglect to apply for limited administration will not be a bar to an application under this rule (1)

Limitation—The application must be made within sixty days from the order of abatement or dismissal (2)

Appeal—Formerly there was no appeal from an order refusing to set aside the abatement of a suit (3) but this was subsequently provided for by sect 588 (20) and now by O XLIII r 1 (2)

2] 10 (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved

(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub rule (1)

Applicability—The former section was introduced by Act X of 1877, and was not amended until the present Code. In the first paragraph all reference to the consent of or notice upon parties has been omitted and the words *either in addition to* etc occurring after the word "come," have also been left out. Sub rule (2) is new. It applies to proceedings on appeals (4) to a partition suit after decree for partition (5) but not where the preliminary decree has been completely carried out and the suit determined (6). It applies to assignment of the rights and interests of a putnadar (7) to devolution of interest by reason of an adjudication in insolvency (8) and to the case of assignment by a defendant pending a suit which was decreed whereupon the assignee filed an appeal, (9) but not on appeal where an assignee applied to be made a party by reason of an assignment executed during the pendency of the original suit, (10) nor to the assignment creation or devolution of any interest after decree, (11) or occurring

(1) Bhojrab Dass v Doman, 5 C 148 (1879) 4 C L R 374 see also Gulshan v Gocaldas 9 B 275 and see Debi Bahadur v Habib Shah, P C, 35 A 331 (1913) 40 I A 151 17 C W N 829

(2) Art 171 Sched I of Act IX of 1908

(3) Benode Mohini v Sharat Chander, 8 C 837 (1882)

(4) Rajaram v Jibhai, J B 141 (1854) r 11

(5) Ram Nath v Uma Charan, 1 C W N 30 (1899)

(6) Gally Churn Mullick v Bhugobutty,

5 C, L R 103 (1879)

(7) Wilson v Government 12 W R. 122 (1899) (before this section)

(8) Punthavelu v Bhasbham 3 M 406 (1901)

(9) Moti Ram v Kundan Lal 22 A 350 (1900)

(10) Shama Charan Chowdhury v Ram Uma Kumari Rule No 1581 of 1900, dated 19th May, 1901 (Cal unreported)

(11) Goodall v Mussoorie Bank 10 A 97 (1887), Raynor v Mussoorie Bank 7 A 21 (1885)

between the decree and the filing of the appeal (1) It was held under the last

a decree pending appeal, (3) but see now as to attachment, sub rule (2) It does not apply to the case of the Official Assignee appointed in insolvency proceedings before the suit was brought against the insolvent (4)

"Other cases"—That is, cases other than those specifically mentioned in the preceding rules of this Order, (5) and not confined to cases other than death, marriage, or insolvency, (6) such as an assignment of a respondent who subsequently died, (7) but the assignee must be arrayed on the same side as the assignor (8) A champertor and part assignee of the plaintiff has been made a party defendant on his own application (9) The rule also applies to an assignment by the defendant pending suit which was decreed whereupon the assignees filed an appeal (10)

"Devolution"—This includes devolution of interest by reason of an adjudication in insolvency and the making of a vesting order (11) Where a Receiver institutes a suit for ejectment and is discharged the person who in the suit in which the Receiver is appointed is declared entitled to the property in question, is entitled to continue the suit, (12) so also where in a pending suit instituted by a manager of an encumbered estate the estate is released and restored to the owners (13)

"Any interest"—Means interest in the property the subject matter of the suit (14) A creditor of a decree holder attaching the decree pending an appeal against it, could not (it was formerly held) be made a respondent to the appeal (15) But see now sub rule (2)

"During the pendency of a suit"—These words relate to a suit in which no final order has been made though a preliminary decree has been passed, (16) such as a suit in which directions to take an account have been given (17) or a

(1) *Collector of Mozaffarnagar v Husain Begum*, 18 A 86 (1890), but see *Grover v Luckhanath v Brindaban Chunder* 18 W R 438 (1872)

(2) *Harish Chandra Tewary v Chandpore Co., Ltd.*, 30 C 961 (1903), see also *Jamadas Chhabildas v Torabji Kharsedji*, 16 B 27 (1901), but see *Midnapur Zemindary Co. Ltd v Narceh*, 16 C W N 109 (1911) and *Arbutnot's Industrials, Ltd v Muthu Chettiar*, 31 M 464 (1909)

(3) *Chail Behari v Rahmal Das*, 20 A 38 (1897)

(4) *Miller v Budh Singh*, 18 C 43

(5) *Bhugwan Das Khettry v Nil Kanta Ganguli*, 9 C W N 171 (1904), *Benode Mohun v Sharat Chunder*, 8 C 537 (1882)

(6) *Bhugwan Das Khettry v Nil Kanta Ganguli*, 9 C W N 171 (1904)

(7) *Rajaram v Jibai* 9 B 151 (1884)

(8) *Radha Prasad v Rajendro* 5 A 209 (1882)

(9) *Rajaram Das v Debendro Nath*, 3 C W N 754 (1899)

(10) *Moti Ram v Kundan Lal* 22 A 360

(11) *Punthavelu v Bhashyam Ayyangar*, 25 M 408 (1901)

(12) *Macleod v Hassan* 30 B 250 (1906)

(13) *Sourindra Mohun Tagore v Shromoni Debi*, 28 C 171 (1900) 5 C W N 307

(14) *Harish Chandra Tewary v Chandpore Co., Ltd.*, 30 C 961 (1903)

(15) *Chail Behari v Rahmal Das*, 20 A 38 (1897)

(16) *Gocool Chunder v Administrator General*, 5 C 731 (1880), *Surendra v Khetter*, 30 C 609 (1903)

(17) *Surendro Keshub v Khetter Kishito*, 30 C 609 (1903), 7 C W N 517

suit respecting a will, where a decree for a scheme to be settled was made but was not proceeded with and no scheme settled or final order made, (1) even though it has been struck off for want of prosecution, (2) or a mortgage suit after decree, at least up to the order absolute for sale, (3) and up to the time the property is actually sold, (4) and even after the sale and before payment out of Court (5). But a purchaser of the plaintiff's interest after a suit is dismissed is not entitled to appeal without joining the original plaintiffs as appellants (6). The devolution must be either pending suit or pending appeal (7).

"By leave of the Court"—The application may be made by the person seeking to be added or substituted, or by one of the parties to the suit (8). In the last Code the leave was to be given either with the consent of, or after service of notice on, the parties. The Court might have revived without consent or notice, where the parties who ought to give consent or get notice were dead (9). On an application by the appellant to substitute for the original respondent the latter's assignee, under an assignment of which the appellant had two years' notice and made before the filing of the appeal, the assignee's objection to be placed on the record was sustained (10). The provision as to consent of, or notice upon, parties has been omitted. But it has been held that its omission does not justify the inference that such an order made *ex parte* cannot be recalled, for all orders of this character made *ex parte* are subject to the implication that they may be revoked at the instance of any party prejudiced, and the Court has inherent power to give such directions as the justice of the case may require (11).

"Continued by or against"—It is not a new suit as against the person added or substituted and he can only take such pleas as his assignor could have raised, and cannot introduce any new issue (12). A purchaser of the rights and

"The person to or upon whom"—The Official Assignee in insolvency proceedings instituted before the suit is brought against the insolvent cannot be made a party under the rule (15). The position of the Official Assignee is not affected by the doctrine of *lis pendens* and the party seeking to bind him by the result of a suit should apply to make him a party to the suit (16). A

(1) Govind Chunder v Rungunmonev, 6 C 60 (1880), 5 C L R 569

(2) Gocool Chunder v Administrator General, 5 C 726 (1880)

(3) Chuni Lal v Abdul Ali, 23 A 331 (1901)

(4) Bhugwan Das v Nil Kanta, 9 C W N 171 (1904)

(5) Khetter Nath v Manick Lal 5 C W N exciu (1901)

(6) Dhunoo v Dunnoo, 15 W R 106 (1871) (prior to this section)

(7) In the matter of Durga Irosad, 22 A 231 (1899)

(8) In the matter of Sarat Chandra Sinha, 18 A 280 (1896)

(9) Gocool Chunder v Administrator, 5 C 726 (1880), 5 C L R 569

(10) Collector of Muzaffarnagar v Husaini Begum, 18 A 86 (1895)

(11) Tikait Ajant Singh v Christian, 17 C W N 862 (1912)

(12) Chuni Lal v Abdul Ali, 23 A 331 (1901)

(13) Wilson v Government, 12 W R 122 (1869) (prior to this section)

(14) Binode Behary v Beer Narain 5 W R, Act A 62 (1868) (prior to this section)

(15) Miller v Budh Singh 18 C 43 (1890)

(16) Punthavolu v Bhasiyam Ayyangar, 25 M 409 (1901)

attached 21 bank shares as the property of B, C sued for them as his own property, and gaining obtained possession of them, and sold to D. On appeal A succeeded, but held he was not entitled to put D on the record of the execution case or enforce restitution against him (1)

“Such Interest.”—Subject to all liabilities resulting from the application of *lis pendens* (2)

“Has come or dovolved.”—In the last Code the words were “*either in addition to or in substitution for the persons from whom it has passed as the case may be*”. Where the whole interest of the sole plaintiff had been transferred with his unqualified assent, and the transferee substituted for him in the inception of the case, and the defendant in his written defence did not demur, it was held not necessary for the original plaintiff to be associated with the transferee on an appeal by the latter (3). Purchasers or assignees *pendente lite* should be added as parties (4). A purchaser of the plaintiff's interest after a suit is dismissed is not entitled to appeal without joining the original plaintiffs as appellants (5). A plaintiff assigned to A the subject matter of the suit while pending and gave him power to continue, held that the application of A to be substituted or added was reasonable and should be complied with, as A was directly interested in the matters to be settled by the suit (6). In a mortgage suit where assignee applied after the sale had taken place and confirmed he was added as a co plaintiff (7). The alteration in language would appear to have been made with a view to compression only the sense remaining the same.

Limitation.—The right to apply in a pending suit i.e. a suit in which a preliminary decree but no final order has been made accrues from day to day and the periods of limitation provided in Arts 171 171A and 178 Sched II Act XV of 1877, do not apply (8) but they do if no preliminary decree has been made. When a person is substituted he must be taken to be brought on the record subject to the law of limitation applicable to the case (9).

Appeals.—Orders disallowing objections were open to appeal (10). An order for substitution is practically the same as an order disallowing objections and was subject to appeal (11). But there was no appeal from an order refusing an application to be made a party, (12) or from an order rejecting the application of a person claiming to be brought on the record as assignee of the deceased

(1) *Goodall v Mussoorie Bank*, 10 A. 97 (1887), *Raynor v Mussoorie Bank*, 7 A. 681 (1885)

(2) *Chunni Lal v Abdul Ali*, 23 A. 331 (1901)

(3) *Moneerooddeen v Farbutty Churn*, 15 W. R. 121 (1871)

(4) *Ahmedbhai v Vuleebhai*, 8 B. 323 (1884)

(5) *Dhunoo v Sunoo*, 15 W. R. 106 (1871) (prior to this section)

(6) *Commercial Bank of India v Sabji Sahel*, 24 M. 202 (1900)

(7) *Khetter Nath Mitter v Manek Lal*,

5 C. W. N. 519 (1901)

(8) *Kedarnath v Harachand*, 8 C. 420 (1882), *Ram Nath v Uma Charan*, 3 C. W. N. 756, *Surendro Keshub v Khetter Krashto*, 30 C. 609 (1903), 7 C. W. N. 517

(9) *Sheikh Abdul Rahman v Sheikh Amir Ali*, 11 C. W. N. 521 (1907), F. B., s. c., 34 C. 612.

(10) Sect. 568 (21)

(11) *Surendro Mohun Tagore v Siromoni Deb*, 28 C. 171 (1900), 5 C. W. N. 507

(12) *Lalit Mohan v Shebock Chand*, 4 C. W. N. 403 (1900)

sole appellant (1) No appeal, however, lay from an order allowing a defendant's objections, neither was such an order a decree (2) See now O XLIII r 1 (f) An appeal lies under the Letters Patent from an order dismissing on its merits an application by the assignee of the plaintiff to be added or substituted (3) An appeal was also held to lie from an order dismissing any application under the former section to be brought upon the record as representative of a deceased party in a case in which a decree under sect 86 of Act IV of 1882 had been passed such order being one under sect 244 of the last Code, and therefore a decree within the meaning of sect 2 of that Code (4) And wherever a matter can be said to fall within sect 47, *ante*, the order as a decree will be appealable An application by a respondent, whose interest was at one time represented by a receiver, to replace upon the record of the appeal as a party respondent the name of such receiver, which had been struck off owing to a misrepresentation of fact may be treated as an application for review of the order striking off the name of the receiver (5)

- 2.] 11. *In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as Application of Order to appeals may be, the word "plaintiff" shall be held to include an appellant, the word "defendant" a respondent, and the word "suit" an appeal*

Appeals—This with some alterations is the second portion of sect 583 of the last Code, the first portion of which is the second clause of sect 107, *ante*, to the notes of which section reference should be made Where in a personal action for an injunction a decree was given for the defendant with costs and the plaintiff appealed, but during the pendency of the appeal the defendant-respondent died it was held that the right to prosecute the appeal against his legal representative did not survive (6)

- 12 (1) *Nothing in rules 3, 4, and 8 shall apply to proceedings Application of Order in execution of a decree or order. to proceedings*

Miscellaneous proceedings—As has been already observed in the notes to the preceding rules the opinion was generally entertained under the last Code that the Chapter which this Order replaces did not apply to the execution of decrees The original bill, therefore proposed to except all execution proceedings from the operation of this Chapter On revision, however, it was considered that only the sections expressly mentioned should not apply to such proceedings, and that otherwise the provisions of the Order should be made equally applicable to suits and to proceedings other than suits (7)

(1) *Jamna Bibi v Jhau* 24 A 532 (1902)
overruling *Moti Ram v Kundan Lal* 22 A. 350 (1900)

(2) *Commercial Bank of India v Sabju Sahib* 24 M 252 (1900)

(3) *Lalit Mohan v Shebock Chand* 4 C W N 493 (1900), *Aj Singh v Chabak Ram* 2 A 342 (1902)

(4) *Indo Mati v Gaya Prasad*, 19 A. 142 (1896)

(5) *In the matter of Sarat Chandra Singh*, 18 A 285 (1898)

(6) *Jowari v. Samrat Jyengar*, 31 M 76 (1910)

(7) See *Manmohan v. Rukhal* 14 C W N 752 (1902)

or otherwise" appearing in the earlier Codes. Sub rule (3) also originated in sect 97 of Act VIII of 1859. To it the words "*or abandon part of his claim*" were added by sect 373 of Act X of 1877, and the words "*or in respect of the same part*" by Act XII of 1879. The words in italics were introduced by the present Code, "*instituting any*" being substituted for "*bringing a*," and "*in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim*" for "*for the same matter or in respect of the same part*." Sub rule (4) was introduced by the Code of 1877.

The rule does not apply to suits before the Revenue authorities under the Bengal Tenancy Act (X of 1859), (1) nor to Probate proceedings, before the matter becomes contentious, (2) nor to an order made for arbitration under the Second Schedule, paragraph 1, (3) nor after the award has been made, (4) but it applies to proceedings under paragraph 20 seeking to file an award made without the intervention of the Court (5). This rule read with sect 139 applies to insolvency proceedings under the late Code (6). That portion of the Code was repealed by the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907. It applies to rent suits in the N W P under Act XII of 1881 (7). Formerly it was held to apply to proceedings in execution, (8) including claim proceedings, (9) but this is not so now (10) and execution proceedings are now excluded from the operation of this rule by O XXIII r 4 (11).

This rule is not applicable where the fresh suit is against a different party, (12) or where the cause of action is different (13). It only applies to cases where the suit is properly proceeding in the Court in which the leave was granted (14).

"At any time after the institution"—But not after issues have been joined and the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence in support of his claim (15) nor after the defendant has obtained a decree in his favour (16). In a recent case where, after all the witnesses had been examined, the Court had given the plaintiff time to produce documents contradicting those produced by the defendant, and on his failure to produce them had granted leave to withdraw and

(1) Radha Madhub v Lukhi Narain 21 C 428 (1893), Mokunda v Bhogaban 21 C 515 (1894), Jonardan v Barclay 5 C W N exl. (1901), Modhoo Soodun v Panch Cowree, 7 W R 302 (1867), Beer Chunder v Tarinee Churn 11 W R 46 (1869), Ramanath v Joy Kshen, 11 W R 3 (1869) but see Woomanath Roy v Sreenath, 15 W R 260 (1871).

(2) Pakiam v Innasi, 19 M. 458 (1896).

(3) Sheosambar v Deodat, 9 A. 163 (1886).

(4) Debi Churn v Bipra Prasad, 7 C W N 186 (1902).

(5) Gauri Shankar v Manda Koer, 31 C 516 (1904).

(6) Haidar v Jamuna, 17 A. 161 (1895).

(7) Madho Prakash v Murla, 5 A. 406 (1883).

(8) Sarju Prasad v Sita Ram, 10 A. 71 (1887).

(9) Subbaraman v Ionnusawmy, 5 M. II

C 298 (1870).

(10) Wajthan v Bishwanath, 18 C 462 (1891), Radha Kshen v Radha Pershad, 18 C 515 (1891), Bunko Behary v Nil Madhub, 18 C 635 (1891), Lakshmi v Atchanna 15 M. 240 (1891), Thakur Prasad v Fakur ulla, 17 A. 106 (1894 P. C.), 22 I. A. 44.

(11) Lodd Govindas v Ramdoss, 4 M. I. J. 88 (1912).

(12) Mukhoda v Ram Churn, 8 C 371 (1882), 11 C. L. R. 194.

(13) Gopal Chandra v Purna Chandra, 4 C W N 110 (1898), 2 C W. N. cclxxxvii.

(14) Ramdeo Dass v Gonesh, 33 C 924 (1903).

(15) Muddun Ram v Israil Ali, 21 W. R. 291 (1874).

(16) Elknath v Ranaji, 35 B. 461 (1911), and see Nata Palat v Beni Madho, 36 A. 173 (1914).

institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, under this rule, it was held this was a material irregularity, since time should not have been given after the hearing was finished and the failure to produce the documents was not ground for granting leave for a fresh suit (1). It must be before judgment and preparation of the decree in proceedings under the Second Schedule, paragraph 20, to file an award made without the intervention of the Court (2). Under the Code of 1859 permission could not be given in the final judgment (3). Leave has been given on appeal, (4) and on special appeal, (5) but on appeal, in Madras, an appellant cannot withdraw without leave of the Court, and will in every instance be liable to pay the respondent's costs of appeal (6). The S C C, it was held might pass an order under the former section corresponding with this rule after granting an application for a new trial, (7) but where it had passed a decree for the plaintiff contingent upon the opinion of the H C, which decided on the plea that the plaintiff could not recover, the S C C could not then give leave to withdraw, but must enter up judgment for the defendant (8).

"Other sufficient grounds"—Such as a misjoinder either of parties (9) or of the matters in contest, (10) or where only the form of the suit was bad, (11) or where on appeal certain important evidence was rejected, (12) or where a material document has been rejected because it has not been properly stamped (13) or where the plaintiff had relied on *sudder jummas* and the Court considered the zemindar's collections would be better evidence (14) or where the plaintiff desired to register the document on which he sued (15) or where the plaintiff was unable to adduce evidence within the time allowed by the Court (16) or where there had been an erroneous valuation of the subject of the suit (13) but not because, after issues have been joined the plaintiff fails to produce evidence in support of his claim (17). Query whether it is sufficient ground

(1) Bai Kashilal v. Shilpa Annappa 27 B 682 (1913)

(2) Gauri Shankar v. Marla Koor 31 C 517 (1904)

(3) Sheoraj Nundin v. Rajenmar 21 W R 23 (1871)

(4) Gregory v. Dooley Chand 14 W R 17 (1868), Ram Pershad v. Bhurora 9 W R 328 (1868) Khatoon Koonwar v. Hurdoot Narain 20 W R 163 (1873) Gang v. Ram v. Datta Ram 8 A 82 (1880)

(5) Juggunnath v. Mohaboolah 17 W R 164 (1872)

(6) Kareem Bee v. Begum Bee 3 W H C 368 (1867)

(7) Jadu Mani v. Ram Kumar 29 C 239 (1902)

(8) A. Yule v. Mahomed Hossain, 24 C 129 (1896)

(9) Watson v. Collector of Rajshahye 12 W R, P C 43 (1869), 13 Moo I A 160, 3

B L R P C 48 Canesh v. Khairati 10 A 279 (1894)

(10) Watson v. Collector of Rajshahye 12 W R 1 C 47 (1869) 13 Moo I A 160 3 B L R P C 48

(11) Juggunnath v. Mohaboolah 17 W R O 1 164 (1872)

(12) Gregory v. Dooley Chand 14 W R 1 (1868)

(13) Watson v. Collector of Rajshahye 12 W R P C 43 (1869) 13 Moo I A 160 3 B L R P C 48

(14) Khatoon Koonwar v. Hurdoot Narain 20 W R 163 (1873)

(15) Musser Dabee Pershad v. Buldeo Pershad 5 N W P, H C R 116 (1873)

(16) Peresh Narain v. Surut Soondaree, 16 W R 100 (1871)

(17) Muddan Ram v. Israel Ali 21 W R 291 (1874)

that the defence was such that the suit must fail (1) It has been held that while it is impossible to lay down any exhaustive definition of "sufficient grounds" within the meaning of this rule, it may be generally said that the Court should not allow withdrawal of suit after the parties are ready for trial if it would obviously prejudice the defendant (2)

"With liberty to institute a fresh suit"—This does not prevent the Court, when such fresh suit is brought, from entering into the question of *res judicata*; (3) but a suit is not barred by the principle of *res judicata* because in the former suit, after evidence had been recorded but before judgment, liberty to bring a fresh suit had been granted (4) Courts in India have not the power to make a decree of non suit So where in a suit for enforcement of a hypothecation against immoveable property it was dismissed, in the form in which it was brought, on the ground that the plaintiff having purchased a part, could not sue for the whole of his claim against the rest of the property, with permission to bring a fresh suit, it was held that such permission ought not to have been granted (5) In a decree wholly dismissing a suit for possession on the ground that the plaintiff had only made out his claim to one third of the property claimed, the liberty given to bring a fresh suit for possession of the one third was a nullity and the claim was *res judicata* in a suit brought in pursuance of the liberty (6) If the permission through inadvertence be not recorded, the omission may be rectified on review (7) The procedure provided in this Order is not the only manner in which a plaintiff can come to Court a second time for adjudication upon the merits of his rights (8) Limitation applies to the second suit as if it was the first (9)

"May grant"—The order should not be for the dismissal of the suit, but in terms of this rule (10) The proper order is one which limits the time in which the payment should be made and which goes on to direct that on failure to pay within that time the original suit is dismissed with costs (11) Apart from this rule the Courts in this country have no power to dismiss a suit and give a plaintiff leave to bring a fresh suit on the same matter (12) It has been held that the dismissal of a suit in the form it was brought does not amount to permission to sue again (13) but this has been dissented from (14) If the defendant has appeared this order cannot be made *ex parte*, (15) but must

(1) *Zahur un nissa v Khuda Yar*, 3 A 528 (1881)

(2) *Mahipati v Nathu*, 33 B 722 (1909)

(3) *Watson v Collector of Rajshahye*, 12 W R, P C 43 (1863), 13 Moo I A 160, 2 B L R, P C 48

(4) *Mona Bibee v Omed Ali*, 14 W R 276 (1871)

(5) *Banwari v Muhammad Mashait*, 9 A 690 (1887)

(6) *Sukh Lal v Bhikhi*, 11 A 187 (1888)

(7) *Pearce Mohun v Gooroodoss*, 20 W R 401 (1873)

(8) *Muhammad Salim v Naluan Bibi*, 8 A 282 (1886)

(9) *Varajlal Shomeshwar*, 29 B 219 (1904)

(10) *Doucett v Wise*, 1 W R 322 (1864), *Gregory v Dooley Chand*, 14 W R, O J App 17, p 22 (1868)

(11) *Shital Prasad v Gaya Prasad*, 19 C L J 529 (1914), at p 532 (*Jenkins, C J*, and *Woodroffe, J*)

(12) *Hira Lal v Udov*, 16 C W, N 1027 (1912)

(13) *Ganesh Lal v Kalka Prasad*, 5 A. 695 (1883)

(14) *Per Mahmood, J*, in *Muhammad Salim v Naluan Bibi*, 8 A 282 (1886)

(15) *Misrar Debes Pershad v Buldeo Pershad*, 5 N W P H C R 116 (1873)

be made on notice to him (1) The effect of the order is to leave matters as if no suit had been instituted and O II r 2 will not debar the plaintiff from seeking relief he did not include in his first suit (2) Where the order was made so as to enable the plaintiff in the first suit to include a portion of his claim omitted in the original suit and such fresh suit was brought it was held that the additional portion was not barred by sect 7 of Act VIII of 1859 (3) Where an Appellate Court, instead of deciding upon an appeal refers the appellant to a fresh suit, the order whether right or wrong if accepted by the parties, is binding upon them (4) A Special Judge under the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act, in the exercise of his revisional powers cannot do so no such application having been made to the Lower Court (5)

Sub rule (3).—The original clause was introduced as the effect of the decision cited (6)

"On such terms"—The only case in which a Court may enforce a condition, e.g. that the payment of costs be a condition precedent to withdrawal, upon a plaintiff who seeks to withdraw is where the plaintiff asks not only to withdraw but also liberty to bring a fresh suit (7) The order that the plaintiff should pay the defendant's costs is almost if not quite a matter of course, and an Appellate Court will not interfere with such an order (8) The plaintiff had to pay the costs incurred by the defendant where he caused the defendant's arrest before judgment and then applied for withdrawal under this rule (9) If the liberty be to bring a fresh suit on payment of costs a subsequent suit is not void *ab initio* if the costs are not paid before its institution and subsequent payment cures the irregularity (10) But if the order be that the costs be paid within a specified time and that is not done the withdrawal must be taken to be without permission, (11) though the Court has power to extend the time for payment when it is absolutely impossible for the party to pay such costs before the day fixed (12) In a recent case where permission to withdraw a suit on payment of costs with liberty to institute another had been granted but the subsequent suit was brought before the costs had been paid it was held that it was barred because the former suit was still pending but that on a later payment of the costs the withdrawal became complete (13)

"Claim"—"Claim" means such a claim as if the allegations on which it

(1) *Misser Debeo Pershad v Buldeo Pershad*, 5 N W P R C R 116 (1873), *Kareem Bee v Beegam Bee* 3 M H C 368 (1867), *Kahan Singh v Lekhra* 6 A 211 (1884)

(2) *Behari Lal v Baran Mat*, 17 A 53 (1894)

(3) *Maht Baksh v Imam Balsh* 1 A. 324 (1876), see also *London Bombay and Mediterranean Bank v Burjorji*, 9 B 346 (1885)

(4) *Rajib v Nil Monoo*, 20 W R 440 (1873)

(5) *Muktaji v Manaji* 12 B 684 (1888)

(6) *Aboo Talch v Abdool Nubee* 20 W R 415 (1873)

(7) *Handar Shah v Jamna Das* 17 A 128

161 (1890)

(8) *Doucett v Wise* 1 W R 322 (1864)

(9) *Syed Ali v Adib* 15 B 160 (1890)

(10) *Abdul Aziz v Elrahim Molla* 31 C 965 (1904)

(11) *Harinath v Syed Hassan* 10 C W N 8 (1900), 3 C L J 480, *Faher v Nagappa* 33 M 208 (1903)

(12) *Perna Muthurani v Karappanna* 29 M 30 (1906)

(13) *Shital Prasad v Gaya Prasad*, 19 C L J 529 (1914) (*Jenkins C.J.* and *Woodroffe J.*), approving *Abdul Aziz v Ibrahim Molla*, *supra*

is based are true gives the plaintiff a cause of action *quoad* that particular claim, and not a claim which is not a cause of action and which the Court may, in any event in the exercise of its discretion, either grant or refuse (1)

“Without the permission”—On a plaintiff filing a petition unconditionally withdrawing his claim the suit should be struck off. He cannot thereafter apply to set aside his petition on the ground that the defendant has failed to fulfil some private arrangement (2). But he may recall his petition of withdrawal at any time before final judgment (3). Where a plaintiff sued for possession and mesne profits and his suit being dismissed, appealed, reserving his claim for future mesne profits for a separate suit, a future suit for such mesne profits whether from date of the prior suit or decree, was held not to be barred (4). And if it was with consent of the defendant, *e.g.* for the purpose of referring the matter to arbitration which fell through, a fresh suit is not barred (5). Where a settlement had been come to and both parties applied that the case be struck off it was the plaintiff's duty to see the terms recorded. He having failed to do so a fresh suit on the same matter was barred under this clause (6). When in a particular suit a defendant had by concession of the plaintiff acquired rights which otherwise could not have existed, the plaintiff cannot by withdrawal of the appeal annul the effect of the concession (7). If the withdrawal be on appeal the decree appealed against becomes final, and is unaffected by any compromises made at the time of the withdrawal (8) and only the decree of the Lower Court can be executed (9). When an appeal is withdrawn after the respondent has filed his answer, no leave to appeal ought to be given to the respondent unless he satisfy the Court he was ready to appeal and would have done so in proper time if the other side had not appealed (10).

“Liable for such costs”—The Court would dismiss the suit with costs (11).

“Such subject matter”—Matter means the subject of legal action, consideration complaint or defence or the fact or facts constituting the whole or a part of a ground of action or defence (12). It does not mean property but the right in property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce (13). And O II r 2 is a bar to his instituting a fresh suit in respect of any portion of his claim which he may have omitted to include in the suit he has withdrawn (14). Where a plaintiff sued for ejectment and withdrew his suit without permission to bring

(1) *Kuppusamy v Venkataram* 15 M L J 465

(2) *Rajah Shamshoo v Mirza Mahomed Ali* 2 Agra 158 (1867)

(3) *Rambhuroo Lal v Gopee Beebee* 6 V W R H C R 66 (1874)

(4) *Kuppusamy v Venkataram* 15 M L J 462.

(5) *Juggobundo v W N Watson and Co* *Bourke's Reports*, 102 (1865)

(6) *Gulikandi Lal v Manni Lal*, 23 A 219 (1901)

(7) *Satyabhamabai v Ganesh Balkrishna* 13 B 12 (1904)

(8) *Vythilinga v Vejaythammal* 15 M 43 (1882)

(9) *Pattoji v Gannu*, 15 B 370 (1890), *Chudasama v Mahani Ishwargar*, 16 B 443 (1891)

(10) *Gour Hari v Pramath* 12 C L R 390

(11) *Hossain Bibi v Peri Khanum* 1 B L R, O C 45 (1868)

(12) *Achuta Menon v Achutan Nayar* 21 M 35 (1897)

(13) *Gopal Chunder v Iurno Chunder*, 2 C W N 243xxvii (1895)

(14) *Harimath v Syed Hossain*, 10 C W N 8 (1900) 2 C L J 450

a fresh suit, on its being objected that the instrument on which he rested his title was not binding after the death of the grantor, the late Zamorin of Calicut, a fresh suit by him after he had obtained a like instrument from the present Zamorin was for the same matter, (1) but where the plaintiff sued to establish his right to sell property in satisfaction of a decree against B, and withdrew his suit without permission, and then sued to sell the same property in satisfaction of another decree against B, it was held not to be for the same matter (2)

Sub-rule (4)—This does not permit one of the plaintiffs withdrawing without permission to bring a fresh suit, even though his co plaintiff do not consent (3)

Appeal—No appeal lies from an order under sub rule (2) (4) but an appeal lies if an Appellate Court in making the order for withdrawal adjudicates on the matter of the suit (5) An order made under this rule is open to revision, (6) thus an order under sub rule (2) giving the defendant a portion of the costs has been held open to revision, (7) as also where a Court on appeal allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the suit under sub-rule (2) without assigning any reason (8)

2. In any fresh suit instituted on permission granted under [s. 3] Limitation Law not the first preceding rule, the plaintiff shall be affected by first suit. bound by the law of limitation in the same manner as if the first suit had not been instituted

Limitation—This rule corresponds with a portion of sect 34 of Act VIII of 1859, and with sect 374 of Acts X of 1877 and XIV of 1882 save that the word "instituted" has been substituted for *brought* It applies to a case where, owing to misjoinder of causes of action one of two plaintiffs was allowed to withdraw with permission to bring a fresh suit (9) It does not apply to proceedings in execution (10)

3 Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a [s. 37] suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by compromise of suit. any lawful agreement or compromise, or where

(1) *Achuts Moosa v Achutsa Nayer* 21 M J 5 (1897)

(2) *Kamun Kant v Ram Nath* 21 C 260 (1893)

(3) *Mohamaya Chowdhrao v Durga Churn* 9 C L R 332 (1881)

(4) *Kalun Singh v Lekhray* 6 A 211 (1884), *Jogodindro v Sarat Sundari* 18 C 322 (1831), *Ramakissore v Sisiranga* 21 W 421 (1898), *Jagdish v Tubhi*, 16 A 13 (1893), *Genda Mal v Pirbha*, 17 A. 97 (1890), *Abdul Mossein v Kasi Sahu*, 27 C 363 (1899), 4 C W N 41, and also *Ram Kanyo v Haroo Chunder*, 17 W R 229 (1872) *Omesh Chunder v Thakoor Doss*, 23

W R 345 (1875) But see *Ganga Ram v Data Ram* 8 A 82 (1885) which held it does not lie

(5) *Satyabhamabai v Ganesh* 29 B 13 (1904)

(6) *Kahan Singh v Lekhray* 6 A 211 (1884)

(7) *Dick v Dick* 15 A 169 (1893)

(8) *Turupati v Mutta* 11 W 322 (1888)

(9) *Varapal v Amratlal*, 29 B 219 (1904), 7 B L R 90

(10) *Tarachand v Hashinath*, 10 B 62 (1880), O XIII r 4 *contra* *Sarju Prasad v Sita Ram* 10 A 71 (1887, i.e. before O XIII. r 4 was enacted)

the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit.

Compromise—This rule corresponds with a portion of sect 98 of Act VIII of 1859 That section referred to "*mutual agreement*," and ran "*shall be recorded, and the suit shall be disposed of in accordance therewith*" By Act X of 1877 these words were changed to "*lawful agreement*," and "*shall be recorded, and the Court shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit, and such decree shall be final*" Act XIV of 1882 added the words "*wholly or in part*," "*the whole or any part of*," and "*so far as relates to so much of the subject matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement, compromise or satisfaction*" The present Code substituted the last set of words in italics for "*If*," and added the words "*the Court shall order*" The concluding words of the former section and such decree shall be final so far as relates to so much of the subject matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement compromise or satisfaction, have been omitted The former section was held not to apply to proceedings under sect 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, (1) nor to proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act though compromises are given effect to in such cases, (2) nor to Probate proceedings, so as to order a grant of Probate without the will being proved (3) It does not apply to proceedings in execution of a decree (4) A compromise effected after a decree for partition must be enforced by a separate suit (5) A compromise in this rule means the settlement of a disputed claim, (6) and it may be either written or verbal (7)

Query whether it applies to a proceeding under sect 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act VIII of 1885 (8) The Calcutta High Court formerly held that this rule applied only to cases where all parties consent to have the terms recorded, and not to cases where any party has declined to carry out the agreement before the judgment has been recorded (9) But the Bombay and Madras High Courts have held that it may be recorded though one of the parties denies it was made or wishes to withdraw from it or objects to its enforcement (10) And the Calcutta High Court has since done the same (11)

"Where it is proved"—This is new, and has been inserted so as to

(1) *Tatayya v Pichayya*, 13 M 316 (1890)

(2) *Culley v Culley*, 10 A 553 (1888)

(3) *Monmohini Gula v Banga Chandra*, 8 C W N 137 (1903)

(4) O XXIII r 4

(5) *Hari Raghunath v Krishnaji*, 19 B 516 (1894)

(6) *Puraji v Ganapati*, 34 B 502 (1910)

(7) *Gajendra v Bindubashini*, 13 C W N 1023 (1909)

(8) *Kali Charan v Parbath Charan* 4 C L J 561 (1906)

(9) *Syud Mehndi Ali t Kowar Ram Chunder*, S D 1891, 381, *Hari Sunari t*

— — — — —
Karuppan t Ramasami S M 482 (1885),
Appasami t Manikam O V 103 (1885),
Harakhbai t Jannabai 37 B 639 (1912)

(11) *Brojo Durlabhi t Rai Nath* 21 C 908 (1897) 1 C W N 97

recognize the power of a Court to inquire into and to record a disputed compromise (1) (See last paragraph)

By any lawful agreement or compromise —The Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree on a compromise unless it is a lawful compromise. Any terms of a contract which are opposed to public policy, e.g. the sale of an office attached to a temple involving services of a personal nature and entitling the holder to receive emoluments are invalid and will not be enforced by the Courts (2). The Court must satisfy itself as to its being lawful by evidence taken before it proceeds to record it and pass a decree in accordance therewith (3). It does not include a mere agreement to refer to arbitration (4). But it includes an agreement to refer the matter in suit to arbitration and the award made thereon (5). This does not include a mere agreement of one party to be bound by the oath of another party, (6) nor an arrangement that the decree or dismissal of the suit should depend upon what was stated in a document in the possession of a witness (7). But it must be such that a Court can pass a decree on and not one that requires something else to be done (8).

Counsel possess a general authority to settle and compromise a suit in which he is actually retained as counsel but not collateral matters outside the scope of such suit (9). Pleaders unless specially empowered have no authority to compromise cases conducted by them (10) and when a counsel or vakeel compromises a case on the instructions of a person who has had no authority to bind the party, the compromise is binding on the latter if he ratifies it. When a counsel or vakeel enters into a compromise a presumption arises that he has done so with his client's assent (11). A decree in pursuance of a compromise is binding though made against the express instructions of a client to his attorney provided such want of authority was not known to the other side (12) but where counsel after receiving the attorney's instruction to do the best he could for the client "compromised a suit notwithstanding the express prohibition of the client and the dissent was notified to the other side before the consent decree was drawn up it was held the consent decree must be set aside (13). Any party has the right to repudiate the action of an agent compromising it without his knowledge and consent before an order is passed accepting the compromise

(1) *Harakibat v Jainaba* 15 Bom L R 340 (1912)

(2) *Lakshmanas vami v Rangamma* 26 M 31 (1902)

(3) *Sridharan v Puramathan* 23 M 101 (1899)

(4) *Lincoy v Isakur Chand* 30 C 218 (1900), 7 C W N 180. *Venkatachala Reddi v Rangiah Redd* 36 M 303 (1911)

(5) *Konnappalen v Perotta* 4 M H C 422 (1899). *Vasudava v Naraina* 2 M 306

(6) *Konnappalen v Perotta* 4 M H C 422 (1899). *Vasudava v Naraina* 2 M 306

(7) *Konnappalen v Perotta* 4 M H C 422 (1899). *Vasudava v Naraina* 2 M 306

(1879) *Mulammad Zahur v Cheda Lal* 14 A. (1891) *Thoyi Ammal v Subbaroya* 22 M. 234 (1899)

(8) *Mubammad Zahur v Cheda Lal* 11 A 141 (1891)

(9) 1b

(10) *Nundo Lal v Natarani* 27 C 405 (1900) 4 C W N 169

(11) *Sirdar Begum v Izzut-ool-nassa* 2 N W P H C R 143 (18 0)

(12) *Bhut Nath v Ram Lal* 6 C W N 52 (1900)

(13) *Jagannath Das v Ramdas* 7 B H C 79 (18 0).

(1856) *Carrison v Rodrigues* 13 C 110

as the final determination of the suit (1) A Corporation can compromise a suit (2) It has been held that there is nothing in the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) to expressly deprive the parties to a suit of the power of entering into a compromise and having it recorded under sect 375 of the last Code (now represented by this rule); (3) and it has also been held that a compromise under that Act is not bad in law merely because it does not comply with sect 15n of that Act (4)

"Shall order."—This is imperative, and a Court cannot refuse to record a lawful agreement of compromise and to pass a decree in accordance therewith merely because in its view it is too favourable to one of the parties (5) The compromise ought to be carried out by proper deeds and filed in Court, particularly where infants are concerned, so as to have the assent of the Court at the time (6) It is not bound to record a compromise which goes beyond the suit (7) When the compromise was an agreement to refer the matter in suit to arbitration, and the award made thereon dealt with additional matter, the award could only be recorded as far as it related to the suit, (8) but not if it does not give the plaintiff any of the reliefs claimed in the suit, but deals with matters not the subject-matter of the suit, and if it appear that the compromise was arrived at conditionally upon its being incorporated in the decree, the suit should be proceeded with (9) This rule was intended to meet cases where the parties having agreed to compromise subsequently fell out The Court has power to frame an additional issue to decide whether a lawful compromise has been effected between the parties subsequent to the institution of the suit, (10) and the present wording of this rule contemplates the Court taking evidence as to the adjustment before recording it The rule does not prevent a party obtaining the enforcement of a compromise even though it has not been recorded So where the parties to a suit executed and registered an agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept certain specific property of the defendant in adjustment of the suit, which agreement was not recorded, and then the plaintiff in execution sold other properties of the defendant, it was held that the agreement was binding and the defendant was, in a suit brought by him, entitled to relief (11)

"Shall pass a decree"—A consent decree upon a compromise has been refused where the suit was not entered in the Cause List of the Court (12)

(1) Monmohini v Banga Chandra, 31 C 357 (1903)

(2) *In re* Norwich Provident Insurance Soc., 8 C. D. 334 (1878)

(3) Piraji v Ganapati, 34 B 602 (1910)

(4) Shivayagappa v Govindappa, 37 B 615 (T B) (1913), approving Piraji v Ganapati, *supra*, and over ruling Kishandas Shivram v Nana Rama, 35 B 190 (1910), (Anandhar Bakharani v Mahadev Santaji, 8 B 20 (1883)

(5) Motiram Balkrishna v Yesu, 22 B 238 (1884)

(6) Abdool Ali v Mozuffar Hossain, 16 W R, P C 25 (1871)

(7) Iajaleh Ali v Kaimaruddin, 13 C. 170 (1880)

(8) Samirai v Premji Pragnu, 40 B. 301 (1893).

(9) Mothu Vijaya v Chandavayya, 22 M 214 (1898)

(10) Appasami v Varadachari, 19 M 113 (1896)

(11) Thota Venkatasubbasami v Krishna Sanyal, 8 M H C 1 (1874)

(12) Pall and Valitta, 5 C L R. 464 (1880)

The words 'in accordance therewith' were introduced as the effect of a Privy Council decision (1)

The former section declared that the decree was final so far as it related to the subject matter of the compromise, etc. When a Court has sanctioned an arrangement and made an order in conformity with it and the agreement has been acted upon neither party is at liberty to rescind from it (2). If the compromise has not been acted upon the plaintiff is restored to his original right of action (3). But when it has been acted on in whole or in part the plaintiff cannot be restored to his original suit but may bring a suit for the performance of the condition uncompleted with (4). The decree must be set aside before a second suit can be brought on the original cause of action (5). A compromise must be treated as a new and positive contract. A breach of its stipulations may be ground for a suit for its enforcement but not for a revival of the original claim (6). The compromise may be specifically enforced as it does not come under sect. 22 of the Specific Relief Act (7) and should be enforced by execution of the decree and not by a new suit (8). Where a compromise was not properly embodied in the decree so that it could be executed a party it was held could sue for its enforcement but could not revert to his original rights (9). A Court in dealing in a fresh suit with a question of right to forfeiture contained in a previous compromise decree whereby the status of landlord and tenant was established between the parties is not precluded from granting such relief against forfeiture as it might have granted had the status arisen from contract or custom (10). A compromise made by the Kurta of a Mitakshara family will be binding so far as it dealt with the matters in suit on a son who was an infant at the time and who was not a party if he were not prejudiced thereby but it would not be binding in regard to matters dealt with outside the scope of the suit if the compromise being one requiring registration were unregistered (11). But a Hindu widow cannot compromise so as to bind reversioners entitled to the estate after her life interest ceases (12). A mother as guardian cannot compromise a suit on behalf of a minor daughter unless it is for the benefit of the daughter (13) and a compromise entered into by a Hindu woman with an alleged adopted son who claimed to be adopted under certain conditions would not bind the daughter (14). Where a compromise was entered into by a guardian of an infant

(1) *Mullick v Jamee* 11 B L R 35 (1872) P C J A Sup Vol 135

(2) *Sheo Golam v Beni Prasad* 5 C 27 (1879)

(3) *Ameer Begum v Noor Begum* 1 Agra F B 1 (1866)

(4) 1b

(5) 1b

(6) *Bishna Coomar v Joy Hurri* 12 W R 909 (1860)

(7) *Shib Lal v Collector of Bareilly* 16 A 423 (1894)

(8) *Luckhee Narain v Ram Mohan* 13 W R 101 (1870) 4 B L R A J 20

(9) *Ram Sahae v Dhanoosharee* 1 W R (1864)

(10) *Krishna Bai v Hary Govind* 31 B 16 S B L R 813 (F B) (1906)

(11) *Bubhadra Nath v Kalpataru* 10 F 1 368 (1900) *Ram Kuber* 1 and 2 10 F 1 30 A 498 (1913) cf *Mada Lal* 1 Sindh 34 A 572 (1912)

maintainable by Kurta with the members of joint family
Sidhewari 1900 1b
C L J 437 (1914)

(12) *Flora* 10 A 1
L R 337 (1902)

(13) 1b

R 4 (1904)

(14) 1b
1b

with the sanction of the Court upon a misapprehension of material facts, (1) or where a compromise in which an infant was concerned was made without the sanction of the Court, (2) or on the ground that the compromise was obtained upon a misrepresentation of the facts, the compromise would be set aside, (3) and a decree embodying unlawful terms of a compromise, e.g., the sale, as being against public policy, of an office attached to a temple involving services of a personal nature and entitling the holder to receive emoluments, is inoperative and will not be enforced, (4) so a decree made on a compromise entered into behind the back of a defendant and to which she is not a party is a nullity as against her (5) For grounds on which a compromise may be set aside, see case cited (6) In England it was held that the question whether a compromise was invalid ought to have been made the subject of a new action, but having been tried without objection as a motion the objection could not be raised on appeal (7) In India it may be set aside either by suit or by way of review, but preferably by review (8) It cannot be set aside on a motion on the ground of fraud (9) nor can the question as to whether the compromise is valid be gone into on an appeal from the consent decree (10) The effect of setting aside a compromise is to renut both parties to their original rights (11) When a consent decree by A against B and C is set aside by a decree in a suit by B against A so far as it affected their rights such decree does not reserve the consent decree so as to entitle A to have his suit restored and reheard on its merits (12) If the compromise does not give the plaintiff any of the reliefs claimed in the suit but deals with the matters not the subject matter of the suit, no decree can be made (13) And a Court is not bound to enforce a compromise which goes beyond the suit It may refuse to do so but it cannot modify it (14) If the compromise goes beyond the scope of the suit the decree should be passed for so much as relates to relief which the Court could give in the suit (15) So where the compromise was an agreement to refer the matter in suit to arbitration and the award made thereon dealt with additional matter, the award could only be recorded as far as it related to the suit (16) But by consent of the parties and the leave of the Court a suit may be amended so as to cover an increased claim and there is nothing in the law which prevents the

-
- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Solomon v Aboul Arze, 6 C 687 (1881) | (9) Foolcoomary v Woodoy Channer, 25 C 649 (1898) |
| (2) Karmali v Rahumbhoy 13 B 137 (1888) | (10) Biraaj Mohini v Chinta Moni 5 C W N 877 (1901) |
| (3) Gilbert v Indean, 9 C D 259, p 263 (1878) | (11) Ahajooroonassa v Roushan Jahan, 2 C 184 P C (1874), 26 W R 30, 11 A 291 |
| (4) Lakshmanaswami v Ramaswami, 26 M 31 (1902) | (12) Bhumaji v Rakmalai, 10 B 335 (1885) |
| (5) Sankara v Kumarasany, 8 M 473 (1885) | (13) Muthu Vijaya v Chandavaraya, 22 M 214 (1898) |
| (6) Ram Nirunjun v Prayag Singh 8 C 134 (1881) | (14) Fajalch Ali v Kamruddin 13 C. 170 (1886) |
| (7) Gilbert v Indean, 9 C D 259 (1878) | (15) Venkatappa v Thamma, 18 M 410 (1894) |
| (8) Asvootosh v Tara Prasanna, 10 C 612 (1884). But see Purmessure v Romeerood den, 5 W R, 226 (1866). Gulab Koor v Balalal Bahader, 13 C W N 1107 (1909) | (16) Samilal v Iramji Prasad, 20 B 304 (1893) |

parties to a suit enlarging by consent or compromise the original claim and getting or allowing a decree for a greater amount of money or land than that originally asked for (1) Where a compromise goes beyond the subject matter of the suit, and a decree is made on the basis of the compromise, although the decree in respect of the surplusage cannot be executed (2) the defendant is bound by its terms if he benefited therefrom. The Madras High Court have, however, held that a decree passed in terms of a compromise entered into between parties and comprising therein reliefs not covered by the suit, is yet enforceable in execution, provided that there is nothing unlawful about the terms though the decree itself as drafted might have been objected to on an appeal therefrom (3) The decree passed on a compromise cannot be regarded as *ultra vires* simply because it goes beyond the subject matter of the suit and contains other conditions. If such other considerations are the considerations for the compromise they must be incorporated in the decree, if they are independent they may be regarded as surplusage (4) But where the suit was for money, and the defendant agreed to his property being charged as a term of the compromise it was held a decree could be made embodying the charge (5) If the compromise affected matters outside the suit and it was agreed that if one party failed to carry that portion out the other could sue in respect thereof the section does not prevent the same being enforced by suit (6) The language of the section is wide and general and does not preclude parties from settling their disputes on such lawful terms as they might agree to without being restricted to such relief as one only of the parties had chosen to claim in the plaint. In a suit for money where the plaint asked for a simple money decree an agreement that the amount decreed should be a charge on certain properties was held to be both lawful and to relate to the suit (7) When by unregistered documents a compromise going beyond the scope of the suit was affected but only such portion as related to the suit recorded and decreed that portion required no registration and the finding thereon was *res judicata* and if the decree had referred to or narrated the other terms of compromise it would have been judicial evidence of that portion of the compromise (8) But an agreement outside the scope of the suit, although incorporated in the decree does not operate as *res judicata* (9) When a consent decree was passed in terms of compromise with a reservation that only the property claimed in the suit could be obtained in execution a subsequent suit in respect of other property dealt with in the compromise based upon both title and the compromise was not barred by this rule or by O II

(1) Mohibullah v. Imami, 9 A 229 (1887)

(2) Jasimuddin Biswas v. Bhuban Telina 34 C 456 (1907)

(3) Anantanarayana Aiyar v. Abdul Karim 17 M L J 255 (1907), a.c., 30 M 421

(4) Purna Chandra v. Nil Madhub 5 C W N 485

(5) Joti Kuruvetappa v. Sri Devandra 16 M L J 354 (1906)

(6) Gupta Narain v. Bejoya Srinani 2 C W N 663 (1897)

(7) Joti Kuruvetappa v. Izari Srusappa 30 M 478 (1907) Natesan Chetti v. Vengal Nachiar 33 M 102 (1909)

(8) Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee 3 C W N 485 P C (1899) a.c. 26 I A 101 Ramdatt v. Kekani Lal 1 C W N 21 (1903)

(9) Purna Chandra Burman v. Panchlari Ghose 5 C L J 15 (1906) and see Bhabhadr Nath v. Kalpatara Panda 1 C L J 353 (1905)

r 2 (1) The object of judicial sanction to a compromise entered into by the parties to a suit where one of them is an infant is to safeguard the interests of the minor before the Court. An objection that a minor son in a Mitakshara family was not made a party to a suit in which his father as *Larta* or manager of the family was a party, and that such minor was in consequence deprived of the protection which he would have enjoyed by reason of a judicial sanction of the compromise is not by itself sufficient to make the compromise inoperative against him. Unless it is shown that the minor has been prejudiced, he cannot successfully impugn the decree. (2) The difference between a consent decree declaring the agreement of the parties and the agreement of parties themselves, when the one or the other is sought to be afterwards enforced, goes no further than this, that in the former case it would not be open to a party to question the accuracy of the decree, as expressing what at the time was the contract which had been made. (3)

Appeal—An appeal lies against an order on a dispute as to whether a compromise had been arrived at the alleged compromise being impeached as not being lawful. (4) Where the decree recorded a compromise going beyond the scope of the suit an appeal lies and on appeal the decree should be modified so as to include only such portion of the compromise as relates to relief which the Court could have given in the suit. (5) See now O XLIII r 1 (m).

5A.] 4 Nothing in this Order shall apply to any proceedings in execution of a decree or order.
Proceedings in execution of decrees not affected

"Proceedings in execution"—This rule was added to the Code by Act VI of 1892 but it then included "*any application or other proceeding in any suit subsequent to the decree*" and had an Explanation which ran "*An application to the Appellate Court pending an appeal is not an application subsequent to the decree appealed from within the meaning of this section*". Prior to the passing of Act VI of 1892 it was held that where a decree was put into execution the proceedings taken therefor amounted to a separate litigation, which could be compromised under O XXIII r 3 read with sect 141 (6).

- (1) *Parsanbi v Narain*, 2 A L J 650
 (2) *Birbhadra Nath v Kaipatara Panda*, 1 C L J 388 (1905)
 (3) *Krishnabai v Hari Corind*, 31 B 15 (1906)
 (4) *Sridharan v Puramathan*, 23 M. 101 (1899)

- (5) *Venkatappa v Thumma*, 18 M. 410 (1894), see also *the Manager of Sri Meenakshi Devasthanam Madurai v Abdul Kasim*, 30 M. 421 (1907)
 (6) *Muhammad Sulaiman v Jitkij Lal* 11 A. 223 (1888)

ORDER XXIV.

Payment into Court.

1. The defendant in any suit to recover a debt or [s. 376.] damages may, at any stage of the suit, deposit by defendant of amount in satisfaction of claim. deposit in Court such sum of money as he considers a satisfaction in full of the claim.
2. Notice of the deposit shall be given through the Court [s. 377.] by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the amount of the deposit shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be paid to the plaintiff on his application.
3. No interest shall be allowed to the plaintiff on any sum [s. 378.] deposited by the defendant from the date of the receipt of such notice, whether the sum deposited is in full of the claim or falls short thereof.
Interest on deposit not allowed to plaintiff after notice.
4. (1) Where the plaintiff accepts such amount as satisfaction in part *only* of his claim, he may prosecute his suit for the balance, and, if the Court decides that the deposit by the defendant was a full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff shall pay the costs of the suit incurred after the deposit and the costs incurred previous thereto, so far as they were caused by excess in the plaintiff's claim.
Procedure where plaintiff accepts deposit as satisfaction in part.
(2) Where the plaintiff accepts such amount as satisfaction in full of his claim, he shall present to the Court a statement to that effect, and such statement shall be filed and the Court shall pronounce judgment accordingly; and, in directing by whom the costs of each party are to be paid, the Court shall consider which of the parties is most to blame for the litigation.
Procedure where he accepts it as satisfaction in full.

Illustrations.

(a) A owes B Rs 100. B sues A for the amount, having made no demand for payment and having no reason to believe that the delay caused by making a demand would place him at a disadvantage. On the plaint being filed, A pays the money into Court. B accepts it in full satisfaction of his claim, but the Court should not allow him any costs, the litigation being presumably groundless on his part.

(b) B sues A under the circumstances mentioned in illustration (a). On the plaint being filed, A disputes the claim. Afterwards A pays the money into Court. B accepts it in full satisfaction of his claim. The Court should also give B his costs of suit. A's conduct having shown that the litigation was necessary.

(c) A owes B Rs 100 and is willing to pay him that sum without suit. B claims Rs 150 and sues A for that amount. On the plaint being filed A pays Rs 100 into Court and disputes only his liability to pay the remaining Rs 50. B accepts the Rs 100 in full satisfaction of his claim. The Court should order him to pay A a costs.

Payment into Court.—This and the following rules (which are now in the same terms as the last Code) were based upon and followed the practice at the time these sections were framed though not now obtaining in England (1). A plea of tender before action must to stop interest, be accompanied by a payment into Court after action otherwise the tender is ineffectual (2).

'To recover a debt or damages'—A suit for an injunction involving a declaration of plaintiff's right to ancient rights is not a suit of this character, even though the Court may have discretion to award damages in lieu of an injunction (3). It is however, a well established practice to pay into Court money in injunction cases, and though there is no express provision for such a case in the Code in ordinary cases where no declaration of right is sought, the principle underlying r 4 ought to regulate the discretion of the Court (4).

'At any stage'—This is apparently before decree as the money is paid in satisfaction of the 'claims' (5). As to what amounts to a compliance with a direction in a decree to pay money into Court, see below (6). When a decree treats an estate as primarily liable to discharge a debt with interest, the

(1) See *Dwarkan Das Agurwallah v Girish Chunder Roy*, 23 C. 769, 768 (1899) and *Ans Pr*, O 22.

(2) *Haji Abdul Rahman v Haji Noor Mahomed* 16 B 141 (1871), a debtor can derive no benefit from a rejected offer of part payment. *Kunhya Singh v Tooydan Singh*, 7 W R 20 (1867) [*dist* *Perishnath Mookerjee v Karto Mohun Shaha*, 12 W R 50 (1869)] *Watson & Co v Dhonculra Choudh* 3 C 6, at p. 16 (1877) *Chunder Chant Mookerjee v Jodoonath Khan*, 3 C

468 (1878)

(3) *Luxmon Nana v Moroba Ramkrishna*, 21 B 502 (1896)

(4) *Id*

(5) As to notice of deposit affecting question of interest, see *Kaleo Dass Ghose v Luran Koomaroo*, 16 W R, 304 (1871), and see also *Kunhya Singh v Tooydan Singh*, 7 W R 20 (1867) *dist* *Perishnath Mookerjee v Karto Mohun Shaha*, 12 W R 50 (1869)

(6) *Gujadhar Paurse v Nank Paurse*, 8 C 28 (1882)

proprietor or his heir has a right to pay the money into Court to satisfy the decree to protect himself from being made responsible to indemnify the sureties (1)

Notice—For form of notice see No III of Appendix H to the First Schedule. The money can be paid to the plaintiff's agent or pleader unless the Court requires the attendance of the party in person (O III. r 1)

"Otherwise directs."—See note, post (2) Where there are conflicting claims, the order of the Court is required under this rule (3)

Acceptance in part.—Money may be paid in with a denial of liability (see ante) According to the present English practice in such a case the money remains in Court This is, however, not the rule under the Code, and a plaintiff can take out the money and prosecute the suit for the balance, though the Court has a discretion under r 2, which must be exercised reasonably, to refuse to allow the money to be paid out (4) So where in a suit on promissory notes, the defendant admitted the receipt of a certain sum, but alleging minority denied all liability in respect of this, or any other portion of the claim, the plaintiff was allowed to take the money out of Court (5)

Acceptance in full—Until issues are settled a plaintiff has no means of knowing what case his adversary means to set up and if he accepts the amount paid at the settlement of issues in full satisfaction, he does so at the earliest possible moment, and he is therefore entitled to his costs up to that time The fact that he first refuses to accept the money does not deprive him of this right to have costs if he does so before trial (6)

Cases not within r. 1.—Where the suit is not one "to recover debt or damages" within the meaning of this rule the Court has a discretion to apportion the costs (7)

(1) *Bissessar Singh v Nim Chand Bone* 12 W. R 505 (1869)

(2) *Dwarkan Dass Agurwallah v Gurus Chunder Roy*, 26 C 766, at p 769 (1899)

(3) *Haji Abdul Rahman v Haji Noor Mahomed*, 16 B 141 (1891)

(4) *Dwarkan Dass Agurwallah v Gurus*

Chunder Roy 26 C 766 (1899)

(5) *Id*

(6) *Ardalur Lamsa v Sorabji Pestonjee*, 1 B H C R 70 (1863)

(7) *Laxumon Dasa v Moroba Ramkrishna* 21 B 502 at p 503 (1896)

ORDER XXV.

Security for Costs.

- [s. 380.] 1. (1) *Where*, at any stage of a suit, it appears to the Court that a sole plaintiff is, or (when there are more plaintiffs than one) that all the plaintiffs are, residing out of British India, and that such plaintiff does not, or that no one of such plaintiffs does, possess any sufficient immoveable property within British India *other than* the property in suit, the Court may, either of its own motion or on the application of any defendant, order the plaintiff or plaintiffs, within a time fixed by it, to give security for the payment of all costs incurred and likely to be incurred by any defendant.
- [s. 382.] (2) Whoever leaves British India under such circumstances as to afford reasonable probability that he will not be forthcoming whenever he may be called upon to pay costs shall be deemed to be residing out of British India within the meaning of sub-rule (1).
- [s. 380.] (3) On the application of any defendant in a suit for the payment of money, in which the plaintiff is a woman, the Court may at any stage of the suit make a like order if it is satisfied that such plaintiff does not possess any sufficient immoveable property within British India.
- [s. 381, first three paras.] 2. (1) In the event of such security not being furnished within the time fixed, the Court shall *make an order dismissing* the suit unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs are permitted to withdraw therefrom.
- (2) Where a suit is dismissed under this rule, the plaintiff may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from furnishing the security within the time allowed, the Court shall set aside the dismissal upon such terms as to security, costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.
- (3) The dismissal shall not be set aside unless notice of such application has been served on the defendant.

"Residing," r. 1, sub rule (1) —As to the meaning of this word, see notes to sect. 20, *ante*. The meaning of the term depends upon the intention of the Legislature in framing the particular provision in which the word is used. The term here means residence under such circumstances as will afford a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will be forthcoming when the suit is decided. Each case must therefore depend on its particular circumstances (1). A person who leaves British India under the circumstances mentioned in r. 1, sub rule (2), is deemed to be residing out of British India.

"British India"—As to the meaning of this term, see notes to sect. 1 *ante*. As the residence must be out of British India a plaintiff who resides in another Province or Presidency of British territory cannot be called on to give security (2). An inhabitant of foreign territory such as Hill Tippera must give security even though the defendant is also a resident in foreign territory (3). The British cantonment of Secunderabad was held to be out of (4) and the cantonment of Wadhwan within (5) British India.

"May."—The exercise of the power conferred on the Court is not imperative but discretionary to be exercised according to the circumstances of each case, (6) and the Court will not order a plaintiff to give security unless grounds are shown tending to show that the defence is true (7) or that the suit is not a *bona fide* one, (8) and it appears that the exercise of the power is necessary for the reasonable protection of the defendant (9).

"Leaves British India," r. 1, sub rule (2) —When a plaintiff leaves British India before the case is decided the defendant should apply to the Court under sub rule (1) to take security for costs (10) and then unless there is a reasonable probability that he will be forthcoming whenever he may be called on to pay costs, or, that he has sufficient immoveable property in British India

if no security is furnished judgment will

But when a case has gone to judgment Court cannot pass any order as to the stay in the case of appeals, see O XII

r 10, *post*

(1) Mahomed Shuffi v Laldin Abdula 3 B 227 (1878), where a residence of 4 months with a statement that it was intended to be permanent was considered insufficient see Sri Gossawan v Shri Govardan Lalji 14 B 541, at 547 (1890).

(2) Gahan v Owen Coryt 11 (1864), as to the Code of 1869, see ss 34 and 35 of same.

(3) Koroona Moyce v Ooma Churn 12 W 1. 465 (1869).

(4) Hossain Ali Murza v Abel Ali Murza, 21 C 177 (1893).

(5) Triccaru Panachand v Bombay, Baroda, etc., Ry, 9 B 244 (1885).

(6) Degumbhari Dellar Aushootash Banerjee, 17 C 610, 613 (1890). Shama Sundary v

Rash Behary Dhur, 3 C W N 753 (1899). In the goods of Prem Chand Moonshce, 21 C 283 (1894). Bai Labai v Devji Meghji, 23 B 100, 102 (1898).

(7) Shama Sundary v Rash Behary Dhur *supra*.

(8) Namubai v Daji Gobind, 35 B 421 (1910).

(9) In the goods of Prem Chand Moonshce, *supra* in which case, as the suit would have to proceed as an administration suit, the plaintiff could in no event have been liable for the defendant's costs.

(10) In re Calcutta and S E Ry Co 3 W R 217 (1867).

(11) Ib

"Suit for the payment of money," r. 1, sub rule (3).—The last paragraph in sect 380 of the former Code was inserted by sect 5, Act VI of 1888. A suit "for money" is wider than a suit for debts. It is necessary to look at the substance of the suit. A suit for money damages is within the section, (1) such as a suit for possession of ornaments and other things, or in the alternative, their value (2). The words formerly appearing, "*independent of the property in suit*," have been omitted because the nature of the suit excludes the possibility of the property in suit being immoveable. If the suit is one in which the chief or principal relief asked is the recovery of money, or of moveable property for which the plaintiff is liable to pay money, the suit falls within this rule (3).

Security.—In terms no exception is made in this rule of the case of a minor, nor can such an exception be introduced into the rule. The order to give security is, however, a discretionary one, and unless in exceptional cases, neither an infant plaintiff nor his or her next friend ought to be required to give security for costs (4). Without deciding the question whether a continuing security is necessary, the Supreme Court held that if security has been furnished, fresh security will not be demanded unless it is shown that the sureties are in no wise subject to and have no property within jurisdiction (5). For the proper mode of proceeding on a security bond see below (6). The words "*or show good cause*," etc., at the end of sect 381 of the last Code, and the last paragraph of that section have been omitted. The Court has, however, under sect 148 power to enlarge the time.

Calling for security in other cases.—The Code itself provides for the taking of security in other cases, such as in staying execution (O XLI r 6, O XLV r 13) and where an appeal has been filed (O XLI r 10). It would, however, appear that the Court can demand security in cases for which no express provision is made. So though the Court will not require security because the plaintiff is a pauper or because he is a mere trustee, they will do so when they find that he is not the real litigant but a mere puppet in the hands of another (7). And the representatives of a Hindu testator suing for the performance of religious and charitable trusts created by him, and in which they are not personally interested, should, it has been held, give security for costs (8).

(1) *Degumbari Debi v Ausbootosh Banerjee*, 17 C 610, 613 (1890).

(2) *Id.*, followed in *Anandamoyee Gohal* 16 C W N 763 (1912).

(3) *Sonabai v Krishnowandas*, 32 B 602 (1908).

(4) *Bai Purbai v Devji Meghji*, 23 B 100 (1898).

(5) *Gibson v Chisholm*, Fulton, 480 (1811). *Bhaishankar v Mulji*, 35 B 339 (1910).

(6) *Poyner Bibee v Nujoo Khan*, 5 C 177 (1897), *Mingala Antonio v Ramchandrar Baje*, 13 B 691 (1891), *Gajinath Chowdhry v Benode Lal Roy*, 31 C 162 (1903), *Krishnan Nayak v Ittanay Nayak*, 24 N

637 (1901).

(7) *Khajaj Asanoollajoo v Solomon*, 11 C 533 (1887) [citing dictum of P. C. in *Ram Coomarr Kundo v Sunder Kanto Mookerjee*, 2 C 237, at pp. 250, 251 (1876)]. *Hari Nath v Ram Kumar Bagchi*, 19 C L J

for costs will be ordered].

(8) *Brojomohun Dass v Harroldoss*, 8 C L R 68, 60 (1880), and as to suits by relatives to enforce public rights see *Cazee Mozhar Hossain v Denobundoo Bourke*, 119, 40 (1880).

Failure to furnish security.—Act VIII of 1859, sect 30 (sect 381 of the former Code) The words after "sect 373 " of first paragraph, were inserted by sect 33, Act VII of 1888, but have now been taken out *vide ante*, "Security " The time may be extended under sect 118 Before dismissing a suit under this rule, the Court should see that notice of the order requiring security has been served on the party or his pleader (1) A person whose suit has been dismissed under this rule, may, if defendant in a subsequent suit, rely on the same matter put forward in the previous suit It was queried whether he could do so if he were plaintiff in the subsequent suit (2) It has, however, recently been held that a dismissal of a suit under this rule does not bar a fresh suit for the same cause of action (3) An order dismissing a suit under this rule is a decree and open to appeal (4)

(1) *Timmu v. Deva Rai*, 5 C. 263 (1882)

(2) *Rungta v. Sidhu Mahomed*, 6 B 482 (1882)

(3) *Hariram Mohanji v. Lalbai*, 26 B 637

(1902), *a. c.*, 4 Bom L R 262.

(4) *Williams v. Brown*, 8 A 108 (1888)

ORDER XXVI.

Commissions.

Commissions to examine witnesses

- [s 383] 1 Any Court may in any suit issue a commission for the examination on interrogatories or otherwise of *any* person resident within the local limits of its jurisdiction who is exempted under this Code from attending the Court or who is from sickness or infirmity unable to attend it
- Cases in which Court may issue commission to examine witness
- [s 384] 2 An order for the issue of a commission for the examination of a witness may be made by the Court either of its own motion or on the application, supported by affidavit or otherwise, of any party to the suit or of the witness to be examined
- Order for commission.
- [s 385] 3 A commission for the examination of a person who resides within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the same may be issued to any person whom the Court thinks fit to execute
- Where witness resides within Court's jurisdiction
- [s 386] 4 (1) Any Court may in any suit issue a commission for the examination of—
- Persons for whose examination commission may issue
- (a) any person resident beyond the local limits of its jurisdiction,
- (b) any person who is about to leave such limits before the date on which he is required to be examined in Court, and
- (c) any civil or military officer of the Government who cannot, in the opinion of the Court, attend without detriment to the public service.
- (2) Such commission may be issued to any Court, not being a High Court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person resides, or to any pleader or other person whom the Court issuing the commission may appoint.

(3) The Court on issuing any commission under this rule shall direct whether the commission shall be returned to itself or to any subordinate Court.

5. Where any Court to which application is made for the issue of a commission for the examination of a person residing at any place not within British India is satisfied that the evidence of such person is necessary, the Court may issue such commission or a letter of request.

* **Commissions.**—Commissions under the Code are of four kinds (a) to examine witnesses (rr 1-8, 15-81), (b) for local investigations (rr 9, 10, 15-18), (c) to examine accounts (rr 11, 12, 15-18), (d) to make partition (rr 13-18). A commission should not be issued for any cause not stated in the foregoing or following rules, and when any such cause is shown, the Court has a discretion, which, however, must be judicially exercised, to grant or refuse a commission. The issue of commissions is governed solely by the provisions of the Code, which are exhaustive (1) An order refusing to issue a commission on the ground that the evidence was not necessary has been held not subject to revision under sect. 622 (now 115). In the case of those interlocutory orders against which no immediate appeal lies, a remedy is supplied by sect. 103 (2).

* **To examine witness.**—A commission may be issued —(a) Where a person resides *outside British India* (3) under r. 5. The reference to letters of request is inserted, as the provisions of the Evidence by Commission Acts, 1859, 1885 (22 Vict. c. 2, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 71), are apt to be overlooked. The British Court may request a Court in foreign territory to execute the commission, or the British Court may itself appoint a commissioner to take the evidence in foreign territory, as was done in the first of the cases last cited. Cf. O. 34, r. 6A of the English rules. A Form of Letters of Request is given in Appendix II, Form 8. (b) Where the person is *resident in British India, but beyond the local limits* of the Court's jurisdiction [r. 1 clause (a)]. (c) Where the person is *resident within the local limits*, (1) but about to leave such limits [r. 4, clause (b)]. Though the case cited (4) is no longer law the Court may, and frequently does, instead of issuing a commission, examine a witness under these circumstances *de bene esse*; (5) (ii) persons who are not about to leave, but who are absolutely

(1) *Veerabadrán Chetty v. Nataraja Desai*, 23 M. 28 (1901) [in which it was also held that the Court may prevent abuse of its process as regards summons to witnesses]. See cases cited, *post*.

(2) *In re Nizam of Hyderabad*, 9 M. 256 (1880).

(3) See *In the goods of Gopal Lal Seal*, 7 C. W. N. 506 (1903), s. c., 30 C. 331. *Agar*

Mohamed v. Nazirullah, 2 B. L. R. 73 (1866).

(4) *Edwards v. Muller*, 5 P. L. R. 252 (1870).

(5) In the matter of the German steamship *Drachenfels*, 3 C. W. N. 67 (1898), it was held that though no written statement had yet been filed an application for contribution of actions, and for a commission to take evidence *de bene esse*, was not premature.

exempted from attending Court, as puidanashm women under sect 132, *post*, (1) or other persons of rank exempted under sect 133, or persons living without the jurisdiction who are not bound to attend under O XVI r 19; (iii) civil and military officers who cannot, in the opinion of the Judge, attend Court without detriment to the public service (2) [r 4, clause (c)]; and lastly, (iv) persons who are from sickness or infirmity unable to attend Court (r 1)

An application for a commission should not be made except on notice to the opposite party (3). A commission should not issue for any cause not stated in these sections, the practice standing upon the statute (4). Assuming, however, that the cause alleged is one mentioned, the Court has a discretion (5) to grant or refuse a commission, the question being in each instance whether a sufficient case has been made out, having regard to the disadvantage (6) which attends evidence taken on commission. This discretion, however, must, like any other, be judicially and not arbitrarily exercised.

A Court will not unless there be an absolute exemption or for strong reason, issue a commission to examine a party to the suit, nor a servant of the party applying, (7) for such a witness may be brought by his master before the Court. If the proposer

of the matter to
being credible,
tunity which has
the like, and will consider not merely what the plaintiff's case requires, but what justice to the defendant as well as to the plaintiff requires (10). In a large number of cases, where the witness is material, the commission goes as a matter of course. As regards delay in making the application, if a party applies late, but thinks it worth his while to incur the expense of taking out a process such as summons or

(1) *Chamatkar Mohney v Mohes Chunder*, 3 C W N 750 (1892). *Mohes Chunder v Manick Lal*, 3 C W N 751 (1893). *Provot Kumarat v Oporbakussen*, 3 C W N 753 (1893), in which it was held, that if a puidanashm offends against the rules of her class that does not deprive her of her right to be examined under commission. Native ladies not exempted under s. 132 should be allowed to remain in their palis in Court while giving evidence. *Rukta Bann v Roberts*, 1 B L R S N, V (1865). *Kristomohun Mookerjee v Adarmoney Dabee*, 2 Hyde, 88 (1864). *Nusrat Banoo v Mahomed Sayem*, 18 W R 230 (1872). As to examination at the witness's residence see *Zohurtoollah Chowdhry v Asafoddien Chowdhry*, 15 W R 129 (1871).

(2) See *Marshall v Chene*, 2 Tayl & Bell, 191 (1851) (application to examine Com-mander in Chief).

(3) *Tarucknath Mookerjee v Gouroo Churn* 3 W R 147 (1865).

(4) See *Gopal Chunder v Kurnodhar Moochee*, 7 W R 349 (1867) [as to prisoners, see now *Prisoners' Testimony Act*], *Marshall v Chene*, 2 Tayl & Bell, 191 (1851), *Ar Beenodeen*, 2 Hyde, 152 (1864) [infant of tender years].

(5) *Burney v Eyre*, 1 Hyde, 63 (1862-63), *Mowji v Nemchand*, 23 B 620, 629 (1893), *Nusrat Banoo v Mahomed Sayem*, 18 W R 230 (1872).

(6) Almost invariably of the opposite side, *Amrith Nath v Dhunput Singh*, 20 W R 253 (1873).

(7) *Amrith Nath v Dhunput Singh*, 20 W R 253 (1873).

(8) *Mowji v Nemchand*, 23 B 620, 629 (1893), citing *Berdan v Greenwood*, 20 Ch D 764.

(9) *Id*.

(10) *Per Cotton, L.J.*, in *Berdan v Greenwood*, 20 Ch D 764 (1893), cited in *Mowji v Nemchand*, *supra*.

a commission on the chance of deriving benefit from it, the Court should ordinarily not prevent his doing so, though it should take care to see that the party does not use the late issue of process as an excuse for delaying the final hearing of the case, (1) and a commission has been allowed where the cause was on the peremptory board of the day, where the issuing of it was not calculated to prejudice the defendant or subject him to loss or inconvenience (2) As to expenses and costs of issuing commission, see r 15 post

6 Every Court receiving a commission for the examination of any person shall examine him or cause him to be examined pursuant thereto

Court to examine witness pursuant to commission.

Examination of witness—The parties should appear before the Commissioner in person, or by agent or pleader (r 18) It is the duty of the party obtaining a commission for the examination of witnesses to take all such steps as are necessary to secure their attendance before the Commissioner (3) As to the latter's powers in this and other respects see r 17 post If one party obtains a commission and the other joins in it the latter is entitled to examine his own witnesses, but he may cross examine his opponent's witnesses without joining (4) In Calcutta the examination and cross examination is by counsel and not by attorney, the examination of witnesses under a commission being of the same nature as an examination in open Court (5) The examination may either be *ex parte* or by interrogatories (6)

7. Where a commission has been duly executed, it shall be returned, together with the evidence taken under it, to the Court from which it was issued unless the order for issuing the commission has otherwise directed, in which case the commission shall be returned in terms of such order, and the commission and the return thereto and the evidence taken under it shall (subject to the provisions of the next following rule) form part of the record of the suit

Return of commission with depositions of witnesses

Return—The commission may be open (7) but generally it is directed to be executed on or before a certain date, called the returnable date of the

(1) *Hurce Dass v Meer Moazzum* 15 W R 447 (1871)

(1864-5) *Pran Krishna v Biswanath* 8 J I R App 101 (1872)

(2) *Janssen v Dundas* 1 Hyde 269 (1864)

(6) See *Nowji v Nemchand* 23 B L 6, 627 (1899) *Tarucknath Mookerjee v Goura Churn* 3 W R 147, 140 (1860)

(3) *Lekraj v Pale Ram* 2 A H C R 210 (1870)

(4) *Gregory v Dooley Chand* 14 W R, O J 17 (1868), a commission returned before a witness is fully cross examined is inadmissible *Bosogomoff v Nahap t Lite Co* 5 C W N 600 (1901)

(7) In *Mackellar v Wallace Fulton* 16 (1842) no specific time was fixed, but six months was held not too long a time for a commission for the examination of witnesses in England to be outstanding.

(5) *Hoffman v Framjee, Coryton* 7

commission though the time within which a commission must be executed may be enlarged on application from time to time. The evidence must be taken within the time allowed. Where a Commissioner took evidence after the last return day had expired it was held that the depositions were inadmissible (1). The return should show on the face of it that the Commissioner had administered the oath to himself and the interpreter if any (2). Documents attached to the return of a commission and identified with the documents referred to in the evidence may be read at the hearing of the suit in which the commission issued unless they have been objected to on being tendered in evidence before the Commissioner. Objection to the inadmissibility of such documents should be taken before the Commissioner (3).

90] 8 Evidence taken under a commission shall not be read
When depositions may be read in evidence as evidence in the suit without the consent of the party against whom the same is offered, unless—

- (a) the person who gave the evidence is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, or dead or unable from sickness or infirmity to attend to be personally examined, or exempted from personal appearance in Court or is a civil or military officer of the Government who cannot, in the opinion of the Court, attend without detriment to the public service, or
- (b) the Court in its discretion dispenses with the proof of any of the circumstances mentioned in clause (a), and authorizes the evidence of any person being read as evidence in the suit, notwithstanding proof that the cause for taking such evidence by commission has ceased at the time of reading the same.

Reading of commission.—The last rule provides that the commission shall form part of the record. On this ground it has been considered that before

(1) Gregory v. Dooly 14 W. R. O. J. 17 (1865)

(2) Prasad v. Bhatnagar 11 B. L. R. 101 (1872)

(3) Struthers v. Wheeler 4 C. L. R. 109 (1884) see Vithala v. Vithala 11 B. L. R. 144

(4) Nataraj Das v. N. S. Lal 3 C. W. N. 223 (1871) 101 D. W. R. 101 (1871)

(5) Gurug Dayal v. B. L. R. 101 (1871)

(6) Dhaniram v. Murli Lal 13 C. W. N. 36 C. 67 (1871) Man. (C. L. R.) 36 C. 67 (1871)

Shastri v. B. L. R. 101 (1871)

in the suit, neither party has the right to make use of it (1) *Seemle*, that the mere fact that a deposition was not read and signed in the usual course would not by its self prevent the reception of the evidence (2) Where a commission was returned after the witness had been in part, but before he had been fully, cross examined it was held to be inadmissible (3) Unless there is consent the Court may refuse to hear evidence taken by commission, unless the circumstances mentioned in clause (a) are shown to exist at the time of trial (4) But the Court may dispense with proof under clause (b) And where it appears from the deposition itself that the person was examined outside the jurisdiction, that is sufficient (5) Clause (a) supplies with reference to r 4 an omission in the former Code

Commissions for local investigations

9. In any suit in which the Court deems a local investigation to be requisite or proper for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute, or of ascertaining the market-value of any property, or the amount of any mesne profits or damages or annual net profits, the Court may issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit directing him to make such investigation and to report thereon to the Court.

Provided that, where the Local Government has made rules as to the persons to whom such commission shall be issued, the Court shall be bound by such rules

"Requisite or proper"—The Judge should not delegate to a Commissioner functions which he can and should discharge himself He cannot depute a Commissioner to inquire into that which can with equal convenience be proved in Court (6) He cannot direct him to take evidence which the Court can take or decide points which the Court can and should decide such as the trial of the most important issues of fact in a case, (7) deputing, in effect, the decision of the case to the Ameen, (8) as where an Ameen was deputed in a case of disputed boundary, the issue turning chiefly on possession before the date of suit (9)

(1) *Kusum Kumari v Satya Ranjan* 30 C 999 1003 (1903), *Hemanta Kumari v Banku Behari Sikdar* 9 C W N 794 (1903)
(2) *Bowogomoff v Nahapiet Jute Co* 5 C W N cccxxx (1901)
(3) *Ib* see generally *Authors Evidence Act*, notes to s. 33
(4) *Rajah Prithvi v Hara Dhun* 22 W R 331 (1874)
(5) *Girdhar Nagjshet v Ganpat Moroba*, 11 B H C R 129 131 132 (1874)
(6) *Shushee Ram v Nobo Kant*, 14 W R 190 (1870) *Ram Dhun v Ram Monce*, 21

W R 280 (1874)
(7) *Buroda Churn v Ajoodhya Ram* 23 W R 236 (1876), *Shitawa v Bhunappa* 24 B 43 45 (1899) In *Krsto Chunder v Brojo Mohun* 22 W R 183 (1874), an objection that the Court itself should have decided the question was overruled
(8) *Iswar Chandra v Jugat Kishor*, 4 B L R App 33 (1870) *Sangili v Moohan*, 16 M. 3-0, 351 (1892)
(9) *Kalce Doss v Khetup Pal*, 17 W. R. 472 (1872)

It is of the utmost importance that witnesses should be examined in open Court, and by the Court itself. Ameen or other Commissioners must not be made the real Judges of important questions of law and fact, which it is the duty of the Court itself to determine. Local investigations ought to be restricted to points which really require some local inspection for their elucidation. Witnesses therefore cannot be examined out of Court, except with reference to points for the determination of which local inspection is required (1). An Ameen should be appointed to hold a local investigation only when it is necessary to inspect the land, to make maps, to obtain information with regard to physical features, to identify land in maps with parcels which are the subject of suit, to identify maps with one another with the aid of objects to be found on the land. For these and similar purposes an Ameen may examine witnesses when the evidence which they have to give is of such a nature that it ought to be taken by him on the spot. Where however, any fact can be proved by evidence taken otherwise than on the spot it should be taken in Court (2). In short, the local investigation referred to in this rule presupposes the existence on the record of independent evidence which requires to be elucidated, and that rule does not authorize a Court to delegate to a Commissioner the trial of any material issue which it is bound to try (3). The last Code after the words "*not profits*," ran "*and the same cannot be conveniently conducted by the Judge in person*." These words, it was held, showed that when a Judge could conveniently conduct a local investigation in person he should do so. The information so derived by him was a matter which, of course, he could take into his consideration in deciding the case (4). But it was considered desirable that he should put the result on record so that the parties might see what he considered established (5).

In such case, summon witnesses and examine them in Court (6). These words have now been omitted. And it has been recently held that the omission of these words indicates that a Judge should only make a local investigation where it is necessary for the purpose of understanding the evidence, and should not do so for the purpose of gathering information to be used for his judgment, for if additional information is required his proper course is to appoint a Commissioner whose report can be used in evidence and who can be examined as a witness (7).

"May issue"—The Judge has a discretion which must be judicially exercised to grant or refuse a local investigation. A local investigation is not imperative in every case, and a Judge is not bound to issue a commission of his

(1) Shadhoo Singh v Ramanoograha, 9 W R 83 (1868), Bindabun Chunder v Nobin Chunder, 17 W R 282 (1872)

(2) Bindabun Chunder v Nobin Chunder, *supra*, Iswar Chandra v Jugat Kishor, 4 B L R App 33 (1870) the local investigation however, does not refer to questions of title to and possession of the land themselves Sangli v Mookan, 16 M 300, 302 (1892)

(3) Sangli v Mookan, 16 M 300 (1892)

Ram Narain v Odindra Nath 17 C W N 369, 374 (1911), 15 C L J 17 23

(4) Dwarka Nath v Prosunno Kumar, 1 C W N 682 (1897) Joy Coomar v Bundhoo Lall, 9 C 363 (1882)

(5) Joy Coomar v Bundhoo Lall *supra*, (6) Jhubbho Sahoo v Mussamat Juso la, 17 W R 239 (1872)

(7) Raikeshori v Humidini 15 C. L. J 133 (1910)

own motion (1) Though the propriety of the order may, under sect 105, be questioned in regular appeal, it cannot be made the subject of direct or special appeal (2) When a Judge has ordered a fresh local investigation, his successor should not interfere with the order, but carry it out before disposing of the case, (3) nor where one inquiry has been carried on, should a second issue for the same purpose without setting aside the first (4) If the Court considers it necessary to order an inquiry, such an inquiry cannot be left to be made after decree (5)

"Such person."—Subject to the Proviso, any person whom the Court thinks fit may be appointed A Munsif may be appointed Commissioner (6) The section itself, however, does not now require that an officer of Government should be appointed (7) But a Judge should not order a Subordinate Judge, whose judgment is before him on appeal, to go and inspect the locality and make a report A Judge from whose decision an appeal is pending, is the most unsuitable person to make such investigation (8)

"To make such investigation."—A Commissioner is bound not to go beyond the points referred to him for inquiry (9) Where a Commissioner was only appointed to draw a map and no power was given to him to take evidence, statements of persons recorded by him were held not to be evidence, and ought not to have been looked at by the Judge (10) Notice should be given to the parties of the time when the local investigation will be held (11)

10 (1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him, to the Court.

(2) The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record, but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit, may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation

(1) McDonald v Munar Roy, 3 W R, Act X., 153 (1860)

(2) Graham v Lopez, 1 W R 141 (1864).
Bykunt Nath v Pearee Monee, ib., 196 (1864).
Poorno Persad v Chandernath, ib., 249 (1864).
Rash Beharee v Saheb Roy, 12 W R 76 (1869)

(3) Shurnoollah v Bawl Mundal, 1 W R 102 (1864)

(4) Nowab Syud v Surasutty Debia, 23 W R 93 (1874)

(5) Jugodumba Debia v Rohinee Debia, 23 W R 422 (1875)

(6) Churamun Singh v Anoop Singh 11 C L R 533 537 (1862)

(7) Doorga Dass v Coormo Churn 6 W R, Act X. 81 (1860)

(8) Roy Sultan v Mussumat Laloo, 17 W R 300 (1872)

(9) Ram Dhun v Ram Monee, 21 W R. 250 (1874)

(10) Shitawa v Bhumappa, 24 B 43 (1899)

(11) Kristo Monee v Eglinton, 12 W R. 139 (1869). Jhubbho Sahoo v Mussamat Jusoda, 17 W R 230 (1872)

It is of the utmost importance that witnesses should be examined in open Court, and by the Court itself. Ameens or other Commissioners must not be made the real Judges of important questions of law and fact, which it is the duty of the Court itself to determine. Local investigations ought to be restricted to points which really require some local inspection for their elucidation. Witnesses therefore cannot be examined out of Court, except with reference to points for the determination of which local inspection is required (1). An Ameen should be appointed to hold a local investigation only when it is necessary to inspect the land, to make maps, to obtain information with regard to physical features, to identify land in maps with parcels which are the subject of suit, to identify maps with one another with the aid of objects to be found on the land. For these and similar purposes an Ameen may examine witnesses when the evidence which they have to give is of such a nature that it ought to be taken by him on the spot. Where however, any fact can be proved by evidence taken otherwise than on the spot it should be taken in Court (2). In short, the local investigation referred to in this rule presupposes the existence on the record of independent evidence which requires to be elucidated, and that rule does not authorize a Court to delegate to a Commissioner the trial of any material issue which it is bound to try (3). The last Code after the words "*not profits*," ran "*and the same cannot be conveniently conducted by the Judge in person*." These words it was held, showed that when a Judge could conveniently conduct a local investigation in person he should do so. The information so derived by him was a matter which of course, he could take into his consideration in deciding the case (4). But it was considered desirable that he should put the result on record so that the parties might see what he considered established (5). Though a Judge might view a spot he could not, in a case where the issue was whether two persons were man and wife go himself to the village where the parties lived in order that he might make inquiries amongst their neighbours. He should, in such case, summon witnesses and examine them in Court (6). These words have now been omitted. And it has been recently held that the omission of these words indicates that a Judge

it is necessary for the purpose.

so for the purpose of gathering additional information is required his proper course is to appoint a Commissioner whose report can be used in evidence and who can be examined as a witness (7).

"May issue"—The Judge has a discretion which must be judicially exercised to grant or refuse a local investigation. A local investigation is not imperative in every case and a Judge is not bound to issue a commission of his

(1) Shadhoo Singh v Ramanooograha, 9 W R 83 (1868), Bindabun Chunder v Nobin Chunder, 17 W R 282 (1872).

(2) Bindabun Chunder v Nobin Chunder, *supra* Iswar Chandra v Jugat Kishor, 4 B L R App. 33 (1870), the local investigation, however, does not refer to questions of title to and possession of the land themselves. Sangli v Mookan, 16 M 350, 352 (1892).

(3) Sangli v Mookan, 16 M 350 (1892),

Ram Narain v Odindra Nath, 17 C W N 369, 374 (1911), 15 C L J 17 23.

(4) Dwarka Nath v Prosunno Kumar, 1 C W N 682 (1897), Joy Coomar v Bundhoo Lall, 9 C 363 (1882).

(5) Joy Coomar v Bundhoo Lall, *supra*.
(6) Jhabhoo Sahoo v Mussamat Juso In 17 W R 230 (1872).

(7) Raikishori v Kumudini, 15 C L J 133 (1910).

own motion (1) Though the propriety of the order may, under sect 105, be questioned in regular appeal, it cannot be made the subject of direct or special appeal (2) When a Judge has ordered a fresh local investigation, his successor should not interfere with the order, but carry it out before disposing of the case, (3) nor where one inquiry has been carried on, should a second issue for the same purpose without setting aside the first (4) If the Court considers it necessary to order an inquiry, such an inquiry cannot be left to be made after decree (5)

"Such person"—Subject to the Proviso, any person whom the Court thinks fit may be appointed A Munsif may be appointed Commissioner (6) The section itself, however, does not now require that an officer of Government should be appointed (7) But a Judge should not order a Subordinate Judge whose judgment is before him on appeal, to go and inspect the locality and make a report A Judge from whose decision an appeal is pending is the most unsuitable person to make such investigation (8)

"To make such investigation"—A Commissioner is bound not to go beyond the points referred to him for inquiry (9) Where a Commissioner was only appointed to draw a map and no power was given to him to take evidence, statements of persons recorded by him were held not to be evidence and ought not to have been looked at by the Judge (10) Notice should be given to the parties of the time when the local investigation will be held (11)

10 (1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him, to the Court.

(2) The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record, but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit, may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation

(1) McDonald v Munar Roy 3 W R Act X., 153 (1863)

(2) Graham v Lopez, 1 W R 141 (1864)
Bykunt Nath v Pearee Monee ib., 196 (1864)
Poorno Persad v Chundernath ib., 249 (1864).
Rash Beharee v Saheb Roy, 12 W R 76 (1869)

(3) Shurroollah v Bawl Mandal 1 W R 102 (1864)

(4) Nowab Syud v Surussutty Debia, 23 W R 93 (1874)

(5) Jagodumba Debia v Rohinee Debia, 23 W R 422 (1875)

(6) Churaman Singh v Anoop Singh 11 C L R 533, 537 (1832)

(7) Doorga Dass v Gooroo Churn 6 W R, Act X., 81 (1866)

(8) Roy Sultan v Mussumat Laloo, 17 W R 300 (1872)

(9) Ram Dhun v Ram Monee, 21 W R 260 (1874)

(10) Shitawa v Bhunappa, 24 B 43 (1899)

(11) Krsto Monee v Eglinton, 12 W R 139 (1869). Jhubboo Sahoo v Mussumat Jasoda, 17 W R 230 (1872)

(3) *Where the Court is for any reason dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, it may direct such further inquiry to be made as it shall think fit*

Procedure—A day should be fixed for the return of the report and then for hearing objections to it (1) The report and evidence are filed, and become part of the record (*vide post*, "Shall be evidence") The evidence without the report is not evidence in the suit It may be, however, that oral testimony may not be necessary, as where a Commissioner is simply deputed to make a measurement and it is not necessary that the report must have depositions attached to it to make it legal evidence (2) though, if there be depositions these cannot go in without the report The latter cannot be rejected because the Amcen's remuneration has not been paid (3) The Court considers the report and evidence taken subject, of course, to any objections that may be taken to them by either party along with the other evidence on the record (4) and may examine the Commissioner and take further evidence, as to which, *see post* While the report may be looked to to explain a map, (5) the Court should not question the correctness of a map attached to a report which is not impugned by either party (6)

"Shall be evidence"—The report, and evidence if the investigation is completed, (7) is evidence upon whatever materials it is based though, of course it will have more or less weight according as the basis of it is more or less reasonable and valid (8) and although the Court may have exercised its discretion unwisely and wrongly in ordering an inquiry or in giving the Commissioner too extensive powers (9) but not if the proceeding is without jurisdiction (10) The Court is not bound by the report, but may inquire further into the matter if there is any necessity for so doing The report is for the assistance of the Court, and is part only of the evidence, and other evidence may be received to explain it or show that it was wrong (11) The Court is at liberty to adopt a portion of the report, and reject the rest (12) The report is sufficient evidence to support a decree if it is believed by the Court and considered sufficient without further

(1) *Ram Narain v Goburdhun Lall*, 21 W R 2 (1873)

(2) *Chunder Monee v Nalambur Mustofee* 7 W R 43 (1867)

(3) *Jagat Kishore v Dina Nath*, 17 C 281 (1889)

(4) *Ib*

(5) *Mahomed Anwar v Roy Chunder*, 17 W R 521 (1872)

(6) *Brijnath Chowdhry v Lall Meah*, 14 W R 311 (1870)

(7) *Kalee Dass v Deb Narain* 13 W R 112 (1870)

(8) *Chunder Coomart v Joy Chunder*, 19 W R 213 (1877) *see Sheo Narain v Boodh Singh*, 11 W R 423 (1861) *Innocent*

Chowdhram v Collector of Mymensingh 8 W R 287 (1867), *Dole Gobind v Chamoo Sing*, 10 W R 312 (1868), *Khajah Abdool v Bhuttoo Sheikh*, 22 W R 360 (1874)

(9) *Umbica Churn v Goluck Chunder* 9 W R 696 (1868), *Rajnath Pandah v Doorga Lall*, 12 W R 136 (1869), *cf Shah Nuthoo v Ghunessam Singl* 8 W R 267 (1867)

(10) *Kandho Sircar v Philipps*, 10 W R 153 (1868)

(11) *Azma Sarung v Alimooldeen* 17 W R 270 (1872), as to further evidence, *vide post*

(12) *Koreshnauth Mukerjee v Martin*, 1 W R 13 (1864)

evidence to corroborate it (1) The report is evidence in the suit in which it is made, but in that suit only (2)

Examination of Commissioner—The Commissioner may be examined in person This provision, it has been said was probably considered necessary because an Ameen is something like an arbitrator, and it may have been thought that he could not be examined as to his proceedings (3) In a recent case it was said that the object of this provision was to protect the Commissioner (who is a *quasi* judicial officer) on grounds of public policy from vexatious examination by either party, and it was held that a Court cannot arbitrarily withhold permission to examine a Commissioner for accounts asked by a party (4) Charges against the Commissioner ought to be fully inquired into (5) This and the last rule do not contemplate the tender of further evidence after the report, except the examination of the Commissioner himself, but they do not forbid it They are consistent with either course, and the point must be decided on general principles, according to the facts of each case (6) Sub rule (3) is to further inquiry is new

Appellate Court—The report must be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court, even though it may be of opinion that local investigation should not have been made (7) If the Court finds the report deficient in any point it can send for the Commissioner and examine him (8) An Appellate Court ought not to interfere with the result of a local inquiry except upon clearly defined and sufficient grounds, which must be expressed in its judgment (9) On the other hand, the report should not be made the basis of a judgment to the total disregard of the other evidence on the record (10)

Commissions to examine accounts

11. In any suit in which an examination or adjustment of accounts is necessary, the Court may issue a commission to examine accounts or adjust accounts to such person as it thinks fit directing him to make such examination or adjustment

(1) Seetaram Mookerjee v Ramnaram Mookerjee, 6 W R 51 (1866) A Munsif's report of a local investigation when not shown to be substantially erroneous in its data or reasoning should convey the greatest weight as evidence of the facts it sets forth Wise v Amereoonnissa Chatoan 3 W R 219 (1865)

(2) Denolandhu Ghose v Nustarim Dasi, 12 C I R 50 (1882)

(3) Azim Sarung v Alimooddeen 17 W R 270 (1872) *sed q* as to Amin's position.

(4) Sitaram v Ram Prosad Ram, 19 C I J 87 (1913)

(5) Abdool K uttem v Campbell 8 W R

172 (1867)

(6) Gresh Chunder v Soshi Shikharshwar, 27 C 951, 966 (1900) s c, 4 C W N 631

(7) Rajnath Pandah v Doorga Lal 12 W R 136 (1869)

(8) Sheo Dyal v Holgkinson 24 W R 342 (1875)

(9) Raneer Sarut v Baboo Prosunno 10 W R (P C) 15 (1870), s c, 13 Moo I A 607 cf Protab Chunder v Raneer Surnomoyee 13 W R 361 (P C) (1873) Nilmadhub v Raj Kashore, 18 C L J 220 (1913)

(10) Buxter Sahoo v Jee Narain 24 W R 338 (1875)

5]

12. (1) The Court shall furnish the Commissioner with such part of the proceedings and such instructions as appear necessary, and the instructions shall distinctly specify whether the Commissioner is merely to transmit the proceedings which he may hold on the inquiry, or also to report his own opinion on the point referred for his examination.

(2) The proceedings *and report (if any)* of the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit, *but where* the Court has reason to be dissatisfied with them, *it may* direct such further inquiry as *it shall think fit*.

Proceedings and report to be evidence Court may direct further inquiry.

Accounts—These and the next rule correspond with sects 180 and 181 of the Code of 1859, which in their essentials are the same as the present law (1) A Court may issue a commission under r 11 without the consent of parties, (2) but where the reference had been made by consent, it was, under the circumstances of the case last cited, regarded as made on an agreement that the Commissioner should decide the questions of fact referred to him reserving questions of law to be disposed of by the Court (3) As to the proceedings on the commission, *vide post* officers: been held to be adapted.

(4) A reference to the Registrar of the High Court has, however, been treated as having been made under the former section (5) The rule does not require that the Commissioner should be sworn or affirmed (6) A direction to a Commissioner to take accounts under these rules is not a preliminary decree (7)

"Necessary."—It was held where the plaintiff filed his books in Court and they were not impugned, that a commission should not have issued, but the plaintiff should have made up the account himself (8) Where there is objection and the items of objection are few in number, they may be disposed of in open Court. If, however, they are numerous, and in order to dispose of

(1) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa*, 6 C W N 692, at p 706 (1901)

(2) *Watson v Aga Mchedee*, 11 A 346, at p 362 (1874)

(3) *Ib*

(4) *Valatchand v Advocate General*, 8 B H C R 96, 100 (1871), where it was held that when a decree had been passed referring the matter to the Commissioner's office to have accounts taken and property sold, the Court had still power to add a party to the suit

(5) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa*, 5 C W N 692 at pp 699, 705 (1901) As to the nature

of the certificate made by the Commissioner in the Bombay High Court, see *Rustomji v Kessowji*, 3 B 161 (1879), and as to extension of time for making of motion to vary report, see *Hurmusji v Bomony*, 9 B 250 (1885)

(6) *Rai Narsingh v Rai Narain*, 3 A H C R 217, 232 (1871)

(7) *Narayan Balkrishna v Gopalji Chads*, 33 B 392 (1914), and see *Kahuram Pichand v Gangaram Sakharam*, 33 B 331 (1913)

(8) *Chand Ram v Brojo Gobind*, 13 W R 14 (1873)

them it is necessary to enter upon complicated inquiries, the proper course to pursue is to appoint a Commissioner. This course may properly be pursued in the first instance if the account required is not of such a nature as to render it probable that there will be no difficulty in dealing with the disputed items in Court (1)

Examination—The Court furnishes the Commissioner with such proceedings and instructions as are necessary (r 12). The Commissioner may examine the parties and any witnesses (2) which may be produced, and call for and examine documents relevant to the inquiry (r 16).

Proceedings—This includes both the evidence taken (3) and the Commissioner's report or opinion (4). A distinction is drawn in the second paragraph between the proceedings which may or may not be accompanied by a report of the Commissioner's opinion and the report. The section is now more clearly worded.

"Shall be evidence"—The Commissioner's proceedings are an inquiry for the information of the Court not a trial. His position is different from that of a Judge trying a cause. The proceedings which include his report when he is required to report, are under this section to be treated as merely evidence in the cause. If therefore he finds a fact his finding is only evidence of that fact, but not a decision upon it. The report cannot be regarded as a judgment of a Court, for, standing by itself it is inoperative. It requires affirmance by an order of a Court to make it operative (5). It is only evidence if the Court is not dissatisfied with it. The section does not restrict the grounds of dissatisfaction (6). The Court must be satisfied with the proceedings before it adopts them. The Court will no doubt in all cases give due weight to the opinion of the Commissioner, and the duty cast upon it of satisfying itself as to the proceedings is in practice modified to this extent that it is usual to confine the examination to those parts of them to which exception has been taken by the parties, but the duty to that extent at all events remains and can only be discharged by such an examination as is sufficient for the purpose of satisfying the Court that the investigation has been conducted by the Commissioner fairly and in accordance with law (7).

Powers and duty of Appeal Court—The fact that the judgment of the Court of first instance is an affirmance of the report of a Commissioner does not affect the powers of a Court of Appeal though when the case comes before the latter the situation is of course somewhat different. What has

(1) *Degambar Mozumdar v Kallaynath Roy*, 7 C 64 657 (1881). *Annoda Persad v Dwarkanath Gangopadhyay*, 6 C 751 (1881) in which cases the procedure in taking accounts is laid down.

(2) *Chand Ram v Brojo Gobind* 19 W R 14 (1873), on this point is not law.

(3) As regards the case of *Chand Ram v Brojo Gobind* 19 W R 14 (1873) see last rule. In *Rai Narsingh v Rai Narain* 3 A H C R 217 at p 233 it is pointed out

that the depositions are to be returned with the report.

(4) *Ib Chetty v Mahomed Essa* 5 C W N 692 at p 707 (1901).

(5) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa* 5 C W N 692 at pp 701 705 707 (1901).

(6) *Ahmed Nanabhai v Khasanharimbhai*, 6 B H C R A O J 149 150 (1869).

(7) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa* 5 C W N 692 at pp 706 707 (1901).

then to be dealt with is the decree of the Court below, and when this gives effect to the findings of the Commissioner, there is the added weight of the Judge's decision. But the duty of the Appellate Court is commensurate with that of the Court of first instance, and if it is dissatisfied with the proceedings in whole or in part, it is incumbent on it to do that which the Lower Court ought to have done, namely, to set them aside either wholly or partially, and send the matter back for such further inquiry as may be necessary (1). It is open to

when examining such report (2). In the first of the cases last cited *Maclean, C.J.*, was of opinion that if there had been a fair investigation of the matter by the Registrar or Commissioner, and his finding had been confirmed, the Appeal Court ought not to interfere except on the strong ground of manifest error or manifest abuse (3).

Commissions to make partitions

96] 13 Where a preliminary decree for partition has been passed, the Court may, in any case not provided for by section 54, issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit to make the partition or separation according to the rights as declared in such decree

996 and 997] 14 (1) The Commissioner shall, after such inquiry as may be necessary, divide the property into as many shares as may be directed by the order under which the commission was issued, and shall allot such shares to the parties, and may, if authorized thereto by the said order, award sums to be paid for the purpose of equalizing the value of the shares

Procedure of Commissioner (2) The Commissioner shall then prepare and sign a report or the Commissioners (where the commission was issued to more than one person and they cannot agree) shall prepare and sign separate reports appointing the share of each party and distinguishing each share (if so directed by the said order) by metes and bounds. Such report or reports shall be annexed to the

(1) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa*, 5 C W N 692, at pp 701 706, 707 (1901)

(2) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa*, 5 C W N 692 at pp 701 706 707 (1901), *Ahmed Anabhai v Khasajikha Anabhai*, 6 B H C R 149 A C J (1869), *Kankatala v Poleshettr*, 6 M H C R 36 (1870) [diss from *Sarapa v Malai*, 1 M H C R 1 (1862), *Venkata v Venkataramaya*, ib 418 (1863)] In the second and third cases it was held that the Appellate Court would examine the accounts even if no exception were taken to them in

the first Court, but see *Venkata v Venkata ramaya* 1 M H C R 418 (1863), *Rantee Chunder v Copee Madhub* 11 W R 3 (1869), and *Seth Gujmull v Musamat Chabee*, 2 I A 34 (1874) in which the Privy Council refused to entertain objections to an account which had not been brought to the notice of the first Court or make a ground of appeal in India

(3) *Chetty v Mahomed Essa* 5 C W N 692 (1901)

commission and transmitted to the Court, and the Court, after hearing any objections which the parties may make to the report or reports, shall confirm, vary or set aside the same

(3) Where the Court confirms or varies the report or reports it shall pass a decree in accordance with the same as confirmed or varied; but where the Court sets aside the report or reports it shall either issue a new commission or make such other order as it shall think fit.

Revenue paying land—The jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters of partition of revenue paying land is restricted only on questions affecting the right of Government to assess and collect in its own way the public revenue (1) See notes to sect 51

"Commissioner"—In the last Code the plural was used. It was held by Pontifex, J, that the Court was not bound to appoint more than one Commissioner, but Field, J. doubted whether having regard to the language of the third clause of the former section, this was so (2) And a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the Court could not legally issue a commission to one Commissioner only (3) The Court may now issue a Commission to one or more persons. Commissioners have been looked on as officers of Court and by a majority, (4) though it is no longer so as regards Commissioners appointed to make a partition. Commissioners have no lien on the return for their fees, and cannot refuse to give it up until they are paid (5) When a Commissioner is unable to execute the commission the plaintiff may apply for the issue of a fresh commission and the Court should grant such an application (6)

Report—A party on the original side of the High Court desiring to vary a report made by the Commissioner must not only file his exceptions to such report, but must also make his motion to vary it, within twenty days after the filing of the report or if the Judge or the Court have allowed further time for such application then within the further time so allowed (7)

"Metes and bounds"—These are merely the measurements and limits of the shares which may be mentioned in the Commission. "Bounds" there do not mean a wall to be built. A Court has no power under this section to order its Ameen to cause a wall to be built on the property of which partition has been decreed (8)

- (1) Jogodehury Debca v. Kashish Chandra 24 C 725 (1897), Rutton Monee v. Brojo Mohun, 22 W R 11 (1874), Ajoodha Lall v. Guman Lall, 2 C L R 134 (1878) Chundernath Nandi v. Har Narain, 7 C 153 (1881), Zahrun v. Gouri Sunkar, 15 C 193 (1887), Debi Singh v. Sheo Lall 16 C 203 (1889), Hemanta Kumari v. Jagadindra Nath 18 C L J 528 (1913)
(2) Gyan Chunder v. Durga Churn 7 C 318 (1881)
(3) Mukhand v. Muhammad Ali Khan

- (4) Rajendra v. Matilal 3 B J 1
(5) Rajendra v. 24 (1897)
(6) Manu v. 1910
(7) Datta v. 1887
(8) v. 1887

Decree.—In suits for partition of immoveable property not paying revenue to Government, the Court, if it has the information before it necessary to enable it to make a decree not only declaring the rights of the parties but actually fixing the particular areas, or rooms, or parts of the houses, as the case may be, of which possession is to be given to the parties respectively in partition, may make such a decree without employing the procedure of these rules, and the decree so made would be enforceable in execution, and possession of the respective areas, rooms, etc., could be given to the parties in execution of the decree (1). But where, as most generally happens, a Court has not the information necessary to the making of such a decree, it must make a preliminary or interlocutory decree of a declaratory nature, and then adopt the procedure of these rules by appointing a Commissioner, or Commissioners, whose duty will be, not to give possession, for at that period there would be no decree capable of execution by possession, but who should allot such shares to the parties, award the sums to be paid in case sums are to be paid, and then prepare and sign a report appointing the shares and distinguishing such shares by metes and bounds, if ordered so to do (2). The Commissioner, or Commissioners, must then submit that report to the Court, and the Court, after giving the parties an opportunity of objecting (3) to the report, might under the last Code quash the report and proceedings of the Commissioner or Commissioners, and issue a new commission, or (where the Commissioners agreed) pass a decree in accordance with the report. The decree in accordance with such report would be a decree allotting the specific shares, areas, rooms, etc., distinguishing them, where possible, by metes and bounds or other adequate description, and decreeing to the respective parties possession of those portions of the property allotted to them. In the latter case that would be the final decree. It is true that the interlocutory decree would be appealable, (4) but for all that it is not the final decree or the decree which is capable of execution, except possibly for such costs as it might award to be paid. It is merely of the character of an interlocutory and declaratory decree (5). It is only after a decree has been made by the Court expressing its approval of the partition scheme that there is any decree capable of execution as a partition-decree (6). In a case which falls under the second of the above-mentioned categories, the appointment of a Commissioner, whether he be the Amn of the Court or some one else, is not the issuing of a process in execution of a decree, nor are any proceedings of such Commissioner the carrying out of any process in execution. The time has not yet arrived for execution of the decree (7). Proceedings under this rule for the purpose of effecting partition are proceedings in the suit itself, and not proceedings in execution of a decree (8).

(1) *Krishnamachariar v Kuppummal* 31 M 540 (1903)

(2) *Shah Muhammad v Hanwant Singh*, 20 A 311, 312-314 (1898)

(3) *Shah Muhammad v Hanwant Singh*, *supra* see as to acquiescence barring objection, *Gyan Chunder v Durga Churn*, 7 C 318 (1881)

(4) *Shah Muhammad v Hanwant Singh*, *supra*, see *Lhola Nath v Sonamou Dasi*, 12 C 273 (1885), *Belin Belari v Lal*

Mohun, 12 C 203 (1885), *Dulhin Golab v Radha Dulari*, 19 C 463 (1892), *Boloram Dey v Ram Chandra*, 23 C 273 (1895)

(5) *Shah Muhammad v Hanwant Singh*, *supra*

(6) *Abdus Samad v Abdur Razzaq*, 21 A 403, 411 (1899)

(7) *Shah Muhammad v Hanwant Singh*, 20 A 311, 312-314 (1898)

(8) *Dwarkanath Misser v Barunda Nath Misser*, 22 C 425 (1900), *follow in last case*

The amendments in clause (2) and the addition of clause (3) replace the following words in the former section "either quash the same and issue a new commission or (where the Commissioners agree in their report) pass a decree in accordance therewith" The provisions are the same with this difference, that the Court has not now to pass a decree where the Commissioners agree, but has in every case power to confirm, vary, or set aside (1) The action of an Amin appointed under this rule in a partition suit to demarcate the shares assigned to the respective parties to the suit is not the executing of a process for enforcing the judgment within the meaning of article 161 of the second schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (2) An order passed in a suit for partition subsequently to the preliminary decree appointing a commission to make the partition is not an order in execution, and therefore is not appealable under sect 47 It is an interlocutory order pending the suit which has not been finally decided, and the appellant may take objection to it in an appeal against the final decree (3) Where in suits for partition, possession is sought of a definite share of a property consisting of a number of houses the principle in such cases is that if a property can be partitioned without destroying the intrinsic value of the whole property or of the shares, such partition ought to be made, but where partition cannot be made without destroying the intrinsic value of the property, then a money compensation should be given (4) The decree must be stamped (5)

Appeal—An application for the appointment of a Commissioner was held not to be a matter coming within the scope of sect 244 (now 47) and therefore no appeal lay from an order made on such application (6)

General provisions

15 Before issuing any commission under this Order, the Court may order such sum (if any) as it thinks reasonable for the expenses of the commission to be, within a time to be fixed paid into Court by the party at whose instance or for whose benefit the commission is issued

Costs—Costs of a commission to take evidence was generally made costs in the cause, (7) and this has been done where a commission issued to examine a purdanashin at her own request (8) A Commissioner has no lien on a return of partition for his fees, and cannot refuse to give it up till they are paid (9)

(1) Cf. *Janaki Prasad v Gauri Sahai* 23 A 75 (1905) where it was held that the Court might accept or reject the report but could not modify it

(2) *Shah Muhammad v Hanwant Singh* 20 A 311 (1898)

(3) *Jogdashury Deba v Radash Chandra Lahury*, 24 C 7-8 (1897)

(4) *Iskhanullah v Hali Kinkur Kur*, 10 C 6-9 (1884)

(5) *Balaram v Ramkrishna* 29 B 366 (1904)

(6) *Jatla Mallayya v Madepalli*, 17 M L J 144 (1906)

(7) *Gahan v Owen Coryt* 11 (1864-65)

(8) *Monendrobhoshun Biswas v Soabee bhoshun Biswas* 3 C 566 (1880)

(9) *Rajmoheeny Dabee v Muddosoodun Dey*, Bourke 24 (1865)

While it is competent to a Court to require that a sum should be deposited, the omission to exercise this power does not debar a Commissioner from recovering his remuneration from the party at whose instance he was engaged (1) It has been held by the Madras High Court (2) that the Code does not authorize the dismissal of a suit on refusal or failure of a party to deposit the amount ordered under this section When after the issue of a commission it is found that the work is in excess of the amount paid in for the costs of the commission, and that the party at whose instance the commission was issued is not willing to pay, the only way in which the additional costs can be realized is by making the amount costs of the suit, and entering the same in the decree An order for depositing additional costs when not entered in the decree cannot be enforced (3)

16. Any Commissioner appointed under this Order may, unless otherwise directed by the order of appointment,—

- (a) examine the parties themselves and any witness whom they or any of them may produce, and any other person whom the Commissioner thinks proper to call upon to give evidence in the matter referred to him,
- (b) call for and examine documents and other things relevant to the subject of inquiry;
- (c) at any reasonable time enter upon or into any land or building mentioned in the order.

Powers—A Commissioner has wide powers and discretion to inquire as he may into the matters referred to him for investigation (4) He is entitled to take evidence in the matter referred to him (5) Where instructions are given in the presence of both parties, and no objection is made by either then and there, they have no ground of complaint after the Commissioner has carried out his instructions if the Court acts upon his report (6) He cannot however, go beyond the terms of the order appointing him (7)

17 (1) The provisions of this Code relating to the summoning, attendance and examination of witnesses, and to the remuneration of, and penalties to be imposed upon, witnesses, shall

Attendance and examination of witnesses before Commissioner

(1) *Gopalaratnamayyar v Bupala Narasimha*, 4 M 399 (1882), as to nature of remuneration, see *Ragava Chariar v Vedanta Chariar*, 3 M 259 (1881)

(2) *Ragava Chariar v Vedanta Chariar* 3 M 259 (1881)

(3) *Tadhin Prashad Singh v Sardar Coommar Narayan Singh*, 10 C W N 234 (1903)

(4) *Mohun Lal v Unnipoorna Dosset*, 9 W R 568, of 3 (1863), as to calling for walls, see *Unnipoorna Dalca v Rance Kholclo mon v Tulen*, 33 (1831)

(5) *Timcour Deb v Sattya Dojal Bannurji*, 6 C L J 105 (1889) [duty of Commissioner when examining accounts]

(6) *Bhassur Roy v Kanchun Roy*, 11 W R 155 (1869)

(7) *Ram Dhun v Ram Monca*, 21 W R 280 (1874), *Shibo Seonduree v Ram Chunder*, 17 W R 469 (1872), *Bustee Sahoo v Joo Narain*, 24 W R 338 (1875), *Bijoy Gobind v Hake Ir sunn*, 16 W R 291 (1871), *D o n r (burn v Deem (bur l*, 11 W R 203 (1874)

apply to persons required to give evidence or to produce documents under this Order whether the commission in execution of which they are so required has been issued by a Court situate within or by a Court situate beyond the limits of British India, and for the purposes of this rule the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court.

(2) *A Commissioner may apply to any Court (not being a High Court) within the local limits of whose jurisdiction a witness resides for the issue of any process which he may find it necessary to issue to or against such witness, and such Court may, in its discretion, issue such process as it considers reasonable and proper*

Powers of Commissioner—A Commissioner was under the last Code vested with the powers of a Civil Court to summon witnesses and enforce their attendance under the provisions of the Code. But a private Commissioner without the machinery of a Court might find practical difficulty in enforcing the order. In a case in which a private Commissioner experienced difficulty in enforcing the attendance of witnesses before him, the Calcutta High Court directed the return of the commission and sent it under sect 386 (now r 4) to the Civil Court, within whose jurisdiction the witnesses resided (1). It has, therefore, been enacted that, as is already the practice in many places a private commissioner may cause his processes to be executed through the Court having local jurisdiction where the witnesses reside. It has been held in Bombay on the Original Side, that an attachment will issue to compel a party to obey an order made by a Commissioner upon the certificate of the Commissioner that such order has been made and disobeyed without in the first instance making such order a rule of Court (2).

18. (1) *Where a commission is issued under this Order, the Court shall direct that the parties to the suit shall appear before the Commissioner in person or by their agents or pleaders*

(2) *Where all or any of the parties do not so appear the Commissioner may proceed in their absence*

Appearance of parties before Commissioner—Act VIII of 1859 sect 181. A party, refusing to appear before an Ameen at the time he holds his local investigation is not at liberty afterwards to take any objection to his report (3). In the case of *Eshan Chunder v Soorjo Lall* (4) it was held that where a plaintiff fails to appear before a Commissioner, and the defendant appears the plaintiff is liable to have his suit dismissed with costs. Before proceeding under clause (2) due notice of the time and place fixed for proceeding should be given.

(1) *Mahomed Ali v Warid Ali*, 23 C 401 (1896)

(2) *Dhurandhardas v Bhanu Govind* 10 B H C R 4 (1873)

(3) *Bamun Doss v Brojo Kashore* 6 W R 139 (1866)

(4) *Marsh* 139 (1864)

ORDER XXVII

Suits by or against the Government or Public Officers in their official capacity

1 *In any suit by or against the Secretary of State for India in Council, the plaint or written statement shall be signed by such person as the Government may by general or special order, appoint in this behalf, and shall be verified by any person whom the Government may so appoint and who is acquainted with the facts of the case*

Suits against Government or Public Officers—See notes to sections 79-82 *ante*

[s 417] 2 Persons being *ex officio* or otherwise authorized to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be the recognized agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made or done on behalf of the Government

[s 418] 3 In suits by or against the Secretary of State for India in Council, instead of inserting in the plaint the name and description and place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, it shall be sufficient to insert the words "The Secretary of State for India in Council"

[s 419] 4 The Government pleader in any Court, or such other person as the Local Government may for any Court appoint in this behalf, shall be the agent of the Government for the purpose of receiving processes against the Secretary of State for India in Council issued by such Court

[s 420] 5 The Court, in fixing the day for the Secretary of State for India in Council to answer to the plaint, shall allow a reasonable time for the necessary communication with the Government through

the proper channel, and for the issue of instructions to the Government pleader to appear and answer on behalf of the said Secretary of State for India in Council or the Government, and may extend the time at its discretion.

6. The Court may also, in any case in which the [s 421]

Attendance of person
able to answer questions
relating to suit against
Government

Government pleader is not accompanied by any person on the part of the Secretary of State for India in Council, who may be able to answer any material questions relating to

the suit, direct the attendance of such a person

7. (1) Where the defendant is a public officer and, on [s 423]

Extension of time to
enable public officer to
make reference to Govern-
ment.

receiving the summons, considers it proper to make a reference to the Government before answering the plaint, he may apply to the Court to grant such extension of the time

fixed in the summons as may be necessary to enable him to make such reference and to receive orders thereon through the proper channel.

(2) Upon such application the Court shall extend the time for so long as appears to it to be necessary

8. (1) Where the Government undertakes the defence of a [s 426]

Procedure in suits
against public officer

suit against a public officer, the Government pleader, upon being furnished with authority to appear and answer the plaint, shall apply to the Court, and upon such application the Court shall cause a note of his authority to be entered in the register of civil suits

(2) Where no application under sub rule (1) is made by the [s 427]
Government pleader on or before the day fixed in the notice for the defendant to appear and answer, the case shall proceed as in a suit between private parties

Provided that the defendant shall not be liable to arrest, nor his property to attachment, otherwise than in execution of a decree.

Government undertaking defence—This does not change the nature of the suit, which will continue as before The suit is against the officer, and against him the decree, if any, must be passed (1)

ORDER XXVIII.

Suits by or against Military Men.

[s 465]

1. (1) *Where* any officer or soldier actually serving the Government in a military capacity is a party to a suit, and cannot obtain leave of absence for the purpose of prosecuting or defending the suit in person, he may authorize any person to sue or defend in his stead

(2) The authority shall be in writing and shall be signed by the officer or soldier in the presence of (a) his commanding officer, or the next subordinate officer, if the party is himself the commanding officer, or (b) where the officer or soldier is serving in military staff employment, the head or other superior officer of the office in which he is employed. Such commanding or other officer shall countersign the authority, which shall be filed in Court.

(3) When so filed the countersignature shall be sufficient proof that the authority was duly executed, and that the officer or soldier by whom it was granted could not obtain leave of absence for the purpose of prosecuting or defending the suit in person

Explanation—In this Order the expression “commanding officer” means the officer in actual command for the time being of any regiment, corps, detachment or dépôt to which the officer or soldier belongs

[s. 466]

2 Any person authorized by an officer or a soldier to prosecute or defend a suit in his stead may prosecute or defend it in person in the same manner as the officer or soldier could do if present, or he may appoint a pleader to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of such officer or soldier.

3. Processes served upon any person authorized by an officer or a soldier *under rule 1* or upon any pleader appointed as aforesaid by such person shall be as effectual as if they had been served on the party in person.

Service on person so authorized, or on his pleader, to be good service.

Military men.—Generally, as regards suits against soldiers, see Army Act, 1881, and case cited (1) If a person sues for a soldier without authority the suit must be dismissed; (2) and an objection to the plaintiff's right to bring the suit, though not taken in the Court of first instance, was allowed on second appeal (3) The provisions of sect 468 of the last Code have been embodied in O V rr. 28-29, which deal with service on military men

(1) Mahomed Saib v. Agas, 10 M 319 B H C R 1 C J 20 (1869).

(1887)

(3) *Ib.*

(2) Shurram Vithal v. Bhagurthebar, 6

ORDER XXIX.

Suits by or against Corporations.

[s 435] 1. In suits by or against a corporation, any pleading
Subscription and verification of pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case

[s 436] 2. *Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of*
Service on corporation. *process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served—*
 (a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, or
 (b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business

[s 436 last para] 3 The Court may, at any stage of the suit, require the
Power to require personal attendance of officer of corporation personal appearance of the secretary or of any director or other principal officer of the corporation who may be able to answer material questions relating to the suit.

“Corporation”—The corporation contemplated by the former Code was, it was held, a corporation as known in English law, that is, a corporation created with the express consent of the Sovereign, or of such antiquity that the consent of the Sovereign may be presumed (1) Thus, the Akhara Panchaiti, an association formed by the followers of Guru Nanak, who flourished in the fifteenth century, and having no royal sanction, though it be a corporation under the Civil law, was held not to be a corporation under English law (2) A company which has been duly registered under the Indian Companies Act of 1882 is a

(1) Panchaiti Akhara t Gauri Kuar, 20 A 167 169 (1897), as to corporations by prescription, see Yusuf Beg t Board of Foreign Missions, 16 A 420, 422 (1894), and as to the attributes of a corporation, see Cantonment

Committee v Burjorji Bamanji, 14 B 250 253 (1883)

(2) Panchaiti Akhara t Gauri Kuar, 20 A 167 (1897)

corporation (1) There is nothing in r. 1 to exclude from its operation a foreign corporation or a foreign company, and there is nothing in the Code, or in the Indian Companies Act, requiring such corporation or company to be registered under the Indian Companies Act before it can claim the benefit of this rule (2) The former section referred also to companies authorized to sue and be sued in the name of an officer or trustee Authority to sue or be sued in the name of an officer or trustee can only be conferred by Act of Parliament, or by an Act of the Indian Legislature, and there are some Acts in the Indian Statute Book by which certain companies are authorized to sue or be sued in the name of an officer (3) Where the actuary of an assurance company established in London by Act of Parliament, which gave him the privilege of suing there on behalf of the company, sued in India, it was held, though the Act did not extend to this country, that he might sue, inasmuch as the insured must be assumed to have notice of the Act under which he could sue and be sued, and the contract might be considered as in effect made by him only (4) The rule now omits reference to such companies Most companies are registered, and a registered company is a corporation Companies authorized to sue and be sued in the name of an officer or trustee must, it was said, be very few, if, indeed, any exist, and it has been thought that they do not appear to call for special treatment

Suits by or against corporations—These rules do not deal with the question who may sue or be sued and in what manner, but merely deal with two incidents of procedure in such suits, viz the subscription and verification of the plaint and service on a defendant corporation The general rule, however, is that a corporation (and a registered company is such) must sue and be sued in its corporate name, (5) and cannot sue (6) or be sued (7) through an agent A company "authorized to sue and be sued," etc., will of course sue and be sued in the name of the officer or trustee It has been held that in the case of a suit by (8) or against (9) an unregistered and unincorporated company or association not authorized to sue or be sued in the name of an officer, the names of the

(1) *Campbell v Jackson*, 12 C 41, 44 (1885)

(2) *Singer Manufacturing Co v Bajnath* 30 C 103 (1902), *dist Yusuf Beg v Board of Missions*, 10 A. 420 (1894), in which it was not shown that the party claiming the benefit of s. 435 of the last Code was a corporation, and see *Jones v Tagore, Fulton*, 388 (1845), *post*

(3) *Campbell v Jackson*, 12 C 41, 44 (1885)

(4) *Jones v Tagore, Fulton*, 388 (1845)

(5) *Ram Dass v. Stephenson*, 10 W R 366 (1868), and according to Private International Law a corporation duly created according to the law of one State may sue and be sued in its corporate name in the Courts of other States *Singer Manufacturing Co v Bajnath*, 30 C 103, 105 (1902), as to suits by an official liquidator, see *Muhammad Yusuf v Himalaya Bank*, 18 A. 198 (1896)

(6) See *Campbell v Jackson* 12 C 41 (1885)

(7) *Nubun Chunder v Stephenson*, 15 W R 534 (1871)

(8) *Mahomedan Association of Meerut v Bakshi Ram*, 6 A 284 (1884), *Panchaiti Akhara v Gauri Kuar* 20 A 167 (1897), *Campbell v Jackson*, 12 C 41 (1885) as to minors, see *Pitum Dass v Ram Dhone*, 1 Taylor, 279 (1849-50)

(9) *Koylash Chunder v Ellis*, 5 W R 40 (1867), *Ganesha Singh v Mundi Forest Co*, 21 A 346 (1899) The latter case, however, dissented from the former in that it held that a plaintiff could not escape the obligation of making each individual member of the defendant company a defendant by stating in the plaint that he had been unable to discover who the individual members of the company were.

members of the company or association must be disclosed, and they must be made parties as in the case of a firm, (1) and a suit cannot be brought by or against a secretary or other person representing such association, though advantage may be taken of the provisions of O I r 8, ante. As to suits by or against firms, see O XXX

Subscription and verification of plaint—The Code enables a principal officer of a corporation to verify a plaint, and it is therefore not necessary that permission for that purpose should be obtained, but it should be shown, in cases to which r 1 applies, that the person purporting to verify a plaint is a principal officer, and is able to depose to the facts of the case. If the plaint contains a statement to that effect, verification in the usual form would probably be sufficient (2). But the Code does not require that the officer should verify from actual personal knowledge. He may do so upon information and belief (3). An acting manager of a bank is a principal officer of the bank corporation, and may sign a plaint for it (4).

Written statements and petition in insolvency—The provisions of the former section (now r 1) have, by virtue of the provisions of sect 115 (now O VI rr 14, 15) and sect 346 of the last Code respectively, been held to be applicable to written statements (5) and petitions in insolvency under the Code (6). Sect 346 has now been removed from the Code, insolvency being dealt with by a separate Act (III of 1907). In conformity with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act service is allowed by post on corporations having a registered office.

Service—An executive engineer of a railway company is not an officer within the meaning of r 2, clause (a), on whom service may be made (7).

(1) *Yeknath v Gulabchand*, 1 B H C R, A C J 81 (1863)

(2) *Sreenath Banerjee v East Indian Railway*, 22 C 268 (1894) which dealt with an insufficient written statement and allowed evidence to be supplied by affidavit and with waiver of objection to sufficiency of verification.

(3) *The Port Canning etc Co v Dhara nudhar Sardar*, 9 C W N 608 (1905)

(4) *Delhi Bank v Oldham*, 21 C 60 (1894),

20 I A 139

(5) *Sreenath Banerjee v East Indian Railway*, 22 C 268, 269 (1894)

(6) *Ram Komal v Bank of Bengal*, 5 C W N 91, 98 (1900). It is, however, to be observed that both these sections which preceded s 435 of the last Code, use the word "hereinbefore".

(7) *Hanlon v India Branch Railway* 1 Hyde, 197 (1862-63)

ORDER XXX.

Suits by or against Firms and Persons carrying on business in names other than their own.

1. (1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as ^{Suing of partners in name of firm.} partners and carrying on business in British India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct.

(2) Where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of their firm under sub-rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons.

2. (1) Where a suit is instituted by partners in the name of ^{Disclosure of partners' names} their firm, the plaintiffs or their pleader shall, on demand in writing by or on behalf of any defendant, forthwith declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.

(2) Where the plaintiffs or their pleader fail to comply with any demand made under sub-rule (1), all proceedings in the suit may, upon an application for that purpose, be stayed upon such terms as the Court may direct.

(3) Where the names of the partners are ~~disclosed~~ referred to in sub-rule (1), the suit shall proceed in the name of the firm and the same consequences in all respects shall follow as if the persons so named as plaintiffs in the plaint:

Provided that all the proceedings shall be conducted in the name of the firm.

3 Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either—

Service

(a) upon any one or more of the partners, or

(b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within British India upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business there,

as the Court may direct, and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without British India :

Provided that, in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon every person within British India whom it is sought to make liable.

Suits by or against firms—"Firm" is simply a compendious expression for the several persons who are members of it, and the general law knows nothing of the firm as a body or artificial person distinct from the members composing it. The Judicature enabled partners to sue or be sued in the names of their firms, but this rule did not introduce anything that amounts to the recognition of the firm as an artificial person as distinct from its members (1). This Order dealing with this subject is entirely new. It is, with the exception of r 4 taken from O 48A of the English Rules. The following notes are also taken from such portions of the notes in the Annual Practice on those rules as are of applicability in this country.

The following are the cross references with respect to this note —

Disclosure of partner's name r 2, service of writ on partners is dealt with in this rule and

Appearance den

O XXI r 50

as a firm r 10

ment against a firm see O XXI r 50. Actions between co partners, r 9 *infra*

Actions between partners—Prior to r 10 of the English rules corresponding with r 9 *post*, it was not quite clear that actions between a firm and one of its members, or between two firms with a common member, were maintainable in the firm's name (2) but this doubt is now removed by that rule which applies the rules to such actions provided the firm or firms carry on business within the jurisdiction, and with the further proviso that "no execution shall be issued in such suits except by leave of the Court."

"Any two or more persons"—If one of the partners is an infant, the minority of one partner cannot be utilized by the other, or others, as a means of deferring payment of the firm's debts (3). But the judgment should be either

(1) *Tukhmidas Khosla v Purshotam*
Hiraldas, 6 B 700, 702 (1882)

(2) See Pollock 1 p 20 and 109

(3) *Harris v Beauchamp Bros* (1833) 2 Q B

534. See also O XXI r 50, note, 'Infant partner'. See also *infra* note 'May sue or be sued'.

against the adult partners by name, or against the firm "other than A B an infant" And in such a case bankruptcy proceedings will, in England, lie against the firm other than the infant partner (1) A foreign corporation is different from a firm, and may be sued as an individual (2)

"As partners."—The liability of partners for debts is joint (3) As a general rule a suit by or against an ordinary partnership would have been defective for want of parties, unless all the partners were before the Court, (4) but now the firm may be sued *without first ascertaining who all the partners are* (5) Where a partner dies before action, and the action is brought against the firm alone, in the firm's name, the deceased partner is not a party to the action at all so far as his private estate is concerned If in an action against a firm in the firm name a partner dies between service of the writ and judgment, the estate of the deceased partner is not bound Unless his personal representative is a defendant, judgment is against the surviving partners, and can only be enforced against them and the partnership assets (6) See here as to right of suit on death of partner, r 4 The estate of a deceased partner is not liable for goods ordered before, but not delivered till after, his death (7)

"Carrying on business in British India"—If the firm carry on business within the jurisdiction within the meaning of the cases cited below, they may sue or be sued in the firm name It happens that in all the cases cited in this and the note on "Foreign firms," the points raised turned upon the question whether the *defendants* were rightly sued But the principle laid down in those cases applies equally to a plaintiff firm as to a defendant firm the right to 'sue or be sued' being given by the same sentence of this rule It is, therefore, the practice of the Central Office in England to refuse to issue a writ wherein a foreign firm is either plaintiff or defendant, unless the individual names of the partners are given The words "carrying on business" do not include an *agency* even though the name of the firm be painted on the door of the office of the agency (8) *Semble*, "carrying on business" means the possession within the jurisdiction of a place of business held in the name of the firm where business is carried on on behalf of the firm by a partner or by a person or persons in the pay of the firm (9) If the firm has no place of business in this country held in the name of the firm they do not carry on business within the jurisdiction even though the partners come to this country regularly in order to purchase goods to be sent to the firm

(1) *Lovell v Beauchamp*, A. C. 607 (1894)
For a case in which a cost book mining company was sued in its partnership name, see *Escott v Gray*, 39 L. T. (N. S.) 121

(2) See Ann. Pr., O 9 r 8, note, Foreign Corporation.

(3) *Pollock*, Part., p. 26, *Kendall v Hamilton*, 4 App. Cas. 504, *Pilley v Robinson*, 20 Q. B. D. 100, and cf. *The Partnership Act*, 1890 ss. 9, 10, 12 and *Weall v James*, 68 L. T. 315

(4) *Lindley*, (316)

(5) *Pollock* Part. p. 109

(6) *Ellis v Wadeson*, 1 Q. B. 714 (1899)

(7) *Bagel v Miller* 2 K. B. 212 (1903)

(8) *Grant v Anderson* 1 Q. B. 103 (1892)

(9) See *Worcester City Banking Co. v Furbank & Co.*, 1 Q. B. 784 (1894), and compare *Bailhe v Goodwin*, 33 C. D. 604, *Grant v Anderson*, *supra*, and *Heinemann & Co. v S. B. Hale & Co.*, 2 Q. B. 53 (1891)

3 Where persons are sued as partners in the name of then
Service firm, the summons shall be served either—

- (a) upon any one or more of the partners, or
 (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within British India upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business there,

as the Court may direct, and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without British India

Provided that, in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon every person within British India whom it is sought to make liable

Suits by or against firms — Firm is simply a compendious expression for the several persons who are members of it and the general law knows nothing of the firm as a body or artificial person distinct from the members composing it. The Judicature enabled partners to sue or be sued in the names of their firms but this rule did not introduce anything that amounts to the recognition of the firm as an artificial person as distinct from its members (1). This Order dealing with this subject is entirely from O 48A of the English Rules portions of the notes in the Annua in this country

The following are the cross references with respect to this note —

Disclosure of partner's name r 2 service of writ on partners is dealt with in this rule and r 5 Appearance r 6 Non appearance except by partner, r 7 Appearance denying partnership r 8 Execution of judgment against firm O XXI r 50 Application of rules r 9 Application of rules to person trading as a firm r 10 As to liability of partners out of the jurisdiction under a judgment against a firm see O XXI r 50 Actions between co partners r 9, *infra*

Actions between partners — Prior to r 10 of the English rules corresponding with r 9 *post* it was not quite clear that actions between a firm and one of its members or between two firms with a common member were maintainable in the firm's name (2) but this doubt is now removed by that rule which applies the rules to such actions provided the firm or firms carry on business within the jurisdiction and with the further proviso that no execution shall be issued in such suits except by leave of the Court.

'Any two or more persons' — If one of the partners is an infant the minority of one partner cannot be utilized by the other or others as a means of deferring payment of the firm's debts (3). But the judgment should be either

(1) Iukh nidas Khimji v. Parsbota : 534 S. also O XXI r 50 note, Infant Haridas, 6 B 700 (1882) partner See also: *infra* not May sue or be sued

(2) See I. J. J. p. 20 and 102

(3) Harr. & Beauchamp Bros (1893) 2 Q B

against the adult partners by name, or against the firm "other than A B and infant" And in such a case bankruptcy proceedings will, in England, lie against the firm other than the infant partner (1) A foreign corporation is different from a firm, and may be sued as an individual (2)

"As partners."—The liability of partners for debts is joint (3) As a general rule a suit by or against an ordinary partnership would have been defective for want of parties, unless all the partners were before the Court, (4) but now the firm may be sued *without first ascertaining who all the partners are* (5) Where a partner dies before action, and the action is brought against the firm alone, in the firm's name, the deceased partner is not a party to the action at all so far as his private estate is concerned If in an action against a firm in the firm name a partner dies between service of the writ and judgment the estate of the deceased partner is not bound Unless his personal representative is a defendant, judgment is against the surviving partners, and can only be enforced against them and the partnership assets (6) See here as to right of suit on death of partner, r 4 The estate of a deceased partner is not liable for goods ordered before but not delivered till after, his death (7)

"Carrying on business in British India"—If the firm carry on business within the jurisdiction within the meaning of the cases cited below, they may sue or be sued in the firm name It happens that in all the cases cited in this and the note on "Foreign firms" the points raised turned upon the question whether the *defendants* were rightly sued But the principle laid down in those cases applies equally to a plaintiff firm as to a defendant firm the right to 'sue or be sued' being given by the same sentence of this rule It is therefore, the practice of the Central Office in England to refuse to issue a writ wherein a foreign firm is either plaintiff or defendant, unless the individual names of the partners are given The words 'carrying on business' do not include an *agency* even though the name of the firm be painted on the door of the office of the agency (8) *Semble*, "carrying on business" means the possession within the jurisdiction of a place of business held in the name of the firm where business is carried on on behalf of the firm by a partner or by a person or persons in the pay of the firm (9) If the firm has no place of business in this country held in the name of the firm they do not carry on business within the jurisdiction, even though the partners come to this country regularly in order to purchase goods to be sent to the firm

(1) *Lovell v Beauchamp* A C 607 (1894)
For a case in which a coal book mining company was sued in its partnership name, see *Escott v Gray* 39 L T (N S) 121

(2) See Ann. Pr. O 9, r 3, note, *Foreign Corporation*.

(3) Pollock, Part, p 26, *Hendall v Hamilton*, 4 App Cas. 504, *Piley v Robinson*, 20 Q B D 150, and cf. *The Partnership Act*, 1890, ss 9, 10, 12 and *Wells v James*, 68 L T 515

(4) *Landley*, (516)

(5) Pollock, Part, p. 109

(6) *Ellis v Wadson*, 1 Q B 714 (1899)

(7) *Bagel v Miller*, 2 K B 212 (1903)

(8) *Grant v Anderson*, 1 Q B 108 (1892)

(9) See *Worcester City Banking Co v Fishbank & Co*, 1 Q B 784 (1894), and compare *Baillie v Goodwin*, 33 Q D 604, *Grant v Anderson*, *supra*, and *Heinemann & Co v S B Hale & Co*, 2 Q B 83 (1891)

abroad (1) The English rule has been held not to apply to proprietors of a newspaper sued under the name of the newspaper (2)

The effect of the addition to the English rule of the words "carrying on business within the jurisdiction," is to establish, out of all the cases cited in the note on "Foreign Firms," the decision of Chitty, J., (3) that where a firm carried on business in England and a partner was a resident in England, service at the principal place of business upon the person in control of the business, was good service on the firm, including any foreign partner resident abroad (4) Moreover, the rule as now framed appears to go even one step further, seeing that under its terms a foreign firm consisting of two or more persons (5) can be sued as a firm provided it carries on business within the jurisdiction, whether a partner resides in this country or not For though Wright, J., held otherwise, (6) the O A refused to indorse his ruling on this point (8 O) And in the case cited (7) it was held that partners usually resident abroad and having a London office in the firm name were rightly sued as a firm If the foreign firm does carry on business within the jurisdiction the partners are persons sued as partners in the name of their firm under r. 1, and service on the person in control of the business is good service on the firm, including all the partners out of the jurisdiction so far as, but no further than (see O XXI r 50), any property of the partnership within the jurisdiction is concerned It makes no difference whether the partners abroad are foreign subjects or British subjects It is not allegiance to the Crown which is in question, but whether the firm and its partners are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court If they carry on business within the jurisdiction in the firm name, then the rule, which must be read with O XXI r 50, applies (8) If the firm does not carry on business within the jurisdiction it cannot be sued in the firm name, (9) though a counterclaim may be pleaded against a foreign firm suing in an English Court (10)

"May sue or be sued"—A firm consisting of "two or more persons" may sue or be sued even though one of them is under a disability (11) A person trading by himself as a firm or in an assumed or trading name, must sue in his own name, though he may be sued in his trading name (12) If one of several partners dies before action brought, and the plaintiff seeks, in suing the firm, to make the deceased partner's private estate liable, he must add as a defendant

(1) *Singleton v Roberts & Co*, 70 L R 697

(2) *De Bernales v New York Herald*, 2 Q B 97 (N) (1893)

(3) In *Shepherd v Hirsch, Pritchard & Co*, 45 C D 231

(4) See also *Lysaght v Clark & Co*, 1 Q B 552 (1891)

(5) See note, "Any two or more persons" *supra*

(6) In *Grant v Anderson*, *supra*

(7) *Worcester Banking Co v Firbank & Co*, 1 Q B 784 (1894)

(8) *Ib*

(9) *Western National Bank of New York*

v Perez Triana & Co, 1 Q B 304 (1891), *Indigo Co v Ogilvy*, 2 Ch 31 (1891),

Heinemann & Co v S B Halo & Co, 2 Q B 53 (1891), *Baillie v Goodwin* 73 C D 604

(10) *Grandtoven v Hamlyn & Co*, 8 Times Rep 238, see O XXI r 50, note, Shall not render liable, etc See also following *in to*

(11) See *Harris v Beauchamp Bros*, *ante* 1 *supra*, note, "Any two or more persons"

(12) *Mason v Moggilge*, 8 Times Rep 500, see r 10, *infra*, note, "May be sued." As to "owners of cargo" in an Admiralty action see *re* suing as such in lieu of trading name see *The Assunta* (1902), P 150

the personal representative of such deceased partner, (1) and see r 4. The right to sue partners in the name of the firm is not limited to the case of partners in the firm at the date of the writ. And the liability of partners who have left the firm prior to or since the action commenced is a question of fact which may be raised under O XXI r 50 (2). A judgment against the firm has the same effect as a judgment against all the partners bad formerly (3). If final judgment has been obtained against a firm upon a writ issued against the firm execution cannot issue against a member of the firm without leave of the Court unless such member comes within the provisions of O XXI r 50 (a) (b) (c) *ante*. Under the English rules if a firm has recovered judgment and one member afterwards dies the survivor may issue execution (4). A firm cannot appear as a firm, but if a partner, together with the firm are made co-defendants he may put in separate defences one for himself and one for the firm (5).

"At the time of the accruing of the cause of action"—These words enable the co-partners in a firm dissolved before action to sue or be sued as a firm provided the co-partnership existed at the time the cause of action accrued. And by the operation of r 10 *infra* it enables an individual trading in a firm to

in this country, the service, it appears, would be good (1) Service on the agent of a firm has been held to be no service on the firm (2) As to service out of the jurisdiction on a partner in a firm carrying on business in England, see note (3) It has been held in England that a defendant firm may contract itself out of the rules and rulings as to foreign firms If its principal place of business is out of the jurisdiction, and it has agreed to receive service at some place within the jurisdiction, a writ served in the manner agreed is well served (4) But an agreement that the Court shall have power to order service on the foreign firm, even though the case is not within O 11 of the English rules, is of no effect The jurisdiction of the Court as to the ordering service out of the jurisdiction cannot be extended by agreement (5) A foreign firm suing in the English Court is liable to have a counterclaim pleaded against it, even though the nature of the counterclaim is such as to preclude the possibility of bringing an action upon it under O 11 of the English rules, which provide for service out of the jurisdiction (6)

"For a statement of the names"—An order to disclose the names of partners hereunder is not an order for discovery within O 31, r 21 of the English rules corresponding with O XI r 21 of this Code (7) Where an affidavit has been filed stating the names of the partners in the plaintiff firm, there is no power to direct a cross examination on such affidavit, or the trial of an issue as to who were the partners in the firm at the time of the accruing of the cause of action (8)

Rule 2 Disclosure of partners' names—By sub rule (1), r 1, *supra*, in an action by or against a firm, any party to the action may apply by summons to a Judge for the names and addresses of the persons who were partners at the time the cause of action accrued (9)

"Provided that all the proceedings"—See *post*, notes to r 6

Rule 3 "Where persons are sued as partners"—These words authorize service in accordance with the provisions of this rule on any person sued, who is carrying on business within the jurisdiction in a name or style other than his own name, (10) and also upon any two or more persons sued, who are liable as co partners and carry on business within the jurisdiction A foreign firm, not carrying on business within the jurisdiction, cannot sue or be sued as a firm (11) *Semble*, it provides a mode of service within the jurisdiction within the meaning of the English rule on firms trading within the jurisdiction whether the partners reside within or without the jurisdiction (12)

(1) See *Carrick v Hancock*, 12 Times Rep. 59

(2) *Baillie v Goodwin* 33 Ch D 604; see also *Grant v Anderson*, 1 Q B 103 (1892)

(3) See O XI r 50, note, "Unless service has been made on such partner"

(4) *Montgomery v Liebenthal & Co*, 1 Q B 487 (1898)

(5) *British Wagon Co v Gray*, 1 Q B 36 (1896)

(6) *Griendtveen v Hamlyn & Co*, 8 Times Rep 231

(7) *Pike v Keene*, 24 W R (Eng) 322

(8) *Abrahams & Co v Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co*, 11 L T 11 (C 1)

(9) See r 1, *supra*, note, "1 or a statement of the names"

(10) *Supra*, r 10, *infra*

(11) See *supra*

(12) *Ann Pr*, notes to O 48A r 3

"Shall be served"—The mode of service prescribed by this rule applies solely to service within the jurisdiction. If a partner is served service must be personal, and may be effected anywhere subject to the rules as to service out of the jurisdiction and to the decisions with regard to foreign firms (1). If the person in control of the business is served service must be effected at the principal place of business within the jurisdiction and must include service of the notice prescribed by r 5 *infra* (2). If no such notice is served the person is deemed to be served as a partner (3). Where a firm is duly served and no appearance is entered and judgment in default is signed, subsequent service of the writ on a partner not previously served is wrong and will entitle such partner to apply to set aside the judgment. The plaintiff's proper course in such a case, in order to bind the personal goods of a partner not originally served is to apply under O XXI r 50 for an order giving leave to issue execution against the person sought to be made liable as a partner.

"At the principal place at which"—*Semble* this means a place where the business of the firm is carried on in the firm's name by a partner or some person who is in the pay of the firm and not merely an agent (4).

'Control of management'—Service on the agent of a firm was held to be no service on the firm (5). Service on a receiver and manager appointed by the Court was held to be bad on the ground that the words of this rule mean that the person having the control or management of the partnership business must be the servant of the partners whereas a receiver is the servant of the Court. So held on the same words in r 260 of the English Bankruptcy Rules 1886 (6). Where there was no one in control substituted service was ordered (7).

"Deemed good service upon the firm"—Service on the firm by serving the person in control hereunder is not service upon each member of the firm so as to make such member a person who has been served as a partner etc. within O XXI r 50 (8) though if partners appear individually under r 6 they will each be personally liable (9).

'Whether all or any of the partners are within or without British India'—These words must be read in conjunction with the words bearing on the same point in O XXI r 50. *Semble* they mean under the wording of the English rule that the service shall be good service on the firm

(1) See *supra*.

(2) Cf. notes *infra*. At the principal place etc. and The control or management.

(3) R 5 *infra*.

(4) See Worcester City Banking Co v Furbank & Co 70 L T 102 (1894) 1 Q B 784 Grant v Anderson, 1 Q B 103 (1897) and cf. Heinemann & Co. v S B Hale & Co 2 Q B 83 (1891). It does not mean an agency, see Baillie v Goodwin 33 Ch D 604 and cf. De Bernaldes v New York Herald 2 Q B 97 (n) (1893). See notes,

supra. Carrying on business, etc. and Foreign firms and as to a foreign firm contracting out of the cases by agreeing to service within the jurisdiction: see note for foreign firms *supra*.

(5) Baillie v Goodwin 33 Ch D 604.

(6) Re Flowrs & Co 60 L J Q B 69.

(7) See St R to Child W N 83 (1898).

(8) *Idem* 17 Q B D 700.

(9) See r 6 *infra*. Practice and O XXI r 50 and cf. Alder v Beckley 20 Q B D 513.

so far as concerns any property of the firm within the jurisdiction, (1) but not so as to otherwise "render liable, release or otherwise affect" any partner out of the jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued, unless service has been made upon such partner or he has come within the jurisdiction after the summons was issued in the manner provided by r 3 (2). The whole rule applies only to actions against partners "in the name of their firm," carrying on business within the jurisdiction.

"Provided that"—The above proviso was formerly contained in O 16, r 14 (now r 1) of the English rules, and its effect is defined in the case cited (3). If there has been a dissolution to the knowledge of the plaintiff he cannot make an outgoing partner liable unless he serves the writ of summons upon him. If he omits to do this, and on proof of service on the firm takes judgment in default against the firm, and then applies under O XXI r 50, for leave to issue execution against the partner who has left the firm, on the ground that he was a partner when the debt was contracted, the Court will refuse to order execution against such partner because he was not made liable by being served with the writ (4).

4 (1) *Notwithstanding anything contained in section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any of such persons dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit*

(2) *Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall limit or otherwise affect any right which the legal representative of the deceased may have—*

(a) *to apply to be made a party to the suit, or*

(b) *to enforce any claim against the survivor or survivors*

Devolution of joint rights—The section of the Contract Act referred to provides that when a person has made a promise to two or more others jointly, then unless a contrary intention appears from the contract, the right to claim performance rests as between him and them, with them during their joint lives, and after the death of any of them with the representatives of such deceased person jointly with the survivor or survivors, and after the death of the last survivor, with the representatives all jointly. It has been held that this rule is not confined to cases where a suit is brought by or against a firm in the name of the firm. The legal representatives of deceased partners may if desired, be brought on the record (5).

(1) *R. J. (1) and of Worcester City Banking Co v Fairbank & Co, 1 Q B 781 (1874)*

(2) See Ann Tr., notes to O 48a r 1

(3) *Wigram v Cox & Co, 1 Q B 722 (1854)*

(4) Ann. Pr., notes to r 3, and see *Ex p Young, 13 C D 124* and O XXI r 50 note, *Has failed to appear*

(5) *Bal Kissen Das v Banky Lal, 17 C L J 648 (1913)*

5 Where a summons is issued to a firm and is served in the manner provided by rule 3, every person upon whom it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters, and, in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner

"Shall be informed."—If service is effected on the person in control of the business and no notice is served as here provided the service is not effective, and cannot be made so. If service is effected on a partner he may be served with the writ with or without a notice, for if served without he is deemed to be served as a partner. (See next note.) But if the person in control is served without a notice, that cannot be treated as service on a partner unless the deponent to the affidavit of service if he subsequently discovers that the person served was a partner, can swear that he served A B a partner in the defendant firm. The notice when served, must be served with the writ in accordance with the rule. The usual practice is for the person effecting service to take a written notice with him headed in the name of the action and being to the following effect:—"Take notice that the writ served herewith is served on you as the person having the management or control of the partnership business of (A B & Co)." Where a partner is served such notice is not delivered with the copy writ, but where the person in control of the business is served on behalf of the firm, it is delivered to him with the copy writ. The notice need not and indeed under the circumstances cannot be addressed to any one by name. Where any difficulty is anticipated in identifying the person served either as a partner or as the person in control of the business the best course is in any case to serve with the writ the following notice:—"Take notice that the writ served herewith is served on you as a partner in the defendant firm of (A B & Co) and also as the person in control of the business." This practice is authorized by the words of the rule "or in both characters" (1) As to entering judgment after such service, see below (2) As to effect of not serving such notice and the necessity of proving service of the notice see next note. The object of the notice is to remove the possibility of dispute as to the character in which a person has been served. The Legislature did not intend to raise merely a rebuttable presumption but to lay down the legal effect of the service (3)

"Deemed to be served as a partner"—As pointed out *supra* the words obviate the necessity of serving any notice on a person who is served as a partner, but they render such notice and proof of service thereof absolutely necessary wherever the firm is served by service on the person in control of the business. If, in such a case, the notice is not served with the writ or if the person served is served as a partner by notice, such person will be able to protect himself from liability as a partner by entering appearance under protest

(1) Ann. Pr., notes to O 48A, r 4

(3) *Baishnab Charan Saha v Bank of*(2) See note, *infra* "Persons served both" *Bengal, 19 C. L. J 581 (1914)*

denying that he is a partner (1) The effect of such an appearance is merely to nullify the service altogether as regards the defendant firm (2) If a person served as a partner appears under protest under r 6, and the plaintiff desires to contest his denial of partnership, he, according to the English practice, can apply by summons to strike out the appearance, entered on the ground that the party appearing is a partner in the firm sued, or was a partner at the time the cause of action accrued, or in the alternative to strike out of such appearance the denial of partnership If necessary, an issue may be directed to determine the question of partnership (3) Or the plaintiff may disregard the appearance under protest, and serve the writ again as provided by r 3, and having obtained judgment against the firm he may apply under O XXI r. 50, for leave to issue execution against the person appearing under protest, if he alleges him to be a partner

Person served both as partner and manager.—Where a person is served both as a partner and as the person in control of the business, by delivery with the writ of a notice to that effect, and such person appears with denial of partnership, and no one appears as a partner, the plaintiff is entitled, notwithstanding such appearance, to take judgment in default against the firm on proof that the person served was also served in the capacity of manager. Such judgment, however, only entitles the plaintiff to issue execution against the firm, unless otherwise ordered under O XXI r 50 (4)

6. *Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names, but all subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue in the name of the firm.*

7. *Where a summons is served in the manner provided by rule 3 upon a person having the control or management of the partnership business, no appearance by him shall be necessary unless he is a partner of the firm sued*

8. *Any person served with summons as a partner under rule 3 may appear under protest, denying that he is a partner, but such appearance shall not preclude the plaintiff from otherwise serving a summons on the firm and obtaining a decree against a firm in default of appearance where no partner has appeared.*

(1) R 8, *infra*.

(2) See the words of r 8, "but such appearance shall not preclude the plaintiff from otherwise serving process on the firm and obtaining a decree," etc

(3) Ann Pr. notes to O 48, r 4, and see

O 36, r 4, O 31, r 1, and see Davis v Morris, 10 Q B D. 436, and Worcester Banking Co v Trotter, 3 James Rep 709, cited *supra*, rr. 1-3

(4) Ann. Pr. notes to O 48, r 4

Rule 6. "Sued as partners in the name of their firm."—*I.e.* according to the English rule, persons carrying on business within the jurisdiction (1) *Semble*, where a firm is sued in the firm name, a person claiming to be a partner may appear under r 6 if he describes himself as a partner, irrespective of the fact that his claim to be a partner is disputed (2)

"They shall appear individually"—A firm cannot appear in the firm name, but the partners must appear in their own names, and must describe themselves as partners. Any partner has a right to appear as such, either with or without his co partners. An appearance here under protest is taken as an admission of partnership (3). No one but a partner and a person served as a partner who denies that he is a partner, or that he was a partner at the time the cause of action accrued, has any right to appear (4). Nor will any appearance be received which does not clearly state that the person either (a) is a partner, or (b) was a partner at the time the alleged cause of action accrued, or (c) has been served as a partner, but denies that he is a partner in the firm sued, or (d) has been served as a partner but denies that he was a partner in the firm sued at the time the alleged cause of action accrued. Before the English rules (O 48A) were passed it was held that a person denying partnership had no right to appear (5). That case is now overruled by r 8, and r 7 provides that no appearance is necessary by a person served on behalf of the firm as the person in control of the business, and such an appearance would be refused. A partner appearing, must describe himself as such. *Semble*, any appearance without protest in an action against a firm must be taken to be in all respects an appearance by a partner (6). An authority given by the managing partner of a firm to defend an action is a good authority to a solicitor to enter appearance for all the partners in the firm (7). An appearance by one out of several partners sued is an appearance on behalf of the firm and sufficient to stop judgment in default against the firm (8).

"All subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue in the name of the firm"—This is laid down by r 2. In every action against partners sued in the firm name every subsequent proceeding must be headed with the firm name as defendants. By r 6 the defendants are to appear individually, so that if they defend the action and are unsuccessful they become personally liable to execution (9). But their individual appearances are to make no difference in the way the action is instituted in all subsequent proceedings nor can they put in any defence which is not a defence on behalf of the firm (10). The judgment must be against the firm in the firm name. The only exception is where the defendant firm contains an infant partner when judgment should be against the

(1) See rr 1-3 *supra* and notes "Carrying on business," etc.

(2) Ann. Pr., notes to O 48 r 5. See Robinson v Ward & Son, 36 Sol Jo 415 cited r 10 *infra* n 11. Appearance.

(3) See O XXI r 30.

(4) See r 7.

(5) See Davy v André, 24 Q B D 293.

(6) Ann. Pr. notes to O 48A r 3.

(7) Tomlinson v Broadbent 1 Q B 386 (1895) see also Ellis v Wadson cited *infra* note. Defence of one of several partners.

(8) Adam v Townsend 14 Q B D 103, Taylor v Collier 30 W R 701.

(9) O XXI r 30.

(10) Ellis v Wadson, cited *infra*, note, Defence of one of several partners."

firm "other than A B an infant" (1) Execution thereon may be (a) against the firm's goods, (b) against the individual partners liable to execution (2) Thus, if one partner out of several appears the appearance is a good appearance for the firm (3) "The rule at Common Law is that the judgment must follow or accord with the writ Under the Judicature Act, and its Order, the writ may be against the firm The writ being against the firm, the judgment must be against the firm" (4) The English Partnership Act, 1890, sect 23, provides that "a writ of execution shall not issue against partnership property except on a judgment against the firm"

Defence of one of several partners.—The action being against the firm any and every defence put in must be a defence for the firm, and cannot be a personal defence of a particular partner Each partner is entitled to put in a defence if there is disagreement, but the form must be "Defence of the defendant firm by A B a partner" The plaintiff must in case of several defences show that none of them prevents him from taking judgment A defendant by putting in a separate defence improperly might render himself liable to his co partners, but that would not affect the plaintiff whose action is against the firm (5)

Rule 7. "Unless he is a partner of the firm sued."—An appearance tendered by a person describing himself as the person in control of the business, is refused at the central office in England The effect of this rule is to guard the plaintiff against the embarrassment and delay previously occasioned by the appearance of persons who were not partners in the firm sued The concluding words of the rule render any person appearing (except under r 8) liable to be dealt with as a partner (6) This rule is to be read subject to r 5, and contemplates only a case where service is on a manager and not a case where the person served is deemed to be served as a partner (7)

Rule 8. "May appear under protest."—The appearance is entered without leave in the following form "For A B having been served as a partner, but who denies that he is a partner in the defendant firm of," etc., or who denies that he was a partner in the defendant firm at the time the cause of action accrued If the plaintiff desires to contest the denial of partnership, he should take the course indicated, *supra*, r 5 note "Deemed to be served as a partner"

"Such appearance shall not preclude the plaintiff," etc.—The words of this part of the rule entitle the plaintiff to disregard the appearance under protest altogether, and proceed as if the writ had not been served, i.e., by "otherwise serving the firm" If the person served was served both as a partner and as the person in control of the business, the appearance with denial of partnership is no bar to judgment in default against the firm based upon the service on the person in control After judgment, if the person appearing

(1) See notes to rr 1-3, *ante*

(2) See O XLI r 50

(3) Taylor v Collier, 30 W R 701, and see Adam v Townsend, 14 Q B D 103, *supra*

(4) Per Brett, L J, Jackson v Lushfield, 8 Q B D p 478

(5) Ann. Pr., notes to r 5, O 484, 1 Ill

v Wadson, 1 Q B 714 (1899). and see Woll v James, 68 L T 74

(6) Cf. O XLI r 50, and see sub rule (1), *ante*, "They shall appear individually"

(7) Banchara Charan v Bank of Bengal, 19 C L J 581 (1914), at p 589, per Beauchcroft, J

under protest with denial of partnership is in fact a partner, the plaintiff may apply for leave to issue execution against his private goods under O XXI r 50 (1)

9 *This Order shall apply to suits between a firm and one or more of the partners therein and to suits between firms having one or more partners in common, but no execution shall be issued in such suits except by leave of the Court, and, on an application for leave to issue such execution, all such accounts and inquiries may be directed to be taken and made and directions given as may be just*

Suits between co partners
Application — Application for leave to issue execution under this rule is made in England by summons

Partners generally — See notes to rr 1-3 *supra*

'Execution' — See notes to O XXI r 50 *ante*

10 *Any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name and, so far as the nature of the case will permit all rules under this Order shall apply*

Suit against person carrying on business in name other than his own
'Any person' — By the concluding words of this rule all the foregoing rules of this Order are to apply to an individual sued who trades within the jurisdiction as a firm or who carries on business under an assumed or trading name (2). But the rule applies to a single individual residing and trading within the jurisdiction in a name other than his own name whether it purports to be the name of a firm or not. If the trading name is apparently the name of an individual (e.g. if William Smith is carrying on a business under the name of Richard Smith) the plaintiff if he is aware of it should add to the defendant's name in the title to the writ the words '(a trading name)'. (3) The English ruling as laid down in the case of foreign firms viz that they cannot be sued in the firm name applies also to a single foreigner trading in a name or style other than his own name. He cannot be sued in his trading name even though he has a branch office in this country (4).

"May be sued" — He may be sued but he cannot sue in his trade name (5). Though this does not interfere with the old Admiralty practice under which

(1) See as to 11 is and as to application to strike out the appearance r 3 *supra* note. Deemed to be served as a partner.

(2) Cf remarks of James and Brett, LJJ *Ex parte Blain*, 12 C D 422, and see r 114 *ante*.

(3) Ann. 1st notes to O 45a r 11.

(4) *St Gobain v Hoyermann's Agency* 2 Q B 96 (1893) see also rr 1-3 *supra* notes. Foreign firms, and Carrying on business, etc and cf Worcester City Banking Co v Furbank & Co, 10 L T 102 (1894) 1 Q B 754.

(5) *Mason v Mogridge* 5 Times Rep 693.

the "owners of the cargo" may in an action *in rem*, sue as such, even where the "owners" consist of a person trading as a firm (1) A person sued by his trading name may be ordered to disclose his real name and private address (rr 1-3) In a firm of "L & Co.," apparently consisting only of L trading as "L & Co.," there was a concealed partner An action was brought by "L & Co.," against G, who counterclaimed for jewellery supplied to L for personal use Held that counterclaim was bad against the firm (2)

Service—The writ may be served as provided by r 3, *supra*, q v, but not in England if the defendant is resident out of the jurisdiction (3) Where a single individual trading as a firm could not be served and there was no responsible person in charge of the business, it was held that substituted service could be ordered (4)

Appearance—Must appear in his own name (5) Appearance under protest of person served denying that he is the person sued (6) As to effect of non appearance, see O XXI r 50

All subsequent proceedings continue in the name of the firm—See as to this notes rr 6 8 *supra*

Execution—See O XXI r 50, *ante*

(1) *The Assunta* P 150 (1902)

(2) *Baker v Gent* 9 Times Rep 103

(3) See *St Gobain & Co v Hoyermann's Agency* cited *supra* note, Carrying on business within the jurisdiction

(4) *Shulito v Child* W N (83) 208

Croydon & Co v Jackson 3 Times Rep 600

(5) R 6 As to the effect of such an appearance, see note to that rule, They all appear individually

(6) See r 8

ORDER XXXI.

Suits by or against Trustees, Executors and Administrators.

1. In all suits concerning property vested in a trustee, [s. executor or administrator, *where* the contention is between the persons beneficially interested in such property and a third person, the trustee, executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested, and it shall not ordinarily be necessary to make them parties to the suit. But the Court may, if it thinks fit, order them or any of them to be made parties

Representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in trustees, etc.

Representation of beneficiaries—The rule which corresponds with English O 16, r 8, applies only when the contention is between the person beneficially interested and a third person. Persons acting as trustees in succession under a will were held to adequately represent all persons beneficially interested in the estate in all suits relating to it (1) Trustees sufficiently represent an unascertained and unascertainable class (2) or persons (3) The rule governs all suits concerning property without distinction (4) The rule has no application when the contention is between beneficiaries and trustees, or between the beneficiaries themselves, though where the section applies it is not ordinarily necessary to make the beneficiaries parties The Court may, if it think fit do so. The last clause is taken from 15 & 16 Vict c 86, s 42, r 9, and beneficiaries are made parties in England when the trustee is either wholly uninterested, or has an interest adverse to their interest (5) The discretion of the Court is not limited in this respect (6) A *cestui que trust* may sue on the refusal or inability of trustees to sue (7) Where a suit was brought by an executor and the names of the beneficiaries who took possession of the estate during the pendency of the suit were

(1) *Arden v Harbair*, 8 B 474 (1884)

(2) *Fussell v Dowding*, 27 Ch D 240. *Pe Sheldon*, 39 Ch D 52.

(3) *Cardigan v Curzon How*, 1901, 2 Ch 485

(4) See Ann Pr, notes to O 16, r 8, which rule was amended to expressly include a case of foreclosure

(5) *Beresford v Ramasabha*, 13 M 137, 202 (1883)

(6) See *Day v Radcliffe* 24 W R (Eng) 544, *Wilkinson v Rees*, 3 W R (Eng) 300, *Gas Light, etc Co v Towse* 35 Ch D 526, *May v Newton*, 34 Ch D 347 cf also D C P 173, 183, 190 207 In *Mohananda Chatterjee v Achhoy Kumar*, 6 C W N 485 (1901), the Court refused to add parties.

(7) Ann. Pr 100, cf *Meldrum v Scott*, 36 L T 471

substituted as plaintiffs, it was held, that no new plaintiffs were substituted within the meaning of sect 22 of the Limitation Act, and that the substitution of names of the plaintiffs did not make a new suit (1)

2 Where there are several trustees, executors or administrators, they shall all be made parties to a suit against one or more of them

Joinder of trustees
executors and adminis-
trators.

Provided that the executors who have not proved their testator's will, and trustees, executors and administrators outside British India, need not be made parties.

Suits against executors or administrators—This rule, which, it will be observed, has (as well as r 3) been extended to the case of trustees, deals only with suits against, and not with suits by, legal representatives or trustees. It embodies the general rule that in actions for administration all executors who have proved, or administrators, must be parties to the suit (2). But if an executor has not proved he should not be made a party, (3) unless he has intermeddled with the assets (4) or has acted as executor, when he may be (5). An executor outside British India, or a renouncing executor, or an absconding executor is not a necessary party (6). The former section had, instead of the words "outside British India" the words "beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court". And it was held that if a defendant insisted that an executor was a necessary party, it was for him to show that he, the executor, lived within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit was brought (7). A judgment for general administration cannot be made without a general administrator, (8) an administrator *ad litem*, (9) or an executor *de son tort*, is not sufficient (10). A suit, however, may, under circumstances, be sufficiently well constituted for the purposes of a motion as for a receiver where one only of several executors is defendant, though it may be necessary to add the other executors as defendants before the suit comes on for hearing (11).

3 Unless the Court directs otherwise, the husband of a married trustee, administrator or executrix shall not as such be a party to a suit by or against her.

(1) *Jahnabi Chowdhurani v Brojo Mohini*, 7 C W N 817 (1903)

(2) *Latch v Latch*, 10 Ch 464, *Re Dracup* W N (92) 43, D C P 203

(3) *Dyson v Morris*, 1 Ha. 413

(4) *Re Lovett*, 3 Ch D 198

(5) *Vickers v Bell*, 4 De G J & S 274

(6) *Drage v Hartopp*, 23 Ch D 114

(7) *Kumar Saradindu Roy v Dharendra Kant Roy*, 2 C I J 484 (1907)

(8) See *Re Toleman* (1897), 1 Ch 866

(9) *Dowdeswell v Dowdeswell*, 9 Ch D 291

(10) *Russell v Morris*, 17 Eq 20

(11) *Hafizabait Hazi Abdul*, 19 B 83, 85 (1893)

ORDER XXXII.

Suits by or against Minors and Persons of Unsound Mind.

1. Every suit by a minor shall be instituted in his name (s. f
Minor to sue by next friend, by a person who in such suit shall be called the next friend of the minor. pa

"Minor."—The Code is applicable generally to all descriptions of parties, whether plaintiff or defendant, and its provisions apply as well to minors as to others. Thus a minor can be directed to file a written statement, and his suit is liable to be dismissed if he fails to do so, and an affidavit of documents may be required of a minor defendant. Doubtless, it is not intended that an infant party to a suit should personally obey such orders. It is evident from the provisions of the Codes that it is intended that his next friend or guardian should obey the orders of the Court on his behalf. Hence, in construing the Code, an exception cannot be read as to infants into its provisions generally, but rather a proviso that orders given to an infant may be obeyed for such infant by his next friend or guardian, nor can this be done in construing sect. 380 (now O. XXV r 1) (1). The Indian Majority Act of 1875 enacts that every person, save as therein otherwise provided shall attain his majority at the completion of his eighteenth year. This Act governs Hindus and Mahomedans, and all other British subjects, European or otherwise, domiciled in British India. Where a guardian has been appointed before the age of eighteen, disability extends to twenty one (2). The minority of an English subject not domiciled in India is twenty one years (3).

"Next friend"—As regards suits on behalf of minors, Acts XL of 1858, and XX of 1861, relating to guardians, have been repealed by Act VIII of 1890, and the present law is to be found in the rules of the Code which embody the amendments of this Act (4). The effect of this rule and r 4 is that if there be a guardian, he alone can institute the suit, unless the Court gives leave to

(1) *Bai Porbai v Dny Meghji*, 23 B 100 (1898)

(2) Notwithstanding the guardian may be discharged. *Sadho Lal v Murlihar*, 29 A 672 (1907)

(3) *Rohilkand Bank v Row*, 7 A. 490 (1885)

(4) As to the cases under the repealed Acts see O Kmealy's C P C, notes to s. 400. The sections of the last Code amended by Act VIII of 1890 (see ss. 53 A, B, C, D, E) were ss. 440, 443, 446, 461, 464. The last paragraph of s. 440 of the last Code was added by s. 53A, Act VIII of 1890.

some other person to sue. Sect. 440 of the last Code required notice to be given to the guardian. This has been omitted. When there is no guardian, any person who fulfils the qualifications of r 4 may sue. In r 1 the word "adult" has been removed. It is unnecessary, as majority is one of the required qualifications under r 4. The protection of the minor's interests is left to persons who may be willing to come forward at the risk of costs, and subject to that risk any person may do so (1). In either case the person suing for the minor is called his next friend. A minor cannot sue alone. He can only sue or be sued by a next friend or guardian *ad litem*, and a decree can only be given for or against him if thus duly represented. The reason why no proceeding can be taken by an infant without the assistance of a next friend is on account of an infant's (2) supposed want of discretion, and his inability to bind himself and make himself liable for costs (3). So far as the minor is concerned, the object of his appointment is to secure the minor's interests, and as regards the defendant, in order that there may be some one before the Court to whom the defendant can look for his costs, if successful. The rule was intended for the protection and benefit of defendants, as in England it has been held that when a defendant waives this benefit and protection the suit may proceed without a next friend (4). Any sane, adult person, not a defendant, and having no interest adverse to the minor, may be a next friend (5). No person can be made a next friend without his consent (6). Although the consent of a minor to the institution of a suit by a next friend is immaterial, and a suit may be instituted on his behalf whether he consents or not, the suit is, in fact, brought in his name, and is treated as a suit brought by him (7). The minor is the real plaintiff (8). The next friend is not a party to the suit, but a person whose duty it is to prosecute the suit for the minor, and he cannot therefore appeal in his own name (9). The right of a minor to sue by a next friend is a matter of principle, and a rule independent of statutory enactment, and therefore a minor may sue for possession in a Mamlatdar's Court by his next friend, although the Mamlatdar's Act (Bom, Act III of 1876) makes no provision for such a

(1) *Kerakoose v Serik*, 3 M I A 329 at p 345 (1844)

(2) *Noor Ahmed v Lulta*, 2 A II C R 183 (1870). *Bama Soonduree v Gresh Chunder*, 3 W R Act N, 138 (1865), *Chinniah v Baribun Saib* 5 M II C R 435 (1870)

(3) *Doorga Mohun v Fahir Ally*, 22 C 270, 274 (1894)

(4) *Ib*, and see as to waiver of irregularity, *Kamalakshmi v Ramasami Chetti*, 19 M 127 (1895), cited *post*, and *Chinniah v Baribun Saib*, 5 M II C R 435 (1870) [advantage of the point must be taken by pleaders objection]

(5) R 4, *post*

(6) See O I r 10

(7) *Venkatanarasayya v Achamma*, 3 M J 4 (1891)

(8) *Brijesuree Dossal v Ashore Doss*, 20 W R J 110 (1876). *Bhobatarini v Sree Ram*,

9 C 629, 630 (1883). The statement in *Bama Soonduree v Gresh Chunder*, 3 W R, Act N, 138 (1865), that "the minor is himself no party to a suit in the eye of the law," is

of the minor, and is governed by the law of limitation applicable to the minor. *Rhodabux v Budree Narain*, 7 C 137 (1881), *Jagovan Amurhand v Hasan Abraham*, 7 B 179 (1883), *Mannohun v Gunga Soondery*, 3 C 181 (1882). *Lalit Mohun v Jawky Nath*, 20 C 714 (1893). Representation by a guardian does not remove disability. *Amutharama v Haruppanan*, 4 M 119 (1881), which, however, is purely personal. *Rudra Kant v Nobi Kshori*, 12 C L R 269 (1883)

(9) *Bhobatarini v Sree Ram*, 9 C 629 (1883)

suit (1) The plaint should describe the minor plaintiff as "*A B a minor by his next friend C D,*" and a minor defendant as "*C D, minor of whom E F is guardian ad litem*" (2) The representative capacity comes to an end with the death of the minor, and the next friend or guardian *ad litem* cannot execute a decree after the minor's decease. The latter's legal representatives should move in the matter (3) Where a suit is brought in violation of these provisions, the plaint should be returned in order that the error may be rectified (4) When a suit is brought by an alleged minor through his next friend, and when it is found that the plaintiff is not a minor, the suit should not (though the Allahabad High Court dissents) be dismissed, as the defendant can be indemnified by costs. The defendant should apply to have the plaint taken off the file or amended, and if this is not done the next friend's name may be treated as mere surplusage (5) Where, on the other hand, the defendant contends that the plaintiff is a minor (6) and that the suit cannot be carried on without a next friend, if the plaintiff fails to prove his majority, the Court should not dismiss the suit, but should appoint a next friend (7) Where a minor sued herself without a next friend, but no objection was taken by the defendants until the case came before the Court of first appeal, at which time the plaintiff had attained majority, it was held that the irregularity was waived (8)

Costs—The words in sect. 440 of the last Code, "*and may be ordered to pay any costs in the suit as if he were the plaintiff,*" have been omitted. If the suit fails, the next friend will be ordered to pay the defendant the costs, an order addressed to the minor in person to pay those costs being illegal (9). But as between the next friend and the minor, the former is *prima facie* entitled to costs (10). The Court may, (11) and usually does direct that the next friend should, though the suit be unsuccessful, have his costs out of the estate. It frequently is right to make a next friend or guardian liable for costs, but there are also cases in which it is not proper to hold him personally liable (12). As a rule he is entitled to attorney and client costs except where the fund is reversionary, and then he may claim the difference when the fund comes into

(1) *Dattatraya v. Vaman*, 21 B. 83 (1836)

(2) See *Mongul Dossee v. Sharad Dossee*, 20 W. R. 48 (1873), *Komal Chunder v. Surbessur Doss*, 21 W. R. 238 (1874). As to the effect of misdescription, see notes to r. 5, post.

(3) *Hulodhar Roy v. Jadoonath*, 14 W. R. 162 (1870).

(4) *Rusank Das v. Pronath Mitter*, 10 C. 102 (1883).

(5) *Taqi Jan v. Olandulla*, 21 C. 200 (1834), *Net Lal Sahu v. Karan Bishah*, 23 C. 656, 657 (1836), dissented from in *Sheorania v. Bharat Singh*, 20 A. 30 (1837).

(6) As to evidence of minority, see *Khetter Mohun v. Ramessur*, W. R. (1864) p. 304, *Kake Halder v. Sreenam Ghose*, W. R. (1864) p. 306 [appearance of alleged minor, positive

evidence].

(7) *Moorice Dhur v. Nathonet Mahtoon*, 20 W. R. 184 (1876).

(8) *Kamalakshmi v. Ramasami Chetti*, 19 M. 127 (1895).

(9) *Rajah Bakromajet v. Court of Wards*, 21 W. R. 312, 314 (1834) [a peculiar case in which though the suit failed the defendant had under the circumstances, to pay], *Bai Porbai v. Dhvi Meghji*, 23 B. 100, 102 (1838).

(10) *Dunn v. Dunn*, 3 B. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

(11) *Devkalait Jaffer*, 10 J. 112, 113, 114 (1836).

(12) *Damant v. Haldar*, 11 W. R. 100, 101 (1836).

possession (1) The Court may also direct that the next friend should pay all the minor's costs, & the costs incurred by himself as next friend, out of his own pocket (2) He is liable to pay the costs of an unsuccessful, (3) or unnecessary, (4) or frivolous or vexatious (5) action or application. If the next friend is personally ordered to pay the costs he cannot of course levy them from the minor's estate (6) Where a guardian (and the same rule will hold good for a next friend) is personally held liable for costs, it should be stated in the decree or order of the Court, since ordinarily he is only liable in his representative capacity (7) Execution may be taken out against the representative personally, leaving him to recover the sum so realized from him from the estate (8) A widow defending a suit as guardian of her minor cannot be made liable in her own person as well as representing the heirs of her husband (9)

2 (1) *Where a suit is instituted by or on behalf of a minor without a next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with costs to be paid by the pleader or other person by whom it was presented.*

Where suit is instituted without next friend, plaint to be taken off the file.

(2) Notice of such application shall be given to such person, and the Court, after hearing his objections (if any), may make such order in the matter as it thinks fit.

Plaint filed by next friend—This rule refers to a case where the plaintiff on the face of it appears to have been filed by a person who was a minor. It does not contemplate any inquiry into the question of minority where the suit is brought by a person professing himself to be adult, and where the defendant objects to the suit on the ground that he is not an adult but a minor, and where upon these conflicting allegations an issue is raised for trial. In a case like this the order of the Court, if it finds that the defendant's allegation is correct is

(1) *Brijessureo Dossia v Kishore Doss*, 25 W R 316 (1876)

(2) *Devkabar v Jefferson*, 10 B 248 (1886)

(3) *Bai Porebai v Devji Meghji*, 23 B 100 (1898) Bligh v Fredgett 5 De G & S 74, it does not however necessarily follow that because the suit is unsuccessful the next friend or guardian should be made liable for costs. *Brijessureo Dossia v Kishore Doss*, 25 W R 316 (1876)

(4) *Re Hicks*, W N (83) 138 (Eng.). *Lisbon's Estate*, W N (77) 177 (Eng.). *Morden v Martin* 75 L T J 220, see *Henrick v Wood*, L R 9 L J 331, as where it is proved that the plaintiff is not a minor, cf *Palmer v Walkley*, J Ch. App. 732, where an action was brought on behalf of an ill and lunatic who was not so. In *Garcia Balla v Chunder Kant*, 11 C. 213 (1880), the

next friend was ordered to pay, as there was no evidence that the suit was for the benefit of the infant

(5) *Golds v Kerr*, W N (Eng) (84) 46

(6) See *Collector of Mymensingh v Kali Chunder S D Sum*, Dec. 1st Sept. 1860, cited in O'Malley, notes to a. 440

(7) *Komul Chunder v Surbassur Doss*, 21 W R 298 (1874), and where the terms of a decree do not make any such distinct order as to costs, no expression of opinion in a judgment can import any such liability for costs into the decree. *Brijessureo Dossia v Kishore Doss* 25 W R 316 (1876)

(8) *Omrao Sing v Prem Narain*, 1 W R 203 (1870)

(9) *Brojo Mohun v Goodernath Surmah*, 10 W R 102 (1871)

not passed under this rule. Such a case is not expressly provided for in the Code, but the practice is to suspend all proceedings and to allow sufficient time to enable the minor to have himself properly represented in the suit by a next friend (1). The Court as a rule only strikes a plaint off the file where it appears on its face that it was filed by a person who was a minor, or where it is proved that it was filed with the knowledge that the plaintiff was a minor, and with the intention of deceiving the Court and evading the payment of costs in case the plaintiff fails in the claim. Where the fact of minority is a *bond fide* question of evidence and the defendant's allegation is found correct, then the usual course is to suspend all proceedings and to allow sufficient time to enable the minor to have himself properly represented (2). No objection can be taken as to the minority of a plaintiff after remand by the High Court unless the point was urged in the Appellate Court (3). While the person presenting the plaint is liable for costs where a plaint is filed by a minor without a next friend, neither this nor the last rule gives a Court authority to make a minor's estate liable for costs (4).

3. (1) Where the defendant is a minor, the Court, on being satisfied of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for such minor.

Guardian for the suit to be appointed by Court for minor defendant

(2) An order for the appointment of a guardian for the suit may be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the minor or by the plaintiff.

(3) Such application shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the fact that the proposed guardian has no interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor and that he is a fit person to be so appointed.

(4) No order shall be made on any application under this rule except upon notice to the minor and to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in that behalf or, where there is no such guardian upon notice to the father or other natural guardian of the minor, or, where there is no father or other natural guardian, to the person in whose care the minor is, and after hearing any objections which may be urged on behalf of any person served with notice under this sub-rule.

Guardian ad litem.—The Code of 1859 contained no provisions as to appointment by the Court of guardians *ad litem* for minor defendants. According to the then practice it was sufficient if a person was made a party as guardian

(1) *Beni Ram v. Ram Lal*, 13 C. 189, 191 (1886). See also *Sham Krishna v. Ram Das*, 20 A. 162, 163 (1897). *Rattan Bai v. Chabildas*, 13 B. 7, 11 (1889). In the first case it was held that the order, though purporting to be passed under the former section, must be taken to have been one

rejecting the plaint or dismissing the suit, and so appealable.

(2) *Rattanbai v. Chabildas*, 13 B. 7 (1889).

(3) *Beni Ram v. Ram Lal*, 13 C. 189 (1886).

(4) *Amchand Talakhchand v. Collector of Abulapur*, 13 B. 224 (1888).

and permitted to act as such on the minor's behalf (1) These provisions have been taken from the *Original Side rules* (2) The same reasons which require the representation of an infant plaintiff (3) apply to the case of an *infant defendant* A minor may appear by attorney or pleader, but he can only plead or conduct the defence by his guardian (4) As to the age of majority, see notes to r 1, ante A guardian *ad litem* is not within the scope of sect 3 of the Majority Act (5) The rule assumes that there is a suit which may and indeed must be instituted of the plaintiff

Upon the institution of a suit against an infant the question of service of summons is one of some difficulty There are no special provisions as to the service of summons upon infants, and therefore the same rules appear to apply as in the case of adults (7) Summons should be issued and served on the minor defendant Where there has been neither personal nor substituted service on the minor defendant or on the certificated guardian, and an *ex parte* decree has been passed, it will be set aside under sect 108 (now O IX r 13) (8) Where, however, it was not definitely shown that any attempt was made to serve the summons upon the infants personally, or upon their mother before serving it upon the only adult male member and *karta* of the family, but it was not shown that the alleged irregularity had caused any prejudice, it was held to be cured by sect 578 (now sect 99) (9)

Subsequent to the issue of summons, the Court must proceed under this rule to satisfy itself of the fact of minority (10) Where no guardian *ad litem* is appointed (mere notice of a proposal to appoint a person being insufficient) and an *ex parte* decree is passed, it will be set aside (11) And where it is so satisfied the Court should proceed to the appointment of a guardian It is the duty of the Court to see that a minor's interests are properly represented (12) The provisions of the rule are mandatory and should be strictly followed (13)

(1) Subramanya Pandya v Siva Subramanya, 17 M 316 335 (1814)

(2) Suresh Chunder v Jugut Chunder, 14 C at p 209 (1886)

(3) 116 r 1

(4) Kasi Das v Kassin Das, 16 M 341, 346 (1892), these provisions apply to the Parsi Marriage Act Northji v Buchooji, 15 B 306 (1894)

(5) Gordhandas v Harvallubdas 21 B 281 285 (1896)

(6) Khem Karan v Har Dyal, 4 A 37 (1881)

(7) Suresh Chunder v Jugut Chunder, 14 C 201 215 (1886), where Wilson, J. doubted whether service on a guardian *ad litem* was good service under the Code In Jatindra Mohan v Srinath Roy, 26 C 217 (1899), it was held that ss. 74 and 78 were controlled by this section, but in that case no summons was served either upon the minors or their certificated guardians In Dakeshure Rewa,

24 C 27 (1896), an attempt to serve the latter was held insufficient

(8) Jatindra Mohan v Srinath Roy, 26 C 207 (1898)

(9) Wahan v Banko Behari, 30 C, 1021 (1903). Munnu Lal v Ghulam Abbas, 12 A 247 P C (1910), 37 I A 77

(10) Suresh Chunder v Jugut Chunder 14 C at p 217 (1886)

(11) Bhura Mal v Har Kishan, 24 A 383 (1902), Dakeshure Rewa, 24 C 25 (1896)

(12) Nursunbomoyce Gopalia v Peary Soondroo, 2 Scy 699 (1863), and a Court should not pass a decree against a minor without taking care that he is properly represented, Shrooburrit Singh v Jalljee Choudhry, 13 W N 202 (1870)

(13) Wahan v Banko Behari, 30 C, 1021 (1903), A C 7 C W N 744; 5 Bom L R 822, Jatindra Mohan v Srinath Roy, 26 C 207, 274 (1898), Bhura Mal v Har Kishan, 24 A at p 786 (1902)

No order appointing a guardian should be made *ex parte*, so that opportunity may be given for the making of an application on behalf of the infant under r 3, though the fact that an order appointing a guardian at the instance of the plaintiff is made *ex parte* is not necessarily fatal to the suit (1) If the minor or his friends and relatives in whose care he may be, fail to move the Court to appoint a guardian then the appointment may be made at the instance of the plaintiff (2) The appointment is made by the Court and not by the parties, though it is on their application, (3) and by the Court in which the litigation is pending (4) The appointment of a guardian *ad litem* under this rule is wholly distinct from the appointment of a guardian under the Guardian and Wards Act (5) The Code expressly requires the appointment of a guardian *ad litem* whether or not a guardian is appointed under Act VIII of 1890, although that Act gives precedence (r 4, clause 2) to a guardian appointed under its provisions (6) Though advisable it is not necessary that there should be a formal order of appointment if it appears on the face of the proceedings that the Court has sanctioned the appointment (7)

As to who may be appointed see r 4 Sub rule (2) of that rule gives precedence (8) to guardians of the person or property unless special reasons exist against their appointment So while there is nothing to prevent a guardian suing her ward, in such a case the minor must be represented by some other person whose interest is not adverse to him (9) Where a guardian filed a written statement which was prejudicial to the interests of the minor the Court observed that in a suit in which it is not necessary for a minor defendant to take an active part, no guardian is ever justified in taking any step prejudicial to his ward If he can do nothing positively for the minor's benefit he ought simply to leave the matter to the Court (10) A father cannot act as guardian *ad litem* of his son when there is a clear conflict of interest between them Thus where a father, professing to act as the head of a *Mital-dara* family executed a deed of the family joint property it was not open to him to impugn its validity

(1) Suresh Chunder & Jugut Chunder 14 C 204 (1886)

(2) Ib See *Isre Motiram* 11 B H C R 21 (1874), *Babaji v Maruti* 11 B H C R 182 (1874), under the Code of 1859 where the plaintiff failed to give the name of the guardian (*vide ante*) the Court dismissed the case *Radha Krishna v Ram Chunder* 11 W R 300 (1869) See rr 3 & 4 *post*

(3) *Guru Churn v Hali Kissen* 11 C 402 (1885) [neither the Code nor Act VI of 1858 give a plaintiff any power to institute a suit against a person named by himself as guardian *ad litem*] *Breenarain Mitter v Sreenmitty Kishen*, 11 B L R at p 191 (1873) *Doorgaswamid v Kesabopernad*, 8 C W G (1852) [manager of estate].

(4) *Rulung* 5 M H C R App. viii (1869)

(5) *Vithaldas v Dattaram* 20 B 295 (1901)

(6) *Dakeshir v Rewat*, 4 C W G (1884)

(7) *Walian v Banks Bahari* 10 C 150 (1904) *Suresh Chunder & Jugut* 14 C 204 (1886) *Jatindra* 14 C 204 (1886) *Jatindra* 14 C 204 (1886) *Jatindra* 14 C 204 (1886)

(8) *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)*

(9) *Ch under A v X* 14 C 150 (1904) *Ch under A v X* 14 C 150 (1904) *Ch under A v X* 14 C 150 (1904)

(10) *Rakhmal* 11 C 402 (1885) *Rakhmal* 11 C 402 (1885) *Rakhmal* 11 C 402 (1885)

which case the plaintiff was natural father of the defendant

fraudulently, and the plaintiff, as plaintiff as husband of the defendant

(11) *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)*

(12) *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)*

(13) *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)*

(14) *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)* *R v 26 C at p 272 (1888)*

it would be the duty of the guardian *ad litem* of the infant son to urge as a defence that the mortgage was beyond the scope of the father's authority, and it was therefore held that the father could not be the guardian *ad litem* (1). Where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is not a minor, and minority is pleaded as a defence to an action, inasmuch as an alleged minor cannot be treated as if he was of full age during the investigations of any material averment in a suit, a guardian should be appointed for the defendant and a preliminary issue should be framed and tried as to whether the defendant is or is not a minor (2). Though by sect 410 of the last Code the next friend of a plaintiff might be made liable for costs there was no similar express provision with respect to a guardian. But according to the English practice, which has been followed by the Bombay High Court, he has been made to pay costs where he has been guilty of gross misconduct in the case, (3) as where a guardian put executors to proof of a will which he wished to upset for his own private purposes, and which the evidence showed was, to his knowledge, duly executed (4). The Madras High Court, in a case (5) which does not appear to have been considered in the one last cited, has held that the Code does not authorize a Court to decree costs against the guardian of a defendant except in the case referred to in sect 458 (now r 11), which deals only with costs when a guardian is removed.

"Shall appoint"—The provisions are imperative, and where they are not substantially complied with the minor is not properly represented, and any decree which may be passed against him is a nullity (6). Thus where a decree had been passed against a minor who was described in the suit as of age, it was held that it was a nullity so far as he was concerned (7). The Court must not only appoint a guardian, but satisfy itself that the proposed guardian is a fit and proper person to represent the minor, to put in a proper defence, and generally to act in the interests of the minor. The duty of the Court is not a mere matter of form (8).

Clause (4).—This is based on sect 443 of the last Code. The Legislature has considered it necessary to ensure that notice should reach one interested in the minor's welfare, and this rule aims at securing this result. It was held that the appointment, apparently by an oversight, as guardian *ad litem* to a minor defendant of a person other than the certificated guardian, amounted to a no more than an irregularity not vitiating the decree or sale thereunder. See next rule, clause (2) (9).

(1) *Balkson v. Tapasur*, 17 C W N 213 (1911), cf. *Ganesha Row v. Fuharam Poo* P C, 18 C L J 1 (1913).
(2) *Kari Doss v. Kasim Dast*, 16 W 314 (1892).
(3) *Coolam Hoossein v. Latmahar*, 8 B JJ (1884).
(4) 1b.
(5) *Narasimha Rao v. Lakshimpatti*, 3 M 263 (1881).
(6) *Hannan Prasad v. Muhammad Isahq*, 28 A 137 (1904).

(7) *Purno Chandra v. Bhoj Chaml* 18 C L J 18 (1913), following *Rasul on ussa v. Muhammad Ismail*, P C, 31 A 572, 13 C W N 1182 (1909), and *Narsing v. Shukh Jabi*, 15 C L J 3 (1911) distinguished in *Wahim v. Banko Bhary*, *supra*, 30 C 1021 (1903).
(8) *Ramchandra Das v. Joti Prasad*, 3 A 675 (1907).
(9) *Dammar Singh v. Prithu Singh*, 29 A 30 (1907).

Petition for guardian *ad litem*—See *ante*, where the procedure will be found dealt with. A person cannot be appointed guardian *ad litem* against his will, and this is now enacted by r 1, (1) but where a guardian *ad litem* has once been appointed, his appointment endures for the whole of the *lis* in the course of which it has been made, unless and until it is revoked by the Court, (2) and therefore for purposes of appeal (3). A Court has jurisdiction to try a suit against a minor notwithstanding the appointment of one of its officers (1) to be the minor's guardian *ad litem* (5).

4 (1) Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority may act as next friend of a minor or as his guardian for the suit:
 Who may act as next friend or be appointed guardian for the suit

Provided that the interest of such person is not adverse to that of the minor and that he is not, in the case of a next friend, a defendant, or, in the case of a guardian for the suit, a plaintiff.

(2) Where a minor has a guardian appointed or declared by competent authority, no person other than such guardian shall act as the next friend of the minor or be appointed his guardian for the suit unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded, that it is for the minor's welfare that another person be permitted to act or be appointed, as the case may be.

(3) No person shall without his consent be appointed guardian for the suit.

(4) Where there is no other person fit and willing to act as guardian for the suit, the Court may appoint any of its officers to be such guardian, and may direct that the costs to be incurred by such officer in the performance of his duties as such guardian shall be borne either by the parties or by any one or more of the parties to the suit, or out of any fund in Court in which the minor is interested, and may give directions for the repayment or allowance of such costs as justice and the circumstances of the case may require.

Who may act—See notes to r 1 *ante*.

Who may be next friend and guardian—A married woman may be next friend (6) though under the provisions of sect 157 of the last Code, which

(1) *Jadow Mulji v Chhagan Ranchand* 5 B 306 (1881), *Issur Chunder v Nobe Kristo* 7 C. L. R. 407 410 (1880) *Narsingh v Sheekh Jahu* 15 C. L. J. 3 (1911)
 (2) *Jwala Devi v Perbbu* 14 A. 3, (1891)
 (3) *Venkata v Alakarajamba* 22 M. 18 (1898)
 (4) See *Issur Chunder v Nobe Kristo*

C. L. R. 407 (1880) *Babaji v Maruti* 11 B. H. C. R. 182 (1874)
 (5) *Jadow Mulji v Chhagan Ranchand*, 5 B. 306 (1881)
 (6) *Asarum Bib v Sharif Mondul* 17 C. 488 (1890) F. B. overruling *Guru Pershad v C. Ram M.* 11 C. 731 (1880)

have not in this respect been re enacted, she could not be appointed guardian *ad litem* (1) In a suit by minors to obtain a declaration that a decree did not affect them inasmuch as they were not properly represented by their mother, who was incapable of acting as guardian, they were held entitled to a decree (2) Whatever be the propriety of making provision by the appointment of a public officer for the institution of suits on behalf of infants, it is of the utmost importance that no person should be appointed of whom even a suspicion can exist that he may be biased by personal interest The Privy Council therefore disapproved of the appointment of the Registrar, who, according to the practice of the Supreme Court was entitled to a commission of 5 per cent on all sums paid into Court (3) It was held that the Code did not apply to all guardians, for it did not apply to natural guardians See notes to last rule (4)

[s. 441] 5 (1) Every application to the Court on behalf of a minor, other than an application under rule 10, *sub Representation of minor by next friend or guardian for the suit* rule (2), shall be made by his next friend or by his guardian for the suit

[s. 442] (2) Every order made in a suit or on any application, before the Court in or by which a minor is in any way concerned or affected, without such minor being represented by a next friend or guardian for the suit, as the case may be, may be discharged, and, where the pleader of the party at whose instance such order was obtained knew, or might reasonably have known, the fact of such minority, with costs to be paid by such pleader

Applications to be by representative—The Code no doubt distinguishes between next friends and guardians for the suit, the former term being used in respect of plaintiff minors, and the latter when the minors are defendants But if a guardian *ad litem* has not been appointed for a defendant a next friend can apply (5)

Order obtained by next friend or guardian—This rule shows that no order by which a minor or lunatic is in any way concerned or affected can legally be made without such minor being represented by a next friend or guardian for the suit (6) The words “may be discharged” appear to give discretionary power to the Court (7) No order binds a minor unless he was

(1) See *Kachaya Kuttali v. Ulumjum thala*, 29 M 58 (1906) 60, 61, *Kabirshankar Sahai v. Pratab Uday Nath Sahi*, 6 C L J 36 (1907), *Kundan Lal v. Gajadhar Lal*, 2 J 728 (1907) The disability has now been removed But see *Narsingh v. Sheikh Jahu*, 15 C L J 3 (1911), appointment of a married woman as guardian *ad litem* for an infant defendant renders the proceedings a nullity so far as the infant is concerned.

(2) *Bham Lal v. Chaudhary*, 23 A 403 (1901)

(3) *Kerakoos v. The J M I A Co.* (1841)

(4) *Budhulal Mungri v. Morari Ramji* 31 B 413 (1907) [testamentary guardian appointed by Hindu father]

(5) *Jotindronath Mitter v. Raj Kishore* 16 C 771 (1889)

(6) *Amchand Lalakhand v. Collector of Sholapur*, 13 B 234 (1888) [application to sue as next friend]

(7) *Doorga Mohan v. Fakir Ally*, 22 C at p. 274 (1897)

properly represented at the time it was made (1) Where an order for sale was made when the minor was properly represented, the absence of a guardian was held not to affect the validity of subsequent proceedings (2) And where a Hindu widow during the course of a litigation adopted a son, but did not put him on the record, it was held that she was justified in pursuing the litigation *bona fide* for his benefit, and that he was bound by the decree (3) If, however, a person entitled to represent a minor does purport to represent him, a mere misdescription in the cause title is not fatal to the suit. In all cases the question to be decided is whether on a construction of the plaint and pleadings the minor is really a party to the suit or not, and, if he be, any irregularity is provided for by sect 93, ante (4) And where a minor has been properly represented he is as much bound by a judgment in his own action as if he were of full age, (5) and the principle of *res judicata* applies (6) Where the decree is sought to be executed, the Court executing the decree cannot entertain the plea of non representation, as it must presume that the decree was rightly passed The minor's remedy is to apply for a review or to file a suit for an injunction restraining the execution of the decree (7) If a minor desire to have a decree set aside because any available good ground of defence was not put forward at the hearing by his guardian, he should apply for a review If the decree was *ex parte*, the procedure to be adopted is that prescribed by the Code for setting aside *ex parte* decrees Where a decree has been made against an infant duly represented, and the former on majority seeks to set that decree aside by separate suit he can succeed only on proof of fraud or collusion on the part of his guardian (8) The costs may be

(1) *Minnamoyi Dabia v Shabchand Chucker butty*, 3 C 40 (1879), *Vishnu Keshav v Ramchandra Bhaskar*, 11 B 130 (1886), *Daji Humat v Dhurajram Sadaram* 12 B 18 (1887), *Ganga Prosad v Umbica Chura* 14 C 704 (1887), *Jungee Lal v Sham Lal* 20 W R 120 (1872), *Durgapersad v Keshopersad*, 8 C 656, 603 (1882), *Radha Kriato v Ram Chunder*, 11 W R 300 (1869) *Russick Das v Preonath Mierce*, 10 C at p 105 (1883), *Sham Lal v Ghasita* 23 A 459 (1901) Is to carrying on suit after majority, see notes to r 12

(2) *Net Lal Sahoo v Sheikh Kareem*, 23 C 686 (1896)

(3) *Hari Saram v Bhubaneswari* 16 C 40 (1888), 15 I A 195, ref, *Vasudev v Krishnaji*, 20 B 534 (1890)

(4) *Bhaba Pershad v Secretary of State*, 14 C 159, 163, F B (1886), *Jogi Singh v Kunj Behari*, 11 C 509 (1885), *Suresh Chunder v Jugut Chunder*, 14 C 204 (1886) [approved by P C, *Walian v Banke Behari*,

v

dar

2),

1080000 v 1000000

Goonoo Monce v Ram Komul, 17 W R 144

(1872) *Alum v Jhalo*, 12 C 48 (1885) But see *Shonai Bawa v Monoram Mundul*, 11 C L R 15 (1882) *Cresh Chunder Mookerjee v Miller*, 3 C L R 17, 19 (1878) [there is no authority for saying that where minors have been really sued though in a wrong form a decree against them would not be valid] *Subramanya Panda v Siva Subramanya* 17 M at p 337 338 (1894)

(5) *Modhoo Soodun v Prithoo Bullab*, 16 W R 231 (1871), *Sherafutoollah Chowdhry v Sm Abedoonissa*, 17 W R 374 (1872) [and the minor is liable to arrest], unless there be fraud or collusion. *Raghubar Dyal v Bhikya Lal* 12 C 69, 76 (1885), *Cursandas v Ladda Vahu*, 19 B 571 (1895)

(6) *Bonomally Kesh v Hingakessur Roy*, 17 W R 492 (1872), *Venkatachalam v Mahalakshamma*, 10 M 272 (1866)

(7) *Nawab Mahomed v Hui Charin v A H C R* 98 (1874)

(8) *Raghubar Dyal v Bhikya Lal* 12 C 69 (1885), *Dabee Dutt v Subodra Bibi* 19 W R 449 (1876), *Cursandas v Ladda Vahu* 19 B 571 (1895), as to carrying on suit after majority, see *Ganesh Lala v Baiji Lal* 23 C 105 (1895), *Bahmoo Dutt v Dhurajram* 12 B 18 (1887)

ducted to be paid by the pleader (1) But the minor being unrepresented, the Court has no authority to make his estate liable for costs (2)

[s. 461.] 6 (1) A next friend or guardian for the suit shall not, without the leave of the Court, receive any money or other moveable property on behalf of a minor either—

Receipt by next friend or guardian for the suit of property under decree for minor.

(a) by way of compromise before decree

or order, or

(b) under a decree or order in favour of the minor.

(2) Where the next friend or guardian for the suit has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be guardian of the property of the minor, or, having been so appointed or declared, is under any disability known to the Court to receive the money or other moveable property, the Court shall, if it grants him leave to receive the property, require such security and give such directions as will, in its opinion, sufficiently protect the property from waste and ensure its proper application

Receipt of property under decree—This section was substituted in the 1st Code by Act VIII of 1890 sect 53 (d) It has been held that this rule did not apply in the case of a managing member of a Mitakshara joint family who was appointed guardian *ad litem* of his minor brother for the purpose of a rent suit in which both the brothers obtained a decree for arrears of rent (3)

[s. 462] 7 (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, *expressly recorded in the proceedings*, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian

(2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court *so recorded* shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor.

Scope of rule—The provisions of this rule are intended to protect the interests of minors (4) and have been adopted (5) from the rule previously laid down by the Privy Council (6) A suit relating to the estate or person of an infant,

L. C. 388 (1899), *Amber Ali and Woodroffe v Evidence Act s 115 6th ed.* In *Ramachari v Duraimani*, 21 M 167 (1897), the alleged minors were of age but *ac jure* minors.

(1) See *Shonal Bawa v Monoram Mun Lal*, 11 C L R 15 (1882)

(2) *Amkhand Talakhchand v Collector of Sahapur*, 13 B 231 (1888)

(3) *Harhar v Mathura Jai C* 561 (1908)
(4) *Rajogopal Pikkaya v Subramanya*
133 ar 3 M 103 104 (1881)

(5) *Sharat Chunder v Kartik Chunder*, 1 C 810 (1883)

(6) *Moulvi v Abdul v Muzaffer Hussain*, 18 W R, 1 C 22 (1871)

and for his benefit has the effect of making him a ward of Court, and no act can be done affecting the property of the minor unless under the express or implied direction of the Court itself (1). This principle, on which the rule is based, has been applied to a case which it was held strictly did not fall within its terms, it being held that when the next friend of a minor withdrew from a suit, though it was not proved that the defendant entered into any agreement with the next friend, it was open to the minor through another next friend to have the suit re-opened on review, on the ground that the former next friend, though guilty of no fraudulent conduct, was grossly negligent of the minor's interest in withdrawing from the suit (2). The rule contemplates the existence of a guardian and a pending litigation, and was therefore held not to apply where when the agreement was made, there was neither a guardian for a suit nor a suit (3).

As to the effect of a compromise entered into without leave, *vide post*. Where a compromise was effected and allowed by the Court and a decree was made in accordance with its terms it was held that no appeal lay against the compromise decree, and that the remedy for setting it aside was by way of review or regular suit (4). Where a guardian had entered into a compromise without leave but undertook to present the petition to Court and subsequently declined to do so, and opposed a decree being passed in its terms it was held that inasmuch as leave had not been asked for and the guardian objected to the Court passing a decree in terms of the compromise, the Court had no power to enforce it, even though its terms might appear to be beneficial to the minors (5). A decree holder who rests his case upon his decree having been made against a minor by consent, is under the necessity of proving that the consent was given by some one having authority to bind the minor (6).

Leave—The Court has to grant leave. The form however of expression used for the purpose of indicating that the Court grants leave to compromise is of slight importance. The question is whether the Court after a consideration of the circumstances really intended to grant leave (7). The Court must however, in some form show that it has considered the question and granted leave. And the mere passing of a decree on a compromise does not amount to sanction, which will not be inferred from the subsequent passing of a decree in terms of such compromise (8). In order that a compromise may be binding upon a minor, the leave of the Court must be express and it must be arrived at upon the exercise of a judicial discretion as to the propriety of the compromise in the interests of the minor and the section makes no exception in the case of

(1) Doraswami Pillai v. Thungasami Pillai 27 M 377 (1903)

(2) Ram Sarup v. Shah Lafafat 29 C 730 (1902)

(3) Vithaldas v. Dattaram, 26 B 293 (1901), a c 3 Bom L R 887

(4) Rakhmalmoni Dassi v. Adosta Prasad 7 C W N 419 (1903)

(5) Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju, 22 M 378 (1899)

(6) Muhammad Munir v. Sheoratanpur

23 C 934 (1896)

(7) Virupakshappa v. Shudappa 26 B 109 (1901) a c 3 Bom L R 565

(8) Arunachalam Chetty v. Miyappa Chetty, 21 M 91 (1897), Rajagopal Takkaya v. Subramanya Ayyar, 3 M 103 (1881), Sharat Chunder v. Kartik Chunder 9 C 810 (1883). See Manohar Lal v. Jadunath Singh 28 A 585 (1906). Krishnan Prosad v. Ramesh 13 C W N 163 (1903)

a certified guardian (1) Under the last Code such leave was presumed in certain cases (2) The amended rule now requires that the leave should be expressly recorded following the Privy Council decision that it should in some way, not open to doubt, be shown that the leave of the Court was obtained (3) Where a Hindu father was party to a partition suit and was himself the guardian *ad litem* of his minor son (also a party) it was held that the fact that he represented the family did not exempt him from the duty of obtaining leave for a compromise which was clearly intended to affect the son's interest, and that since such leave was not obtained, the son was not bound by it (4)

The Court should not make a decree by consent against an infant without ascertaining that it is for his benefit that such a decree should be pronounced (5) The Court must have before it the materials necessary to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion with respect to the compromise The terms and evidence of their propriety and reasonableness must be before it (6) In order to make an agreement or compromise, to which this rule applies, a lawful agreement or compromise, it is necessary that the next friend or guardian should ask the Court to consider the proposed terms of the agreement or compromise, and before making the agreement or entering into the compromise should obtain permission from the Court to enter into the agreement or compromise proposed The Court should record the fact that such application was made to it, that the terms of the proposed agreement or compromise were considered by the Court, and that, having regard to the interests of the minor, the Court granted leave to the making of the agreement or compromise From the mere fact that the Court passed the decree in accordance with the compromise it cannot be inferred that any of those steps preliminary and necessary to the making of the decree have been taken by the Court (7) If leave is given under a misrepresentation of a material fact, due either to fraud or culpable and wilful ignorance, it is not binding (8)

When necessary—The rule does not only refer to agreements out of Court but to such agreements as also to compromise decrees, namely, those agreements which are given effect to by a decree of the Court The words "any agreement etc.", include a compromise finally determining the suit (9) The provisions apply to compromises after decree (10) Applications in execution are proceedings in the suit so that a compromise of such a proceeding would be a compromise

(1) *Lala Majlis v Must Narsin*, 7 C. W. N 90 (1902) In an early case the Court required the certificate holder to procure the consent of the Court by which the certificate was granted to the filing of the compromise *Sheonundun Singh v Katea Koor*, 6 A. H. C. R. 170 (1874), and see *Pirojshah v Manilal*, 36 B. 53 (1911) (no exception in the case of a Collector)

(2) *Sridhar Rao v Ram Lal*, 31 A. 7 (1908)

(3) *Manohar Lal v Jadunath Singh*, 23 A. 557 (1900) *Kunwar Partab Singh v Balut Singh* P. C., 18 C. L. J. 334 (1913)

(4) *Ganesha Row v Tuljaram Row*, P. C. 40 I. A. 132, 36 M. 295, 18 C. L. J. 1, 17 C. W. N. 765 (1913)

(5) *Ram Churn v Mungal Sircar*, 16 W. P. 232 (1871)

(6) .

(7) .

(8) *Bilco Solomon v Ablood Azeez*, 6 C. 687 (1881)

(9) *Lala Majlis v Narsin Bil* 7 C. W. N. 30 (1902)

(10) *Arumachellam v Ramaswami*, 29 M. 102 (1904)

"with reference to the suit" (1) A guardian has no power to waive a right to compensation for part of the estate taken under the Land Acquisition Act; (2) nor to enter into an agreement to refer matters in suit to arbitration, (3) though the contrary has also been held, (4) or to withdraw a suit without the leave of the Court (5) A mere matter of proof, such as the consent by a guardian of a minor defendant to accept the oath of the plaintiff, (6) or abstaining from pressing objections, it being uncertain whether there was evidence sufficient to sustain them (7) is not within the rule

Effect of want of leave.—A decree by consent without leave is invalid and not binding on the minor (8) The only modes, however, of setting aside a decree are by review under sect 114 or by a separate suit, (9) and not by application for a rule in the original suit, (10) or in execution proceedings under sect 47. the question whether a decree was void as against the minor not being one relating to the execution of the decree (11) The compromise can be avoided by a minor either on or before his attaining majority (12) In a recent Privy Council decision where a Hindu father had been appointed guardian *ad litem* of an infant son in a suit for partition by a member of the joint-family and had made a compromise without the leave of the Court it was held that the

(1) Virupakshappa v Shidappa, 26 B 109 (1901), s. c. 3 Bom L R 565

(2) Luchmeswar Singh v Chairman, Dharbhanga Municipality, 18 C 99 (1890)

(3) Lakshmana Chetti v Chinnathambi Chetti, 24 M 326 (1900) As to arbitration out of Court, see Romon Kassen v Hurrolohi Sett, 19 C 334 (1892)

(4) Hardeo Sahai v Gauri Shankar, 28 A 35 (1905), Atmarani v Bhola Ganpat (1912) 15 Bom L R 223, and see Lutawan v Lathya, 36 A 69 (F B) (1913)

(5) Doraswami Pillai v Thungasami Pillai, 27 M 377 (1903)

(6) Chengal Reddi v Venkata Reddi, 12 M 483 (1889), Shoo Nath v Sukh Lal, 27 C 229 (1899), s. c. 4 C W N 327 See Lakshmana Chetti v Chinnathambi, 24 M at p 330 (1900)

(7) Mirali Rahimbhoy v Rehmoobhoy 15 B 594, at p 597 (1891), per Bayley, J It has, however, been held that actual waiver will not bind a minor if not for his benefit Swamirao v Collector of Dharwar, 17 B 299 (1892)

A 93 (1897), is not clear, but apparently sanction was given after the compromise had been entered into and not before See Seiburam v Vasantra 34 M 314 (1910) (in which Aman Singh v Naram Singh was not followed), and Bhawa v Dechand 35 B 322 (1911) (the fact that the minor has benefited by the settlement makes no difference)

(9) Mirali Rahimbhoy v Rehmoobhoy, 15 B 594 (1891) [which deals, at p 599, with the case of Eshan Chundra Safoor v Nundamoni Dossee, 10 C 357 (1884)], Virupakshappa v Shidappa 23 B 620 (1899), s. c. 1 Bom L R 82 [and not by the Court *proprio motu* but see as to this decision, Virupakshappa v Shidappa, 26 B 109, at p 113 (1901)], where the Court wrongly rejected an application for review, the High Court interfered in revision Doraswami Pillai v Thungasami Pillai, 27 M 377 (1903), Barhamdeo Prasad v Banarsi Prasad, 3 C L J 119 (1904) [when decree should be set aside by suit and when by review]

(10) Mirali Rahimbhoy v Rehmoobhoy *supra*, s. c. in Lower Court, *sub voc.* Harmali Rahimbhoy v Rahimbhoy Habibhoy, 13 B 137 (1888)

(11) Arunachellam v Marugappa, *supra* but see Rajagopal Takkaya v Muttuplaem Chetti, 3 M. 103 (1881)

(12) Virupakshappa v Shidappa, 26 B 109 (1901)

D 100, 1113 v 1113 binding at any rate upon parties not minors, see Lakshmana Chetti v Chinnathambi, 24 M 326, at p 321 (1900) The effect of the decision in Aman Singh v Naram Singh, 20

compromise was not binding on the minor and that he was remitted to his original rights under the decree in partition (1)

8. (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a next friend shall not retire without first procuring a fit person to be put in his place and giving security for the costs already incurred

(2) The application for the appointment of a new next friend shall be supported by an affidavit showing the fitness of the person proposed, and also that he has no interest adverse to that of the minor

"Retire"—The words "*at his own request*" have been omitted, but the sense is the same (2)

9. (1) *Where* the interest of the next friend of a minor is adverse to that of the minor or *where* he is so connected with a defendant whose interest is adverse to that of the minor as to make it unlikely that the minor's interest will be properly protected by him, or *where* he does not do his duty, or, *during the pendency of the suit*, ceases to reside within British India, or for any other sufficient cause, application may be made on behalf of the minor or by a defendant for his removal, and the Court, if satisfied of the sufficiency of the cause assigned, may order the next friend to be removed accordingly, and make such other order as to costs as it thinks fit

(2) *Where* the next friend is not a guardian appointed or declared by an authority competent in his behalf, and an application is made by a guardian so appointed or declared, who desires to be himself appointed in the place of the next friend, the Court shall remove the next friend unless it considers, for reasons to be recorded by it, that the guardian ought not to be appointed the next friend of the minor, and shall thereupon appoint the applicant to be next friend in his place upon such terms as to the costs already incurred in the suit as it thinks fit

the appointment of a new next friend, or in order that the minor plaintiff may,

on coming of age, elect to proceed with the suit or withdraw from it (1) Courts can be moved to stay a suit improperly brought on behalf of an infant, and to remove an improper next friend of an infant and to substitute a proper person in his place (2) It has been considered expedient to enact that where a guardian insists on his right to be appointed next friend in the place of another there should be power to require him to become liable or give security for costs in the suit previously incurred, and the second clause has been amended accordingly

10. (1) On the *retirement*, removal or death of the next friend of a minor, further proceedings shall be stayed until the appointment of a next friend in his place

Stay of proceedings on removal, etc., of next friend.

(2) Where the pleader of such minor omits, within a reason-

such person as it thinks fit

11. (1) Where the guardian for the suit *desires to retire* or does not do his duty, or *where* other sufficient ground is made to appear, the Court may permit such guardian to retire or may remove him, and may make such order as to costs as it thinks fit

Retirement removal or death of guardian for the suit

(2) Where the guardian for the suit *retires*, dies or is removed by the Court during the pendency of the suit, the Court shall appoint a new guardian in his place

Costs—The former section ran “and may order him to pay such costs as may have been occasioned by his retirement”

now This rule is r

person appointed to act as guardian

As to whether the Court may decree costs against a guardian except in the case mentioned in this rule see notes to r 3 ante

12. (1) A minor plaintiff or a minor not a party to a suit on whose behalf an application is pending shall, on attaining majority, elect whether he will proceed with the suit or application

Course to be followed by minor plaintiff or applicant on attaining majority

(2) Where he elects to proceed with the suit or application, he shall apply for an order discharging the next friend and for leave to proceed in his own name

(1) Doraswami Pillai v Thungasami Pillai, (1898)

27 M. 377 (1903)

(2) Bai Porehai v Devji Meghji, 23 B 100 B 306 (1831)

(3) Jadov Mulji v Chhagan Ramchand, 5

(3) The title of the suit or application shall in such case be corrected so as to read thenceforth thus.—

“A. B., late a minor, by C. D., his next friend, but now having attained majority”

[s 452] (4) Where he elects to abandon the suit or application, he shall, if a sole plaintiff or sole applicant, apply for an order to dismiss the suit or application on repayment of the costs incurred by the defendant or *opposite party* or which may have been paid by his next friend

[s 453] (5) Any application under *this rule* may be made *ex parte*, but no order discharging a next friend and permitting a minor plaintiff to proceed in his own name shall be made without notice to the next friend

Election of minor to proceed—An application under this rule may be made *ex parte* and does not require notice. Leave (which may be *nunc pro tunc*) will be given as a matter of course unless there is an absolute bar by positive enactment. The provisions as to correction of title refer to a pending suit and not to a suit after final decree in which it only remains to proceed to execution. The omission to comply with the requirements of this rule is a mere irregularity and will not bar execution of a decree (1) *Quære*—whether a minor who having been a party to a suit but not properly represented, was served with summons afterwards on attaining majority carried on the suit as transferee of the estate from the previous owner, was not bound as a party (2)

[s 454] **13** (1) Where a minor co plaintiff on attaining majority desires to repudiate the suit, he shall apply to have his name struck out as co plaintiff, and the Court, if it finds that he is not a necessary party, shall dismiss him from the suit on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit

(2) Notice of the application shall be served on the next friend, on any co plaintiff and on the defendant

(3) The costs of all parties of such application, and of all or any proceedings theretofore had in the suit, shall be paid by such persons as the Court directs

(4) Where the applicant is a necessary party to the suit, the Court may direct him to be made a defendant

Majority—Sect 154 of the last Code required that the attainment of majority must be proved by affidavit. Though this provision is omitted I feel of course is still necessary

(1) *Durga Mohun v. Bai* 22 C. 720 (1894)

(2) *Parlab Narain v. Pund. Khatu*, 11 C. 151 (1884). II I A 127

14 (1) A minor on attaining majority may, if a sole Unreasonable or im- plaintiff, apply that a suit instituted in his proper suit. name by a next friend be dismissed on the ground that it was unreasonable or improper

(2) Notice of the application shall be served on all the parties concerned, and the Court, upon being satisfied of such unreasonableness or impropriety, may grant the application and order the next friend to pay the costs of all parties in respect of the application and of anything done in the suit, or make such other order as it shall see fit

15 The provisions contained in rules 1 to 14, so far as they are applicable, shall extend to persons Application of rules to persons of unsound mind *they are applicable, shall extend to persons adjudged to be of unsound mind and to persons who though not so adjudged are found by the Court on inquiry, by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity to be incapable of protecting their interests when suing or being sued*

Persons of unsound mind or mentally infirm—By sect 463 of the last Code the provisions in sects 440 to 462 of that Code were declared *mutatis mutandis* to apply in the case of persons adjudged to be lunatics under Act XXX of 1858 or any other lunacy law for the time being in force. It was held that the provisions of sect 440 of the last Code were by that section to be applied to lunatics. Whatever might be the meaning of the word guardian in sect 440 when minors were concerned it was held that there was no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to alter or affect the existing law in respect of the persons who alone are entitled to bring suits on behalf of the estate of a lunatic. The person denominated guardian must mean the person who is in self competent to sue. A guardian of the person only of a lunatic has no right to bring a suit in respect of the lunatic's estate. The manager of the estate is the person to do so though under sect 440 a person other than the guardian of the estate could also sue with the leave of the Court (1).

Sect 463 of the last Code applied in terms only to those adjudged to be of unsound mind and therefore in other cases of unsoundness of mind a next friend or guardian could not be appointed under Chapter XXXI (2). The provisions however of that Chapter were held not to be exhaustive and the Courts to have an inherent power to act in the interests of justice. Though a person alleged to be a lunatic though not so found might appear either in person or through a vakil (3) if it was held that a person of unsound mind was not entitled to sue by a next friend or defend by a guardian until he had been adjudged to be a lunatic serious failure of justice might result (4). Where therefore a person

(1) Bai Dvali v. Huralal 23 B 403 (1898)

(3) Un a S ndari v. Ramji Holkar 7 C 217 (1881)

(4) See Vabhu Khan v. Sita 90 A 2 at 1P 43 (1893) Kadala Redd v. Natus 24 M 504 at 1 507 (1901) where also it is

was admitted or was found to be of unsound mind, although he had not been adjudged to be so, he should if it was held that he was of unsound mind

in question was or was not of unsound mind, and in the case of a suit instituted by a next friend whether the suit was for his benefit (2) It will be observed that the amended rule gives effect to these rulings, and the preceding rules are made directly applicable both to adjudged and non adjudged lunatics The rule also includes the mentally infirm so as to cover the case of a person incapacitated from protecting his interests by reason of his mental weakness or of his being a deaf mute

s 484] **16** Nothing in this Order shall apply to a Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief being or being sued in the name of his State, or being sued by direction of the Governor General in Council or a Local Government in the name of an agent or in any other name, or shall be construed to affect or in any way derogate from the provisions of any local law for the time being in force relating to suits by or against minors or by or against lunatics or other persons of unsound mind

Princes and Chiefs—Sect 464 of the last Code, which this rule replaces, was substituted for the former section by sect 53 (e), Act VIII of 1890 The former section ran, after the word "name," "and nothing in sects 442-462 applies to any minor or person of unsound mind for whose person or property a guardian or manager has been appointed by the Court of Wards (3) or by the Civil Court under any civil law

pointed out that it was wrongly assumed in *Naryana v Krishna* S M 214 217 (1885) that any suitor could obtain an adjudication in lunacy the fact being that only certain specified persons can move in the matter

(1) *Nabhu Khan v Sita* 20 A 2 (1897) *Venkatramana Hambhat v Timappa Dorappa*, 16 B 132 (1891), *Kadala Reddy v Narasi* 24 M 504 (1901), *Pransukhram Dinanath v Bai Ladkor*, 23 B G 3 (1899), where as also in the first and third cases cited, it is pointed out that the rule as to next friends in England is no longer that stated in the passage of *Danville v Chancery Practice*, which was relied on in *Tularam Anant v Vitthal Joshi* 13 B 266 (1894) In *Harjaram Jhambhram v Moha Dojappa*, 10 B 135 (1894) the matter was queried *Rasik Lal Dutta v*

Rudhumukhi Dasi, 33 C 1904 (1900), *Lakhya Dasia v Uma Kanto* 14 C W N 236 (1900)

(2) *Pransukhram Dinanath v Bai Ladkor*, 23 B 653 (1899)

(3) See *Sanku v Puttamma* 14 M 254, 293 (1890), *Beresford v Ramasubba* 13 M 197 (1889), *Bhoopendra Narain v Haroda Prosad*, 18 C 500 (1891), *Burawar Roy v Shoshi Shikhar*, 17 C 688 (1889), *Ducchi Chunder v Golam Mostapha* 16 C 89 (1888) Where a suit was brought by a manager under the Court of Wards and it was objected that he had no authority to sue, the Privy Council refused to entertain the objection on appeal *Hurdley Narain v Jodher Prakash* 10 C 626 (1881)

ORDER XXXIII

Suits by Paupers

1 Subject to the following provisions, any suits may be
Suits may be instituted in forma pauperis instituted by a pauper

Explanation — A person is a "pauper" when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or, where no such fee is prescribed, when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit

"Suit" "Instituted" — It was held that the wording of this and the only kind of application contemplated by the
 .. institute a suit (1) The word instituted
 - ought It was however held in the case last
 cited that a Court had power to allow a suit instituted in the ordinary form to be
 co. to be in forma pauperis (2) It has been held that an order to give security

pauperis (4) Order XLIV *post* provides for pauper appeals and as to cross appeals in *forma pauperis* see notes to that order Sect 141 provides for the process in miscellaneous proceedings and the provisions of Chapter XXVI

"Pauper" — The only question is whether an applicant is a pauper as defined in the Explanation A person is not bound to try and raise funds by

(1) See argument in *Thompson v. Calcutta Tramway Co.*, 20 C 319 320 (1893)

(2) *Ib.* *foi* *Nirmul Chandra v. Doyal Nath*, 2 C 130 (1877), *Revji Lalil v. Sah haram*, 8 B 615 (1884)

(3) *Bai Laxmi v. Harjivan Nathu* 36 B 415 (1911)

(4) *Doorga Churn v. Nittokally Dossee* 2 C 819 (1880)

(a) *In re Will of Dawulal* 18 B 237, 239 (1893)

(c) *Gurusami v. Krishnasami* 4 M 419 (1901)

mortgaging his claims (1). A Hindu father's wealth is not a bar to a son suing as a pauper to prove his adoption, (2) nor does a husband's wealth preclude a wife suing as a pauper when she cannot claim from him the means of carrying on the suit (3). In the case of minors the English practice (4) appears to be not to allow a minor to institute a suit through his next friend, unless he gives proof not only that he is himself a pauper, but that the next friend is a pauper, and that he cannot get any substantial person to act as next friend (5). Following this practice, the Calcutta High Court allowed a suit to be brought in *forma pauperis* by a next friend who was also a pauper (6). The question whether a minor might sue as a pauper by a next friend who was not a pauper was not decided in that case, but the right was subsequently affirmed by the Madras High Court, (7) which held that the English practice to the contrary was not justified by the Code. The Code does not exclude persons holding a fiduciary character, and therefore an executor or administrator can sue in *forma pauperis* (8). It has been held that there is no necessity for an inquiry whether an alleged representative of an admitted pauper is a pauper or not, and that the Court, if satisfied that he is the legal representative, should admit him to carry on the suit (9). But the Bombay High Court has disagreed (10). The conditions of pauperism are different (a) when the plaintiff requires a court fee, and (b) when none is required. In either case the effect of pauperism is the same. As regards the first case the measure is the sum required to pay the fee on the plaint. In the second case Rs 100 is the measure. The intention in both cases is the same, viz to fix a certain sum—in one case the fee on the plaint, and in the other case Rs 100, and to provide that if the petitioner has not this sum at his disposal, he will be exempt from court fees (11). So properly admitted to be the property of the petitioner is not the "subject matter of the suit," although claimed in the petition (12). The concluding portion of the Explanation, "other than his necessary wearing apparel" etc., do not govern its first part (13).

Formerly excepted suits.—Under art 103 of the last Code a pauper could not sue to recover compensation for loss of caste, libel, slander, abusive language, or assault. The suits excepted were strictly limited to those mentioned. Where it was argued that Chapter XXVI of the former Code was

(1) *Vedanta v. Irimetavannur*, 3 M 243 (1881) distinguished in *Jagpal Dew v. Ram*, JJ 1 337 (1910).

(2) *Chitto Ram Tewari Plaintiff v. S. D. Sum Dey*, 7th Decr, 1884.

(3) *Isakoonassu Plaintiff v. S. D. Sum Dey*, 17th Decr, 1885.

(4) See English O 10 r 22 JJ.

(5) *Venkataramasayya v. Achamma*, 3 M 3 (1881).

(6) *Gulabimonee v. Irosonomoy*, 11 B L R 373 (1873). See also *Misner v. Mutty Lal*, 11th B, 490 (1844).

(7) *Venkataramasayya v. Achamma*, 3 M 3 (1881). As to payment of costs by next friend see notes to r 11, post.

(8) *In re B. H. T. M. J. O.* (1881). *In re Will*

of Diwulal, 16 B 237 (1853), for English rule, see case first cited, and Ann Pr., notes to O 10 r 31. *Offutt v. Cobbett*, 11th 615, D C Br 57, 63.

(9) *Blagbut Dass v. Balaaram Dass*, J W R Misc 50 (1860) but see *In re Diwulal*, 18 B 337.

(10) *Manaji Rajaji v. Khanloo*, 36 B 279 (1911).

(11) *Dwarka Nath v. Mallavaris*, 10 B 207 (1856), in which it is suggested that the wording of the section might be amended. But see *Fatmalal v. Dassabhoj*, 31 B. 134 (1899).

(12) *Id.*

(13) *Kamalulal v. Manjar*, 13 B. 333 (1900).

intended to apply only to suits for the enforcement of personal claims, and therefore not to suits under the Religious Endowments Act, or sect 53J (now 92, 93) of the Code, it was held, that in that Chapter, and particularly in sect 102 and the former section corresponding with r 5, the restrictions on the liberty of the right to sue as a pauper were expressly prescribed and that the Court would be adding to those restrictions if it held that a person should not be allowed to sue as a pauper when his suit is one that is brought under the Act mentioned (1) There are, however, now, no excepted suits, as sect 102 of the last Code has not been re enacted The Special Committee stated that in the light of the case law it was misleading, so far as it suggested that a suit would lie for loss of caste or abusive language, and they saw no sufficient reason for withholding from a pauper a right to sue as such in respect of defamation or assault

2 Every application for permission to sue as a pauper shall contain the particulars required in Contents of applica- tion. regard to plaints in suits a schedule of any moveable or immoveable property belonging to the applicant, with the estimated value thereof, shall be annexed thereto, and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings

3 Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, Presentation of appli- cation. the application shall be presented to the Court by the applicant in person, unless he is exempted from appearing in Court, in which case the application may be presented by an authorized agent who can answer all material questions relating to the application and who may be examined in the same manner as the party represented by him might have been examined had such party attended in person

Presentation of application —Where an applicant dies before leave is granted, the legal representative may present a fresh application or may institute a suit for the same relief which the deceased sought to recover if the right to sue survives in him (2) R 3 is imperative and a petition to sue as a pauper must be presented in person, unless the pauper is exempted from appearing in Court under sects 132 133 ante (3) So where a petitioner was in jail and did not present the petition in person it was rejected (4) and the mere fact that

(1) Gurusami v Krishnasami 24 M 419 (1901)

(2) Lalit Mohan Mandal v Satish Chandra Das, 33 C 1163 (1906)

(3) Ex parte Durgur Guru 4 B H C R, A C J 91 (1867) So a pardonashin is

exempted Wazir un nissa v Habi Baksh 24 A 172 173 (1901)

(4) Ib

(a) Burgess v Siddon 10 M 193 (1887)

(b) Kishore Mohun v Gour Monce, 15 H P 193 (1871)

as the pauper's attorney, an ordinary *talakutnamah* not being sufficient (1)
If the applicant does not appear in person he may, under r 4, be examined by
commission

406] 4. (1) *Where* the application is in proper form and duly
Examination of appli- presented, the Court may, if it thinks fit,
cant examine the applicant, or his agent when the
applicant is allowed to appear by agent regarding the merits of
the claim and the

(2) *Where* the applicant is examined by an agent, the
Court may, if it thinks fit, order that the
If presented by agent, Court may order appli- applicant be examined by a commission in
cant to be examined by the manner in which the examination of an
commission. absent witness may be taken

Examination of applicant—It was held under the corresponding section
of the Code of 1859, that the examination referred to is that of the petitioner
or his or her agent and that at this stage the Court has no power to examine
witnesses (2) The present rule also speaks merely of the examination of the
petitioner or his agent If on the examination some of the grounds appear
which are mentioned in the next rule then notices are to issue as provided in
r 6 and they pave the way to the formal hearing mentioned in r 7, at which
the question of the applicant's pauperism has to be determined The proceedings
under this (3) and the next rule are of a preliminary character, and a rejection
under them is not as in the case of r 7, of a final kind and a bar to a subsequent
application (4)

The rule directs the examination of an applicant regarding the merits in
order that it may be ascertained whether his allegations show or do not show a
right to sue (5) The mere statements in the plaint cannot be accepted as the
sole material on which a decision as to this question can depend, for if this were
so the granting of an application would depend not on whether the pauper had
in fact any merits to go upon, but on the skill of the person drafting his petition
and plaint, and the examination as to the merits under this section would be
superfluous (6)

407] 5 The Court shall reject an application for permission to

405] Rejection of applica- *sue as a pauper*—
tion (a) *where it is not framed and presented*
in the manner prescribed by rules 2 and 3, or

(1) *Musat Bhugubutt v. Ganes* 21 W R 308 (1874)

(2) *In re Larkash Ojha* 25 W R 74 (1871)

(3) The case cited in next note says a. 105 but this appears to be a mistake

(4) *Chattaraj Singh v. Raja Ram*, 7 A

161 at 11 603, 604 (1880)

(5) *Koka Ranganayaka v. Koka Venkata chalapati*, 4 M 323 324 (1881)

(6) *Kamrakh Nath v. Smlar Nath* 20 A 222, at p. 301 (1898) *Nawab Bahadur v. Haral* 13 C 1 1 223 (1910)

- (b) where the applicant is not a pauper, or
 (c) where he has, within two months next before the presentation of the application, disposed of any property fraudulently or in order to be able to apply for permission to sue as pauper, or
 (d) where his allegations do not show a cause of action, or
 (e) where he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject matter of the proposed suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject-matter.

Rejection or application—The provisions of this rule, operating as they do in derogation of the ordinary rights of a litigant, must be construed strictly, and the exercise of the Court's power to reject under this rule is limited to the grounds specified in the various clauses of the rule itself (1)

There are conflicting decisions as to whether an appeal does (2) or does not (3) lie from an order rejecting an application to sue as a pauper. It has, however, been held in several cases (4) that such an order is subject to revision. As to limitation in the case of pauper applications, see below (5)

Clause (d) in the last Code ran, "*that his allegations do not show a right to sue in such Court*." The concluding words, '*sue in such Court*,' lent some support to the argument that the paragraph referred to the jurisdiction of the Court, and not to the cause of action disclosed in the application (6). It was, however, held that the words '*show a right to sue*' cannot be read as limiting the Court's discretion to merely ascertaining whether '*the right to sue*' arose within its jurisdiction, but have a more extended meaning, namely that an applicant must make out that he has a good subsisting cause of action capable of enforcement in Court, and calling for an answer and not barred by the law of limitation or any other law (7). This is now made clear in the amended clause

(1) *Chattarpal Singh v Raja Ram* 7 A 661, (170 (1885)), *per* Mahmood J

(2) *Baldeo v Gula Kuar*, 9 A. 123 (1887)

(3) *Secretary of State v Jillo* 21 A 133 (1898). See *Skinner v Orde* 2 A 241 at p 245. The question of pauperism is not a point in the cause, it is a mere matter of procedure, *per* Sir M. Smith. In *Mumtazan v Rasulan*, 23 A. 361, 366 (1901) it was treated as clear that no appeal lay from an order granting leave to sue as a pauper.

(4) *Chattarpal Singh v Raja Ram* 7 A. 661 (1885), *per* Mahmood, J., *Muhammad Husain v Ajudhia Prasad*, 10 A. 407 (1888), *Secretary of State v Jillo* 21 A. 133 (1898), *Koka Ranganayaka v Koka Venkatachellapati* 4 M. 323 (1881), *Debo Das v Mohunt Ram* 2 C. W. N. 474 (1898), *Gopal Chandra v Begoo Mistry*, 5 C. W. N. 70

(1903) under s 115 *ante*, but not under the Charter. *Shaikh Babur v Gokhal Lall*, 21 W. R. 62 (1875)

(5) S. 4 Act XV of 1877. *Mitra v Limitation Act* 677 4th ed., *Janardan Vithal v Anant Mahadev*, 7 B. 373 (1883) (application to sue as pauper—death of opponent—substitution of heirs)

(6) *Amurtham v Alwar Manikam*, 27 M. 37-39 (1903), and see *per* Mahmood J. in *Chattarpal Singh v Raja Ram* 7 A. 661, at p. 671 (1885)

(7) *Chattarpal Singh v Raja Ram* 7 A. 661 (1885) F. B. *Dulari v Vallabdas* 13 B. 126 (1883), *Vijendra v Sudhendra* 13 M. 137 (1893), *Kamrakh Nath v Sundar Nath* 20 A. 239 (1898), *Amurtham v Alwar Manikam* 27 M. 37 (1903)

So the Court will see not only whether it has jurisdiction,(1) but whether there is a right to sue or cause of action to be entertained,(2) and, assuming so, whether the intended suit is barred by *res judicata* (3) or limitation,(4) or whether a previous application has been refused (5). The Madras High Court in one case,(6) and apparently the Calcutta High Court,(7) have held that if the petitioner shows a right to sue, the Judge should allow the application without going into the merits of the claim, the examination as to the merits under r 4 being merely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations do or do not show a right to sue, or cause of action. Where a plaint in *forma pauperis* has been admitted, but the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, and returns the plaint to the plaintiff, it has no jurisdiction to make the plaintiff pay the court fees (8). An agreement by a plaintiff, about to sue to redeem a village, to pay his *vakil* a lump sum of Rs 1500, and in default to realize it out of the revenue of the property, was held to be an agreement within the scope of clause (c) (9). No leave to appeal in *forma pauperis* will be given where there is subsisting such an agreement (10).

403 1 6 Where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in rule 5, it shall fix a day (of which at least ten days' clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism, and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof.

409 1 7. (1) On the day so fixed or as soon thereafter as may be convenient, the Court shall examine the witnesses (if any) produced by either party, and may examine the applicant or his agent, and shall make a memorandum of the substance of their evidence.

(1) See *In re Ganga Dass Adhikarce*, 14 W. R. 281 (1870). In *Brohmo Moyce v Anund Chunder*, 22 W. R. 120 (1874), the defendant was held on appeal estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction, and see *Akbar Husain v Alia Bibi*, 23 A. 137 (1902), where it was held that there was an estoppel to objection to plaintiff's representative suing as a pauper.

(2) *Vijendra v Sudhendra*, 19 M. 197 (1895).

(3) *Id.*

(4) *Id.*, *Chattarpal Singh v Lajja Ram*, supra. In *re Parkash Ojha*, 25 W. R. 74 (1876), *Chunder Churn v Ram Narain*, C. 71, 8 (1864).

(5) *Bisheshur Singh v Motahur Baksh*,

S. D. N. W. (1864) u. 183.

(6) *Kola Ranganayaka v Kola Venkata chellapati*, 4 M. 323 (1881).

(7) *Dobo Das v Mohunt Ram*, 2 C. W. N. 471 (1893), where, at p. 478, the Court said that if the Judge had stated that the allegations did not show a right to sue it was extremely doubtful whether the Court could interfere in revision, *Gopal Chandra v Isgoo Mistry*, 8 C. W. N. 70 (1903).

(8) *Collector of Ratnagiri v Janardan* 6 B. 530 (1882).

(9) *Manohar Ramchandra v Lashman Mahadev*, 9 B. 371 (1885).

(10) *Hansa Bai v Haji Sultack*, 30 M. 547 (1908).

(2) The Court shall also hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether, on the face of the application and of the evidence (if any) taken by the Court as herein provided, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in rule 5.

(3) The Court shall then either allow or refuse to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper.

Examine—The examination must be conducted by the Judge in person (1) As appears from the second paragraph, and was previously held, (2) the examination is not limited to the question of pauperism, but embraces all the matters referred to in r 5, *ante* (3) This paragraph enables the parties to argue the question if they so desire, but does not preclude the Court, if no argument is offered, from considering that question (4) If a new defendant be added, an inquiry must be made in the presence of such new defendant (5) *Semble*, that an order admitting a plaintiff to sue as a pauper made by one Court becomes ineffectual when the plaint is returned by that Court, and that it becomes the duty of the Court before which the petition is subsequently presented to pass orders *de novo* on the subject (6) The inquiry into pauperism under this and the previous rule takes place before any suit is in existence, for until an application to sue as a pauper is granted there is no plaint and consequently no suit (7) As to appeal and revision, see notes to r 5, and as to review, notes to r 15

8. Where the application is granted, it shall be numbered and registered, and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit, and the suit shall proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner, except that the plaintiff shall not be liable to pay any court fee (other than fees payable for service of process) in respect of any petition, appointment of a pleader or other proceedings connected with the suit.

Admission of application—When an application is granted no appeal lies (8) The order cannot be set aside either on appeal or motion by a superior Court If, subsequently to permission being granted it appears that the order has been obtained improperly, application should be made to the Court out of which the order issued (9) Limitation depends on the date of the application

(4) *Amurtham v Alwar Manikam* 27 M 37 (1903)

(5) *In re Hur Chunder Lahori* S D Sum Dec 20th July, 1847

(6) *Skinner v Orde*, 6 A H. C R 225 (1874) This case distinguished on question of limitation in *Kuhavial v Mayathai* 9 Bom

I R 204 (1907)

(7) *Dwarika Nath v Madhavray*, 10 I 207 (1856).

(8) *Mumtaz v Rasulan*, 23 A. 564, 360 (1901)

(9) *In re Ishadejoonissa* 7 W R 486 (1867), as to whether the propriety of the order can be questioned, if and when the case is appealed see notes to r. 100

and not on the day when the application is granted and registered, otherwise a case might be barred whilst the Judge is considering whether the application to sue as a pauper should be admitted (1) As to limitation in cases in which an application is withdrawn or refused, see notes to r 15, *post* There is no suit in existence until the application has been granted (2) The exemption from liability upon that event only extends to the cases mentioned So a pauper must pay the proper stamps and penalty (if any) on a document on which he relies (3)

[s 411]

9 The Court may, on the application of the defendant, or of the Government Pleader, of which *seven days' clear* notice in writing has been given to the plaintiff, order the plaintiff to be *dispaupered*—

Dispaupering.

- (a) if he is guilty of vexatious or improper conduct in the course of the suit,
- (b) if it appears that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper, or
- (c) if he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the suit, under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject-matter

Dispaupering—If it appears from facts that have been discovered after permission to sue *in forma pauperis* has been granted, that the applicant ought not to be allowed to continue to litigate as a pauper, the remedy is by application under this rule to the Court which made the order, and not by appeal or motion in the superior Courts (4)

[s 411]

10 Where the plaintiff succeeds in the suit, the Court shall calculate the amount of court fees which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper, such amount shall be recoverable by the Government from any party ordered by the decree to pay the same, and shall be a first charge on the subject matter of the suit

Costs where pauper succeeds.

Rights of Government—As to the meaning of the word “succeed,” see

(1) *Vinayak Dharlat v. Samvat*, 4 B H C, 1 C J 39 (1867), *S. Ctaram Gower v. Goluknath Dutt*, Marsh 174 (1862), in the last case the application was not admitted until more than one year after it was presented.

(2) *Dwarkanath v. Madhavray*, 10 B 407 (1867), *Janardan Vitthal v. Anant Mahadev*, 71 143 (1863) But see *Amibika v. Satpat*

Dwarkanath, 30 A 93 (1867) (tho so is a contentious proceeding as soon as the application has been filed)

(3) *Golam v. Lkram* 10 W R 357 (1863)

(4) *In re Khodejoochissa* 7 W R 466 (1867), as to orders when a pauper's appeal is withdrawn see *Chandabai v. Kaver Salot*, 18 B 461 (1861)

notes to next rule. The Crown has a right to receive fees at the institution of every suit. It temporarily foregoes (r 8) its right in the case of pauper plaintiffs, and thus places means in their hands to proceed to judgment against their defendants. Without the forbearance of Government to insist on its ordinary rule, the suit in such a case could not have been brought or the money realized. It is therefore reasonable that the Crown, in consideration of its giving up its rights to these fees, should have for their defrayal the first claim on the proceeds of the pauper suit (1). The order should not be a contingent one (2). The amount of court fees is a first charge (3) on the subject matter (1) of the suit. To enforce it the Government need not bring a separate suit, but can realize the court fee from the property by proceedings in execution (5). The rule is enabling, and though it indicates the manner in which the Crown may proceed to realize the debt, it does not preclude the Crown or its representatives from urging its prerogative and insisting on its rights to precedence over all their creditors (6). The period allowed to Government is the ordinary period allowed for execution to an individual under the Limitation Act (7). The section provides that persons who have been successful as paupers shall, so far as the subject-matter of their success is concerned, be liable to satisfy, out of what they recover, the amount of the fees which have been for a time, pending the decision of their suit, remitted to them. But the Collector cannot sell the decree, that is, the whole of the plaintiff's right in the decree, which he has got without waiting for the recovery by the plaintiff of that for which he has got his decree (8). An order under this rule for sale of property for the purpose of realizing court fees, and a sale under such order, are *ultra vires* and a nullity when, in fact, there was no jurisdiction in the Court to make the order (9). In addition to their being a first charge, they are also recoverable from any party ordered to pay. If the pauper succeeds, the fees payable to Government are, under this rule, recoverable from the defendant (10). A defendant should not, however, be made liable to

(1) *Ganpat Putaya v Collector of Kanara*, 1 B 7, 9 (1875), the point here decided [followed in *Collector of Moradabad v Mahomed Daim*, 2 A 196 (1879)] has since been made clear by the introduction of the words 'shall be a first charge,' etc., which were not in the Code of 1859. See *Fran Krsto v Collector of Moorshedabad*, 15 W R 205 (1871), *Ramchandra v Pitchaikanni*, 7 M 434 at p. 436 (1883); *Ragho Prasad v Mewa Lal*, 39 I A 62 P C (1912), 34 A 223, 16 C W N 433, 15 C L J 327, 14 Bom L R 212, 22 M L J 457.

(2) *Shostee Churn v Collector of Chittagong*, 13 W R 150 (1870) in which case, by reason of the form of the order, the Government could get nothing from either party until *wasilat* was determined, and the parties refused to carry on the proceedings for this purpose.

(3) See *Janki v Collector of Allahabad*, 9

A 64 (1886), *Pathia Valappal v Veloth Assenar*, 25 M 733 (1902).

(4) As to the meaning of this term, see *Janki v Collector of Allahabad*, 9 A 64 (1886).

(5) *Ram Das v Secretary of State*, 18 A 419 (1896).

(6) *Gayanoda Bala Dassee v Butto Krsto Baragoe*, 33 C 1040 (1906).

(7) *Collector of Beerbhoom v Sreechurry*, 22 W R 512 (1874), *Appaya v Collector of Vizagapatam*, 4 M 165 (1881), *Venubai v Collector of Nasik*, 7 B 552 (1877), *Collector of Broach v Desai Raghunath*, 7 B at p. 549 (1883).

(8) *Jotindro Nath v Dwarka Nath*, 20 C 111 (1891).

(9) *Balwant Rao v Muhammad Husam* 15 A 324 (1893).

(10) *Jetha Mulchand v Golraj Jassur* S B 582 (1884).

pay court fees on any sum greater than that decreed against him (1) If the pauper fails, these fees are, under the next rule, recoverable from the plaintiff (2) Government may be deemed to have been a party to the suit, and therefore orders deciding any matter between Government and the party charged are open to appeal under sect 47, *ante* (3) See r 13, *post*

412] 11. Where the plaintiff fails in the suit or is dispaupered, Procedure where pauper or where the suit is withdrawn or dismissed,— fails
(a) because the summons for the defendant to appear and answer has not been served upon him in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to pay the court-fee or postal charges (if any) chargeable for such service, or

(b) because the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing

the Court shall order the plaintiff, or any person added as a co plaintiff to the suit, to pay the court fees which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper

Failure of suit—There has been some conflict as to the meaning of the word "fails". It has been held that r 10 only applies where there has been a contest, or else an admission of the claim which has avoided a contest, and refers to cases of adjudicated success, and that similarly, this rule applies only to cases of adjudicated failure, and to the other cases specified as where the plaintiff has been dispaupered or the suit has been dismissed under O IX rr 2, 3, *ante* (4) It was held, therefore, not to apply where the parties came to an amicable arrangement under which the suit was to be dismissed (5) And where an appeal *in forma pauperis* was withdrawn, it was held that no order could be made either under this rule or r 9, and that it was not open to the Court to order the respondents to pay any fees on the strength of any agreement between the parties (6) The last decision but one has, however, been dissented from by the Madras High Court, which has held that the words "succeeds" in the last rule and "fails" in this, refer to the ultimate decision or the result of the suit, and not to the mode in which the decision is arrived at, that it would be doing violence to the language of the section to introduce the words "after contest," and that a pauper plaintiff is liable to pay the stamp-duty if his suit is dismissed without trial (7) A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has more recently

(1) *Chandareka v Secretary of State* 14 M 163 (1890)

(2) *Jetha Mulchand v Gulraj Jaurup*, 3 B 577 (1884)

(3) *Tanki v Collector of Allahabad*, 9 A 61 (1886), *Secretary of State v Bhagawanti* 13 A 326 (1891), *Secretary of State v Narayan* 3 B 418 450 (1911)

(4) *Collector of Kanara v Krishnappa* 15 B 77 (1890)

(5) *Ib*

(6) *Chandaba v Kurer Sahab*, 18 B 404 (1894)

(7) *Collector of Vizagapatam v Abdul Khair*, 21 M 113 (1897) in which case the Court interfered under s. 622 (now 115)

held that where there is a withdrawal as the result of a compromise, the plaintiff does not succeed within the meaning of the last rule, but "fails" within the meaning of this (1). The section has now been amended to include a withdrawal.

The terms of this rule are mandatory, and it is obligatory upon the Court when it passes its decree to provide in that decree for payment by the plaintiff of the court fees (2). The decisions, however, are conflicting upon the question whether where the Court omits to make an order, the Government may, (3) or may not, (4) apply to rectify the decree. R 12 now declares the right of Government to apply. An order under this rule amounts to a decree in favour of Government against the unsuccessful plaintiff for the amount of the court fees, and can be executed by attachment and sale of any property he possesses (5). This and the last rule only deal with the fees payable to Government. Costs, that is, costs of parties *inter se* against a pauper plaintiff might, it was held, be awarded to a successful defendant under Chapter XVIII of the former Code (6).

Where a suit is instituted by a next friend on behalf of a minor, the latter is the plaintiff. It frequently is right to make a guardian or next friend liable for costs, but there are also cases in which it is not proper to do so. And it does not necessarily follow that because the suit is unsuccessful, the next friend is, as a matter of course, to be ordered personally to pay the costs (7).

The origin of the last penal clause of sect 142 of the last Code is to be found in sect 53, Reg IV of 1827, known as Elphinstone's Code, where however, it is made applicable to all plaintiffs alike. It was omitted from the Code of 1859, but re-enacted in that section with respect to pauper plaintiffs not for the purpose of exempting them from paying costs to a successful defendant but because it was deemed necessary to provide a special protection to defendants against being harassed by persons who *ex hypothesi* are not likely to be influenced by the fear of having to pay costs (8). It has now been altogether omitted.

12 *The Government shall have the right at any time to apply to the Court to make an order for the payment of court fees under rule 10 or rule 11*

Government may apply for payment of court fees

"May apply"—See notes to last rule. An order passed on an application by Government under this rule for payment under rr 10 or 11 of this Order is under sect 47 and appealable (9).

(1) *Secretary of State v Bhagurathbhai* 31 B 10 (1906), and see *Secretary of State v Narayan Balkrishna* 29 B 102 (1904) *Secretary of State v Narayan* 35 B 448 (1911).

(2) *Secretary of State v Bhagwanti Bibi* 13 A 326, 329 (1891).

(3) *Collector of Kanara v Krishnaappa* 15 B 77 (1890), *Collector of Kanara v Rambhat*, 18 B 454 (1893).

(4) *In re Secretary of State*, 2 C. L. R. 461 (1878) *Shusti Churan v Karmar Ali* 1 Shome, 266 (1878) on the ground that

Government is not a party to the suit.

(5) *Jwala Sahai v Maslat Khan* 20 A 346, at p 348 (1904) as to order for payment where the Court has no jurisdiction, see notes to r 5, ante.

(6) *Jetha Mulchand v Gulraj Jasarup* 8 B 577 (1884) F B.

(7) *Brigessuree Dossia v Kishore Do* 25 W R 316 (1870).

(8) *Jetha Mulchand v Gulraj Jasarup* 8 B 577 at pp 580, 581 (1884).

(9) *Secretary of State v Narayan* 35 B 448 (1911).

13. *All matters arising between the Government and any Government to be party to the suit under rule 10, rule 11 or deemed a party rule 12 shall be deemed to be questions arising between the parties to the suit within the meaning of section 47.*

"Between the parties."—See *ante*, note to r. 10.

14. *Where an order is made under rule 10, rule 11 or rule 12, the Court shall forthwith cause a copy of the decree to be forwarded to the Collector.*

413.]

15. An order refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper shall be a bar to any subsequent application of the like nature by him in respect of the same right to sue; but the applicant shall be at liberty to institute a suit in the ordinary manner in respect of such right, provided that he first pays the costs (if any) and by the opposite party in opposition to sue as a pauper.

Bar to subsequent application.—There must be a "refusal." Therefore the rule does not apply where the Court has not passed such an order, as, for instance, if it returns the application to have the question of pauperism tried by a Court of concurrent jurisdiction; (1) or strikes off "for the present" the application for default by non-appearance. Under such circumstances the application may be renewed (2). The provisions, moreover, of this rule do not affect the right of a person against whom an order of refusal has been made to obtain a review, and an order under r. 7, refusing leave to sue as a pauper, is subject to review under sect. 114 (3). Assuming, however, that there is an order which is final, the bar under this rule being one to jurisdiction, a Court is competent and bound to take notice of it at any stage of the suit (4).

On the rejection of an application for leave to sue as a pauper, the only course open to the applicant is that declared in this rule, viz. to institute a suit in the ordinary way, and the date of the institution of that suit for the

(1) *Skinner v Orde*, 6 A H C 225 (1874)

(2) *Bhoj Singh v Maha Koonwer*, 3 Agra Misc 1 (1868), as to whether an unsuccessful application to sue in *forma pauperis* is a demand by way of action, see *Ranee Khajoo roonissa v Ranee Ryersoona*, 2 I A 235 (1875)

(3) *Adarji Edulji v Manikji Edulji*, 4 B 414 (1880) [but as to the application being accompanied by copy of judgment, etc., see *Wajid Ali v Nawal Kishore*, 17 A 213, 214

(1893)], *Rancho Morar v Bezanji Edulji*, 20 B 85, 90 (1894)] in which it was also held that both the applications were made in respect of "the same right" to sue], *In re Rani Umasundari*, 5 B L R App 29 (1870) [in which the Court interfered under s. 15 of the C.

Umda

(4)
86 (1894)

purposes of limitation is the actual date thereof, and not the date when the application to sue as a pauper was made (1) *After*, when leave to sue as a pauper having been granted, the applicant is dispaupered (2) The rule does not expressly provide for the case of withdrawal by the petitioner of his application for leave and payment by him of the court fees It has, however, been held by the Calcutta High Court, (3) dissenting from the opinion of the Allahabad High Court, (4) that if an application for leave to sue as a pauper is made, and, upon the defendant opposing it, the applicant puts in the proper court fee and asks the Court to treat his application as a plaint, the application should be deemed for the purpose of limitation to be a plaint presented on the date on which it was filed

Costs incurred.—Although this rule makes it a condition precedent in the institution of an ordinary suit by a person whose application to sue *in forma pauperis* has been rejected that he should first pay the costs incurred by Government, the suit ought not to be dismissed for default in payment of such costs when no demand for the payment has been made either on behalf of the Government or by the Court (5)

16 The costs of an application for permission to sue as a pauper and of an inquiry into pauperism shall be costs in the suit [s 4

Costs.

(1) Keshav Ramchandra v. Krishnarao Venkatesh, 20 B 503 (1890), Naraini Kuar v. Makhan Lal 17 A 526 (1890), Aubhoja Churn v. Basawswari, 24 C 589 (1897), Keshavlal v. Mayabhai, 9 Bom I R 204 (1907)

(2) Naraini Kuar v. Makhan Lal 17 A 26 (1890)

(3) Janakdharj Sukul v. Janki Koor, 28 C 427 (1900), *follo* Skinner v. Orde 2 A 241 (1879) P C

(4) Ahbasi Begam v. Nanhi Begam, 18 A 206 (1896)

(5) Minnalini v. Tinkauri 16 C W N 641 (1912)

ORDER XXXIV.

Suits relating to Mortgages of Immoveable Property.

1 *Subject to the provisions,*

*Parties to suits for an interest
foreclosure sale and the right of
redemption to any suit relating to the mortgage*

Explanation—A puisne mortgagee may sue for foreclosure or for sale without making the prior mortgagee a party to the suit, and a prior mortgagee need not be joined in a suit to redeem a subsequent mortgage

Mortgage suits—This Order is taken (with the exception of rr 9 and 11 which are new) from sects 85-90, 92-94, 96, 97 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). R 14 is a provision analogous to sect 100 of that Act, both dealing with charges. Certain amendments, chiefly by way of addition, have been made, to which notice will be drawn. The object of the introduction of this Order was stated to be that hitherto some confusion had been occasioned by the co-existence of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and of the Code in regard to execution in mortgage suits. The incorporation of this Order in the Code would, it was said, be welcomed by every one who is familiar with the almost endless controversies which have gathered round the applicability of the provisions of the Code to the enforcement of decrees for sale under the Transfer of Property Act. It was considered that the provisions relating to execution in mortgage suits—that is, questions of *procedure*—should be dealt with in their entirety in the Code, and this Order has been introduced to give effect to this view. As a consequence of this the sections above mentioned of the Transfer of Property Act as also sect 99 (as to which, see r 14), and a portion of sect 100 of that Act, have been repealed by the fifth schedule. The general effect of this order, therefore, is that the ordinary provisions of the Code apply to mortgage suits and the execution of mortgage decrees, unless there be some special exception to the contrary. It has been said that the effect of the incorporation of these sections of the Transfer of Property Act is that the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court should discard any independent practice based on the old procedure (1). The subject of this Order has already been fully dealt

(1) *Sarat v Nahapiet*, 37 C 507 (1910), and see *Amlook Chand v Sarat* 38 C 913 (1911)

with by Dr Rash Behary Ghose in his work on mortgages and by Mr H S Gour in his Law of Transfer in British India. It is not necessary, therefore, to go over the same ground. We therefore content ourselves with noting the amendments and additions effected by the present Code.

R 1 is taken from sect 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, but after the word "interest" substitutes, in lieu of the words "*in the property comprised in a mortgage*," (1) the words "*either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption*." The former phrase, "*Having an interest in the property*," etc., has been the subject of numerous cases, which will be found collected in Mr Gour's work. It was proposed to add at the end of the first paragraph of the rule the words "*and the decree shall not bind any person not so joined*." Sect 85 of the Act contained the proviso following: "*Provided that the plaintiff has notice of such interest*." It was pointed out that this proviso had given rise to certain doubts which it was sought to remove by substituting for it the words cited with a view to making it clear (2) that a person not a party is not bound by a decree. It has been recently held that a mortgagee who is made a defendant, and who omits to set up a mortgagee who is barred from suing on such mortgage where in consequence of his omission the property is ordered to be sold free from the mortgage which had not been pleaded (3). As regards the former proviso it was said (4) that the proviso subordinating the obligation to join, to notice, was unnecessary and misleading. For, in the absence of any discriminating equity affecting the right of excluded interests, it was not clear what object the proviso was intended to serve. Could it be supposed that if the plaintiff had omitted to join a necessary party because he had no notice of his interest, then his interest would be differently affected to what they would be if he was excluded even though the plaintiff did have notice of his interest? Notice may sometimes affect the question, but it does not always do so. The proviso has now been omitted, but the proposed addition has not (probably as being unnecessary) been made. It has been held that a son in a Mitakshara joint family is a person having an interest in the mortgage and is a necessary party (5). But in a suit for sale on a mortgage where the defendant mortgagors were the managing members of a Mitakshara joint family who in that capacity had purchased the mortgaged property it was held by the Allahabad High Court that the family was sufficiently represented by them and that the suit would not fail through non joinder of the other members (6). The Calcutta High Court has recently dissented from this holding that under this rule a mortgage suit brought by the *karta* of a joint family without making the other members of the family parties is not maintainable (7). It has also been

(1) See Jaggeswar Dutt v Bhuban Mohan Mitra, 33 C 425 (1906).

(2) Cf. Ram Nath Rai v Luchman Rai 21 A 193 (1899), Ram Taran Goswami v Ramswar Malia 11 C. W. N 1078 (1907).

(3) Nallu Krishnamoorti Annangara Charitar 30 M 353 (1907).

(4) H S Gour, Law of Transfer in British India. Notes to sect 85 of Act IV of 1882.

(5) Biswanath v Jagdip, 40 C. 342 (1912).

(6) Hari Lal v Munman 34 A 549 (1912), Madan Lal v Kishan Singh 34 A 572 (1912), cf. Kishan Prasad v Har Narain 33 A 272 (1911).

(7) Sridharan v Dharanji Dharan 19 C. L. J. 437 (1914) p 440 following Lala Surja Prasad v Golab Chand 27 C 724 (1900) dissenting from Hari Lal v Munman Kunwar and Madan Lal v Kishan Singh, *supra*.

ORDER XXXIV.

Suits relating to Mortgages of Immoveable Property.

1 Subject to the provisions of this Code, all persons having an interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage.

Parties to suits for foreclosure sale and redemption

Explanation—A puisne mortgagee may sue for foreclosure or for sale without making the prior mortgagee a party to the suit; and a prior mortgagee need not be joined in a suit to redeem a subsequent mortgage

Mortgage suits—This Order is taken (with the exception of rr 9 and 11 which are new) from sects 85-90, 92-94 96, 97 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) R 14 is a provision analogous to sect 100 of that Act, both dealing with charges. Certain amendments, chiefly by way of addition, have been made, to which notice will be drawn. The object of the introduction of this Order was stated to be that hitherto some confusion had been occasioned by the co existence of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and of the Code in regard to execution in mortgage suits. The incorporation of this Order in the Code would, it was said, be welcomed by every one who is familiar with the almost endless controversies which have gathered round the applicability of the provisions of the Code to the enforcement of decrees for sale under the Transfer of Property Act. It was considered that the provisions relating to execution in mortgage suits—that is, questions of procedure—should be dealt with in their entirety in the Code, and this Order has been introduced to give effect to this view. As a consequence of this the sections above mentioned of the Transfer of Property Act, as also sect 99 (as to which, see r 14), and a portion of sect 100 of that Act, have been repealed by the fifth schedule. The general effect of this order, therefore, is that the ordinary provisions of the Code apply to mortgage suits and the execution of mortgage decrees, unless there be some special exception to the contrary. It has been said that the effect of the incorporation of these sections of the Transfer of Property Act is that the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court should discard any independent practice based on the old procedure (1). The subject of this Order has already been fully dealt

(1) *Sarat v Nahapiet*, 37 C 907 (1910) and see *Amlook Chaud v Sarat*, 38 C 913 (1911)

with by Dr Rash Behary Ghose in his work on mortgages and by Mr H S Gour

R 1 is taken from sect 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, but after the word "interest" substitutes, in lieu of the words "*in the property comprised in a mortgage*", (1) the words "*either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption*". The former phrase, "Having an interest in the property," etc., has been the subject of numerous cases, which will be found collected in Mr Gour's work. It was proposed to add at the end of the first paragraph of the rule the words 'and the decree shall not bind any person not so joined'. Sect 85 of the Act contained the proviso following 'Provided that the plaintiff has notice of such interest'. It was pointed out that this proviso had given rise to certain doubts which it was sought to remove by substituting for it the words cited with a view to making it clear (2) that a person not a party is not bound by a decree. It has been recently held that a mortgagee who is made a defendant and who omits to set up a mortgage is barred from suing on such mortgage where in consequence of his omission the property is ordered to be sold free from the mortgage which had not been pleaded (3). As regards the former proviso it was said (4) that the proviso subordinating the obligation to join to notice, was unnecessary and misleading. For, in the absence of any discriminating equity affecting the right of excluded interests it was not clear what object the proviso was intended to serve. Could it be supposed that if the plaintiff had omitted to join a necessary party because he had no notice of his interest, then his interest would be differently affected to what they would be if he was excluded even though the plaintiff did have notice of his interest? Notice may sometimes affect the question but it does not always do so. The proviso has now been omitted but the proposed addition has not (probably as being unnecessary) been made. It has been held that a son in a Mitakshara joint-family is a person having an interest in the mortgage and is a necessary party (5). But in a suit for sale on a mortgage where the defendant mortgagors were the managing members of a Mitakshara joint family who in that capacity had purchased the mortgaged property it was held by the Allahabad High Court that the family was sufficiently represented by them and that the suit would not fail through non joinder of the other members (6). The Calcutta High Court has recently dissented from this holding that under this rule a mortgage suit brought by the *karta* of a joint family without making the other members of the family parties is not maintainable (7). It has also been

(1) See Jaggeswar Dutt v Bhuban Mohan Mitra, 33 C 425 (1906)

(2) Cf Ram Nath Rai v Luchman Rai 21 A 193 (1899) Ram Taran Goswami v Parneswar Malia 11 C W N 1078 (1907)

(3) Nallu Krishnamurti v Annangara Chariar 30 M 353 (1907)

(4) H S Gour, Law of Transfer in British India Notes to sect 85 of Act IV of 1882

(5) Biswanath v Jagd p. 40 C. 342 (1912)

(6) Hari Lal v Munman 34 A 549 (1912) Madan Lal v Kishan Singh 34 A 572 (1912), cf Kishan Prasad v Hari Narayan 33 A 272 (1911)

(7) Siddeswari Prasad v Dhanraj Narayan 19 C L J 437 (1914) p 440 following Lala Surja Prasad v Golab Chand 27 C 704 (1909) dissenting from Hari Lal v Munman Kunwar and Madan Lal v Kishan Singh *supra*

held that the effect of an intentional non joinder of a subsequent mortgagee in a suit on a prior mortgage would not be the dismissal of the suit but only of so much of it as relates to property affected by the subsequent mortgage (1)

Even if the non joinder as a party defendant who ought to have been made a party to a suit for sale on a mortgage is by itself a defect fatal to the suit, such defect is cured if the Court acting under O I r 10, sub rule (2), adds such person as a defendant (2)

The Explanation to r 1 is new. There were a number of decisions on the question whether a prior mortgagee was a necessary party in a suit to enforce a subsequent mortgage, a question the determination of which depended upon the meaning to be attached to the word "property" in sect 85. Was all that was involved in the puisne mortgagee's suit the equity of redemption, in which case the prior mortgagee not being interested therein need not be joined, or was the interest involved something more than the equity? in other words, the mortgaged property subject to the rights of the prior mortgagee, in which case the latter was a necessary party. This question has now been settled by the exclusion of the ambiguous word "property" in the body of the rule and the addition of the Explanation, which removes the doubts which have arisen from the conflict of authorities on the point.

In r 2 (c) the words "*if so required*" have been added before "retransfer". The special Committee stating that according to Mofussil practice a retransfer was not ordinarily required, and being of opinion that this practice should not be altered. It has been held that a Court passing a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit under this rule has no power to award interest at other than the contractual rate up to the time fixed for payment unless for some legal reason it sees fit to interfere with the contract as to the rate of interest (3).

The same Committee as regards r 3 omitted a proposed provision as to the defendant paying money to the plaintiff, considering it better that in every case he should pay into Court. Clauses (a) and (b) of the same rule are new, as are also the similar clauses in rr 5 and 8. R 5 (2) deals with an application by the plaintiff only. The concluding words of sect 89, "and thereupon the defendant's right to redeem and the security shall both be extinguished," have been omitted.

Clause (3) of r 8 appears to be an addition. The question which may be raised in connection with this rule, whether one suit for redemption has the effect of barring a second suit for the same relief, has already been dealt with. See notes to sect 9, O II r 2, sects 11-14, and Index.

R 9 is new. It is a recognition of existing practice and remedies, and is an obvious omission in the Transfer of Property Act.

So also is r 11, which has been inserted in compliance with the suggestion of the Privy Council (4). This rule was in the Transfer of Property Bill, but

(1) *Alam Singh v Gokal Singh*, 35 A 484 (1913)

(2) *Kundan Lal v Iqbal Chand*, 27 A. 75 (1904)

(3) *Rajwanti Kunwar v Shanti Narain*

Singh, 36 A 220 (1914), *Rameswar Koor v Mahomed Mehdi*, 26 C. 39 (1898)

(4) *Gopi Narain Khanna v Babu Bansidhar*, 32 I A 123 (1905), *Sindara Reddiah v Subbiah Koindan* 4 M I 23 (1912)

was omitted by the Select Committee in that Bill on the ground that it ought to find a place in the Civil Procedure Code

The third paragraph of r. 13 has been amended

2 In a suit for foreclosure, if the plaintiff succeeds, the Court

Preliminary decree in foreclosure-suit shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering that an account be taken of what will be due to the plaintiff for principal and interest on the mortgage, and for his costs of the suit (if any) awarded to him on the day next hereinafter referred to, or

(b) declaring the amount so due at the date of such decree, and directing—

(c) that if the defendant pays into Court the amount so due on a day within six months from the date of declaring in Court the amount so due to be fixed by the Court, the plaintiff shall deliver up to the defendant, or to such person as he appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall, if so required, retransfer the property to the defendant free from the mortgage and from all incumbrances created by the plaintiff or any person claiming under him, or, where the plaintiff claims by derived title, by those under whom he claims, and shall also, if necessary, put the defendant in possession of the property, but

(d) that, if such payment is not made on or before the day to be fixed by the Court, the defendant shall be debarred from all right to redeem the property

3 (1) Where, on or before the day fixed, the defendant pays

Final decree in foreclosure-suit into Court the amount declared due as aforesaid, together with such subsequent costs as are mentioned in rule 10, the Court shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering the plaintiff to deliver up the documents which under the terms of the preliminary decree he is bound to deliver up,

and, if so required,

(b) ordering him to retransfer the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree,

and, also, if necessary,

(c) ordering him to put the defendant in possession of the property

(2) Where such payment is not so made the Court shall, on application made in that behalf by the plaintiff, pass a decree

that the defendant and all persons claiming through or under him be debarred from all right to redeem the mortgaged property and also, if necessary, ordering the defendant to put the plaintiff in possession of the property.

Power to enlarge time Provided that the Court may, upon good cause shown and upon such terms (if any) as it thinks fit, from time to time postpone the day fixed for such payment

(3) On the passing of a decree under sub rule (2) the debt secured by the mortgage shall be deemed to be discharged

Discharge of debt

Clauses (a) and (b), sub rule (1) —See notes to r 1 ante The Transfer of Property Act did not contain any provision for the passing of a final decree in cases where payment was made in accordance with the terms of the preliminary decree. This was an omission which has been supplied in the first clause of this rule, and of rr 5 and 8, post. These provide for the passing of final decrees in such cases

Extension of time—As to appeal sec O XLIII r 1 (c)

4 (1) In a suit for sale, if the plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a decree to the effect mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of rule 3 and also directing that, in default of the defendant paying as therein mentioned, the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and that the proceeds of the sale (after defraying thereout the expenses of the sale) be paid into Court and applied in payment of what is declared due to the plaintiff as aforesaid, together with subsequent interest and subsequent costs, and that the balance (if any) be paid to the defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same

Preliminary decree in suit for sale

(2) In a suit for foreclosure, if the plaintiff succeeds and the mortgage is not a mortgage by conditional sale, the Court may, at the instance of the plaintiff or of any person interested either in the mortgage money or in the right of redemption, pass a like decree (in lieu of a decree for foreclosure) on such terms as it thinks fit, including the deposit in Court of a reasonable sum, fixed by the Court, to meet the expenses of sale and to secure the performance of the terms

Power to decree sale in foreclosure suit

5 (1) Where on or before the day fixed the defendant pays into Court the amount declared due as aforesaid, together with such subsequent costs as are mentioned in rule 10, the Court shall pass a decree—

Final decree in suit for sale

(a) ordering the plaintiff to deliver up the documents which under the terms of the preliminary decree he is bound to deliver up, and, if so required,

(b) ordering him to retransfer the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree, and also, if necessary,

(c) ordering him to put the defendant in possession of the property

(2) Where such payment is not so made, the Court shall, on application made in that behalf by the plaintiff, pass a decree that the mortgaged property, or a sufficient part thereof, be sold, and that the proceeds of the sale be dealt with as is mentioned in rule 4

Clauses (a) and (b), sub rule (1) — See notes to r 1 and 3 ante. It is now provided by this rule that the application which follows a preliminary decree for sale is for a decree for sale (1) An application for a decree absolute for sale of a mortgage charge, under the terms of a consent decree which provided for satisfaction of the decretal debt by instalments is an application under this order, and is governed by Art 181, Sched I of the Limitation Act and must be made within three years from the accrual of the right to apply (2)

6 Where the net proceeds of any such sale are found to be insufficient to pay the amount due to the plaintiff, if the balance is legally recoverable from the defendant otherwise than out of the property sold, the Court may pass a decree for such amount

In making a decree against the mortgagor personally under this rule the Court may direct payment by instalments under O XX r 11 (3)

7. In a suit for redemption, if the plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering that an account be taken of what will be due to the defendant for principal and interest on the mortgage, and for his costs of the suit (if any) awarded to him on the day next hereinafter referred to, or

(b) declaring the amount so due at the date of such decree, and directing—

(c) that, if the plaintiff pays into Court the amount so due on a day within six months from the date of declaring in Court the amount so due, to be fixed by the Court, the defendant shall deliver up to the plaintiff, or to such person as he appoints, all documents in his

(1) *Amlooh Chand Iarrack v Sarat Chunder Mookerjee*, 35 C 913 (1911), and see *Tara Prasanna Bose v Nilmoni Khan*, 41 C. 418 (1913), and for Court fee on appeal *Bagranji Lal v Mahabir Kunwar* 35 A. 478

(1913)

(2) *Datto Atmaram v Shankar Dattatraya*, 33 B 32 (1913)

(3) *Bidhu Sudhury v Mahatabuddin*, 16 C W 44 (1911)

possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall, if so required, retransfer the property to the plaintiff free from the mortgage and from all incumbrances created by the defendant or any person claiming under him, or, where the defendant claims by derived title, by those under whom he claims, and shall, if necessary, put the plaintiff in possession of the property, but

- (d) that, if such payment is not made on or before the day to be fixed by the Court, the plaintiff shall (unless the mortgage is simple or usufructuary) be debarred from all right to redeem or (unless the mortgage is by conditional sale) that the mortgaged property be sold

8 (1) Where, on or before the day fixed, the plaintiff pays into Court the amount declared due as afore-
Final decree in re said, together with such subsequent costs as are
demption suit mentioned in rule 10, the Court shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering the defendant to deliver up the documents which under the terms of the preliminary decree he is bound to deliver up,
 and, if so required,

(b) ordering him to retransfer the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree,
 and also, if necessary,

(c) ordering him to put the plaintiff in possession of the property

(2) Where such payment is not so made, and the mortgage is not simple or usufructuary, the Court shall, on application made in that behalf by the defendant, pass a decree that the plaintiff and all persons claiming through or under him be debarred from all right to redeem the mortgaged property and also, if necessary, ordering the plaintiff to put the defendant in possession of the property.

(3) On the passing of a decree under sub rule (2) the debt secured by the mortgage shall be deemed to be discharged

(4) Where such payment is not so made, and the mortgage is not by conditional sale, the Court shall, on application made in that behalf by the defendant, pass a decree that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold and that the proceeds of the sale (after defraying thereout the expenses of the sale) be paid into Court and applied in payment of what is found due to the defendant, and that the balance (if any) be paid to the plaintiff or other persons entitled to receive the same.

Provided that the Court may, upon good cause shown and upon such terms (if any) as it thinks fit, from time to time postpone the day fixed for payment.

Power to enlarge time

Clauses (a) and (b), sub rule (1) —Where in a suit for redemption of a mortgage, the plaintiff owing to a *boni fide* mistake paid into Court less than the sum due, it was held that under this rule the Court had power to extend the time limited for payment of the full decretal amount (1) See notes to rr 1 and 3, ante

Extension of time — as to appeal, see O XLIII r 1 (c)

9 Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, if it appears, upon taking the account referred to in rule 7, that nothing is due to the defendant or that he has been overpaid, the Court shall pass a decree directing the defendant, if so required, to retransfer the property and to pay to the plaintiff the amount which may be found due to him, and the plaintiff shall, if necessary, be put in possession of the mortgaged property

Decree where nothing is found due or where mortgagee has been overpaid

Nothing found due — See notes to r 1 ante

10 In finally adjusting the amount to be paid to a mortgagee in case of a foreclosure or sale or redemption, the Court shall, unless the conduct of the mortgagee has been such as to disentitle him to costs, add to the mortgage money such costs of suit as have been properly incurred by him since the decree for foreclosure or sale or redemption up to the time of actual payment

Costs of mortgagee subsequent to decree

11 Where property is mortgaged for successive debts to successive mortgagees, any mesue mortgagee may institute a suit to redeem the interests of the prior mortgagees and to foreclose the rights of those that are posterior to himself and of the mortgagor

Right of mesue mortgagee to redeem and foreclose

Successive mortgages — See notes to r 1 ante

12 Where any property the sale of which is directed under this Order is subject to a prior mortgage, the Court may, with the consent of the prior mortgagee, direct that the property be sold free from the same, giving to such prior mortgagee the same interest in the proceeds of the sale as he had in the property sold

Sale of property subject to prior mortgage

13 (1) Such proceeds shall be brought into Court and applied

Application of proceeds as follows —

- first, in payment of all expenses incident to the sale or properly incurred in any attempted sale*
 - secondly, in payment of whatever is due to the prior mortgagee on account of the prior mortgage, and of costs, properly incurred in connection therewith,*
 - thirdly, in payment of all interest due on account of the mortgage in consequence whereof the sale was directed, and of the costs of the suit in which the decree directing the sale was made,*
 - fourthly, in payment of the principal money due on account of that mortgage, and*
 - lastly, the residue (if any) shall be paid to the person proving himself to be interested in the property sold, or if there are more such persons than one, then to such persons according to their respective interests therein or upon their joint receipt*
- (2) Nothing in this rule or in rule 12 shall be deemed to affect the powers conferred by section 57 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Prior mortgage — See notes to r 1 ante

14 (1) Where a mortgagee has obtained a decree for the payment of money in satisfaction of a claim arising under the mortgage, he shall not be entitled to bring the mortgaged property to sale otherwise than by instituting a suit for sale in enforcement of the mortgage, and he may institute such suit notwithstanding anything contained in Order II, rule 2

(2) Nothing in sub rule (1) shall apply to any territories to which the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has not been extended.

It has been said that this rule has merely effected a change of procedure in the manner in which mortgaged property must be realized in execution of money decrees (1)

Suit for sale — The Code repeals sect 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. In its place this rule has been enacted. The first part of that section provided that a mortgagee should not bring the mortgaged property to sale otherwise than by instituting a suit under sect 67 of that Act. In so far as it precluded the mortgagee from selling the mortgaged property under a judgment unconnected with the mortgage debt it has been considered inexpedient. It was held and doubt competent to a mortgagee to purchase the equity of redemption

tion from the mortgagor by an agreement subsequent to, and distinct from, the mortgage transaction. There was no reason, therefore, why it should not be equally competent to him to have it sold in satisfaction of any claim which he might have against the mortgagor unconnected with the mortgage (1). This has accordingly been enacted. Sect. 99 spoke of "any claim whether arising under the mortgage or not." The present rule is limited to claims arising under the mortgage. To this extent only the former provisions are retained. The Select Committee were also at one time of the opinion that sect. 99, in so far as it precluded the mortgagee from selling the property under a judgment for the mortgage debt served no useful purpose. As to this they wrote "We understand that the provision was enacted to prevent mortgagees from suing their mortgagors on the debt as such, and in execution selling the mortgagor's interest in the property, we, however, think that no such provision was needed seeing that under the law, as it stood prior to the Act, the Courts never allowed the sale of a bare equity of redemption under a judgment on the covenant" (2). It was however, subsequently considered that as the mortgagor would be deprived of the benefit of the period of redemption given him by a mortgage-decree under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, unless the former provisions were maintained in respect of claims arising under the mortgage, the former restrictions should to this extent be retained in those territories to which that Act applied. Where a usufructuary mortgagee who had not obtained possession brought a suit for possession and this was compromised and by consent a simple money decree was passed in his favour, it was held that the decree being one passed on a compromise he was not precluded from bringing the mortgaged property to sale in execution of it (3). Where usufructuary mortgagees obtained a decree for possession and costs and then in execution of the decree for costs applied for attachment of part of the property it was held that this application was not barred by this rule (4). In a recent case where mortgagees, stating that they had relinquished their claim under the mortgage obtained a simple money decree and when this was not satisfied proceeded to put their mortgage into Court and prayed for a decree for sale on it it was held that the former proceedings were not a bar to this suit (5).

15. *All the provisions contained in this Order as to the sale or redemption of mortgaged property shall, so far as may be, apply to property subject to a*

Charges

charge within the meaning of section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

(1) The Select Committee referred to *Kharajmal v. Daim* 32 C 296 (1904), *Lisle v. Reeve*, 1902, A C 461.

(2) The Select Committee referred to *Syed Imam v. Rajcoomar Doss* 23 W R. 187 (1875), *Kharajmal v. Daim*, 32 C 296 (1904) Report of Select Committee, Feb 12, 1903.

(3) *Ganesh Singh v. Datta Singh*, 32 A. 377 (1910). For limitation as regards payment

of interest by instalments, see *Abdul Ahad v. Mahtab Bibi* 3, A 378 (1913). For limitation in case of usufructuary mortgage by conditional sale, see *Bakhtawar Begam v. Husa ni Khanam* P C, 19 C L J 47.

(4) *Haribans Rai v. Sri Niwas Nank* 3, A. 518 (1913), distinguishing *Kharajmal v. Daim*, *supra*.

(5) *Indarpal Singh v. Mewa Lal*, 36 A 264 (1914).

ORDER XXXV

Interpleader

471.] 1 In every suit of interpleader the plaintiff shall, in addition
Plaint in interpleader to the other statements necessary for plaints,
suit. state—

(a) that the plaintiff *claims* no interest in the *subject matter*
in dispute other than for charges or costs,

(b) the claims made by the defendants severally, and

(c) that there is no collusion between the plaintiff and any
of the defendants

472.] 2 Where the thing claimed is capable of being paid into
Payment of thing Court or placed in the custody of the Court,
claimed into Court the plaintiff *may be required to* so pay or
place it before he can be entitled to any order in the suit

476.] 3 Where any of the defendants in an interpleader suit is
Procedure where defen actually suing the plaintiff in respect of the
dant is suing plaintiff subject matter of such suit, the Court in which
the suit against the plaintiff is pending shall, on being informed
by the Court in which the interpleader suit *has been instituted*,
stay the proceedings as against him, and his costs in the suit
so stayed may be provided for in such suit, but if, and in so far
as, they are not provided for in that suit, they may be added
to his costs incurred in the interpleader suit

473.] 4 (1) At the first hearing the Court may—
Procedure at first hear (a) declare that the plaintiff is discharged
ing from all liability to the defendants
in respect of the thing claimed award him his costs,
and dismiss him from the suit, or
(b) if it thinks that justice or convenience so require, return
all parties until the final disposal of the suit
(2) Where the Court finds that the admissions of the parties
their evidence enable it to do so, it may adjudicate the title to
the thing claimed

(3) *Where the admissions of the parties do not enable the Court so to adjudicate, it may direct—*

(a) *that an issue or issues between the parties be framed and tried, and*

(b) *that any claimant be made a plaintiff in lieu of or in addition to the original plaintiff,*

and shall proceed to try the suit in the ordinary manner.

5. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to enable agents

Agents and tenants
may not institute inter-
pleader-suits.

to sue their principals, or tenants to sue their
landlords, for the purpose of compelling them
to interplead with any persons other than

persons making claim through such principals or landlords.

Illustrations

(a) A deposits a box of jewels with B as his agent. C alleges that the jewels were wrongfully obtained from him by A, and claims them from B. B cannot institute an interpleader suit against A and C.

(b) A deposits a box of jewels with B as his agent. He then writes to C for the purpose of making the jewels a security for a debt due from himself to C. A afterwards alleges that C's debt is satisfied, and C alleges the contrary. Both claim the jewels from B. B may institute an interpleader suit against A and C (1).

6. *Where the suit is properly instituted the Court may*

Charge for plaintiff's costs. provide for the costs of the original plaintiff by giving him a charge on the thing claimed or in some other effectual way.

Interpleader—Prior to the English Judicature Acts, the right of interpleader at Common Law differed from that in Equity. Common Law interpleader was regulated by the Interpleader Act (1 & 2 Will 4, c 58), and the C L P Act of 1860 (2). The language of sects 470 and 471 of the last Code was almost identical with that of the first mentioned statute, and the English rulings, so far as the two enactments are the same, applied (3). The English Acts, with the exception of sect 17 of the C L P Act, 1860, are now repealed, and the right of interpleader and practice in interpleader proceedings are regulated in England exclusively by O 57. As to the form of an interpleader suit, see case last cited. The prohibition in r 5 forbidding a tenant to bring a suit to compel his landlord to interplead with another person not claiming through

(1) *Shelly Bonnerjee v Raj Chandra*, 37 C. 502 (1910)

(2) *Annual Practice*, O 57

(3) *Bombay Baroda Railway v Sassoon*, 18 B 231, 235 (1893). As to the earlier

English decisions passed before O 57 came into force see *Danells Ch. 1r*, and *Day's C. L. P. Acts*. As to interpleader generally, see *Seton*, 509-514, *Chitty, Ards*, para 1477.

him does not apply where the title of the landlord to grant the lease is not disputed, but it is alleged by such other person that the landlord only acted as trustee in granting such lease (1) In execution of a decree against B, the bailiff A seized certain goods, which were released on C paying under protest the sum mentioned in the warrant A paid the money into the office Held, that C's remedy was not by interpleading, but suing for money had and received (2) An interpleader suit is not improperly constituted merely because one of the defendants does not claim the whole of the subject matter (3) An applicant may apply for relief before an action is commenced against him In the case cited, (4) the plaintiffs sued, and were held to have properly sued for an injunction restraining the defendants from suing them The former section spoke of a person whose only interest was that of a stakeholder The phrase has been altered, but the meaning remains the same R 3 provides for a stay where the stakeholder has been actually sued In this connection, however, the proviso to sect 88 is to be borne in mind R 1 requires that a person constituting an interpleader suit should have no interest otherwise than as a mere stakeholder, that is, no interest other than for charges and costs A lien in respect of freight and charges is allowable (5) And personal relief may be sought by way of an injunction restrain . . .

There must be no collusion . . .

Where plaintiffs had entered . . . they bound themselves to defeat the claim of the other claimants to the fund, it was held that there was collusion within the rule (7) Under r 2, the subject of dispute may be required to be paid into or placed in the custody of the Court In the case cited (8) the plaintiffs had not done so, and it was therefore held that their charge for wharfage and demurrage could not be allowed There is an appeal from orders in interpleader suits under rr 3, 4, 6 Sec O XLIII (9) As a general rule, a plaintiff in a properly instituted interpleader suit is entitled to his costs In such case he is entitled to a lien for his costs on the fund, and is not forced to take his chance of getting them from the defendant, against whom the Court decides (10) An interpleader suit with a prayer for declaration of the titles of the several acts of defendants in the disputed land by the tenant against the landlords in whose favour he has executed separate Kabulyats is not maintainable (11)

(1) *Orr v Chidambaram* 33 M 220 (1909)

(2) *Cohen v Mullick*, 1 Gasper, 139

(3) *Secretary of State v Mir Muhammad*, 1 M. H. C. R. 360 (1863)

(4) *Bombay Baroda Railway v Sassoon*, *supra*, and see O 57, r 1 (a), and notes in A. P.

(5) *Bombay Baroda Railway v Sassoon*, 18 B 231 (1893)

(6) *Ib.*, at p 235

(7) *Murrieta v South American Co.*, 62 L. J. Q. B. 396

(8) *Bombay Baroda Railway v Sassoon*,

supra

(9) An adjudication upon the claims of defendants in an interpleader suit is a decree and appealable under section 96 *Maharaj Singh v Chittar Mai* 30 A 22 (1907) And an order dismissing such a suit is a decree *Orr v Chidambaram*, 33 M. 220 (1909)

(10) *Secretary of State v Mir Muhammad*, 1 M. H. C. R. 360, 361 (1863), and see *Bombay Baroda Railway v Sassoon*, 18 B 231 (1893)

(11) *Shelly Bonnerjee v Raj Chandra* 37 C 552 (1910)

ORDER XXXVI.

Special Case.

1. (1) Parties claiming to be interested in the decision [s 5
Power to state case for Court's opinion. of any question of fact or law may enter into an agreement in writing stating such question in the form of a case for the opinion of the Court, and providing that, upon the finding of the Court with respect to such question,—

(a) a sum of money fixed by the parties or to be determined by the Court shall be paid by one of the parties to the other of them, or

(b) some property, moveable or immovable, specified in the agreement, shall be delivered by one of the parties to the other of them, or

(c) one or more of the parties shall do, or refrain from doing, some other particular act specified in the agreement.

(2) Every case stated under this rule shall be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, and shall concisely state such facts and *specify such* documents as may be necessary to enable the Court to decide the question raised thereby

2. Where the agreement is for the delivery of any property, [s 5
Where value of subject-matter must be stated. or for the doing, or the refraining from doing, any particular act, the estimated value of the property to be delivered, or to which the act specified has reference, shall be stated in the agreement.

3. (1) The agreement, if framed in accordance with the [s 5
Agreement to be filed and registered as suit. rules hereinbefore contained, may be filed in the Court which would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, the amount or value of the subject-matter of which is the same as the amount or value of the subject-matter of the agreement.

(2) The agreement, when so filed, shall be numbered and registered as a suit between one or more of the parties claiming to be interested as plaintiff or plaintiffs, and the other or the others

of them as defendant or defendants, and notice shall be given to all the parties to the agreement, other than the party or parties by whom it was presented

530] 4 Where the agreement has been filed, the parties to it shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court and shall be bound by the statements contained therein

Parties to be subject to Court's jurisdiction.

531] 5 (1) The case shall be set down for hearing as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner, and the provisions of this Code shall apply to such suit so far as the same are applicable.

Hearing and disposal of case.

(2) Where the Court is satisfied, after examination of the parties, or after taking such evidence as it thinks fit,—

(a) that the agreement was duly executed by them,

(b) that they have a *bonâ fide* interest in the question stated therein, and

(c) that the same is fit to be decided,

it shall proceed to pronounce judgment thereon, in the same way as in an ordinary suit, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow

Proceedings on agreement—As O XIV rr 6 7, *ante* deal with the stating by consent of an issue in a suit, upon the finding of which an agreement becomes absolute, so the present rules deal with the power of parties to state a case for the Court's opinion which shall be set down for hearing as a suit (1)

(1) See ss 328-331 Act VIII of 1859, notes in Annual Practice to O 24, and the following cases stated under this section *Fatma Bibi v Advocate General*, 6 B 42

(1881), *Bombay Burmah Co v Dorabji Cur setji*, 10 B 415 (1886) *Kraal v Whymper*, 17 C 786 (1890)

ORDER XXXVII.

Summary Procedure on Negotiable Instruments

1. *This Order shall apply only to—*

- Application of Order* (a) the High Courts of Judicature at Fort St. George, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, [s. 5]
- (b) the Chief Court of Lower Burma, [s. 5]
- (c) the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind, and [s. 5]
- (d) any other Court to which sections 532 to 537 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, have been already applied.

Small Cause Courts—As Chapter XXXIX of the last Code has been transferred to the rules, clause (c) of sect. 538 of that Code has not been reproduced, as its appropriate place will be in rules under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882

2 (1) All suits upon bills of exchange, hundis or promissory notes may, in case the plaintiff desires [s. 5]

Institution of summary suits upon bills of exchange, etc.

to proceed *hereunder*, be instituted by presenting a plaint in the form prescribed, but the summons shall be in the form *No. 4 in Appendix B* or in such other form as may be from time to time prescribed

(2) In any case in which the plaint and summons are in such forms, respectively, the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter *provided* so to appear and defend, and, in default of his obtaining such leave or of his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof, *the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for any sum not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons, together with interest at the rate specified (if any) to the date of the decree, and such sum for costs as may be prescribed, unless the plaintiff claims more than such fixed sum, in which case the costs shall be ascertained in the ordinary way, and such decree may be executed forthwith.*

Scope of rules.—In 1885 was passed the English Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 67). Subsequently to the passing

of the Code of 1859, the Indian Bills of Exchange Act (V. of 1866) was passed. The words of the Indian Act were slightly larger than those of the English Act, (1) but in spirit the two Acts were precisely the same (2). The Code of 1877 consolidated the provisions of the Code of 1859 and of Act V of 1866 from sect 2, of which Act sect 532 in the last Code was taken (3). The intention of the Act was that where there was no pretence for a defence the party sued should not be allowed to defend, and the plaintiff should have judgment as of course, but that if the defendant had a real, though it may not be a good, defence, he should have leave to appear and to set it up (4). The effect of the provision therefore is, that where leave is refused, the plaintiff gets a decree on his allegations merely, unsupported by evidence, on proof of service of summons and on the usual certificate of the Registrar that no leave to defend has been obtained (5). If leave is granted, the suit proceeds as one instituted in the ordinary course, evidence being taken on both sides.

"Suits upon bills of exchange," etc.—The rule is confined to suits on negotiable instruments, (6) and the plaintiff is entitled to claim by his summons and obtain by his decree whatever sum, principal, and interest is, on the legal construction of the instrument demandable (7). As, however, already stated, the plaintiff, when no leave to defend is granted, gets his decree upon his simple statement in the plaint unsupported by any evidence. It was accordingly formerly held (8) that it was not the intention of the Legislature that a summons served in the form prescribed by the former section should have the effect of enabling the plaintiff's statement of the fact, in his petition to prevail without evidence. The section it was considered applied only to those simple cases in which the negotiable instrument itself, together with mere lapse of time, was sufficient to establish for the plaintiff a *prima facie* right to recover. Therefore the section was held not to apply where a promissory note was payable by instalments, and contained a stipulation that on default in payment of the first instalment the whole amount was to become due, and a suit was brought to recover the whole amount on default in payment of the first instalment, as in such case the plaintiff was obliged to allege the occurrence of another fact before the first instalment was due.

of the
instalment
to the section of the last Code overruled this decision and declared that a suit

(1) The Act is now repealed in the High Court (O II r 6), but is in operation in County Courts. In the former Court the procedure is by specially endorsed writ (O III r 6, O XIV r 1), which may be had in suits other than those on negotiable instruments to which the procedure is confined under the Code.

(2) *Voulintzy v Narayan Singh*, 6 B L R App 61, 62 (1871).

(3) See *Luckindas Vithaldas v Lbrahim Osman*, 2 B at pp 648, 649 (1878).

(4) *Voulintzy v Narayan Singh*, *supra*.

citing *Bramwell, B*, in *Agra and Masterman's Bank v Leighton*, 2 L R Ex 56.

(5) See *Remfry v Shillingford*, 1 C. 130 at p 131 (1876).

(6) See *Bank of Bengal v Kartick Chunder*, 10 C 804 (1889). Last *India Bank v Vullho Goolwamy*, 1 Ind Jur, N S 247 (1860).

(7) *De Souza v Ranganian*, 6 M H L C R 257 (1871).

(8) *Remfry v Shillingford*, 1 C 130, 132 (1876).

(9) *Ib*.

on a negotiable instrument was not limited to such cases. Thus, had the case cited occurred after the enactment of the Explanation, a decree would have been granted (1). The last mentioned case appeared, however, to throw doubt on the point, and with a view to clear it up the following amendments were suggested —

"The provisions of this rule shall not be deemed to be inapplicable to a suit merely because the cause of action includes facts which, if not admitted by the defendant, would have to be proved by the plaintiff."

Illustrations

(a) *A sues B upon a promissory note bearing an endorsement of payment which has been cancelled. This section is not inapplicable merely because A must prove that the note was endorsed by inadvertence but that payment was not made and the endorsement cancelled in consequence.*

(b) *A executes, in favour of B, a promissory note for Rs 1,000 payable in two equal instalments on the 1st July and 1st September, respectively, with a stipulation that, in default of payment of the first instalment the whole amount shall become immediately payable. On the 1st July, B sues A for the whole amount. This section is not inapplicable merely because B must allege and prove that the first instalment was not paid on the 1st July.*

As regards, however, the proposed amendment the Special Committee reported that the explanation to sect 532 of the last Code was inserted to negative the effect of the decision in 1 Cal 130 but its meaning as it stood was obscure. They therefore deleted the explanation and added the words italicized in the body of the rule, *"the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted"* which will remove the doubts at which the explanation was aimed. Suits under this Order must be brought within six months from the time the instrument sued on becomes due and payable (2).

Summons—The plaint is in the ordinary form but as evidence is not receivable, particular care must be taken to see that all the facts showing how the cause of action arose are stated in the plaint (3). The summons however, either follows the Form in the Schedule or is in such other form as the High Court may from time to time prescribe. (See notes to next rule.) After the usual return of service and the expiration of the period mentioned in the summons an order of Court for a decree should be obtained (4). *Quare*—whether the Court has power to grant an extension of time if an application for such extension be made before the time fixed by the summons has expired. But the Court has no power, after the time fixed by the summons for obtaining leave to appear and defend has expired, to extend the time (5). But see now sect 148 and notes to next rule. The plaintiff is entitled to claim by his summons whatever sum

(1) This view of the case was not considered in *Bhupati Ram v. Sourendra Mohan*, 30 C. 446 (1903). As to the actual point decided, *vide post*.

(2) Limitation Act, Art. 5.

(3) Chartered Mercantile Bank v. *Secconde*,

3 B. L. R., O. C. 146 (1869).

(4) *Schiller v. Marker*, 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 253 (1866).

(5) *Quazie Mahmudur Rohman v. Sarat Chandra*, 5 C. W. N. 259 (1900).

of the Code of 1859, the Indian Bills of Exchange Act (V of 1866) was passed. The words of the Indian Act were slightly larger than those of the English Act, (1) but in spirit the two Acts were precisely the same (2). The Code of 1877 consolidated the provisions of the Code of 1859 and of Act V of 1866 from sect 2, of which Act sect 532 in the last Code was taken (3). The intention of the Act was that where there was no pretence for a defence the party sued should not be allowed to defend, and the plaintiff should have judgment as of course, but that if the defendant had a real, though it may not be a good, defence, he should have leave to appear and to set it up (4). The effect of the provision therefore is, that where leave is refused, the plaintiff gets a decree on his allegations merely, unsupported by evidence, on proof of service of summons and on the usual certificate of the Registrar that no leave to defend has been obtained (5). If leave is granted, the suit proceeds as one instituted in the ordinary course, evidence being taken on both sides.

"Suits upon bills of exchange," etc.—The rule is confined to suits on negotiable instruments, (6) and the plaintiff is entitled to claim by his summons and obtain by his decree whatever sum, principal, and interest is, on the legal construction of the instrument, demandable (7). As, however, already stated, the plaintiff, when no leave to defend is granted, gets his decree upon his simple statement in the plaint unsupported by any evidence. It was accordingly formerly held, (8) that it was not the intention of the Legislature that a summons served in the form prescribed by the former section should have the effect of enabling the plaintiff's statement of the fact in his petition to prevail without evidence. This section it was considered applied only to those simple cases in which the negotiable instrument itself, together with mere lapse of time, was sufficient to establish for the plaintiff a *prima facie* right to recover. Therefore the section was held not to apply where a promissory note was payable by instalments, and contained a stipulation that on default in payment of the first instalment the whole amount was to become due, and a suit was brought to recover the whole amount on default in payment of the first instalment, as in such case the plaintiff was obliged to allege the occurrence of another fact besides the lapse of time since the making of the bill, viz that the first instalment had not been paid, which fact was necessary according to the terms of the bill in order to complete the plaintiff's right to sue (9). The Explanation to the section of the last Code overruled this decision and declared that a suit

(1) The Act is now repealed in the High Court (O II r. 6), but is in operation in County Courts. In the former Court the procedure is by specially endorsed writ (O III r. 6, O XIV. r. 1), which may be had in suits other than those on negotiable instruments to which the procedure is confined under the Code.

(2) *Vonlitzky v Narayan Singh*, 6 B L R App 64, 65 (1871).

(3) See *Luckmadas Vithaldas v Ibrahim Osman*, 2 B at pp 648, 649 (1878).

(4) *Vonlitzky v Narayan Singh*, *supra*.

citing *Bramwell, B*, in *Agra and Masterman's Bank v Leighton*, 2 L R Ex 56.

(5) See *Remfry v Shillingford*, 1 C 130, at p 131 (1870).

(6) See *Bank of Bengal v Kartick Chunder*, 16 C 804 (1889), *Last India Bank v Vullo Goolwary*, 1 Ind Jur, N S 217 (1866).

(7) *De Souza v Ranganath*, 6 M H C R 257 (1871).

(8) *Remfry v Shillingford*, 1 C 130, 133 (1870).

(9) *Ib*.

on a negotiable instrument was not limited to such cases. Thus, had the case cited occurred after the enactment of the Explanation, a decree would have been granted (1). The last mentioned case appeared, however, to throw doubt on the point, and with a view to clear it up the following amendments were suggested —

“The provisions of this rule shall not be deemed to be inapplicable to a suit merely because the cause of action includes facts which, if not admitted by the defendant, would have to be proved by the plaintiff”

Illustrations

(a) *A sues B upon a promissory note bearing an endorsement of payment which has been cancelled. This section is not inapplicable merely because A must prove that the note was endorsed by indorsement, but that payment was not made and the endorsement cancelled in consequence*

(b) *A executes, in favour of B, a promissory note for Rs 1,000, payable in two equal instalments on the 1st July and 1st September, respectively, with a stipulation that, in default of payment of the first instalment, the whole amount shall become immediately payable. On the 15th July, B sues A for the whole amount. This section is not inapplicable merely because B must allege and prove that the first instalment was not paid on the 1st July*

As regards, however, the proposed amendment the Special Committee reported that the explanation to sect 532 of the last Code was inserted to negative the effect of the decision in 1 Cal 130 but its meaning as it stood was obscure. They therefore deleted the explanation and added the words italicized in the body of the rule, *“the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted”* which will remove the doubts at which the explanation was aimed. Suits under this Order must be brought within six months from the time the instrument sued on becomes due and payable (2).

Summons—The plaint is in the ordinary form but as evidence is not receivable, particular care must be taken to see that all the facts showing how the cause of action arose are stated in the plaint (3). The summons, however, either follows the Form in the Schedule, or is in such other form as the High Court may from time to time prescribe (See notes to next rule). After the usual return of service and the expiration of the period mentioned in the summons an order of Court for a decree should be obtained (4). *Quare*—whether the Court has power to grant an extension of time if an application for such extension be made before the time fixed by the summons has expired. But the Court has no power, after the time fixed by the summons for obtaining leave to appear and defend has expired, to extend the time (5). But see now sect 148 and notes to next rule. The plaintiff is entitled to claim by his summons whatever sum

(1) This view of the case was not considered in *Bhupati Ram v Sourendra Mohan*, 30 C 446 (1903). As to the actual point decided, *vide post*.

(2) Limitation Act, Art. 5.

(3) Chartered Mercantile Bank v. Bank of India.

3 B L R., O C 146 (1869).

(4) *Schiller v. Marker*, 1 Ind. Jur., N S 253 (1866).

(5) *Quazie Mahmoodar Rohman v. Sarat Chandra*, 5 C. W. N. 100 (1900).

principal, or interest is, on the legal construction of the instrument, demandable, though as to interest beyond the scope of the instrument the question is a different one, and out of the scope of the Act (1) The rule, however, says that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for a sum not exceeding that mentioned in the summons, together with interest at the rate specified (if any) Where a suit has been instituted under these provisions, which was held to be not maintainable under them, a fresh summons under the ordinary procedure may be ordered (2)

Leave to defend—See notes to next rule

Payment into Court—See notes to next rule

Decree—In a suit against the drawer, acceptor, and indorser, a decree containing a condition exempting the indorser from liability until the plaintiff has exhausted his remedies against the drawer and acceptor is illegal (3)

33]

3 (1) The Court shall, upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and to defend the suit, upon affidavits which disclose such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the application

(2) Leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to payment into Court, giving security, framing and recording issues or otherwise as the Court thinks fit

Leave to defend—Applications for leave to appear and to defend a suit must, according to the Limitation Act, be made within ten days from the date when the summons was served (4) It has been held however, that the Court, on granting leave to issue a plaint under these provisions, may fix a reasonable time, having regard to the residence of the defendant, within which the latter may apply for leave to defend, and that the ten days prescribed by the Form was not an unalterable limit (5) In the last cited case twenty eight days was

(1) *De Souza v Ranganai*, 6 M. H. C. R. 257 (1871) [in this case the Registrar had refused to insert a claim for interest in the summons because the note sued on did not bear interest on the face of it] In *Bhupati Ram v Sourendra Mohun*, 30 C 446 (1903), 7 C W N 13, the case was held not to fall within the section, as no interest was specified in the note, and the claim for it was on an agreement apart from the note The suit apparently was on two causes of action—the note and a separate agreement In the case *Remfry v Shillingford*, 1 C 130 (1876), referred to, the stipulation in case of default was contained in the note itself.

(2) *Remfry v Shillingford*, 1 C 130, 132 (1876), *Bhupati Ram v Sourendra Mohun*,

supra

(3) *Bank of Bengal v Kartick Chunder Roy*, 16 C 804 (1889)

(4) Limitation Act, Art 159

(5) An extension of time may be necessary [see *Chandrakant Roy v Pogose* 3 B L R. O G. 83 (1869), the headnote of which is incorrect, *Quazie Mahmudar v Sarat Chandra*, 5 C W N 209 (1900), and see *Grob v Palmer*, 1 Ind. Jur., N S 397 (1866)]

mons, but within ten days of the date of its service See s 118, ante

fixed by the summons itself as the time within which the defendant might apply for leave. But where the time fixed by the summons itself is ten days, though it has been a question of doubt whether the Court has power to grant an extension of time if an application for such extension be made before the time fixed by the summons has expired, the Court has no power, after the time fixed by the summons for obtaining leave to appear and defend has expired, to extend the time (1) But see now notes to last rule It has been held that in an application for leave to appear and defend, the defendant cannot go into the question whether the summons was served on the date shown by the sheriff's return or not at all (2)

When there is no pretence for a defence the party sued should not be allowed to defend, and the plaintiff should have judgment as of course, but if the defendant has a real (it is not necessary to say a good) defence, he should have leave to appear and set it up As cases, however, sometimes occur where an apparently real defence is shown but its sincerity is doubtful there the defendant is let in to defend, only on the terms of his bringing the money into Court (3) It was held under the English Act that it was not necessary that there should be a defence on the merits, and that if the defendant appears and discloses any defence, legal or equitable he will be allowed to appear and defend (4) In a summary suit, if a defendant has been arrested before judgment and claims compensation under sect 95, he is entitled to apply for leave to defend, and if *prima facie* case is made out, leave should be given (5) Where there is a reason to doubt the *bona fides* of the defence, the condition of paying the money into Court, or giving security, will be imposed (6) In giving leave to defend, the Court has a discretion to order security for costs, not only where there is a doubt as to the *bona fides* of the defence but also where it appears unnecessary, though allowable (7) If the plaintiff has not been heard at first against the defendant's application, he will be allowed to apply to have the leave resumed (8) Where a conditional order is passed, but the condition is not performed the order is a nullity, and subsequent steps to set it aside are unnecessary (9)

4. After decree the Court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree, and if necessary

Power to set aside decree stay or set aside execution, and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems reasonable to the Court so to do, and on such terms as the Court thinks fit

(1) *Quazie Mahmud Ali Rohman v Sarat Chandra*, 5 C W N 259 (1900)

(2) *Madhu Lal v Woopendranaram* 23 C 573 (1896) a somewhat peculiar case

(3) *Vonlitzky v Narayan Singh* 6 B L R App. 64 (1871)

(4) *Casella v Darton*, L R 8 C P 100 In *Simon v Hakim*, 19 M 368 (1896) leave to defend was refused, as it was held that the collateral agreement set up was no answer to the suit on the note

(5) *Roult v Fetterle* 18 B 717 (1894)

(6) *Vonlitzky v Narayan Singh*, 6 B L R App 64 (1871) In *Ram Lal v Haran Chandra* 3 B L R O C J 130 (1869) leave was given on the terms of bringing the money into Court.

(7) *Vonlitzky v Narayan Singh*, *supra*

(8) *Ib.*

(9) *Gourdas Malvi v Hewitt*, Fulton, 18 (1845)

ORDER XXXVIII

Arrest and Attachment before Judgment

Arrest before judgment

1 *Where at any stage of a suit, other than a suit of the nature referred to in section 16, clauses (a) to (d), the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise,—*

Where defendant may be called upon to furnish security for appearance

(a) that the defendant, with intent to delay the plaintiff, or to avoid any process of the Court or to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him,—

(i) has absconded or left the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(ii) is about to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(iii) has disposed of or removed from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court his property or any part thereof, or

(b) that the defendant is about to leave British India under circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may thereby be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit,

the Court may issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show cause why he should not furnish security for his appearance

Provided that the defendant shall not be arrested if he pays to the officer entrusted with the execution of the warrant any sum specified in the warrant as sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and such sum shall be held in deposit by the Court until the suit is disposed of or until the further order of the Court

2. (1) *Where the defendant fails to show such cause the Court shall order him either to deposit in Court money or other property sufficient to answer*

Security

the claim against him, or to *furnish* security for his appearance at any time when called upon while the suit is pending and until satisfaction of any decree that may be passed against him in the suit, or *make such order as it thinks fit in regard to the sum which may have been paid by the defendant under the proviso to the last preceding rule*

(2) *Every* surety for the appearance of a defendant shall bind himself, in default of such appearance, to pay any sum of money which the defendant may be ordered to pay in the suit

Application for security—These rules amalgamate sects 477, 478, 479 of the last Code. The object of the process in this and the following rules is to have some security for the execution of the decree when it is passed, and that the person of the defendant will be within reach at that time. A creditor is, however, not entitled, merely because he has a just demand against his debtor, to arrest him before judgment, (1) nor can a debtor be arrested simply to secure easy execution of the decree should one be obtained (2). The procedure is only intended to secure to a creditor his rights when it is shown that a debtor with one or other of the intentions (3) mentioned in r 1, has done or is about to do the acts mentioned in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or is about to leave British India (4) under the circumstances stated. And if a creditor procures the arrest of his debtor without reasonable or probable cause, he renders himself liable to a suit for damages or to summary proceedings under sect 95. It is not the principles governing the English writ *ne exeat regno* which govern the matter, but the words of the Code (5).

Warrant—For a form of warrant of arrest before judgment, see First Schedule, Appendix F No I

Order to give security—In showing cause it may be shown that the suit is not a *bona fide* one, that the defendant has not done or is not about to do the acts charged in clauses (i), (ii), (iii) of r 1, or that he is not about to leave India or that, if he is about to leave, none of the circumstances mentioned exist, or that even if the suit is *bona fide* the institution of it has been vexatiously delayed till the defendant is about to depart from India in order to embarrass or coerce him (6). It has been held that the word "claim" in sect 479 of the last Code meant the amount of money claimed and that the security required to be given by a defendant who is arrested before judgment did not include security for costs (7).

(1) *Goutière v Charriot*, 1 A. H. C. R. 91 (1869)

(2) *Kelaram Majee v Narain Dass*, 13 W. R. 278 (1870)

(3) *Teenarain v Ram Rutton* 2 Hyde, 181 (1864), *Goutière v Charriot* *supra*

(4) *Agra Bank v Minto*, 1 Ind. Jur., N. S. 265 (1866) *Goutière v Robert*, 2 A. H. C. R. 353-358 (1870), *Harrison v Dickson*, 1

Boulton, 33, *Probodh Chunder v Dowe*, 14 C. 695 (1887)

(5) *Probodh Chunder v Dowe*, *supra*

(6) See *Spence v Hotel v Anderson*, 1 Ind. Jur., N. S. 294 (1866)

(7) *Reinhold v Holloway*, Suit 600 of 1877, November 20, cited in O'Kinealy, C. P. C. notes to this section

3 (1) A surety for the appearance of a defendant may at any time apply to the Court in which he became such surety to be discharged from his obligation

Procedure on application by surety to be discharged

(2) On such application being made, the Court shall summon the defendant to appear or, if it thinks fit, may issue a warrant for his arrest in the first instance

(3) On the appearance of the defendant in pursuance of the summons or warrant, or on his voluntary surrender, the Court shall direct the surety to be discharged from his obligation, and shall call upon the defendant to find fresh security

4 Where the defendant fails to comply with any order under rule 2 or rule 3, the Court may commit him to the civil prison until the decision of the suit or, where a decree is passed against the defendant, until the decree has been satisfied

Procedure where defendant fails to furnish security or find fresh security.

Provided that no person shall be detained in prison under this rule in any case for a longer period than six months, nor for a longer period than six weeks when the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit does not exceed fifty rupees

Provided also that no person shall be detained in prison under this rule after he has complied with such order

appearance by a warrant to the jailor (2) The defendant is to be committed until the suit is decided or where a decree is passed against him until the decree has been executed. The words in the former Code were "until execution of the decree". These last words were somewhat obscure. It was said that they could not mean until steps were taken to execute the decree as such a construction would put an immense power of oppression into the hands of the judgment creditor. It was held therefore that execution meant complete execution—that is until possession was given to the plaintiff of what was ordered by the decree. An arrest therefore under this section became after decree an arrest until the decree was satisfied or wholly executed. It therefore became subject to the limitation as to time imposed by sect 312 (now 58) which forbade extension of such arrest beyond the period of six months (7) The amendment gives effect to this view

(1) *Kelaram Majee v. Narain Das* 13 W R 278 (1870)

(2) *Ib.*

(3) *Ghanashamdas v. Joharimull* 7 B. 431 (1883). In *Re Kalla Chand*, 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 328 (1866) it was held that after decree the

commitment becomes one in execution, and that after judgment the debtor must have subsistence money or be released. S. 452 of the last Code however provided for subsistence money.

Attachment before judgment

[s 483] 5 (1) *Where, at any stage of a suit, the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him,—*

Where defendant may be called upon to furnish security for production of property

(a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property, or

(b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court,

[s 484] the Court may direct the defendant within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security

[s 483, last para] (2) The plaintiff shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof

[s 484, last para] (3) The Court may also in the order direct the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so specified

Scope of rule—This rule corresponds with sects 81 and 83 of Act VIII of 1859, and amalgamates sects 483 and 484 of the last Code. Clause (b) of the former sect 483 has been omitted. The main object of an attachment before judgment is to enable the plaintiff to realize the amount of the decree, supposing a decree is eventually made, from the defendant's property. (1) Though an attachment before judgment is directed by r 7 to be made in the same manner as attachment in execution, the objects for which these two sorts of attachment are made are entirely different. An attachment prior to decree is not an attachment for the enforcement of the decree but it is a step taken merely for preventing the debtor from delaying or obstructing such enforcement when the decree subsequently passed is sought to be executed. (2) An attachment after decree is an attachment made for the immediate purpose of carrying the decree into execution, and it presupposes an application on the

(1) *Ganu Singh v Jang Lal*, 26 C 531, 533 (1899) by preventing alienation or removal, but the process is inoperative to charge the property in the subject of the attachment. *Sarkies v Bundhoo Bacc*, 1 A 11 C R. 172 185 (1869) and see *Gamble v Bholaipur* 2 B H C R at p 160 (1866) or

create a lien. *Sarkies v Bundhoo Bacc* 1 A 11 C R at pp 184 185 (1869). See notes to r 6, post

(2) *Sri Rammanik v Tincowri Rai* 4 B J. R 63, 67, 68, 1 B (1869), *Basraim v Kattayanti*, 38 C 448 (1911), 15 C W N 795

part of the decree holder to have his decree executed (1) The scope and object of this and the following rules are merely to protect a plaintiff against loss arising from the defendant making away with his property pending the suit. They do not ensure to the plaintiff payment, in any event, of whatever may be decreed to him. They do so only so far as that is ensured by preventing the defendant making away with property (2)

The application.—The jurisdiction given to Civil Courts to attach before judgment should be exercised with great discretion, and no Court should grant such an attachment on light grounds or unless it is perfectly satisfied by trustworthy evidence that the defendant is about to dispose of his property or to remove it from the jurisdiction of the Court (3) In all applications for attachment before judgment, there must be *uberrima fides* on the part of the plaintiff, and where the most perfect good faith is wanting the application should be rejected (4) The application can be made at any stage of the suit, but can be entertained only so long as the suit is pending (5) The facts mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) must have been done with the intent mentioned in the first paragraph, namely, to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree which might be passed (6) Clause (a) says, is “*about to dispose of*,” etc., therefore the section does not apply where the defendant has actually parted with the property (7) The section does not refer exclusively to moveable property but applies to immoveable property also (8) Where it was contended that the words in sect 484 of the last Code, “*produce and place at the disposal of the Court*” show that moveable property only can be attached it was held that the term “*property*,” as used in the section was wide enough to include property of every description, moveable and immoveable, whether in the actual possession of the defendant or of some other person on his behalf, and the words mentioned only referred to such property as is capable of being produced in Court (9) Attachment of property covers its profits (10) A Small Cause Court cannot, however, attach immoveable property (11) Where the property is the property in suit, an injunction should be obtained under O XXXIX r 1 clause (a) which may be enforced under r 2 of that order by imprisonment or attachment. And where the property is not that in suit, an alternative remedy is given under r 1 of the same order, clause (b), where the word “*property*” is not confined to property within the jurisdiction or to property which is in dispute in the suit (12) This rule has no application in divorce proceedings (13)

(1) *Sri Rammanik v Tincowni Rai*, 4 B L R (F B) 63, 68 (1869)

(2) *Id.*, at p. 74

(3) *Gamble v Bholagur*, 2 B H G R 146, 161 (1866)

(4) *Ahmed Ali v Gladstone Wallis* 7 W R 503 (1867)

(5) *Sri Rammanik v Tincowni Rai*, 4 B L R (F B) at p. 68 (1869)

(6) *See Ram Narain v Levy*, 2 Hyde, 163 (1864)

(7) *Soorjee Kumar v Issur Chunder, Bourke*, 243 (1865)

(8) *Babambar v Sukhdas*, 16 A 180 (1864)

(9) *Chedi Lal v Kuarji Dicit*, 17 A. 62 (1894)

(10) *Ram Coomarr v Gobindnath* 12 W R 391 (1869), but if the owner is allowed to enjoy them the profits cease to be specifically liable as

(11) *Id.* *post*

(12) *Raja Goculdas v Jankibai*, 3 Bom L R 570 at p. 574 (1903), where it is pointed out that *Jaynarain George v Shubernahad*, 6 W R Misc 1 (1866) is not applicable, as s 93 of the Code of 1863 was expressly limited to the property in dispute

(13) *Phall ps v Phall ps*, 37 C. 613 (1910)

Property without the jurisdiction—It was held under the last Code both that the section did not (1) and did (2) apply where the property sought to be attached was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit was pending. A Court which cannot attach primarily in execution of its decree cannot attach in anticipation of it. It was therefore held under the Code of 1859, that a Court of Small Causes could not attach immoveable property under this section (3). This is the law now. It was held that the Court had jurisdiction where the property was a chose in action due from the Collector who, like the judgment debtor, resided within the jurisdiction of the attaching Court (4).

Effect of attachment—See notes to next rule.

Call for security—For form of order calling for security, see Sched I, App F, No 5. As to whether property beyond the jurisdiction can be attached under this rule, see last paragraph but one. Cause can be shown after security has been furnished to avoid attachment (5). Sect 145, *ante* applies to sureties under this rule (6). An order under sect 483 of the last Code was not one of those in respect of which an appeal was given under sect 588 of that Code (7) though an appeal lay from an order of attachment under the following section. An appeal lies under the present section (see O XLIII r 1 (g)). The words "*produce and place at the disposal of the Court*" refer only to such property as is capable of being produced in Court (8).

"Conditional attachment."—"Conditional attachment" might mean an attachment to be made conditionally on the security not being furnished or cause shown by the prescribed day, or it might mean an immediate attachment of a provisional kind conditioned to become plenary if security should not be furnished or cause shown according to the terms of the order. The form shows that the latter was the intention of the Legislature (9).

[s 485]

6 (1) *Where* the defendant fails to show cause why he should not furnish security, or fails to furnish the security required, within the time fixed by the Court, the Court may order that the

Attachment where cause
not shown or security not
furnished

(1) *Haji Jiva v Abubakar*, 8 B H C R O C J 29 (1871). *Balaram Mullick v Solano* 8 B L R 335 (1871), *Krishnasami v Engel*, 8 M 20 (1884), *Kedar Nath v Seova Veyana*, 1 C L R 336 (1878), *Ram Pertab v Pokur Mull*, Unreported, Suit 413 of 1893, Cal H C, referred to in 7 C W N 116, *Raja Goculdas v Jankibai*, 5 Bom L R 570 (1903) [the Court however, granted an injunction under s. 492, clause (b) of the last Code].

(2) *In re Abraham*, 6 B H C R, A C J 170 (1869) [but see *Haji Jiva v Abubakar*, 8 B H C R, O C J at p 37 where it is said the Judges afterwards considered that the ruling could not be sustained]. *Ram Pertab*

v Madho Rai, 7 C W N 216 (1902) [under s. 648 read with s. 483] and see remarks of Russell J., in *Raja Goculdas v Jankibai* 5 Bom L R 570, at p 574 (1903).

(3) *Marthamma v Kattu*, 6 M H C R J1 (1871).

(4) *Ravji Moreswar v Narayan Ballal*, 7 Bom L R 402 (1901).

(5) *Lotlikar v Lotlikar* 5 B 643 (1881).

(6) *Baboo Ram v Harkho Singh* 7 B P 322 (1867).

(7) See *Ahmed Ali v Gladstone Wyllye*, 7 W R 508 (1867).

(8) *Chedi Lal v Kaurji Dicht*, 17 A 62 (1894).

(9) *Lotlikar v Lotlikar*, *supra*, at p. 641.

property specified, or such portion thereof as appears sufficient to satisfy any decree which may be passed in the suit, be attached.

(2) *Where the defendant shows such cause or furnishes the required security, and the property specified or any portion of it has been attached, the Court shall order the attachment to be withdrawn, or make such other order as it thinks fit*

Order of attachment.—This rule corresponds with sect 84 of the Code of 1859. It is only on the defendant's failure to show cause or furnish security that attachment can be made. So the latter cannot be ordered unless security has first been demanded (1) and on one or other of the grounds stated in r 5 *ante* (2). As to the form of an order under this section, see Sched I, App F, No 7. An appeal lies from it (3).

Effect of attachment.—The property in the goods attached is in no wise altered by the attachment, but remains as before in the defendant. The Court, as it were, locks up the goods, so that they cannot be disposed of or carried away in any mode that would delay or defeat the execution of the decree if obtained (4). There is nothing in the Code which makes an attaching creditor a secured creditor, or creates any charge or lien in his favour over the property attached. The order does not purport to deal with any question of title. In other words, attachment prevents alienation, it does not confer title. The making of an order of attachment only operates so as to give the judgment creditor certain rights in execution (5). It has always been held that an attachment before judgment conferred on the plaintiff no right prior to that of the Official Assignee (6). And it makes no difference whether the vesting order is before or after decree, for it cannot be contended that a decree *qua* decree simply constitutes the judgment creditor a secured creditor, or gives him any charge or lien over the property of the judgment debtor (7). Under however, the Code of 1859, an attachment, previous to the date of the vesting order, in the

(1) Gobind Persad Khan, S D A. Sum Dec., 12th June, 1848.

(2) Begun Behari Ghose, *ib.*, 27th Sept., 1847.

(3) O XIII r 1 (g), Mir Ali r Bihari Lal, 21 B 273 (1890).

(4) Sava Ramji v Jadavji Nathu, 2 B H C R 142, 143 (1865), property passes not by seizure but by sale. Gamble v Bholagur 2 B H C R 146, at p. 155 (1866), though the judgment creditor, by force of the seizure, has at least a security, but this does not impart present property, nor even beneficial interest *ib.*, at p. 149.

(5) Kristnasawmy v Official Assignee, 20 M 673, 678 (1903), Peacock v Madan Gopal, 20 C. 428 (1902).

(6) Bank of Bengal v Newton, 12 B L R App 1 (1873), Petumber Mundlo v Gocool Das 1 Ind Jur, N J 327 (1866), Ramper saule Callachund, 1 Ind Jur, N S 325, 373 (1866), Gamble v Bholagur, 2 B H C R 142 (1866) Sarkis v Bundhoo Bacc 1 A H C R 172 (1866), Sava Ramji v Jadavji, 2 B H C R O C J 142 (1865), Shib Kristo v Muller 10 C 150 (1883), Sadagappa v Ponnama 8 M 64 (1885), Muller v Mon Mohun Roy 7 C 213 (1881), s.c. 8 C L R 213, Turner v Pestonji, 20 B. 403 (1895), Kristnasawmy v Official Assignee, 20 M 673 (1903).

(7) Kristnasawmy v Official Assignee, 20 M 673, at p. 679 (1903).

execution of a decree, conferred on the judgment creditor a right prior to that of the Official Assignee (1) This was so because under that Code the first attaching creditor had priority over other judgment creditors But no such priority is now allowed In fact, there is now no question of priority in a matter of this description, for under sect 295 (now 73) all decree holders who have applied for execution of their decrees for money against the same judgment debtor before the realization of assets from him are entitled to rateable distribution (2) As already stated an attachment creates no lien Whether the attachment be before or after judgment, all creditors are entitled to share rateably, subject to the provisions of sect 73 An attaching creditor has no exclusive claim until a sale at his instance has actually taken place The amendments of the law of procedure in this country have been based upon the principle that so far as possible the creditors should be treated *pari passu*, and that nothing short of actual realization of the debt due should give rights of priority (3)

Save and except in the two classes of cases mentioned in rr 9 and 10, the intention of the Legislature was that an attachment before judgment should be fully operative The effect of such an attachment, whether made before or after a decree is the same, provided that in the former case a decree is made for the plaintiff at whose instance the attachment takes place Therefore though there is no distinct provision such as that which is to be found in sect 64, any private alienation of property attached before judgment during the continuance of the attachment is void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment (4) An attachment does not affect rights of strangers See r 10, *post* Where an attachment under the former section, issued by a Court at the instance of a third party, prohibited the creditor from recovering and the debtor from paying the debt, it was held that an order on those terms was not an order staying the institution of a suit within the meaning of sect 15 of the Limitation Act (5)

[s 486]

7. *Save as otherwise expressly provided*, the attachment shall be made in the manner provided for the attachment of property in execution of a decree

Mode of attachment.—This section corresponds with sect 85 of the Code of 1859 As to attachment of property in execution, see O XXI, *ante* See also Forms in Sched I, the concluding words of the former section, "for money," have been omitted

(1) Anand Chandra Pal v Panchulal Sarma, 5 B L R 691, 1 B (1870), s c, 14 W R (F R) 33, Aga Mahomed v Jallah, 7 B L R 50 (1871), s c 17 W R 234

Ramsack Lall Mitter, 15 C 202 (1884)
(3) Kristnasawmi v Official Assignee, M 673, 680 (1903)

(4) Ganu Singh v Jangal Lal, 20 C 531 (1899), Sarkis v Bundhoo Baco, 1 A H C B 172, 180 (1860)

(5) Betti Maharani v Collector of Ltwah, 17 A 138 (1891), 11 A 112 (1892)

8 Where any claim is preferred to property attached before judgment, such claim shall be investigated in the manner hereinbefore provided for the investigation of claims to property attached in execution of a decree for the payment of money

Claims to attached property—This rule corresponds with sect 86 of the Code of 1859 (1) The order dealing with the investigation of claims is O XXI rr 58-63, which must therefore be applied to cases of attachment before judgment (2) In the last-mentioned case it was said that this section, which prescribes the manner of investigation, is silent as to the result, the Court apparently considering that the sections following sect 278 of the last Code had not been applied But however this may be, if the defendant has ceased to have any interest in the property, as where a vesting order in insolvency has been made, it is clear that the attachment ought to be raised for when the law directs the claim to be investigated it implies that if the claim is made good the attachment, which was intended merely to preserve the defendant's interest from the effect of private alienations, shall come to an end (3) The omission to object to the validity of the attachment, on the ground that property sought to be attached is not transferable at the time when the application is made for attachment before judgment, does not operate as a bar to the investigation of the objection when an application has been made for execution of the decree made in the suit (4)

9. Where an order is made for attachment before judgment, the Court shall order the attachment to be withdrawn when the defendant furnishes the security required, together with security for the costs of the attachment, or when the suit is dismissed.

Removal of attachment—This rule, which corresponds to sect 87 of the Code of 1859, indicates that in the event of the suit not being dismissed or decreed, the attachment shall subsist, and save in the case mentioned in this rule and in the next, the intention of the Legislature was that an attachment before judgment should be fully operative (5) For the former words 'the Court which passed the order shall remove' have been substituted the words italicized.

(1) See *George v Ram Rutton* 3 Agra 272, *Ram Rutton v Gobind*, 2 Agra 141
Raumanik Shaw v Doobram Pantool 2 Hyde, 22

(2) *Turner v Pestonji* 20 B. 403 (1830)
Hashmat Bibi v Bhagwan Das, 30 L. G. (1913)

(3) *Id.*, p. 407 In *Mir Ali v Behari Lal*,

21 B. 73 (1830) it was held, unsuccessfully, that the attachment remedy was *unlawful*

(4) *Basiram v K...* (1911)

(5) *Gang...* 34 (1877)

[s 489]

10 Attachment before judgment shall not affect the

Attachment before
judgment not to affect
rights of strangers, nor
bar decree-holder from
applying for sale

rights, existing prior to the attachment, of persons not parties to the suit, nor bar any person holding a decree against the defendant from applying for the sale of the property under attachment in execution of such decree

Rights of third parties—The attachment does not by this rule (1) affect the rights of persons not parties to the suit. Therefore the rights of rival creditors cannot be affected by it (2) But these rights must now exist prior to the attachment (3) The attachment does not prevent the property being sold in execution of another decree, whether that decree has been obtained before or after the attachment (4) The main object of the attachment before judgment being to prevent the defendant from disposing of or removing his property from the jurisdiction this rule, it has been said, proves that this prevention is not intended merely for the benefit of the attaching creditor, but may enure also to the benefit of other persons (5) Though one person may have secured the goods another decree holder may apply for the sale of them (6) In a recent case in the Bombay High Court, where the plaintiff had obtained a money decree against a Mitakshara coparcener, after having obtained attachment before judgment of certain joint-property, and the debtor had died before execution it was held on appeal that a subsequent application to execute the decree had been rightly dismissed, since an attachment before judgment is merely precautionary and creates no charge, and so could not defeat another coparcener's title by survivorship (7) As to insolvency, see notes to r 6, ante

[s 490]

11 Where property is under attachment by virtue of the

Property attached before
judgment not to be re-
attached in execution of
decree

provisions of this Order and a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff, it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution of such decree to apply for a re-attachment of the property

"Re attachment"—It has already been pointed out that the rules of which this is one differ in their respective objects and consequences (8) Their

(1) As to the object of the introduction of this provision which corresponds with a 89 of the Code of 1859, see *Sarkies v Bundhoo Bace*, 1 A M C R 172, at p 185 (1863)

(2) *Sri Rammanik v Sincowri Rai* 4 B L R (B B) at p 69 (1869)

(3) *Sie Gamble v Bhola gur*, 2 B H C R 117, 160 (1866), *Shib Kristo v Miller*, 10 C at p 165 (1883)

(4) *Referred Case*, 6 M H C R 135 (1871)

(5) *Gamble v Bhola gur*, 2 B H C R. at p. 160 (1866)

(6) *Bendut Roy v Sree Canto Maity* 43 C 639, 613 (1906)

(7) *Subra Mangesh Chaudavarkar v Maha devi Kom Manjibhatta*, 38 B. 100 (1913), *Ramanayya v Rangapayya*, 17 M. 144 (1873), *Pallonji Shajurji Mistry v Jordan*, 12 B 400 (1888)

(8) *See ante*, notes to r 6.

object is to ensure to a plaintiff payment of his decree. Although they do not ensure this in any event, they do so only so far as that is ensured by preventing the defendant making away with property (1). In other words, the attachment does not of necessity ensure the property to the person who attaches it, provided only he eventually gets a decree. The plaintiff must not only wait until he has obtained a decree, but he is not competent to proceed against the property attached until he has taken the preliminary steps the law requires for its enforcement (2). He must, in other words, apply for execution just like any other creditor (3). This is now made clear by the addition of the words "*upon an application for execution of such decree*". When, however, an application for execution is made, by the terms of this rule no application for attachment is

attachment in execution is that on which application for execution is made (5). It has been held that an attachment before judgment cannot be regarded as the inception of an execution, or as binding the goods in such a manner as to exclude the right of a third party (such as the Official Assignee) accruing after such attachment, but before judgment and warrant for execution (6).

12. *Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to authorize the plaintiff to apply for the attachment of any agricultural produce not attachable before judgment in the possession of an agriculturist, or to empower the Court to order the attachment or production of such produce.*

"Agricultural produce"—The exemption of a portion of growing crops

(1) See *Rammanik v Tincowri Rai*, 4 B L R. (F B) 63, 75 (1869).

(2) *Ib.*, at p 68, namely, proceedings in execution, which are proceedings by which the judgment-creditor seeks to establish a right to have his money paid out of the property of the judgment debtor. *Aga Mahomed v Judah*, 7 B L R. at pp 53, 54 (1871), and which though preserved by the attachment before judgment remains his until it is taken in execution for satisfaction of the decree.

(3) *Palloni v Jordan*, 12 B 400 (1886), *followed in Sewdut Roy v Sree Canto Manti*, 33 C 639, 644 (1906). It is to be observed that the rule does not say that execution is dispensed with, but that it is not necessary to re-attach in execution, that is, when execution is applied for and granted. Further, necessary if it desired to control

the rights of rival decree holders. (See *Sri Rammanik v Tincowri Rai*, 4 B L R. at p 67, F B (1869), though it is not now necessary to re-attach, as was held in that case.)

(4) *Ih.*, *Bhagwan Chandra v Chandra Mala*, 1 C L J. 97 (1902), in this respect the law is now settled, it being previously a matter of doubt whether a new attachment was, *Sri Rammanik v Tincowri Rai*, B L R. (F B) 63 (1869), or was not, *Sarkies v Bundhoo Bace*, 1 A H C R 172, 186 (1869), necessary.

(5) See as to this, remarks in last case at p 68, though the point of date has not the same importance now that rateable distribution is allowed under s. 73.

(6) *Gamble v Bholagur*, 2 B H C R 146, at p. 159 (1866).

in execution of decrees necessitated a similar exemption from attachment before judgment. It was considered, however, that there were practical difficulties in the way of adopting the same procedure, and an agriculturalist possessing a growing crop is unlikely to abscond, and unable, except at maturity, to remove it. It has therefore been thought that the attachment of growing crops before judgment was productive of hardship, and that there was no sufficient reason for its retention.

ORDER XXXIX.

Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders.

Temporary Injunctions

1. *Where* in any suit it is proved by affidavit or other-

Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.

wise—

(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or

- (b) that the defendant threatens, or *intends*, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors,

the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the Court thinks fit, *until the disposal of the suit or until further orders*

2. (1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from

Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.

committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may,

at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right

(2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit

(3) In case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term

not exceeding six months, *unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.*

(1) No attachment under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the *disobedience or breach continues*, the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit, and *shall* pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.

Injunctions—An injunction is a judicial process, whereby a party is required to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing according to the exigency of the order (1) Remedies for the non performance of a duty are either compensatory, that is by an award of damages (a remedy which is often useless or inadequate), or specific, that is by taking away the option to pay damages for non-performance and compelling the party in default to do or forbear the very thing which he is bound to do or forbear under sanction of the penalty, in case of disobedience, of imprisonment or attachment of his property, or both (2) The issue of an injunction is then a form of specific relief. It is preventive relief. The exercise of the jurisdiction to grant relief is not *ex debito justitiæ*, but a matter of discretion, though such discretion is not arbitrary, but guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal (3) It is granted *quia timet*, that is because the party fears some future probable inquiry. It is, of course, therefore, not necessary that a wrong should have been actually committed before the Court will interfere (4) The best guides in the matter of interference have been judicially stated to be the principles which determine the action of Courts of Equity in England, (5) though the peculiar circumstances of the country are also to be considered (6) Injunctions are either perpetual or temporary. The perpetual injunction is a decree. Such an injunction is regulated by the Specific Relief Act (7) Temporary injunctions are granted by interlocutory order at any period of a suit, and being intended merely to preserve the *status quo* pending the decision, are regulated as procedure by the Code. Apart, however, from the special circumstances which determine whether the Court should, in its discretion, grant an injunction before the hearing of the suit, the same general principles must equally apply to the granting of a temporary, as to a perpetual, injunction, and these principles must, therefore, be sought in the Specific Relief Act itself (8) This statement has been qualified (9)

(1) Woodroffe's Law of Injunctions, 3rd ed p 19, where the subject will be found treated in detail

(2) *Ib.*, 11

(3) *Ib.*, 16

(4) *Ib.*, 15

(5) *Ib.*, 3, Nusservanji Morwanji Panday v Gordon, 6 B 266, 279, 284 (1883), Land Mortgage Bank v Ahmedbhai Habibbhai, 8 B 35, 67 (1883), Chundal Mancharam v Manushankar Atmaram, 18 B 610, 613 (1893),

Ghanasham Nilkant Nadiarn v Moroba Ranchandra Pat, 18 B 474, 488 (1884), Shamnugger Jute Factory v Ram Narain Chatterjee, 14 C. 189, 199, 200 (1886)

(6) Woodroffe, 7, and cases there cited

(7) Act I of 1877, ss. 52-57

(8) Nusservanji Morwanji Panday v Gordon, 6 B 266, 279 (1883)

(9) Subba Naidu v Haji Budsha Sahib, 10 M 163 (1902)

So it has been held that sect 56 of the Specific Relief Act does not affect injunctions in restraint of sale in execution under sect 142 (now r 1) of the Code, (1) whilst, on the other hand, the precise terms of that section (though it is submitted erroneously) (2) have been held to exclude the grant of an injunction in a case not falling within its express provisions. (3)

An injunction, whether perpetual or temporary, may be mandatory, that is, framed to compel the performance of a positive act, or non mandatory, that is, a negative prohibition against the doing of a particular act (4)

The subject-matter of an injunction is the actual or threatened infringement of some legal right. The grant is not limited to cases of injury to property. So the publication of libel or injury to personal status may be restrained. (5) The subject matter is more particularly stated in the Code of Specific Relief Act. It may be classified as follows. (A) Injunctions in respect of Civil Judicial Proceedings being either actions or proceedings in execution, (B) in respect of acts not being Judicial Proceedings, viz, in the case of obligations arising from (a) contract, (b) trust, (c) in tort

An injunction will only be issued in favour of the person or persons whose legal right has been infringed, and against persons against whom the claim of the plaintiff is, in fact, rightly laid, provided they be within the reach of the Court, amenable to its jurisdiction, and bearing such a character as renders them personally so amenable (6). In so far as it is a remedy against an individual it will be issued only in respect of acts done by him against whom it is sought to be enforced. So an injunction cannot be obtained against executors on account of acts done by their testator though they may be restrained in respect of acts done by themselves. Nor does an injunction run with the land (7). And it has been held that in a representative suit an injunction will only be binding on those who are parties to the record (8).

The essentials to the grant of relief by way of injunction are (a) relief cannot be granted merely to enforce a penal law, (b) there must be a civil (9) pending action in which it may be granted (c) the cognizance of the suit itself must not be barred, and (d) the Court must otherwise have jurisdiction to

(1) *Amar Dulh n v Administrator General* 23 C 351 (1895)

(2) *Rash Behary Dey v Bhowanee Charan Bhose*, 34 C 97 (1906) dissenting from case in next note. *Mingie Chand v Gopal Ram* 34 C 101 (1906)

(3) *Jairam Das v Zamon Lal*, 27 B 157 (1903)

(4) *Woodroffe*, 25. But in a recent case in the Bombay High Court it was held by one of the Judges whether a mandatory injunction can be considered as a temporary one under this rule and whether a mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application under it: *Hassid Karim v Pirbhai Amulhal Jh B* 381 (1914)

(5) 1b, 26.

(6) 1b 31

(7) *Att Gen v Birmingham, etc. Drainage Board*, 59 L J Ch 786 *Dayabhai v Bhalal* 26 B 140 (1901) *Sakar Lal v Bai Purvatbai*, 26 B 283 (1901)

(8) *Sahib Thambi Marakayar v Hamid Marakayar*, 36 M 414 (1911) *Srinivasa Aiyangar v Arjya Srinivasa* 23 M 493 (1910)

(9) In *Malharao Deshwant v Maniklal Munshanlar* 2 Bom L R 97 (1900) the Court stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether s 647 of the last Code extended 492 of that Code to proceedings under the Probate Act of 1831 but that the Court should, in preference follow the special powers given in s 34 of that Act

try the suit (1) As to this, "Equity acts *in personam*," that is, the Court's directions are addressed to the defendant personally, and they are not regarded as directly affecting the subject-matter in dispute. The application of the maxim in India is subject to the statute. The Code (2) has given to Mofussil Courts the power to act *in personam*. The Presidency High Courts under their Charters have a similar, but in terms less restricted, jurisdiction (3). Injunctions may be granted by all Civil Courts with the exception of Presidency and Provincial Small Cause Courts. The jurisdiction may be exercised either by a Court of first instance, or of appeal (4). The Court of first instance has, *before* appeal, no jurisdiction to grant an injunction after the claim is dismissed, and it has no jurisdiction *after* the appeal has been admitted to issue an injunction during the pendency of the appeal. Nor *a fortiori* when a suit for an injunction is dismissed, can the Court which dismisses such suit take upon itself to stay by injunction the execution of a decree passed in another suit (5). The Appellate Court has the same power in respect of the grant of an injunction as the first Court had (6). The Court may also interfere in revision (7).

The High Courts may enforce these orders by proceedings for contempt (8) and the Code (r 2) invests Courts with power to compel obedience (9). The Code has also provided for the enforcement of decrees granting permanent injunctions (10). An injunction operates from the date of the order being made and not from the time of the sealing of the writ or even from the time of its being drawn up, and a party who has notice of an order is bound by it from the time it is pronounced. An injunction must, however erroneous it may be, be obeyed until it is discharged. It has, however, no effect in altering the rights of property (11).

Though the issue of an injunction is a matter of discretion, the latter is governed by certain general judicial principles (12). As an injunction is not to be arbitrarily refused where a proper case for its issue is made out, so it is not to be granted merely on the ground that it can do no harm (13). The subject-

(1) Woodroffe, 36-49, *et ibi casus*.

(2) S 16 *ante*. Crisp v Watson, 20 C 689 (1893). Vithalrao v Vaghoji, 17 B 570, 572 (1892).

(3) Letters Patent s 19, 24 & 25 Viet c 104, s 9. H H Holkar v Dadabhai, 14 B 353 (1890). Rajmohan Bose v East Indian Ry Co, 10 B L R 241 248 (1872). East Indian Ry v Bengal Coal Co, 1 C 95, 100 (1875). Delhi and London Bank v Wordie, 1 C 249, 251, 263 (1876).

(4) Woodroffe 54 *et seq.* as to the power of the Court of first instance, see in particular Yamin ud Doulat v Ahmed Ali Khan, 21 C 561 (1894).

(5) Gossain Money Puro v Guru Pershad Singh, 11 C 146 (1884).

(6) Shaikh Moheemooddeen v Shaikh Ahmed Hossein, 14 W R 334 335 (1876). Gossain Money Puro v Guru Pershad Singh, *supra*.

Kurpa Dayal v Ramkushore, 10 L 80 (1887). Kanahu Ram v Biddya Ram, 549, 551 n (1878) see s 102, O XVII r 11, s 103, O XLV r 13, O XLIV r 1.

(7) Chandidhat Jha v Padmanand Singh Bahadur, 22 C 459 (1893). Gossain Money Puro v Guru Pershad Singh 11 C 146 (1884). Ius v Luis, 12 M 156 (1888). Israel v Shamser Rahman 41 C 437, 19 C L J 47 (1913).

(8) See notes, *post*, Woodroffe, 71 *et seq*.

(9) *Ib*.

(10) *Ib*.

(11) Woodroffe, 82.

(12) See Woodroffe, 80 *et seq.*, where the subject is more fully discussed.

(13) Dunn v Bryan, 7 R R 174 143. Noyan Miaser v Rupkun J C 609, 611 (1882).

matter of a temporary injunction is the protection of legal rights *pendens litigation*. Its object is to prevent future injury, leaving matters as far as possible *in statu quo* until the suit in all its bearings can be heard and determined (1) In exercising jurisdiction the Court does not pretend to determine the legal rights, but merely keeps the property in its actual condition until the legal title can be established. It interferes on the assumption that the party who seeks its interference has the legal right which he asserts, but needs the aid of the Court for the protection of the legal right or of the property in question until the legal right can be ascertained. The Court upon an application for a temporary injunction will deal with the injunction upon the evidence before it, and will confine itself strictly to the immediate object sought and as far as possible abstain from prejudging the question in the cause (2) A temporary injunction is thus not decisive upon the merits, whilst a perpetual injunction being in effect a decree, is conclusive upon all parties in interest.

The general rules governing the grant of relief are (a) the applicant must show a fair *prima facie* case in support of the right claimed, (3) (b) and an actual or threatened violation of that right, (4) (c) productive of irreparable or at least serious damage. (5) So a temporary injunction will not be granted to restrain a wrong which is a mere technical invasion of the plaintiff's rights and does not threaten serious injury (6) As has been concisely said the Court will not grant an injunction unless *real injury* is apprehended (7) (d) The applicant's conduct should be such as not to disentitle him to assistance. It should be fair and honest and free from acquiescence or delay (8) A less degree of acquiescence or delay will bar relief on an interlocutory application than at the final hearing. Apart from the fact that delay is calculated to throw doubt upon the reality of the alleged injury, it is not really material unless it has prejudiced the defendant (9) (e) There must be a greater convenience in granting than in refusing the injunction (10) Where however there is a right it

(1) *Stephens v Trustees Port of Bombay* 1 B 145 (1876)

(2) *Gopeenath Mookerjee & Bally Doss Mullick*, 10 C 223, 231 (1883) *Chandidat Jha v Padmanand Singh Bahadur* 22 C 549 466 (1895), *Moran v River Steam Navigation Co.*, 14 B I R 357 (1875)

(3) *Woodroffe*, 82 *et seq.*, and cases there cited, and in particular, the Indian cases, *Moran v River Steam Navigation Co.* 14 B L R 352, 357 (1875) *Gomes v Carter* 1 Ind. Jur N S 411, 412 (1866), *Chandidat Jha v Padmanand Singh Bahadur* 22 C 459 464 465 (1895)

(4) *Ib.*, 101, cf. Act I of 1877 s 51 [invades or threatens to invade] *Benode Coomaree Dossee v Soudamney Dossee* 18 C 257 (1889), *Dindu Basini Chowdhuran v Jahnabi Chowdhuran*, 24 C 260 (1896) *Kalidas Jivram v Gor Parjaram Hurji* 15 B 309 (1890); *Chabildas v Municipal Commissioners, Bombay*, 8 B H C R 85 (1871),

Krishna Ayyan v Venkateshella Muthal, 7 M H C R 60 71 (1872) *Ghivasslam Ndkant Nadkarni v Morba Ramchandrai* Pat 18 B 488 (1894)

(5) *Woodroffe* 82

(6) *Spelling v Laxraorhury Relief* s 19

(7) *Hillard Inj* s 14 The term irreparable injury must be considered with reference to the circumstances peculiar to the country. *Anantnath Dey v Mackintosh*, 6 B L R 571 (1871)

(8) *Woodroffe* 96 *et seq.*

(9) *Ib.* at p 103 *Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd* L R 5 P C 239

(10) *Ib.* 104 *Gomes v Carter*, 1 Ind Jur N S 411 412 (1866) *Anantnath Dey v Mackintosh* 6 B L R 571, 573 (1871), *Rupul Khettry v Mahima Chandra Roy*, 5 B I R 254, 257 (1870), *Subba Naidu v Haji Badsha Sahab*, 26 M 168, 176 (1892), *Shamuggur Jute Factory Co v Ram Naidu Chatterjee*, 14 C 189 200 (1886)

cannot, it has been said, be limited by the religious prejudices of neighbours (1) (f) Lastly, equally efficacious relief must not be obtainable by any other usual remedy except in case of breach of trust (2) In a recent case it was held that in deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction the Court should consider whether there was a substantial question pending decision as to the rights of the parties, and whether the nature of that question was such that it was proper that an injunction should meanwhile be granted and whether there would be a greater convenience in granting it (3)

With certain exceptions the aforementioned principles apply equally to perpetual as well as to temporary injunctions. These exceptions are that whereas upon an application for a temporary injunction the plaintiff is required merely to show a clear *prima facie* case, in order to obtain a grant of a perpetual injunction, the legal right must have been established as well as the fact of its actual or threatened violation productive of serious damage (4) In the case of alleged acquiescence a stronger case must be made than would be a bar upon an interlocutory application

A mandatory injunction, that is, an order compelling a defendant to restore things to the condition in which they were at the time when the plaintiff's complaint was made may be either temporary or perpetual, and, generally speaking, the principles regulating its grant are those which are applicable to preventive injunctions, temporary or perpetual as the case may be (5) It has, however, been doubted by one of the Judges in a recent case in the Bombay High Court whether a mandatory injunction can in strictness be considered as a temporary injunction under this rule (6) Prompt action is essential if a mandatory injunction is the desired remedy (7)

Practice as to issue of injunctions—See notes to rr 3, 4, *post*

Breach of injunction—As already stated an injunction has operation from the time it is pronounced. With whatever irregularities the proceedings may be affected, or however erroneously the Court may have acted in granting the injunction, it must be obeyed until it is properly dissolved. In order

(1) Behari Lal v Ghisa Lal, 24 A 499 (1902)

(2) Woodroffe 105

(3) Israel v Shamser Rahman, 41 C 437 (1913) Cf Dwijendra Narain Roy v Purnandu Narain Roy, 11 C L J 189 (1910), Walker v Jones (1865), L R 1 P C 50

(4) Ib., 130. Krishna Ayyan v Venkata chella Mudali 7 M H C R. 60, 71 (1872). Akilandammal v Venkatachella Mudali, 6 M H C R. 112, 116 (1871)

(5) Woodroffe, 110, see Kadarbhai v Rohumbhai 13 B 674 (1889), Chandra Nath Pal v Sree Gobind Chowdhuri, 6 C W N 708 (1900), Jannadas Shankarlal v Maram Harjivan, 2 B 137, 139 (1877), Shamnuggur Jute Factory v Ram Narain Chatterjee, 14 C 189, 200 (1880), Vaganlal Chhotalal, 26 B

136 (1901), Nandkishor Balgovan v Bhagubhai Pranvalabhdas, 8 B 98 (1883), Navroji v Dastur, 28 B 20 (1903) and cases in next note but one

compelling defendant to remove a screen blocking up an opening which plaintiff had made in his wall and the High Court held that the grant of such injunction was a material irregularity. But see Woodroffe on Injunctions, 3rd ed., p 188, 189

(7) Ghanasham Nulant Nadkarni v Moroba Ramchandra Pal, 18 B 492 (1894), Rnodo Coomaroo Dossee v Soulanney Dossee, 16 C 272 (1889), Haji Syed Mahomed v Galab Rai, 20 A 315 (1898)

to see whether the operation of an injunction has been interfered with, regard must be had to the terms of the injunction itself. If it has been disobeyed, then proceedings in the matter of the contempt will lie against those in active disobedience and those who abet them. The High Courts have all the powers of a Court of Equity in England for enforcing these decrees *in personam*. This jurisdiction has not been affected by the Code (1). It has been held that a District Court is not a Court of Record, and as such has no inherent power to commit for contempt (2). However this may be, the Code gives powers which according to the last cited case are only exerciseable when the Court is put in motion by a party who deems himself aggrieved. Sub rule (3) has been remodelled. See Bombay decision, cited (3). The Code, while providing a specific penalty for the breach of an injunction, does not provide that one of the penalties which result from infringement is that any dealing with property the subject of an injunction contrary to its terms is illegal and void. The words of the rule are not to be read as providing for any other penalty than that which is therein specially mentioned (4). Sect. 188 of the Penal Code does not apply to an order made by way of injunction in a civil suit between party and party (5).

As an injunction operates from the date of the order being made, a party may be committed for the disobedience of an order between the date it is made and the date of its issue, the reason being that if the rule were otherwise the party against whom the order was made would have all that time during which he might defeat it (6). A party, therefore, who has notice of an order, is bound by it from the time it is pronounced, and any means of information whereby notice is actually received is sufficient. It not being requisite that a defendant should be officially apprised of the injunction or be served with process in order to render him liable for contempt (7).

In order to decide whether there has been an actual breach of the injunction, it is important to observe the objects for which the relief was granted as well as the circumstances attending it. The violation of the spirit of an injunction even though its strict letter may not have been disregarded, is a breach of the Court's orders (8). On the other hand, when the conduct complained of although literally a breach of the injunction, is not so in spirit and where defendants have acted in good faith and there is no evidence of any intention on their part to violate the order, they will be held guiltless (9). It is however, no answer for a defendant to say that he has acted under advice (10). Only the person against whom an injunction is issued may be committed for its breach, but a person who with knowledge of an injunction against a particular person, aids

(1) *Hassonbhoy v Cowasji Jehangir Jassawalla* 7 B 1 (1891), *Narvahoo v Narotm das Candas*, 7 B 5 (1882), *H. H. Holkar v Ashburner*, 14 B 303 309 (1890), *Martin v Lawrence*, 4 C 605 (1879).

(2) *Korsaji v Sachu Das* 26 W 494 (1902).

(3) *Advocate General, Bombay v Ganji Akhai*, 19 B 152 153 (1891).

(4) *Delhi & London Bank v Ram Narain* 9 A 497, 499 (1887), *Manchar Das v Ram Autar Pandit*, 20 A 431 (1903).

(5) *In re Chandra Kanta De* 6 C 445 (1880).

(6) *Woodroffe* 74 *et seq*.

(7) *Ib*.

(8) *Grand Junction Canal Co v Dimas*, 17 Sim. 38.

(9) *Fraas v Bailment*, 10 Green 84 (Amer.), *Woodroffe*, 76.

(10) *Pranpradas Harjandas v Mavaram Samaldas* 1 Bom. H. C. R. O. C. J. 118 (1863).

and assists that person to commit a breach of the injunction may himself be committed for contempt though not for breach of the injunction (1) As regards permanent injunctions, they are decrees, and are enforceable as such (2)

Appeal, Review, Revision—An appeal lies from an order under rr 1, 2, 4 See O XLIII r 1 (r) And it has been held that since an order under r 1 means any order passed under r 1, and since under that rule a Court has the power of refusing an injunction, an appeal lies against an order refusing an injunction (3) It is essential to prove a wrong exercise of discretion (4) But in the under mentioned cases (5) a second appeal was held not to lie It has been held that no appeal lies from an order refusing to grant an injunction without notice (6) A permanent injunction is appealable as a decree (7) The Court may, under sect 115, revise an order, (8) or under sect 114, review (9) Where on an application for the issue of a temporary injunction the Court ordered the defendants to furnish security, it was held that this was not an order under r 1 of this rule, and was not appealable under O XLIII r 1 (10)

Damage or alienation, waste—Sometimes an injunction, whether temporary or perpetual, is the instrument by which the Court specifically enforces the obligation if arising on contract, or specifically restrains the violation of those other obligations which are the subjects of the law of tort In other cases a temporary injunction is merely incident or ancillary to the general relief in this sense that it seeks merely to preserve the *status quo*, enjoining interference *pendente lite* by waste, damage or alienation with the subject of litigation or the fraudulent disposition of his property by a party defendant to a suit These two rules regulate the grant of temporary injunctions, the latter relating to temporary injunctions in cases of contract or tort, the former relating to injunctions against interference with the subject of litigation here spoken of as injunctions *pendente lite*

In the case of injunctions in matters of contract and tort, it is not necessary to separately consider temporary and perpetual injunctions in cases of contract, for the kinds of cases, whether of contract or tort, in which an injunction, either temporary or perpetual, may be granted, do not differ from each other If the case, as alleged, be such that at the hearing a perpetual injunction would not be granted, then clearly a temporary injunction ought not to be granted before the hearing, though of course, it does not follow that a temporary injunction

(1) Woodroffe, 76

(2) See O XIX. r 32, Woodroffe, 65, Bhoobun Mohun Mundal v Nobin Chunder Bullub, 10 B L R app 12 (187-), Protap Chunder Das v Pary Chowdhra, 8 C 174 (1881)

(3) Hari Lal v Prajag Ram, 17 C. W N 596, 18 C. L J 39 (1913), and see Lachmi Narain v Ram Charan Das, 35 A. 420 (1913)

(4) Umesh Chandra v Nibaran Chandra, 19 C. L J 5 (1913)

(5) Kamadhan v Janardhan, 1 Bom

L. R 138 (1902), Venkatajathi Naidu v Arumalai Chetti, 24 M. 417 (1901).

(6) Lutz v Lutz, 12 M. 186 (1888)

(7) As to application for execution, see Sadagopa v Krishnamachari, 12 M. 361 (1889)

(8) See last case, Gossain Money Purse v Gour Ierabad Singh, 11 C. 146 (1881)

(9) See Dhurondhar Sen v Agra Bank, 5 C. 80 (1879)

(10) Sato Mahton v Christian 17 C. W N 315 (191-)

will be granted before the hearing, in every case in which a perpetual injunction might fitly be granted at the hearing, for to justify a temporary injunction, not only must the case be such that an injunction is the appropriate relief but there must be the further ingredient that, unless the defendant is at once restrained by injunction, irreparable injury or inconvenience may result to the plaintiff before the suit can be decided upon its merits.

In the limited class of cases which are now to be considered, the injunctions are always from the nature of the case of a temporary character, and must thus be separately considered.

Injunctions may thus be roughly divided into (A) injunctions whether temporary or perpetual in cases of (a) contract or (b) tort (r 2) and (B) temporary injunctions against (a) interference with the subject matter of litigation or (b) fraudulent disposition of property pending litigation (r 1).

The power given by r 1, clause (a), is substantially the same as that long exercised by English Courts of Equity. The object is to restrain the defendant from doing anything which may prevent the property remaining *in statu quo* during the pendency of a suit, upon the principle that when the plaintiff seeks to recover property in specie the defendant shall not be allowed to decide the question in his own favour by dealing or making away with the property the right to which is the question in dispute. So the Court will restrain not only waste or damage to the subject of litigation whether moveable or immoveable property, but may also restrain the mere alienation of property whether moveable or immoveable. For in every case the plaintiff might be put to the expense of making the vendor a party to the proceeding, and at all events his title if he prevails in the action, may be embarrassed by such new outstanding title under the transfer (1). The Court, even though it acts on the doctrine of *lis pendens* will prevent, if possible, the necessity of proceeding on such a principle and will not in a proper case deprive a suitor of the more effective protection of an injunction (2). This clause deals with suits in which a claim is made for specific property in the hands of the defendants, and it is only in such suits that any question can arise of waste, damage or alienation. The object of the exercise of the jurisdiction is to secure the safety of that specific property which is in dispute in the suit pending the litigation, as also at its close to secure that any decree which may be made with reference thereto shall not prove unfructuous (3).

The power, however, of issuing an injunction *pendente lite* ought to be most cautiously exercised. It is only in cases where property, which it is essential should be kept in its existing condition during the pendency of the suit, is in danger of being destroyed, damaged, or put beyond the power of the Court, that the latter ought to interfere so as to restrain persons who may turn out in the final event of the litigation to be the actual owners of the property from proper enjoyment and possession of it (4).

(1) See Collett v Specific Performance, 265-273, Story, Eq. Jur., 906-908, 2nd English Edition.

(2) Hood v Aston, 1 Russ 412, one of the large number of cases dealing with injunctions restraining the negotiation of negotiable

instruments and the transfer of stock, securities and other like *indicia* of property.

(3) Goluck Chunder Gooch v Moha Chunder Ghose, 13 W R. 95, 96 (1870).

(4) Mun Mohinoo Dasce v Ist Dasce, 13 W R. 60 (1870), per

Immoveable property should always, if possible, be retained *in statu quo*, until the suit which is to determine the title to it shall have been decided (1)

The restraint imposed need not necessarily be absolute, but should be such as the circumstances require. So where the subject matter of the injunction comprised mortgage bonds and Government promissory notes the order of injunction while prohibiting any alienation of or dealing with the bonds or notes by the defendant, permitted him to sue upon the mortgage bond and take steps to realize the amount covered thereby, and ordered the money when realized to be kept in Court, until the disposal of the suit, and as regards the promissory notes permitted him to draw the interest as it fell due from time to time (2)

In granting a temporary injunction restraining the alienation of property, the subject of suit, the Court will, as in the case of other injunctions, first see that there is a *bona fide* contention between the parties, and then on which side, in the event of obtaining a successful result to the suit, will be the balance of inconvenience (3) if the injunction do not issue, bearing in mind the principle (already alluded to) of retaining immoveable property *in statu quo* (4)

The wrongful sale of property in execution of a decree is only one form of alienation which may be restrained *pendente lite* (5). Even a judicial sale, if wrongful will be restrained upon principles and circumstances which are hereafter dealt with.

In order to obtain an injunction under the rule there must be, (a) a suit in which the injunction may be granted, (b) and (b) the threatened danger of waste damage or alienation must be *alleged and proved*; (7) (c) in respect of property which is in *dispute* in that suit (8)

"Wrongfully sold in execution"—This is one of several forms of injunction in restraint of judicial proceedings (9). Prior to the Specific Relief Act the High Court restrained by injunction proceedings to be instituted and pending, as also proceedings not instituted but threatened, and prohibited the execution of decrees which had been or might be obtained (10). The matter is now as regards permanent injunctions governed by the Specific Relief Act and as regards temporary injunctions in part by the Code. An opinion has been expressed that temporary injunctions are limited to matters mentioned in sections 492 and 493 (now rr 1 and 2) of the Code. And on this ground the Court refused an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant proceeding with a suit filed by the defendant against the plaintiff in the Small Cause Court until the hearing of a suit in the High Court in which an application for an injunction was made (11). But this case has been dissented from (12). It seems anomalous

(1) *Gomes v Carter*, 1 Ind. Jur., N S. 411 (1866)

(2) *Chandilal Jha v Padmanand Singh Bahadur*, 22 C. 453, 467 (1895)

(3) *Goluck Chunder Goohe v Mohini Chunder Ghose*, 13 W. R. 95, 96 (1860)

(4) *Gomes v Carter*, 1 Ind. Jur., N S., 411 (1866) *per* Ilcar, J.

(5) *Collett v op. cit. supra*

(6) R 1

(7) *Id.*, *Prosunno Moyee Doss v Wooma Moyee Doss*, 14 W. R. 403 (1870).

(8) R 1 *vide post*, *Goluck Chunder Goohe v Mohini Chunder Ghose*, 13 W. R. 95, 96 (1860)

(9) See Woodroffe, 162 et seq

(10) *Id.*, 151

(11) *Jayramdas v Zamonlal*, 27 B. 357 (1903)

(12) *Hart v Grosse*, 9 C. W. N. 715 (1905).

that a perpetual injunction may be granted, but not an interlocutory one, where to refuse it may be to make the proposed decree unfructuous. An injunction in respect of civil judicial proceedings may have reference to an action or to proceedings taken in execution of a decree obtained therein. R 1 deals with the particular case of wrongful sale in execution, a provision which was not contained in the Code of 1859. Sect. 56 of the Specific Relief Act was not intended to and does not affect temporary injunctions applied for under sect. 492 (now r 1) against the wrongful sale of property in execution of a decree. Therefore a subordinate Court may issue an injunction restraining proceedings in execution pending before a superior Court (1).

The law does not say that a property is, or is about, to be wrongfully sold, but that it is in danger of being wrongfully sold (2). These words are wide enough to include (3) and the section is, in fact, most commonly applicable to claims in execution made under O XXI r 58. If a claimant under that rule, whose claim has been disallowed, institutes a regular suit against the decree-holder, the Court has power to grant an injunction staying the sale pending the decision of the suit (4). And the Code having been amended so as to admit of the grant of an interlocutory injunction in such a case, the procedure indicated by the rule should be followed, and a sale should, in case of applications by third parties, be restrained by injunction in the suit brought to try the title, and not by the order of the Court executing the decree (5). And in the execution of a decree ordering the sale of property, it is not competent for a Court to refuse to sell it because a stranger who is in possession of such property impeaches the decree, the course open to him if he wishes a stay of execution being to file a suit and obtain an injunction for that purpose (6). But though where property is in danger of wrongful sale the Court may issue an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing his decree against the property, yet when the Court dismisses the suit in which the injunction is sought and has been granted, it has no right to further restrain the defendant from executing upon the mere possibility of the Appellate Court reversing its decree. Once the suit is dismissed the Court has, in point of law, no power at all to deal with the proceedings in the suit in which execution has issued (7). Upon the dismissal of a suit for an injunction restraining the sale, the Appellate Court may issue a temporary injunction restraining the decree holder from proceeding with execution pending the appeal, (8) and the application may be granted subject to the terms of the

Rash Behary Dey v Bhowani Churn Bhose, 34 C. 97 (1906) where it was also pointed out that the High Court has a general Equity jurisdiction independent of the Code.

(1) *Amir Dulhaz v Administrator General of Bengal*, 23 C 351 (1895).

(2) *Brojendra Kumar Rai Chowdhury v Rup Lal Dass*, 12 C 515, 517, 518 (1886), see *Fulkumar v Ghanshyam Misra*, 31 C 511 (1903), and as to an injunction being consequential relief as held in the latter case, see *Kunj Behari v Keshav Lal*, 28 B 567 (1904).

(3) *Brojendra Kumar Rai Chowdhury v*

Rup Lal Dass, 12 C 515 (1886).

(4) *Ib*, *Abdullah v Banke Lal*, F B 33 A 79 (1910).

(5) *Ib*, a case which clearly emphasizes the difference between the former and the present law.

(6) *Purshotom Vithal v Purshotom Iswar*, 8 B 532 (1884).

(7) *Gossam Money Pures v Gour Pershad Singh*, 11 C 146 (1884), referred to in *Yamin ud Dowlah v Ahmed Ali Khan* 21 C 561 (1894).

(8) *Krupa Dayal v Rani Kashori*, 10 A 80 (1887).

applicant giving such security as the Court thinks fit (1) This decision has, however, recently been discredited from the Court holding that in a case like this it was impossible to say that the property was in danger of being wrongfully sold that sect 192 of the last Code required that it must be "proved" that the property was in such danger, and that to hold in such an application this was proved would be to decide an appeal which was not before the Court (2) It is submitted that the question is rather one of fact than of law, though no doubt dealing with the matter as one of fact the decree appealed from would unless it was clearly erroneous, prove a serious obstacle to the grant of an injunction The Code directs that ordinarily before granting an injunction notice of the application should be given to the opposite party (3) Where a Court made an order granting a temporary injunction without directing notice of the application for an injunction to be issued to the other side, and its order directing stay of sale of property in execution was passed *ex parte* without the other side being given an opportunity to show cause it was held that the order was irregular (4) The application should be made without unnecessary delay (5) and should on the face of it disclose a sufficient ground to warrant an order being made as prayed (6) The meaning of the word 'wrongfully' may in certain cases be open to doubt (7) It is however clear that the property is not in danger of being wrongfully sold when the plaintiff has no title to or interest in it or if he has an alleged interest when such interest is not the subject of sale in execution (8) So where ancestral property was attached in execution of a decree and a son of the judgment debtor instituted a suit to establish his right to the property and made an application for a temporary injunction directing stay of sale pending the decision of the suit it was held that inasmuch as what was advertised to be sold was the right and interest of the plaintiff's father in the property it could not be said that the property was being wrongfully sold in execution of a decree and the temporary injunction ought not to have been granted (9) It has been said that in interpreting this portion of the Code a Judge cannot be too careful as to the mode in which he permits the machinery of the Courts to be used for the purpose of enabling a plaintiff in one suit to delay a decree holder in another from obtaining the fruit of his judgment by executing his decree in ordinary course against the property of his judgment debtor At the same time it is of course most desirable to guard as far as possible against a multiplicity of suits which was one of the objects the Legislature had in view in enacting the provision in its present shape The

(1) *Kurpa Dayal v Rani Keshi* 10 A 80 (1887)

(2) *In re Chando Bibi* 20 A 311 (1904)

(3) R 3

(4) *Amolak Ram v Salib Sengi* 7 A 100 (1885)

(5) *Ib*, 502

(6) *Ib*

(7) *Kurpa Dayal v Rani Keshi* 10 A 80 82 (1887) See *In re Chando Bibi* 20 A 311 (1904) *supra*

(8) *Amolak Ram v Salib Sengi* 7 A 100 (1885)

(9) *Ib*

(10) *Per Straight J in Kurpa Dayal v Rani Keshi* 10 A 80 82 (1887)

dant, therefore applications under these provisions are clearly distinguishable from an application for an injunction under clause (a) against the waste, damage and alienation of property which is in dispute in the suit. And as applications under that Order and clause (f) are both distinguishable from an application under clause (a), so also, applications under that Order and clause (f) respectively are clearly distinguishable from each other. O XXXVIII r 6 is applicable only to cases where it is probable that the defendant is about to make away with his property so as to make it impossible for the plaintiff to execute any possible decree against him, and empowers the Court in such a case to make an order calling upon the defendant for security and, in default thereof, to attach the property. It has no application where the property is the *property in suit*, which must, if necessary, be followed under the provisions of r 1, clause (a). The latter provision applies to a case where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant in possession is likely to damage and make away with any property in dispute in the suit, and empowers the Court in such a case to issue an injunction to the defendant to refrain from the particular act complained of (6). But though O XXXVIII r 6 and r 1, clause (b), of this Order have both this in common, that the property to be dealt with by the Court is not that in dispute in the suit, the following important differences exist between

(1) S 2	606
(2) Onkar Singh v Bhub Singh, 16 A 496 (1894)	(5) Bahamber Sahai v Sukhdev, 16 A 186, 187 (1897)
(3) Collett, <i>op cit</i> 265	(6) Joynarain Georoe & Shihpersad Georoe, 6 W R, Misc, 1 (1866)
(4) See Robinson v Pickering, 16 Ch D	

applicant giving such security as the Court thinks fit (1) This decision has, however recently been dissented from the Court holding that in a case like this it was impossible to say that the property was in danger of being wrongfully sold that sect 492 of the last Code required that it must be "proved" that the property was in such danger, and that to hold in such an application this was proved would be to decide an appeal which was not before the Court (2) It is submitted that the question is rather one of fact than of law, though no doubt dealing with the matter is one of fact the decree appealed from would unless it was clearly erroneous prove a serious obstacle to the grant of an injunction The Code directs that ordinarily before granting an injunction notice of the application should be given to the opposite party (3) Where a Court made an order granting a temporary injunction without directing notice of the application for an injunction to be issued to the other side, and its order directing stay of sale of property in execution was passed *ex parte* without the other side being given an opportunity to show cause it was held that the order was irregular (4) The application should be made without unnecessary delay (5) and should on the face of it disclose a sufficient ground to warrant an order being made as prayed (6) The meaning of the word "wrongfully" may in certain cases be open to doubt (7) It is however clear that the property is not in danger of being wrongfully sold when the plaintiff has no title to or interest in it or if he has an alleged interest when such interest is not the subject of sale in execution (8) So where ancestral property was attached in execution of a decree and a son of the judgment debtor instituted a suit to establish his right to the property and made an application for a temporary injunction directing stay of sale pending the decision of the suit, it was held that, inasmuch as what was advertised to be sold was the right and interest of the plaintiff's father in the property it could not be said that the property was being wrongfully sold in execution of a decree and the temporary injunction ought not to have been granted (9) It has been said that in interpreting this portion of the Code a Judge cannot be too careful as to the mode in which he permits the machinery of the Courts to be used for the purpose of enabling a plaintiff in one suit to delay a decree holder in another from obtaining the fruit of his judgment by executing his decree in ordinary course against the property of his judgment-debtor At the same time it is of course most desirable to guard as far as possible against a multiplicity of suits which the Legislature had in view in enacting Courts will therefore

ie objects
pe The
fusal to
whether

It has

(1057) *J. v. Rani Kishori* 10 A 80

(2) *In re Chando Bib* 20 A 311 (1904)

(3) R 3

(4) *Amolak Ram v. Salub Singh* 7 A 500 (1885)

(5) *Ib.*, 552

(6) *Ib.*

(7) *Kurpa Dayal v. Rani Kishori* 10 A 80, 82 (1887) See *In re Chando Bib*, 20 A 311 (1904) *supra*

(8) *Amolak Ram v. Salub Singh* 7 A 500 (1885)

(9) *Ib.*

(10) *Per Straught J.*, in *Kurpa Dayal v. Rani Kishori*, 10 A 80 82 (1887)

been held by the Allahabad High Court that the term "sue" in the Code (1) does not include the exercise of a Court of Revenue and that therefore the application of rule 10 in execution of a decree of a Court of Revenue is a suit under sect. 3 of Act VII of 1859 and can be entertained by a Civil Court (2).

Fraudulent disposition of property—This provision is based on the principle laid down in clause (1) in that the property dealt with by the injunction is not the property in dispute in the suit, it is only that which the parties lay claim to the title to which has to be decided. It is property whether movable or immovable (3) the title to which is about to be decided in the defendant's favour in dispute in the suit. It presupposes a general intention on the part of the defendant to defraud and to fraud his creditors and permits of an injunction and goes to the remedy of attachment before judgment (4). The ordinary rule is that, pending a suit to enforce a general claim against a person there cannot be an injunction to restrain him from parting or dealing with his property, not being property specifically in dispute in the suit (5). When however such an act of parting and dealing with property is not done in the *bona fide* exercise of own right but with an intent to defraud persons who being creditors of the owner, have, or might have the right to resort to such property in satisfaction of their claim, there arises in their behalf an equity to restrain such threatened dealing with the property even as against its legal owner. Both an attachment under O XXXVIII r. 6 and an injunction under this clause have as their subject matter not the property in suit but the property of the defendant, therefore applications under these provisions are clearly distinguishable from an application for an injunction under clause (a) against the waste, damage and alienation of property which is in dispute in the suit. And as applications under that Order and clause (1) are both distinguishable from an application under clause (a) so also applications under that Order and clause (1) respectively, are clearly distinguishable from each other. O XXXVIII r. 6 is applicable only to cases where it is probable that the defendant is about to make away with his property so as to make it impossible for the plaintiff to execute any possible decree against him and empowers the Court in such a case to make an order calling upon the defendant for security and, in default thereof, to attach the property. It has no application where the property is the property in suit, which must if necessary, be followed under the provisions of r. 1, clause (a). The latter provision applies to a case where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant in possession is likely to damage and make away with any property in dispute in the suit, and empowers the Court in such a case to issue an injunction to the defendant to refrain from the particular act complained of (6). But though O XXXVIII r. 6 and r. 1, clause (b), of this Order have both this in common, that the property to be dealt with by the Court is not that in dispute in the suit, the following important differences exist between

(1) S. 2

(2) *Onkar Singh v. Bhub Singh*, 10 A. 450 (1894)

(3) *Collett, op. cit.* 267

(4) See *Robinson v. Lockington*, 16 Ch. D.

606

(5) *Bahamber Sahai v. Sukhdov*, 16 A. 180, 187 (1897)

(6) *Joynarain Gecree v. Sh. Bpersad Chatterji*, 6 W. R., Misc., 1 (1886)

these provisions. In the first place, the property is actually attached in the one case, while in the other the property is left in the owner's hands, subject only to the prohibition enjoined by the injunction. Secondly, the provisions as to attachment are generally limited to property sufficient to satisfy the decree which may be passed in the suits in which the application for attachment is made.

whereas an injunction, in so far as its action is *in personam*, is not so limited. Lastly, any private alienation made subsequent to attachment is null and void, but such is not the case with alienations made subsequent to the issue of an injunction either under clause (a) or (b) of the first rule (2).

"Breach of contract"—See Woodroffe on Injunctions, Ch. VI, where the subject is fully considered. Whether or not there has been a breach of contract in any particular case depends on the facts of that case, and the substantive law governing it. The ordinary remedy for such breach is damages. Extraordinary remedies are specific performance, rescission, cancellation, receiver and injunction. With this last relief in its temporary form, the Order alone deals. The Court will interfere by injunction, to prevent the violation of contracts and to compel parties to perform their covenants and agreements by injunction temporary or perpetual, mandatory or otherwise. Certain common conditions are essential to the grant of this relief, viz (a) the Court must be one of competent jurisdiction (3) to grant the relief prayed, (b) the agreement must constitute a contract, (4) (c) such contract must not be one the performance of which would not be specifically enforced, (5) for injunctions respecting contracts must be governed by rules relating to specific performance (6). Where an agreement is of an affirmative character, the remedy lies in specific performance and an injunction may also be granted both for the enforcement of negative terms, if any, and also in aid of and ancillary to the relief sought by way of specific performance of the contract. If, however, an agreement, though of an affirmative character, is such that the Court would not specifically enforce it, no injunction will be issued to prevent the breach thereof (7) except in certain cases of negative agreements coupled with affirmative

(1) See notes to rules dealing with attachment before judgment.

(2) *Delhi & London Bank v. Ram Narain*, 9 A 497, 499 (1887). [In this case the Lower Court issued an injunction under s. 492, cl. (b), but the facts proved do not appear to have warranted the order. The clause requires not only proof of attempted alienation, but of intent to defraud. The High Court appears to have considered that the injunction was not legally issued but disposed of the case upon another point. See *Manohar Das v. Ram Autar Pande*, 25 A 431 (1903).]

(3) Woodroffe 190-191.

(4) *Ib.* 191-194. So no injunction can be granted in respect of a void agreement.

Bhajan Sahay v. Bapu Sayer, 1 B 500 (1877). In the case of voidable agreements an injunction may be granted when the person at whose instance the contract is voidable has elected to ratify it, provided that ratification is not (as in the case of a minor) impossible.

(5) Woodroffe, 195.

(6) See Act I of 1877, ss. 54-56 (f), *Joyce's Doctrines*, 204. As to contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, see s. 21, Act I of 1877, Woodroffe, 195, for whom contracts may be specifically enforced, *ib.* 237, against whom contracts may be so enforced, *ib.* 241.

(7) Act I of 1877, s. 56 cl. (b).

against nuisances, (23) such as those in respect of air, light, water, support, way, against infringement of copyright, trademarks and patents (24) and any other wrongful act, whatever may be its nature (25). This is now made clear, though it ought not to have been ever doubtful (26) by the addition of the words 'of any kind'.

(1) Act I of 1877, s 57 As to affirmative and negative covenants, see Woodroffe, 209-224

(2) Act I of 1877, s 4, cl. (c), Woodroffe, 204-209

(3) Woodroffe, 243-247

(4) *Ib*, 249-250

(5) *Ib*, 251-256

(6) *Ib*, 257-259

(7) *Ib*, 261

(8) *Ib*, 262-271

(9) *Ib*, 263

(10) *Ib*, 271-275

(11) *Ib*, Ch VI

(12) *Ib*, Ch VII

(13) *Ib*, 283, as to threatened but in complete acts, see *Bindu Basini Chowdhani v Jahnab Chowdhani*, 24 C 260 (1896)

(14) Act I of 1877, s 50, cl (g)

(15) *Ib*, s 50, cl (d)

(16) *Ib*, cl (f)

(17) *Ib*, cl (j)

(18) *Ib*, cl (i)

(19) See Clerk and Lindell, *Torts*, § 81

(20) Woodroffe, Ch VII, p 287 Act I of 1877, s 54

(21) *Ib*, Ch VIII

(22) *Ib*, Ch IX

(23) *Ib*, Ch X

(24) *Ib*, Ch XI

(25) *Ib*, Ch XII

(26) The decision in *Darab Kuar v Gomti Kuar*, 22 A 443 (1900), that the section does not apply to cases of injury in tort and acts of trespass, is clearly erroneous.

94] 3 The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party.

98] 4 Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order.

Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.

Practice Notice—The present Order contains the practice as regards temporary injunctions. The practice as regards perpetual injunctions is the same as that which governs the making of decrees generally (1) Injunctions are granted upon suit, and should as a rule be specifically prayed for when the obtaining of this form of relief is a substantial object of the action. In urgent cases application for an injunction may be made *ex parte* without notice and before or after appearance. As, however, enacted by r 3, notice as a general rule must be given to the opposite party. The power to issue an *ex parte* injunction no doubt exists, but the greatest care should be employed in its exercise, and only in cases where considerable mischief might ensue if the issue of the process were delayed until notice was given (2) If the Court be of opinion, upon an application *ex parte*, that the case is not so urgent as to require its immediate interference, it will either grant a rule nisi or order notice of the application to be served on the defendant. Where an injunction is granted without notice the party aggrieved may apply either to have it discharged under r 4 or he may appeal, (3) though the former appears to be the more proper course. No appeal lies from an order refusing an injunction. Where an application is made by motion for a rule nisi, the defendant

Instead of issuing an injunction in the first instance the Court may grant an *interim* order (5) which is really an order in the nature of an injunction granted when the plaintiff, not showing quite a case for an *ex parte* injunction without more, shows a case for giving short notice of motion for an injunction and for protection in the meantime.

An *interim* order and a rule nisi may be, and ordinarily are, granted at the same time. In the case of every application it must be proved either (as is

(1) Woodroffe, 129 *et seq*

(2) *Ib*, 130, Hari t Secretary of State, 27 B 424 451 (1903), Freeman t McArthur, 2 Tayl & Bell 10, 25 (1851), see Schochurrry Dosso t Hurree Kato Roy, 2 Boulu. 62 (1859) Amalak Ram v Sahub Singh, 7 A 570 (1885)

(3) *Amalak Ram v Sahib Singh* 7 A 550.

662 (1885)

(4) Luis & Luis, 12 ML 186 (1888)

(5) By which the defendant is restrained until after a particular day named, liberty being given to the plaintiff to serve notice of motion for an injunction for the day before such day.

usually the case) by affidavit, or otherwise that sufficient grounds exist for the grant of the relief claimed (1) The defendant's admission may, of course be sufficient. (2) Particular care must be taken to state all material facts fully and fairly in applications for an *ex parte* injunction (3) such as injury (4) defendant's intention to waste, damage, alienate, or to commit some other threatened injury (5)

If sufficient *prima facie* evidence is given the Court may either grant an injunction absolutely or as provided for in r 2 on terms It may require the plaintiff or defendant to enter into terms as a condition of withholding an injunction The most usual undertaking is to require a plaintiff as a condition of the Court's interference in his favour to abide by any order which it may make as to damages (6) The undertaking is ordinarily given by Counsel or pleader on behalf of the party for whom he appears, or by the party appearing in person and forms part of the order of injunction

In some cases the motion for a temporary injunction is treated as a trial of the action, and the hearing of the cause is not proceeded with, the injunction being by consent made perpetual on the motion In cases, however, where relief, additional to that by injunction, is sought, such a course is not feasible, and the trial proceeds, when upon judgment the injunction is made permanent or dissolved If upon judgment the action is dismissed, any injunction which may have been granted goes as a matter of course An injunction which has been granted upon an interlocutory application is superseded by the judgment in the action If it is intended that it should remain in force it must be expressly continued.

Discharge, Variance and Dissolution A marked feature of temporary injunctions, as distinguished from those which are final or perpetual, is that the former are liable to be dissolved on notice upon sufficient cause shown at any stage of the proceedings after, or perhaps even before, the coming in of the answer (7) The application should be made on motion at any time before the hearing of the cause in which it was granted, (8) and before the Court by which

(1) See *Jagoran Nanabhai v Shridhar Balkrishna Nagarkar* 2 B 206 (1877)

(2) *Coluck Chunder Goohe v Mohim Chunder Chose*, 13 W R. 95 (1870), *Appaji Patil v Aja*, 20 B 735 (1902), or it may go a long way to remedy defects in the plaintiff *Hunj Behari v Keshav Lall*, 28 B 567, 572 (1904)

(3) *Freeman v McArthur*, 2 Tayl. & Bell, 10, 25, Joyce, Inj., 1263

(4) Woodroffe, 137, Spelling, §§ 991, 993, High, Inj., s 158, but see *Hunj Behari v Keshav Lall*, 28 B 567, 572 (1904), against too strict construction of Mofussil pleadings.

(5) Woodroffe, ib, *Chabildas Lalubhai v Municipal Commissioner of Bombay*, 8 B H. C R., 85 (1871), *Prosunno Moyee Dossee v Wooma Moyee Dossee*, 14 W R

409 (1870), *Boj Luchmiput Singh v Secretary of State*, 11 B L. R. app 27, 28 (1873), *Chandidat Jha v Padmanund Singh Bahadur*, 22 C 459 406 (1895), *Moran v River Steam Navigation Co* 14 B L. R. 352 (1875)

(6) See as to injunctions on terms, *Anant natu Dey v Mackintosh* 6 B L. R. 571, 574 (1871), *Moran v River Steam Navigation Co*, 14 B L. R. 352, 361, 366 (1875), *Ratanje Hormasje Bottlewalla v Edalje Hormasje Bottlewalla*, 8 B H. C R. 181, 184 (1871), *Chandra Nath Pal v Sree Gobind Chowdhury*, 6 C. W. N 308 (1900), *Madras Railway Co v Rust*, 14 M. 18 22 (1890), *Kripa Dayal v Ram Kishori*, 10 A. 80, 83 (1887)

(7) Woodroffe, 142

(8) Joyce, Inj., 1263, *Freeman v McArthur*, 2 Tayl. & Bell 25 (1851), *Sm*

the injunction was granted,(1) unless the cause has been transferred, when the application may be made to that Court to which the cause has become attached. The same rules of pleading and evidence apply both to applications for the grant and dissolution of injunctions. The injunction will either be continued or dissolved according to the merits as disclosed by the pleadings and the preponderance of the evidence.

If an injunction obtained *ex parte* is set aside on the ground of concealment of material facts,(2) or an injunction granted on notice is set aside as having been issued on insufficient grounds (3) the plaintiff may apply again if he can make out a sufficient case.

An appeal lies under O XLIII r 1 (r) from an order under this rule, the appeal not being limited to an affirmative but including also a negative order (4).

Compensation for issue of injunction.—This in the last Code was dealt with in sect 197, which is now incorporated in sect 93, which see.

- 95] **5** An injunction directed to a corporation is binding not only on the corporation itself, but also on all members and officers of the corporation whose personal action it seeks to restrain.
- Injunction to corporation binding on its officers.*

Interlocutory Orders

- 98] **6** The Court may, on the application of any party to a suit, order the sale, by any person named in such order, and in such manner and on such terms as it thinks fit, of any moveable property, being the subject matter of such suit, or attached before judgment in such suit, which is subject to speedy and natural decay, or which for any other just and sufficient cause it may be desirable to have sold at once.
- Power to order interim sale.*

Sale of perishable articles—The benefit of the provisions of sect 498 of the last Code should plainly be claimable in the case of attachment before judgment, and the section has accordingly been so amended. Words have been added so as to empower the Court to order a sale of securities where the state of the market requires such a course.

Sohochurry Dossee v Hurree Kisto Roy, 2 Broun's Rep, 62 (1853), Kerr, Inj 631 (1877), Spelling, Extraordinary Relief, 2. 1017

(1) *Woodroffe*, 142.
(2) *Fetch v Rockfort*, 18 L. J. Ch. 459.
(3) *Freeman v McArthur*, 2 Tayl. & Bell, 20 (1851).
(4) *Zabada Jan v Muhammad Taub*, 15 A. 8 (1892), *Hari Lal v Prayag Ram*, 17 C. W. N. 996 (1913), *Lachmi Narain v Ram Charan Das*, 35 A. 425 (1913).

(3) *Jagjivan v Shridhar* 2 B. 255 256

7. (1) The Court may, on the application of any party to a suit, and on such terms as it thinks fit,—
Detention, preservation of subject matter of suit (a) make an order for the detention, preservation or inspection of any property which is the subject-matter of such suit, or as to which any question may arise therein ;
 (b) for all or any of the purposes aforesaid authorize any person to enter upon or into any land or building in the possession of any other party to such suit ; and
 (c) for all or any of the purposes aforesaid authorize any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made or experiment to be tried, which may seem necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence.
 (2) The provisions as to execution of process shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to persons authorized to enter under this rule.

"Application."—The application can only be made after summons has been served, and after reasonable notice of the intention to apply for the order has been given in writing to the defendant (1) See next rule

Inspection.—The principle upon which the right of inspection is justified is that wherever in respect of the property of an individual a right accrues to another which cannot be measured without inspection of the subject or property, the Court is competent to compel the proprietor to permit such inspection as indispensable for administering justice (2) Under this rule the Court has jurisdiction to make an order for preparation of an inventory (3)

Detention, etc.—An order for investment is not an order for detention, custody or preservation under this rule (4)

"Subject matter of such suit"—the words of the English rule *or as to which any question may arise therein* were originally omitted because it was thought that the words marginally noted were sufficiently comprehensive to cover all matters in issue in the suit, (5) but they have now been inserted

8. (1) An application by the plaintiff for an order under rule 6 or rule 7 may be made after notice to the defendant at any time after institution of the suit.
Application for such orders to be after notice.
 (2) An application by the defendant for a like order may be made after notice to the plaintiff at any time after appearance.

(1) *Sengotha v Ramasami*, 7 M. 241 (1883)

(2) *Dhoroney Dhar Ghose v Radha Gobind Kur*, 2 C 117, at pp 121, 122 (1886)

(3) *Amjad v Ali Hussain*, 15 C W N 353 (1910)

(4) *Ib*

(5) *Dorasinghain v Vyavan*, 21 M L J 404 (1913)

9. Where land paying revenue to Government, or a tenure liable to sale, is the subject matter of a suit, if the party in possession of such land or tenure neglects to pay the Government revenue, or the rent due to the proprietor of the tenure, as the case may be, and such land or tenure is consequently ordered to be sold, any other party to the suit claiming to have an interest in such land or tenure may, upon payment of the revenue or rent due previously to the sale (and with or without security at the discretion of the Court), be put in immediate possession of the land or tenure,

and the Court in its decree may award against the defaulter the amount so paid, with interest thereon at such rate as the Court thinks fit, or may charge the amount so paid, with interest thereon at such rate as the Court orders, in any adjustment of accounts which may be directed in the decree passed in the suit

Decree not containing order for adjustment.—It was held in the under mentioned case (1) that a separate suit was not necessary, and that where a decree does not expressly direct an adjustment of accounts, such adjustment can be ordered in execution if it be shown from the nature of the decree that it could and should have contained such an order and is imperfect without it.

10. Where the subject-matter of a suit is money or some other thing capable of delivery and any party thereto admits that he holds such money or other thing as a trustee for another party, or that it belongs or is due to another party, the Court may order the same to be deposited in Court or delivered to such last-named party, with or without security, subject to the further direction of the Court

Deposit.—The rule applies only when the party making the admission holds the property or other thing which the party in whose favour the order is made seeks to have delivered to him. But even if this rule is intended to apply to a case where the property is not so held by the party making the admissions, it would not cover the case where the money was held by another Court to the credit of another suit (2)

(1) *Radhey Singh v Mangni Ram*, 6 C W N 710 (1902)

(2) *Rajah Partha Saradhi Appa Row v Rajah Rungiah Appa Row* 27 M 165 (1903)

[*Subrahmanya Ayyar, J*, diss], as to liability for interest for money not deposited, see *Ram Dass Gossain v Prasanna Moyee Dessee*, 16 W R 207 (1871)

ORDER XL.

Appointment of Receivers.

1. (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order—

Appointment of receivers.

(a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree ;

(b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property ,

(c) commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver , and

(d) confer upon the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit

is

(2) Nothing in this rule shall authorize the Court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove
2. The Court may by general or special order fix the amount to be paid as remuneration for the services of the receiver.

Remuneration.

to be paid as remuneration for the services of the receiver.

for
3. Every receiver so appointed shall—

Duties

(a) furnish such security (if any) as the Court thinks fit, duly to account for what he shall receive in respect of the property ,

(b) submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs ,

(c) pay the amount due from him as the Court directs , and

(d) be responsible for any loss occasioned to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence.

is
sec
pai

4 Where a receiver—

Enforcement of receiver's duties

(a) fails to submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the

Court directs, or

(b) fails to pay the amount due from him as the Court directs, or

(c) occasions loss to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence,

the Court may direct his property to be attached and may sell such property, and may apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him or any loss occasioned by him, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the receiver

5 Where the property is land paying revenue to the Govern-

When Collector may be appointed receiver

ment, or land of which the revenue has been assigned or redeemed, and the Court considers that the interests of those concerned will be promoted by the management of the Collector, the Court may, with the consent of the Collector, appoint him to be receiver of such property

Amendments—The former Chapter XXXVI, dealing with Receivers contained three sections 503 504 and 505. Sect 503 has (subject to the amendments italicized) been incorporated in rr 1-3. R 1 corresponds with the first half and the last paragraph of sect 503. R 2 corresponds with the first portion of clause (d) the rest of that clause being retained in r 1. R 3 is the second half of sect 503 less the last paragraph, which has been put in r 1. R 4 is new. R 5 is sect 504. Sect 505 has been omitted. This is the most important change effected as the former restriction of power to High Courts and District Courts has been removed. Other amendments of former provisions appear to be of a verbal character.

Just and convenient—These words are derived from the English Judicature Act which greatly enlarged the powers which the Court of Chancery formerly exercised and the Courts in India have the fullest jurisdiction to appoint, as well as to remove a receiver in the exercise of judicial discretion (1)

Definition and nature of the Office of Receiver—A receiver is an independent person between the parties to a cause appointed by the Court to receive and preserve the property or fund in litigation *pendente lite* when it does not seem reasonable to the Court that either party should hold it, (2) or where a party is incompetent to do so as in the case of an infant (3). A receiver is a ministerial officer, originally of the Court of Chancery and as a general rule

(1) *Srimati Mathura v Shubdayal* 14 C W N 253 (1909) *Ramjiram v Salgram*, 14 C W N 248 (1909)

(2) High on Receiver, sect. 1, Kerr on Receiver, 3, with regard to this definition it must be noted that the Court sometimes

appoints (not uncommonly in partnership cases) one of the parties to be receiver. See generally Woodroffe's Law relating to Receivers in British India

(3) Kerr, 3.

a mere custodian having no powers except those conferred by the order of his appointment, though with the growth of Equity jurisdiction it has become usual to clothe them with much larger powers than were formerly conferred (1) A receiver is an officer of the Court through whom Equity takes possession of the property which is the subject of a litigation, preserves it from waste and destruction, secures and collects the proceeds, and ultimately disposes of them according to the rights and priorities of those entitled thereto, whether regular parties in the cause, or only coming before the Court in a reasonable time and in the due course of procedure to assert and establish their claims. As the representative of the Court he is subject to its orders, accountable in such manner and to such persons as the Court may direct, and has in his character as receiver no personal interest save that arising out of his fiduciary capacity and responsibility for the correct and faithful discharge of his duties. He is not the representative of a party or parties, but the representative of the Court (2) A receiver can only be properly granted for the purpose of getting in and securing funds which the Court at the hearing, or in the course of the cause, will have the means of distributing among the persons entitled to those funds (3) The receiver appointed in a particular suit is nothing more than the hand of the Court so to speak, for the purpose of holding the property of the litigants whenever it is necessary that it should be kept in the grasp of the Court in order to preserve the subject-matter of the suit *pendente lite*, and the possession of the receiver is simply the possession of the Court. To such an extent is this the case that any attempt to disturb that possession, without the leave of the Court, is a contempt of Court. The receiver has no personal rights in the property and he cannot take any steps even for the purpose of defending his possession without the sanction of the Court. Also as a rule so little personal interest of any kind has he in the matter that he is not justified himself in making any application whatever to the Court. If it is necessary that he should take action of any sort it is for the parties to the suit, or one of them, to come to the Court to put him in motion, and whatever the receiver rightly does with regard to the property, he does it simply in the character of agent for the owners of the property or the persons interested in it, and with certain exceptions in no sense as principal (4) Although ordinarily a receiver does not himself apply for commencing proceedings for contempt, and although, generally speaking, the action is taken by the parties beneficially interested in the property, there is nothing to prohibit his doing so. Receivers have on occasions taken action themselves without the parties coming forward in the matter (5) A receiver has no proprietary rights or interest whatever. Notwithstanding his appointment the proprietary right in the estate remains in the persons who are by law entitled to the estate (6) The receiver's possession is not a possession by any personal right. It is the

(1) Beach on Receivers, sect. 1. He does not represent the estate, but is merely an officer of the Court. Miller v. Ram Ranjan Chakravarti, 10 C. 1014 (1884).

(2) Gluck and Becker, Law of Receivers of Corporations, sect. 1.

(3) Evans v. Coventry, J. Drew, 80

(4) Wilkinson v. Gungadhar Sirkhar, 6 B. L. R. 486, at pp. 487, 488 (1871).

(5) Grey v. Woogra Mohun Bhakur, 28 C. 703 (1901). Mohamad Kasim v. Panchapa Iesa, 35 M. 578 (1911).

(6) Ram Lochun Sircar v. Hugg, 10 W. R. 430, 431 (1868).

possession of the Court, and he is totally devoid of any interest in the property (1) A receiver should not be appointed in supersession of a *bona fide* possessor of the property in dispute unless there is some substantial ground for interference (2)

The general objects sought by the appointment of a receiver may be described to be to provide for the safety of property pending a litigation, and until the hearing of the cause, (3) or during the minority of infants to preserve property in danger of being dissipated or destroyed by those to whom care it is by law entrusted or by persons having immediate but partial interest therein (4) A receiver duly appointed is from the moment of his appointment to be considered as an officer of the Court itself He will be protected by it in the proper discharge of the necessary duties of his office, the possession of the receiver not being permitted to be disturbed without the special leave of the Court (5) and it will be treated as a contempt of the Court if any such interference takes place (6) the reason being as explained by Lord Eldon (7) that their possession is the possession of the Court (8) and the Court being competent to examine the title will not permit itself to be made a suitor in a Court of law, but will itself examine the title, the mode being by permitting the party to come in to be examined *pro interesse suo* (9)

The receiver's functions are to obey the orders of the Court collect and account for the rents, and manage the estate, and the Court will see that this is done and the last Codo a rec or im moveable present

rule are "any property," without either of these qualifications, which however doubtless still subsist Where a receiver is required for the purpose not only of receiving rents and profits, or of getting in outstanding property but of carrying on or superintending a trade or business he is usually called a manager, or a receiver and manager (12) though the terms are synonymous (13) The appointment of a manager implies that he has power to deal with the property over which he is appointed manager and to appropriate the proceeds in a proper

(1) *Wilkinson v Gungadhar Surkhar* 6 B L R 486, 493 494 (1871)

(2) *Srimati Mathura v Shubdayal*, 14 C W N 252 (1909)

(3) *Fulct v Armstrong*, 1 Keen 428
Owen v Homan 4 H L 1032, *Woodroffe*, 4

(4) *Bennet on Receivers* 2

(5) *Brooks v Greathhead* 1 J & W 178
Angel v Smith 9 Ves 330

(6) *Broad v Wickham*, 4 Sim 571,
Johnes v Cloughton Jac 573, *Doulat Koer v Ramswari Koer* 26 C 655 629 (1899)

(7) *Angel v Smith s pro* in this case the rule was spoken of as applicable to sequestrators, which rule equally applies to receivers

(8) So where a receiver is appointed to receive rents and profits of immoveable

property the tenants in possession become virtually *pro hac vice* tenants of the Court their landlord, *Orr v Nuthia Chetti* 18 M 501, 503 (1893) See also *Doulat Koer v Ramswari Koer* 26 C 655 629 (1899) The Court is not concerned with any claims of or rights which may have accrued to any third party by reason of any assignment or transfer during the pendency of the suit

(9) As to the practice with regard to a examination *pro interesse suo* see 1 J & W 19

(10) *Dinonath Sreemoulic v H gg - Hav* 390 397 (1863)

(11) *Scott* 503

(12) *Kerr*, 246 *Woodroffe* 5

(13) *Orr v Nuthia Chetti* 17 M 501 504 (1893)

MANAGER He is bound to carry on in accordance with the general course of business adopted by the particular trade, and is the servant and officer of the Court, and must, upon any question arising as to the character or details of the management, be directed by the Court, which on appointing a manager of a business or undertaking in effect, assumes the management into its own hands. Managers are responsible to the Court which appoints them, and no order of any of the parties interested in the business over which they are appointed managers can interfere with this responsibility. The Court will in no case assume the management of a business or undertaking, except with a view to the winding up and sale of the business or undertaking. The management is an interim management, its necessity and its jurisdiction spring out of the jurisdiction to liquidate and sell, the business or undertaking is managed and continued in order that it may be sold as a going concern and with the sale the management ends. A manager may be appointed to carry on a private trade or business so as to wind it up for the benefit of the parties interested (1) The Court, if it can appoint a receiver, has ample power to provide for the management of the property, and can deal with property which is under its control just as completely as the owner of the property can deal with it (2) In cases where the manager of the estate must necessarily reside in the country where the estate is situated, it is usual in English practice to add to the order directing the appointment of a manager, an order for the appointment of one or more consignees (who are the paid agents of the Court to manage the estate which is in the hands of the Court) resident in England to whom the produce of the property in question may be remitted and by whom it may be disposed of (3)

The possession of the receiver is on behalf and for the benefit of all the parties to the suit in which he is appointed (4) His possession is the possession of all the parties to the proceeding according to their titles. The property in his hands is in *custodia legis* for the person who can make a title to it. It does not follow that because wide powers are conferred upon receivers including a power to remove the property in possession his relation either to the Court or to the parties interested in the proceeding undergoes any change in proportion to the extent of his powers (5) The appointment though it may operate to change possession has no effect itself upon the title to the property in any way and determines no right as between the parties (6) Although a receiver is an officer to hold property for the benefit of the party ultimately entitled to it

(1) *Herr*, 246, in *Short v Pickering*, 6 M. 138 (1852), in which the Court directed a receiver to manage the business of a milliner's shop attached in execution of decrees it was held that the servant of a firm the business of which was being managed by a receiver appointed under sect 303 of the last Code, had no preferential claim over the attaching creditor on the assets of the firm for wages due before the appointment of the receiver, in *Orr v Muthia Chetti* 17 M. 501 (1893) a receiver of attached property was appointed to superintend the harvest and to

recover the *meluara* n

(2) *Poreshnath Mukerjee v Omerto Nath Mitter* 14 C 614 615 (1890)

(3) *Herr* 253 As to the position and lien of consignees see *Moran v Mittu Babu* 2 C 35 (18 6) *Woodroffe* 7

(4) *Hartick Nath Pandey v Judmanund Singh* 11 C 496 498 (1885) *Orr v Muthia Chetti* 17 M 501, 506 (1893)

(5) *Orr v Muthia Chetti* 17 M 501 503 (1893)

(6) *Leach*, sect. 1, *Orr v Muthia Chetti*, 503

yet when such property is ascertained, the receiver is considered as his receiver (1)

though the ordinary law of principal and agent applies to this extent, that what the receiver rightly does he does in the character of agent for the owner (whoever he be) of the property, and this is so even in the case of parties who opposed his appointment or objected to his receiving particular powers (3). It was held under the Code of 1859, which contained less extensive provisions than those of the last and present Code, that his duties as officer of the Court were confined in the case of property the subject of attachment to realizing, preserving, or managing the property for the collection of the moneys and money profits due to the debtors (4). Where, however, the receiver of attached property acts in the exercise of powers conferred upon him by the Court, it is erroneous to regard him as the judgment creditor's agent because on his application the appointment is made. The appointment is the act of the Court, and once made he is an officer of the Court and subject to its orders (5). A receiver is frequently spoken of as the "hand of the Court," and the expression very aptly designates his functions as well as the relation which he sustains to the Court. The assets and property in his hands are as much in the custody of the law as if levied upon under an execution or attachment, it being held that the appointment of a receiver is in effect an equitable execution by means of which the Court makes a general appropriation thereof, leaving the question of who may finally be entitled to be determined thereafter (6). When a party is declared entitled to the property by the final decree in a suit the Court has no option but to give that party possession of it. The Court having been in possession of the property on behalf of the parties to the suit is bound to give possession to the successful party in that suit. Any one else entering into possession would be a trespasser (7). He has no estate or interest himself, and his power to manage is created simply by the order of the Court appointing him, and is binding only upon the persons

(1) *Orr v Muthia Chetti*, 503. This principle is applicable in the case of a suit in which title to property is decreed, and not to attached property the title to which continues to vest in the judgment debtor. See also *Appasami Naichan v Jotha Naichan*, 22 M 448, 451 (1899), *Herr*, 156, 157, but see *Beach*, sect. 223, High sect. 135, the person who has the title to the property must be deemed to be in possession. *Tribhuvan Sundar Koer v Sri Narain Singh*, 20 A 341, 344 (1898).

(2) *Beach*, sect. 2, he exercises his functions in the interest of neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common benefit of all parties in interest, High, sect. 1, on whose behalf he is appointed. *Prem Lal Mullick v Sumbhoonath Roy*, 22 C 960, 963 (1893).

(3) *Porshnath Mukerjee v Omertonath*

Mitter, 17 C 614, 616 (1890), referring to *Wilkinson v Gungadhar Sutar*, 6 B L R 486, as the leading case in this country on the position of a receiver. *Woodroffe*, 8. The appointment ordinarily gives no advantage or priority to the person at whose instance the appointment is made, over other parties in interest. High sect. 5.

(4) *Tilak v Abdool Hye* 19 W R 37 (1872) distinguished in *Orr v Muthia Chetti*, 17 M 501, 502, 503 (1893). See post *Receiver of attached property*.

(5) *Orr v Muthia Chetti*, 17 M 501, 503 (1893).

(6) High, sects. 2, 5. See *Administrator General of Bengal v Prem Lal Mullick*, 22 C 1015, 1016 (1895).

(7) *Doulat Koer v Ramswari Koer*, 26 C 623, 629, 630 (1899).

before the Court (1) His powers at best are no more than those which the parties to the suit turn out to be possessed of when the case is finally decided but if he takes possession of property under colour of his appointment his conduct cannot be disputed by a motion to discharge or get rid of the attachment (2) As the servant of the Court and not of the parties he has only such power as the Court may choose to give him and it is a contempt for any of the parties to enter into an agreement with him restricting and controlling his powers (3)

Appointment of receiver is a form of specific relief—The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a form of specific relief (4) The last Code (5) further provided for the appointment of a receiver of property under attachment (6) This can still be done by virtue of the words *any property* and *before or after decree* Relief by specific performance injunction and receiver belong to the same branch of the law Moreover the appointment of a receiver operates as an injunction against the parties their agents and persons claiming under them restraining them from interfering with the possession of the receiver except by permission of the Court (7) and an order for an injunction is always more or less included in an order for a receiver It is not necessary if a receiver be appointed to go on and grant an injunction in terms (8) All three forms of relief are dealt with by the Specific Relief Act The issue of temporary injunctions and the appointment of receivers together with the orders

Remedy

in many respects a close analogy to that by temporary injunction Both are extraordinary equitable remedies as distinguished from the ordinary modes of administering relief Both are essentially preventive in their nature being properly used only for the prevention of future injury rather than for the redress of past grievances Both have one common object in so far as they seek to preserve the *res* or subject matter of the litigation unimpaired to be disposed of in accordance with the future decree or order of the Court (10)

Whether however the negative duty or duty to abstain be contractual or general the injunction which enforces it is the same in nature and form The general grounds of similarity between relief by receiver and by injunction have been adverted to Perhaps the principal element of difference between these two important remedies lies in this that an injunction is strictly a conservative remedy merely restraining action and preserving matter *in statu quo* without affecting the possession of the property or fund in controversy while the appointment of a receiver is usually a more active remedy since it changes

(1) Nilmadhub Mundul v. Gollanders 9 Ser 901 (1863)

(2) Bissessuree Debbar Sookram Dass Mohut v. W. R. 347 (1811) T. 1 v. Abdool Hye 19 W. R. 37 (1841) as to the first case *vide post*

(3) Manick Lal Seal v. Surutt Coomary Dassie 22 C. 648 656 (1890)

(4) Act I of 18 sect. 5.

(5) Sect. 503 Woodroffe 9

(6) See from 168 in the fourth Schedule of the last Code.

(7) Mahomed Zohuruddeen v. Mahomed Noorooddeen 21 C. 80 91 (1893)

(8) Kerr 10 Woodroffe 10

(9) Civil Procedure Code Part IV

(10) Story Eq. Jur. sect. 876 High Inj. 1 23 Woodroffe 11

the possession as well as the subsequent control and management of the property. The Court by an injunction ties up the hands of the defendants, and preserves unchanged not only the property itself but the relations of all parties thereto. But in appointing a receiver the Court goes still further, since it wrests the possession from the defendant, and assumes and maintains the entire management of the property or fund, frequently changing its form, and retaining possession through its officer, the receiver, until the rights of all parties in interest are satisfactorily determined.

From the point of resemblance already indicated, it is not to be inferred that the appointment of a receiver necessarily follows from the granting of an injunction, or that the two remedies are necessarily inseparable. And while it frequently happens that the Courts are called upon to administer both species of relief in the same action, and at one and the same time, yet it by no means follows that because an injunction is granted a receiver must be appointed, and the two are to be treated as distinct and independent matters. The Court, therefore, may refuse a receiver although the case presented is a fitting one for an injunction, and although an injunction has already been granted (1). A distinction exists between the case in which an injunction and that in which a receiver will be issued and appointed respectively. "That distinction seems to be that, while in either case it must be shown that the property should be preserved from waste or alienation, in the former case it would be sufficient, if it be shown that the plaintiff in the suit has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right alleged, while in the latter case, a good *prima facie* title has to be made out" (2).

Relief, whether it be given by the issue of an injunction or the appointment of a receiver, is granted generally upon the principle *quia timet*, that is, the Court assists the party who seeks its aid, because he fears (*quia timet*) some future probable injury to his rights or interests, and not because an injury has already occurred which requires any compensation or other relief.

Law relating to receivers.—The law relating to the appointment of receivers in Civil suits (3) in British India (4) is contained in this Code, (5) and in the Specific Relief Act, (6) which merely declares that the appointment of a receiver pending a suit rests in the discretion of the Court, and refers to the Code of Civil Procedure for the mode and effect of their appointment and for their rights, powers, duties, and liabilities. Both the earlier Codes (Act VIII of 1859, and X of 1877) dealt with the subject (7). Act X of 1877, however, contained provisions of a more complete character, and which were in fact,

(1) High, 17, 18, Woodroffe, 12, and see Hall v. Hall, 3 Mac G 83, where it was said that the rights to those different remedies are essentially distinct and depend upon totally different grounds and circumstances."

(2) Chandidat Jha v. Padmunand Singh Bahadoor, 22 C 459, 465 (1895).

(3) The Criminal Procedure Code in sects 88, 145 (2), deals with the appointment of receivers of attached property. Specific relief by the appointment of a receiver can

not be granted for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law. Act I of 1877, sect. 1.

(4) For definition of these words, see Act I of 1868, sect 2 (8) as amended by Act XII of 1891.

(5) Order XL. As to the appointment of receivers of property under attachment, vide *supra*.

(6) Act I of 1877, sect 44.

(7) See Act VIII of 1859, sects. 112, 94, 243, Act X of 1877, sects 503, 505.

with some minor alterations in the sections relating to receivers, the same as those of the present Code. Sect. 92 of Act VIII of 1859 enabled the Court to appoint a receiver or manager in all cases in which it might appear to the Court to be necessary for the preservation or the better management or the custody of any property "which is in dispute in a suit," and sect. 243 enabled the Court to appoint a manager to realize debts or rents and receipts of landed property where the debts or land were attached in execution of decree. Chapter XXXVI. of the Code of 1877, which, with some minor alterations, (1) was identical with the same Chapter of the last Code, supplied the place of both of these provisions, and going further, gave the Court very general powers as to the appointment of receiver (2). Further, orders made under sect. 92 of Act VIII. of 1859, were appealable only at the instance of the defendant, (3) but orders made under sect. 503 of the Codes of 1877 (4) or 1882 (5) were appealable at the instance of either party. Prior to the establishment of the High Courts, the Supreme Courts of the Presidencies appointed receivers following the principles and practice of the Court of Chancery in England (6). The provisions of the present Code are (with one important exception) the same as those of the last, with certain omissions which have been noted and additions which have been italicized, and the principal of which will be found in rr. 1, 2, and 4. The exception is the omission of sect. 503 of the last Code, as to which, see *post*.

Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.—The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in this country to grant relief by injunction or receiver is determined by the Code and Specific Relief Act. Certain common conditions are necessary to the existence of jurisdiction to grant either of these forms of relief. Shortly stated, (7) these conditions are as follows —

(1) In the first place, specific relief whether given by the issue of an

(1) In sect. 503, cl. (d), the words "*as the Court thinks fit*" were inserted after the word "*remuneration*" by Act VII of 1883, sect. 42. In sect. 591, Act X of 1877, the opening words of the section were "*if the property be*" instead of "*where the property is*". In the same section Act XII of 1883, sect. 43, substituted the words "*the Court may with the consent of the Collector appoint him*" for the words "*the Court may appoint the Collector*" in Act X. of 1877, so as to render the Collector's consent necessary to his appointment as receiver.

(2) Sects. 503-505 of Act X. of 1877 were, except as to the points mentioned in the last note, identical with the same sections of the last Code. As to sect. 504, see Act XIII of 1880, sect. 92. Sect. 505 was first inserted in the Code by Act X. of 1887. A Mofussil Court of Small Causes could not appoint a receiver under the Code of 1877, as Ch. XXXVI. was not extended to those Courts, but it is otherwise under the present Code. *Narsingdas v. Tuburain*, 2 B. 553 (1875).

(3) Act VIII of 1859, sect. 94.

(4) Act X. of 1877, sect. 588 (c).

(5) Act XIV of 1882, sect. 588 (24).

(6) See *Kistonundo Biswas v. Prawn Kissen Biswas* (1829), *Clark's Rules and Orders*, 1829. Notes of decided cases, 52. In the charter establishing the Supreme Court of Judicature, 26th March, 1774, cl. 18, given in Vol. I of Smout and Ryan's *Rules and Orders*, it is ordained that the Supreme Court be a Court of Equity with full power and authority to administer justice as nearly as may be according to the rules and proceedings of the Courts of Chancery. As to the High Courts, see *High Courts Act*, 1861, cls. 9-11, and *Letters Patent*, sect. 19. As to the former powers of District Courts to appoint receivers, see *John Tiel: Abdul Hye*, 19 W. R. 37, 39 (1872); *Joyanarain Geecree v. Shubpersal Geecree*, 6 W. R. Misc. 1 (1866) (*Jurisdiction of Sudder Ameen*). As to Mofussil Small Cause Courts, *vide ante*.

(7) Woodroffe, 16 *et seq*.

the possession as well as the subsequent control and management of the property. The Court by an injunction ties up the hands of the defendants, and preserves unchanged not only the property itself but the relations of all parties thereto. But in appointing a receiver the Court goes still further, since it wrests the possession from the defendant, and assumes and maintains the entire management of the property or fund, frequently changing its form, and retaining possession through its officer, the receiver, until the rights of all parties in interest are satisfactorily determined.

From the point of resemblance already indicated, it is not to be inferred that the appointment of a receiver necessarily follows from the granting of an injunction, or that the two remedies are necessarily inseparable. And while it frequently happens that the Courts are called upon to administer both species of relief in the same action, and at one and the same time yet it by no means follows that because an injunction is granted a receiver must be appointed, and the two are to be treated as distinct and independent matters. The Court, therefore, may refuse a receiver although the case presented is a fitting one for an injunction, and although an injunction has already been granted (1). A distinction exists between the case in which an injunction and that in which a receiver will be issued and appointed respectively. "That distinction seems to be that, while in either case it must be shown that the property should be preserved from waste or alienation, in the former case it would be sufficient if it be shown that the plaintiff in the suit has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right alleged, while in the latter case a good *prima facie* title has to be made out" (2).

Relief, whether it be given by the issue of an injunction or the appointment of a receiver, is granted generally upon the principle *quia timet*, that is the Court assists the party who seeks its aid because he fears (*quia timet*) some future probable injury to his rights or interests, and not because an injury has already occurred which requires any compensation or other relief.

Law relating to receivers—The law relating to the appointment of receivers in Civil suits (3) in British India (4) is contained in this Code (5) and in the Specific Relief Act, (6) which merely declares that the appointment of a receiver pending a suit rests in the discretion of the Court, and refers to the Code of Civil Procedure for the mode and effect of their appointment and for their rights powers duties and liabilities. Both the earlier Codes (Act VIII of 1859, and X of 1877) dealt with the subject (7). Act X of 1877, however, contained provisions of a more complete character, and which were in fact,

(1) High, 17, 18. Woolffe 12, and see Hall v. Hall 3 Mac G S. where it was said that the rights to those different remedies are essentially distinct and depend upon totally different grounds and circumstances.

(2) Chandulat Jha v. Padmumand Singh Bahadour 22 C 459 465 (1895).

(3) The Criminal Procedure Code in sects 88, 146 (2) deals with the appointment of receivers of attached property. Specific relief by the appointment of a receiver can

not be granted for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law. Act I of 1877, sect 7.

(4) For definition of these words see Act I of 1858, sect 2 (8) as amended by Act XII of 1891.

(5) Order XI. As to the appointment of receivers of property under attachment *vide* *supra*.

(6) Act I of 1877 sect 44.

(7) See Act VIII of 1859 sects 87, 84 243. Act X of 1877 sects 303, 304.

with some minor alterations in the sections relating to receivers, the same as those of the present Code. Sect. 92 of Act VIII of 1859 enabled the Court to appoint a receiver or manager in all cases in which it might appear to the Court to be necessary for the preservation or the better management or the custody of any property "which is in dispute in a suit," and sect. 243 enabled the Court to appoint a manager to realize debts or rents and receipts of landed property where the debts or land were attached in execution of decree. Chapter XXXVI of the Code of 1877, which, with some minor alterations,⁽¹⁾ was identical with the same Chapter of the last Code, supplied the place of both of these provisions, and going further, gave the Court very general powers as to the appointment of receiver⁽²⁾. Further, orders made under sect. 92 of Act VIII. of 1859, were appealable only at the instance of the defendant,⁽³⁾ but orders made under sect. 503 of the Codes of 1877⁽⁴⁾ or 1882⁽⁵⁾ were appealable at the instance of either party. Prior to the establishment of the High Courts, the Supreme Courts of the Presidencies appointed receivers following the principles and practice of the Court of Chancery in England⁽⁶⁾. The provisions of the present Code are (with one important exception) the same as those of the last, with certain omissions which have been noted and additions which have been italicized, and the principal of which will be found in rr. 1, 2, and 4. The exception is the omission of sect. 503 of the last Code, as to which, see *post*.

Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.—The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in this country to grant relief by injunction or receiver is determined by the Code and Specific Relief Act. Certain common conditions are necessary to the existence of jurisdiction to grant either of these forms of relief. Shortly stated,⁽⁷⁾ these conditions are as follows —

(1) In the first place, specific relief whether given by the issue of an

(1) In sect. 503, cl. (d), the words "as the Court thinks fit" were inserted after the word "remuneration" by Act VII of 1888, sect. 42. In sect. 594, Act X of 1877, the opening words of the section were "if the property be" instead of "where the property is". In the same section Act VII of 1888, sect. 43, substituted the words "the Court may with the consent of the Collector appoint him" for the words "the Court may appoint the Collector" in Act X. of 1877, so as to render the Collector's consent necessary to his appointment as receiver.

(2) Sects. 503-505 of Act X of 1877 were, except as to the points mentioned in the last note, identical with the same sections of the last Code. As to sect. 504, see Act XIII of 1859, sect. 92. Sect. 505 was first inserted in the Code by Act X. of 1887. A Mofussil Court of Small Causes could not appoint a receiver under the Code of 1877, as Ch. XXXVI. was not extended to those Courts, but it is otherwise under the present Code. *Narsingdas v. Tulairam*, 2 B. 558 (1878).

(3) Act VIII of 1859, sect. 94.

(4) Act X of 1877, sect. 558 (e).

(5) Act XIV of 1892, sect. 533 (24).

(6) See *Kiatonundo Bannas v. Prawn Kissen Bannas* (1829), Clark's Rules and Orders, 1829. Notes of decided cases, 53. In the charter establishing the Supreme Court of Judicature, 26th March, 1774, cl. 18, given in Vol. 1 of Smollett and Ryan's Rules and Orders, it is ordained that the Supreme Court be a Court of Equity with full power and authority to administer justice as nearly as may be according to the rules and proceedings of the Courts of Chancery. As to the High Courts, see *High Courts Act, 1891*, ch. 9-11, and *Letters Patent*, sect. 19. As to the former powers of District Courts to appoint receivers, see *John Tiel v. Abdul Hye*, 19 W. R. 37, 39 (1872), *Joynarain Geeree v. Shibpersad Geeree*, 6 W. R. Misc. 1 (1866) (*Jurisdiction of Sudder Ameen*). As to Mofussil Small Cause Courts, *vide ante*.

(7) *Woodroffe*, 16 *et seq*.

injunction or the appointment of a receiver, cannot be granted for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law, (1) that is, such enforcement must not be the sole object of requiring specific relief, but the real object must be the protection of some civil rights or the prevention of a tort or civil wrong. Though, however, the Court cannot interfere for the purpose of giving a better remedy in the case of a criminal offence, yet if an act which is criminal touches also the enjoyment of the property the Court has jurisdiction. (2) So the fact that an act complained of amounts to the criminal offence of misappropriation rather than to simple waste, is no ground for refusing relief by way of appointment of a receiver. (3)

(B) Secondly, assuming the matter to be of a civil nature, it is ordinarily a necessary condition to the grant of either form of relief that there should be a suit pending in which either of these reliefs may be granted. (4) Under the last Code, however, a receiver might have been appointed not merely of property the "subject of a suit," but also of property "under attachment." And though these words are omitted this is doubtless so now. (5) The suit must be pending in the Court from which either of these reliefs is sought. Thus, a District Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver or manager in respect of property in dispute in a suit pending in a Subordinate Court, (6) and where a Court has thus no jurisdiction to make an order it can have no jurisdiction to modify such order. (7) R 1 gives power only to the Court in which the suit is brought or by which the property has been attached. A Court cannot appoint a receiver except it has seisin of the property either by a suit being pending or by proceedings in execution of decree made in a suit being pending, and attachment having been made. It is only the Court in which a proceeding is pending, and which has thereby the property under its control, that can appoint a receiver. It was formerly only where the procedure contained in sect 505 of the last Code had been adopted that a District Court could appoint a receiver in suits pending before or attachments made by subordinate Courts. (8) As to this now, *vide post*.

(C) Thirdly, not only must the matter be of a civil, as opposed to a criminal, nature and subject to what is above stated a suit be pending but such suit must disclose a cause of action, and to entertain it. If it has not such grant relief. The Court must not be from taking cognizance of the suit, which must further be not only of a civil nature generally, but within the meaning of that Code. (9)

(D) Lastly, the Court to which application for the relief prayed for is made, must be one which, assuming all the preceding conditions to have been fulfilled,

(1) Act I of 1877, sect. 7

(2) See Woodroffe's Injunctions, 30

(3) Hanamayya v Venkatasubbayya, 18 M 23 (1894)

(4) A Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver unless a cause be depending. *Ex parte Wintheld Bennett, J., Woodroffe's Law of Injunctions*, p. 36

(5) Bai Jaiminabai (in re) 36 B 20 (1911), the operation of this rule is not confined to a

suit

(6) Dhundiram Santukram v Chandra Nani 2 Bom H C R 103 2nd Ed., 98 (1865) Latefat Hossein v Anunt Chowdhry, 23 C 517 (1894)

(7) Dhundiram v Chanda, *supra*

(8) Latefat Hossein v Anunt Chowdhry, 23 C 517, 519 520 (1894)

(9) See Woodroffe's Law of Injunctions, pp 37, 38

has otherwise jurisdiction to try the suit in which that relief is sought. With regard to this, the extensive power of the Court of Chancery to act *in personam* must be considered with reference to the limitation on jurisdiction imposed by the Charter and by the Code. The Courts of this country have ordinarily no jurisdiction to try suits for immovable property where such property is situate without the local limits of their jurisdiction and it would appear to be doubtful whether the equitable jurisdiction of the High Courts in India is of the same extent as that which has been claimed by the Court of Chancery, namely, to take cognizance of any equity between persons residing within the jurisdiction respecting lands outside it. But whatever may be the precise extent of the jurisdiction the Civil Procedure Code has given to the Mofussil Courts the power to act *in personam* when the person against whom relief is sought resides within the jurisdiction. The Presidency High Courts under their Charter have a similar but in terms less restrictive jurisdiction (1). In the case of receivers it is not necessary in all cases to authorize the Court to make an appointment that the property in respect of which the receiver is to be appointed should be within the local limits of its jurisdiction (2).

The Presidency High Courts possess the same powers with regard to the appointment of a receiver as are possessed and exercised by the Courts in England under the Judicature Act of 1873 and the practice in respect of these matters should be the same (3). Formerly while all Civil Courts, with certain exceptions had jurisdiction to issue injunctions on the other hand the powers conferred by the Code in respect of the appointment of receiver could be exercised by the High Courts and District Courts only provided that whenever the Judge of a Court subordinate to a District Court (1) considered it expedient that a receiver should be appointed in any suit before him he nominated such person as he considered fit for such appointment and submitted such person's name with the grounds for the nomination to the District Court and the District Court authorized such Judge to appoint the person so nominated or passed such orders as it thought fit (5). The first step taken by the Subordinate Judge was to nominate and from this proceeding there was no appeal the Judge then approved and authorized the appointment and from this also there was no appeal then the Subordinate Judge appointed the receiver previously nominated and from his order there was an appeal (6). The Judge of the Lower Subordinate Court had first to satisfy himself that it was expedient that a receiver should be appointed in a

(1) See the subject fully discussed and cases cited in Woodroffe a Law of Injunctions pp 38-54

(2) Juggodumba Dossee v Puddomoney Dossee, 10 B L R 318 324 325 330 (1875)

(3) Jaikissondas Gangadas v Zenabai 14 B 431, 434 (1890)

(4) As to the meaning of District Court, see sect 2

(5) Sect. 500 Act XIV of 1832 Sect. 503 extended to the Presidency Small Cause Courts (Act XV of 1832 sect 23, Sched. II but see also the terms of sect 23), and sects 503 500 applied to Provincial Courts

of Small Causes (Act IX. of 1837 sect. 17 Sched. I but see also the terms of sect 17 Act IX of 1837) It was otherwise under the Code of 1877 See Nursingdas Raghu nathdas v Tulsuram bin Doulatram, 2 B 508 (1885) The Code is applicable to suits under the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), vide ib sects 143, 148, and as to the appointment of receivers in such suits, see Kartio Nath Pandey v Padmanund Singh, 11 C 496 (1885)

(6) Sangappa v Shivbasawa 24 B 38 41 (1890)

suit before him, for this purpose he had to inquire judicially, and satisfy himself upon evidence that the appointment of a receiver was necessary and recommend a proper person. He did this under sect 503 of the last Code. If he refused to do it his order refusing the application was an order under the same section, and as such was appealable (1). In the first of the last mentioned cases, it was held that an order by a Subordinate Judge dismissing an application for the appointment of a receiver after obtaining sanction from the District Judge was appealable. But it was recently held that a Subordinate Judge when considering the expediency of the appointment of a receiver, was also acting under sect 503, and whether he appointed or whether he refused to take the necessary steps preliminary to the appointment, he was equally acting under sect 503 and an appeal lay (2). After such inquiry he was to nominate such person as he considered fit to be nominated, and submit such person's name with the grounds for the nomination to the District Court, then, if the District Court authorized such Judge to appoint the person so nominated, but not otherwise, he was to appoint him. But the Judge of the District Court might decline to authorize the Judge of the Lower Court to make the appointment of the person so nominated, and might himself pass "such other order as he thinks fit" (3). These words in the last Code gave the Judge of the District Court full control over the matter of the appointment of a receiver. His duty was not only to approve or disapprove of the particular person nominated, but also to take into consideration the necessity for the appointment of a receiver at all (4). These words gave full discretion to the District Judge to pass such order as the circumstances of the case, considered in all their bearings, required. He might give the proper directions to the Subordinate Court. Nomination in sect 503 seemed to be equivalent to the conditional appointment of a receiver which the District Court could accept or reject or modify (5). In the latter case the District Judge made an *ex parte* order for the appointment of a receiver under sect 503. Subsequently, the District Court made an order admitting a review. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Without deciding whether an appeal would lie against the order of the District Judge, the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order of the District Judge having been in the first instance *ex parte*, he had clearly the power to review it (6). But the words, it was held, must be read as controlled by the words preceding them and did not confer upon the District Court the power itself to appoint a receiver not nominated by the Subordinate Court (7). The Judge of the Lower Court in making his inquiry, had all the power conferred upon him that might be necessary for such

(1) Gossain Dulmar Puri v Tekait Hetna
rain 6 C. L. R. 467, 468 (1880). Venkata
sami Stridavamma 10 M. 19 (1886),
Bondya Nath Adya v. Mahan Lal Adya,
17 C. 680 (1880).

(2) Saigappa v. Shivbasawa, 24 B. 33
(1899).

(3) Gossain Dulmar Puri v Tekait Hetna
rain, *supra* 468. The Subordinate Judge
might nominate but he could not go further
and appoint a receiver. Latifut Hossein v.

Anant Chowdhry, 23 C. 517, 519, 520 (1896).

(4) Brajan Koor v. Ram Churn Lal

(5) Chundal v. Sonabai, 21 B. 323 (1899).

(6) Chundal v. Sonabai, *supra*.

(7) Amar Nath v. Raj Nath 18 A. 453
(1896).

inquiry. He might adjourn the case from time to time, and he might hear fresh evidence at any time before he made the appointment. He might even abstain from appointing when he had received the necessary authority if he had good grounds for so doing; otherwise he might be appointing an unfit person when he had facts before him to show that the appointment would be most improper. Sect. 505 of the former Code was not imperative. It merely enabled the Judge of the Lower Court to appoint when authorized by the District Court to do so (1). As already stated, sect. 505 of the former Code has now been omitted. It was considered that its effect in practice was often to defeat the purpose for which an application was made, and that having regard to their standard of efficiency there was no longer any reason to withhold from Subordinate Judges the power to appoint receivers.

The jurisdiction to appoint a receiver may be exercised either by a Court of first instance or by a Court of Appeal (2). In order to give the Court jurisdiction there must be a pending suit, (3) and the Court cannot in so far as its power to appoint a receiver extends only to the better management or custody of any property which is the subject of a suit appoint or continue the previous appointment of a receiver when the suit comes to an end by its dismissal (4) but when a suit is decreed there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which limits the power of the Court to appoint a receiver after the decree when this course is necessary or proper. This is now expressly stated. As long as the order appointing a receiver remains unrevoked and as long as the suit remains a *lis pendens*, the functions of the receiver continue until he is discharged by order of the Court (5). Although the dismissal of a suit may operate as a discharge of the receiver appointed in it (6) yet the Court has ample jurisdiction without the aid of a pending process to require accounts from its own officer to permit parties interested to intervene in the examination of these accounts to make just allowances to its officers for his administration and to deal with all questions of costs connected with the investigation of his accounts as between him and any parties interested who may be allowed to appear and take part in it (7).

The Court if it can appoint a receiver has ample powers to provide for the management of the property and can deal with property which is under its control just as completely as the owner of the property can deal with it (8). The subject matter of the appointment was in terms of the last Code (vide now ante) property moveable or immovable which was the subject of the suit (9).

(1) *Gossain Dulmar Puri v. Telsat Hetna*
rian *supra* 469.

(2) *Jankisondas Gangadas v. Zenaba*
14 B 431 (1890). See also *Shah Mohesood*
been v. Shaikh Ahmed Hossein 14 W R
384 385 (1890).

(3) *Vide ante*.

(4) *Shah Mohesood been v. Shah Ahmed*
Hossein supra.

(5) *Dinonath Sreemoney v. C. S. Hoag* 2
Hay, 395 396 (1863).

(6) *Prem Lal Mullick v. Sumbhoo Nath*
Ray, 22 C. 960, 973 (1895).

(7) *Administrator General of Bengal v.*
Prem Lal Mullick 22 C 1011 101 1016
(1895).

(8) *Poroshnath Mookerjee v. Omro Nath*
Mitter 17 C 614 615 (1890).

(9) Sect. 503. See *Sundaram v. Sankara*
9 M. 331 (1886), *Jaynarain Gecree v. Shih*
persad Gecree 8 W R Misc 1 (1865), *Kartie*
Nath Pandey v. Palmanund Singh 11 C 496
(1885), *Yeshwant Bhagwant Phatarpakar*
v. Shankar Ram Chandra Phatarpakar 17
B 358 (1892), *Poroshnath Mookerjee v.*
Omro Nath Mitter 17 C 614 (1890).

or under attachment which latter words applied to property taken for the first time in execution of any decree (1) Where the property to be managed is not the subject of the suit no manager can be appointed before attachment (2) Where owing to the value of the subject matter of a suit the Court has no power to try the same, any order made therein by way of appointment of a receiver is passed without jurisdiction (3) The fact that the acts complained of and which form the ground of an application for a receiver amount to a criminal offence rather than to a civil wrong will not deprive the Court of jurisdiction if such acts affect a right to property (4) It was held by the Allahabad High Court that the fact that there exists, in respect of any immovable property an order of a Magistrate passed under sect 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is no bar to the exercise by a civil Court of the power conferred on it by r 1 of appointing a receiver in respect of the same property, for the Magistrate's order under sect 145 is only intended to control any period up to the time when the Civil Court takes seisin of the matter, and passes such order as may be necessary for the protection of the property (5) But it has been recently held by the Calcutta High Court that the appointment of a receiver by a Civil Court under r 1 of this order cannot supersede an appointment by a Magistrate and that the Court should either appoint as its receiver the person appointed by the Magistrate or should make a conditional appointment and inform the Magistrate of it so that he may have an opportunity to withdraw his attachment (6)

The appointment may be made either by a Court of first instance or by a Court of Appeal
dismisses a suit it
own decree or order

first instance after dismissal of the suit but *before* appeal filed asking that a receiver might be restrained from parting with funds in his hands pending an appeal was held to be one which the Court had no jurisdiction to grant The Court's jurisdiction extends no further in regard to a suit which has ceased to be a pending suit (7)

An Appellate Court may also appoint a receiver If therefore a party whose suit has been dismissed desires to have any measure taken for the realization preservation better custody or management of property claimed by him he is at liberty after filing his appeal to apply to the Appellate Court which has authority to make or continue the appointment pending the determination of the appeal If a receiver has been appointed but the facts proved only warrant the issue of an injunction the Appellate Court will set aside the order appointing a receiver and in lieu thereof will issue an injunction (8) When a receiver of a property has been appointed by an Appellate Court pending an

(1) See form No 168 in the fourth Schedule of the last Code Woodroffe 27

(2) *Bunwaree Lall Sahoo v Baboo Girdharee Singh* 16 W R 273 (1871)

(3) *Bordya Nath Adya v Mahan Lal Ailya* 17 C 680 (1890)

(4) *Hanumayya v Venkatasubbayya* 18 M 23 (1894)

(5) *Barkat un Nissa v Abdul Aziz* A

214 (1900)

(6) *Budya Prasad Varma Singh v Ashrafi Singh* 40 C 867 (1913) 14 C W Y 100

(7) *Yamin ud Doulah v Ahmed Ali Khan* 11 C 361 (1894) Woodroffe's Injunctions

p 41

(8) *Chand Lal Jha v Padmauni Singh Bahadur* 22 C 459 (1896)

appeal to the Court, he must even when the appeal is no longer pending, be regarded as the receiver of the property of which he has been put in possession until he is finally discharged, and the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to the receiver including proceedings for contempt, until he has had his accounts passed by it (1)

The grant of preventive or protective relief is purely discretionary—The exercise of the jurisdiction to appoint a receiver or issue an injunction (2) is not a matter *ex debito justitiæ*, but one which is purely within the discretion of the Court. The latter is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. But the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of Appeal (3). All questions of discretion are usually questions of degree (4). Where there is a discretion exercisable the Court is bound to look at all the circumstances of the case (5). The jurisdiction of the Court to interfere being equitable is governed on equitable principles. And, therefore, the Court will, amongst other things, look to the conduct of the person who makes the application (6). Where an appeal attacks the exercise of discretion, before the Appellate Court will interfere on this ground in favour of the appellant, the latter must satisfy such Court that the discretion has been improperly exercised (7).

The appointment as well as the removal of a receiver is also a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the Court (8). In exercising its discretion the Court should proceed with caution (9) and be governed by a view of the whole circumstances of the case (10). The power conferred by the Code to appoint a receiver is not to be exercised as a matter of course and it is not a reason for

no
be
ver
the

(1) Grey v Woogra Mohun Bhakur, 28 C 90 (1901)

(2) Act I of 1877 sects. 44-52, Woodroffe 31

(3) Ib, sect. 22. Discretion when applied to a Court of law means discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule and not by humour. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular, per Lord Mansfield in Wilkes's case, 4 Burr 2539 cited in Harbans Sahai v Bhauru Pershad Singh, 5 C. 259-260 (1879), see also remarks in Queen Empress v Chagan Dayaram, 14 B 331, 344, 352 (1890), per Jardine, J.

(4) Ghanashan Nilkant Naddkarni v Moroba Ramchandra Patil 18 B (1894) at p. 493

(5) Ib, p. 484, Bhupendra Nath Basu v Ranjit Singh, 41 C 384 (1913)

(6) Act I. of 1877, sect. 50 (J), Kerr, b

(7) Shadi v Anup Singh 12 A 438 (1889)

(8) Act I of 1877 sect. 44, Kerr, 3, Sideswari Debi v Abhoyeswari Debi, 15 C 818-822-823 (1888) Chandidat Jha v Padmanund Singh Bahadur, 22 C 459, 464-465, (1880), Ex parte Jyoti Amba 13 M. 390 (1890) [Removal of receiver], Weatherall v Eastern Mortgage Agency Co. 13 C L J 495 (1911)

(9) Mun Monihay Dass v Ichamoyee Dass, 13 W R 60 (1870) Prosonomoyo Debi v Beni Madhub Roy 5 A 556 (1883)

(10) Owen v Homan, 4 H. L. 1033, Sideswari Debi v Abhoyeswari Debi, supra, Chandidat Jha v Padmanund Singh Bahadur, supra.

(11) Prosonomoyo Debi v Beni Madhub Roy, 5 A 556 (1883)

(12) Ib

case of a *bona fide* possessor with legal title (1) The main principles upon which such discretion should be exercised have been laid down in the case of *Owen v Homan*, (2) and those principles have been held to be as equally applicable in this country as in England (3) In that case Lord Cranworth said — "The receiver, if appointed in this case, must be appointed on the principle on which the Court of Chancery acts of preserving property pending the litigation which is to decide the right of the litigant parties In such cases the Court must of necessity exercise a discretion as to whether it will or will not interfere by this kind of *interim* protection of the property Where, indeed, the property is as it were *in medio*, in the enjoyment of no one, the Court can hardly do wrong in taking possession It is the common interest of all parties that the Court should prevent a scramble Such is the case when a receiver of a property of a deceased person is appointed pending a litigation in the Ecclesiastical Court as to the right of probate or administration (4) No one is in the actual lawful enjoyment of property so circumstanced, and no wrong can be done to any one by taking it and preserving it for the benefit of the successful litigant But where the object of the plaintiff is to assert a right to property of which the defendant is in the

ally fail in establishing his right against the defendant, the Court may by its *interim* interference have caused mischief to the defendant for which the subsequent restoration of the property may afford no adequate compensation In all cases, therefore, where the Court interferes by appointing a receiver of property in the possession of the defendant before the title of the defendant is established by decree, it exercises a discretion to be governed by all the circumstances of the case" (5)

As in the case of injunctions the Court will always look to the conduct of the party who makes the application for a receiver and will not interfere unless his conduct has been free from blame, (6) and parties who have acquiesced in property being enjoyed against their own alleged rights cannot come to the Court for this form of relief (7) A stronger case is generally required for the appointment of a receiver than for the issue of an injunction It may well be that circumstances which will warrant the issue of an injunction will not warrant the appointment of a receiver Accordingly, while the Court may in its discretion refuse to appoint a receiver, it may yet consider the case to be one which calls for an injunction The opinion of the Court of first instance is, in these matters of great weight It has all the facts and the parties before it and is probably the best tribunal to decide whether it is necessary or expedient, having

(1) *Gossain Dulmar Puri v Ickait Hetna*
rain 6 C L R 467, 469 (1880)

(2) 4 H L 1032, 1033

(3) *Sideswari Debi v Abhoyeswari Debi*,
supra *Chandidat Jha v Padmanund Singh*
Bahadur supra *Ranjiram v Salgram*
14 C L J 215 (1909)

(4) See *Joy Kally Debi v Shih Nath*
Chatterjee Bourke, *lest* 5 (1866), *Yashwant*

Bhagwant Phatarpakar v Shankar Lwin
chandra Phatarpakar, 17 B 353 (1892)

(5) *Owen v Homan supra* 1032, 1033

(6) *Kerr, S.*, see *Baxter v West* 23 L J
Ch 169, cf *Wood v Hitching*, 2 Bea 147.

(7) *Ib.*, *Gray v Chaplin* 2 Russ 147.
Shamir's Society v Irish Society, 1 M &
Cr 162

regard to the circumstances of the case, that a receiver should be appointed (1) And a party who in appeal attacks the exercise of this discretion should show that the discretion has been improperly so exercised (2) The exercise of the power being thus discretionary it would be difficult, even if it were possible, with any precision to make out the limits within which it is ordinarily circumscribed, but some of the principles which govern the discretion of the Court in such appointment will be found considered more fully and in detail in the work cited (3) in those Chapters which specially treat of the cases in which a receiver may be appointed

The best guides in the matter of interference by way of injunction and receiver have been judicially stated to be the principles which determine the action of Courts of Equity in England (4) It is, in fact, on these principles that the relief given in Indian Courts by injunction and receiver is in the main founded

A judgment of the Court which is *in personam* may be enforced by process *in personam*, that is, by attachment of the person when the person is within the jurisdiction or by sequestration of the goods or lands of the defendant when these are within the jurisdiction of the Court until the defendant do comply with the judgment or order of the Court (5) Under the authority conferred by the Charters of the Supreme Courts and continued by their own Letters Patent the High Courts in India possess the power of enforcing obedience to their orders by attachment for contempt (6) and they have all the powers of a Court of Equity in England for enforcing their decrees *in personam* (7) The jurisdiction of the High Court to imprison for contempt is a jurisdiction that it has inherited from the old Supreme Court and was conferred upon that Court by the Charters of the Crown, which invested it with all the powers and authority of the then Court of Chancery in Great Britain and this jurisdiction has not been removed or affected by the Code (8) The power of the Mofussil Courts to commit for contempt otherwise than under the authority of special statutory enactments conferring or of case law recognizing that power is a matter of doubt (9)

(1) The Oriental Bank Corporation v Gobin Lall Seal 10 C 737 (1884) per Garth, C.J. See also Ram Sunder Dass v Kamal Jha 32 C 741 (1906) where it was also held that in considering an application for a receiver it was inadvisable to go into the general merits of the case

(2) See Shadi v Anup Singh, 12 A 438 (1889)

(3) Woodroffe's Receivers

(4) See Nusservanji Merwanji Panday v Gordon, 8 B 266 281 2 9, Sideshwari Deb v Abhoyewari Deb, 10 C 818 822 823 (1888), Chandidat Jha v Padmanund Singh Bahadur, 22 C 103 461, 466 (1896), and cases cited in Woodroffe's Law of Injunction pp. 3, 4

(5) Penn v Lord Baltimore 1 Ves 441 *vide ante*. Woodroffe, 39

(6) Hassonbhoy v Cowasji Jehangir Jassawalla 7 B 1 (1861) Navinahoo v Naratam Das Candus 7 B 3 (1882)

(7) H. H. Shrimant Maharaj Yashwantrao Holkar v Dadabhar Cursetji Ashburner 14 B 303 309 (1890) per Sargent C.J. citing Martin v Lawrence 4 C 600 (18 9) Hassonbhoy v Cowasji Jehangir Jassawalla 7 B 1 (1861)

(8) Martin v Lawrence 4 C 600 (18 9) per White J. Hassonbhoy v Cowasji Jehangir Jassawalla *supra* 4 Navinahoo v Naratam Das Candus *supra* 12 13, 1 v Tinnal Reddi 24 M 323 318 N to (1900)

(9) See Hassonbhoy v Cowasji Jehangir Jassawalla *supra* at p. 3, Navinahoo v Naratam Das Candus *supra* at pp. 13 14

A receiver is an officer of the Court and the Court will therefore see that he performs his function and will protect the agent appointed under its orders (1) Being such officer, his possession is simply the possession of the Court and to such an extent is this the case that any attempt to disturb that possession without leave of the Court is a contempt of Court (2) Thus an attachment of money in the hands of the receiver is an interference with the Court's possession through its officer the receiver and may not therefore be made without the Court's leave first obtained (3) The mere appointment of a receiver operates as an injunction against the parties their agents and persons claiming under them restraining them from interfering with the possession of the receiver except by permission of the Court (4) The Court requires and insists that application should be made to it for permission to take possession of any property of which the receiver has taken or is directed to take possession The rule is not confined to property actually in the hands of a receiver The Court will not permit any one without its sanction and authority to intercept or prevent payment to the receiver of any property which he has been appointed to receive though it may not be actually in his hands (5) The form in which the Court usually enforces its order in the matter of receivers is in extreme or aggravated cases by commitment to prison or ordinarily by ordering the party in contempt to pay the costs and expenses occasioned by his improper conduct and the costs of the application In cases where the contempt consists in entering upon land in the possession of a receiver or in bringing an action against the receiver or against a party over whose property a receiver has been appointed the Court restrains by injunction the trespass or prosecution of the action and orders the party in contempt to pay the costs of the application (6) The High Courts in India being Superior Courts of Record have full powers to punish for contempt of their orders committed either directly or through interference with the action of officers appointed by them (7) It has already been observed that the nature and extent of the powers of Mofussil Courts in the matter of contempt is doubtful in the absence of express statutory provisions on the subject The Code does not directly provide for the case of the breach of or the enforcement of orders under r 1 (otherwise than in execution of a decree) as it does in the case of interlocutory orders under O XXXI rr 1 2 But the order appointing a receiver operates *per se* as an injunction and if necessary for the purpose of giving express effect to the order an injunction may be granted in terms Although ordinarily the receiver does not himself apply for commencing proceedings by way of contempt and generally speaking action is taken by the parties beneficially interested there is nothing to prohibit his doing so (8)

When a receiver is appointed by an Appellate Court the latter has even

(1) Dinonanth Sreemonee v C. S. Hogg 13 May 390 39 (1863)

(2) Wilkinson v Gangadhar Sircar 6 B. L. R. 486 48 (18 1) Kerr 139

(3) Kahn v Ali Mahomed Hap Umer 16 B. 3 (189) followed in Mahommed Zohuruddeen v Mahommed Noorooddeen, 11 C. 80 (1893) The Sheriff may not disturb the possession of a receiver Kerr

13 14 Woodroffe 11

(4) Mahommed Zohuruddeen v Mahommed Noorooddeen s. pra at p. 91

(5) Kerr 160 A. C. 1 Burkenhead Dock 40 Bear 353.

(6) Kerr op. c. 4, 1 1 1 3.

(7) *Idem* ante, and see there c. 10.

(8) Grey v Woodgramohun Thakur s. C. 190 (1900)

although the appeal be no longer pending jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to the receiver, including proceedings for contempt, until he has had his accounts passed by it (1) A receiver, being a mere officer of the Court, is bound to obey every order of the Court, and if he neglects or refuses to comply therewith, he stands in no better position than any other person, and may be punished in the same way (2)

the functions to be discharged by him Inasmuch as a receiver is required to be an impartial person, the person chosen should as a general rule be wholly disinterested in the subject matter of the suit The Court may however, with the consent of all the parties, or in very special cases without such consent, appoint as receiver a person who is mixed up in the subject matter of the suit, if it is satisfied that the appointment would be attended with benefit to the estate Where the defendant in a suit for partition made an application regarding the custody of the property, and the Court directed *suo motu* that pending the suit the plaintiff should have the control and management of one part of the property and the defendant should have the same power over the rest, it was held that this order was legal and proper and practically amounted to an order under r. 1 (3) Apart from the question of interest, the Court will consider the character and qualifications of the person proposed, his familiarity with the kind of property to be managed his place of residence with reference to the estate to be managed his ability to spare sufficient time for the duties of his office, and other similar facts bearing upon the appointment (4) The second general rule is that the Court is averse to appointing as receivers persons occupying relations of trust as trustees executors or otherwise towards the property or estate which is the subject of the receivership The reason of this rule is that the Court is exceedingly jealous of appointing any person to a receivership whose duty it would otherwise be to watch the proceedings of the receiver or to call him to an account for his management (5)

In all cases the selection of a particular person for the receivership is regarded as a matter of judicial discretion to be determined by the Court according to the circumstances of the case The exercise of this like all other matters of judicial discretion will rarely be interfered with by an appellate tribunal and it may be stated, as a general rule that to induce an Appellate Court to interfere with the decision of an inferior tribunal in the selection of a receiver it is necessary to show some "overwhelming objection in point of propriety of choice or some objection fatal in principle," to the person named (6)

(1) *Ib.*, *vide ante* Woodroffe, 42

(2) Beach, sect. 248, where also a liquidator is in possession the receiver will be in contempt if he moves against him without leave Kerr 174, 175

(3) Dan Prasad v. Chellabhai, 36 A 13 (1913)

(4) Woodroffe, 46, High, sects. 61, 68-69.

Kerr 119, 120

(5) Woodroffe *ib.*

(6) *Cookes v. Cookes* 2 De G J & S 526, at p 528, *per* Knight Bruce L.J., *Perry v. Oriental Hotels Company, Ltd.*, 5 Ch. App 420 High, sect. 65, *Jibanessa v. Maslunessa* 17 C W N 551 (1913).

A receiver may be appointed of *any* property, whether moveable or immoveable, provided it is the *subject matter of a suit or under attachment*, and probably, though the italicized words have now been omitted the appointment will be limited to such cases. In, however, suits for partition of joint estates the Court has jurisdiction to place the whole of the estate out of which the plaintiff seeks to have his share partitioned, in the hands of a receiver, and to order that the latter shall be at liberty to raise money on the security of the whole of such joint estate (1). Receivers have been appointed of undivided shares, though Equity is generally averse to extending the aid of a receiver as between joint owners or tenants in common (2).

Time when receiver may be appointed — A receiver may be appointed during the pendency of the litigation at any time before decree. The application for a receiver may be made at any stage of the action according as the urgency of the case requires it. Where proceedings are already pending an order for a receiver may be made in these proceedings without any fresh suit being instituted. If the appointment of a receiver is a substantial object of the action the plaint should contain such a prayer, and if it does not, upon amendment a receiver may be obtained (3). A receiver may also be appointed or continued (4) by the decree, or the appointment may be made after the decree, (5) even though it had been previously refused, if a state of facts entitling the party to a receiver were made to appear in the proceedings in

Act (8). A receiver will be appointed at the instance of a mortgagee when the interest payable under the security is in arrear (9).

Time from which appointment takes place — Where an order is made that a certain person upon his giving security, be appointed receiver, the order appoints the receiver conditionally upon his giving security only, a receiver becomes such on giving security. When he has done that he can take possession. He is not legally clothed with the character of receiver, nor able to perform its duties, until he has given security and his recognizances are perfected. It has been held that the appointment of a receiver as far as it affects the rights of creditors or third parties dates not from the order appointing him, but from the completion of the security required to be given by the order and, accordingly, until the appointment has been completed a judgment creditor is not

(1) Poreshram Mookerjee v Omerto Nath Mitter 17 C 614 (1899)

(2) High sect 606 Woodroffe 50, Joy naram Geere v Shibjersad Geere, 6 W R Misc 1 (1866)

(3) Kerr, 128. H v H, 1 Ch D 26, Seton Decr 652

(4) Motivahu v Premavahu 16 B 511 512 (1802), Mathusri Umamba Boyi Saiba v Mathusri Dipamba Boyi Saiba 19 M 120 (1890), Ex parte Jijai Amba 13 M 300

(1890)

(5) Shunmugan v Moudin 8 M. 229 233 (1884), Kerr 131

(6) Att Gen. v Mayor of Galway, 1 Moll 95, 164, Kerr 132

(7) Madaneswar v Mohamaya, 13 C L J 487 (1911), 15 C W N 6, 2

(8) Ib

(9) Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co v Rakea Khatus 16 C W N 497 (1912)

debarred from proceeding to execution (1) But in a later case it has been held that the appointment of a receiver is complete on the entry of an order of appointment although he may not be able to take actual possession of the property until the security is approved (2) If no security is required (which should appear upon the face of the order) the appointment is complete upon possession being taken under the order (3) When as will be done in urgent cases an *interim* receiver is appointed for a limited time without security he becomes an officer of the Court and is legally clothed with that character from the date of his appointment (4) The receiver's liability however to account in respect of moneys received and expended by him as receiver at once arises whether the security has been completed or not (5) As far as respects parties to the action the rents and profits of the estate over which a receiver has been appointed are bound from the date of the order for the appointment (6) but the latter does not date back to the date of the application (7) Though outsiders may not be affected until the completion of the security the parties to the suit may, before such time be restrained from touching the property (8)

Duration of receivership—Except (according to English practice) in the case of managers there is often no limit of time fixed (9) When this is the case, and the suit is dismissed the dismissal of the suit will in general operate as a discharge of the receiver But if the suit is decreed and no limit is fixed in the appointment of a receiver it is not necessary for the judgment to direct that he be continued (10) Sometimes the receiver is only appointed until judgment, that is during the pendency of the suit or until further orders When this is the case if he is to continue receiver the judgment must so direct and as this is practically a new appointment further security must be given unless as is usually the case the security originally given is made applicable to any continuation of the appointment (11) It is within the discretion of a Court appointing a receiver in a suit to order that the office should continue permanently after the decree when such continuance is necessary or for so long as it may be so (12)

(1) *Lidwars v Lidwars* L. R. 2 Ch. D. 291, 296 In *Defries v Creed* 34 L. J. Ch. 607, it was held that there was no contempt, possession having been taken after the receiver was nominated but before he had passed his recognizances and before he had been actually appointed and see *Ex parte Evans Re Watkins*, 13 Ch. D. 252, 253 High sect. 121 A contrary rule generally prevails in the American Courts in which it is held that upon the filing of the bond the receiver's title has relation back to the date of his appointment and such title has been upheld against creditors levying upon the property between the date of the appointment and the filing of the bond High sect. 121A., and see Beach sect. 163.

(2) *Rowland Hudson v John Pierpont Morgan*, 13 C. W. N. 604 (1899)

(3) *Morrison v Skerme Iron Works Co* 60 L. T. 558 As to forms of appointment see Seton 50

(4) *Taylor v Eekersley* 2 Ch. D. 302, 5 Ch. D. 741

(5) *Smart v Flood* 49 L. T. 407

(6) *Floyd v Mason* 2 M. & C. 487 (odington v Johnston, 1 Beav. 520 See Wickens v Townshend 1 R. & M. 361, Pe Burt 22 Ch. D. 603)

(7) *Re Clarke* 1893 1 Ch. 339

(8) See *Defries v Creed* 34 L. J. Ch. 607

(9) *Herr* 146 *Woodroffe* 59 et seq

(10) *Herr* 146.

(11) *Ib.* In *Motivahu v Premvahu* 16 B. 511 512 (1892) the receiver who had been previously appointed was continued by the decree

(12) *Maharaj Limamba Boyi Saiba v*

Mode of appointment—A receiver will not be appointed under the Code unless an action is pending or the property be the subject of attachment (*vide ante*). A plaint should be filed claiming a receiver, where the obtaining of it is a substantial object of the action. Application should be made upon or after, the filing of the plaint and before or after, service of the writ. An application for a receiver may be made on motion or on petition. The party applying may either move to obtain a rule nisi or serve notice of motion. If the matter be urgent he may apply for an *ad interim* receiver until the hearing of the application or he may apply for leave to serve short notice of motion. It is submitted that under the Code the Court possesses the power of appointing a receiver at the instance of the defendant but that the exercise of such jurisdiction will be limited to cases where the defendant's claim to relief arises out of the plaintiff's cause of action or is incidental to it but that if the relief sought by a defendant is not connected with the subject matter of the plaint the defendant must if he desires a receiver, institute an action of his own for such purpose (1). Application for a receiver may be made either *ex parte* or on notice but it is only in case of emergency that a receiver will be appointed upon an *ex parte* application as where there is any risk of making away with the property of a receiver. The Courts

upon application *ex parte* (2). The motion should be properly founded on affidavits copies of which should be served with notice of the application although if the papers on which the moving party seeks relief are already on file on the cause it is sufficient to refer to them in the notice. It is not regarded as necessary or essential to the appointment of a receiver that the facts upon which the application is based should be set forth in the pleadings but it is sufficient if they are presented to the Court by affidavit upon the hearing of the motion. It is proper on denying a motion for a receiver to give leave to the moving party to renew his motion upon additional proof if it appears that he may by obtaining new proof present a strong case for the relief sought and it is competent for a plaintiff to ask for and for the Court to appoint a receiver after a hearing and even after a rehearing and refusal when an altered state of facts is presented showing an appropriate case for the relief. But when the application has once been before the Court and has been denied a receiver will not be appointed upon a subsequent application upon a simple motion for that purpose founded upon the same papers as before without affidavits or additional proof showing a necessity for the relief. The person whose property it is sought to place in the receiver's hands must be made a party to the suit in order that he may have an opportunity of resisting the application the granting of which might result in irreparable injury to his interests (3).

Security—Every receiver appointed must give such security (if any) as the Court thinks fit duly to account for what he shall receive in respect of the property (4). As a general rule security is required but if as in *ex parte* and

Mathusri Dyamba Boyi Saiba 19 M. 120
(1895) and see *Ex parte Jai Amba* 13 M.
390 (1880)

(1) See Woodroffe 61

(2) *Herr* 127 I S., High sect. 111

(3) High sect. 17

(4) R. 3 Woodroffe 60

cases, no security is to be given, it should be so stated in the order. Where a person is appointed receiver subject to his giving security, the order is not effective until security is given (1). According to English practice, where there is evidence of immediate danger to the property and there is no time for the receiver to complete his security, an *interim* receiver may be appointed without security for a limited period or until a receiver should be appointed under a reference for that purpose upon the undertaking of the person so appointed *interim* receiver, if he be the plaintiff, not to deal with the property except under the direction of the Court, and to abide by any order which the Court may think fit to make as to damages or otherwise. In other cases where the case is urgent and there is no time for the receiver to complete his security, the party moving the Court must enter into an undertaking as to damages and for the receipts of the receiver, or must undertake that the person so appointed receiver shall give such security as the Court can enforce that he will preserve intact the property of which he is appointed receiver (2). There seems to be no reason why this course should not be followed in this country if necessary. In any case the Court might dispense with security or in the case of the High Court appoint the Court receiver. The Court has, moreover, where there was great danger to the property appointed a receiver without security and directed him to take possession before the order of appointment was formally drawn up (3).

Effect of appointment—A receiver duly appointed is from the moment of his appointment an officer of the Court and entitled to the possession of the property comprised in the order appointing him. The effect of the appointment is to remove the parties to the action from the possession of the property (4) subject to this that the Court cannot remove from the possession or custody of property under attachment any person whom the parties to the suit or some or one of them has or have not a present right so to remove (5). The appointment, however, though it may operate to change possession has no effect itself upon the title to the property in any way and determines no right as between the parties (6). Receivers and managers are only custodians of the property of which they take possession. The Court in an action for a receiver deals with the possession only until the right can be determined if the right be the subject matter in dispute between the parties or until the incumbrances have been cleared off, if the appointment has been made at the suit of an incumbrancer. The title is in no way prejudiced in theory or principle by the appointment (7) and remains in those in whom it was vested when the appointment was made (8). The possession of the Court by its receiver is the possession of all parties to the suit according to their titles. His appointment is not for the benefit of the

(1) *Herr*, 138, 139, *In re Roundwood Colliery Co.*, 1897, 1 Ch. 373, High sect. 121, *Rowland Hudson v. John Pierpont Morgan*, 13 C. W. N. 654 (1909) (the appointment is complete on the entry of the order of appointment, although he may not be able to take possession).

(2) *Herr*, 143.

(3) *Woodruffe*, 67.

(4) *Herr*, 143, r 1 ante.

(5) *R.* 1.

(6) *Orr v. Muthia Chellu*, 17 M. 504 (1893), *Beach*, sect. 1.

(7) *Herr*, 149, 152.

(8) *Beach*, sect. 203. The object of the appointment is not to divest a rightful owner of the title but to protect the property by taking possession of it, *ib.*, sect. 221.

plaintiff merely, but for all other persons who may establish right to the cause. He is not the particular agent of any party but an officer of the Court (1). With regard to the limitations on his title, it is to be observed that his possession is subject to all valid and existing liens upon the property, at the time of his appointment, and it does not divest a lien previously acquired in good faith (2). The rights of the parties to an action are not interfered with by the appointment (3). It is not averse to either party (4). If at the time a receiver is appointed a party claiming a right in the same subject matter under a title paramount to that under which the receiver is appointed is in possession of the right which he claims, the appointment of the receiver leaves him in possession (5). The appointment of a receiver is a matter which does not concern mortgagees or prior incumbrancers, for a receiver in the exercise of his authority will be obliged to respect former orders of the Court, and prior incumbrancers are at liberty to take such proceedings in behalf of their own interests as they may think fit (6). The appointment operates as an injunction against the parties, their agents and persons claiming under them, restraining them from interfering with the possession of the receiver except by permission of the Court (7). The order does not, however, create a charge, but it operates as an injunction to restrain the defendant from himself receiving the proceeds of sale (8). A receiver of land never takes actual possession, he only receives the rent, nor does he receive such rent and profits by virtue of an estate or title vested in him, but he collects the same merely as an officer of the Court upon the title of some persons parties to the action (9).

Possession and interference with possession of receiver—The receiver being the officer of the Court from which he derives his appointment, his possession is exclusively the possession of the Court, the property being regarded as in the custody of the law, *in gremio legis* for the benefit of whoever may be ultimately determined to be entitled thereto. The possession being therefore that of the Court may not be disturbed without the leave of the Court, and any person who disturbs such possession is guilty of a contempt and liable to punishment therefor. No one is entitled to interfere with the possession whether he claims under or paramount to the right which the receiver was appointed to protect (10). Thus an attachment of money in the hands of the receiver is an interference with the Court's possession and may not, therefore, be made without the Court's leave first obtained (11). When the Court appoints

(1) Kerr, 153

(2) High sect 138, Beach, sect. 202

(3) Kerr 151

(4) Beach sect 222

(5) Kerr 149, 164, Evelyn & Lewis, 3 Ha
4 2, Bryant & Bull, 10 Ch D 155(6) Bryant & Bull *supra* the appointment of a receiver is for the benefit of incumbrancers only so far as expressed to be for their benefit and as they choose to avail themselves of it. Kerr, 153 154 156(7) Foster & Townshend 2 Abt N C 29
45 (Amer) Beach sect 211(8) Mahommed Zohuruddeen & Mahommed
Noorooddeen 21 Cal, 91 (1893)(9) *Ex parte Evans* 13 Ch D 200, 110
D 243C 85 (1893) A judgment creditor cannot
without leave execute against property in
the hands of the receiver. *Jagendra Nath*

a receiver it requires the parties to the action to give up the possession to the receiver of all property comprised in the order and treats them as guilty of contempt if they refuse to do so (1)

As a general rule appointment of more than one receiver whether by the same or a different Court, except in case of joint receivers, is not allowable (2) If at the time a receiver is appointed a party claiming a right in the same subject matter is in possession of the right which he claims, the appointment of the receiver leaves him in possession of the right, and does not interfere with the exercise of it (3) If, on the other hand, the claimant is out of possession he must apply to the Court before he institutes any legal proceedings affecting the possession which the receiver has acquired (4) even where the receiver has been appointed without prejudice to the rights of persons having prior charges (5) So, too, where a receiver has been appointed over the estate of a tenant in possession, though the appointment does not affect the rights of the landlord, the latter will not be permitted to exercise these rights, as for example the right of distrainment without first obtaining the leave of the Court (6)

Parties whose rights are interfered with by having a receiver put in their way may, on making a proper application to the Court, obtain all that they may justly require. The Court has the power, and will always take care to give a party who applies in a regular manner for the protection of his rights the means of obtaining justice and will even assist him in asserting that right and having the benefit of it (7) The course of a party who claims a right paramount to that of the receiver, or rather to that of the party obtaining the receiver, is either to apply on notice in the action in which the receiver was appointed and to come in and be examined *pro interesse suo* or to apply for leave to proceed by action notwithstanding the receiver's possession (8) The application in the suit is usually framed in the alternative that the receiver do accede to the plaintiff's demand or that the latter may be allowed to proceed (9) In most instances a party aggrieved may have ample relief by application on motion to the Court appointing the receiver. In most cases of claims against a receiver the

Gossain v Debendro Nath Gossain 16 C 127, 129 (1838), *Hem Chunder v Frankristo*, 1 C 403 (1836) and first two cases, *Sarat A. Aputra*, 15 C W N (1911) 14 C L J 33 (and each creditor must obtain leave)

(1) *Woodroffe*, 70

(2) *Ib.*, 78

(3) *Evilyn v Lewis*, 3 Ha 472, *Wells v Helpin*, 18 Eq 298, *Underhay v Read* 10 Q B D 209, *harr*, 164

(4) *Evilyn v Lewis supra*, 470 *harr*, 164, 169

(5) *Bryan v Cornick*, 1 Cox 422, *Langton v Langton*, 7 D M and G 30 *harr*, 165

(6) *Sutton v Rees*, 9 Jur N S 450, *harr* 163. See also as to distrainment, *ib.*, 168, 169

(7) *harr*, 163, 166, *Woodroffe*, 80

(8) *harr*, 166. As to form of notice & motion or summons for examination *pro*

interesse suo see *Dan Ch I* 115 1608; with respect to the practice on examination *pro interesse suo*, see *Brooks v Grallard* 1 J C W 179, *Hamlyn v Lee* 1 Dick 61, *Gossain v West* 2 Dick 472, *Hunt v West* 1b 510 *Anon.*, 6 Ves 287. The effect of such an examination may generally be obtained on motion or petition when a reference to inquire into the claim will if requisite be ordered *Walker v Bell* 2 Mad. 21; *Dixon v Smith* 1 Swan 457 *Dickinson v Smith* 4 Mad. 177 *Dan Ch. Pr* 921 1636 *Boscawne v Dabner* *Bookram Das Mohunt* 15 W R 317 (1871) appears to have been a case of this kind but the report is so meagre that it is not clear why the application was refused.

(9) *harr*, 167

remedy by motion is adequate, and any person having such a claim may resort to this summary remedy. The more common practice and that which has been generally commended by the Court, is to hear and determine all rights of action and demands against a receiver by petition in the cause in which he was appointed without remitting the parties to a new and independent suit. And it rests wholly within the discretion of the Court to grant leave to bring an independent action against its receiver or to determine the controversy upon petition in the original cause (1).

Suits and applications against receiver—It would be inconsistent with the main purpose of a receivership (to preserve property in controversy *pendente lite*) which devolves upon the Court the duty of protecting its possession, as well as incompatible with the dignity and authority of the Court, to allow its officer to be summoned before any tribunal in respect to the property in his hands, at the will of any and every person who has, or imagines he has, a just cause of action, or who for sinister purposes might institute a fictitious suit against him. On the other hand, to deny to those having just causes of action or claims which call for the adjudication of the Courts of Law or Equity, all opportunity for investigation and all right to a proper remedy, simply because the property to which they must look for reparation has been seized by the Court and is in its keeping, would violate the fundamental principles of personal rights. The difficulty thus presented has been overcome by requiring all those who desire to bring suit against a receiver first to obtain leave to do so from the Court which appointed him. The Court usually grants such leave unless it appears clearly from the application of the claimant that his demand has no legal foundation, the petition should therefore show a probable cause of action—one demanding adjudication by proceedings in Court (2). If a receiver duly appointed and in possession of the property in controversy, be sued without the leave of the Court appointing him first obtained, the parties who bring the suit may be subjected to proceedings in contempt of Court and punished accordingly. The proceedings in a suit so brought will generally be restrained by injunction or stayed or set aside on motion. Whether the party proceeding at law did or did not know that a receiver has been appointed over the property, or however clear his right may be, the Court will restrain the prosecution of the claim if it be instituted without leave (3). It has even been held that the consent of the Court to an action against a receiver is a condition precedent to the right to sue, and cannot be rectified by a subsequent application for permission to continue the action brought without such permission (4). But several later cases have disagreed with this (5).

(1) See Woodroffe, 81 High, sects 204, 254B, Kerr, 168, 170, Mahomed Mehdi Gahstana : Zoharra Begum 27 C 28, (1889).

(2) Beach sect 602, Miller : Ram Ranjan Chackravarty, 10 C 1014 [a receiver cannot be sued except with the permission of the Court], Kerr 170. It is not the course of the Court unless it is perfectly clear that there is no foundation for the claim to refuse

liberty in any case to try a right which is claimed against its receiver. *Randfield v Randfield*, 3 De G F & J 786, but the application should show a probable ground of recovery. High, sect 204, Woodroffe 80.

(3) Beach sect 653, Kerr, 158, 172.

(4) *Pramatha Nath Gangooly v Rhettra Nath Bannerjee*, 32 C 270 (1904) *sed qu*.

(5) *Sarat : Apurba* 15 C W N 32, (1911), *Banku : Haren* 15 C W N 34.

It rests in the discretion of the Court to allow a party claiming rights against its receiver to bring an independent action against him or to compel such party to proceed against him by petition in the action in which he is receiver (1) When a Court is asked to give leave to sue its receiver, it may, and usually must, examine into the merits of the claim to ascertain whether a suit is necessary or proper for its adjudication, but such examination and the order made upon it cannot be used by either party as in any way affecting the merits of the case. The order simply permits a judicial investigation to be made, the examination is not itself a trial, nor is the decision an adjudication upon the merits (2)

Generally a receiver cannot be held personally liable in an action brought against him in his official capacity, the judgment being entered only so as to affect the funds in his hands (3) An action cannot be brought against a receiver by a person at whose instance he was appointed (4) If a special case be made out, the Court will allow a party to continue an action, notwithstanding that it has been commenced without leave (5)

An application for leave to sue a receiver may be made *ex parte* at the time of presenting the plaint and not in the suit in which the receiver has been appointed or on notice to the parties, (6) though it would appear that the latter course of applying in the suit has sometimes been followed (7) Any order declaring that leave to sue is not necessary will not bind the parties who are not present (8)

"Any property."—A considerable portion of the text books is occupied with a discussion of the cases or instances in which receivers will be appointed, and references are given to all the decisions in which receivers have in fact, been appointed or refused This mode of treatment had its origin in the fact

(1910), *Maharaja of Burdwan v. Apurba*, 13 C W N 872 (1911), and see *Satya Kriśna Banerjee v. Satya Bhupal Banerjee* 19 C L J 191 (1913) (Court after dealing with the contempt may give leave to proceed)

(1) Beach, sects 654, 709, High, sects 254, 254B, 255 It is common practice instead of asking leave to bring action to intervene in the original suit by petition, and some cases are more conveniently so tried than by separate action Beach, sect 654, Woodroffe, 80 In the suit of *Sattya Sunkar Ghosal v. Ram Golap Monce Dence*, an application was made (3 Sept., 1900, cor. Ameer Ali, J) for an order that the receiver who had put up property of the parties for lease and who had subsequently refused to grant a lease to the highest bidder, should grant a lease to the applicant or return his deposit money or be discharged as to fifth share of applicant In the affidavit filed against the application objection was taken that the matter was properly one for a suit, but the objection was not pressed at the

bearing, and the Court disposed of the application.

(2) Beach, sect 657

(3) *Ib.*, sects 715, 718

(4) Kerr, 160 161

(5) *Ib.*, 167 *Gower v. Bennett*, 9 L. J., 310 See *Aston v. Heron*, 2 M. & K. 307, If an action has been brought or the possession interfered with without leave, the order restraining those acts will also give leave or direct that the party be examined *pro interesse suo* *Johnear Cloughton, Jac* 573, as to whether leave to sue is jurisdictional, see High, sect 254A

(6) *Ib.*

(7) See *Humar Sattya Sattya Choudhary v. Ram Golapmoni Datta*, 5 C W N 27 (1897), Woodroffe, 89

(8) *Chartered Bank of India, Australasia & China v. Hursh Chunder N. S. S. S.*, also as to suits *Chartered Bank of India, Australasia & China v. Sattya Choudhary* 27 (1897), *Chartered Bank of India, Australasia & China v. Sattya Choudhary*, 10 C W N 11

that in its inception the law of receivers was a case made law of very gradual growth declared from time to time as necessity arose and with reference to the particular circumstances of the case in which the jurisdiction was exercised. Though precedent was added to precedent, there was yet no general statutory statement of the nature and extent of this form of jurisdiction which could only be ascertained by an enumeration of all the cases in which it had been exercised. This course is, however, no longer necessary or expedient. An excessive citation of case law even where it is not, as is sometimes the case, of doubtful authority or incapable to present circumstances, too often serves no other purpose than to confuse and to obscure the plain provisions of modern Statutes and Codes (1).

The effect of the English Judicature Act was to enlarge very much the powers which the Court of Chancery formerly possessed and there is now no limit to the power of the Court to appoint a receiver except that such power is only to be exercised where "*just or convenient*". The words have now been adopted in *r 1 ante*. Here again the question to be determined is one in the main if not entirely of fact. The Court may, in any pending litigation, appoint a receiver if the circumstances of the particular case require it. A Judge has, therefore, a wide discretion. But that discretion must be judicially exercised (2). Though the discretion to grant relief will in the main be influenced by the particular facts of each case it must also be guided by certain broad and well established principles which have governed previous practice and which though unexpressed may be said to underlie the provisions of the Code (3).

In the first place the jurisdiction thus given must not be lightly but most cautiously exercised (4). The relief is not one *ex debito justitiæ* but one which is purely within the judicial discretion of the Court. The power to appoint a receiver is not to be generally exercised as a matter of course and it is not a reason for allowing an application that it can do no harm to appoint a receiver. The appointment of a receiver is in many cases a matter for the most serious consideration for the Court by taking possession at the instance of a plaintiff may be doing a wrong in some cases irreparable, to the defendant. For if the plaintiff should eventually fail in establishing his right the Court may, by its *interim* interference have caused mischief to the defendant for which the subsequent restoration of the property may afford no adequate compensation (5).

In an application for the appointment of a receiver it is sufficient if a *prima facie* title to the property over which the receiver is sought to be appointed is made out. The removal of property has been considered a sufficient ground (6).

(1) Woodroffe, 96

(2) *Srinasti Mathura v Shubdayal*, 14 C W N 252 (1909), *Ramjaram v Saligram* 14 C W N 248 (1909)

(3) Woodroffe 97

(4) *Mun Mohines Dasseo v Ichamoyce Dasseo*, 13 W R 60 (1870)

(5) Woodroffe, 97, 98, see observations as to injunction which *de jure* apply in the case of the stronger remedy in *Baddam v Dhunpat Singh* 1 C W N 430 432 (1889)

(6) *Sham Chand Guri v Bhaya Ram*

Pandey, 5 C W N 365 (1894). In this case a receiver was appointed of the property of the shrines of Tarakeswar, liberty being given to move to extend the rule on fresh materials. The Court directed that the conduct of the daily *Shewa* was not to be interfered with, and that the receiver was to pay for them out of the offerings he received, followed in *Sree Ram Das v Mohabir Das* 27 C. 279 (1899). And see as to removal of property, *Chandlat Ji v Lalchand Singh Bahadur*, 22 C. 456 (1896)

It is, of course, no ground for refusing to appoint a receiver that the acts complained of amount to a criminal offence and that a criminal prosecution is available to the petitioner.

Nextly, the situation of the property and parties must be considered.

The cases may be dealt with in the following classes —(a) where the property is *in medio*, (b) where the plaintiff possesses an admitted interest, (c) where the plaintiff's title is disputed by the defendant claiming under legal title, (d) miscellaneous cases (1).

Where the property is as it were *in medio*, in the enjoyment of no one, the Court can hardly do wrong in taking possession. It is the common interest of all parties that the Court should prevent a scramble, as where there is litigation as to the right to probate or administration (2).

The second case where plaintiff possesses an admitted interest is that of joint tenants and tenants in common in which the Courts are generally averse to interfere, (3) partition suits in which receivers are frequently appointed, (4) cases of tenant for life, remainderman, Hindu widow (5) partnership where such a state of facts is shown by the party complaining as if proven at the hearing will entitle him to a dissolution, (6) cases of trust where there are substantial grounds for the exercise of the jurisdiction, (7) infancy, the property and interests of infants being under the peculiar and exclusive care of the Court of Chancery, (8) and lunacy (9).

Thirdly, there are the cases of disputed title. If a right is asserted to property in the possession of the defendant claiming to hold under a legal title generally, a strong case is required to be made out. There must be some equity, danger of waste, fraud, abuse of trust or the like, or want of reasonable appearance of title (10).

Then, lastly, there are miscellaneous cases, (11) on contract, covenant, conveyance, lease, debtor and creditor, mortgages (12) and other cases (13) in which

(1) Woodroffe, 101

(2) See Owen v Homan 4 H. C. 1032, 1033. Kerr, 23, 25, 27-29, High sect. 46, Beach, sect. 41, Yashwant Bhagwant v Shankar Ramchandra, 17 B. 300, 392 (1892). In the Goods of Luchmanaram Begla 5 C. W. N. 441 (1901).

(3) Woodroffe, 112. See Humara Tirumalai v Bangaru Tirumalai, 21 M. 310 (1898).

(4) Woodroffe, 119, Beach, sect. 492, High, sect. 607, Porahnath Mookerjee v Omerto Nath Mitter, 17 C. 614 (1890).

(5) Woodroffe, 120, Beach, sect. 488, Kerr, 75, 76, Mt Nabaran v Nanda Lal Mitter 1 B. L. R., A. C. J. 27 (1868).

(6) Woodroffe, 120 where subject is discussed, Kerr, 80, 81, and as to attachment of property of a partnership, see Damodar v Paulal 3 Bom. L. R. 510 (1897).

(7) Woodroffe, 133, Beach, sect. 59. The same principles apply where a receiver is sought against an executor or administrator.

Woodroffe 137. Hafizabai v Kazi Abdul Karim 19 B. 83, 85 (1893), High, 664, 665, Bennet 33.

(8) Bennet 26, Woodroffe, 141.

(9) Kerr, 63-9.

(10) Woodroffe, 142, *et seq.* The leading Indian decision is Sidheswari Dabi v Abhoyeswari Dabi, 15 C. 818 (1895), foll. Chaudat Jhar Pandmanand Singh Bahadur 22 C. 459, 461, 463 (1893), see also Sree Ram Das v Mohabir Das, 27 C. 279 (1899). Prasannaiah Dair v Beni Madhub Rai, 5 A. at p. 561 (1883), Gossain Dulmir Puri v Tikant Hettarain, 6 C. L. R. 467, 469 (1880).

(11) See Woodroffe, 149.

(12) Tribhovan v Jamuna, Bom. P. J. 184 (1889), Latafat Hossain v Anunt Chowdhry, 23 C. 517 (1899), Jaikissondas v Zenabai, 14 B. 431 (1885), Ajassam Narsan v Jotha Narsan, 22 M. 448 (1899), Woodroffe, 155 *et seq.*

(13) Woodroffe, 163 *et seq.*

general principles may receive some modification from the peculiar circumstances of the case

Hitherto property the subject of a suit has been considered, but a receiver may also be appointed of property under attachment. The appointment of a receiver at the instance of a judgment creditor is known in English practice as equitable execution (1). A proceeding under the Code has nothing in common (beyond the fact that a receiver is appointed) with "equitable execution" (2). The application for a receiver may be made either by the judgment creditor or debtor, and in some cases it is as much to the interest of the first as of the second (3). Attachments are not superseded by the appointment of a manager (4). The proceeding does not change the property in the subject which is attached and affected by it (5). The fact that property under attachment is in the hands of a receiver does not protect it from attachment of all other creditors (6). A receiver may be appointed without the consent of the decree holder (7). The scope of the powers and duties of receivers of attached property are wider than those of managers under the Code of 1859 (8). "*Powers of the owner*," referred to in s. 11 must be read in connection with other provisions of the Code (9). When a debt due from a third person to the judgment-debtor is attached in the hands of the person who owes it, the Court may, if necessary, appoint a manager to sue for it (10). A receiver appointed in execution may sue for any debts attached, (11)

not represent the estate for all purposes. He has none of the powers which

(1) *Fink v Mahara; Bahadur Singh*, 26 C 772 (1899)

(2) *Woodroffe*, 174

(3) See generally ib., 175, *Hurce Sunkur Mukerjee v Jogendra Coomar Mookerjee*, 19 W R 66 (1873), *Din Dyal Lall v Ram Ruttan Neogee*, 16 W R 46 (1871), *Brojender Narain Roy v Kunwer Roy*, 1 W R Misc 15 (1864), *Doorga Dutt Singh v Bunwaree Lall Sahoo*, 25 W R 33 (1876), *Bunwaree Lall Sahoo v Girdharoo Singh*, 16 W R 273, 274 (1871), *Mohabur Pershad Singh v Collector of Tirhoot*, 13 W R 423 (1870), *Bunwari Lall Sabu v Mohabur Persad*, 12 B L R 297 (1873), *Redaam Atchutara v Khaja Mahomed*, 5 M H C R 272 (1870), *Mohunt Ram Kucha v Doorga Dutt Misser*, 13 W R 453 (1870), *Ootum Singh v Ram Surun Lall*, 23 W R 287 (1875), *Mohinee Mohun Dass v Ram Kant Chowdhry*, 15 W R 322 (1871), *Umbica Churn Sarnakar v Meuk*, 5 C W N xxx.

(4) *Mohabur Pershad Singh v Collector of Tirhoot*, 13 W R 423 (1870), *Bunwari Lall Sabu v Mohabur Persad*, 12 B L R 297 (1873)

(5) *John Tiel v Abdool Hye*, 19 W R 37, 38 (1873)

(6) *ib*

(8) As to that Code, see *John Tiel v Abdool Hye*, 19 W R 37, 38 (1872), *Moran v Muttu Bibee*, 2 C 72 (1876)

(9) *Gopalasami v Sankara*, 5 M 418 (1885)

(10) *Rambhatty Koor v Ramessur Pershad*, 23 W R 36 (1874), *Reasat Hossein v Jugganath Singh*, 21 W R 419 (1874), as to order on garnishee, see *Toolas Goolal v Bombay Tramway Co*, 11 B 448 (1884)

(11) *ib*

(12) *Benodo Behary Mookerjee v Rajnaram Mitter*, 30 C 699 (1903)

(13) *Sundaram v Sankara*, 9 M 334 (1886)

(14) *Murza Mahomed v Widow of Balmu kund*, 3 I A 241, 245

(15) *Gopalasami v Sankara*, 5 M 418, 440 (1885)

may be conferred under r 1 in respect of property belonging to the judgment debtor not attached in the suit in which the order was made (1) If grounds be shown for such a course the receiver may on the application of the parties be removed (2)

Rights and powers. (a) **General**—It may be said in a general way that a receiver has no powers except such as are conferred upon him by the order by which he is appointed, and by the practice and usage of the Court. He is merely an officer of the Court—his holding is the holding of the Court—he is but a minister, and therefore has not the discretionary power of a person acting in a fiduciary character. In theory the Court itself has the care of the property in his hands. He can do nothing likely to seriously diminish the fund without the special leave of the Court. He is not however merely the assignee of him whose property is placed in his care, but he may exercise such power in dealing with the property as belong to a receiver according to the practice of the Court and as are particularly conferred upon him by the order of his appointment (3) Under the Code the Court may grant to the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection preservation, and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of instruments in writing *as the owner himself has* or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit (4) A receiver is at all times subject to the control of the Court which possesses the power to make all necessary orders for the control of receivers appointed by it (5) He has a right to the protection of the Court and his possession will not be allowed to be disturbed (6) The Court will see that he carries out his functions and will protect the agent appointed under its orders (7) The scope of the receivership may be extended

(b) **Discretion**—In many matters of care and management receivers are allowed to use their own discretion subject to the control and approval of the Court. But in all important matters a receiver should apply for and obtain the direction of the Court which appoints him (8)

(c) **Application for instructions**—A receiver has a right to apply to the Court for instructions when a question arises as to what may be his duty under its orders (9)

(d) **Delegation**—A receiver is not justified in delegating or entrusting to another a duty entrusted to him by the Court. If he does so, and thereby causes loss to the estate, he is bound to make it good (10)

(1) *Sun laram v Sanhara* 9 M 334 (1886)
as to general position of receiver, see *Orr v*
Muthia Chetti, 17 M 501 (1893)

(2) See *Huree Sunkur v Jogendro Coomar*
19 W R 66 (1873) *Bunwaree Lall Sahoo*
v Gndhareo Jinh, 16 W R 273, 274 (1871)
Huree Sunkur v Jogendro Coomar, 22 W R
220 (1874)

(3) *Beach*, sect 249, *Woodroffe*, 204

(4) *Sect* 30a

(5) *Beach*, sect 260

(6) *Ib*, sect 266

(7) *Dino Nath Sreemonce v Hogg*, 2 Hay,
395, 397 (1863)

(8) *Balaji Narayan v Ramchandra Govind*,
19 B 660 662 (1891)

(9) *Woodroffe*, 208, *Beach*, sect 2a9

(10) *Balaji Narayan v Ramchandra Go*
vind, 19 B 660 (1891) *Woodroffe*, 208-210

(e) **Possession**—It is both the receiver's power and duty to take possession of the property whether moveable or immoveable over which he is appointed. Where a receiver is appointed by the Court to get in outstanding personal property, it is his duty to collect all he can get in. The power of a receiver to take property implies a correlative duty on the part of any one having it in his possession to deliver it to him, and such holder violates the law in resisting the exercise of the lawful authority of the receiver (1).

(f) **Leases**—If tenants in possession of property over which a receiver is appointed are directed by the order to attorn to him, the receiver should, as soon as his appointment is complete, call on them to attorn accordingly, and if they refuse, application should be made to the Court. The receiver is entitled to all the rents in arrear at the date of his appointment and to all the rents which accrue during the continuance of his receivership, and an order will, if necessary, be made for payment (2). As to power to serve notice to quit and sue see below (3). As regards the power of leasing, it is created by the order appointing the receiver who has no estate or interest in himself which enables him to lease. It is common to grant such powers of lease for a limited period usually three years but whenever it is desired to lease for a longer term, the sanction of the Court must be obtained (4).

(g) **Sales**—As to the practice of the High Court in assisting purchasers at receiver's sales (5) and sale by receiver during administration (6) see cases cited. Liens upon property held by a receiver are not divested by virtue of a sale made by him (7). A sale by the receiver, made under the order of Court, cannot, in the absence of fraud, be attacked collaterally by persons who were parties to the proceedings or their representatives (8). When a suit has been dismissed the Court has no jurisdiction to give the receiver any fresh power, as for instance, liberty to sell (9).

(h) **Borrowing**—If a receiver requires money to discharge his duties the Court will give him leave to borrow upon the security of the property in his

(1) Woodroffe, 211

(2) *Ib* 212

(3) Drobomay Gupta & Davis, 14 C 323 (1883), *dist* in Hari Das Kundu & Macgregor, 18 C 477 (1891), see matter more fully discussed in Woodroffe, *op cit* 213-219

(4) Under the general permission the receiver may in his discretion let out property, but not for any period exceeding three years without obtaining special permission. Bel chambers R and O, Note to R 20, Krishna Chunder Ghose & Krishnosokha Ghose, order dated 20th May, 1878 (Cal. H. C.) see Woodroffe, 219-223. Gonesh Chunder Dass & Troylucko Nath Biswas, Suit 294 of 1881, Cal. H. C. O O C J 23 March, 1887, Surendro Keshub Roy & Doorga Seondery

Dossee, 15 C 253 (1888), Suttia Sunkur Ghosal & Golap Money Daber, Suit 568 of 1871, Cal. H. C., Nilmadhub Mundle & Gollanders, 2 Ser 955

(5) Minatoonesha Bibee & Khatoonesha Bibee, 21 C 49 (1894), dissented from in Golam Hossein Ariff & Fatima Begum, 10 C. W. N. 394 (1910)

(6) Notai Chand Chuckerbutty & Ashutosh Chuckerbutty, 5 C. W. N. 408 (1901)

(7) Woodroffe, 231. See Gora Chand Lurki & Mahhan Lal Chakravarti, 6 C. L. J. 404, 409 (1907)

(8) Gora Chand Lurki & Mahhan Lal Chakravarti, 6 C. L. J. 401, 408 (1907)

(9) Rakobol & Smith 34 C 336 (1907)

hands (1) Where a receiver of joint property mortgaged that property to another after a money decree had been obtained against the owners but had executed the mortgage previous to the attachment held that the attaching creditors were not entitled to priority over the mortgagee (2)

(i) Payment — As to payments out by receiver, see note (3)

(j) Suits by or defended by receiver — With regard to suits by a receiver two questions require consideration, namely, as to his right to sue in general and as to the name in which he should sue. One of the most important functions exercised by receivers in the discharge of their official duties is that of bringing such actions as may be necessary to the proper discharge of their trust as well as to secure and protect the assets and funds to whose control they are entitled by virtue of their appointment (4). As a general rule all rights of action which belong to the party whose property is put into the hands of a receiver are transferred to the latter by virtue of his appointment (5). The appointment does not affect existing contracts or rights of action between the party whose property is placed in the hands of a receiver and others, he has no greater rights or advantages than those possessed by his principal (6). A receiver, therefore, cannot maintain an action upon a note or obligation running to the original party which he himself could not have maintained (7). His right of action relates back to the beginning of the title in the party for whose property he is receiver if substituted in place of the owners of the property he acquires all their rights by subrogation (8). Inasmuch as for the purpose of actions and suits connected with the receivership, receivers occupy substantially the same relation which was occupied by the original parties against whom or over whose estate they were appointed, any defence which a defendant might have made to an action brought by the original party in interest is equally available, and may be made with like effect when the action is instituted by the receiver (9). The fact that a person is an officer of the Court entitles him to no privileges not accorded to other suitors, and in seeking relief he must commence his actions by the same process that other suitors are required to employ (10). A receiver's liability for costs in an action instituted by him on behalf of the estate is similar to that of any other trustee—as, e.g., an executor or administrator—who sues for the interest of an estate, but being an officer of the Court, he usually receives special consideration (11). Should he fail in his action he will of course, be directed to pay the costs of the defendant, but as between himself and the

(1) Woodroffe, 231, Poreahnaath Mookerjee v Omerto Nanth Mitter, 17 C. 614 619 (1890). Mohari Bibee v Shama Bibee 7 C W N cclxxviii. (1903)

(2) Herumbo Nath Banerjee v Satish Chandra Mukerjee, 33 C 1175 (1905)

(3) Motivahu v Premvahu, 16 B 511 (1892), Kuppusami Chetti v Rathnavelu Chetti, 24 M. 511 (1901). In the goods of Gopal Lal Seal, Cal. H. C. suit 11 of 1902, Order 9 March 1903 [advance of money for defence of suit]

(4) High sect. 200 *et seq.*, Woodroffe, 238

et seq.

(5) Beach, sect. 663

(6) *Ib.*, sect. 664, High, sect. 204

(7) Williams v Babcock, 23 Barb 109 (Amer.) Bell v Shibley, 33 Barb 610 (Amer.)

(8) Beach sect 667

(9) High, sect. 205, Beach, sect. 669-706

(10) Beach, sect. 666 [verification of plaint by receiver a Muktear is probably sufficient Drobomoy Gupta v Davis 14 C. 339 (1887)]

(11) *Ib.*, sect 679

estate he represents, he will, if he has acted properly, with care and in good faith, be allowed his costs out of any funds which are in, or may come to his hands (1) Such an order in favour of a receiver will, however, generally, only be made in the suit in which he has been appointed, and not in the suit brought by him, unless in such latter suit the estate which he represents is fully before the Court. Since, however, a receiver sues in a representative capacity and not in his personal right it is necessary that a suit should be brought by him in the matter of allowing them to bring suits concerning their receivership, and an action brought by a receiver is considered as brought under the order of the Court itself. If, therefore, a suit is instituted on of the Court against the receiver, who will be directed to discontinue the action (2) The usual practice, both in England and America (3) and in this country, before instituting actions by a receiver in matters connected with his trust, is to apply to the Court, from which he derives his appointment, for leave to bring such action. And, although it is frequently the case that the order of appointment in general terms authorizes the receiver to sue for and collect all demands due, yet it is a common and a safe practice to first obtain special leave of Court before beginning the action. In order to avoid the necessity of frequent application to the Court for liberty to sue, it has become customary to give to the receiver in the order by which he is appointed general leave, but as the authority to sue conferred by the order of appointment is confined to such suits as are contemplated by the order, (4) and doubt may arise whether the particular suit brought is within the terms of the authority, it is customary, as above stated to obtain special leave in each case. Proof of the appointment of the receiver and of leave to sue is generally given by the production of a certified copy of the respective orders. It seems to be established that the regularity, propriety, or necessity of the appointment of a receiver is not to be questioned in a merely collateral action at least by parties or privies to the action in which the appointment was made. As to the rights of other parties in this respect there seems to be a difference of opinion. It has been said to be probable that those who were entire strangers to the original proceedings should be allowed in a collateral action where their interests are affected by the appointment to attack the order on the ground that it was procured through fraud, collusion, or deception practised on the Court, but for no other reason (5) The general doctrine recognizing a receiver as the officer of the Court is not to

(1) See *Ib.*, Seton 4th Ed., 442, 5 Simon, 620 2 Phillips

(2) Beach, sect 693, High, sects 201, 202, as to the necessity for leave, see Kerr, 163-171 In *Dionath Sreemonee v C S Hogg*, 2 Hay 395, 399 (1863), it was said that in the absence of evidence the Court will assume that the receiver's suit was instituted by order of the Court, *sed qu.*, it being upon the receiver as plaintiff to establish both his case

and authority to sue. As to cases where, having an independent cause of action, the fact that a person is receiver does not disqualify him from suing, and in which case he does not sue in his character of receiver, see Kerr, 164

(3) High, sect 183

(4) Beach, sects 697, 691

(5) *Ib.*, sects 698, 702

be understood as limiting or restricting his rights in the management of a suit which he has once undertaken, and after entering upon a litigation he is regarded as being entitled to all the freedom of action of any other suitor, and the fact that he appeals from a decision which is against him is not of itself evidence of bad faith or of mismanagement of his trust, and may be a meritorious rather than a censurable act (1)

Some conflict of authority exists whether, in the absence of the special authority, a receiver may sue in his own name or in the name of the original party in whose favour the action accrued. In the first case a distinction must

a receiver, who is holder of a bill of exchange, may by the law merchant sue in his own name; (2) also when, as bailee, he has a special property in the goods, (3) or if he is possessed of chattels and those chattels are unlawfully detained from him. So, too, after a tenant has attorned to the receiver and so created a tenancy between him and the receiver, the latter may distrain upon the tenant in his own name, and on his own authority without leave obtained from the Court, (4) and there may be other cases in which, having an independent cause of action, the fact that he is receiver does not disqualify him from suing (5). In other cases, however, and where the receiver is suing in respect of a cause of action which has accrued to him in his representative capacity from the party whose estate he holds, the prevalent rule appears to be that where the matter is not controlled by statute or order of the Court the receiver should sue not in his own name, but in that of the parties whose estate he holds (6). But this view is stated (7) to be losing ground and has not always been adhered to either in America (8) or England, (9) and it has been held in the former country that a receiver by virtue of his appointment is a quasi assignee invested with title to

(1) High, sect 207, and see as to appeals by a receiver, Beach, sect 710

(2) *Ex parte Harris*, 2 Ch D 423, Kerr 185

(3) *Hills v Reeves*, 31 W R (Eng), 209

(4) Kerr, 181, *et ibi casus* *Wilkinson v Gungadhar Sirkar*, 6 B L R 491 (1871)

(5) *In re Sacker*, 22 Q B D 185 in *Wilkinson v Gungadhar Sirkar*, *supra*, at p 491, it was said 'It may happen that matters arise out of the receiver's possession which are such as to render it necessary for him to sue personally in regard to them, &c such as it would be wrong for any of the parties themselves to sue, e.g. where tenants have attorned to him or he has let property in his own name.' This was a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale executed by the receiver in his own name and the receiver was admitted as co plaintiff

(6) Beach, sect 688, High, sect 209,

Wilkinson v Gungadhar Sirkar, 6 B L R 486 (1871). Now the application that the receiver should have leave to sue simply means this that he should use the names of the owners of the property and come into Court on their behalf whether they consent to his doing so or not. *Id* at p 490. *Ram Jochun Sirkar v High* 10 W R 430 (1868). Suit in receiver's own name held to be an error of form only remediable in appeal where no objection had been taken. *Juggannath Pershad Dutt v Hogg* 12 W R 117 (1869)

(7) Beach sects 684 685 High, sects 209 210

(8) Beach sects 688 689, High sects 209 210

(9) Kerr 199 *et ibi casus* see also *Estelyn v Lewis* 3 Hare 472 *Armstrong v Armstrong* 4 L R 12 Eq 614, *Paterson v Gas Light & Coke Co* 2 Ch (1836) 476

such an extent at least as will enable him to sue in his official character (1) Where the order appointing the receiver gives him power to sue in his own name or in the names of the parties to the suit, it might well be held that such an order merely entitles the receiver to sue in his own name in cases in which such action is proper, and in all other cases to use the names of the parties It has, however, been decided that the Court had authority under sect 503 (now r 1) to confer on a receiver the power to sue in his own name, and that if the order appointing the receiver gives him liberty, he may do so in any case (2) Where the receiver is permitted to sue in the names of the parties and does so, no action on their part is necessary (3) A receiver of attached property may also sue He does not represent the estate for all purposes He would have none of the powers which may be conferred under r 1 in respect of property belonging to the judgment debtor not attached in the suit in which the order was made (4) It has been held that where a receiver institutes proceedings, and is then replaced by another receiver, it is necessary that the new receiver should be made a party to those proceedings (5)

The necessity for permission extends not merely to suits brought by, but also to suits defended by, the receiver (6) The proper rule as regards applications in respect of the estate is that they should be made by the persons beneficially entitled, and not by the receiver, though it must be admitted that receivers have often originated proceedings in their own name (7)

(A) Indemnity—A receiver is entitled to be indemnified out of his estate in respect of all costs, and charges, and expenses, properly incurred by him in the discharge of his office or under the order of the Court (8)

A receiver is entitled to his costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred in the discharge of his duties (9) A receiver may be entitled to allowances beyond his salary for any extraordinary trouble or expense (10) The receiver is entitled to be paid next after the costs of realizing the estate As the officer of the Court the Court is bound to see that he is paid (11)

(1) Beach sect 689

(2) *W R Fink v Maharaj Bahadur Singh*, 25 C 642 (1898) = c, 2 C 469 "It is such a convenience to suitors for the receiver to sue in his own name Some of the parties may be dead, and if the receiver is to use the name of the parties he would have to get the suit revived but if he sues in his own name no such difficulties arise" *ib*, per cur, 616, it is often a great saving of time, trouble, and expense *ib*, 446 In *Fink v Buldeo Dass*, 26 C 715, the receiver sued in his own name. The first mentioned case was followed in *Jagat Tarini Das v Naba Gopal Chaki*, 34 C 305 (1907)

(3) *Drobnanyi Gupta v Davis*, 14 C 339

(1887)

(4) *Sundaram v Sankara D M* 334, 337

(1886)

(5) *Akula Paradesi v Dhella Jagannadha*, 28 M 157 (1904)

(6) *Woodroffe*, 247, Beach, sect 708

(7) *Woodroffe*, 248, 249

(8) *Ib*, 249, Beach, sect 771, Kerr, 261, *Moran v Mitter Bibee*, 2 C 69 (1876)

(9) *Balaji Narayan v Ramchandra Govind*, 19 B 660, 662 (1894), *Woodroffe*, 260

et seq

(10) *Kerr*, 313, 214

(11) *Prem Lal Mullick v Sumbhoo Nath Roy*, 22 C 960 (1895)

(m) Lien.—He has a lien on the estate for his claims and allowances (1)

Duties and liabilities of receiver—He is, as an officer of the Court, strictly amenable for his acts and accountable to the Court (2) which appoints (3) him. His first duty is to obey the order of the Court appointing him (4). He is not liable for acts done under the order of the Court (5). He should be strictly impartial, as he is appointed for the benefit not merely of the party on whose application the appointment is made, but equally for the benefit of all persons who may establish rights in the case (6). Many of the receiver's duties have been alluded to in dealing with his rights and powers. So his right to take possession implies also a duty to do so. He is responsible for any loss occasioned to the estate from his wilful default or gross negligence (7). He ought to appear and give all necessary information to the Court in all applications for payment of money (8). He is liable to account (9). He should keep correct and accurate accounts with vouchers (10) and should file them with regularity and promptitude, (11) showing that all disbursements are payments properly made in respect of the estate (12). A receiver may be ordered to account although the suit in which he was appointed may be no longer pending (13). R 4 is new and contains important provisions in this respect. It has been drafted on the lines of sect 18 (4) of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907. The original proposal to imprison receivers was considered too wide, and has been omitted.

Jurisdiction to remove and discharge—The power to terminate flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power to create. The power of the Court to remove or discharge a receiver whom it has appointed may be exercised at any stage of the litigation. It is a necessary adjunct of that power of appointment, and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of that power, the authority to call such officer into being necessarily implying the authority to terminate his functions when their exercise is no longer necessary, or to remove the incumbent for an abuse of those functions or for other cause shown, and the cases upon this branch of the subject will resolve themselves into two classes, viz cases of removal or substitution for cause and cases of final discharge because of the necessity of the appointment having ceased to exist (14).

(1) *Ib.*, *Moran v Mittu Bebee* 2 C 70 (1876) see *Bertrand v Davies* cited *ib* and *Woodroffe* 252 *et seq*

(2) *Woodroffe*, 254

(3) *Buddinath Paul Chowdhry v Bycaunt Nath Paul Chowdhry* 2 Tayl & Bell 192 193

(4) *Woodroffe*, 254

(5) *Ib.*, 255

(6) *Ib*

(7) R 3 (d), *Kerr* 302. *Woodroffe*, 258, *Coomar Sattya Sanhar Ghosal v Rance Golap monnee Debee*, 5 C. W. N. 2-3 (1900)

(8) *Chaitan Charun Mullick v Gocool Chan Ira Mullick*, 1 C. W. N. 303 (1897)

(9) *Woodroffe* 259. See as to liability case cited in last note but one and as to misappropriation by receiver's employees *Balaji Narayan v Ramchandra Govind* post

(10) *Balaji Narayan v Ramchandra Govind* 19 B 660 662 (1894)

(11) *Gonch Chunder Das v Troylucko Nath Baswas* *Re C T Davis* Suit 294 of 1881, Cal. H. C. 23 March 1887

(12) *Mohini v Ram Narain* 14 C. L. J. 415 (1911)

(13) *Administrator General of Bengal v Prem Lal Mullick* 22 C 1011 (1895)

(14) *High sects* 820 826, *Woodroffe*, 269 *et seq*

A distinction indicated by the terms themselves is to be drawn between the removal and the discharge of a receiver. The discharge of the receiver is, in general, the termination of the receivership, while the removal of the receiver upon his own motion or for cause and the substitution of another person or persons in his stead, is a proceeding not inconsistent with the continuance of the receivership. The rules of law, however, which regulate the removal of a receiver are, in general, applicable to the case of his discharge. A receiver is removed when it is made to appear that the interests of the parties concerned require it, and a receiver is discharged when the objects sought to be obtained by his appointment have been accomplished. In the one case the property in litigation continues in the possession of the Court, subject to the final decree while in the other case it passes pursuant to the decree to the party entitled. The power of removal being incident to the power of appointment, the Court, whose officer the receiver is, may in a proper case direct his removal, and may impose such conditions in connection therewith as seem just. The Court is not limited in respect of time in the matter of the removal of the receiver, but may act thereon whenever it seems proper and at any stage of the litigation.

As regards the power of the Court to remove a receiver for cause and to substitute another in his stead, it is to be observed that the exercise of the power is regarded as a matter properly vesting in the sound discretion of the Court, and hence to be governed by the circumstances of the particular case. It is difficult therefore, to frame any definite rules susceptible of general application, and the power of removal for cause is referred to the broad and undefined region of the discretionary jurisdiction of Courts of Equity (1). The removal of a receiver and the appointment of another in his stead does not have the effect of invalidating claims against the former receivership, since the management of the estate is one and the same, though it becomes necessary to change the receiver (2). All proceedings which directly affect the receivership ought regularly to be commenced in the same suit and before the same Court in which the appointment of the receiver was made. Accordingly a proceeding to remove or suspend a receiver must be commenced by motion in the suit in which he was appointed. It was the early rule in Equity that the application for the removal of the receiver could be made only to the Court by which he had been appointed and whose officer he was (3).

The motion in receiver, or in the order upon further consideration (4)

(1) High, sect. 821, Beach, sect. 716

(2) High, sect. 827

(3) *Ib.*, it is here pointed out that this doctrine has been essentially modified in the United States, in which a receiver may under various circumstances be removed by Courts other than that by which he was appointed. This qualification of the rule was an almost necessary outgrowth of the complex system

of State and Federal Courts and of the power of the removal of causes from one of these classes of Courts into the other. It is also sometimes provided for by Statute. See Budd v. Nath Paul Chowdhry, 1 Bycaunt v. Nath Paul Chowdhry, 2 Tayl. & Bell 192, 193 [a receiver is only amenable for his acts as an accountable to the Court appointing him]

(4) *harr* 238, 239

Removal of the receiver.—As already observed, this may take place either upon the application of the receiver himself appointed in the cause or upon the application of the parties thereto, over whose property he has been appointed

(a) **Upon his own application.**—It is not, in general, the policy of the Courts to remove a receiver upon his own application after he has once accepted the office and entered upon the discharge of his duties. This is the rule partly because of the unwillingness of the Courts to charge the estate with the expense of such a proceeding, and partly because it is contrary to the theory upon which justice is administered in a Court of Equity to allow changes of this nature, which necessarily cause delay in collecting and settling the affairs of the estate affected by the receivership. It may be laid down, therefore, as a settled rule that the Court will not remove or discharge a receiver except where good cause therefor can be shown, and it seems also that, generally, this must be something arising subsequently to the acceptance of the office (1). Accordingly, where the receiver accepted the office at the request of the defendant, and was subsequently incapacitated from performing the duties of his office by reason of blindness, he was discharged upon his own petition, (2) but where the motion for relief was based upon the fact that the duties of the receivership interfered with the receiver's own private business, the application was refused (3). In a case where the receiver wanted to go to Europe on his own affairs and remain a year, the Court allowed the receiver to be discharged, gave him his costs and appointed a new receiver (4). A receiver who wishes to be discharged and cannot show any reasonable cause for putting the parties to the expense of a change, will not be discharged on his own request unless on the terms of his paying the costs of the appointment of another receiver and consequent thereon, but where a receiver had acted for many years and had paid in his balance, the Court would not charge him with the costs of the removal and the appointment of a new receiver (5).

(b) **Upon the application of the parties.**—It is, as of course an elementary proposition that a Court of Equity will not sanction or continue a receivership which has been created collusively or fraudulently, and that a receiver so appointed will be removed upon proof that the appointment was made by collusion between the parties or in fraud of the rights of any of the parties interested (6). When it subsequently appears that the appointment was improvidently made, the Court may unquestionably vacate the appointment and thus remove the receiver, but the Court may properly require as a condition precedent to an order vacating the appointment that the receiver's expenses and compensation be provided for by the moving party. Where the receiver's

(1) Beach, sect. 782, Kerr, 233, 234 High, sect. 838, Smith & Vaughan, Cas. temp. Haudw. 251, Richardson & Ward, 6 Madd. 1266, Edwards on Receivers, 600.

(2) Richardson & Ward, 6 Madd. ch. 266, where the receiver was allowed the costs of the proceedings.

(3) Beach, sect. 782 citing Beers & Chelsea

Bank & Fdw Ch 277

(4) Purdy & Rapalje cited in Edwards on Receivers 661, and referred to in Beach, p. 733.

(5) Kerr, 234 citing Cox & Macnamara, 11 Ir Eq 306.

(6) Beach, sect. 784.

security is insufficient the Court may remove him summarily, and direct the delivery of all the assets to his successor, if he neglect or refuse to procure additional sureties (1) Where a receiver becomes bankrupt he will be discharged and a new receiver appointed (2) If a receiver has been wrongly appointed over property of a person not a party to the cause he will be discharged although there has been an abatement by the death of the sole defendant (3) When a receiver has been appointed temporarily in an *ex parte* proceeding, or before answer, and it subsequently appears from the defendant's pleading or otherwise that the appointment ought not to have been made, or that the complainant has presented no case for the intervention of a Court of Equity, it is proper that the receiver should be removed So where it is made to appear that there was no necessity for the appointment of the receiver, or where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that all the usual grounds for the appointment of a receiver—such as imminent danger to the property, fraud, insolvency, and the like—are wanting, the Court will remove the receiver and restore the *status quo* But where a receiver enters in good faith upon the discharge of his duties and the parties in interest acquiesce for a considerable time, their laches may be such as to defeat a subsequent application on their part looking to the removal of the receiver (4)

Since absolute impartiality as between the parties to the litigation is an indispensable qualification of a receiver, upon an application for his removal the Court may properly consider his past relations to the parties as well as his present sympathies And when it is shown that he was the nominee of one hostile party and bitterly opposed by the other, and that he was appointed under the mistaken belief that all interests had united in his selection, and that by reason of his interest his efficiency as an officer of the Court is impaired, it is proper to remove him (5) The mere fact of relationship between the receiver and the plaintiff in the action in which he was appointed, is not, of itself, sufficient ground for his removal, such relationship affording at the most, merely a circumstance to be taken into consideration at the time of his appointment, it being the general rule that no relative of either of the parties ought to be selected as receiver But where, in addition to relationship, bias and improper conduct are shown a ground is made for his removal (6)

It is an established rule that a receiver will not be arbitrarily removed and another person substituted in his place in the absence of a substantial ground, merely because certain parties in interest desire it But it is competent for the Court to remove one receiver, and to substitute another in his stead, by consent of all parties when the proceedings are *bona fide*, and when there is no attempt to traffic in the receivership (7) Where a receiver had been appointed

(1) Beach sect 775

(2) Kerr, 236, Dan Ch Pr, 1716

(3) *Ib*, 237, citing *Lavender v Lavender*,
12 R 9 Lq, 593

(4) Beach sect 780

(5) High, sect 821

(6) Beach sect 786, High, sect 821, and
as to where a party in interest has been
appointed see Beach, sect 790

(7) Beach, sect 789, High, sect 827

(8) *Stanley v Coulthurst* 11 N (150s),
305

The rule that a receiver may be removed for misconduct or breach of trust arises out of the nature of the office, and the supervising power of the Court of Chancery. Whenever the receiver is guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance in office it is the duty of the Court to call him to account, and in a proper case it has the undoubted right to order a summary removal (1). Either mismanagement or incompetence is a ground for removing a receiver (2). A receiver will be removed if his appointment has been an improper one, (3) if he is irregular in carrying in and passing his accounts, (4) if his conduct has been such as to impede the impartial course of justice, (5) or to amount to gross dereliction of duty, (6) and when a receiver appointed on behalf of incumbrancers has been guilty of gross negligence in the discharge of his duties, he may be removed upon their application, and may be required to pay interest upon the balances from time to time in his hands, and to pay the costs of the proceedings for his removal (7).

Final discharge of the receiver—The discharge of a receiver may take place either during the course of the proceedings or at the conclusion of the litigation. A receiver is generally continued until judgment, but according to the decision undermentioned, (8) if the right of the plaintiff ceases before that time the receiver may be discharged, and cannot be continued at the instance of the defendant. In this case the plaintiff claiming to be an equitable creditor or incumbrancer of the defendant had obtained a receiver of the rents and profits of defendant's real estate upon which he claimed to have a charge. Defendant having paid and plaintiff having received the amount claimed to be due the receiver was discharged, although other defendants claiming to have annuities or incumbrances upon the same property objected, and asked to be heard against the discharge. Lord Eldon said, "I apprehend that with the right of the plaintiff to have the receiver must fall the rights of the other parties. It would be most extraordinary if, because a receiver has been appointed on behalf of the plaintiff, any defendant is entitled to have a receiver appointed on his behalf. My decided opinion is that the order for the receiver must be discharged, and that all falls together. In however a subsequent case (9) the Master of the Rolls said "There is no doubt that where a receiver is appointed under the authority of the Court he is appointed for the benefit of all parties interested, and therefore he will not be discharged merely upon the application of the party at whose instance he was appointed" (10). If during the course of the proceedings the continuance of a receiver becomes

(1) Beach, sect 763

(2) Gonesh Chunder Doss v Troylucko Nath Biswas, *Re C T Davis*, Suit 294 of 1881, Cal H. C., O O C J., Cor Trevelyan J., 23rd March, 1887(3) *Re Lloyd*, 12 Ch D 448, *Neilman v Neilman*, 43 Ch D 198, *Re Wells*, 45 Ch D 569, *Brenan v Morrissey*, 26 L R Ir 618 cited Kerr, 236(4) *Bertie v Lord Abingdon* 8 Beav 53(5) *Mitchell v Canly* W N 1873, 232,

cited in Kerr 236

(6) *Ib.*, citing *Re St George's Estate*, 10 L R, Ir 566(7) *Ib.* High, sect 829(8) *Davis v Duke of Marlborough*, 2 Sw 167 168 see Woodroffe, 278 *et seq*(9) *Bainbridge v Blair*, 3 Beav 421

(10) In other cases also of a somewhat similar character proceedings have been stayed without prejudice to the order appointing a receiver: Kerr, 238

unnecessary, or the object of the receivership is attained, the receiver will be discharged (1)

While the propriety of discharging a receiver, like that of appointing him, is to some extent a matter of judicial discretion, yet in some cases the right to a discharge becomes an absolute right which the Court has no discretion to refuse (2) In such a case, therefore, the granting of the order of discharge is not a matter of discretion, but its refusal is error which may be reversed on appeal (3)

In general a receiver will not be discharged until the object for which he was appointed has been fully accomplished, or until the Court is satisfied that the exigency calling for a receiver has ceased (4) Since the final decree in the cause is generally decisive of the subject matter in controversy, and determines the right to the possession of the fund or property held by the receiver, it is usually the case that such decree supersedes the functions of the receiver since there is then nothing further for him to act upon If, on the other hand, the result be favourable to the defendant, the functions of the receiver are at an end, and it is proper to order him to account and be discharged (5) An order of dismissal of the suit which follows on the reversal of an order appointing a receiver clearly operates as a discharge of the receiver (6)

Under the Civil Procedure Code, once a suit has been dismissed, the Court dismissing it is *functus officio* except that it may stay execution of its own decree or order for costs Its jurisdiction extends no further in regard to a suit which has ceased to be a pending suit (7) If, on the other hand the controversy terminates favourably to the plaintiff or the party at whose instance the receiver was appointed, it will usually devolve upon him to carry out the decree of the Court according to the nature of the receivership and his powers under the decree (8) It has been said that the determination of the suit, however will not, *ipso facto*, discharge the receiver, but his functions must be terminated by a formal order of Court (9)

Unless the minutes of the order appointing or continuing a receiver and manager contain a provision for his discharge, an application to the Court is in general necessary to divest the possession of the receiver The appointment of a receiver made previous to judgment will not be superseded by it unless the receiver is only appointed until judgment or further order (10) The receiver may, however, be continued by the decree (11) The Court has jurisdiction notwithstanding a receiver has been discharged, to surcharge him in his accounts, (12) or to order him to pay his balance together with the amount allowed him for his salary and interest (13)

(1) See Woodroffe, 280

(2) High, sect 840

(3) *Ib*, Beach, sect 793

(4) See Smith & Lyster, 4 Beav 227

(5) Beach, sect 799

(6) Prem Lal Mullick v Sambhoo Nath Roy, 22 C 960 973 (1895)

(7) Yamin ud doulah v Ahmed Ali Khan, 21 C 561, 563-565 (1894), see Woodroffe &

Injunctions, 56-58

(8) Beach, 799

(9) *Ib*, High, sect 841

(10) Kerr, 232

(11) See Moti Vahu v Prem Vahu, 16 B 511, 512 (1892)

(12) *Re* Edwards, 31 L R Ir 212 cited in Kerr, 240

(13) Harrison & Boydell v Sun 211

The decree may direct a permanent appointment, in which case the discharge of the receiver is a matter of discretion (1)

Discharge of sureties.—The sureties of a receiver will not be discharged at their own request, and no regard will be had to their application unless it is for the benefit of the estate or unless there be special circumstances in the case, (2) as for instance where underhand practice can be proved, and the person secured can be shown to be connected with such practice (3) Where also a surety had become such in violation of partnership articles, he was discharged on his own application (4) When a surety procures his discharge during his continuance of the receivership, the receiver must enter into a fresh recognizance with new sureties When a surety becomes bankrupt the receiver is usually required to enter into a fresh recognizance with two or more sureties If a surety dies without leaving any property available for the satisfaction of the recognizance, the Court will direct a new surety to be appointed, but the rule is otherwise where he leaves real property bound by his recognizance (5) The condition of the bond is that if the receiver shall from time to time, and at all times so long as he shall continue as receiver, duly and faithfully in all respects discharge the duties and obligations which devolve upon him and duly pass his accounts, then the bond shall be paid, but otherwise it will remain in full force (6)

If the receiver faithfully discharges his duties and passes his accounts and pays the balance due by him, the surety is discharged, and he is at liberty to apply to have the recognizance vacated as to him Should this be not so, an action must be brought on his bond against the surety who is answerable to the extent of the amount of the recognizance for whatever sum of money, whether principal, interest, or costs, the receiver has become liable for, including the costs of his removal, and of the appointment of a new receiver in his place In ascertaining the liability of the surety the Court proceeds upon the principle that the surety is liable (to the extent of the amount of the penalty) for all sums of money which the receiver himself was properly liable to pay into Court or account for (7)

A surety who has been compelled to pay money on account of his obligation is entitled to be reimbursed out of the balance in the receiver's hands, Lord Eldon saying. "As the receiver is an officer of the Court, and the surety is so in a sense, if there is anything due on account between them, justice requires that, upon the application of the surety, he shall be indemnified for what he has paid for the receiver out of the balance due him" (8) And a surety who pays the debt of his principal has the same right against his co surety that he has against the principal, and will be permitted to put the bond in suit as against the co-surety (9)

(1) See *Ex parte Rani Mathuri Jyas Amba*, 13 M. 390 (1890)

(2) *Griffith v Griffith*, 2 Ves 400, Kerr, 241. *Woodroffe*, 291

(3) *Hamilton v Brewster*, 2 Moll 407, Kerr, 241

(4) *Swain v Smith*, Dec on Decr 680

(5) *Woodroffe*, 292

(6) *Idem*, Appenda

(7) Kerr, 242-244

(8) *Glossop v Harrison* 3 V & B 134

(9) *Re Swans Estate*, Ir R 4 Fq 209, cited in Kerr, 245

Appeal—It was held under sect 588 of the 1st Code (now represented by O XLIII) that an order authorizing a receiver to remove any person in possession of the property was appealable, under that section, at the instance of the person dispossessed, (1) and it has also been held that under O XLIII r 1, cl (s) a final, but not an interlocutory order, appointing a receiver is appealable (2) and also that directions given by a Court in passing a receiver's accounts are not appealable (3)

(1) Rowland Hudson v John Pierpont Morgan, 13 C W N 654 (1909)

(2) Upendia v Bhupendra, 13 C L J 157 (1910)

(3) Mohunt v Ram Narain, 14 C L J 445 (1911), Keshobati v McGregor, 35 C

568 (1908)

ORDER XII.

Appeals from Original Decrees

1 (1) Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment on which it is founded.

(2) The memorandum shall set forth, concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively.

Memorandum of appeal.—The Appellate Court must look at the memorandum of appeal itself and not at the stamp on it in order to see which part of a decree is the subject of appeal before it. The Court can no more deal with a part of a decree which is not challenged by a memorandum of appeal or by objections filed by the opposite party than it can pass an order reversing the decree of a first Court when that decree is not in appeal before it. The memorandum of appeal or objections when filed are what give the Judge on appeal jurisdiction to interfere with the decree below. He cannot of his own motion deal with a decree which is not the subject of appeal to him or with a portion of a decree against which portion there has been no appeal and no objections filed. The Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to deal with that portion of the decree which is not the subject of appeal before it (1). The Code does not make any provision as to how Courts should deal with memoranda of appeal containing scandalous matter, but Courts possess inherent power to stop such an abuse of its records (2).

"Presented."—In order to effect a valid presentation of an appeal it must be by the suitor in person or by a person duly qualified to present it, (3) and where an advocate or vakil is heard the grounds should have been duly

(1) Cheda Lal v Badullah 11 A 30 37 38 39, 40 (1888)

(2) Zamindar of Tumt Bannayya, 22 M. 150, 153 (1898)

(3) Shashi Karam v Raghubandan 22 A

331 (1900) [presentation by person not suitor, advocate attorney or vakil] Wazir un nissa v Hahu Bahsh, 24 A. 172, 173 (1901) [authorized agent of female suitor]

certified (1) Though in the *takalatnama* filed in the Court below the names of two *wakils* were entered, and though the *takalatnama* was accepted only by one of them yet the presentation of the appeal by the pleader, who accepted the *takalatnama*, was considered a sufficient presentation (2) But where by an oversight the name of the *takil* who had filed an appeal was omitted from the body of his *takalatnama*, it was held, on objection taken by the respondents, that the document was invalid and the appeal had not been properly presented (3) If an appeal, being in reality a first appeal from a decree, is erroneously described as "First appeal from order" in the memorandum of appeal, and it is shown that neither respondent was in any way prejudiced by such misdescription or an insufficient stamp was placed on the memorandum by reason thereof, the appeal should not be dismissed for such misdescription (4) It has been held that there is no proper presentation when the court fees due have not been paid, (5) but as regards subsequent affixing not having retrospective effect the first set of cases were decided before the enactment of sect 582A of the last Code (see now sect 149), which was intended to cover cases where the insufficiency of the stamp upon the memorandum of appeal was due to mistake (6)

"Accompanied by a copy of the decree"—In appeals against decrees in suits or proceedings tantamount to a suit (*e.g.* contentious probate proceedings) it is necessary that the memorandum of appeal should be accompanied by a copy of the decree and a copy of the decree is a necessary accompaniment for a valid appeal (7) The Court has no power to exempt an appellant from production of a copy of the decree, but (if satisfied that the discretion vested in it under sect 5 of the Limitation Act should be exercised) it may make an order that a certified copy of the decree may be received and allowed to be attached to the memorandum of appeal (8) But in cases of appeals against orders under sect 244 (now sect 47) (which are decrees under sect 2) it is sufficient to attach to the memorandum a copy of the order itself (which is the decree, and no other decree is necessary), and it is not necessary to attach a copy of the decree even if such a decree may have been drawn up (9) The provisions of this rule as extended to second appeals by sect 108 do not require that any

(1) *Kishen Chunder v Hurish*, 3 W R 216 (1865) *Ohullah v Bachulal*, 15 C 506 (1888) *In re Noor Ahmed*, 17 W R 338 (1872), but a *wakil* appellant cannot certify his own appeal, *Thakoor Dass v Ameer Mondal*, 14 W R 168 (1870)

(2) *Ayyanna v Nagabhoosnam*, 16 M 285 (1892)

(3) *Muhammad Ali Khan v Jas Ram*, 36 A. 47 (1913), *Pokhlpal Singh v Dambar Singh*, 6 A L J 110 (1909)

(4) *Sant Lal v Sri Kishen*, 14 A 221 (1893)

(5) *Balkaran v Gobind*, 12 A 129, 142 (1890), see also *Shco Partap v Shco Ghulam*, 2 A. 810 (1880), *Yakut un nissa v Asilorce*, 19 C 747 (1891), *Lakht Narain Kart bas Das*, 18 C L J 133 (1913), but

see *Dhondiram v Taba Savalan*, 27 B 330 (1902)

(6) See *Doorga Charn v Dax Khram*, 26 C 925, 929, 930 (1890), *Bairaut Desai Manoo bhar*, 23 B 849 (1897), *Valumbal Ammal v Vythilinga*, 24 M. 331, 332, 333 (1900), s.c., 25 M 389

(7) *Chameja Kuar v Anur Kahn*, 16 A 77 (1893), see also *Bhawanit Kallu*, 17 A 537, 553 (1895), *Khirodo Sundari v Jnanendra*, 6 C W N 283, 284, 285 (1901)

(8) *Prasonoo v Ram Chandra*, 17 C L J 66 (1912), *Hem v Jadab*, 16 C L J 116 (1901), *Binapani v Sashi*, 16 C L J 133 (1912)

(9) *Khirolo v Jnanendra*, 6 C W N 283, 284, 286 (1901)

other documents should be presented with the appeal than a copy of the decree against which the appeal is presented and the judgment on which it is founded. It is not necessary to file a copy of the first Court's decree. If an appellant relies on the original judgment, and decree in support of a second appeal, he may reasonably be called on by the Court to produce copies when applying for admission of second appeal. In other cases it is vexatious to insist on parties incurring useless expense and trouble (1).

"And of the judgment."—Where the parties in two or more suits are the same, and the decision in one case governs all the cases, then if the appellant file copies of the judgment and decree passed in the principal case this may be considered a sufficient compliance with the law, but if the parties in each case be different, it is not sufficient for the appellant to refer to a case with which he has nothing to do, and to say that the judgment of the Lower Court in that case governs his, and that it has been filed by another appellant with whom he has no privity (2). In appeals under clause 10 of the Allahabad Letters Patent under the rules of that High Court a copy of the judgment appealed from is required to be presented with the memorandum of appeal (3).

2 The appellant shall not, *except by leave of the Court*, [s. 105] *urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; but the Appellate Court, in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the grounds of objection set forth in the memorandum of appeal or taken by leave of the Court under this rule*

Provided that the Court shall not rest its decision on any other ground unless the party who may be affected thereby has had a sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground

Grounds of appeal.—The grounds which may be taken without leave under this rule are those only set out in the memorandum (4). An objection which may be heard under sect 105 (formerly sect 591) must be one set forth in the memorandum of appeal (5) and the Court has a discretion to grant or refuse leave, (6) which is not taken away even when the point sought to be raised is one of limitation (7). Question however may arise even as to those which

(1) *Pirathi Sing v Venkatramanayyan*, 4 M 419 (1881)

(2) *Bhyrub Nath v Huro Sundara*, W R M 28 (1864), see also *Mothoor Nath v Kissen Mohun*, W R M 9 (1863, 1861)

(3) *Fuzal Mahammad v Phul Kuar* 2 A 192 (1879)

(4) As to specifically raising the point, see *Narayana v Chingalamma*, 10 M 1, 8 (1885), and see *Protap Chunder Boroosa v Collector of Goalpara*, 22 W R 216, 219 (1874)

(5) *Tilak Roy Singh v Chakardhari Singh* 15 A. 119, 120 (1892), *foli.* in *Bansa Lal v*

Rampi Lal, 20 A 370, 372 (1893)

(6) It has refused leave where the matter was one of Court fees. *Ram Kishen Upadhyay v Dips Upadhyay*, 13 A 580 (1890) and will consider the conduct of a party. *Thakuri v Kundan*, 17 A 280 281 (1895)

(7) *Ahmed Ali v Waris Hussain*, 15 A 1-3 (1893) and see *Dattu v Kasai*, 8 B 535 (1884) *contra* *Mukvana Saluj v Raj Sangar* 2 B H C R 169 170, 173 174. In *Baloram v Mangla Das* 11 C W N 959 (1907), s c 34 C 911 the majority of the Court considered that leave should be given

are set out by reason of the fact that they raise a new case or points not the subject of determination in the lower Court. Generally speaking, in these cases pure points of law only are arguable which arise on the findings and require no further inquiry. This subject will be found discussed under the heading "Scope of the appeal" in the notes to sects 100 and 101, *ante*. This rule is equally applicable to second as to first appeals (1).

Grounds of appeal must be such as arise from out of the plaintiff's pleadings and documentary proofs and necessary to the decision of the appeal (2). In drawing up grounds of appeal it should (it has been held) be remembered that no subsequent event or devolution of interest can effect the decision of a question as it stood at the time the decision was pronounced. To give effect to these, some supplementary proceeding and not an appeal is necessary (3). Points not taken in the memorandum of appeal, if they raise questions of fact, upon which the findings arrived at by the Court of Appeal must be taken to be conclusive, will not be allowed to be taken in special appeal (4).

If the appellant thinks that his grounds of appeal in the memorandum filed with the Judge are not sufficient, he may apply to the Judge to allow him to be heard upon the objections not mentioned in the memorandum of appeal, but if he does not do so, nor does he even make the objections upon which he relies before the High Courts previously to his appealing to that Court, he cannot ask the High Court to reverse the decision of the Judge of the Lower Appellate Court because he did not reverse the decision of the first Court on grounds which were never mentioned in appeal, or not brought to the notice of the Judge of the Lower Appellate Court (5). The Court however, itself is not limited by the grounds of objection. It is entirely within the competency of the Court to take into its consideration anything in the case which either affects the regularity of the proceedings of the Court below, or relates to the correctness of the decision upon the merits, and the Court is not confined to the grounds set forth in the memorandum of appeal (6). This rule confers upon Courts power to decide appeals upon grounds other than those set forth by the appellant in the memorandum, and that power is to be exercised by the Court alone, and not to enable the appellant to take the respondent by surprise by urging matters of which he had no notice. Parties, however, complaining of judgments and decrees must mention all the grounds of complaint in the memorandum of appeal, and these provisions are not meant to relieve them of such necessity (7). As a rule the High Court will not permit grounds of appeal to be taken in argument which have not been taken in the memorandum of appeal, but where a decree comes before it which upon its very face is illegal—a decree which goes beyond the power of the Court which passed it—the High Court is bound to take up the point itself and rectify the mistake, and not to allow itself to become an

(1) *Ahmed Ali v Wariis Hussain*, 15 A 123 (1893)

(2) *Nawab Sidhee Nuzur Ally Khan v Godhyaram*, 10 M I A 540, 553, s c, 5 (1890), P G 83

Gholam, and Moyee v Sheeb Chunder, 2 *Kashoor* 11 19 (1862)

v Kart bas Das. Ram Rutton, 5 C W N 627,

639 (1901)

(5) *Mahomed Anjob v Court Pershad*, 6 W R 61, 64 (1866)

(6) *Shama Churn v Bidadaban*, B L R F R 892, 900 (1863), and see *Thakuri v Kundan* 17 A 280, 281 (1895)

(7) *Bansidhar v Sita Ram*, 13 A 181 (1891)

instrument for the commission of further mistakes (1) An Appellate Court exceeds its authority in giving a plaintiff a relief for which he does not ask. Although the Court may decide an appeal before it upon grounds other than those stated in the memorandum of appeal, yet the rule does not entitle the Court to go beyond the subject matter of appeal (2)

Where a Lower Appellate Court allowed an appellant (one of the defendants interested in a small portion of the decree) to raise an objection verbally (and not taken in the memorandum of appeal) to the whole of the decree, and dismissed the suit on the ground of non joinder of parties, it was held by the High Court that it was not open to the Judge upon the appeal of only one of the defendants as to a small portion of the decree to entertain the objection upon which he had thrown out the suit (3) When a Lower Appellate Court dismissed a suit on a point on which no issue was raised although it had been taken in the written statement, and which was not made a ground of appeal it was held by the High Court that the point must be considered to have been abandoned at the trial, it was therefore not open to the Lower Appellate Court to dismiss the suit on that ground (4)

3 (1) *Where the memorandum of appeal is not drawn up in the manner hereinbefore prescribed,* Rejection or amendment of memorandum it may be rejected, or be returned to the appellant for the purpose of being amended within a time to be fixed by the Court or be amended then and there

(2) *Where the Court rejects any memorandum it shall record the reasons for such rejection*

(3) *Where a memorandum of appeal is amended the Judge, or such officer as he appoints in this behalf shall sign or initial the amendment*

Rejection or amendment of memorandum—The memorandum may be rejected under this rule if it is not drawn up in the manner prescribed, (5) as also on any of the grounds set out in O VII r 11 (formerly sect 54) read with sect 107 (formerly 582) (6) but a judicial order should be passed, and the reasons for such rejection must be given (7)

Memo appeal insufficiently stamped—When a memo of appeal which is insufficiently stamped is returned in order that it may be sufficiently stamped the Appellate Court should fix a time within which the deficiency is to be supplied (8) In this rule there is no limitation as to the time when a memorandum

(1) *Poran Sookh v Parbutty*, 3 C 612, 615, 616 (1878), *Lachman v Bahadur Singh*, 2 A 834 838 (1880), and cf *Bansidhar v Sita Ram* 13 A. 381 (1891)

(2) *Saroda Sundaroo v Gobind Monree*, 24 W R 179 (1875)

(3) *Nakur Chunler v Judoo Nath* 24 W R 389 (1875)

(4) *Govindrao Krishna v Balu*, 16 B 586

(1891)

(5) *Budy Prasad v Baij Nath*, 15 A 367, 30 (1893)

(6) *Ib*

(7) *Ib*, *Jugsah Sahay v Haseo Nath*, 1 Ind. Jur 121 (1882)

(8) *Sheo Partab v Sheo Golam*, 2 A. 875 (1880)

may be rejected or amended (1) But the time for rejection is when the appeal is presented, and not after it has been once admitted (2) The filing of an appeal out of time is another matter The registration is a ministerial proceeding And when registered out of time, the Court may, on discovery, reject it (3) where there is fraud misrepresentation, suppression of fact, or mistake (4) An order admitting an appeal after time, made *ex parte* by a single Judge of the High Court sitting to receive applications for the admission of appeals under a rule of the Court made under 24 & 25 Vict c 101, sect 13, and sect 27 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court, can be impugned and set aside at the hearing by the Division Court before which it is brought for hearing, on the ground that the reasons assigned for admitting it were erroneous and inadequate (5) The High Court in special appeals can look into the grounds which the Lower Appellate Court Judge has given for admitting the appeal in which the decision appealed against was passed after the lapse of the period of limitation and the grounds upon which he acted in so admitting it as a matter of

opinion or prejudice, or where the discretion is exercised without any proper legal material to support it Where the exercise of discretion is perverse, the High Court in second appeal will interfere (7)

4 Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be

Decree proceeding on common ground—The ordinary rule is that upon an appeal of one of several parties an Appellate Court cannot reverse the decree appealed from as against any other of the parties, (8) nor can the Appellate Court on the appeal of one defendant, having only a part interest in a decree, reverse the entire decree (9) It is not competent to certain defendants appealing

(1) *Damoda v Gokulchand*, 7 A 79 85 (1884)

(2) *Gopeo Bullub v Goluck*, W R 135 (1861)

(3) *Syud Jafir Hossein v Sheikh Mahomed Amir* 4 B L R App 103, 104, 106 (1870) (and the respondent may apply to dismiss the appeal)

(4) *Secretary of State v Mutu Jawmy*, 4 B L R App 84 (1870)

(5) *Dulcay Sahai v Ganesh Lal* I A 34 (1874)

(6) *Mouri Bawa v Surendra*, 2 B L R 184 (1869), Note, s c 10 W R 18 See also *Sarbhari Raghu Nath*, 10 B H C R 397 (1873), *Chunder Doss v Boshoon Lal* 8 C 251, 253 (1881)

(7) *Id. Ranchodai v Lallu*, 8 B 304 306 307 (1882), *Parbati v Ganpati* 23 D 513 (1898)

(8) *Koolada Pershad v Gora Chand*, 17 W R 353 (1872)

(9) *Woomesh v Matungnee* 2 W R 170 (1865)

and making a non appealing defendant a respondent, between themselves, to open out that portion of the case which, as between the plaintiff and the non appealing defendant, has not been appealed against and when the ground on which the decision is given is not common to all the defendants this rule does not apply (1) But when the decision of the first Court proceeds on grounds common to all the defendants, one of the defendants is justified in appealing on behalf of all (2) Thus where, on the appeal of one of the several judgment debtors, the bond on which the plaintiff sued was found to be false and not binding at all, all the other parties to the bond were released notwithstanding that they did not appeal (3) It is incongruous that a claim should be dismissed as against one party and allowed against another on contradictory grounds, as say in the first case on the ground that a mortgage is satisfied, and in the second on the ground that the mortgage had not been discharged It is to prevent such incongruities that power is conferred when an appeal is presented against the whole decree to interfere as well on behalf of parties who have not appealed as on behalf of those who have appealed (4) No distinction is made between decrees *ex parte* and others (5) Where there is a common ground among plaintiffs or defendants in appeal by one is virtually an appeal by all though they may not be parties to the record (6) It is not directed that the Appellate Court should pass a decree in favour of persons who are not before it in appeal but the effect of the provision is to make a decree passed in favour of one out of the defendants or plaintiffs operate in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants as the case may be (7) The decree which may be the subject of such appeal is one affecting in the same manner all the plaintiffs and defendants—one incapable of division and upon which it would be impossible for a Court to find in one sense for some of the plaintiffs or defendants and in the opposite sense for the other plaintiffs or defendants for instance where the suit relates to property in which all the plaintiffs or all the defendants are co sharers (8) If one of the several defendants appeal not against the whole decree but only against that portion of it which affects him and his defence in the Lower Court was not a defence common to other defendants the Lower Court decree cannot be reversed in favour of those defendants who have not appealed (9) In a recent case where a lambardar had appealed against a decree without joining his co defendants (his tenants) it was held that under this rule it was open to him

(1) *Khermukurte Dasse v Nilambur* 2 W. R. 227 231 (1865) *Gudadhur v Monmohun* 7 W. R. 366 (1867) *Deoputtee v Dhumoo Lal* 11 W. R. 238 240 (1869) *Shaikh Mahomed v Sheikh Anwar Ali* 21 W. R. 112 (1873)

(2) *Siveste v Sreenath* 18 W. R. 331 332 (1872), *Sreenunjee v Ioorusattum*, 9 W. R. 199 (1868) *Ram Lockun v Nittya* 12 W. R. 211 (1869), *Jadumoni v Fudu Bibi* 11 W. R. 28 (1871) *Mohunt Rung Lal v Gouri Mundal*, 10 W. R. 286 (1868)

(3) *Sufur Ali v Busuroolla* 6 W. R. 3-3 (1866)

(4) *Seshadri v Krishnan* 8 M. L. J. 131

(1884) and see *Kulai Kadi v Viswanatha Pillai* 28 M. 229 234 (1904)

(5) *Sreenath v Grey* 13 W. R. 114 116 (1870)

(6) *Abdul Rahman v Mardin Saiba* 2 B. 500 503 (1896) *Sardar Singh v Krishna Mills Co* 63 P. R. (1914)

(7) *Mulchand v Pam Ratai* 20 A. 493 496 (1898)

(8) *Sreeram Ghuttuck v Brojo Mohun* 11 W. R. 419 (1865) and see *per Bayley J in Kharmukra v Nilambur* 2 W. R. 227 230 (1865)

(9) *Ram Chunder v Oomachurn* 18 W. R. 27 (1871)

to obtain a reversal of the decree in favour of all the defendants, but the plaintiffs were bound to join all the defendants as respondents in a second appeal (1)

What is a common ground must be determined in each case upon the nature of the decree given, and the cases cited are given in illustration only of the general principle enacted.(2)

The Calcutta High Court has held,(3) dissenting in this from a Madras decision, subsequently overruled,(4) that the former section did not require that the decree appealed against should proceed *exclusively* on grounds common to all the defendants, but that it should proceed on any ground common to the defendants

Under this rule, one of several persons who have stood on a common ground may appeal for all. They are not prevented from appealing severally if they wish to do so, but if they allow one of their number to represent them for pressing their appeal, they must accept his representative character as to the incidents also of the appeal, at least so far as the juridical relation between the parties are concerned. The appeal opens up the whole case, though made by but one of the joint parties in the Court below. But the case being thus opened up, it is opened up for the respondent as well as for the appellant, and under the former sect 561 (now O XLII r 22) the respondent may press any objection against the decree which he could have urged in an independent appeal. Where a decree of the Court of the first instance is partly in favour of two joint plaintiffs, and one plaintiff appeals, the Appellate Court may reject the whole claim on the cross objection of the defendant,(5) the decree having been passed against the defendants, it was open to any one of them to appeal against it if the ground of appeal was common to all the defendants (6). But where there are several respondents before the Court of first appeal, though one of them may represent his fellows in a further appeal, he cannot represent a person who was not his

(1) *Dasarath v Brojo Mohon*, 18 C L J 261 (1913)

(2) *Joykisto v Nityanand*, 3 C 733 (1878), *Doyal Chunder v Nobin*, 8 B L R 180 (1871), *Doorga Churn v Shama Nand*, 12 W R 376 (1869), *Katyance v Madhub*, 4 W R 68 (1865), *Shaukh Mahomed v Sheikh Anwar*, 21 W R 112 (1873); *Lall Soondar v Hurry Kishen, Marsh*, 113, 115 (1862), *Ram Kamal Saha v Ahmad Ali*, 30 C 129, 432 (1903), *Boydsonath v Ojan Bibi*, 11 W R 238, 240 (1869), *Lukhy Kant v Ram Doyal, Marsh*, 281 (1863), *Najamma v Subba*, 11 M 197, 199 (1837), *Appa Rau v Ratnam*, 13 M 249, 251 (1889), *Yezabala v Abdul Khader*, 1 M H C R 26, *Sumana Velkraman v Razan*, 16 M 293 (1892), *Annammalay Chettiar v Pitchu Ayyar*, 28 B 699, 702 (1901), *Ram Chunder v Ooma Churn* 18 W R 26, 27 (1872), *Chunder Monce v Modhoo Dey*, 23 W R 166 (1875).

Gretsch Chunder v Gour Mohun, 7 W B 49 (1897)

(3) *Ram Kamal Saha v Ahmad Ali*, 30 C 429, 432 (1903), *foli Annammalay v Pitchu Ayyar*, 28 M 122, 131 (1904)

(4) *Syed Hussein v Madan Khan*, 17 M 263 (1894), overruled by *Dhuttaloor Subbayya v Pardigantam Subbayya*, 30 M 470, F B (1905), s c, 17 M L J 119

(5) *Babaji Dhondshet v Collector of Salt Revenue*, 11 B 596, 597, 598 (1887)

(6) *Chander Sang v Khumabhai*, 22 B 718, 721 (1897), also *Chintamon v Gungabai*, 27 B 281 (1903), s c, 5 Bom. L R 99, *accabo Chappu Umrao Singh*, 22 A 350, 352 (1900), *Puran Mal v Krant Singh*, 20 A 8 (1897), *Ram Lochun v Natya*, 12 W R 211 (1869), *Ram Sewak v Lamber Pande*, 25 A 27, 28 (1902), *Doorga v Balwant*, 23 A 47, 48 (1901), *Abdul Ghani v Muhammad*, 28 A 93, 97 (1905)

co-respondent and against whom therefore no decree could have been made on a point common to the two, or on any point at all (1)

It was held that the former section applied only to appeals by parties arrayed on the same side of a litigation in the original Court and against whom judgment on a common ground had been passed, and only some of them appeal from such judgment on behalf of themselves and others who do not join in the appeal. It did not relate to cases in which a party (be he a plaintiff or a defendant in the original Court) who has been unsuccessful only to a certain extent of the subject matter of the litigation in appeal from so much of the decree as has been passed against him, brings a total appeal.

in a certain share to set aside the sale of that share, having been dismissed, one

the other parties did not appeal. As they both had joined in one suit, but only one had appealed, the decree of the Appellate Court would have been for the benefit of both, and the whole sale would have been set aside. Their bringing separate suits instead of joining in one suit ought not to make any difference in that respect (3)

It was held that where a respondent failed to give the notice required by sect 561 of the former Code (see r 22 of this Order) it was not open to the Appellate Court to grant any relief to that respondent in a case where the granting of such relief was not necessarily incidental to the relief granted to the party who had appealed (4). But see now in this connection r 33 of this Order, which enacts part of O 58, r 4 of the English Rules.

Stay of proceedings and of execution

5 (1) *An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings* [s 545]
under a decree or order appealed from except
so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor
shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal
having been preferred from the decree, but the Appellate Court
may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree

(2) *Where an application is made for stay of execution of*
an appealable decree before the expiration of
the time allowed for appealing therefrom, the
Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown
order the execution to be stayed

(1) *Duo Gopal Savant v Vasudev Vishal Savant*, 12 B 371 (1887)

(2) *Per Mahmood, J*, in *Cheda Lal v Badullah*, 11 A 35, 40 (1888)

(3) *Sheikh Nagur v Shurmutoolah* 20 W R 77 (1873)

(4) *Kulai Kada Pillai v Viswanatha Pillai* 28 M 229 232 (1901), as to suits for contribution see *Rup Jan v Abdul Kadir*, 8 C W N 496, 31 C 643 (1901) *Asundi v Bareddi*, 31 M 219 (1910)

to obtain a reversal of the decree in favour of all the defendants, but the plaintiffs were bound to join all the defendants as respondents in a second appeal (1)

What is a common ground must be determined in each case upon the nature of the decree given, and the cases cited are given in illustration only of the general principle enacted (2)

The Calcutta High Court has held, (3) dissenting in this from a Madras decision, subsequently overruled, (4) that the former section did not require that the decree appealed against should proceed *exclusively* on grounds common to all the defendants, but that it should proceed on any ground common to the defendants

Under this rule, one of several persons who have stood on a common ground may appeal for all. They are not prevented from appealing severally if they wish to do so, but if they allow one of their number to represent them for pressing their appeal, they must accept his representative character as to the incidents also of the appeal, at least so far as the juridical relation between the parties is concerned. The appeal opens up the whole case, though made by but one of the joint parties in the Court below. But the case being thus opened up, it is opened up for the respondent as well as for the appellant, and under the former sect 361 (now O XLI r 22) the respondent may press any objection against the decree which he could have urged in an independent appeal. Where a decree of the Court of the first instance is partly in favour of two joint plaintiffs and one plaintiff appeals, the Appellate Court may reject the whole claim on the cross objection of the defendant, (5) the decree having been passed against the defendants, it was open to any one of them to appeal against it if the ground of appeal was common to all the defendants (6). But where there are several respondents before the Court of first appeal, though one of them may represent his fellows in a further appeal, he cannot represent a person who was not his

(1) *Dasarath v Brojo Mohon*, 18 C L J 261 (1913)

(2) *Joykisto v Nittyanund*, 3 C 738 (1878), *Doyal Chunder v Nobin*, 8 B L R 180 (1871), *Doorga Churn v Shama Nund*, 12 W R 376 (1869), *Katyance v Madhub*, 4 W R 68 (1865), *Shaikh Mahomed v Sheikh Anwar*, 21 W R 112 (1873), *Lall Soondar v Hurry Kishen*, *Marsh*, 113, 115 (1862), *Ram Kamal Saha v Ahmad Ali*, 30 C 429, 432 (1903), *Boydonth v Ojan Bibi*, 11 W R 238, 240 (1869), *Lukhy Kant v Ram Doyal*, *Marsh*, 281 (1863), *Najamma v Subba*, 11 M 197, 199 (1887), *Appa Rau v Ratnam*, 13 M 249, 251 (1889), *Yenabalu v Abdul Khader*, 4 M H C R 26, *Sumana Velkrman v Razan*, 16 M 293 (1892), *Annamalay Chettiar v Pitchu Ayyar*, 28 M 122, 124 (1904), *Vishwa Nath v Vasudev*, 28 B 699, 702 (1901), *Ram Chunder v Ooma Churn*, 18 W R 26, 27 (1873), *Chunder Monce v Modhuo Day*, 23 W R 166 (1875).

Greesh Chunder v Gour Mohun, 7 W R 49 (1861)

(3) *Ram Kamal Saha v Ahmad Ali*, 30 C 129, 432 (1903), *follo Annamalay v Pitchu Ayyar*, 28 M 122, 124 (1904)

(4) *Syed Hussein v Madan Khan* 17 W 265 (1894), overruled by *Dhuttaloor Subbayya v Pardigantam Subbayya*, 30 M 470, F B (1905), s c, 17 M L J 119

(5) *Babaji Dhondshet v Collector of Salt Revenue*, 11 B 599, 597, 598 (1887)

(6) *Chander Sang v Khimabhai*, 22 B 718

Puran Mai v Kharu Singh, -
Ram Lochan v Nitya 12 W R 211 (1869),
Ram Sewak v Langbar Pandu, 25 A 27, 28 (1902), *Doorga v Balwant*, 23 A 478 481 (1901), *Abdul Ghami v Muhammad* 24 A 95, 97 (1905)

co respondent and against whom therefore no decree could have been made on a point common to the two, or on any point at all (1)

It was held that the former section applied only to appeals by parties arrived on the same side of a litigation in the original Court and against whom judgment on a common ground had been passed, and only some of them appeal from such judgment on behalf of themselves and others who do not join in the appeal. It did not relate to cases in which a party (be he a plaintiff or a defendant in the original Court) who has been unsuccessful only to a certain extent of the subject matter of the litigation in appeal from so much of the decree as has been passed against him happens to value the appeal as if it related to the whole subject matter of the litigation or to pay Court fees on such amount (2). Where two suits brought by two different parties claiming different interests in a certain share to set aside the sale of that share having been dismissed one of the plaintiffs appealed and the sale was set aside, it was held that the decision must be considered as setting the sale aside as to the whole of that share, although the other parties did not appeal. If they both had joined in one suit but only one had appealed the decree of the Appellate Court would have been for the benefit of both, and the whole sale would have been set aside. Their bringing separate suits instead of joining in one suit ought not to make any difference in that respect (3).

It was held that where a respondent failed to give the notice required by sect 561 of the former Code (see r 22 of this Order) it was not open to the Appellate Court to grant any relief to that respondent in a case where the granting or such relief was not necessarily incidental to the relief granted to the party who had appealed (4). But see now in this connection r 33 of the Order which enacts part of O 58 r 4 of the English Rules.

Stay of proceedings and of execution

5 (1) *An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings* [s 545]
under a decree or order appealed from except
so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor
shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal
having been preferred from the decree, but the Appellate Court
may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree

(2) *Where an application is made for stay of execution of*
an appealable decree before the expiration of
the time allowed for appealing therefrom, the
Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown
order the execution to be stayed

(1) Deo Gopal Savant v Vasudev Vithal Savant 12 B 371 (1887)

(2) Per Mahmood J, in Chela Lal v Badullah 11 A 30 40 (1888)

(3) Sheikh Nagar v Shuruttoolah 20 W R 77 (1873)

(4) Kula Kada Pillai v Viswanatha Pillai 28 M 229 232 (1901), as to suits for contribution, see Rup Jan v Abdul Kadir, 8 C W N 490, 31 C 613 (1901), Arundi v Bareddu 31 M 219 (1910)

(3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied—

- (a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made,
- (b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
- (c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (3), the Court may make an *ex parte* order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application.

“Stay of execution”—This rule, which refers to applications by parties only (1) assumes that there is something to stay and therefore does not apply where the decree has been in fact executed (2) To execute a judgment or order is to carry it into effect or enforce it. When there still remains something substantial to be done under a decree, before it can become thoroughly effectual that decree has to be “executed” within the meaning of this rule (3) So a decree directing the issue of a grant of probate to the propounder of a will is one that is capable of execution, and stay of execution of such decree can be granted under it (4) It was held that sect. 283 of the former Code did not constitute an exception to the procedure laid down by sect. 545, now replaced by this rule (5)

The principle upon which all stay is granted for the preservation of property pending litigation is that the successful party in the litigation—that is, the ultimately successful party—is to reap the fruits of that litigation and not to obtain merely a barren success (6) In cases where a stay of execution or an injunction is granted on an *ex parte* application, liberty to apply to the Judge to vary or set aside the order must be implied if not expressed (7) And a Court which has jurisdiction to pass an order has equally jurisdiction to pass any subsequent order in any matter flowing from and naturally and necessarily arising out of the first order (8) The ruling that if property is sold before an order staying execution is communicated, the sale is in such case not void (9)

(1) See *Khaluck Chander v. Prasanna Moyle*, Marsh, 478 (1864)

(2) *Dharam Singh v. Kishan Singh*, 12 C. L. R. 532 (1883)

(3) *Mt. Bry Coomaroo v. Ramrick Dass*, 5 C. W. N. 781 (1901). As to orders directing criminal proceedings to be taken against parties or witnesses, see *Ram Churn*, S. D. N. W. P. 363 (1863)

(4) *Mt. Bry Coomaroo v. Ramrick Dass*, 5 C. W. N. 781 (1901)

(5) *Syed Fathul v. Munyappa*, 6 M. L. J. (1852)

(6) *Mt. Bry Coomaroo v. Ramrick Dass*, 5 C. W. N. 781 (1901)

(7) *Anur Hasan v. Ahmad Ali*, 9 A. J. (1896)

(8) *Moonshie Ameer Ali v. Kashti Ali Khan*, 13 W. R. 403 (1870)

(9) *Biswanath Chowdhurany v. Hurro Sundar*, 1 C. W. N. 226 (1872)

has been dissented from (1) the order of stay taking effect when it is made and not when it is communicated. It has been said that an applicant who has asked for stay of execution should on the ground of its being an indulgence be made to pay costs even if successful (2). But this has been dissented from (3) and there is certainly strong support in reason for the view that when the law allows an appeal and allows an appellant upon proper cause being shown to ask for and obtain an order for stay it cannot be said that what is asked for is merely an indulgence.

By Court of first instance—The rule assumes that the decree is appealable and not final (4). If an appeal lies but has not been filed the first Court but no other (5) may stay execution upon an application made before the expiry of the period of appeal though as the rule states the successful party is not prohibited from executing his decree simply on the ground that the period for appealing has not expired (6). The Court which dismisses a suit becomes *functus officio* save that it may stay execution of its own decree or order for costs (7). After appeal is filed the Appellate Court, as the Court which has seizure of the suit may stay execution (8). A Civil Court cannot stay execution in cases in which an appeal has been made to the Privy Council against a decree of the High Court (9).

"Sufficient cause"—The application should be supported by an affidavit verifying the facts alleged and these facts should show sufficient cause for a stay (10). What constitutes sufficient cause must depend upon the facts of the particular case (11). In this connection the proviso to the rule must be referred to. The Court is given a discretion in the matter and may refuse the application where there has been such delay as disentitles the party to any consideration from the Court (12). And *see post*. The provisions of this rule as regards the exhibition of sufficient cause apply equally to decrees for immovable as for moveable property (13).

"Substantial loss"—As appears from the use of the word *shall* this

(1) *Hukum Chand Boid & Kamalanand Singh* 33 C 927 (1906) and *see also Meah Jan & Man Singh* 2 A 686 (1880).

(2) *Chuni Lal v Anantram* 25 C 893 (1898) *per Maclean C.J.* and *Jenkins J*.

(3) *Ib per Bannerjee J*.

(4) *Amir Hasan v Ahmad Ali* 9 A 36 (1886).

(5) *See Barlow & Abdul Haye* 1 W R 341 (1872).

Woodroff & Injuncta 3rd ed 11 *et seq*.

(8) *See Chuni Lal & Anantram* 25 C 893 (1898) *per Bannerjee J*. *Natra*

Shankar v Maharaj Narain 30 A 119 (1912).

(9) *Muttalammal v Chellayammal* 5 M J C R 93 (1869).

(10) *Multan Chand Shivram & Khan Sahib Kharsedji* 10 B 536 (1890). As to the duty of a pleader to verify statements made to him *see Re Sreenath Roy* 17 W P 400 (18 2). *Ram Nath & Kamleshwar* 15 C W N 437 (1911). (The High Court may also deal with the order under s 115 and direct stay in terms of r 6 of this Order).

(11) *See Mahomed Hossein & Lutf Ali Khan* 20 W P 393 (18 3) in *Re Ahmad Reza* 13 W R 81 (18 0) sufficient cause was held not shown.

(12) *In re Leslie* 17 W P 160 (18 2).

(13) *In re Ismail Koor* 9 W P 448 (1868).

must be shown (1) So the Court granted the stay of that part of a decree which directed the completion of certain works, but refused it as regards another part ordering payment of money, as it was not satisfied that substantial loss would result (2)

"Delay."—*Vide ante*

Notice—Though there was no express provision as to notice under the last Code it was the practice to give notice to the decree holder before disposing finally of an application for stay of execution (3) And this will probably be so in the generality of cases now, though not statutorily required, unless the case falls within the fourth clause

Security—The taking of security is compulsory (4) The nature and extent of the liability depends on the words of the security bond given to the Court (5) The rule refers to the ultimate order, and, therefore, the obligation extends to the final decree passed after remand by the High Court in second appeal (6) The amount, of course, is determinable by the special circumstances When proceedings are ordered to be stayed on giving security, the judgment debtor must be allowed reasonable opportunity to show that the security offered is sufficient (7) This clause does not contemplate a decree or order in a separate proceeding to be instituted in the future (8) The relationship between a decree holder and judgment debtor who has executed a security bond mortgaging property is not such as to be governed by sect 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, and a suit is not necessary (9) In the case of third parties, the Bombay High Court has held (10) that payment by a surety may be enforced by summary process in execution The Calcutta High Court has considered a suit necessary (11) The former view has now been adopted in sect 145, *ante* In the under mentioned case the Court directed that execution should be first taken against the judgment debtor and then the surety (12) When property is deposited in Court in lieu of security for the purpose of staying a sale and the order directing the sale is confirmed on appeal, neither the depositor nor judgment debtor can claim to have the deposit restored which is then held for the decree holder (13) As to appeal see next paragraph The Court may, on the bond ceasing to have

(1) See *Nazar Ali Khan v Ojoodhyaram*, 1 Ind Jur N S 185 (1866)

(2) *H H Gaikwar Sirkar v Ghandi* 25 B 243 (1899), s c, 3 Bom L R 367

(3) *Multan Chand Shivram v Khan Sahib Kharsedp*, 15 B 536 (1890)

(4) *Cf Wise v Rajkrishna Roy*, B L R 11 B 541, 550 (1866), *Sagore Chunder v Sheobourne, Bourke*, 103 (1865)

(5) *Cf Shivalal Khubchand v Apaji Bhivray* 2 B 654 (1878), 3 B 204 (1879) [*cf* *Shek Suleman v Shivram Bhukaji*, 12 B 71 (1887)], *Moonsee Ameer Ali v Kassim Ali*, 13 W R 403 (1870)

(6) *Shivalal Khubchand v Apaji Bhivray*, *supra*

(7) *Mt Bahoor v Lalla Jumahar Lal*, 20 W R 52 (1873)

(8) *Saminatha Pathan v Sornatha Ammal*, 23 M L J 190 (1911)

(9) *Shyam Sundar Lal v Bajpai Jarnarayan*, 30 G 1060 (1903), s c, 7 C W N 914

(10) *Jamsedji v Bawabhai*, 25 B 409 (1900), s c, 3 Bom L R 35

(11) *Surjo Das v Balmakund Das* 23 G 212 (1895) *Tokhan Singh v Roop Narain Singh* 22 C 25 (1894)

(12) *Gopal Nana Shet v Goharmal* 10 B 578 (1894)

(13) *Shoo Gholam Sahoo v Rahut Hossein*, 4 C 6 (1878)

effect, direct that it be cancelled and returned. For the power to take security involves the other (1). But a Subordinate Court has no jurisdiction to release a security taken under the directions of the High Court (2). Where by order of an Appellate Court a security bond was executed by the judgment debtor for stay of execution of a decree pending the decision of an appeal under sect 545 of the last Code (now represented by this rule) and after the disposal of the appeal the decree holder applied for sale of the property under the subsisting attachment, it was held that the sale could be carried out in execution proceedings consequent on the attachment (3). A security bond under this rule pledging immovable property exceeding Rs 100 in value requires registration (4).

Stay by Appellate Court—An appeal must be pending. A Court has no power after the passing of a final unappealable decree and before the granting of an application for review of judgment to order a stay of execution of the decree (5). In the decision cited (6) it was held that where an incidental decree under sect 241 (now 47) is under appeal the Court may stay execution of the substantive or original decree in the suit pending the hearing of the appeal though such original decree is itself not under appeal. See now r 8 *post*. The manner in which an Appellate Court effects a stay is either on appeal from an order of the Court of first instance refusing a stay for such an order when made by a High Court is a judgment under the Letters Patent (7) and when made by other Courts is one falling within sect 244 (now sect 47) *ante* (8) provided that the Court against which the appeal is made is the Court executing the decree within the meaning of that section, (9) or after an appeal has been filed an original application may be made direct to the Appellate Court (10). But the Appellate Court must have acquired *seizin* either of the original suit or of the execution proceedings. It was therefore held that the High Court was not competent to stay proceedings in execution of a decree of a Subordinate Court merely by reason of an appeal having been preferred against an order of refusal to set aside the decree under sect 108 of the former Code corresponding with O IX r 13 of this Code (11). A Superior Court has no power to direct a Subordinate Court to stay execution in a case which is not before it (12). When an Appellate Court reverses a decree

(1) *Moonshree Ameer Ali v Hassan Ali* 13 W R 403 409 (1870)

(2) *Abuloonussa Khatoon v Amecroo nussa Khatoon* 17 W R 464 (1872)

(3) *Baj Nath v Mohant Sa Ram* 17 C. L. J. 267 (1913)

(4) *Nagaruru v Tangatur* 31 M 330 (1908)

(5) *Ameer Hasan v Ahmad Ali* 9 A 36 (1886)

(6) *Pasupati Nath Bose v Nanila Lal Bose* 28 C 734 (1901)

(7) *Mt. Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Dass* 5 C. W. N. 731 (1901)

(8) *Chazid n v Fakir Bulsh* 7 A 73 (1884), *Udaya Deb v Cresson* 12 C 624

(1886) *Musaji v Damodardas* 12 B 279 (1898) *Mahant Ishwargar v Chudasama* 12 B 30 (1883)

(9) *Ramchandra v Balmukund* 6 Bom I R 780 (1904), and see *ib* and *Mt Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Dass* *supra* as to interfering in appeal with an exercise of discretion

(10) *Chuni Lal v Anantram* 30 C 893 894 (1899). In *Mt Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Dass* *supra* there was both an appeal from an order of the original Court followed by a separate application to the Appellate Court

(11) *Bhagwat Rajkore v Sheo Colam Sahu* 31 C 1091 (1904)

(12) *Railow v Alwlood Haji* 17 W R 341 (1872)

must be shown (1) So the Court granted the stay of that part of a decree which directed the completion of certain works, but refused it as regards another part ordering payment of money, as it was not satisfied that substantial loss would result (2)

"Delay."—*Vide ante*

Notice.—Though there was no express provision as to notice under the last Code it was the practice to give notice to the decree holder before disposing finally of an application for stay of execution (3) And this will probably be so in the generality of cases now, though not statutorily required, unless the case falls within the fourth clause

Security.—The taking of security is compulsory (4) The nature and extent of the liability depends on the words of the security bond given to the Court (5) The rule refers to the ultimate order, and, therefore, the obligation extends to the final decree passed after remand by the High Court in second appeal (6) The amount, of course, is determinable by the special circumstances When proceedings are ordered to be stayed on giving security, the judgment debtor must be allowed reasonable opportunity to show that the security offered is sufficient (7) This clause does not contemplate a decree or order in a separate proceeding to be instituted in the future (8) The relationship between a decree holder and judgment-debtor who has executed a security-bond mortgaging property is not such as to be governed by sect 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, and a suit is not necessary (9) In the case of third parties, the Bombay High Court has held (10) that payment by a surety may be enforced by summary process in execution The Calcutta High Court has considered a suit necessary (11). The former view has now been adopted in sect 145, *ante* In the under mentioned case the Court directed that execution should be first taken against the judgment debtor and then the surety (12) When property is deposited in Court in lieu of security for the purpose of staying a sale, and the order directing the sale is confirmed on appeal, neither the depositor nor judgment debtor can claim to have the deposit restored which is then held for the decree holder (13) As to appeal see next paragraph The Court may, on the bond ceasing to have

(1) See *Nazar Ali Khan v Ojoodhyaram*, 1 Ind Jur, N S 185 (1886)

(2) *H H Gaiwar Sarkar v Ghandi*, 25 B 243 (1899); s c, 3 Bom L R 367

(3) *Multan Chand Shivram v Khan Sahib Kharsaji*, 15 B 536 (1890)

(4) Cf *Wise v Rajkrishna Roy*, B L R 17 B 541, 550 (1866), *Sagore Chunder v Sheebourne, Bourke*, 103 (1865)

(5) Cf *Shivlal Khubchand v Apaji Bhivray*, 2 B 654 (1878), 3 B 204 (1879) [cf *Shek Suleman v Shivram Bhukaji*, 12 B 71 (1887)], *Moonshce Amcer Ali v Kasm Ali*, 13 W R 403 (1870)

(6) *Shivlal Khubchand v Apaji Bhivray*, *supra*

(7) *Mt Bahoori v Lalla Jumahar Lal*, 20 W R 52 (1873)

(8) *Saminatha Pathan v Sornatha Ammal*, 22 M L J 190 (1911)

(9) *Shyam Sundar Lal v Bajpai Jafar rayan*, 30 C 1060 (1903), s c, 7 C W N 914

(10) *Jamsedji v Bawabhai*, 25 B 409 (1900), s c, 3 Bom L R 35

(11) *Surjoo Das v Balmakund Das*, 23 C 212 (1895), *Tokhan Singh v Roop Narain Singh*, 22 C 25 (1894)

(12) *Gopal Nana Shet v Golarmal*, 19 D 678 (1891)

(13) *Sheo Gholam Sahoo v Rahut Hossain*, 4 C 6 (1878)

effect, direct that it be cancelled and returned. For the power to take security involves the other (1). But a Subordinate Court has no jurisdiction to release a security taken under the directions of the High Court (2). Where by order of an Appellate Court a security bond was executed by the judgment debtor for stay of execution of a decree pending the decision of an appeal under sect 545 of the last Code (now represented by this rule) and after the disposal of the appeal the decree holder applied for sale of the property under the subsisting attachment, it was held that the sale could be carried out in execution proceedings consequent on the attachment (3). A security bond under this rule pledging immoveable property exceeding Rs 100 in value requires registration (4).

Stay by Appellate Court—An appeal must be pending. A Court has no power after the passing of a final unappealable decree and before the granting of an application for review of judgment to order a stay of execution of the decree (5). In the decision cited (6) it was held that where an incidental decree under sect 244 (now 47) is under appeal the Court may stay execution of the substantive or original decree in the suit pending the hearing of the appeal though such original decree is itself not under appeal. See now r 8 *post*. The manner in which an Appellate Court effects a stay is either on appeal from an order of the Court of first instance refusing a stay, for such an order when made by a High Court is a judgment under the Letters Patent (7) and when made by other Courts is one falling within sect 244 (now sect 47) *ante* (8) provided that the Court against which the appeal is made is the Court executing the decree within the meaning of that section; (9) or after an appeal has been filed an original application may be made direct to the Appellate Court (10). But the Appellate Court must have acquired seizin either of the original suit or of the execution proceedings. It was therefore held that the High Court was not competent to stay proceedings in execution of a decree of a Subordinate Court merely by reason of an appeal having been preferred against an order of refusal to set aside the decree under sect 103 of the former Code corresponding with O IX r 13 of this Code (11). A Superior Court has no power to direct a Subordinate Court to stay execution in a case which is not before it (12). When an Appellate Court reverses a decree

(1) *Moonshee Ameer Ali v Kasim Ali* 13 W R 403, 409 (1870)

(2) *Abdelounissa Khatoon v Ameerounissa Khatoon* 17 W R 464 (1872)

(3) *Baij Nath v Mohant Sa Ram* 17 C L J 267 (1913)

(4) *Nagaruru v Tangatur* 31 M 330 (1906)

(5) *Ameer Hasan v Ahmad Ali*, 9 A 36 (1886)

(6) *Paasupati Nath Bose v Nanla Lal Bose* 28 C 731 (1901)

(7) *Mt. Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Dass* 5 C L N 781 (1901)

(8) *Ghazidin v Fakir Bulsh* 7 A 73 (1881) *Udayadita Deb v Cregeon* 12 C 621

(1886) *Musaji v Damodardas* 12 B 279 (1889), *Mahant Ishwargar v Chudasama* 12 B 30 (1887)

(9) *Ramchandra v Balmukunt*, 6 Bora I R 780 (1904), and see *ib* and *Mt Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Dass* *supra* as to staying in appeal with an exercise of discretion.

(10) *Chuni Lal v Anantram* 25 C 203 (1893). In *Mt Brij Coomaree v Ramrick Dass* *supra* there was held as to the effect of an order of the original Court as to a separate application to the Appellate Court.

(11) *Bhagwat Pals* 31 C 1031 (1901)

(12) *Barlow v Barlow* 11 M 261 (1872)

in favour of a plaintiff, it should not stay execution of its own decree, for in such case a plaintiff having lost his decree is in no better position until his special appeal is decided than a plaintiff before judgment (1) When an Appellate Court refuses an application for stay, this does not prevent an application under sect 546 (now r 6), should an order for execution be obtained (2)

The Court has inherent powers of stay beyond those given by statute. There is an inherent power in the Court to stay under proper circumstances the drawing up of its own order or to suspend their operation, if the necessities of justice so require, (3) or to stay proceedings in the Lower Court—such power being auxiliary to that of the Appellate Court to reverse the order of the Inferior Court (4) And when an appeal is pending against a preliminary order directing an account, the Court having seizure of the appeal can apart from the question whether the case falls within the Code, make an order staying the carrying out of such order pending the hearing of the appeal (5)

Appeal—An order refusing stay of execution made by a Court which is not executing the decree is not appealable (6)

6 (1) *Where an order is made for the execution of a decree from which an appeal is pending, the Court which passed the decree shall, on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant, require security to be taken for the restitution of any property which may be or has been taken in execution of the decree or for the payment of the value of such property and for the due performance of the decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the Appellate Court may for like cause direct the Court which passed the decree to take such security.*

(2) *Where an order has been made for the sale of immovable property in execution of a decree, and an appeal is pending from such decree, the sale shall, on the application of the judgment debtor to the Court which made the order, be stayed on such terms as to giving security or otherwise as the Court thinks fit until the appeal is disposed of*

(1) *Kavasji Bhimji v Dhond ray* 10 B H C R 411 (1873)

(2) *H H the Gaikwar Surhar v Glande* 25 B 243, 244 (1900) The decision in *Janardan v Nilkanth* 25 B 583 (1901) is not understood the application was under s 545 and the Court said no order could be made under s 546, *Srinibash v Kalso Prasad* 38 C 754 (1911), 15 C W N 475

(3) *Vit Prj Coomaree v Pamrick Dass* 5 C W N 781 at p 796 (1901)

(4) *Panchanan Singha Roy v Dwarka*

Nath Roy, 3 C L J 29 (1905) and see remarks in *Hukum Chand Baid v Kama lanand Singh* 3 C L J 67 (1905), and see *Nanda Kishore Singh v Pam Golan Sahu* 40 C 955 (1912) For essential prerequisite to a stay of execution by an Appellate Court, see *Srinibash v Kesho Prasad* 38 C 754 (1911) 15 C W N 475

(5) *Palkshen Sahu v Klugni* 31 C 22 1 B (1901) 8 C W N 572

(6) *Famel antra Kasturehant v Bal* 11 *land Chaturbhuj* 29 B 71 (1901)

Security for restitution—No action can be taken unless an appeal is pending (1) Under sect 36, Act XXIII of 1861, the Court was given a discretion (2) Under the present rule, as under the last Code, the Court must demand security on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant In the case of money decrees the party appealing may obtain stay of execution of the decree, so far as it directs payment, on his lodging the amount in Court, unless the other party gives security for the repayment of the money in the event of the decree being reversed, in which case stay should not be granted (3) Where the application is made before execution has been taken out sufficient cause must be shown—that is, probable cause—of the judgment-debtor's inability to recover the property if the decree be reversed (4) The former section spoke of property which "may be taken in execution," and a question therefore arose whether security may be taken, where the decree has been already executed at the date of the application See cases cited (5) The case has now been met by the introduction of the words "or has been" The security bond should be made applicable to the ultimate decision which may be passed in the suit (6) An order requiring security is appealable (7) As regards the enforcement of the security if it be personal to the parties to the suit there is no difficulty in proceeding to realize any amount that may be due in execution of the decree to which they were parties A difficulty, however, has arisen where the security is given by a third party for either the appellant or respondent (8) The Calcutta High Court has held that a bond given by a third party must be enforced by separate suit, and not in execution of the decree for the due performance of which it was given (9) The Bombay High Court has held that summary process in execution is available (10) See however now sect 145

Stay of sale—The former section referred to execution of a decree "for money," and a decree for arrears of rent was held to be such (11) These words have now been omitted The former section did not expressly state to what Court the application should be made It was a point of doubt whether the Appellate Court had jurisdiction (12) The amendment makes it

(1) See *In re Bhugwan Chunder Ghose* 6 W R Misc 15 (1866)

(2) See *Wise v Rajkrishna Roy* B L R F B 511, 550 (1866) which also held that the corresponding section under that Act did not apply to cases on appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council.

(3) *Dhunjibhoy Cowasji v Isboia*, 13 B 241 (1888)

(4) See *Sukhee Monee v Brojoraj Mookerjee* 17 W R. 69 (1871)

(5) *Hukum Chand Baid v Ramalanand Singh*, 33 C. 927 s c, 3 C. L. J. 67 (1905) where the earlier decisions are collected

(6) Cf. *Narayan Deo v Gajanan Dilashit* 10 B H C R 1 (1873) in which it was held that the bond was not confined in its operation to the first Appellate Court but included whatever order might be passed in appeal

whether first or special *Shivlal Khubchand v Apaji Bhivisar*, 2 B 64 (1878)

(7) *Lutchmeeput Singh v Sita Nath Doss*, 8 C 477 (1882)

(8) *Surjo Das v Balmakund Das* 23 C 212 at p 215 (1890) but see at p 216

(9) *Id* and see *Arunachellam v Arunachellam* 15 M 203 at p 210 (1891)

(10) *Jamsedjee Banabhai* 25 B 409 (1900) and see *Janki Kuar v Sarup Ram* 17 A 99 (1895)

(11) *Banku Behary Sanyal v Syama Churn Bhattacharyee* 25 C. 322 (1897)

(12) *Kunj Lal Marwari v Bahadram Marwari* 8 C W N 351 (1904), *In re Murad unnessa* 15 A 196 (1893) *Tribeni Sahu v Bhugwat Dux Pat* 11 C W N 1030 (1907), s c, 34 C 107

clear that the application is to be made to the Court which passed the order (1)

- 71 7 No such security as is mentioned in rules 5 and 6 shall be required from the Secretary of State for India in Council or, where the Government has undertaken the defence of the suit, from any public officer sued in respect of an act alleged to be done by him in his official capacity.

- 8 The powers conferred by rules 5 and 6 shall be exercisable where an appeal may be or has been preferred not from the decree but from an order made in execution of such decree
- Exercise of powers in appeal from order made in execution of decree*

Appeal from orders in execution.—This rule, which is new, has been added to meet particularly the case where the litigant does not quarrel with the decree but appeals from an order passed in execution of that decree. It adopts, as regards stay of execution, the decision noted, (2) in which it was held that an Appellate Court had power to stay execution when an appeal from an order in execution proceedings was pending before that Court. See note to r 5, ante 'Stay by Appellate Court'

Procedure on admission of appeal

- 9 (1) Where a memorandum of appeal is admitted, the Appellate Court or the proper officer of that Court shall endorse thereon the date of presentation, and shall register the appeal in a book to be kept for the purpose

Register of Appeals

(2) Such book shall be called the Register of Appeals

Registration.—The registration of an appeal is a proceeding of a purely ministerial character (3). An appellant has no right to withdraw an appeal which has been regularly registered without the permission of the Court, and the leave of the Court is in every case necessary after an appeal has been regularly registered. As a general rule of practice the respondent should be served with due notice of the application for leave when it is made after the notice of the day fixed for hearing has been issued. In every instance the appellant will be liable to pay to the respondent his costs occasioned by the appeal (4). When

(1) As to meaning of expression 'Court which passed the decree,' see Ghazulm v Fakir Baksh, 7 A 73, 76 (1884)

(2) Pasupati Nath Bose v Nanta Lal Bose, 28 C 734 (1901)

(3) Syed Jaffar v Sheikh Mahomed (1870), 4 B L R Ap 103, 104, s e, 13 W R 351

(4) Karam Bee v Begam Bee and others (1879) 4 M L J C R 368

the Lower Appeal Court rejects an appeal—holding that no appeal lies, on the ground that the first Court's judgment was final under sect 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act—the High Court, on second appeal, when *prima facie* the suit is not one under sect. 153 of the Tenancy Act, can direct that the appeal in the Court below be duly registered under this rule (1)

10 (1) The Appellate Court may in its discretion, either before the respondent is called upon to appear and answer or afterwards on the application of the respondent, demand from the appellant security for the costs of the appeal, or of the original suit, or of both :

Where appellant resides out of British India, cases in which the appellant is residing out of British India, and is not possessed of any sufficient immoveable property within British India other than the property (if any) to which the appeal relates.

(2) Where such security is not furnished within such time as the Court orders, the Court shall reject the appeal.

Object of rule.—This rule was never intended by the Legislature to derogate from the right of appeal given by the law to every person who is defeated in a suit in the Court of first instance (2) Its object is to secure the respondent in an appeal from the risk of having to incur further costs which he might never succeed in recovering from the appellant (3) The fourth paragraph of the former section, which was one of procedure only, (4) and dealt with summary proceedings in execution against the surety has been omitted The matter is covered by section 145, *ante* (5)

"The Appellate Court"—This rule applies, it has been held, only to appeals preferred to the High Court from subordinate Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction, and not to appeals preferred to the High Court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of one of its own Judges, (6) and does not apply to appeals from the orders of a Judge sitting as a commissioner of the Insolvent Court, (7) the right of appeal in such cases being given by sect 73 of the Insolvent Act (11 & 12 Vict c 21) It is applicable to an appeal from an order under sect 211 (now sect 47) (8)

(1) Mathura Mohun v Amiruddi (1903), 8 C. W. N. 64, 66.

(2) Lakhmi Chand v Gatto Bas 7 A 542, 546 (1885)

(3) Lekha v Bhauna, 18 A 101, 103, 101 (1895)

(4) Added to the Code of 1852 by sect 46 of Act VII of 1883

(5) Abdul Wahed v Farooqunnissa, 16 C 723, 326 (1889)

(6) Saha Ayyar v Nagarathana (1903), 27

M. 121, 123, as to orders by single Judges sitting on the original side, see Monohur Doss v Khodum (1895), Bourke 110, Cazez Mazhar v Denobundo (1895) Bourke 119, Bama Sundari v Ramnarayan (1875), 7 B L R App. 59, Nawab Behram v Haji Sultanali, 14 Bom. L. R 1106 (1912)

(7) In the matter of Ramsabai Misser, 5 B L R 179 (1870)

(8) Dagdu v Chandrayan 1 Bom L. R 837, 24 B 314 (1899)

[s. 549, paras. one to three.]

"In its discretion"—Under the first paragraph the Court has absolute discretion in all cases not coming under the second paragraph in making or refusing an order for security for costs. Under the second paragraph, which is the proviso to the first, the Court is given no discretion in the matter. In cases falling within that proviso the Court has to follow the mandate of the statute and make an order for security for costs. An order for security for costs having been made under either the first paragraph or the second, it is by the third paragraph of the rule enacted that if such security be not furnished within such time as the Court orders the Court shall reject the appeal. There again the Court is given no discretion in the matter (1). But the Bombay High Court has recently held that under sect 129 it is not bound to demand such security under the second paragraph, since the provisions of the Bombay High Court Rules are inconsistent with this (2). In this as in other cases the discretion must be properly exercised. And this is not so when no opportunity has been given to show cause against the order (3). The rule is somewhat general in its terms, and it is very desirable that in applying it, the Court should proceed in the exercise of its discretion on some definite general principles, otherwise litigants will be encouraged to make applications, in the great majority of cases (4). Mere poverty is no ground for requiring an appellant to give security for the costs of the appeal (5). But where something more than mere poverty is alleged as where it has been found that the suit is a mere speculation security may be called for (6). If the appellant is unable to pay the costs ordered there is nothing vexatious in his not obeying the order, it is his misfortune and not his fault. But where the conduct of the party complained of, in not paying the costs ordered to be paid, is vexatious—that is, such as indicates a wilful determination on his part not to obey the order of the Court and there is a vexatious determination not to pay costs ordered to be paid—there is good ground for applying for security for costs (7). Where the parties have agreed that there should be security for costs, security should be demanded (8). The Madras High Court has held that the former section was applicable to appeals *in form* 1

(1) *Lekha v Bhauna*, 18 A 101, 103, 104 (1895)

(2) *Behram Jung Nawab v Haji Sultan Ali Shustry* 37 B 572 (1912). For Bombay High Court Rules see Appendix

(3) *Siraj ul Haq v Khadim Husain* 5 A 380 (1883). In *Balwant Singh v Doulat Singh*, 18 I A 57, a c., 8 A 315 (1880) where there was no proper notice, the appeal was restored.

(4) *Ahmed bin Shaik Fasa v Shaik Fasa* (1888) 13 B 458, 461, in which also the Bombay practice as to amount of security is referred to.

(5) *Maneckji Inani v Goolbar* (1878) 7 I 241. *Lakhmichand v Catto Bai* (1885) 7 A

(6) *Jivan Ali v Basa Mal* (1880) 8 A 203, *Khajah Assenoollojoo v Solomon* (1887) 14 A 17 [it is otherwise if he is not the real

litigant, but a puppet in the hands of others], *Hewitson v Deas* 21 C 526 (1894), *Quere* therefore as to *Jogendra Deb Roykut v Funnadro Roykut*, 18 W R 103 (1872). As to pauperism, see *Hanken v Turner* 10 Ch D 372, 376 (1873) and insolvency, *Phodes v Dawson* 16 Q B D 548. *Havelock v Ashberry*, 19 Ch D 84, *Cook v Whitlock* 24 Q B D 658, *Blackett v Blackett*, C A (1902) W N 91, pp 170, 170.

(6) *Ram Singh v Balubai* (1903), 5 Bom L R 101. It is held that the

O XXV r 1) of the Code

(7) *Ahmed bin Shaik Fasa v Shaik Fasa* 13 B 458, 462 (1888)

(8) *Fl v Chuckerlitty* 11 L J 48 V 8 227

pauperis, though very special grounds must be shown for taking security (1) The Calcutta High Court has held otherwise (2)

"On the application."—Such an application must be made promptly. The rule has always been that applications for security for costs must be made promptly, not only on the ground that the respondent should apply for security for costs before he incurs them, but on the ground that it is unreasonable that security should not be applied for till the applicant has incurred the costs of the appeal, whether they have been paid by himself or by his solicitors (3). Thus when an application for security for costs already incurred and for estimated costs was made by the respondent, when the appellant had already incurred all the costs of preparing the paper book and the appeal was actually on the board, the application was dismissed with costs (4). It is a wholesome rule of practice that no order affecting a party should be made without notice to him calling upon him to show cause why the order should not be made (5). The practice is that the respondent obtains a *rule nisi* on an affidavit, then the appellant shows cause and then the respondent replies (6).

"Of the respondent."—The Appellate Court has no power of its own motion to dismiss an appeal for not furnishing security (when no application has been made for security for costs by the respondent) because the appellant is guilty of no default, not having been called upon by the respondent or the Court to furnish security for costs or of laches, in not voluntarily offering security (7).

"From the appellant."—An application that the respondent should give security was of course refused (8).

"Or of the original suit."—This expression must refer primarily to the original suit in which the decree was passed, in execution of which the order appealed against was passed. It may also refer to the costs recited in the order in the execution proceedings, which are proceedings in the suit. Thus the Court has power to require an appellant from an order under sect. 214 (now sect. 47), to give security for the costs of the appeal and of the original suit (9). As regards the costs of original hearing, the applicant must make out either that the appellants are residing out of the jurisdiction or that the conduct

(1) *Sishayyagar v Jamulavadin*, 3 M 66 (1880).

(2) *Nussurooddin v Ujjal Biswas*, 17 W R 68 (1871).

(3) *Poolley's Trustees v Whitham*, 33 Ch D 76 (1886); *Jogen Ira v Jammira* 18 W R 102 (1872).

(4) *Bhobonath v Radhaprasad*, 5 Q W N 119 (1900).

(5) *Siraj ul Haq v Khadim Hussain* 5 A 350 (1883). It was held in this case that an order rejecting an appeal, for not furnishing security, was a "decree," but on this point the case has been overruled by *Lakshmi v Bhavana* (1893), 18 A 101.

(6) *Bama Sundari v Samnarayan* (1877) 7 B L R 4p 59.

(7) *Wise v Jugbunloo*, 7 M J A 41 (1859).

(8) *Bhugbutty v Iswar Chaudhary*, 14 W R 311 (1861), and see *Lakshmi v Jammira*, 4 B L R, O C J 92 (1874) where it was held not entitled to appeal, in Court, pending appeal, in Court by the plaintiff, not successful.

(9) *Daglu v Chaudhary*, 14 W R 337 (1859); *Wise v Jugbunloo*, 7 M J A 41 (1859), *Wise v Jugbunloo*, 7 B L R 41, 42, 43.

of the party complained of, in not paying the costs ordered to be paid is vexatious (1)

Form of order—An order for security for costs should follow the words of the rule, and should not specify the particular amount in rupees for which security should be given. It would be a good order under the rule if it directed the appellant to furnish the security within a time to be stated 'for the costs of the appeal' or 'for the costs of the original suit' or "for the costs of the appeal and of the original suit". To hold that the order must specify the amount in rupees of costs for which security should be given would either be to frustrate the intention of the Legislature in framing the section or to make the order a purely speculative order. The object of the rule is that the respondent at the earliest moment which suits him should take the advantage of the rule and at that time it would be impossible for the respondent the appellant or the Court to say what might be the costs of the appeal. The last paragraph of the former section was said to point to the security being for an indefinite and not for a definite amount. An order specifying the amount would not be a bad order but the better practice is that the amount should not be specified in the order (2)

"Within such time"—The application to the Court to enlarge the time for giving security may be made either before or after the expiration of the time within which the security has been ordered to be furnished and the Court may thereupon enlarge the time according to any necessity which may arise where it is just and proper that it should do so. If ultimately the order is not complied with and the security is not furnished the appeal may be rejected (3). It cannot be laid down as a hard and fast rule that the Court can in no case after the time for giving security is passed allow the appellant further time for giving security (4). This principle has now been adopted in *sect 148 ante*. Though the Court may extend the time for furnishing the security demanded after the time allowed by the order has elapsed it will not do so unless on good grounds (5).

"Shall reject."—The Code empowers the Appellate Court to demand

notice to show cause is not tantamount to a demand. It simply informs

A Court is not bound by the Code to issue such a notice, though it would generally be improper to make an order for security without affording

(1) *Ahmed bin Shaik Essa v Shaik Essa* 13 B 458 462 (1888) 687 688 followed in *Sirajuddin v Krishna*

(2) *Lekha v Bhauna* (1890) 18 A 101 105 overruling *Thakur Dass v Kishori Lal* (1881) 9 A 164 see also *Ahmed bin Shaik Essa v Shaik Essa* 13 B 458 (1888)

(3) *Bultri Naran v Sheo Koor* (1889) 17 A 131 s.c. 17 C 512 514 (overruling *Haideri Bai v E. F. Coy* (1878) 1 A

576 579)
(4) *Ma Husuda v Bhikari Prapanna* (1889) 17 A 9 s.c. 17 C 516, *Rajab Ali v Amr Hossein* (1890) 17 C 1 (p.c.)

the appellant the opportunity of contesting it. Where such notice is given the appellant is not bound to appear. He may allow the application to be decided in his absence. If he does not appear and the order is not made in his presence, he must have due notice of it to constitute a demand. The order directing the appellant to furnish security must be served either on him or on his vakil. It would be unreasonable to hold that he was in contempt or disobedience of an order which had not been communicated to him (1). Conflicting opinions have been expressed upon the question whether when the appellant has not given security for costs, the respondent should apply specially to have the appeal rejected or whether it is sufficient for him to object at the hearing of the appeal for non-compliance with the order (2). An appeal, though rejected, may, on sufficient grounds, be restored (3). No appeal is given from an order for security for costs. It has been held therefore, that it could not have been intended that the order for security which was unappealable might be questioned by an appeal from the act of the Court compulsorily done under the rule on security not being given is ordered. An order, therefore, rejecting an appeal under this rule is not a decree and is not appealable in such (4) nor is an order (5).

11 (1) The Appellate Court, after sending for the record [s 551]

Power to dismiss appeal
without sending notice to
Lower Court

if it thinks fit so to do, and after fixing a day for hearing the appellant or his pleader and hearing him accordingly if he appears on that day, may dismiss the appeal without sending notice to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred and without serving notice on the respondent or his pleader.

(2) If on the day fixed or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed.

(3) The dismissal of an appeal under this rule shall be notified to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred.

Summary dismissal—This rule applies to appeals admitted and registered (6). A proceeding under this rule is to all intents and purposes a trial (7).

(1) *Tunmu v Deva Bai* 5 M 265 266 (1882)

(2) *Muhammadbhai v Bhaup Tojan* 3 Bom. H C R 61 (1886), *contra* *Thakur Das v Keshori Lal* 9 A 161 166 (1886) [overruled]

disregarded.

(3) *Balwant Singh v Doulat Singh* 8 A 315 (1886), see *Jamnabai v Vasoonias* 21 I 576 579 (1897)

(4) *Lekha v Blawna*, 15 A 101, 103 104

5 B overruling *Sarajul Haq v Khadur Husam* 5 A 350 (1883). From *Bagam v Abdul Latif* 30 A 143 (1898)

(5) O XIII

(6) *Iulir Prasad v Bajnath* 15 A 367 (1893) in which Edge C.J. also held that there was a power to summarily reject a memorandum of appeal before admission if none of the grounds mentioned in sect. 551 (now 100) existed.

(7) *Thakur of Masada v Widow of Thakur of Nandwa* 2 A 819 823 (1880)

and a judgment and decree should be drawn up in the usual manner. It has been held that in dismissing an appeal under this rule a District Judge is not relieved from the necessity of writing a judgment, however short showing the reasons therefor (1). But it is not
to draw up decrees under this rule (2)

And the Allahabad High Court has held that it is not obligatory upon the lower Appellate Court to write a judgment in such cases (3). But a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has recently held that a lower Appellate Court must write its judgment (as provided by Bombay Civil Circular 51), when it dismisses an appeal under this rule (4). The order of dismissal under this rule is a decree and not merely a refusal to entertain the appeal, and so far as it is a final adjudication there is no distinction between an appeal which is dismissed under this rule and an appeal dismissed after full hearing (5). Where an appeal is dismissed under this rule, the effect of the dismissal is to affirm the decree appealed against, which becomes merged in the decree of dismissal of the Appellate Court. When, therefore, an appeal has been dismissed under this rule, the Court which made the decree appealed against has no jurisdiction to review its judgment or decree (6).

552]

12. (1) Unless the Appellate Court dismisses the appeal under rule 11, it shall fix a day for hearing the appeal.

(2) Such day shall be fixed with reference to the current business of the Court, the place of residence of the respondent, and the time necessary for the service of the notice of appeal, so as to allow the respondent sufficient time to appear and answer the appeal on such day.

It is not competent to a Court of Appeal to restrict the ground or grounds upon which the appeal heard under this rule is to be admitted finally (7).

550]

13. (1) Where the appeal is not dismissed under rule 11, the Appellate Court shall send notice of the appeal to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred.

Appellate Court to give notice to Court whose decree appealed from

(1) *Puttappa v. Yellappa*, 5 Bom. L. R. 233 (1903), *Rami Deka v. Brojo Nath Saikia*, 25 C. 97 (1897), *Royal Reddi v. Langa Reddi*, 3 M. 1 (1881), *Rakkhal Chunder Tewari v. Satindra Deb Rai*, 6 C. L. J. 348 (1906), *Pachu Das v. Bala Das*, 13 C. W. N. 1031 (1909).

(2) *Uma Sundari Devi v. Bindu Beshmi*, 21 C. 759.

(3) *Samun Hasan v. Perin*, 30 A. 319 (1906), *Janaji Dagde v. Shankar*, 36 B. 116 (1911).

(4) *Haamant v. Annapu Nammapta*, 37 B. 611 F. B. (1913), overruling *Janaji Dagde*

v. Shankar, 36 B. 116 (1911).

(5) *Uma Sundari Devi v. Bindu Beshmi* (Chowdhrama, 21 C. 759 (1897)), *Int. v. Pappu v. Vajur*, 21 B. 518 (1898), which, as well as the former case, deal with the question of amendment of the decree. This latter case has been disavowed from in *Asma Bibi v. Ahmad Hussain*, 30 A. 299 (1908).

(6) *Pary Mohan Mukherjee v. Mohendra Nath Mania*, 1 C. L. J. 566 (1904), and see *Ramappa v. Bharna*, 30 B. 625 (1906).

(7) *Loklu v. Sri Ram*, 15 C. W. N. 921 (1911), 11 C. L. J. 110.

(2) *Where the appeal is from the decree of a Court, the records of which are not deposited in the Appellate Court, the Court receiving such notice shall send with all practicable despatch all material papers in the suit, or such papers as may be specially called for by the Appellate Court*

(3) *Either party may apply in writing to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, specifying any of the papers in such Court of which he requires copies to be made, and copies of such papers shall be made at the expense of, and given to, the applicant.*

Records.—*If there is any part of the record not sent up which the appellant wishes to bring before the Appellate Court, it is his duty to ask the Court to send for it before the day of trial (1)*

14. (1) *Notice of the day fixed under rule 11 shall be affixed in the Appellate Court-house, and a like notice shall be sent by the Appellate Court to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and shall be served on the respondent or on his pleader in the Appellate Court in the manner provided for the service on a defendant of a summons to appear and answer, and all the provisions applicable to such summons, and to proceedings with reference to the service thereof, shall apply to the service of such notice* [s 553]

(2) *Instead of sending the notice to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, the Appellate Court may itself cause the notice to be served on the respondent or his pleader under the provisions above referred to*

15. *The notice to the respondent shall declare that, if he does not appear in the Appellate Court on the day so fixed the appeal will be heard ex parte.* [s 554]

Procedure on leave

16 (1) *On the day fixed or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the applicant shall be heard in support of the appeal*

(1) *Baksh Ali Sowdagur v Jovannt Khan, 11 W 1 110 (1)*

(2) The Court shall then, if it does not dismiss the appeal at once, hear the respondent against the appeal, and in such case the appellant shall be entitled to reply.

Hearing—The rule says “on the day fixed,” but the hearing of the appeal before the day fixed, if the pleaders of both parties are present and argue the case, is not such a defect in procedure as renders interference in special appeal necessary (1) If it appears that the rules of Court relating to appeals have not been complied with, and no adequate excuse is offered, the appeal may be dismissed (2)

6] 17. (1) *Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed*

(2) *Where the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear, the appeal shall be heard ex parte*

“Where on the day fixed,” etc.—A party seeking to put in motion the stringent provisions of this rule is bound to show very distinctly that the procedure under it has been strictly complied with, and that the appellant did not make his appearance on the day to which the case was adjourned. When he is unable to show that, or that the appellant below had any notice that his appeal was to have been heard on the day on which the Judge disposed of it the appeal cannot be dismissed under this rule (3) Where a Lower Appellate Court, after eleven months’ delay and without fixing any time for disposing of an appeal, dismissed it for default, the High Court set aside the order and remanded the case (4) If an appeal is called on without any day having been fixed for hearing and the appellant is absent, his absence is not a default which renders his appeal liable to be dismissed (5) It should appear on the record that a day had been fixed for the hearing of the appeal, and that thereupon the default had followed (6) But if an appeal is taken up before the appointed day and is allowed to proceed to a hearing in the presence of the pleaders of the parties and is argued by them, there is no defect in the procedure (7)

“Appear”—The former section (556) ran “does not attend in person or by his pleader” But the word “attend” was held to be practically synonymous with “appear” (8) The present wording therefore effects no alteration in the

(1) *Hukumunnissal Bibee Mukldoomun*
1 W R 246 (1864)

(2) *Bhungi Girdhar v Morgan*, 3 B H
C R O C J 63 (1865)

(3) *Shub Chunder v Alla I Monce* (1866)
5 W R 118 22

(4) *Soo thumonet v Gooropersaud* (1864)
W R 176

(5) *Huro Chun ler v Ram Coomar* (1865),
2 W R 254

(6) *Id*
(7) *Hukumunnissal Bibee Mukldoomun*
(1864), 1 W R 246

(8) *Satish v Ahara I rasad* 31 C. 403 408,
417, F B, s c, 11 C W N 329

"Appearance" has several meanings, and these must be understood in reference to the particular subject to which it relates, and the purpose or end to be answered by the appearance has an important bearing in determining what is sufficient to constitute an appearance in a particular case. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court (2) has recently ruled that an application by counsel or pleader who is instructed only to apply for an adjournment, which is refused is not an "appearance," and that when in such circumstance an appeal is dismissed the dismissal is one for default under this rule entitling the appellant to apply for re-admission under r 19. The decisions are not altogether uniform but the balance of authority in the Bombay (3) and Allahabad (4) High Courts is in favour of the same view, which has also been taken by the Punjab Chief Court (5). Where, however, a pleader for the appellant appeared and asked for an adjournment but did not withdraw from the case, merely urging that the records were in possession of his leader who was absent and that he could not argue the appeal, but the application for adjournment was not granted it was held by the Madras High Court that it was open to the Court to refuse the adjournment but that if it did so it was bound to write a judgment and dispose of the appeal, and could not dismiss it for default (6). But the Madras High Court has recently held that where the pleader was instructed only to apply for an adjournment and was not duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit, nor accompanied by any one able to answer such questions there was no appearance by the defendant (7). When the appellant and his pleaders were present when the appeal was called on for hearing and one of the pleaders addressed the Court, but soon after the commencement of his argument went to another Court and did not return and the other pleader refused to address the Court the appeal it was held should be dismissed but not for default (8). If the appellant in a case remanded to the Lower Appellate Court does not put in an appearance and takes no steps to produce evidence the Lower Appellate Court may dismiss the appeal for default (9). Where there were two appel-

- (9) Talke Chand r r Mullal Chand r
(1873) 21 W. R. G.

- (4) Lalit Prasad e Nand Lal ore, 22 A
60 (1899), Hira Das e Hira Lal - A. 33
(1899), Jambhal e Balwihar - A. 11)

by the same appellant before the Court and he was summoned to give evidence in one of them but failed to attend judgment, it was held could not be given against him for default in the other appeal (1)

"Be dismissed"—The Court in the absence of the appellant on the day fixed for hearing should dismiss the appeal and not reverse the judgment of the lower Court (2) If a Judge instead of dismissing the appeal for non appearance of the appellant in person or by pleader, goes into the merits of the case and gives judgment against the appellant the appeal must be considered as dismissed for default of the appellant in appearing, and an application for re admission and re hearing of the appeal cannot be treated as one for review. It is improper to consider or decide upon the merits of a case when the Judge

re admission of the appeal (4) The amended rule now says the Court may make an order of dismissal. The former section ran "shall be dismissed" (5)

Appeal—An order dismissing an appeal from a decree for default (6) or dismissing objections to the execution of a decree for default (7) was formerly held to be a decree within the meaning of sect 2 of the last Code and thus appealable. But that section now excludes orders of dismissal for default from the category of a decree (8) A party may apply for re admission under r 19 and from this there is an appeal under O XLIII *post*

Delivery of paper books—In appeals to the High Court from its original jurisdiction if the appellant does not deliver the prescribed number of paper books within the prescribed time the respondent or his attorney may with the leave of the Court or a Judge prepare and deliver such paper book or he may apply on notice to the appellant to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution or for such other order as he may be advised. If no application

(1) *Arunachella v Vencatachella* (18 0) 5 M. H. C. R. 269

(2) *Munckaram v Roop Narain* (1862) Marsh 5. But see *Dalabinamoorthy v Municipal Council of Trichinopoly* 31 M. 157 (1907)

(3) *Mohesh Chunder v Thakoor Dass* (1873) 20 W. R. 425 426 [approved in *Satish Chandra Mukerjee v Alara Prasad* 31 C. 403 414 (1907)] *Buldeo Misser v Syul Ahmed* (1871) 15 W. R. 143 *Kanah Lal v Naubat Rai* (1881) 3 A. 519

(4) *Zainab Begam v Manawar Husam* (1886) 8 A. 277, 278

(5) *Muruga Chetty v Rajasam* 22 M. L. J. 284 (1912)

(6) *Radda Nath v Chandu Charan* (1903) 30 C. 660 (1 B) *Pratap J., dissenting over ruling Jagannath v Bullan* (1890) 23 C. 115

117, *Anwar Ali v Jaffer Ali* (1896) 23 C. 837 see also *Ram Chandra v Madhav* (1891) 16 B. 23 *Varadangi v Mehta Haridattam* (1891) 19 B. 307. In *Manab Ali v Nihal Chand* (1893) 15 A. 359 the Allahabad H. G. Court has held that such an order is not a decree. *see also*

387, *Gilkinson v Subramanna* (1895) - 2-1 see also the cases cited in *Radhakrishna v Chandu Charan supra*

(7) *Lal Narain v Mahomed Rafuddin* (1900) 28 C. 81

(8) *Rukminumayi v Purnan Chandra* 30 C. 341 (1910) 15 C. L. J. 331 *followed in Prabhat v Tulsi Koori* 18 C. L. J. 148 (1913)

be made the case will be set down in the next peremptory lists of appeals from the original side and be disposed of by the Court as it may think fit (1)

18 Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, it is found that the notice to the respondent has not been served in consequence of the failure of the appellant to deposit, within the period fixed the sum required to defray the cost of serving the notice the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed

Dismissal of appeal where notice not served in consequence of appellant's failure to deposit costs

Provided that no such order shall be made although the notice has not been served upon the respondent, if on any such day the respondent appears when the appeal is called on for hearing

Deposit — A period must be fixed by the Court for the deposit unless a time has been fixed the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to deposit (2) A party has been held not excused for omission to deposit by the fact of the duty having been committed to an ignorant *karpurda* who failed to perform it (3) An appeal should not be dismissed for default merely because the appellant has failed to explain satisfactorily why the *talabana* was not deposited within the period fixed by the Court without ascertaining whether there was ample time after the deposit to serve the notices upon the respondents (4) If the fees for the service of the notice of appeal on the respondent are deposited but the notice to be served as required by the Circular Order of the High Court is not filed the appeal cannot be dismissed under this rule (5)

19 Where an appeal is dismissed under rule 11 sub rule () or rule 1 or rule 15 the appellant may apply to the Appellate Court for the re-admission of the appeal, and where it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for hearing or from depositing the sum so required, the Court shall re-admit the appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit

Re-admission of appeal dismissed for default

The appellant. — This rule provides that an appellant whose appeal has been dismissed for want of prosecution under the circumstances mentioned may apply for the re-admission of the appeal but nothing is said in it as to rehearing the case upon the application of the respondent against whom an *ex parte* decree has been passed and a respondent against whom such a decree

(1) Billambers Rules and Orders Appeal
late S. C. R. 18 Pt II Ch VII r 11 p 200
(2) See *Rela* see *Idra* (1861) 13 P. 200 (1869)
(3) *Francis* v *Roy* v *Jagannath* M. 1867

see 11 W. R. 41 (1869)
(4) *Chandra* v *Kaliprasanna*, 50 C. 33 (1885)
(5) *Col Mahomed* v *Abdul Jubbar* 16 C. W. N. 495 (1911) 1 C. I. J. 63

has been passed cannot apply for re-hearing under this rule (1) In such cases the remedy lies under r 21

"To the Appellate Court."—The application must be made to the Court dismissing the appeal (2) If an appeal is referred by a District Judge to an Assistant Judge for trial under sect 17 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (Act XIV of 1869), and the Assistant Judge dismisses the appeal for default, the application for re-admission of the appeal should be made to him and not to the District Judge and his order refusing to re-admit the appeal is not subject to reversal or review by the District Judge (3) As to limitation in case of such an application, see case cited (4)

"Prevented"—This and the kindred provision in O 1X r 13 mean that the application may be based upon any ground which would be a just and proper one for granting the application, and not that the application can be based upon one ground only, viz that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. The affirmative provisions of the Code that a plaintiff or appellant may prove that he was "prevented by sufficient cause" from appearing or attending when his suit or appeal was called on and dismissed do not imply the negative namely, that an application for restoration cannot be granted unless "sufficient cause (in this sense) is shown" (5) It has been recently held that a Court has power to restore an appeal dismissed for default even where the appellant is not able to prove that he was prevented by a sufficient cause from appearing and that the Court is not bound to restore an appeal in every case where the non-appearance is due to the pleader's negligence but may in its discretion leave him to his remedy against the pleader by an action for damages (6) The Court is bound to see whether the reasons set forth in the application for the re-admission of the appeal are satisfactory or not. Thus, where the Lower Appellate Court refused an application for re-admission merely because the appellant had not conformed to a rule which he had passed that two pleaders should be engaged in every appeal, the High Court sent back the case to the Judge to consider whether a good ground had been shown for the re-admission of the appeal (7) The reasons for rejecting the application should be stated (8) When an appeal was transferred from the file of one Court to another, no notice of the transfer having been given to the appellant by the pleaders in the case and the appeal was dismissed in his absence, held that sufficient ground for his absence had been made out (9) What however is "sufficient cause" must be decided in each case according to its own peculiar circumstances

"From appearing"—Whether the application is made for restoration under this rule or O 1X r 13 the same principle will apply. In both cases

(1) *Tara Chant v. Anund Chunder* (1868) 10 W. R. 450

(2) *Kisto Persad v. Cowie* (1864) W. R. 315

(3) *Saklaram Lakshman v. Govind Joti* 17 B. 107 (1890)

(4) *Hloga Bibee v. Minna Bibee* 31 C. 10 (1903)

(5) *Somayya v. Sullivan* 1 (1903) 2 M.

199 607

(6) *Maruga Cletty v. Rajasami* 22 M. L. J. 231 (1910)

(7) *Shomach Ali v. Fusoof Khan* 15 W. 1 40 (1871) *Huro Chunder v. Ram Chandra* 2 W. P. 251 (1864)

(8) *Huro Chunder v. Ram Chandra* *supra*

(9) *Narayan Singh v. Bhojra Churn Panik* 8 C. L. J. 250 (1841)

the question is whether an appearance by a counsel or pleader instructed to apply only for an adjournment is an "appearance" within the meaning of the Code, and whether in such a case the suit or appeal can be dismissed for default. The first question has been answered in the negative and the second in the affirmative (1). When an appeal is dismissed under such circumstances the order of dismissal is for default, and the appellant is entitled to apply for re-admission of the appeal under this rule (2). Where an appeal is dismissed by a Divisional Bench of the High Court, for default in depositing the estimated costs of preparation of the paper book, such a dismissal can be set aside by review. Such a case is not one in which default was made in appearing at the hearing of the case if the record shows that the pleaders on both sides were in attendance and heard. Under the Code there are only two methods known to the law by which a judgment and decree of a Divisional Bench of the High Court can be set aside in India. These two methods are described in these provisions and those relating to review. Where it appears from the record that pleaders on both sides were in attendance and heard there has been no default in appearing at the hearing of the case, and therefore this rule will not apply (3).

Appeal.—The Code allows an appeal from an order refusing to grant an application under this rule for the restoration of an appeal. But it does not provide for an appeal from an order granting such an application (4). When, however, the order dismissing an appeal is not one which can properly be made under r 17 there is no appeal from an order refusing to re-admit the appeal under this rule and the remedy in such a case is by revision. Thus in a case when the appeal came on for hearing the appellant himself and two pleaders on his behalf were present in the Lower Appellate Court, one of the pleaders opened the case but in a short time was called away to attend to a case before another Court and the Lower Appellate Court waiting some little time for the pleader to return called upon the other pleader and the appellant to support the appeal and when each of them declared his inability to do so dismissed the appeal for the default of prosecution. The appellant then applied for the restoration of the appeal which was refused on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown for the restoration. The appellant appealed to the High Court under this rule. It was dismissed on the ground that the appeal in the Lower Appellate Court was not dismissed for default but the appellant was allowed to file an application for revision (5). When an application for restoration

(1) *Satish v. Alara Prasad* (1907) 34 C 403 417 (F.B.), s.c. 11 C.W.N. 329 50 C.L.J. 247, *Cooke v. Equitable Coal Co.* (1904) 8 C.W.N. 621 see also the cases cited in notes to r 17.

(2) *Satish v. Alara Prasad supra* overruling *Watson & Co. v. Ambica Dasi* (1899) 4 C.W.N. 237, s.c. 27 C.L.J. 9.

(3) *Fatmunissa v. Deoki Prasad* (1898) 24 C. 300 301 (F.B.), s.c. 1 C.W.N. 21.

Das (1907) 24 A. 464 *Huro Gunder v. Ram Coonar* (1888) 2 W.R. 254 *Shakil Mitoor v. Rahn an Kisan* (1867) 8 W.R. 31 *cf. Rameswar Dutt v. Loolunnissa* (1867) 6 W.R. 114, 170 *Kalee Kistoo v. Huro Gunder* (1885) 10 W.R. 160.

(4) *Jawahar Singh v. Datta Singh* (1850) 18 A. 119 for meaning of the word "default" see *Satish v. Alara Prasad* 34 C. 903, and notes to r 17 but see *Baldeo Misser v. Syed Ahmed* 15 W.R. 143 (1871) *Shilendra v. Koonoo Pann* 17 C. 673 (1886).

is made the applicant must produce all his evidence in support of it before the Court to which it is made. If he does not do so and the application is refused, he cannot, on appeal from the order dismissing his application, supplement his evidence (1)

9]

20. Where it appears to the Court at the hearing that

Power to adjourn hearing and direct persons appearing interested to be made respondents.

any person who was a party to the suit in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made a party to the appeal, is interested in the result of the

appeal, the Court may adjourn the hearing to a future day to be fixed by the Court and direct that such person be made a respondent

Adding respondent—The power of the Court to act under this rule is only limited in two respects, first, the person whom the Court may add must have been a party to the suit, and secondly, he must be a person interested in the result of the appeal. There is no period of limitation specified in the Limitation Act, for the action of the Court in that matter (2). The party added must be interested in the result of the appeal. Whether this be so must be determined in each case on its facts (3). In a suit for contribution the first Court gave a decree against one of the defendants and dismissed it against the other. On appeal by the defendant against whom the decree was passed, the lower appeal Court having at the hearing of the appeal, found that the defendants against whom the suit was dismissed were not made parties to the appeal, though interested in the result of the appeal directed that they should be made parties, and they entered appearance in accordance with the order made. Held that there was nothing wrong in the lower appeal Courts making them respondents and passing a decree against them (4). An Appellate Court is competent to make a person a respondent who in the original suit was arrayed on the same side with the appellant (5). In a suit for contribution where there was a decree against defendants Nos 1 and 3 separately, and the suit was dismissed against defendant No 2 on appeal by defendant No 1 there being no appeal by the plaintiff

(1) Muzaffar Ali v Kedarnath, 20 A 266 (1898)

(2) Bindeshri v Ganga Saran (1892), 14 A 154, Girish Chunder Laluri v Sasi, 33 C 329 337 (1905)

(3) See e.g. Bishun Churn v Jagendranath (1898), 26 C 114 121, Amlook Chand v Sarat, 16 C W N 49 (1911), 38 C 913

(4) Upendra Lal Mukerjee v Girindia (1898) 25 C 565, 568 s.c. 2 C W N 425. Rup Jan Bibee v Abdul Kader (1904) 8 C W N 496 509 (F B) dis. from Anna Pam v Balkishen (1883) 5 A 266, where it was held that inasmuch as s. 509 did not empower an Appellate Court virtually to make an

appeal for an appellant who had refrained from availing himself of his privileges under law, by introducing for him other respondents than those included in the memorandum of appeal defendants against whom the suit was dismissed could not be made respondents. See also Soura Padma nabh v Narayan Pao (1893) 18 B 250, Hudson v Basdeo Bajpye (1898) 26 C 109 113, s.c. 3 C W N 76, Subramanian v Veerabadran 31 M 442 (1908)

(5) Sohra v Khalak Singh (1883) 13 A 78 86, Konagappa v Sokkallappa (1892) 17 M 762

defendant No 2 might, it was held, be made a respondent (1) The Allahabad High Court has held that the provisions of the former section did not apply to second appeals, and that a second Appellate Court could not add a party as a respondent unless that party was a party to the appeal below, and thus notwithstanding that he was a party to the suit in the Court of first instance, (2) but the opposite view has been held by the Madras High Court, and according to the ruling of that High Court, it is competent for the second Appellate Court to add parties who were defendants in the Court of first instance, though not joined as respondents in the Lower Appellate Court (3) This rule applies only to cases where at the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that a person who was a party to the suit in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made a party to the appeal is interested in the result of the appeal (4)

21. Where an appeal is heard *ex parte* and judgment is pronounced against the respondent, he may [s 560]

Re-hearing on application of respondent against whom *ex parte* decree made.

apply to the Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal, and, if he satisfies the Court that the notice was not duly served or that he was

prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for hearing, the Court shall re-hear the appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit to impose upon him.

Rehearing of appeal — After an appeal is filed the power to set aside the original decree on an application under sect 108 (now O IX r 13) is vested in the Appellate Court This power is distinct from the power to set aside an *ex parte* appellate decree conferred by the present rule which only enables the Court to direct the appeal from the original decree to be reheard thus temporarily restoring the original decree (5) No appeal lies to the High Court under sect 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act from an order refusing to hear an application under this rule to have an appeal from a decree in a rent suit valued less than Rs 100 reheard in the presence of the respondent (6) An application to rehear the appeal is an application in the suit (7)

22 (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed [s 561]

Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal.

from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below, but take any cross-objection to the decree which

(1) *Rup Jan Bibee v. Abdul Kadir* (1904) 30 C W N 496, 500

(2) *Chunni v. Lala Pam* (1893) 15 A 5, 6

(3) *Pava Matathil v. Kovamel Amma* (1891) 13 M 131, 173

(4) *Bhims Lout v. Dasarath* 40 C 327 (1912)

(5) *Bankara Bhatta v. Subraya* 1

M 535 (1907), s c, 17 M L J 4

(6) *Samad Bhatta v. Neta* 1

19 C L J 316 (1914)

(7) *Ib.*, and see A C 3

Chun 25 C 140 (1914)

he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed *such* objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.

(2) Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto.

(3) Unless the respondent files with the objection a written acknowledgment from the *party who may be affected by such objection* or his pleader of having received a copy thereof, the Appellate Court shall cause a copy to be served, as soon as may be after the filing of the objection, on *such party* or his pleader at the expense of the respondent.

(4) *Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit*

(5) The provisions relating to pauper appeals shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to an objection under this rule.

Scope of rule—In this rule two classes of cases have been referred to under it a respondent may, firstly, *support* the decree of the Court of first instance upon grounds which may have been decided against him by that Court, and if a part of the decree is adverse to him he has the right to *object* at the hearing of the appeal to that part of the decree without filing a separate appeal. These two classes of cases are not of an analogous character. Cross-objections are in the nature of an appeal, a remedy which a respondent has against a decree which is partly unfavourable to him (1) A respondent, when the decree is against him, cannot (unless he has filed a cross appeal) be heard except to support the decree, and can only alter it by means of a cross appeal (2) A party may be satisfied with the decree of the Lower Court, and may be willing to allow it to stand unimpeached if his opponent does not think it necessary to appeal, but he may not be willing to have the decree modified or altered upon appeal in favour of his opponent, without having the whole decree set right. Again suppose a defendant sets up two defences to a claim brought against him, and the Lower Court determines in his favour as to one of them and against him as

(1) Kalyan Singh v. Rahmu, 23 A 130, 134 (1901) see also Ramjiwan Mal v. Chand Mal, 10 A 58-601, 602 (1889), Jaisaitunnissa v. Jutunnissa (1885), 7 A 606-621, Thakoor Das v. Gopee Kristo (1871) 5 W R 18, and as to appeal and cross objections under the

City of Bombay Improvement Act see Raghunath Das v. Secretary of State, 29 B 514 (1905), and see Rangam Lal v. Janil u (1911), 31 A 32

(2) Casper v. Ashori Lal Poy Chowdhury (1906) 23 G 92, 929, s. c., 1 C W N 12

to the other the plaintiff's claim would be dismissed. The Lower Court might be wrong as to both defences, and ought to have decided in the defendant's favour the defence which was decided against him, and *vice versa*. If the plaintiff were to appeal and to reverse the decision of the Lower Court upon the defence decreed in the defendant's favour it would be unjust not to allow the defendant, if he could, to show that the Lower Court was wrong in point of law in determining the other defence against him, for he might thereby be able to show that the Lower Court was substantially right in dismissing the plaintiff's suit, though wrong as to the defence which barred it (1). He may support the decree on the ground decided against him. This reason applies to special appeals with as much force as to appeals held that the order of a Lower Court may be reversed by the respondent in that Court and a decree passed in appeal within the meaning of sect 581 of the last Code, whether it dealt with the grounds of appeal urged by the appellant or the objections taken by the respondent under sect 561 (3). It was also held that sect 647 of the last Code made applicable to revision petitions under sect 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, the procedure relating to appeals and consequently a memorandum of objections would lie in such revision petitions (4).

Decree entirely in favour of respondent.—Where a decree is entirely in favour of a respondent it is not necessary for him to file a notice of objection to the decision on any issue found against him. He can support the decree on the ground that that issue ought to have been decided in his favour. The Appellate Court ought to decide that issue or show in its judgment a reason for not doing so (5). And see *ante*.

"Decided against him"—If a point has not been decided in favour of the respondent, it must for the purposes of the rule be taken to have been decided against him within its meaning. It is not necessary to entitle a respondent to support a decree upon a particular ground that that ground should have been in express terms decided against him (6). Where a claim to set off was asserted in the respondent's (defendant's) written statement but no issue on the point was raised, and no pronouncement on it was made by the first Court and it was not made the subject of any cross objection nor was it urged before the Appellate Court in argument, the former decision was held to be no bar to the Appellate

(1) Issur Chunder Huls (1862) 1 Ind Jur 29 s.c., Marsh 151, 153, 1 Hay 350 W R. Sp. n. 49, and as to Code of 1859 see *In re Mirza Himmatal B* L. R., F B 429 431 (1866).

(2) *Ib.*, Narayan Aiyar v. Lakshmi Ammal 3 M H C. R. 216 291 (1866).

(3) *Ganapati v. Satharama* (1867) 10 M 202, 291.

(4) *Krishna Aiyangar v. Ajjanarayangar* 17 M L J 62 (1906).

(5) *Lala Gouri Sinker v. Janki Prasad* (1869) 17 L A 77, 61, s.c. 17 C 409 *Blagden v. Blagden* (1868) 13 R 77.

(6) *Shrush Chunder Ray v. Mungra Bewa*, 9 C. W. N. 14 18 (1901). In *Balek v. Kamal* 4 A 491 (1862) it was held on the facts that at the matter was not decided against the respondent in *Ganga Prasad v. Gudsithar Prasad* 2 A 601 604 (1860) the appellant to the High Court had his appeal in the Lower Court and there was no objection which respondents could have taken by way of appeal to this Court against the decree of the Lower Appellate Court. See as to this case *Kamal v. Kamal* 5 B 365, 371 (1864).

Court's jurisdiction to deal with the point, because the first Court did not decide the point adversely to the respondent. It did not deal with it, and so the case was held to fall within the operation of sect 506 of the former Code (1)

Decree unfavourable to respondent.—This rule gives the respondent the power of taking any objection to the decree at the hearing of an appeal which he could have taken by way of appeal, (2) provided he has filed a notice of his objection within the prescribed period. Where there is, as a matter of fact, an appeal to be heard (and the question whether the appeal would, in law, lie or not does not affect the respondent's right in such cases), at such hearing the respondent is entitled to have his objections to the decree heard or determined (3). The law gives a defendant the right to file a cross objection. Of this right he cannot be deprived merely because only one of two plaintiffs appealed instead of both (4). But the right of taking objections exists only in those cases in which the party proposing to file them might have appealed and did not. Thus where, immediately upon the dismissal of his appeal, the plaintiff filed objections in the defendant's appeal setting up the very grounds upon which in his own appeal he had asked for relief and been refused it was held that such objections could not be entertained (5). Where a decree is in favour of the respondent the Appellate Court should not accept the facts found by the first Court as incontestably proved, merely because no objection to the decree was filed by the respondent under this rule. The Appellate Court should deal with the evidence in the case and find on it whether the facts found by the first Court were proved or not (6). The consequence of the grant of a certificate under sect 48 of the City of Bombay Improvement Act (Bomb Act IV of 1898) is that there shall be an appeal to the High Court from the award or any part of the award of the Special Collector under the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) and this must mean that there shall be a right of appeal, or to use the language of the Code that an appeal will lie to the High Court, and it follows that the respondent will be entitled to object in manner provided by this rule (7). It has been held that where a respondent to an appeal failed to give the notice required it was not open to the Appellate Court to grant any relief to that respondent in a case where the granting of such relief was not necessarily incidental

(1) The Ahmedabad, etc., Spinning and Weaving Co v. Lakshmi Shankar (1904), 30 B 173, 189

(2) See Ganga Prasad v. Gajadhar Prasad, 2 A. 651, 654 (1880), and notes to s. 96, "Who can appeal"

(3) Kamat v. Kamat (1884), 8 B 368, 370. The Judges did not express any opinion as to the soundness of the decision in Ganga Prasad v. Gajadhar Prasad (1880), 2 A. 651, 654, as it had no bearing on this case. In the case in 2 A. 651 both parties appealed from the decree of the first Court, and both the appeals were dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court. The plaintiff then appealed to the High Court whereupon the defendant wanted to

file objections to the decree of the Lower Appellate Court dismissing his appeal, and it was held that such objection could not be entertained (at p. 654).

(4) Babaji Dhanubhai v. Collector of Salt Revenue, 11 B 596, 598 (1897)

(5) Ramji Das v. Ajudhas Prasad (1903) 25 A. 628. In Kulsikada Pillai v. Venu natha Pillai, 28 M 229, 231 (1904) the opinion was expressed that the section applied only where a party had a right of appeal, but who would forced or misled into Court did not think fit to exercise it.

(6) Bahaji v. Rajaji (1889) 13 B 75, 77

(7) Raghunath Das v. Secretary of State (1905) 29 B 511, 527

to the relief granted to a party who had appealed, (1) but that the rule in no way prevented an Appellate Court from upholding the decree of the Lower Court on any ground which in law warranted such upholding, even though that ground may not have been referred to, or disallowed in the Lower Court (2) The Appellate Court ought not, it was held, to reverse the decision of the Lower Court where the respondent has made no objection to it. Thus a plaintiff claimed a certain sum and was awarded a less sum by the first Court. He then appealed on the ground that he should have been awarded the full amount but the defendant did not object to the decree awarding the lesser amount. The Appellate Court could not, it was held, reverse the first Court's decree and dismiss altogether plaintiff's suit (3). When the defendant respondent does not appeal against or object to the amount awarded by the first Court to the plaintiff, it was held not open to the Appellate Court to reduce it (4). The extended powers which have been now given to Appellate Courts by the new r 33 of this Order are, however, to be noted in connection with these and similar cases.

"To the decree"—The decree alone is appealable: there is no appeal from the judgment. If a party desires to have formal effect given to findings in a judgment by the decree so as to allow of his filing objections under this rule, he should apply to have the decree brought into conformity with the judgment (5).

Against whom cross objections may be filed—The question whether the right of a respondent to prefer cross objections is limited to urging them against the appellant or whether one respondent can prefer cross objections against another respondent, has given rise to some discussion. On the one hand, it may be said that the right of urging cross objections on the part of the respondent ought to be limited to urging them as against those of his adversaries in the Court below, who are dissatisfied with the decree of that Court and who have preferred an appeal against the same and that other parties who have not preferred any appeal against the decree of the Court below and against whom no appeal has been preferred ought to be left unaffected by the appeal except so far as it may benefit them under the provisions of O 41 r 4. On the other hand it may be urged that cases may arise in which the appeal of some only of the defendants or of the plaintiffs may open up matters which render it necessary for the ends of justice that the whole case should be gone into and some of the respondents should be allowed the opportunity of urging cross objections against their co-respondents. When this question came up

(1) *Kulakada Lalai v. Viswanatha Pillai* (1904) 28 M. L. J. 233. In *1 up Jaun v. Abdul Kadir* (1904) 31 C. 643 the question whether an Appellate Court can give relief to a respondent who has not given notice was not considered, and the judgment of the Full Bench in that case was expressly limited to the case of a suit for contribution. In the first case White, C.J., observed that sect 561 only applied where a party had a right of appeal but until forced or invited into Court did not think fit to exercise it.

(2) *Receiver of N. la lavelle v. later Vegas*

sena 28 M. L. J. 435 (1904)

(3) *Hem Chunder v. Ahmed Iza* (1893) March 332

(4) *Nyan Chandra v. Narayan* (1890) 4 B. 293

(5) *Jamiatunnissa v. Lutfunnissa* 7 A. W. 610 (1895) Mahmood, J. however, being of opinion that the expression "objection to the decree" referred not only to matters existing on the face of the decree, but also to those which should have existed but did not exist there.

before the Calcutta High Court (1) it was decided that as a general rule the right of a respondent to urge cross-objections should be limited to his urging them against the appellants, and it is only by way of exception to this general rule that one respondent may urge cross objections as against the other respondents, the exception holding good, among other cases, in those in which the appeal of some of the parties opens out questions which cannot be disposed of completely without matters being allowed to be opened up as between co respondents (2) Thus where the Court of first instance decided a suit upon a ground common to all the defendants it was held it was competent for the Appellate Court, on the appeal of only one of the defendants, to modify or set aside in favour of all the defendants the decree of the Lower Court, and the whole case was opened out in appeal, not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant who had appealed, but also as between the plaintiff and other defendants who had been made respondents apparently because they had not joined in the appeal. It was held that the Appellate Court could not do complete justice between all the parties without opening up the whole case, and such an instance was one of the exceptional cases in which a respondent should be allowed to prefer objections as against his co respondents (3) It was also held by the Madras High Court that one respondent can file a memorandum of objections against another respondent (4)

Court fees on cross objections—The objections under this rule have to be made by means of a document which has to be filed within one month after service of notice of the appeal, that is, on a date which is generally long prior to the date of hearing. Is that document chargeable with court fees at the time it is filed? Under sect 4, Court Fees Act, it is not so chargeable unless it is a document of any of the kinds specified in the first or second Schedule annexed to the Act. A memorandum of objections is not a document so specified in those schedules. Such being the case, no fee is leviable on a memorandum of objections until the time of hearing, and it is leviable under the special provision in sect 16 of the Court Fees Act (5). The Court cannot remit the stamp duty in such cases, (6) the proper order is to dismiss the memorandum (with or without costs, at the discretion of the Court) (7).

(1) *Bishun Churn Roy Chowdhury v Jogendranath Roy* (1898) 26 C 114, followed in *Shabuddin v Deomoorat* 30 C 605 (1903)

(2) *Bishun Churn Roy v Jogendranath*, 26 C 114 121 (1898), and see *Abdul Ghani v Muhammad Fasih* 28 A 95 (1905), *Upendra Lal Mukherjee v Girindranath Mukherjee* 25 C 565 (1898), *Shabiruddin v Deomoorat* (1903) 30 C 655 657, 658, *Jad Nandan v Deo Narain* 16 C. W. N. 612 (1911), 15 C. L. J. 61, *Nursay Virji v Harrison*, 37 D 511 (1913)

(3) *Abdul Ghani v Muhammad Fasih* (1905) 28 A 90, 97 98, *dist Kallu v Manu* (1900) 23 A 93, and pointing out that the reasoning in *Summatta v*

Lakshmana 7 M 215 (1893), was based upon the provisions of Act XII of 1899 the language of which materially differed from the Code of 1852

(4) *Per Benson and Lodian JJ* (1901) 14 Mad L. J. 34 S. N.

(5) Reference under Court Fees Act, 25 V 24 26 (1901), *Narasau v Krishna* (1891) 8 M 214 217, *Bahaji Hatti v Pajaram Ballal* (1895) 1 B 75, 79, *Sjara la Soonduree v Gobind Monce* (1875) 21 W. R. 170

(6) *Brojeshwari v Guroo Churn* (1890) 11 C. 735 (pat per respondent)

(7) *Humarasmiva v Udayar Nandan* 32 M 170 (1908), for cross objections in *for 1 pauper* see *Govind v Ralla* 15 C. W. N. 205 (1910)

"Within one month"—This rule allows a respondent to file a memorandum of objections within one month from the date on which notice has been served on him or on his pleader. The right so conferred is an absolute right, and the hearing of the appeal cannot be advanced so as to defeat this provision. An appeal cannot be definitely posted until the Court has ascertained that notice of the appeal has been served on the respondent, and a date should then be fixed not less than one month from the date of service (1). The Court may grant further time. Whether it will do so will depend on the particular facts proved (2). Under this rule the Court has power to receive a memorandum of cross-objections at any time (3).

Withdrawal of appeal (sub rule (4))—Cross objections are in the nature of an appeal, a remedy which a respondent has against a decree partly unfavourable to him, but they were considered to so far differ from a cross appeal that they depended on the hearing of the appeal, and could not be heard if the appeal was not heard. Upon this view a number of questions arose as to the effect of the withdrawal of an appeal before and after the commencement of the hearing, and what constituted a hearing upon the right to have cross objections heard and determined (4). The general result of these decisions may be stated to be that they involved a discussion of the meaning of the term "hearing" that if the appeal was withdrawn before the 'hearing' the respondent could not be heard upon his cross objections dependent as they were on the appeal, but that if the hearing had begun and the Court had thus become seized of the cross objections the respondent could not be deprived of his remedy because the appellant choose to abandon his (5). The matter need not now be further considered. An appellant may of course withdraw his appeal at any time up to its actual decision (6). But now under sub rule (4) in all cases of withdrawal the Court may proceed to determine the cross objections. Where, however, the decree is wholly in favour of the respondent his right to contest any of the conclusions in the first Court judgment is only for the purpose of supporting the decree, and if the appeal is withdrawn that purpose is fully secured because the decree is left standing and the right to dispute the conclusions in the judgment is no longer of any use to him. To withdraw the appeal in such a case cannot, as in the case of cross objections, deprive the respondent of

(1) *Sunaram v. Annangar*, 13 M 492 493 (1900)

(2) In *Bulman v. Jacob* Jan 14 B 111 (1900) the Court refused an extension

(3) *Govind v. Radha* 15 C. W. N. 205 (1910)

(4) See *Kalyan Singh v. Rahmu*, 23 A 130, 131 (1901), *Jafar Hasan v. Ranjit Singh* 17 A 515 *Pamjavan v. Channal* 10 A 597 602 (1885) [dismissal of appeal as barred by limitation], *Kombi Achen v. Keshavn* 21 M 352 (1897) [dismissal of failure to join parties], *Baroda Kant v. Parcoe Wilson*, 23 W 1 37 (1871) [discovery of default] and see also *Parvati Narain v. Wala* 11 A 11 23 W

R 229 (18 4) *Bahaloor Singh v. Bhugwan Dass* 1 Agra H C P 23 *Sharia Chaman v. Radha Kanto* 14 W 1 210 (1870) *Sarblal Doyal v. Bhagunath* 10 B H C R 337 (1873) *Dhoni Jagannath v. Collector of Salt Pannu*, 9 I 28 30 (1881), *Maktab Beg v. Hasan Ali* 8 A 104 (1888), *Venkata ramayya v. Kopp* 3 M H C R 32 (1887), *Late Nihal v. Bhurora*, 9 W 1 328 (1885)

(5) See *Shankar Lal v. Sarup*, 31 A 40 (1911)

(6) *Kalyan Singh v. Rahmu*, 23 A. 130, 131 (1901)

any remedy whatever (1) Sub rule (4) is therefore limited to cross objections. A question also arose as to whether, when an appeal was abandoned, and the respondent could not proceed with his objections to the decree, he could file an appeal, after the expiry of time allowed for appeal by the Limitation Act, under sect 5 of that Act. It was held that the mere fact that an appeal has been withdrawn did not amount to "sufficient cause" within that section. But each case had to be decided upon its own special circumstances. If the Court was satisfied in any case that there had been "sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed time," then it would allow the appeal to be admitted (2). For the reason given such a case is not likely to recur, as there is no necessity to file an appeal if the appeal covers only the ground of the cross objections which can now be determined when the appeal is abandoned.

23 Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the Appellate Court may, if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, with directions to readmit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit, and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand.

Remand—Where the Lower Court has taken evidence sufficiently to enable the Appellate Court in its view of the case to pronounce judgment, then the latter Court must determine the case whether the Lower Court has or has not fixed the proper issues. In such case it has all the materials necessary to the exercise of its judgment, and if the proper issues have not been fixed it may resettle the issues under r 24. Cases may, however, occur where the Court has not such material.

The first case is where there has been no complete determination of the suit by reason of the Court's erroneous disposal of the case on a "preliminary point." Such an order of remand implies a reversal of the first judgment, (3) and reopens the whole case, (4) and involves a second decision by the Lower Court, that is, the Court which first disposed of the suit and no other (5). This

(1) *Kalyan Singh v Rahmu*, 23 A 130, 134 (1901)

(2) *Hurgovindas v Jadavahoo* (1899) 23 B 692, 693

(3) See *Hebul Kishen v Mt Ambala* 7 W R 326 (1867) and *Madhub Chunder v Ram Dyal*, 8 W R 303 (1867), where it was pointed out that an Appellate Court could not affirm a decision regarding one part of the claim when it had remanded the substantive

part for the trial of the merits which the first Court had refused. As to informal orders

Awastee, L. W. R. 21 W R 7 (1873)
Dutt v Shushen Monce, 21 W R 7 (1873)

(5) *Bai Shri Majarajba v Magandal Jibai Shankar*, 19 B 303 (1896)

is a complete remand. As already stated a complete remand involves a reversal of the first judgment. Where the first Court disposes of the suit on two grounds only *res judicata* and limitation and on appeal its decision was upheld only on the first ground and the question of limitation was not gone into in second appeal the High Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Lower Appellate Court to decide it on the merits. This was held to leave the whole case open to that Court and before it could reverse the first Court's decree and remand the case for a first decision it was bound to determine whether the first Court's decision on the question of limitation was right or wrong (1). It has been held that it is not a good ground for passing an order of remand under this rule to say that the preliminary issue has been decided by the Court of first instance on a wrong view of the burden of proof unless the Appellate Court finds that such decision was wrong (2).

The next case is when the Lower Court has omitted to try an issue or to determine a question of fact essential to the right decision of the case set up in the first Court and in consequence the evidence is insufficient (rr 25-26). In such a case the decree is not set aside (3). The case is retained undisposed of on the file of the Appellate Court. The Lower Court is directed to take the additional evidence and to try on such evidence the issues remitted. When it has done this it returns the additional evidence with its finding thereon to the Appellate Court which then being placed in a position to determine the appeal passes judgment (4). In this case there is what has been called a partial remand. Where the Court of first instance has considered the whole of the evidence before it and completely disposed of the suit on the merits the Appellate Court must itself finally determine the appeal and cannot remand (5) but if it thinks that the determination of any particular question unnecessary it may make an order under r 25 *post* (6).

The third case (which is not properly speaking a remand) exists where the Lower Court has determined the whole case and has not omitted to frame or determine any issues but has decided the case on insufficient evidence (rr 27-29). In this case the Appellate Court itself takes the evidence or directs the Lower Court to do so and when such evidence is returned passes judgment in the appeal which as in the former case has meanwhile remained on its file.

An improper order of remand is not necessarily void but only illegal or irregular (7). Under the last Code an order under sect 562 was

(1) *Ras ngi v Balvantrao* 11 B 663 (1887).

(2) *Habibullah v Lalla Prasad* 74 A 612 (1912).

(3) *See Mokund Lal v Hurbulal Narain* 1 C L R 130-138 (1882).

(4) *See Lalla Chuni Lal v Moh ji Singh* 1 C W N 310 (1895).

(5) *Narain Pal v Kali Kishore* 1 C W N xxix (1896). *Mall Karjuna v Patharens* 19 N 49 (1896). *Parvatisankar v Ba Naital* 1 B 33 (1891). *I am Das Mondal v Indromoni Das* 3 C W N 320 (1898) and *see Arunugam Chetti v Jagavvera Rama* 2-M

444 (1905).

(6) *Amrita Churn Das v Kala Chandra Das* 10 C W N 40 (1905).

(7) *Mirza Jiwad Ali v Hossein Bhee B W R* 90 (1867). *Mohesh Chandra Dass v Jamru* 11 N Mollah 28 C 371 (1900). *con. v Cloda Lal v Badullah* 11 A 3 (1888). *Rameshur Singh v Sheodan Sen* 12 A 510 (1889). *Tradokya Mohan Das v Kal Prosanna Ghose* 11 C W N 280 (1900) and as to proceedings subsequent to an order of remand see *Jatunga Tea Co v Chandra Tea Co* 12 C 45 (1888). *Durga J. v. Konchal Bonza* 5 C 1 J 71 (1900).

appealable, (1) and a party might impeach the order of remand on appeal from the final decree (2) Under sect 578 (now s 99), however, no decision should be reversed unless it has affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court But jurisdiction in this section is used in its strict sense, and does not mean the legal authority of a Court to do a certain thing, viz to order a remand, and therefore in each case it had to be determined whether the merits had been prejudicially affected (3) Under the present Code, however, an appeal is given from an order under this rule (O XLIII), and under sect 105, if an appeal lies and the party does not appeal, he cannot afterwards dispute the correctness of the order of remand

When a case is remanded the Lower Court should fix a reasonable date for the parties to appear and carry on the suit, (4) and if they do not appear the case should be dismissed (5) If they appear no fresh *talatnama* is necessary (6) When a case is remanded to a District Judge he should not transfer it to another officer (7) Costs of the Appellate Court can be recovered only when the order of remand provides for them (8) If on the return of the case it appears that the remand order has not been carried out, the Court, in remanding it a second time, should point out the manner in which the carrying out of the previous order seemed defective (9) If a party who is offered a remand elects to go on with the case as it stands, he is estopped from impugning the decision on that point (10) Where a case was remanded to be tried on the merits, the Court remanding considering it not barred, the Lower Court was held wrong in entering again into the question of limitation (11) For the Court cannot

(1) S 588, cl 28, and the appeal was not restricted by the sect 586 Mahadev v Bagho, 7 B 292 (1883), Gulam Husen v Sayad Musa 8 B 260, 261 (1884), Kirti Mohaldar v Bamjan, 10 C 523 (1884); Collector of Bijpur v Jafar Ali, 3 A 18 (1890) As to appeals, see Lohi Mahto v Aghore v Ajad, 5 C 142 (1879), Gauri Shanlar v Karima Bibi, 15 A 413 (1893), Abraham Khan v Tarunnessa 17 C 168 (1889) Bhau Bala v Bapaji Bapuji 14 B 14 (1889) Deekshen v Bans 8 A 172 (1886), Sohan Lal v Azizunnissa, 7 A 136 (1884), Jhanday Lal v Sarman Lal, 21 A 291 (1899), Partap Singh v Narain Das, 16 A 375 (1894), Ram Prosad v Sachu Dass, 6 C W N 585 (1902), Mathura Nath Ghose v Nobin Chandra, 24 C 774 (1897) [no appeal from order under cl 16, sect 588], Hasan Ali v Siraj Husain 10 A 272 (1894)

(2) Savitri v Ramji, 14 B 232 (1890), Rameshwar Singh v Sheodin Singh, 12 A 610 (1890), Cheda Lal v Badulal, 11 A 35 (1888), Badam v Imrat, 2 A 675 (1891) and next case

(3) Mohesh Chandra Das v Jasmirul H

Mollah, 23 C 324 (1900), s c, 5 C W N 509, and cases there cited, Nawoore Mundal v Mookta Bibee, 2 W R 181 (1865), Nasurooddeen v Lall Mahomed, 10 W P 234 (1870), Gunga Monee v Isaur Chunder, 17 W R 465 (1872)

(4) Haradhun Chuckerbutty v Protaj Narain Chowdhury, 14 W R 401 (1870) Watson & Co v Kunbilji Bahadoor, 6 W P 294 (1868)

(5) In re Kake Mohun Dass, 17 W R 70 (1872)

(6) In re Kake Mohun Dass v Joy Gopal

nessa Bibee, 10 W P 400
(8) Digambar Chatterjee v Ram Foodro, 13 W R 39 (1870)

(9) Radhaballub Surma v Anun Imoyee Dabia, 1861, W R 39, Misc

(10) Nobi Lall Khan v Godeheerance 3 W R 5 (1865)

(11) Mt Ju loobunsee v Mt Asman Koor, 14 W R 371 (1870)

re open a matter already adjudicated upon between the parties (1) It has been held that when a case is sent back for trial on the merits the order of remand shuts out preliminary objections such as limitation or *res adjudicata* (2) or jurisdiction (3) On the other hand, it has been held that the remand of a case for trial on the merits does not prevent adjudication upon any other issue arising in the case, e.g. limitation, provided that such issue has not been adjudicated upon by the Court making the remand (4) The question whether sect 25 of the last Code, now sect 24, had application to a case remanded was considered in the case cited (5) It has been held that where the decision of the Court of first instance is not based on any preliminary ground and where the whole of the evidence has been taken and the conclusion of the Court relates to the merits of the case, the Appellate Court cannot set aside the decree under this rule (6)

"Preliminary point"—Prior to the amendment of the Code of 1882 by Act VII of 1888, sect 562 contained the words "*So as to exclude any evidence of fact which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the determination of the rights of the parties,*" and the word "*investigate*" was used instead of the word "*determine*" at the end of the section The condition therefore necessary to justify a remand consisted prior to Act VII of 1888 in the exclusion of evidence of a material fact or in the omission to investigate the merits as the consequence of the decision on a preliminary question which the Appellate Court could not uphold (7)

The condition necessary to a remand after 1888 was the omission to determine the merits Therefore it was held competent for an Appellate Court to remand a case where the Court of first instance recorded evidence on all the issues and at the final hearing determined the suit erroneously on some particular point without expressing any opinion on the other issues (8) But there could be no remand where, though the Court held that the suit was barred by limitation it at the same time came to a definite decision on each of the other issues (9)

(1) Sahab Tewaroo v Kishoreo Sahoy, 24 W P 330 (1875) Ram Kuvarbhai v Dimolhar, 6 B H C R 146 (1869)

(2) Sheo Sahoy Tewaroo v Ram Persha Narsin, 24 W R 333 (1875), and see Moru bin Patilaji Gopalbin Sahu, 2 B 120 (1877) Dattu v Kasal, 8 B 535 (1884); where the objections seem to have been taken in the final appeal after the remand order had been carried out.

(3) Temulji Rustamji v Fardunji Kavaji 5 B. H. C. R. 137 (1865)

(4) Rajah Tel Kushen v Shob Chunler Rose, 3 W R Act V 155 (1865)

(5) Gurdoo Singh v Chanbrikah Singh 5 C. L. J 611 (1907), followed in Protah Chandra Roy v Julestir Das, 19 C. L. J 405 (1914)

(6) I ani Dassi v Ashutosh 15 C. L. J 310 (1910)

(7) Ramachandra Joshi v Hari Khasim

16 M 207 at p 209 (1853) see Muniappa Narlar v Iyasamy Mukley 5 M H C R 313 (1890) Syud Hussun Ali v Manoowar Ali 21 W R 413 (1874) Durga v Hollar Ali, A 167 (1884) Lingammale Venkatammal 6 M 239 242 (1882), Sit Rama Koor v Lalla Bhagwan Lall 22 W R 224 (1874) Amma v Kunhunnal 9 M 355 (1886)

(8) Ramachandra Joshi v Hari Khasim, 16 M. 20 209 210 (1892) Venganayyan v Ramasami Ayyan, 19 M. 422 423 (1897); Krishnan Chetti v Muthu Palanda 22 M 172 (1893) Matadin v Jamna Das, 27 A 191 (1905) and see Muhammad Allahdad Khan v Muhammad Ismail Khan 10 A. 259 (1885) Kelumunachen v Chentia, 19 M. 157 159 (1893)

(9) Hafiz Abdul Rahim v Hari Raj Singh, 22 A. 435 (1900) Paramahani v Nyrani 1 Rom. L. R. 72 (1890)

It was held that the expression "*preliminary point*" was used in sect 562 of the last Code, not in the sense of some point collateral to the merits, *e.g.* limitation, *res judicata*, and the like, but of some point preliminary to a general investigation of the merits. The words referred thus to some point either collateral to the merits which precluded their determination altogether or some particular question which, though relating to the merits, precluded their general determination (1). The term is somewhat ambiguous. The meaning would appear to be that the Appellate Court may remand where the Lower Court has disposed of a suit upon a point or issue, the determination of which has precluded the necessity for determining other points or issues in the suit, and such other points or issues have been left undetermined.

Sect 562 was held to authorize a remand only where the entire suit and not merely a portion of it had been disposed of by the Court upon a preliminary point (2). In an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a decree (sect 108 or O IX r 13 of this Code), the only case which can be remanded to be tried on its merits is the application under sect 108, and not the original case the decree in which is sought to be set aside (3). When, in contravention of the provisions of sect 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, a Civil Court heard and determined a suit in which a question of tenant right was raised, and on appeal the Lower Appellate Court remanded the suit, it was held that that Court ought not to have done so, but should have passed the order required by sect 202 of the Act (4).

It not infrequently, however, happens that a remand is necessary in consequence of an error, omission, or irregularity by reason of which there has not been a proper trial or an effectual and complete adjudication of the suit. The former Code not providing for the case, difficulty was felt, (5) and recourse was had to an inherent jurisdiction (6) (the only powers of remand being those contained in sects 562 and 566 of that Code) (7) or a jurisdiction implied in the terms of other sections of the Code (8). So a case has been remanded where the suit was decided without the plaintiff being given a fair opportunity of

(1) *Ramachandra Joishi v Hazi Kassam*, 16 M. 207, 210 (1892), *Kanakammal v Rangachariar* 20 M 25, 27 (1896) [where the Court held that there was no cause of action], *Matu Din v Jamna Das* 27 A 691 (1905). In *Mana Vikrama v Gopalan Nari*, 30 M 203 (1906), the point was held not preliminary but an integral part of the merits, *Meghan Dabe v Pran Singh*, 30 A 63 (1907).

(2) *Banwarilal v Samman Lal*, 11 A 488 (1889).

(3) *Rai Radha Kissen v Collector of Jaunpore*, 5 C W N 153 (1900).

(4) *Jagan Nath v Bhiawani*, 27 A 167 (1904).

(5) See *Moheesh Chandra Das v Jamirud din Mollah*, 28 C 324, at p. 334, ["we may add that cases may arise in which

although a complete remand under sect. 562

by all

satisfy the requirements of justice, followed in *Nabin Chandra Tripathi v Prankrishna De*, 41 C 108 (1913).

(6) *Perumbra Nayar v Subrahmanian Pattar*, 23 M 445 (1899), *Durga Dihal Das v Anoraj*, 17 A. 20 (1894), *Zohra Bibi v Zobeda Khatun*, 12 C L J 368 (1910). But

remanded from in *Nabin*

of

remand)

(7) *Habib Bakshi v Buldeo Prasad*, 23 A 167, 171 (1901).

(8) *Ib* at p 173.

knowing the line of defence he had to meet, (1) where the decision was given without taking the defendant's evidence, (2) or where an Appellate Court made an order under sects 27, 32 or 53 of the former Code, (3) or where the Court mistook the nature of the case (4) and had not properly tried an issue, (5) where the parties were or might have been misled by the act of the Court, (6) where an appeal was held wrongly to have abated (7) or a suit was wrongly decided *ex parte* (8) A remand under sect 562 was, however, under the last Code held to be bad where the Lower Court acted irregularly in issuing a commission (9) and on the ground of defect of parties, (10) and where the deposition of the witnesses did not bear the usual certificate (11) It was proposed to specially legislate for cases where the Lower Court had committed any error omission or irregularity by reason of which in the opinion of the Appellate Court there had not been a proper trial or an effectual and complete adjudication of the suit as contemplated by law, and the party complaining of such error omission or irregularity had been materially prejudiced thereby The Special Committee however reported that they thought it safer not to give legislative sanction to the views enunciated by the Allahabad High Court in *Habib Baksh v Baldeo Prasad* (12) considering that the power of reversal and remand was liable to be abused while the procedure under r 23 was free from this liability and at the same time furnished (as it considered) an effectual remedy As to this it is to be observed that under that rule a remand is not made for a further trial and decision by the first Court on the whole case but only for findings on specified issues to enable the Appellate Court itself to pass a proper decision Cases may occur where an Appellate Court has power to make an order under some section or rule of the Code and in order to give effect to the provisions of the section or rule applicable, it is necessary that it should in certain cases for the ends of justice send back the case to the Court of first instance In the present Code the absolute prohibition of sect 564 which created a difficulty against the adoption of this course has been removed (that section being now omitted), and under sect 151 the Court may make such order as is necessary for the ends of justice Probably under the circumstances it is a correct conclusion to draw

(1) *Shub Perahad Pattuck v Anbo Kuden Mookerjee* 17 W. R. 445 (1872)

(2) *Perumbra Nayar v Subrahmanian Pattar* 23 M. 445 (1899)

(3) *Habib Baksh v Baldeo Prasad* 23 A. 167 (1901) *Langammal v Chinn Venkattammal* 6 M. 239 241 245 (1887) but see as to amendment and joinder of parties *Farzani Ali v Yusuf Ali* 2 A. 669 (1860) *Ganesh Bhikaji v Bhikaji Krishna* 10 M. 398 (1886) *Kelu Mulichetti v Chennu* 13 M. 157 (1887) *Keshav Mohale v Pandurang Waman*, 1 Bom. L. R. 29 (1899) *Krishna v Panchu* 17 M. 167 (1893)

(4) *Jugur Nath v Rajah Chatter Naran* 17 W. R. 410 (1871)

(5) *Pam Chandi Mookerjee v Hameed* 10 W. R. 236 (1868), see *Umbka*

Clara v Ramdhan Mohurrar 11 W. P. 35 (1869)

(6) *Mahamed Wahid v Mahamed Ismail Khan* 10 A. 290 (1888)

(7) *Bai Full v Adesang* 3 Bom. L. L. 36 (1901)

(8) *Krishna Ayyar v Kuppan Ayyangar* 30 M. 54 (1906)

(9) *Dhondo v Panha Lal* 1 Bom. L. P. 110 (1899)

(10) *Bando Daji v Bhaker Mahaboo* 1 Bom. L. P. 33 (1899)

(11) *Lam Copal Day v Laghu Nath Choshal* 24 L. J. 496 (1904)

(12) 23 A. 167 followed in *Jadub v Gobinda* 37 C. 171 (1909) and see *Narottam v Mahandal* 14 Bom. L. R. 1154 (1912) 37 R. 259

that though the Legislature has expressly omitted to lay down as a positive rule that a remand may be granted in the cases referred to in the proposed, but rejected, amendment, for fear that a power expressed in such wide terms might be liable to abuse, the Court may, where that course is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice, exercise the power of remand in cases not falling within the precise terms of this rule or of r 23, *post*. Further, if an order of remand is erroneous a party who has consented to it may be estopped from contesting it, (1) and in no case are subsequent proceedings void merely because of such error (2). It has, however, been recently held that an Appellate Court has no inherent power to remand when the Lower Court has committed errors materially prejudicing the complainant, and that its only power of remand is under sect 107 (1) (b) as limited by this rule and is no wider than it was under the last Code (3). In the under-mentioned cases it has been held that an order of remand may be made even when the disposal has not been on a strictly preliminary point, *e.g.* where there has been no regular hearing of the matter and the evidence on which the disposal was made has not been placed on record (4). Where a judgment had been partly based on evidence not on the record it was held on second appeal that if such evidence was excepted it would be impossible to decide whether the remainder was sufficient to support the judgment and the case was remanded (5). In this case the lower Court had relied on a statement made by a pleader and it was held that such a statement must be regularly proved and permission to admit additional evidence was given.

“And the evidence”—It was reported that the practice in various provinces differed on the question whether evidence recorded in the proceedings leading up to the decree set aside under sect 562 was in itself available as evidence during the retrial or whether it could only be made admissible in the case of witnesses attending at the hearing by examining them upon their previous depositions as statements recorded in a different proceeding. The Legislature has shown itself to be of the opinion that, subject to all just exceptions, such depositions should of their own force be available as evidence. Evidence may be received from parties who did not appear at the former trial (6). Where the Judge in a remand observed that evidence was unnecessary, the declaration was held to sufficiently justify the plaintiff in making no further application for a summons on their witnesses (7). Where a review had been granted for the purpose of seeing whether a *chittah* ought not to be used and the case was remanded for a rehearing, the party was held to be concluded from objecting that the *chittah* was improperly made use of upon the rehearing (8). It has been

(1) *Bakunta Nath Dey v Nawab Sah mulla* 6 C L J 547 (1907)

(2) *Durga Kinkar v Honelal Ronza* 5 C L J 71 (1906)

(3) *Nabul Chandra Iripatis Prankrishna D.* 41 C 108 (1913), dissenting from *Zohra Bibi v Zoleda Hatun* 12 C. L. J 368 (1910)

(4) *Veinula Jambalaya v Rajamma*, 21 W L J 57 (1912) *Kurcalant Kuruvallil*

931 L. T. 373 (1911)

(5) *Moni Lal v Uma* (Larin 19 C L J 541 (1913)

(6) *Koorj Bhatr Amuldeo v Jarnar Kant Lahree* 8 W L J 128 (1867)

(7) *Ram Jewan Sah v Pabha Persha Singh* 16 W R 103 (1871)

(8) *Makhan Koor v Tin oree Dutt* 14 W R 22 (1870)

to determine such issue itself, but should refer it for determination to the Court of first appeal (1) But see now sect 103, *ante*

25 Where the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the Appellate Court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and in such case shall direct such Court to take the additional evidence required;

and such Court shall proceed to try such issues, and shall return the evidence to the Appellate Court together with its finding thereon *and the reasons therefor*.

Omission to frame or try issue—See notes to r 23 Prior to sect 52 of Act VII of 1888, sect 566, which this rule replaces, contained in place of the words “if necessary” the words “and the evidence upon the record is not sufficient to enable the Appellate Court to determine such issue or question” The rule, it has been said, is intended to provide for cases where some point has come to light in the Appellate Court which has not been raised or the importance of which has not occurred to the parties or to the Judge in the Court below (2) Where, however, though no specific issue has been framed on a particular question yet the matter has been tried and determined without any objection on the part of the plaintiff who has not been taken by surprise, but was fully informed by the defendant’s list of documents and from cross-examination of his witnesses that the defence would be taken, it is undesirable in general that the case should be sent back to be retried on a special issue framed as to that particular question (3) The expression “determine any question of fact” means in a legal manner (4) The Court may (5) frame issues (6) provided that there has been an omission (7) on the part of the Lower Court The Appellate Court should frame the issues which are essential and send them to the Lower Court for trial, but should not remand and direct the Lower Court to frame the issues (8)

(1) *Shoo Ratan v Lappu Kuar*, 5 A 14 (1882), *Sohawan t Babu Nand*, 9 A 26, 30 (1888), *Gurdhari Lall v Crawford*, 9 A 117 (1886)

(2) *Anundo Lall Dass t Boycaunt Ram Roy*, 5 C 283 (1879)

(3) *Chundra Kunwar t Chaudhri Narpat*, 29 A 191 (1906)

(4) *Nivath Singh t Bhukli Singh*, 7 A 649 655 (1885)

(5) *Mitna v Fuzl Rub*, 13 W 1 A 573 (1870), *Sreenath Bhowas t Luckhee Narain Aich* 24 W R 268

(6) *Chandi Din v Narain*, 14 A 366

Hurperahad t Shoo Dyal 31 A 13, 14 (1876), *Goluck Chunder Sent Pareah Mahomed* 25 W R 284 (1870), *Ganga Prasad t Lal Bahadoor Singh*, 17 A 117 (1884) *Bhugo Chunder Banerjee v Chunder Nath Chunder butty* 25 W R 47 (1875)

(7) *Runpal Singh t Joy Mungul H B R*, 106 (1879); *Tiluck Chunder t Bro o Soon Sur*, 24 W R 121 (1875)

(8) *Chunder Nath Sarma t Ramanauth I* W R 69 (1864)

The issues should be specifically stated by the Appellate Court. It is not sufficient to direct the case to be decided in accordance with the observations in the judgment (1). It is always dangerous to allow parties to make a new case in a Mofussil Appellate Court, and the Courts as a general rule should not allow a point not appearing in the pleadings or raised in any other way in the first Court to be framed into an issue (2). A party cannot change the nature of the case after remand (3). Where a Judge proceeds under this rule he should not reverse the decree of the Lower Court and remand the suit, but should frame the necessary issues and send them down for trial, and keep the suit pending until the return of the first Court's finding on the issues with the record of the trial (4). The effect of such an order is not a re-hearing and as to the issues sent down the first Court has no power to deal with the case (5). The Court is to direct additional evidence to be taken, and the parties are entitled to have the opportunity of giving evidence upon the fresh issue, even though the order of remand contains no express direction to that effect (6). The parties should have the fullest opportunity to produce their evidence (7). When a case is remanded by one Judge and subsequently comes before another of equal jurisdiction (8) or the Judge's successor, (9) the latter officer cannot set aside the order of remand. So where a Judge remanded a case to be tried on a certain issue and directed the Munsiff to give plaintiff a decree according to the decision at which he would arrive, and the case went back in appeal before another Judge, it was held that the Appellate Court was limited to seeing whether the issue was a proper issue or not, and could not go behind the order (10). A Court to which a case is remanded for retrial, on a particular issue amongst others, cannot on remand allow that issue to be abandoned and proceed to try the case upon the other issues raised, (11) nor can the Court refer the case to an arbitrator, (12) and when the case is remanded to the Lower Appellate Court for findings on certain issues,

(1) *Grish Chunder Lahuri v. Soshi Shik hareshwar Roy*, 4 C W N 631 (1900)

(2) *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal*, 3 A 259, 279 (1876), *Greenath Biswas v. Luckee Narain Aich*, 24 W R 268 (1875), *Ram Narain Roy v. Nilmonce Adhikarce*, 23 W R 169 (1875), *Pran Kishen Deb v. Mahomed Ameer*, 21 W R 338 (1874), *Ustoorum v. Mohun Lal*, 21 W R 333 (1874), *Brojo Soondur v. Futick Chunder*, 17 W R 407 (1872), *Hlikka Pak ramar v. Kutti Kunhamed*, 17 M. 69 (1893)

(3) *Padma Kishore v. Mahtab Chund*, 3 W R Misc 5 (1865), *Norendro Coomar Dutt v. French* 3 W R 199 (1865)

(4) *Bon-haree Ghose v. Amooddeen Bis was*, 24 W R 137 (1875), see *Umbika Churn Mundle v. Ramdhar*, 11 W R 35 at p. 36 (1869), *Wise v. Ishan Chunder Banerjee*, 14 W R 380 (1870). In *Ganga Monce v. Issur Chunder*, 17 W R. 405 (1872), it was held that the irregularity in procedure did not affect the merits of the case, *Abdul Fayaz* 15 C W N 575 (1911).

(5) *Gossain Dowlat Geer v. Bissasaur Geer*, 22 W R 207 (1874)

" " " " " "

Ram Sunkur v. Nilkant Biswas, 9 W R 392 (1868)

(7) *Laloo Munda v. Bhooban Mohun Chatterjee*, 17 W R 361 (1872)

(8) *Brjo Soondur v. Juggut Chunder*, 21 W R 199 (1874), *Kharag Prasad v. Durdhar*, 14 A 318 (1892)

(9) *Laleet Panday v. Brynnath Singh*, 14 W R 285 (1870), *Wise v. Ishan Chunder Banerjee*, 14 W R 380 (1870)

(10) *Bodun Burooah v. Abdul Gunny*, 19 W R 281 (1873). See also *Sura J Din v. Chatter*, 3 A 755 (1881)

(11) *Shub Chund Lahuri v. Joyimala Dasi*, 7 C L R. 103 (1880)

(12) *Nand Pam v. Fakir Chand*, 7 A. 523, 526 (1885)

it is not competent to that Court to delegate the decision of those issues to a Court subordinate thereto, (1) for when issues are remitted under this rule, such issues are triable only by the Court which was originally seized of the case (2) There is no appeal under the Letters Patent from an order referring to issues for trial (3)

"Return"—Where an Appellate Court has made an order under this rule the return to such order must be made to the same Court and such Court is not competent to transfer the appeal for disposal elsewhere (4) Where a Judge has heard the argument on some of the issues and expressed his decision upon them he is not bound to hear the whole case on the return made to another issue framed under these sections (5) The findings upon issues remanded by the High Court in second appeal cannot be challenged upon the evidence as in first appeals but objections to these findings must be restricted to the limits within which the original pleas in second appeal are confined (6) In any case the Court may direct the appellant to file a copy of the findings of the Court below and may direct the Court below to re-examine the evidence and to re-form its own opinion on the evidence and record its findings with the reasons for them (7) Where a party is dissatisfied with a decision and appeals and re-opens the whole case, he must acquiesce in the result finally arrived at by the Court below in accordance with the instructions of the High Court in his special appeal (8)

26 (1) Such evidence and findings shall form part of the record in the suit, and either party may, within a time to be fixed by the Appellate Court, present a memorandum of objections to any finding

(2) After the expiration of the period so fixed for presenting such memorandum the Appellate Court shall proceed to determine the appeal

Objections.—The Appellate Court on the return of the finding and evidence should fix a reasonable time (9) for the parties to file their objections. If no objection is raised by either party within the period allowed neither has a right to be heard though the Court has a discretion to allow objections afterwards and if no objection be raised then or at the hearing the Appellate Court is not bound to amend the finding but apart from any objection by the parties it

- (I) Subr. t. Canonici 14 A 23 (1891)

- (2) Ali Sher Khan : Ahmad Ulal 29 A
60 (1907)

- (3) Kala Kristo Pal Chowdhury : Ram
under Nag 9 C. L. R. 461 (1981)

- (4) Udit Narain Singh : Jlands 15 A
15 (1893)

- (c) Iacobi man i Jan na 10 A 18
887)

- (6) Balk. l. c. r. Tansu's house " 4 15
(1885)

- (1835)
(7) Panchintra Unvot Ma & r A 10
Sarkhot 10 B 50 (1891) anlace Hlag an
t. Heng Kaveri 17 B 1 4 (1891)

- (B) Cingaram Dutt Chowdhry Jun
major 10. I. F 144 (1877)

- (9) S. C. Bahlourec : M. en Lett. 3
Agre 196

should examine and test them to see whether or not they ought to be accepted (1) Objections which might have been but were not made under this rule in a Lower Appellate Court to the findings on remand of the Court of first instance cannot be raised for the first time as grounds of second appeal from the Lower Appellate Court's decree (2) In case of an unnecessary remand under the last rule, it is competent to the Judge before whom the appeal subsequently comes to disregard the finding on the order of remand (3) The Court is in any case bound to consider the findings of the Lower Court on the merits (4)

27. (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to [s 568

Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court But if—

(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or

(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause,

the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined

(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.

“Additional evidence”—There ought not to be a remand for the purpose

“Additional evidence”—There ought not to be a remand for the purpose of allowing parties to make a new case and call fresh evidence upon an issue on which they have failed upon the evidence originally adduced in support of it, and more expressly so in the Mofussil Courts (6) The power given by this rule should be exercised sparingly except at the instance of the parties, (7) and then with caution An appellant, who has had ample opportunity of giving evidence in the Court below and elected not to do so, but to rest his case on the evidence as it stood, ought not to be allowed at the stage of appeal to give evidence which

allow parties to make a new case and call fresh evidence upon an issue on which they have failed upon the evidence originally adduced in support of it, and more expressly so in the Mofussil Courts (6) The power given by this rule should be exercised sparingly except at the instance of the parties, (7) and then with caution An appellant, who has had ample opportunity of giving evidence in the Court below and elected not to do so, but to rest his case on the evidence as it stood, ought not to be allowed at the stage of appeal to give evidence which

(1) Damodar Das v Gopal Chandra 7 A 79, 91 (1884), Iatan Singh v Wazir 1 A 165 (1876), Mumtaz Begam v Iatch Husam 6 A 391 (1884), Akbari Begam v Wajayat Ali 2 A 908 (1880)

(2) Muhammad Abdul Hai v Sheo Bishal Rai, 10 A. 28 (1887)

(3) Mubarak Husam v Bhari 16 A 306 (1894), Ganendra v Surya Kant, 17 C W N 462 (1912)

(4) Umed Ali v Salma Bibi 6 A 383 (1884) Woomesh Chunder Roy v Jonar lun Hajrah 15 W R 275 (1871)

(5) Ram Parshad Bookul v Jaju Ir Sah 3 C W R 262 265 (1884)

(6) Hurizshad v Sheo Dyal 31 A 229 (1876)

(7) Freeman Chunder Dey v G. J. v. Chatterjee der Chatterjee 11 M I 44 (1866)

he could have given below (1) Ordinarily speaking it is only when a Court sees that from some inadvertence, mistake, or surprise a party has not adduced evidence which he was capable of adducing and that he is likely to be prejudiced by the omission, that the Court should allow further evidence to be taken (2) The test as to whether additional evidence should be received depends on the question whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' or for any other substantial cause, and as to this the Appellate Court is to be the sole judge (3) The word 'requires' means needs or finds needful The legitimate occasion for this rule is when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, and not where a discovery is made outside the Court of fresh evidence and the application is made to import it That is the subject of review of judgment (4) An application to admit fresh documents the genuineness of which can be tested with certainty, stands on a much more favourable footing than an application to admit fresh parol evidence after the pinch and pressure of the case has been sustained, (5) but they should not be admitted if the appellant cannot show sufficient cause, (6) or generally if having had an opportunity of tendering them in the Court below he omitted to do so, (7) or resisted their production, (8) or if they do not bear on the issues tried by the Court of first instance (9) Where the Appellate Court with the assent of both sides examines witnesses and also admits documentary evidence, and there is nothing to show that such admission was objected to it is not open to any party on appeal to the Privy Council to take exception to the regularity of this procedure (10) As each case must depend on its own circumstances it is not profitable to deal in detail with the cases in which additional evidence has been allowed or refused (11) A local inquiry may be ordered under this rule (12) The improper reception of evidence under this rule is not sufficient to reverse a decision if independently of that

(1) *Ram Das Chakrabarti v Official Liquidator* 9 A 366 (1887)

(2) *Gowhur Ali Khan v Sakheena Khanum*, 15 W R 507 (1871)

(3) In the goods of *Prem Chand Moonsee*, 21 C 484 (1894), *Aadiappa Pillai v Muthukumara Thevan*, 36 M 477 (1912), and *Juba Naidu v Ethirajammal* 22 M L J 15 (1911) (meaning of 'substantial cause')

(4) *Kesowji Issur v G I P Railway Co*, 31 B 381 (1907) *Midnapur Zamindary Co, Ltd v Muktakashi*, 17 C W N 615 (1912), *Krishnama v Narasimha* 31 M 114 (1908), *Jagrani Kunwar v Durga Prasad*, 36 A 93, 19 C L J 165 (1913) P C

(5) *In re Wiltshire Iron Co* 3 Ch App 449
(6) *Nadhar Chand v Chunder Sikhar* 15 C 765 (1888), *Durga v Jai Narain*, 33 A 379 (1911)

(7) *Bibee Zahrah v Bhugwan Dass*, 16 W R 211 (1871)

(8) *Manohar Ganesh v Lakshminaray Govindram*, 12 B 217 (1887)

(9) *Leslie v Alexander* 17 W R 300 (1872)

(10) *Jagannath Pershad v Hanuman Pershad* 36 C 833, 13 C W N 830 (1901)

(11) See *Abelakh Poy v Guggun Bhuggut* 22 W R 268 (1874), *Shaikh Komarooddeen v Monye Mundal*, 16 W R 220 (1871), *Appa v Vithoba* 6 B H C R, H C J 88 (1869) [section applies not merely to case where Lower Court has refused to take evidence but also where there is substantial cause for taking further evidence], *Mohesh Chund v Dora v Mathub Chunder Sirdar*, 13 W R 85 (1879), *Khuda Baksh v Imam Ali Shah* 9 A 339 (1886), *Srinivasa Chariar v Rangammal*, 16 W 94 (1891), *Arjun v Shanlar*, 22 B 253 (1896), *Jadu Nath Mookerjee v Hari Pada Mookerjee* 1 C W N 1335

(12) *Roy Soontan v Laloo Koor* 1 W 1 300 (1872)

evidence, there is sufficient evidence on the record (1) It has been held that on an appeal against an order made under O XVII r 3, when the plaintiff was present, but his witnesses were not, and no application for adjournment or to enforce the attendance of the witnesses was made, the Appellate Court should proceed under this rule to direct the admission of fresh evidence, and under r 25 of this Order to refer the issues (which in fact had never been tried) for trial to the Court of first instance, directing that Court to return findings (2)

The power can be exercised even after the case has been remanded on special appeal (3) It is not necessary that the party before applying to the Appellate Court should have sought for a review of the original Court's judgment and asked it to receive the evidence (4) After a review has been admitted fresh evidence may be taken under this rule (5)

An appeal does not lie from an order admitting or refusing to admit additional evidence, (6) but both may be considered in an appeal from the final decree

under this rule gives no right of appeal to the Privy Council (9) This and the next rule are not, it has been held, applicable to proceedings before Civil Courts under sect 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (10)

Record of reasons for admission.—These are strictly required, (11) and should be stated in open Court in the presence of the parties (12) It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation, and the statement of the reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection (13) But such record of reasons is not a condition precedent to the reception of the evidence, so that the omission to do so would not render the evidence inadmissible (14)

(1) *Maharajah Jagadindra Banwari* :

lick, 24 W R 20 (1875)

(4) *Ram Lal v Rung Lal* 17 W R 47 (1872)

(5) *Beharee Lal Kundee v Troyluckho Moyce Burmonee* 12 W R 223 (1869), and see *Gunesh Ram Surmah v Rohinee Dassee* 14 W R 236 (1870)

(6) *Kulpo Singh v Thakoor Singh*, 15 W R 429 (1871). *Golam Mukdoom v Hafeezoonissa* 7 W R 489 (1867), *Mohesh Chunder Shah v Shosheo Moolhee*, 6 W R 196 (1866), though the refusal to exercise discretion would be an error in procedure *Ram Pearl v Kallu*, 23 A 121 (1900)

(7) *Mohunt Damoodur v Ritoo Singh*, 24 W R 325 (1875)

(8) *Mahomed Kamil v Abdool Luteef*, 23 W R 57 (1875)

(9) In the goods of *Prem Chand Moonshee*, 21 C 484 (1891)

(10) *Rama Iyer v Venkatachela Padayachi* 17 M L J 123 (1906)

(11) See *Sreesman Chunder Day v Gopaul Chunder Chuckerbutty* 11 M I A 28, 48 (1866), *Hurparshad v Sheo Dyal* 3 I A 259 (1876), *Gunga Gobind Mundal v Collector of 24 Purgunnahs* 11 M I A 315, 368 (1867)

(12) See *Gunput Roy v Ram Deen Roy*, 21 W R 416 (1874)

(13) *Gunga Gobind Mundal v Collector of 24 Purgunnahs* 11 M L A 315 368 (1867)

(14) *Ib*, *Bhugwan Chunder v Raj Coomar*, 13 W R 303 (1870), *Gopal Singh v Jhakri Rai* 12 C 37 (1885), *Hafiz Abdul Kurr v Sri Kissen Rai*, 11 C 139 (1881)

391

28 Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the Appellate Court may either take such evidence, or direct the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate Court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the Appellate Court

"Or direct the Court."—If the order is for the taking of particular evidence the Lower Court cannot go beyond it and take other evidence, (1) though in a case where A was directed to be examined and was ill, his agent was allowed to be examined in his stead (2) It has been held that the lower Court taking evidence acts in a ministerial capacity (*sed quære*), and that the parties may object to the admissibility of the evidence recorded before it without objection, when it is submitted for the consideration of the Appellate Court (3)

01

29 Where additional evidence is directed or allowed to be taken, the Appellate Court shall specify the points to which the evidence is to be confined, and record on its proceedings the points so specified

Judgment in appeal

11

30 The Appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day, of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders

"After hearing"—It is the duty of the Appellate Court to allow the parties or their pleaders to submit the evidence to it at the hearing in open Court and to make upon the evidence so submitted every comment and found upon it every arguement on the ground that

the affidavits containing facts proving such an allegation ought to be clear and exhaustive and should leave no doubt upon the subject, excluding the possibility of the Judge having done that which it was his duty to do. The judgment may be given at once. But there are cases, especially complicated cases, in which it is desirable that the Judge should have an opportunity of considering the evidence at leisure before giving judgment (1) This rule only

(1) *Bolskeo Lall v. Radha Sing* 1 W R 317 (1864)

(2) *Rajah Syul Ahmed v. Faeet Hossain* 1 W R 370 (1864)

(3) *Ram Joy Churnash v. Frankishen Singh* 2 W R 80 (1865)

(1) *Juggeswar Sahay v. Gopal Lall*, 15 W R 61 (1871)

authorizes the Court to pronounce judgment *after hearing* the parties and judgment pronounced without hearing them is unauthorized by the Code. Thus where the appellant died before the hearing of the appeal, but his pleader did not know of his death until after the appeal had been decided, and an application of his son to the District Judge to have his name placed on the record and the appeal reargued, was rejected, held by the High Court that as the representative of the plaintiff appellant applied within the prescribed time to have his name entered on the record the Court was bound to enter his name, and in not doing so the Court failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law. As the judgment was pronounced without hearing him, it was unauthorized by the Code (1). It has been held that the senior pleader who is present before the Court has the entire control of a case in the High Court and that it is not open to the junior pleader to take any ground of appeal which his senior has not thought fit to argue, except only when the senior has obtained the permission of the Court that that course should be taken (2).

31. The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in [s 574]

Contents, date and signature and shall state—
nature of judgment

- (a) the points for determination,
 - (b) the decision thereon,
 - (c) the reasons for the decision, and
 - (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled,
- and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein

Judgment of Appeal Court—The duty of the Appellate Court is not to interfere with the judgment of the first Court until it is perfectly satisfied in its own mind that the conclusion arrived at by the first Court is erroneous. If there is any doubt in the case the benefit of that doubt ought to be given to the respondent and not to the appellant, for it must be presumed in law that the judgment of the Lower Court is right until the contrary is shown. No doubt the Appellate Court may make further inquiries, but such inquiries ought to be made with discretion and only in those cases where the Appellate Court finds it unable to do justice to the parties on the evidence and material as they stand upon the record (3). The judgment therefore of the first Court if not shown to be erroneous, ought to be affirmed, and it is for the appellant to show manifest (4) errors in the decree appealed from (5). The Court of Appeal ought to give great weight, but not undue weight to the opinion of the Judge who tried the cause and saw the witnesses and their demeanour. That gives him considerable advantages over those who only draw this information from

(1) *Jonardhan v Ram Chandra* 26 B 317

319 (1901) s c 4 Bom. L. R. 23

(2) *Sreeneebath v Umbika* 12 W R 3 5

(1869)

(3) *Taliboonwar v Sham Kishore* 15 W R.

293 229 (1871)

(4) *Shetabdeo Biswas v Molamdee*, 25 W

R 30 (1875)

(5) *Wise v Sunduloonias* 11 M I A 177

191 (1867)

perusing the notes. But still, though the Court of Appeal ought not lightly to find against the opinion of the Judge who tried the cause, that Court, if convinced that the inference in favour of the plaintiff ought not to have been drawn from the evidence, should find the verdict the other way (1). The parties to the cause are entitled, as well on questions of fact as on questions of law, to demand the decision of the Court of Appeal, and that Court cannot excuse itself from the task of weighing conflicting evidence and drawing its own inferences and conclusions, though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect (2). "If we are to accept," says James, L J, "as final the decision of the Court of first instance in every case where there is a conflict of evidence, our labours would be very much lightened. But then, that would be in truth to do away with the right of appeal in all cases of nuisance, for there is never one brought into Court in which there is not contradictory evidence, and there have been, I am satisfied, a larger percentage of appeals in those cases than in any other" (3). And therefore the Judge of an Appellate Court ought to explain

manifestly clear from the probabilities attached to certain circumstances in the case that the Court below was wrong in the conclusion drawn from such evidence, that however necessary as regards a Court of Appeal far removed from India, it need not be extended as one equally necessary and applicable with the same strictness, to a Court of Appeal in India, which has the opportunity of calling witnesses and has all the advantages to be derived from a personal acquaintance with the people, their feelings, habits, and character as well as other local advantages (5).

The dismissal of an appeal under sect 551 (now r 11) by a Court whose decision may be the subject of an appeal, does not relieve the Court from the necessity of writing a judgment which, according to the provisions of this rule, should show the points raised, the decision upon those points, and the reasons for deciding them. Thus, where an Appellate Court's judgment was simply "Appeal rejected under sect 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure," held that

(1) *Smith v Chadwick*, L R 9 A C 187, 194 (1884), per Lord Blackburn

(2) *The Glanibanta* 1 P D 283, 287 (1876)

(3) *Bigsby v Dickinson*, 4 Ch D 24, 29 (1876), see also *Akbari Begum v Wilayat Ali*, 2 A 908 (1880), *Mumtaz Begum v Fatch Hussain*, 6 A 391 (1884); compare *Nobin v Rungochunder*, 25 W R 363 (1876), *Hoymobutty v Sreekissen*, 14 W R 58 (1870), *Anund v Rufnessur*, 25 W R 50 (1875) where it was held that the Appellate Court should not disbelieve the witnesses believed by the first Court without good reasons for doing so, and that it is not justified in believing a witness whose demeanour was

declared, by the first Court, to be unsatisfactory, *Gopee Nath v Boodhunnant*, 25 W R 26 (1875)

(4) *Rohimoni v Zamrudlin*, 8 C L P 597 (1881)

(5) *Sarodasoondery v Tincovery Nundy*, 1 Hyde, 223, 252 (1862), in which it was also held that a Court of Appeal cannot refer to evidence in another case. But see *Heera Lal v Mohesh Chunder*, 1 Hyde, 105 (1862), where it was held that the High Court sitting in appeal on questions of fact, is guided by the same rules as those of the Privy Council when they sit upon motions for a rule for new trials from the Old Supreme Court

the judgment was not in conformity with law, and the case was remanded for disposing of the appeal according to law (1)

A Court of second appeal cannot enter into the merits of the appeal, in

The rule here laid down cannot be too strictly enforced. A judgment which falls short of complying with the clear provisions of this section is, as such, worthless for the purposes contemplated by the law. Its imperative provisions apply alike to cases remanded by the first Appellate Court for trial of issues and to those in which no such remand has taken place (2). As the High Court in second appeal is bound to accept the findings of fact arrived at by the Lower Court, it should insist upon a due obedience by those Courts of the mandate contained in this rule (3).

Under clause (42) of the Letters Patent the Judges of the High Court are bound to record the reasons for their decisions, and these reasons should, on appeal to England, be transmitted with the record for information at the hearing by the Judicial Committee (4). These reasons should be stated publicly at the hearing and not reserved to influence the Court of Appeal (5). But it has been held to be doubtful whether the former section applied to cases where the High Court, having heard the judgment of the Court below and argument upon that judgment, came to the conclusion that it was right and agreed with the reasons which it gave (6).

It was held that on remand under sect. 566 of the last Code that sect. 567 required the lower Court of Appeal to proceed to determine the appeal, but sect. 571 required it to pronounce judgment, and sect. 574 (this rule) was imperative as to what the judgment was to contain. The Appellate Court was required to give its own decision and the reasons for it upon the issues remanded to the original Court under sect. 566 (7). These provisions apply alike to cases remanded by the first Appellate Court for the trial of issues and to those in which no such remand has taken place (8). A Judge having remanded a case for further evidence to be taken and a fresh finding recorded on a question of fact, is bound, though there is no memorandum of objection, to state in the correctness of the finding and come to a conclusion whether it is correct or not, unless its correctness has been admitted by the party to whom it is

(1) *Pami Deka v. Brojo* 25 C. 9 (1897) this case was dissented from in *Samin Haza v. Piran* 30 A. 319 (1908) but followed in *Saravana Pillai v. S. S. Reddi* 31 M. 469 (1908).

(2) *Ahmed Ali v. Salima Bibi* 6 A. 333

(3) *Sohawan v. Lal* 1 P. 100 (1896) *Moni Lal v. I. K. S. S. S.* 541 (1913).

(4) *Katchokabhyasa v. K. S. S. S.* 12 Y. 100 (1892).

(5) *Recher v. V. S. S. S.* 481 (1874).

(6) *Sunday v. S. S. S. S.* 1886.

(7) *Bhagv. v. S. S. S. S.* 430 (1892).

(8) *Uma v. S. S. S. S.* 1834, *S. S. S. S.* 6 A. 391 (1897).

Sono Salashiv 19 B. 551 (1894) and as to judgment on remand for further evidence see *Kunhi Marakkar v. Kuth Umma* 20 M. 416 (1897).

adverse (1) An appellant is fairly entitled to an expression of opinion of the Appellate Court on the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal (2) If, however, the Appellate Court is not asked to express any opinion on any particular ground of appeal stated in the memorandum of appeal, the Court is not at fault if no decision is passed upon it If, having had his attention called to it a Judge fails to decide such point, the proper course for the parties aggrieved is to ask him to review his judgment In order to satisfy the High Court that a point which the Judge omitted to notice was actually taken in the oral pleadings a party may put in either an affidavit of some person who heard the point raised or a copy of the petition to the Judge drawing attention to the omission with his order (3) Where this rule has not been complied with and action is required the Court may either reverse the decree and remand the case for a fresh decision (4) and this is generally done, or the Court may (it has been said), without reversing the decree, retain the case on appeal but return the proceedings in order that the Lower Court may state its reasons (5) But though a decision may not be as clear as it might have been, if there are words to be found which substantially dispose of the case set up, the Court may consider it unnecessary to remand for a clearer finding (6) It is, however, no objection that a judgment is short if it sufficiently appears that the evidence has been considered and the Court has given its opinion thereon (7) As to whether a Lower Court's omission to comply (8) with the terms of this rule can be considered a ground for second appeal see notes to sect 100, *ante*

Clause (a)—The necessity for this clause is obvious, it being the foundation of those which follow The point or points on which the appeal has to be decided should be set down distinctly (9) And it is a convenient practice which keeps the decision on each point and the reasons therefor separate from the rest

Clause (b)—The judgment should clearly and fully dispose of all the points in issue between the parties by a distinct finding on each of them (10)

(1) Kunhi Marakkar Haji v Kutti Umma 20 M 496 (1891) Sul bayya v Pami Peidi, 22 M 344 (1899)

(2) Muhammad Ahmad v Zubaida Jan, 16 I A 205, 211 (1889), s c, 11 A 460 470, Tayammul v Sasechalla Nailer, 10 M I A 429, 436 (1865)

(3) Yusoff Ali v Tyzoonissa 15 W R 296 (1871)

(4) Haimabati Dasi v Govinda Chandra 2 C W N 135 197 (1898), Kristo Chunder v Ram Brohmo 20 W P 403 (1873) and numerous cases

(5) Dool o Chand v Oomda Begum, 17 W R 472 (1872), Bisvanath Maiti v Bailya nath Munul, 12 C 199 (1885), Asanullah v Hafiz Mahomed Ali 10 C 932 (1884), Kristo Chunder v Ram Brohmo, *supra*

(6) Shurbessur Ghose v Sadhes Churn, 15

W R 130 (1871)

(7) Ramesur v Shaukh Bahoo, 12 W R 272 (1869)

(8) See Doolo Chand v Oomda Begum 18 W R 472 (1872), Ramesur v Bahoo 12 W R 272 (1869), Kamat v Kamat 8 F 369 (1881), Parshotam v Dorgoi 14 B 452 (1890), Ningappa v Shisappa 19 B 327 (1894), Gopal Rao v Ksher Kalas 9 B 527 (1895), Ravanath Maiti v Bailyanath Munul 12 C 199 (1885), Golam Hossain v Ram Gopal, 12 W R 152 (1869), Shunt srooddy v Jan Mahomed 21 W R 20 261 (1871)

(9) Shurbessur Ghose v Sadhes Churn 15 W R 130 (1871)

(10) Bhagbut Khan v Pudi Dewa 3 W R 192 (1866)

Sect 565 of the last Code was held to enable the Appellate Court in some cases to determine a question of fact upon the evidence then on the record but not to declare a right in favour of one of the parties where no issue had been framed on the point, and the right had not been set up in the Lower Court (1) The Judge should specifically decide each point or points raised and give his reasons. It is not sufficient to say that by confirming generally the order of the Lower Court it has therefore virtually tried and disposed of the particular point when no mention has been made by it (2) Where the Appellate Court does not sufficiently consider important matters such as sufficiency of notice or a question of the nature of a tenure, its judgment will be set aside (3)

Clause (c)—Having stated the points for determination and the decision thereon the Court must state its reasons therefor (4) The provisions of this rule are imperative, and require the Appellate Court to give its own decision and the reasons for it (5) and a judgment which falls short of complying with the clear provisions of this section is as such worthless for the purposes contemplated by the law (6) It is not however laid down in this rule that the judgment of the Appellate Court, any more than the judgment of the Court of the first instance is to contain a review or setting forth of the whole of the

for which he thinks particular portions of the evidence to have been more or less worthy of consideration. The Judge of the Appellate Court who most fully gave his reasons or his judgment and most fully entered into the merits of the case before him would be held to have most efficiently and intelligently carried out the duties required of him (7) In certifying to the High Court the findings on issues sent back on remand the Lower Appellate Court in the absence of any distinct admission by the appellant's pleader that the finding of the first

(1) Official Trustee of Bengal & Krishna Chandra 12 C 39 246 (1885) s c 121 A 166 170

() Ila Gopinath Paniklore 8 W R 340 (1877) Hamirbati Das & Govinda Chandra 9 C W N 6 5 (1898) (decisions by implication)

(3) Pertap Narayan Magl Lal 13 C W N 949 (1909) Shal arulla & Bangoo Monlal 13 C W N 143 (1908) Santalwar & Lakshikants 13 C W N 177 (1908)

(4) See Shurbessurt Salloo Churn 15 W R 130 (1871) Baj Chunder Ranakant 15 W R 374 3 6 (1871) Hussein Buksh & Ameenah Khatoon 15 W 1 220 (1871) Korbani Ali Aslan Ali 4 W R 4 (1863) Juglubeer Salas & Chattrajut 1 Agra 73 (1868) Dhan Rao & Pamplul Rao - N W P H C R 109 (1860) Sahawan &

Bab Nanil 9 A 90 8 (1886) Karim Fakhr I case 9 C W N 2222222 (1894) Br Kant Hurn Das 11 C L R 131 (1892) Pam Deka Brojo 9 C 9 (1897) Chundappar Lobana & Yarn L R 496 (1899) Appa Kalya Nait Mallu 10 R 4 (1891) Junt Singh Kovilal 11 W R 630 (1890) Kartel Napti Personon see 2 W R 77 (1865) Jhamabati Das & Govinda Chandra C W N 69 69 (1898) Chander Kant & Hurn Chunder 1 W R 214 (1864)

(5) Bhawan Kesur Kaveri 1 B 425 430 (189)

(6) Uned Al & Salma Bibi 6 A 323 (1884) Mumtaz Begum & Fateh Hussain 6 A 3 1 (1884) Pandianra Govind & Sono Sadal 19 B 661 (1894)

(7) Noor Mahomed & Zuhor Ali 11 W L 34 (1869)

Court on the issues was correct, is bound to form its own opinion on the evidence and record its finding with the reasons therefor (1) It is no judgment to say merely that a point is worthless (2) or absurd, (3) or that the plaintiff has not been able to make out his case, (4) or that on the evidence the claim is proved, (5) or that there is no ground for appeal, (6) or the like. The mere adoption of and concurrence with the reasons given by the Lower Court has been considered insufficient, (7) for an appellant has a right to the opinion of the Appellate Court on the case and the evidence given in support of it. It is sometimes said that where a judgment is one of affirmance the Court need not go very fully into the reasons. It would, however, be more correct to say that if a judgment is defective in this respect the defect is of a more serious character in the case of a judgment of reversal than of affirmance. It is very desirable that the Appellate Court should state with as much fullness as the nature of the case may require the reasons for its decision even when it affirms the decision of the first Court (8). But it is not obligatory on an Appellate Court either to take notice of every item of evidence produced by the parties or to meet categorically every one of the arguments advanced by the first Court in support of its decision, if it gives special reasons of its own for coming to an opposite conclusion (9). It is sufficient if the judgment deals with all the material points involved in the case (10). It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to when the Court should consider that the reasons for a particular finding by the Lower Appellate Court must be stated. There may be cases in which the omission to state the reasons would render the judgments so unintelligible that the High Court could not pronounce any opinion upon whether it was right in law. In

(1) Ramchandra Govind : Sono Sadashiv, 19 B 551 (1894)

(2) Hossein Buksh : Ameena Khatoon 16 W R 280 (1871)

(3) Hem Chunder : Ahmed Reza, Marsh 332 (1863), Juggesurce Dobia Gudadhura Bonnerjee, 6 W R Act X 21 (1866)

(4) Karim Baksh v Lucas, 2 C W N 666 (1898)

(5) Trilochun Dutt : Ishen Chunder, 3 W R 176 (1875) (The Court should also state what that evidence consists of, and in what way or for what specific reasons it proves the plaintiff's or defendant's case)

(6) Asanullah : Hafiz Mahomed Ali 10 C 932, 935 (1889)

(7) Sahawan v Babu Nand, 9 A 26 (1886), Gundappa : Lobosa, 1 Bom. L. R 490 (1899) Babban Singh v Jaimangal Singh, A W N 86 (1906), Sitaram : Surya Narayana, 22 W R 12 (1898), Rajoo : Raj Coomar, 7 W R 13 (1867), Ommatul Fatima : Jame Khanum 1 W R 295 (1864), Khelluck Chunder : Nund Ram Sein 2 W R 7 (1875), Krishna Reddi v Srinivasa Reddi 5 W R C

R 174 (1870)

(8) Pam Rangini : Chandra Banode 1 C W N 691, 692 (1897), Imrit Singh : Koylashoo 11 W R 559 (1860) Kartick Napt : Personomycet, 2 W R 77 (1865) Munsoob Bibee v Ali Meah 17 W R 338 (1872), Shathuk Paul : Gudadhur Roy, 4

(9) Jatra Mohan Nandi : Itambur 10 C I J 385 (1913) at p 387, per Jenkins CJ, following Dibek Peshai : Joy Lal Chowdhry, 12 B R 361 (1869)

(10) Krsbendro : Dgumbur 16 W R 15, 19 (1871)

such case, reasons should be stated. But there may be cases in which the Court would not think it necessary to require them (1)

Clause (d)—When an Appellate Court, in a judgment which in some material matters differs from the conclusion of the first Court, upholds the decree of the first Court, it must specify in the decree the exact modifications which its conclusions have necessitated, as contemplated by this rule, (2) and when it reverses a decree, it should state the relief which it considers the appellant entitled to (3)

32. The judgment may be for confirming, varying or [s. 57]
What judgment may reversing the decree from which the appeal
direct is preferred, or, if the parties to the appeal
agree as to the form which the decree in appeal shall take, or as
to the order to be made in appeal, the Appellate Court may pass
a decree or make an order accordingly.

Judgment in appeal—As to functions of the Appeal Court, see notes to sect. 96 and r 4 and the last rule of this Order (4). The powers conferred by this rule are powers which require that parties should be in accord with each other at the time when the decree is pronounced by the Appellate Court. The use of the word "may" indicates discretion in a Court and does not force the Court to pass a decree in any manner which goes beyond the scope of its discretionary power. Thus where an application containing the terms of a compromise was presented to the High Court by one of the parties and the *Solehnama* was sent down to the Lower Court for verification but the attendance of the parties for that purpose could not be procured the High Court refused to pass a decree under sect. 577, in accordance with the terms of the *Solehnama* (5)

33. The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree
Power of Court of Appeal and make any order which ought to have been
Appeal passed or made and to pass or make such further
or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may
be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to
part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any
of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties
may not have filed any appeal or objections

Illustration

1 claims a sum of money as due to him from A or B and C
both obtains a decree against A. A appeals and A and C

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| (1) <i>Shumshuroodly v. Jan Mahomed</i> (1874) | (1) <i>Kandiah v. C.</i> |
| 21 W. R. 260 (1874) | (2) <i>Idem v. C.</i> |
| (2) <i>Lochho v. Har Sabai</i> 12 A. 40 (45) (1912) | |
| (1887) | |
| (3) <i>Hell v. Gurudas</i> 1 B. L. 1 A. C. 50 | |

The Appellate Court decides in favour of X It has power to pass a decree against Y

Powers—This rule, which is taken from English O 58, r 4, is new, and has been inserted because (as the Select Committee said) it is most imperative that an Appellate Court should have the fullest power to do complete justice between the parties (1) It is applicable to all cases where an appeal is heard after this Code came into force (2) The latter part of the clause is explained by the illustration (3) It is open to the Appellate Court to vary the decree appealed against, either in points (if any) in which it is erroneous or in respect of supplemental matters which are admitted (4) It is entitled to take cognizance of events which have happened since the filing of the appeal (5) or, in other words, it is open to the Appellate Court to vary a decree under appeal not only for error, but also on grounds which have come into existence since it was passed (6) The Courts, in the exercise of the powers conferred by this rule, should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code, nor of the Court Fees Act, nor of the Limitation Act In particular, it should bear in mind the case stated in the Illustration (7) R 22 of this Order shows that it is intended that (*prima facie* at least) a respondent should not be allowed to take exception to so much of a decree as was against him without complying with the provisions of the rule (8)

"May not have filed any appeal or objection."—See notes to rr 1 and 22 of this Order, as also notes to sect 96, *ante*

34. Where the appeal is heard by more Judges than one, any Judge dissenting from the judgment of the Court shall state in writing the decision or order which he thinks should be passed on the appeal, and he may state his reasons for the same.

Decree in appeal

35 (1) The decree of the Appellate Court shall bear
Date and contents of decree date the day on which the judgment was pronounced.

(2) The decree shall contain the number of the appeal, the names and descriptions of the appellant and respondent, and a clear specification of the relief granted or other adjudication made.

(3) The decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the appeal, and by whom, or out of what property, and in what proportions such cost and the costs in the suit are to be paid

(1) Ravaneshwari Chandu, 38 C 721 (1911)
(2) Chandramarthy v Narayanawami, 33 M 211 (1909)
(3) Rangan Lal v Jhandu, 31 A 32 (1911)
(4) Saktharam Mohan v Hari Krishna, 4 R 113, 115 (1891)

(5) Ahmad v Mahan ady, 1 Bom. J. R 215 (1899)
(6) Rustonji v Lurshotam Das, 25 B 600, 613 (1901)
(7) Rangan Lal v Jhandu, 31 A 32 (1911)
(8) Ib

(4) The decree shall be signed and dated by the Judge or Judges who passed it.

Provided that where there are more Judges than one and there is a difference of opinion among them, it shall not be necessary for any Judge dissenting from the judgment of the Court to sign the decree.

Appellate decree—The appellate decree is the first decree and the only decree capable of being executed after it has been passed whether the same reverses, modifies, or confirms the decree of the Court from which the appeal was made (1) It is clear from the terms of this rule that in any case the decree to be executed not only for the costs of the appeal but for the costs of the suit is the decree of the Appellate Court only. The effect of the rule is to cause the decree of the Appellate Court to supersede the decree of the Court below even when the decree of the Appellate Court is one which merely affirms that decree below and does not reverse it or modify it. The only decree that can be amended is the decree to be executed, and the decree to be executed is the decree of the Appellate Court and not the decree of the Court below (2) If a decree is made in appeal so that the appellate decree becomes the one to be executed, time runs from its date and not from that of the original decree (3) When, however, an appellant withdraws an appeal no decree is made. The order of the Court does not come within the definition of the word "decree." The litigation commenced with the presentation of the appeal is merely discontinued, and the case remains as if the appeal had never taken place and the decree appealed against becomes final and time runs from the date of that decree (4) The only Court which has jurisdiction to amend an appellate decree is the Court of Appeal (5) When two parties to a suit appeal so that the one

(1) *Shohrat Sing v Bridgmann* 4 A 36 F B (1882)

(2) *Muhamma Sulaiman Khan v Muhammad Yar Khan* 11 A 267 273 274 (1888) Mahmood J., dissenting. See also *Bhann shankar v Raghunathram*, 2 Bom H C R (A C I) 106 (1865), *Doult v Bhukan Das* 11 B 172 (1886) also *Sikhaj Chand v Velchan* 18 R 203 (1893) *Arunachellathu dayan v Velulayan* 5 M H C R 215 (1870), *Noor Ali Chowdhury v Kom Meah* 13 C 13 (1880) *Kut v Kular v Burroda* Caunt 10 B L F 101 (P C.) (182) *Manavikraman v Unmajjan* 15 M 170 171 172 (1891), *Nourang Rat v Latif Choul huri*, 13 A 391 (1891) *Jawahir Mel v Kistur Chani* 13 A 343 (1891), *Lachuvav rager v Sahavvanger* 18 M 214 216 (1 B) (1891) *Nan Chat v Vithu* 19 R 278 280 (1891) of *Mulchan v Pam Ratan*

20 A 493 494 (1893) *Kadash v Ginja Sundari* 39 C 425 (1912)

(3) *Patloji v Gan* 15 B 370 374 (1890) *Noor Ali Chowdhury v Kom Meah* 13 C 13 (1886) *Muhammad Sulaiman v Muhammad Yar Khan* 11 A 267 (1888) *Rup Chan v Shamah ul Jel an*, 11 A 346 (1889) *Aruna Chellathulavan v Velulayan* 5 M H C R 215 (1870) *Sakhaj Chani v Velchand* 18 B 203 (1893) *Abdul Rajman v Moulin Saiba*, 22 B 500 503 (1891)

(4) *Patloji v Gan* 15 B 370 375 (1890), *Vithdina v Vijayatlammal* 6 M 43 46 (1882) *Hungan Khan v Cana* 1 R 101 1 A 293 (1867)

(5) *Muhamma Sulaiman v Muhammad Yar Khan* 11 A 267 (1888) Mahmood, J., dissenting. *Sheolal v Jumakhal* 18 F 542 545 (1893)

appeal is but the cross appeal of the other, there ought to be only one final decree made between the two parties. Not only is there nothing to prevent, but it is the duty of the Court to make one decree, and only one decree, between the same parties (1). The date which the decree should bear is the date when the judgment was delivered (2).

"Relief granted," etc.—A decree should be so drawn up as to need no interpretation other than may be gathered from the language of the decree itself, and there should be no need of reference to any document or paper whatsoever, unless such document or paper is attached to the decree and forms part of it. While, on the one hand, it is true that the decree should be drawn up in this manner, it is also just that litigants who have been successful should not be deprived of the fruits of their success owing to carelessness on the part of the Court or officer charged with the preparation of decrees. Thus where a decree in its terms, is ambiguous, the Court executing the decree can refer to the pleadings in the suit in which the decree was passed to ascertain its precise meaning (3). Again, where the decree omits to reserve the rights of prior mortgages admitted by all the parties to the suit, it ought to be construed with reference to the

should be drawn up in such a form as will show in itself the ultimate relief granted. If the Appellate Court decrees an additional amount and the decree as drawn up only mentions the amount decreed by the first Court, and the amount due to the decree-holder is ascertainable from the decree of the first Court and the finding of the Lower Appellate Court, then he should obtain execution for the amount found in his favour and for his costs (5). This rule does not require the claim to be stated in the decree so as to make the statement a part of the decree itself (6).

Costs—It was held that the former section, when it provided that the decree of the Appellate Court should state by what parties and in what proportion the costs incurred in the appeal and the costs in the suit were to be paid, referred to the parties who were parties to the appeal, and not to parties who were not arrayed either as appellants or as respondents in the appeal, but who, under sect 544 of the former Code, might take the benefit of the decree (7). This section referred (as does also this rule) to cases where there are more parties than one made liable for costs, which necessitate the fixing by the Court of Appeal of the proportion in which the costs are to be paid (8).

(1) *Raghoobans Sahay v Asloo*, 2 W R 294, 296 (1873)

(2) *Parbati v Bhola*, 12 A 79 81 (1889)

(3) *Lachmi Narain v Jwala Nath*, 18 A 344, 347 (1896); *Robinson v Dulcep Singh*, L R 11 Ch D 708, 813, 818 821 (1878); *Muhammad Sulaiman v Muhammad Yar Khan* 11 A 267, *dist* (1888)

(4) *Strinivasa v Yamunabhai*, 29 M 81 (1905), *s c*, 16 M L J 50

(5) *Jawahir Mal v Kistur Chand*, 13 A 313 345 (1891)

(6) *Souda Shrinivasa v Krishnapa* 11 P 177 (1890). In this case the decree awarded the plaintiff's claim.

(7) *Mulchand v Ram Batan*, 20 A 493, 495 *dist* (1893); *Muhammad Sulaiman v Muhammad Yar Khan*, 11 A 267 (1888)

(8) *Raj Krishna v Pramoda*, 21 W R 74 (1873)

It is the business of the Appellate Court finally determining a suit to decide by which of the parties before it the costs shall be borne, it is not at liberty to declare that the costs of the suit shall be borne by the unsuccessful party in a suit to be thereafter brought, because it might be that the suit will not be brought at all and in that case there will be no execution or the plaintiff and the defendant might be left to bear their own costs (1) Though the Judge must state by what parties (and in what proportions if necessary) the costs of the original suits are to be paid he is not bound to go into particulars, or append to his judgment a schedule setting forth the different items which make up the costs of the first Court. He takes the amount of costs for granted and decides who is to pay them (2) Where the order of the Appellate Court awarded (a) all the costs of the appeal amounting to a certain sum named (b) all the costs in the original Court not naming any sum and (c) the costs of the remand and it was argued that the decree holders were only entitled to the sum of money specifically named in the High Court's decree for costs and that they could not have the costs of the first Court because the amount was not mentioned nor the costs of the remand because such remand costs if they come in under any head at all would come under the head of costs of the appeal and that these had not been allowed beyond the sum fixed by the decree it was held that the decree was perfectly clear as to what it meant to give and there was nothing in the law which made the order for costs bad simply because it did not specify the exact sum to be paid as costs of the Lower Court that there was nothing to make it incumbent on a Court of Appeal to specify the amount of the costs incurred in the first Court. It had only to declare the proportion in which they were to be paid. As to the costs of the remand it was held that the decree declared that besides the costs of the appeal and the costs in the original Court the costs of the remand were to be paid it did not matter whether those costs were included or not in the appeal costs (3) But though the law does not direct that a Court should annex to every decree the costs incurred by both parties yet it is a convenient practice to do so (4) When an Appellate Court decrees an appeal and gives costs of its own Court the costs of the first Court should be included in the decree (5) When an appeal is dismissed on wholly different grounds from those relied on by the Court below the dismissal should be without costs (6)

- 11 37. A copy of the judgment and of the decree, certified by the Appellate Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf, shall be sent to the Court which passed the decree appealed from and shall be filed with the original proceedings in the suit, and an entry of the judgment of the Appellate Court shall be made in the register of civil suits.
- Certified copy of decree to be sent to Court whose decree appealed from*

ORDER XLII.

Appeals from Appellate Decrees.

1. *The rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be,*
Procedure to appeals from appellate decrees.

Second appeals—See sects 100-103 and sects 107 and 108, *ante*, and notes thereto, and notes to O XLI

ORDER XLIII

Appeals from Orders

1. An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely —
- Appeals from orders*
- (a) an order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court,
 - (b) an order under rule 10 of Order VIII pronouncing judgment against a party,
 - (c) an order under rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit,
 - (d) an order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed *ex parte*,
 - (e) an order under rule 4 of Order X pronouncing judgment against a party,
 - (f) an order under rule 21 of Order XI,
 - (g) an order under rule 10 of Order XVI for the attachment of property,
 - (h) an order under rule 20 of Order XVI pronouncing judgment against a party,
 - (i) an order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement,
 - (j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXII setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale,
 - (k) an order under rule 9 of Order XXIII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit,
 - (l) an order under rule 10 of Order XXIII giving or refusing to give leave,
 - (m) an order under rule , of Order XXIII recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction,
 - (n) an order under rule 1 of Order XXIV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit,

- (o) an order under rule 3 or rule 8 of Order XXXIV refusing to extend the time for the payment of mortgage-money;
- (p) orders in interpleader suits under rule 3, rule 4 or rule 6 of Order XXXV,
- (q) an order under rule 2, rule 3 or rule 6 of Order XXXVIII,
- (r) an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX,
- (s) an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order XL,
- (t) an order of refusal under rule 19 of Order XLI to re-admit, or under rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal;
- (u) an order under rule 23 of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court,
- (v) an order made by any Court other than a High Court refusing the grant of a certificate under rule 6 of Order XLV;
- (w) an order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review

Appeals from Orders—See the notes to the various rules referred to. As regards clauses (b), (c), and (h), these orders were under the previous law appealable as decrees. But having regard to the present definition of decree they would no longer be appealable in that way and it has therefore been necessary to make them appealable as orders. It has been held that under this rule an appeal lies from negative orders under O XXXIX (1) and that if there is an appeal against an order made under any rule there is an appeal against any order made under part of that rule (2).

2. The rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be, [s. 590]
Procedure. to appeals from orders.

"Appeals from orders."—See sects 101-103, *ante* and Order XLI and notes to those sections and orders.

(1) *Lachmi Narain v. Ram Charan Das*, 35 A. 425 (1913), *Hari Lal v. Prayag Ram*, 17 C. W. N. 996 (1913), *Zabada Jan v. Muhammad Tareb*, 152 A. 8 (1922).

(2) *Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. v. Fakrudin* 17 C. W. N. 16 (1912), *Mahant Anand v. Ram Parkash* 14 C. W. N. 185 (1909).

ORDER XLIV.

Pauper Appeals.

592

1. Any person entitled to prefer an appeal, who is unable to pay the fee required for the memorandum of appeal, may present an application accompanied by a memorandum of appeal, and may be allowed to appeal as a pauper, subject, in all matters including the presentation of such application, to the provisions relating to suits by paupers, in so far as those provisions are applicable.

Who may appeal as pauper
Procedure on application for admission of appeal
Provided that the Court shall reject the application unless, upon a perusal thereof and of the judgment and decree appealed from, it sees reason to think that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or is otherwise erroneous or unjust

593

2 The inquiry into the pauperism of the applicant may be made either by the Appellate Court or under the orders of the Appellate Court by the Court from whose decision the appeal is preferred.

Inquiry into pauperism.
Provided that if the applicant was allowed to sue or appeal as a pauper in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, no further inquiry in respect of his pauperism shall be necessary unless the Appellate Court sees cause to direct such inquiry

Application.—In the case of appeals the rule requires two separate documents to be presented—an application for leave to appeal as a pauper and a memorandum of appeal. When the Judge disposes of the pauper application he does not thereby necessarily dispose of the appeal. There are two separate documents and in this respect this case differs from a petition to sue as a pauper which includes both the plaint, the allegations as to pauperism and the prayer to sue as a pauper. In the latter case, when the pauper petition is rejected under O XXXIII r 7 the proceedings are at an end and the Judge has no power to allow it to be stamped as a plaint r 15 of that Order providing the course, open to the applicant viz to institute a suit in the ordinary manner. On the

other hand in proceedings under this rule, when the Judge refuses leave to appeal as a pauper, he effectually deals with the pauper application but he does not necessarily deal with the memorandum of appeal which accompanies it. On his rejection of the application, there is nothing to prevent him from treating the memorandum as still a memorandum of appeal if the appellant, on being refused leave to appeal as a pauper, desires, with the aid of borrowed funds or the assistance of friends to continue the appeal. If O XXXIII r 15 applied to the memorandum of appeal, the result would in practice be that the appeal would be time barred when the application was refused. The result is that a Court is under no legal obligation to dismiss the appeal if and when it refused leave to appeal as a pauper (1).

"Subject, in all matters"—A petition for leave to appeal as a pauper is presented together with a memorandum of appeal. It was held under the last Code that the presentation of the application itself was not subject to the rules contained in Chapter XXVI of that Code. But after an application had been presented, all action taken subsequent to such presentation was by the terms of the section to be subject to the rules contained in that Chapter. Therefore sect 404 of that Code, which required, except in certain circumstances, that the application should be presented in person, did not apply (2). In any case, if sect 404 did apply, an appeal presented on behalf of an exempted pauper by a vakil retained under an ordinary retainer and not authorized to sign as agent was considered insufficiently presented (3). A petition presented by a duly authorized agent of an exempted person though not by an advocate, vakil, or attorney, was properly presented (4). Although the Madras High Court held that the question of the presentation of an appeal was not subject to the rules contained in Chapter XXVI of the former Code the same Court determined that the question of the right to appeal under the section corresponding with r 1 of this Order was subject to such rules. Therefore when at the time of the institution of the suit there was subsisting an agreement falling within the terms of sect 407 (d) now (O XXXIII r 5 cl (e)) no leave to appeal under r 1 could be given to the plaintiff who by such agreement had allowed other persons to obtain an interest in the subject matter

(1) *Bai Fult Desai Manorbhai* 22 B 849 850 855-857 (1897) per Farran C.J. Canby J., decided the case on the ground that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within proper time under s 5 of the Limitation Act. In *Bal Nath v. Jagannath* 13 A 305 (1891) where an application to appeal as a pauper was rejected and a regular appeal on a proper stamp was subsequently presented, but after time it was held not to relate back to the time of the application on behalf of paupers. As to extension of time when application is rejected see *Jumna Bai v. Nissam* 21 B 570 (1897).

(2) *Madhvi v. Sonappa Banta* 20 M 303 (1902) dissenting from *In re Naras* 5 M 504

(1887) which follow *Bhugobutty Kar v. Gunesb Dutt* 21 W R 308 (1874). In *Hararan Singh v. Mulammai Raza* 4 A 91 (1891) also the High Court refused under s 622 to interfere with an order rejecting an application which was presented by a pleader. In *Anil Warisun Nissam Bahi Baksh* 24 A 172 (1901) appears to assume that presentation in person is necessary except in the case of persons exempted. In *re Naras* however, states several circumstances in favour of the rule in the text.

(3) *Bhugobutty Kar v. Gunesb Dutt*, 23 W R 305 (1874).

(4) *Wazirun Nissam Bahi Baksh* 24 A 172 (1901).

of the suit (1) The amendment now includes the presentation of the application and has been made to avoid the conclusion at which the Madras High Court arrived in the decision cited

After presentation of the petition an inquiry as to pauperism is directed, and the application to appeal as a pauper is refused or granted (2) The application must be presented within thirty days from the date of the decree appealed against and no extension can be allowed under sect 5 of the Limitation Act (3) The Code of 1859 directed (4) that the inquiry might be conducted either by the Appellate Court, or by the Court from whose decision the appeal was made under the orders of the Appellate Court, provided that if the applicant was allowed to sue *in forma pauperis* in the Court below no further inquiry was necessary unless the Appellate Court should see special cause to direct such inquiry, and these provisions have been reproduced in sect 593 of the last Code and r 2 of this Order

The proceedings are subject to the provisions mentioned only "in so far as those provisions are applicable" So if the appellant is found to be a pauper, and the appeal is admitted, he cannot be called in to give security for costs (5) It would render the section nugatory if the Judge could say that although the applicant was a pauper, and although there was just ground for appealing (for such a decision is required by the proviso) a condition shall be imposed which in the case of a pauper, would render it impossible to go on with the appeal The question has already been discussed as to whether this rule is subject to O XXXIII r 3 and a memorandum of appeal to r 15 of that Order

Proviso to r 1—This is mandatory, being a necessary safeguard for the benefit of litigants who find themselves opposed by paupers and the Courts should be careful to see that the proviso is satisfied It is to be noticed that the Court must come to its conclusion upon a perusal only of the application the judgment and decree This proviso is apt to be overlooked, but it would provide a safeguard against this if the Judge or Bench admitting a pauper appeal were to express and record very briefly the reasons for granting leave, so that the Appellate Court may have an assurance that the leave was properly given (6)

as a

(1) *Hanifa Bai v Haji Siddiq*, 30 M 447 (1906), a c, 17 M L J 447

(2) See *Bai Ful v Deyar Manorbhas* 22 B 849 850 (1897) An application need not be preceded by a separate formal application for inquiry into the pauperism of the applicant, *Hamid Poor v Sheo Poor*, 1 A 11 C R 219 (1869)

(3) *Parbati v Bhola* 12 A 79, 93 (1880), *Bechi v Abayulla* 12 A 461, 465, 488 (1890), *Mahadev v Lakshman* 19 B 49 (1895)

(4) Act VIII of 1859, s 370 See ss 367 371, ib

(5) *Musserood teen Biswas v Ugal Biswas* 17 W R 69 (1871) *alter*, however where the application to sue as a pauper is dismissed *In re Jendra Deb Roykut* 18 W R 102 (1872)

(6) *Balubhai Canpat Jamkhalna* 4 A 451 (1901)

(7) In one suit however the High Court sent the case back for reconsideration with an expression of their opinion: *In re Mothadiah Khan* 14 W L 415 (1870) *In Hararan Singh v Muhammad Reza* 4 A 91 (1881) the High Court refused to interfere under s 622 of the last Code

an application on the original side of the High Court it was held that no appeal lay from an order of a single Judge of the High Court made under this rule rejecting an application for leave to appeal *in forma pauperis* (1). These decisions however, proceeded on the ground that the right of appeal given by the Letters Patent is subject to the limitations on appeal presented by the Code (2). It is, however, now law so far as the Calcutta and Madras High Courts are concerned that the interpretation to be placed on the decision of the Privy Council (3) is that sect 588 (now 104) of the Code does not touch the right of appeal given by the Letters Patent (4).

Respondents.—The Code provides for pauper plaintiffs and appellants, but not for pauper defendants and respondents. Objections by a respondent to a decree under O XLI r 22 cannot be filed *in forma pauperis*. If a pauper desires to contest any part of the decree of the Court of first instance which is unfavourable to him he should directly appeal as a pauper and as an appellant claim the benefit of this section (5). The opinion has been expressed that the omission was unintentional (6) but on the other hand it has been said that the reason why no exception is made in favour of a pauper respondent probably was that he already had the opportunity of directly making an appeal without expense for court fees and that an inquiry into his pauperism at the last stage of the case would involve great delay and inconvenience (7). The omission now must be taken to be intentional the Legislature considering that the exceptional liberty of moving a Court *in forma pauperis* should not extend to objections to appeals.

(1) *In re Rajagopal* 9 M 41 (1886)
Banno Bibi v Mehdi Husam 11 A 375 (1889)

(2) As to whether these decisions are defensible on any other ground see *arg* in *Tooke Money v Suderi Dasse* 26 C at p 364 (1899)

(3) *Hurriah Chunder v Kali Sunderi* 9 C 482 10 I 14 (1892)

(4) *Tooke Money v Suderi Dasse* 26 C 364 (1899), *Chajpan v Moidin Kutta* 22 M 68 (1898) *Sablapathi Chetti v Narayana*

sami Chetti 25 M 500 (1901)

(5) *Narayana v Krishna* 8 M 214 (1884), *Brojeswarri Das v Guroo Churn* 11 C 730 (1889), *Rashomonee Dossee v Junmojoy Mullick* 9 W R 306 (1868) *Babaji Hari v Pajaram Ballal* 1 B 309 (185) as regards pauper defendants see notes to O XXXIII r 1 ante

(6) *Narayana v Krishna supra* at p 217

(7) *Babaji Hari v Pajaram Ballal, supra* at p 9

determined by a Division Bench of the High Court, which in theory of law is a decision of the High Court. All that a Judge of the High Court can in most cases do after that, is to assist the parties in bringing their appeal before the Privy Council. Of course, an Act of the Imperial Parliament, or a provision of the Letters Patent, issued in pursuance of an Act of Parliament or an order issued by His Majesty in Council, might confer upon the High Court, or a Judge of that Court, not only power to admit or reject an appeal, but might make the right to appeal dependent upon that admission or rejection. But if that has been done in any case whatever, it is only in the cases in which the High Court has power to declare that the case is a fit one for appeal. The Courts in India have no power to admit or allow an appeal unless expressly authorized to do so by competent authority (1). The admission of an appeal to the Privy Council is not a matter as to which the High Court has any discretion provided that the requirements of the law are satisfied. All that the High Court has to do is to see that the requirements of sect 110 are satisfied. If they are, an appeal lies under sect 109 as a matter of right. The application for a certificate that these requirements are satisfied is merely preliminary and ancillary to the admission of the appeal (2).

"Amount or value"—See notes to sect 110, *ante*

"Otherwise."—By sect 109 and this rule, an appeal may be granted if the High Court certifies that the case is fit for appeal "otherwise," i.e. when not meeting the conditions of sect 110. That is clearly intended to meet special cases, such, for example, as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance. To certify that a case is of that kind, though it is left entirely in the discretion of the Court, is a judicial process which cannot be performed without special exercise of that discretion, evinced by the fitting certificate. In the absence of the conditions required by the Code, to give the right of appeal, no certificate under this rule can be issued even with the assent of the other party (3). Whether the matter is under the appealable value, there should be an application under this clause before the proper Court in India for a certificate (4).

"Notice . . . on the opposite party"—If a respondent appears and a notice served, of an intended application to have a petition of appeal to the Privy Council received, but does not object his costs of that application are

together and the decree in one applying in principle to the other two suits, (1) is also where A and B purchased the same properties deriving title from different persons. The value of the properties with mere profits was over Rs 10,000. B granted two part leases of the properties to different persons, A was, therefore obliged to bring two suits for the recovery of the properties, and the value of the subject matter in each suit was less than Rs 10,000 (2). But where there were distinct causes separate judgments given in each suit and the suits were not consolidated in Courts below but were all along treated as separate and distinct actions such suits it was held could not be consolidated for the purpose of appeal to the Privy Council (3). These principles have been embodied in this rule which is now. And it has been held under it that where the fundamental question is common to all the suits and the cases are tried together and decided by the same judgment the suits will be consolidated for purposes of pecuniary valuation even though a substantial question of law arises in some of the suits and not in others (4).

When an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council is made in more than one suit which have not been consolidated though the points to be decided are the same in all of them it must be shown that in each of the suits the amount or value of the matter in dispute in appeal to His Majesty in Council is Rs 10,000 or upwards (5). But in a recent case a large number of suits for recovery of possession of distinct parcels of land were tried together dealt with in one judgment, and were decreed in favour of the plaintiffs, of these some were for sums over Rs 10,000 and leave to appeal was granted, of the remaining cases, each taken separately, the value was below Rs 10,000 yet if taken collectively the aggregate reached that amount and all the cases were dependent on the same judgment, leave to appeal was granted in the suits where the value of the subject of each suit was below Rs 10,000 (6).

5. *In the event of any dispute arising between the parties as to the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit in the Court of first instance, or as to the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council, the Court to which a petition for a certificate is made under rule 2 may, if it thinks fit, refer such dispute for report to the Court of first instance, which last mentioned Court shall proceed to determine such amount or value and shall return its report together with the evidence to the Court by which the reference was made.*

Inquiry as to value—Where there has been a contest as to the true value of the matter in dispute, it has hitherto been the invariable practice to ascertain

(1) *Ashanulla v Karoonamoyi* 4 C L R 125, 127 (1879)

(2) *Jogul Kashore v Jotindra Mohan* 8 C. 210 (1882)

(3) *Moolji Mohtaramd Liboolish v Moolji* Civil J M F A 763 765 (1837) &c, 5

W R 31 (P C)

(4) *Hanga v Jagat* 13 C L J 503 (1910)

(5) *Royal Insurance Coy v Akhoy* Coomar Dutt 6 C W N 41 (1901)

(6) *Deonara v Kaur Singh* 24 C 400, 402 (1907)

by evidence and inquiry what the true value is (1) The present rule now gives legislative sanction to this practice

101] 6. Where such certificate is refused, the petition shall be dismissed.
Effect of refusal of certificate.

"Refused"—The High Court, in refusing a certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, should state their reasons for refusing it (2)

Restoration—After an appeal has been dismissed for default or for any reason removed from the file, the High Courts have power to restore an appeal (3) It may bring an appeal on to the file after it has struck it off the file on the application of the appellant himself (4)

102] 7 (1) Where the certificate is granted, the applicant shall, within six months from the date of the decree complained of, or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate, whichever is the later date, —

Security and deposit required on grant of certificate

- (a) furnish security for the costs of the respondent, and
- (b) deposit the amount required to defray the expense of translating, transcribing, indexing and transmitting to His Majesty in Council a correct copy of the whole record of the suit, except—

- (1) formal documents directed to be excluded by any order of His Majesty in Council in force for the time being,
- (2) papers which the parties agree to exclude,
- (3) accounts, or portions of accounts, which the officer empowered by the Court for that purpose considers unnecessary, and which the parties have not specifically asked to be included, and
- (4) such other documents as the High Court may direct to be excluded

(2) Where the applicant prefers to print in India the copy of the record, except as aforesaid, he shall also, within the time mentioned in sub rule (1), deposit the amount required to defray the expense of printing such copy.

"Certificate is granted"—As to the functions of a Court granting a certificate, see notes to r 3, ante The certificate under r 7 may be given by a

(1) *Amrita Nath v. Abhoy Chandra* 9 C W N 370, 371 (1907)

(2) *Venganaik Swaroopathal v. Chakraborty* 20 M 191 (1900), s.c., 10 C W N 115, 116 L.J. 305

(3) In the matter of the petition of *Benode Mookerjee* L.R. 2 p. 101 (1871) s.c. 7 W N 171

(4) *Shankar Bhalchandra Harilal Bhalchandra* 37, 401 s.c. 1 L.A. 71 77

single Judge called the "Judge of the Privy Council Appeal Department,"(1) and there is no appeal from the order of such a Judge,(2) or it may be given by a Bench consisting of more than one Judge hearing the applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The certificate and not the order for the certificate is the document which their Lordships are bound to consider and act upon, and unless the certificate upon which the leave to appeal is based is in such a form as to justify the leave, their Lordships will hold that leave has not been properly given. Thus where the order for the certificate was "Let certificate issue, that the case is fit one for appeal to Her Majesty in Council," but the certificate stated "The Court, having had before it an

of the case it fulfils the requirements of sect 596 (Act XIV of 1882) " held that the leave was granted without jurisdiction. Valuation is an essential part of the requirements under that section, and when the valuation of the case is below the amount mentioned in that section, leave cannot be granted under that section. An erroneous certificate to the effect that the case fulfils the requirements of sect 110 is ineffectual even if assented to by the respondent. In cases below Rs 10,000, there must be a special certificate that the case is

sect 110), but the order on it was ' Let a certificate be granted that this is a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council and let the usual notices be issued held by the Privy Council that the leave was given pursuant to sect 595 (c) (now sect 109 (c)) and the latter alternative of sect 600 (now r 3) and was properly given (4). When the petition for leave stated "the appeal involved some substantial questions of law and the case fulfilled the requirements of sect 596 and was a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council" and the order was "we think on the whole that this is a case in which a certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council ought to be granted" held that the certificate was properly given (5). But where the certificate was "certified that the above case fulfils the requirements of sect 596 (now sect 110) as regards value and nature inasmuch as the value of the subject matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was upwards of Rs 10 000 and the value of the matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty's Privy Council also exceeds that amount

(1) *Amirunnessa v Behary Lall* 25 W R 29 (1877), *Tara Chand v Radha Jeebun* 24 W R 148 (1875), *Hurrah v Kali Sundari* 9 C 482 493 (1882).

(2) *Luft Ali Khan v Asgar Raza* 17 C 455, 458 (1890), *Kishen Pershad v Tiluckdhari*, 18 C 182, 186 (1890), *Amirunnessa v Behary Lall* *supra*, *Tara Chand v Padma Jeebun*, *supra*, *Manley v Patterson*, 9 C 1 R 166 (1881) s c, 7 C 319.

(3) *Ilaltha Krieldhar v Rai Krishna Chari*,

28 I A 182 184 (1901) s c 23 A 415, 5 C W N 689, cf *Moti Chand v Gangay Parshad* 29 I A 40 42 (1901), s c 21 A 174 C C W N 362 *Webb v Macpherson*, 30 I A 238 (1903), s c 31 C 57 *Amar Chand v Soshi* 31 C 305 310 (1903).

(4) *Webb v Macpherson*, 31 C 57 (1903), s c 30 I A 238.

(5) *Amar Chand v Soshi* *Thusan* 31 C 305, 310 (1903).

a substantial question of law the order allowing leave to appeal was granted but the report was withheld for

a certificate that the appeal involved a substantial question of law (1) where the order allowing leave to appeal stated "There seems to be a point of law, which, however, does not appear to have been argued here" it was held by the Privy Council that the leave was granted contrary to the provisions of the Code (2)

The Calcutta High Court has treated the rule as applicable to cases where special leave has been granted by the Privy Council (3)

Date of the decree—It has been held that within the meaning of this rule the date of the decree is the date on which it is pronounced not that on which it is signed (4)

"Furnish security"—Under r 7 the party to whom a certificate has been granted is bound to furnish security within six weeks from the date of such certificate. If he fails to do so, and also fails to satisfy the Judge in the Privy Council Department that there were sufficient reasons for extending the time in his favour, then it cannot be declared that the appeal has been admitted under r 8 and the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council will be struck off the file (5). A Hindu widow's interest in her husband's property should it was held, not be taken as security for the purposes mentioned (6). Notwithstanding the admission of the appeal under r 8 a surety is not precluded from disputing the validity of the security bond in execution proceedings (7). As to revocation of and power to order further security, see rr 9-11, *post* and as to increase of security, r 14.

Deposit of amount of estimate—The petitioner for leave to appeal has no right after getting the estimate from the officer of the Court to change it from an estimate for translating, printing and transmitting to an estimate for translating, transcribing and transmitting. If he is dissatisfied with the estimate he can apply to the officer to have the estimate amended or, failing that, he may apply to the Court to direct it to be amended. He has no right to amend the estimate himself, still less has he any right to amend the estimate in the way in which he thinks fit to amend it. If he does not deposit the amount mentioned in the estimate of costs by the officer of the Court within the prescribed time, his application for leave will be stayed (8). As to refund of amount deposited see r 12, *post*.

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) <i>Tasaddug Rasul v. Mani Chandi</i> 70 | 420 (1909) cf O 20 r 7 |
| 1 A 35 40 (1902), s. c. 25 A 109 | (7) <i>Kohen Parshad v. Bhuckdhar</i> 15 C |
| (2) <i>Karuppanan v. Srinivas</i> 6 C W N | 182 186 (1890) |
| 241 (1901), s. c. 25 M 215 (Bom. L. J. | (8) <i>Phool Kher v. Daboo Parshad</i> 12 W |
| 248 | 1. 187 (1893) |
| (3) <i>Roy Jotindra Nath Chowdhury v.</i> | (7) <i>Crisandra Nath v. Beg v. Copal</i> 10 C |
| <i>Bal Prayanna Kumar</i> , 11 C W N 1104 | 246, 249 (1898), s. c. 3 C W N 41 |
| (1907) | (9) In the matter of <i>Gour Surn Dass</i> , 19 |
| (4) <i>Harentra v. Hari Das</i> 14 C W N | W R 307 306 (1873) |

Extension of time.—The High Court may extend the time allowed for giving the security and making the deposit required as the words in the section relating to the giving of security are directory only but not to be departed from without cogent reason (1). The "cogent reasons" referred to by the Privy Council must be such, according to the decisions of the Madras High Court, as would lead the Court to believe that the party was diligent in due time to be prepared to lodge the deposit within the limited period and that he was prevented from making his deposit, not owing to absence or difficulty of getting funds, but owing to some circumstances accidental or otherwise over which he had no control, or owing to mistake which the Court would consider not unreasonable or caused by negligence. But J., considered that absence of funds or difficulty in raising the same if true was a very cogent reason for granting an application for extending the time but that the decisions cited bound him (2).

8. *Where such security has been furnished and deposit made to the satisfaction of the Court, the admission of appeal and procedure thereon, Court shall—*

- (a) declare the appeal admitted,
- (b) give notice thereof to the respondent,
- (c) transmit to His Majesty in Council under the seal of the Court, a correct copy of the said record, except as aforesaid, and
- (d) give to either party one or more authenticated copies of any of the papers in the suit on his applying therefor and paying the reasonable expenses incurred in preparing them

"Declare the appeal admitted"—Until a petition of appeal has been admitted and allowed, a party has no right of appeal and if the petition is allowed to remain on the file of the Court, and is not prosecuted within a reasonable time, the opposite party can apply to have the petition struck off the file, and the Court may order its removal (3).

"Correct copy of the said record"—After the appeal has been allowed

(1) *Burjore v Bhagana*, 11 I A 7, 10 (1893), s. c., 10 C 557, *Fazul un Nissa v Mulo*, 6 A 250 (1884), *Roy Jotindra Nath v Rai Prasanna Kumar*, 11 C W N 1104 (1907). See also *Damodar v Gokul Chand*, 7 A 79, 93 (1881).

(2) *Rangasami v Mahalakshamma*, 14

M 391, 395, 396 (1890).

(3) *Gobardhan v Mano Bibi*, 5 B L R 76 (1870), *Thakoor Kapil Nath v The Government* 1 C 142 (1870), *Moorajee v Vazirajee*, 12 C 658 (1886), *Aghore Nath v Damodar Das*, 2 C W N xlvi. (1897).

could not, it was held, be made before the High Court, but the Judicial Committee might deal with the question when the whole case was before them (1)

For the rule as to transmission of evidence and other documents, see clause 42 of the Charter. The Charters of the High Courts expressly require that the reasons of their decisions should be recorded by the Judges and transmitted for the information of the Privy Council with the records (2). All costs and expenses unnecessarily occasioned by the inclusion in the transcript sent from India of matters improperly introduced therein will be disallowed (3).

All petitions and applications connected with appeals to His Majesty in Council except *Mookarnamas* should be drawn up in the English language. Security bonds are not made a part of the proceedings transmitted to England, and so need not be drawn up in that language (4). Where an appeal to the Privy Council has been admitted against a regular decree made in appeal, such proceedings as applications for review of the judgment and the order of the Court should not form part of the transcript, and should not be sent to England with the record of the original appeal to the Privy Council (5). Nor will the appellant be allowed to refer to or read as evidence in the appeal to the Privy Council the documents tendered to the Court on the application for the review of judgment as the order refusing such application has not been appealed from (6). Where the Court of first instance framed and decided several issues, and the High Court on appeal confined their decision to the questions which in their opinion governed the case, leaving other issues undecided as not affecting the result of the suit, only so much of the original records as properly bore upon and might be natural for the decisions of the questions of law, decided by the High Court and the subject of the appeal, should, it was held, be printed and transmitted (7).

9. At any time before the admission of the appeal, the Court may, upon cause shown, revoke the acceptance of any such security, and make further directions thereon.

10. Where at any time before the admission of an appeal the power to order further security or payment but before record, in Council, such security appears inadequate,

(1) *Ratan Koer v. Chotay Narain*, 21 C 176 (1894).

(2) *Katcha Kaley v. Kachuryaya*, 12 W I A 191, 502 (1869), *Fayez Hossein v. Rowshan Jehan*, 10 W R (F B) 1, 4 (1863).

(3) *Tarakant v. Puddomonee*, 10 W I A 176, 489 (1866), *a.c.* 5 W R P C 67.

(4) *Meer Mahomed Luker v. Iuchmeesut*, 7 W P 291, 292 (1867). For rule as to transmission of copies of evidence and other documents, see cl. 42 of the charter.

(5) *Shukh Imal Ali v. Kooty Begum*,

2 W I A 1, 7 (1811-42), *Fayez Hossein v. Rowshan Jehan*, 10 W R (F B) 1, 4 (1863), *Fakherooddeen Mahomed v. Nuy moonshan*, 11 W R 145 (1869), in this decision a case is cited in which such proceedings were sent for by the Privy Council under the special circumstances of that case.

(6) *Shukh Imal Ali v. Kooty Begum*, *supra*.

(7) *Yenkata Surya Mahipati v. Govt of Waris*, 20 A 101 (1897), *a.c.* 20 W 397.

or further payment is required for the purpose of translating, transcribing, printing, indexing or transmitting the copy of the record, except as aforesaid

the Court may order the appellant to furnish, within a time to be fixed by the Court, other and sufficient security, or to make, within like time, the required payment.

11. Where the appellant fails to comply with such order, is

Effect of failure to
 comply with order

an order in this beha

and in the meantime execution of the decree appealed from shall not be stayed

12. When the copy of the record, except as aforesaid, is

Refund of balance
 deposit.

has been transmitted to His Majesty in Council, the appellant may obtain a refund of the balance (if any) of the amount which he has deposited under rule 7.

Security and deposit.—See notes to r 7, ante

13 (1) Notwithstanding the grant of a certificate for the

Powers of Court pend-
 ing appeal.

admission of any appeal the decree appealed from shall be unconditionally executed unless the Court otherwise directs

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, on special cause shown by any party interested in the suit or otherwise appealing to the Court,—

(a) impound any moveable property in dispute or any part thereof, or

(b) allow the decree appealed from to be executed, taking such security from the respondent as the Court thinks fit for the due performance of any order which His Majesty in Council may make on the appeal, or

(c) stay the execution of the decree appealed from, taking such security from the appellant as the Court thinks fit for the due performance of the decree appealed from, or of any order which His Majesty in Council may make on the appeal or

(d) place any party seeking the assistance of the Court under such conditions or give such other direction respecting the subject-matter of the appeal, as it thinks fit, by the appointment of a Receiver or otherwise

"The grant of a certificate"—It was evident from the express terms of sect 608 of the last Code that the intention of the Legislature was to confer on the High Court the powers therein indicated only in the event of the appeal having been already admitted. The Calcutta High Court accordingly uniformly refused to grant any application under that section before an appeal was finally admitted (1). But the Bombay High Court held that it could order stay of execution of its decree when only the necessary petition for admission had been presented, but that petition had not come before the Court and the appeal had not been declared admitted (2). Under the section as it now stands the application may be made before the appeal is finally admitted under r 8. It was formerly doubted whether the High Court could act under this rule where the appeal had not been certified by itself, but special leave had been granted by the Privy Council (3). But it has now been held by the Privy Council that the High Court has power to stay execution in such a case (4). The Calcutta High Court has held that it has no power to stay proceedings in a suit following a preliminary decree for partition against which it has granted leave to appeal to the Privy Council, and that the latter alone can do so since it has seisin of the appeal (5).

Preservation of property pending appeal—The principle which underlies all orders for the preservation of property pending litigation is that the successful party in the litigation—that is, the ultimately successful party—is to reap the fruits of that litigation and not obtain merely a barren success (6). Property may be thus preserved either by taking possession of it when moveable under clause (a) taking security for its restitution under clause (b) by stay of execution under clause (c), or by making such other order as may be necessary (and as to this the Court is given a complete discretion) under clause (d).

"Taking such security," clause (b)—The object of security being taken from the holder of a decree from which an appeal has been preferred to the Privy Council is to indemnify the appellant for any loss he may suffer owing to the execution being taken out by the decree holder during the pendency of the appeal in the Privy Council. It is therefore only on the execution of the decree that the surety becomes liable. If the decree holder, after applying for execution of the decree, does not take any further steps for execution and the decree remains unexecuted, the terms of the security bond falls to the ground, and the surety cannot in any way be made liable for costs or anything else.

(1) *Jarao Kumari v. Gopi Chand* 5 C. W. N. 502 (1900). See *Burra Lal v. Court of Wards* 18 W. R. 289 (1871) per Paul, J.

(2) *Damo Janbai v. Sab Mahomed*, 19 B. 10 (1894).

(3) *Mohesh v. Safrughan*, 26 F. A. 281, 283 (1899).

(4) *Nityamoni v. Mallikarjun P. C.* 34 F. A. 71 (1911) cf. 74 C. 775 (1911), and see *Nanika Kashori Singh v. I. Am. C. I. am. Sahu* 10 C. 255 (1912) inherent power to stay

execution in view of an application for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council (5) *Lalteswar v. Dabshewar*, 13 C. W. N. 630 (1900).

(6) *Mt. Bry Coon v. Ramrick Das* 5 C. W. N. 791 (1901) and the cases there cited in argument. The Privy Council came to it at p. 789 and held that the principle is laid down in the English decisions as to stay and security have their application.

awarded by the High Court (1) The Court may require security although possession of the property in dispute has been already obtained without the giving of security (2) Security to the extent of the whole sum decreed need not always be taken from the decree holder When security is taken for less than the full amount decreed, the decree holder should be restrained from using process of execution with a view to realizing any sum in excess of the amount for which security is given (3) The ordinary practice is that calculation is made for an amount sufficient to meet the mesne profits which are to go to the hands of the decree holder from the date of his obtaining possession to the probable date of the eventual execution of the decree of the Privy Council That period is generally taken to be three years (4) A Hindu widow's interest in her husband's estate has been refused as such security (5) Judges in reporting upon the securities, should state particulars of the documents which have been produced and proved before them and upon which the title of the surety appears to be made out but they need not transmit to the High Court the documents produced before them (6) The High Court under whose directions security has been taken can release a surety, a District Judge has no right to do so (7) A judgment debtor, pending an appeal to the Privy Council, having been ordered by the High Court to furnish security within two months, put in a petition in the District Court on the last day allowed by the order, tendering a *dur panti mehal* as security and on the following day gave an unregistered security bond which was rejected by the Judge on the grounds that the bond was unregistered and 'there being no guarantee that the property pledged will turn out available Held that the bond offered as security was not required to be registered until the security had been accepted and before rejecting it the Judge should direct an investigation into the sufficiency or otherwise of the property tendered (8) In the case cited it was held that the provisions of the Contract Act relating to revocation of a surety were inapplicable to a person who had stood as a surety under this rule because there was no personal guarantee given by him (9)

Stay of execution, clause (c)—See *ante* *Preservation of property pending appeal* After the admission of an appeal to the Privy Council with leave granted by a High Court application for stay of execution of a decree pending an appeal to His Majesty in Council ought always to be made in the first instance at any rate to the Court in India which has ample power to deal with the matter according to the circumstances of the particular case and has knowledge of details which the Privy Council cannot possess on an interlocutory

(1) *Nuffer Chunder v. Soorendro Nath Roy* 14 W. R. 410 411 (1870)

(2) *Hukum Chand Baid v. Kamalanath Singh* 3 C. L. J. 61, 73 ---79 (1905) and cases there cited including *Jarrut ool Begum v. Hosseine Begum* 10 Moo. I. & 196 (1902) (1865)

(3) *Molka v. Sumpat*, 6 W. R. Misc. 62 (1866)

(4) *Ameeroonissa v. Dunne* 14 W. P. 361 (1871)

(5) *Phool Koer v. Dabee Pershad* 12 W. 1 187 (1869) see also *Indar Kuar v. Lalta Prasad* 4 A. J. 337 (1882) at p. 542

(6) In the matter of *Ameeroonissa* 14 W. 1 91 (1870)

(7) *Abedoonissa Khatoon v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon* 17 W. P. 464 (1872)

(8) *Dunne v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon* 13 W. R. 41 (1870)

(9) *Narayanan v. Arunachellam* 19 M. 140 143 (1876)

application Where, on an application, the High Court made an order "that execution be stayed for three months from this date so as to give the defendants an opportunity to apply to the Privy Council for stay of execution," the Judicial Committee held that the application should have been made to the Court in India, but acting upon the suggestion of the High Court, their Lordships recommended stay of execution on terms (1) The Privy Council stated that they could not stay execution, but where special leave was given they have advised it (2) But where, after the declaration that an appeal has been admitted, an application for stay of execution was rejected (the Judges hearing the application differing in their opinion, and the adverse judgment of the Senior Judge prevailing) on a petition for special leave to appeal, the Judicial Committee, being of opinion that as the two judges in the High Court had differed in opinion, the discretion of the High Court had not in fact been exercised, made an order for stay of execution (3) And where the High Court refused to make an order for want of jurisdiction in an appeal not certified by itself, the Judicial Committee advised the grant of an order of stay (4) The under mentioned case dealt with the procedure to be followed where there was an order of Court to stay the execution of a decree obtained by a party who had appealed to the Privy Council from another decree against himself if the

execute it (5)

obtained a rule

was given, when

against the decree holder in the matter of time, limitation not running against him until the result of the appeal was known, or the rule otherwise fell to the ground (6) An application for staying execution for costs pending an appeal is not granted as a matter of course unless evidence be adduced to show that the respondent to the appeal will be unable to repay the amount levied by execution, if the appellant be successful, such an application is in England not granted (7)

"Such other direction," clause (d) —The words "*by the appointment of a receiver or otherwise*" have been added, thus authorizing the High Courts in India to grant such relief when necessary This provision as well as the others would appear to apply to appeals certified by the High Court itself, when a certificate was refused, but special leave was granted by the Judicial Committee The latter said that it was impracticable that they should directly

matter, and an intimation to them would be effective; on which, in

(1) *Vasudeva Modehar v. Shadagopu*, 29 W. 379 (1906), s. c., 1 C. L. J. 101, 10 C. W. N. 915

(2) *Maharani Indu Kumari v. Maharani Tajal Kumari* 14 I. A. 1, s. c., 14 C. 290, 295 (1886), and see *Nityamoni v. Madhusudan*, P. C., 38 I. A. 71 (1911)

(3) *Chutrajit Singh v. Dwarka Nath Ghosh* 21 I. A. 170, s. c., 22 C. 1 (1904)

(1) *Mohesh Chandra v. Satukhan Didi* 26 I. A. 281, 283 (1899), and see *Nityamoni v. Madhusudan*, P. C., 38 I. A. 71 (1911)

(5) *Dwarkanath v. Wooma* s. c. *lure* 14 W. R. 323 (1870)

(C) *Ganesh Dutt Singh v. Muzzeer Dutt Choudhry*, 19 W. R. 186 (1873)

(7) *Barker v. Lavery* (1885) 11 Q. B. 719

being in possession a stay of proceedings would keep the position of things intact. Where the High Court had no jurisdiction it could not be directed to act but their Lordships ordered a stay of proceedings (1). The High Court can it would seem make an order for restitution under this clause as to that part of the decree which has been executed (2).

14 (1) *Where at any time during the pendency of the appeal the security furnished by either party appears inadequate the Court may, on the application of the other party, require further security.*

(2) In default of such further security being furnished as required by the Court,—

(a) if the original security was furnished by the appellant the Court may, on the application of the respondent execute the decree appealed from as if the appellant had furnished no such security,

(b) if the original security was furnished by the respondent the Court shall so far as may be practicable stay the further execution of the decree, and restore the parties to the position in which they respectively were when the security which appears inadequate was furnished or give such directions respecting the subject matter of the appeal as it thinks fit.

15 (1) *Whoever desires to obtain execution of any order or decree of His Majesty in Council shall apply by petition accompanied by a certified copy of the decree passed or order made in appeal and sought to be executed to the Court from which the appeal to His Majesty was preferred.*

(2) Such Court shall transmit the order of His Majesty in Council to the Court which passed the first decree appealed from or to such other Court as His Majesty in Council by such order may direct and shall (upon the application of either party) give such directions as may be required for the execution of the same and the Court to which the said order is so transmitted shall execute it accordingly in the manner and according to the provisions applicable to the execution of its original decrees.

(3) When any monies expressed to be payable in British currency are payable in India under such order the amount so

(1) *Mohesh v Satrup*, 1877 C 14 4 s.c.
66 I A 281 4 C W N 34 (1899)

(2) *Aslanulla v Karoonamoy*, 1 C L P 109 (1879). The provisions of this rule

are wider than those of the Regulation of 179 as to which see *Rakshent Barla*
Dabce 6 W R Mac 111 (1870)

payable shall be estimated according to the rate of exchange for the time being fixed at the date of the making of the order by the Secretary of State for India in Council with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury for the adjustment of financial transactions between the Imperial and the Indian Governments

"Shall apply by petition"—The practice with respect to the decrees of His Majesty in Council is as follows. The original decree is given to the successful party, or to one of the successful parties to the appeal. That is brought to India and it is the duty of the person to whom it is given to file that original decree in the High Court from the decision of which the appeal was preferred and that being done the proper officer of that High Court will be able to give a certified copy or the Registrar of the Judicial Committee will be able to do the same. In this case it was also held that where the party, to file it, a copy, though not certified may. The party then applies by petition accom

"Certified copy"—A mere copy of the printed judgment is not sufficient (2). The provision cannot be construed as restricting the only possible evidence to the certified copy but as directory words with the object of ensuring that proper information upon the subject of any order in Council should be supplied to the Court in India. See last paragraph.

"To the Court from which the appeal to His Majesty was made to the High Court and if proper are invalid (3). If an application it to hold his hands and refer the parties to the High Court (4). It is the duty of the High Court to give directions for executing the decree to the Court of first instance (5).

"Shall transmit."—When a decision of the Judicial Committee has been reported to His Majesty and has been sanctioned and embodied in an order of Council it becomes the decree or order of the final Court of Appeal and it is the duty of every subordinate tribunal to whom the order is addressed to carry it into execution (6). In receiving and filing for the purpose of executing an order of His Majesty in Council made on appeal from an order or decree of the Court of first instance the latter Court does not exercise a discretionary power, but performs a function of a purely ministerial character. The Court to which an order in Council is transmitted for execution is to enforce or execute in the manner and according to the rules applicable

(1) Hurrish & Kish Sunkari 10 I A 4 15, s.c. 9 C 482 (1882)

(2) In re Naran (see Golak Chunder Myles 20 W R 414 (1873) Jagganath & J. K. Roy, 5 C 32 (1890)

(3) In re Naran (see Golak 20 W R 10.

(1874)

(4) Habbesh Bahar (where the High Court

22, (1867)

(5) Barlow v. Ogle 18 W R 170 (1872)

(6) In re Naran 10 I A 4 (1874)

483 (1880)

the execution of its original decrees (1) The Court which formerly had, but no longer has, territorial jurisdiction ought, when the decree is sent to it, to transfer the decree for execution to the Court which has territorial jurisdiction But the question whether or not the decree ought to be sent direct from the High Court to the Court having territorial jurisdiction was not decided (2) When the Privy Council remits a case to India with directions that the District Court may arrive at certain results by certain inquiries, the objects and reasons of those inquiries, as set forth in the judgment of the Privy Council, are part of the judicial record, and may be forwarded to the District Court with the decree of the Privy Council (3) Where the Privy Council, being doubtful whether the respondents were, on the face of the plaint, entitled by Mahomedan law to the full amount claimed by them left the matter to be determined by the High Court in execution, the latter, being satisfied that the doubt had arisen simply from a slip in the English translation of the plaint, allowed the respondents to take out execution for the whole amount (4) Where a judgment of the Privy Council ordered execution for mesne profits to be taken out first against one particular defendant (J), and only on failure to obtain satisfaction from him against the others *held* that before the assets of the former (J) had been exhausted, attachment could not issue against the property of the latter even by way of a preliminary and protective step The inquiry whether or not the assets of (J) have been exhausted should be made by calling upon the other defendants to show cause why execution should not issue against them (5)

"In the manner and according to the provisions — thus where pending an appeal to the Privy Council certain property forming part of the subject matter of the suit in which such appeal had been preferred was sold by auction in execution of a money decree against the plaintiff who held the decree of the High Court under appeal and the appeal to the Privy Council was decreed *held* that the successful appellant was entitled to recover the property sold as mentioned above by an application under the corresponding former section read with sect 241 (now 47) and this right was not affected by the fact that the auction purchasers were not parties to the decree of the Privy Council (6)

"Rate of exchange" — Rate of exchange for the time being fixed at the date of the making of the order by the Secretary of State The portion italicized was not in the former section and has been introduced as there were conflicting decisions on the question of the date for fixing the rate In the case (7) cited the words 'for the time being' were construed to mean the year in which

(1) Premalal Mullick v Sumbhoonath 11
22 C 960 972 (1893), Gooroo Suran v
Hunooman Pershad 20 W R 419 (1873)
Garurduj v Baiju Mal 28 A 337 339
(1906)

(2) Gurindra Chunder Poy v Jarawa
Kumar, 20 C 105 (1891)

(3) Goluck Chunder v Mohun Lal 5 W
R 271 (1866)

(4) M v Mozaff Ali, int A Crooness
1 W R 340 (18 2)

(5) Dhunput Singh v Forbes 2 W 1
104 (1874)

(6) Garurduj Prasad Singh v Baiju Mal
28 A 337, 339 (1906)

(7) Param Sukh v Ramloval 5 A 60,
62 (1880)

costs and interest expressly. But if no provision for interest on the specific sum mentioned, as costs in the Privy Council, is made in the order of the Privy Council, then no interest will be allowed on that sum (1) On the other hand, if the decree of the Privy Council and the decree of the local Court, confirmed by the Privy Council, are silent on the question of interest, no interest will be allowed (2) Where a decree of the Privy Council gives interest, but does not clearly specify the rate, the Court should ascertain if possible, from other parts of the decree itself, or from other documents which may be read in conjunction with the decree, what rate was intended to be given (3) When an appeal to the Privy Council was allowed by the High Court in a suit instituted by a Hindu widow as the guardian of her husband's adopted son, then a minor, but who on attaining majority petitioned for the withdrawal of the appeal, this petition also referred to the Judicial Committee and on the petition of the respondent the appeal was dismissed by the Privy Council, the costs incurred by the widow being ordered to be recouped from the adopted son's estate (4) If a suit is dismissed on a preliminary point in the Court of the first instance, and this decree is confirmed by the Appellate Court in India but set aside by the Privy Council and the case is remanded for the trial of the suit, a refund of the costs which have been taxed and paid under the reversed decrees may be ordered by the Court of first instance, on motion (5) The third and fourth paragraphs of the former section as to the execution of a decree for costs against a surety have been omitted The Legislature by Act VII of 1888 made express provision with regard to matter coming under sects 549, 610 of the former Code by declaring that the liabilities of a surety for costs might be enforced in execution of a decree of the particular Court in the same manner as if he were a party to the appeal, but the Calcutta High Court held that a security bond given by a third party for the due performance of the decree of the Appellate Court under sect 546 of the last Code could not be enforced in execution of that decree (6) The matter is now regulated by sect 145, *ante* See notes thereto A surety is not precluded from questioning

(1) *Muddun Tnahoor v Morrison*, 18 W R 253 (1872), s. c. 9 B L R 4p 22, cf. *Dakhina Mohun v Saroda Mohun*, 23 C 357, 360 (1896), following *Forester v Secretary of State*, cf., however, *Nil Madhub v Bissumbhur*, 21 W R 411 (1874), where Jackson, J., allowed interest though the Privy Council decree was silent about it

(2) *Lekhraj v Mahtab Chander*, 21 W R 147 (1874), *Dakhina Mohun v Saroda Mohun*, 23 C 357 (1896) In this case it is not mentioned whether the decree of the local Court confirmed by the Privy Council, allowed interest or not See also *Broja Sundaree v Anand Moree*, 16 W R 302 (1871) [cite in *Forester v Secretary of State*, 3 C 161 170 (1877)], *Amceeroonissa v Meer Mahomed*, 18 W R 103 (1872), *Mahtab Chander v Lalm Lall* 3 C 351 (1877).

Gooroo Dass Roy v Stephens, 21 W R 190 (1874)

(3) *Amceeroonissa v Meer Mahomed*, 18 W R 103 (1872)

(4) *Bastopria v Kund Dhul*, 13 M I A 602 (1870)

(5) *Dorab Ally v Abdool Azeez* 3 C L I. 358 (1871) s. c. 4 C 229 In this case interest was allowed on the amount to be refunded at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the order made on motion till realization But interest from the time when the money was paid was not allowed

(6) *Surjoo Das v Balmukund* 23 C 212 215 (1896) The decision in the case of *Padma Parshad Singh v Phuljari Koer*, 12 C 402 was superseded by Act VII of 1888 sect 58 amending sect 610 of the last Code

the validity of the security bond in execution proceedings, as he was not a party to the order of the High Court, and if the bond is invalid it cannot be enforced against the surety.(1)

Mesne profits, interest—It is settled law that where a decree is silent touching interest on mesne profits subsequent to the institution of the suit, the Court executing the decree cannot assess or give execution for such interest or mesne profits.(2)

16. The orders made by the Court which executes the order of His Majesty in Council, relating to such execution, shall be appealable in the same manner and subject to the same rules as the orders of such Court relating to the execution of its own decrees

Appeal—An appeal to the Privy Council will lie as of right from the order of a single Judge of the High Court as to execution of a decree of the Privy Council when the property is over Rs 10,000 (3) Whether or not an order under the rule is a ministerial proceeding, if a judicial discretion is exercised thereunder, it may amount to a "judgment" under sect 15 of the Charter and may be appealable. If in such exercise of judicial discretion a Judge usurps jurisdiction, that alone would be a valid ground of appeal (4)

(1) *Guindra Nath Mukerjee v Bojaj Gopal* 28 C 216, 249, s c 3 C W N 34 (1898)

(2) *Sada Siva Pillai v Ramalinga Pillai*, 2 I A 219, 15 B L R 393, 24 W R 193 (1875), *Ram Kanyo v Gooroo Prasunno* 16 W R 30, 31 (1871), *Fakharuddin v Official Trustee of Bengal*, 8 C 178 (1881), *Chunder Coomar v Gonesh*, 13 C 283, 200 (1886), but see *Leelanund Singh v Lakshmi put* 14 W R P C 23, s c, 5 B L R 605, 13 M I A 490, 496 (1870), *Gooroo Dass Poy v Stephens* 21 W R 195 (1874), *Tarmonco v Radha Jeebun* 14 W R 485 (1870), *Lati Koor v Sobultra*, 3 C 720, 725 (1873), *Gogun Chunder v Lallay*, 5 C L R 189,

191 (1879), *Arunachellam v Arunachellam* 15 W 293 (1891) See index and see 'Mesne Profits'

(3) *Lalanand v Luckimpur Sing & B L F* 605, 608, s c, 13 M I A 490 (1870), and cf *Leelanund v Lakshmi put*, 14 W R P C 23

(4) *Harrish Chunder v Kish Sundarl* 10 I A 4, 16, 17, s c, 8 C 482 (1842) Such cases to be distinguished from those in which a single Judge grants a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and

..

..

ORDER XLVI

Reference.

1. *Where*, before or on the hearing of a suit or an appeal ^{is} in which the decree is *not subject to appeal*, or ^{Reference of question to High Court} *where*, in the execution of any such decree, any question of law or usage having the force of law arises, on which the Court trying the suit or appeal, or executing the decree, entertains reasonable doubt, the Court may, either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained, and refer such statement with its own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court

2. The Court may either stay the proceedings or proceed ^{is} in the case notwithstanding such reference, ^{Court may pass decree contingent upon decision of High Court} and may pass a decree or *make an order* contingent upon the *decision* of the High Court on the point referred, but no *decree or order* made shall be executed in any case in which such reference is made until the receipt of a copy of the judgment of the High Court upon the reference

Reference—Any Judge may make a reference provided the terms of the rule are complied with (1) This rule applies only when doubts arise in the hearing of a suit or appeal or execution or other proceeding. It was not intended to apply to supposititious cases, which do not actually arise in a proper proceeding before the Court (2) It does not authorize a reference except on a point arising in a litigation between parties or in a matter wherein the Court is called on to adjudicate that is to pronounce on the opposite pretensions of contending parties (3) So it has been held not to apply to an application by the alleged trustee of a mosque for permission to grant a lease of lands alleged

(1) See Abdul Cufur v. Albyn, 30 C. 713 (1903) [reference by Munsif], Malamad Haji Zakaria v. Ahmadbhai 25 B 327 (1900) [reference by District Judge].

(2) Mahamud Haji Zakaria v. Ahmadbhai supra s. c., 3 Bom. L. R. 265. S. 28, Act

XXIII of 1861 was held not to apply to applications for review. Bonomally Deo v. Ram Sadov 1, W. I. 90 (1872)

(3) Yashwant Narayan v. De Souza 12 I. 4 (1887)

to belong to the mosque, (1) or to an order fining a pleader (2). The proceeding in which the reference is made must be one in which there may be a decree (3) and in which such decree, when passed, is final (4). For in appealable cases a remedy to correct possible error is provided by the appeal. The question must be one of law, and the Court cannot make a reference on a point merely on the application of the parties unless it entertains a reasonable doubt upon the matter, (5) nor on a point on which a Division Bench of the High Court has expressed an opinion (6). A Judge cannot ordinarily entertain a reasonable doubt on a point clearly decided by the rulings of the High Court of his Presidency, unless the authority of the decision can be questioned by virtue of anything said or decided in the Privy Council (7). In r 1 the words "*or the construction of a document which construction may affect the merits*" have been omitted as they are sufficiently covered by the power to refer any question of law. The alterations in r 2 are verbal only. It has been held that a Collector hearing an application under sect. 23 of the Bombay Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906, has no power to make a reference to the High Court, not being a Court trying a suit or appeal or executing a decree (8).

Presidency Small Cause Courts—Sect. 69 of Act XV of 1882 provides for a compulsory reference where the Judges differ in opinion as to any question of law or construction of a document affecting the merits, and also where in suits exceeding Rs. 500 in amount or value, any such question arises upon which the Court entertains reasonable doubt, and either party so requires (9). The provisions of rr. 3-5, so far as they are applicable, are deemed to apply as if such reference had been made under the present rules. It was formerly said (10) not to be an easy matter to make sect. 69 dovetail with the present rules and divergent views (11) were entertained upon the question whether

(1) *Mahamad Haji Zakeria v. Ahmadbhai*, 25 B. 327 (1900).

(2) *Yashwanth Narayan v. De Souza*, 12 B. 78 (1887).

(3) See *Ramphul v. Durga*, 7 A. 816 (1885).

(4) *Krishna Nath v. Ram Kumar*, 7 C. L. R. 144 (1880) [where the matter referred could be made subject of second appeal], *Secretary of State v. Fazal Ali* 18 C. 234, 236, 239 (1891) [objection overruled], *Mahant Ishwargar v. Chudusama Manabhai*, 12 B. 30 (1887) [amount of security required on grant

55 (1888).

(7) *Bhanaji v. De Brito*, 30 B. 226 (1903).

Fillingham v. Dunn, 8 P. R. 22 (1914).

(8) *Dalpat Zopuloo v. Mahadu Uka* 14 Bom. I. R. 259 (1911).

(9) See *Benode Lal v. River Steam Navigation Co.* 1 C. W. N. 113 (1897); *Ishwardas Tribhovandas v. Kalidas Bhandas*, 20 B. 770 (1896); *Ralli Bros v. Goculbhai Mulchand*, 15 B. 376 (1890); *Oakshott v. British India Steam Navigation Co.* 15 N. 170 (1881); *as v. 175 (1890)*.

Oriental Loan Association v. Hatch, 17 B. 13 (1892) [a question arising in execution cannot be referred except where the decree is final] *In re Monohur Mookerjee*, 5 C. 756 (1879) [order on application for Probate not being final cannot be referred]; *as v.* 6 C. L. P. 229.

(5) *Cf. Hurish Chundker v. O'Brien* 14 W. R. 218 (1870).

(6) *Naru Keli v. Chima Bhoi*, 13 B. 54.

(10) *Girling v. Secretary of State* (1903), at p. 461.

(11) See *Benode Lal v. River Steam Navigation Co.* *supra*, *Girling v. Secretary of State*, 30 C. 159 (1903), *contra* *Lalli Bros v. Goculbhai Mulchand*, 15 B. 376 (1890) at 176, *as v.* *Mathura Das*, 15 C. at p. 21 (1899).

sect 69 was controlled by them. It is now unnecessary to further consider the matter as by Act IV of 1906 the Presidency Small Court Act was amended with a view to remove the difficulties which had been experienced.

3 The High Court, *after hearing the parties if they appear and desire to be heard*, shall decide the point so referred, and shall transmit a copy of its judgment, under the signature of the Registrar, to the Court by which the reference was made, and such Court shall, on the receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with the decision of the High Court.

Judgment of High Court to be transmitted and case disposed of accordingly

"After hearing the parties"—The rule has here been altered as the language of the former section might if strictly interpreted require a hearing of the parties even though they had not appeared.

"Dispose of the case"—The word "case" in the last part of the rule refers to "the case" in the first part showing that what is intended is the suit and not the subject of the reference (1). Where the Small Cause Court passed a decree for the plaintiffs, but contingent on the opinion of the High Court and on the reference the latter decided that upon the plaint before the Court the plaintiffs could not recover it was held that the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to allow the suit to be withdrawn but on receipt of the copy of the judgment of the High Court was bound to enter judgment for the defendants. Had the case been referred in an intermediate stage the final judgment being withheld until the decision on the point referred to the High Court the Small Cause Court would then have been in possession of the case but having pronounced judgment contingent upon the opinion of the High Court which opinion was against that judgment there was only one course to take (2).

Review—The judgment passed by the High Court is not a decree or order within clause (b) of O XLVII r 1 but simply a statement of the grounds in conformity with which the Subordinate Judge is to dispose of the case as provided by this rule (3). A review is expressly given by that order and rule in the case of a judgment on a reference from a Court of Small Causes but not one from a Subordinate Judge exercising the powers of a Small Cause Court (4).

4 The costs (if any) consequent on a reference for the *decision of the High Court* shall be costs in the case.

Costs of reference to High Court

Costs—Costs "in the case" means costs of the suit or appeal as in r 1 this rule being the one under which the costs are dealt with and the costs being

(1) Gul & C. v. Mal omel Hossain 24 C L.R. (1896)
(2) 11

(3) Pamchandera Balaji v. S. Garam Vinnak 10 B.L.R. (1885)
(4) 11

made costs in this case (1) Under this rule the costs of a reference cannot be dealt with separately, but must be dealt with when awarding the costs of the suit. They are, however, in the discretion of the Court, and need not necessarily follow the event of the suit (2)

- 1] 5. Where a case is referred to the High Court under rule 1, the High Court may return the case for amendment, and may alter, cancel or set aside any decree or order which the Court making the reference has passed or made in the case out of which the reference arose, and make such order as it thinks fit

"Amendment"—The case may be returned for amendment, as in the decision noted below (3)

- 6 (1) Where at any time before judgment a Court in which a suit has been instituted doubts whether the suit is cognizable by a Court of Small Causes or is not so cognizable, it may submit the record to the High Court with a statement of its reasons for the doubt as to the nature of the suit

(2) On receiving the record and statement, the High Court may order the Court either to proceed with the suit or to return the plaint for presentation to such other Court as it may in its order declare to be competent to take cognizance of the suit

7. (1) Where it appears to a District Court that a Court subordinate thereto has, by reason of erroneously holding a suit to be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes or not to be so cognizable, failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, or exercised a jurisdiction not so vested, the District Court may, and if required by a party shall, submit the record to the High Court with a statement of its reasons for considering the opinion of the subordinate Court with respect to the nature of the suit to be erroneous

(2) On receiving the record and statement the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit

(3) With respect to any proceedings subsequent to decree in any case submitted to the High Court under this rule the

(1) N. I. Matl. or a Dist. District Court
(1888) at 110
(2) Id.
(3) Clerk, Secretary of State, 10

478 (1907) 1001 1001 1001 1001
C. 1001 1001 1001 1001
1001

High Court may make such order as in the circumstances appears to it to be just and proper

(4) A Court subordinate to a District Court shall comply with any requisition which the District Court may make for any record or information for the purposes of this rule

Power to refer—Act VII of 1888 sect 60 Rule 6 applies only to a case before judgment (1)

Submission for revision—It has been held by the Madras (2) and Calcutta (3) High Courts that the Judge is bound to make a reference if one of the parties requires him to do so. The Allahabad Court has however held that the word "shall" in the former section was not mandatory but directory, and that before a District Court could make a reference under it it must be of opinion that the Subordinate Court has erroneously held upon the point of jurisdiction in regard to the particular suit before it and that therefore the matter was one in which the interference of the High Court should be sought (4). When a reference is made to the High Court under r 7 the Court which makes it should state its reasons for considering the opinion of the Subordinate Court with respect to the nature of the suit to be erroneous (5). Notwithstanding sect 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the High Court has on a case being submitted to it under this rule full power to consider the matter of jurisdiction or to deal with it on the merits so as to do substantial justice without putting the parties to the expense of a fresh trial. Where a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court was tried both in the Munsif's and District Judge's Court without objection to the jurisdiction held on a second appeal to the High Court that the former section must be read with sect 19 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act so as to modify its full effect in a case wrongly tried by an ordinary Civil Court and taken in appeal to the District Court both parties having submitted to the jurisdiction it was not competent to either of them on second appeal to plead the want of jurisdiction so as to render the proceedings taken in the suit void (6). In a suit for damages on account of use and occupation of land brought in a Court of Small Causes exception was taken to the plaintiff's title. The plaint was returned by the Judge under sect 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887) for presentation in the ordinary Civil Court and it having been presented to the Munsif, who tried the suit and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed that decree holding that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Held that under sect 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the order of the Small Cause Court Judge was regularly made and the Munsif had therefore jurisdiction to entertain the plaint. See *Ule*

(1) *Dawal Bai v. Salishivadas* 24 B 310 (1899) s. c. 1 Bom L. R. 836

(2) *Singh v. McMaister* 13 M 311 (1890) and the fact that an appeal lay to the District Judge from the order made by the District Munsif did not preclude him from making the reference. *Id.*, at p. 316

(3) *Surendra Chunder v. Krishna Lingam* 21 C. 249 251 (1893)

(4) *Madan Gopal v. Bhagwan Das* 11 A 301 (1888)

(5) *Chhotu v. Jawahir* 25 A 293 (1894)

(6) *Suresh Chunder v. Krishna Parani* 21 C. 249 (1893)

It is doubtful whether the Appellate Court would have been right in dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction, even supposing that the order made under sect 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act had not expressly conferred jurisdiction upon the Munsif (1) This rule does not apply to every case in which a Court of Small Causes has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, or has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, but only to a restricted number of such cases namely, those cases in which a Court of Small Causes has erroneously held a suit to be, or not to be, cognizable by it Where no question as to the Court's jurisdiction was raised by either party, and the Court of Small Causes proceeded to judgment as if the case was properly cognizable by it, the High Court refused to interfere upon a reference made by the District Judge purporting to be made under the former section (2) The rule is an enabling one, and does not cut down the jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal (3)

(1) *Mahamaya Dasya v Nitya Hari*, 23 C (1902)

425 (1895)

(3) *Sri Raja Simhadri v Chelazano Di*

(2) *Ram Lal v Kabul Singh*, 25 A 135 *drayya* 30 M 41 (1906)

ORDER XLVII.

Review.

1. (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

Application for review
of judgment.

(a) by a decree or order from which
an appeal is allowed, but from
which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is hereby
allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

Application for review of judgment—This rule corresponds with sect 376 of Act VIII of 1859. That section was modified by sect 623 of Act X of 1877, by which Act the sub clauses (a) (b), and (c) were substituted for “by a decree of a Court of original jurisdiction from which no appeal shall have been preferred to a Supreme Court, or by a decree of a District Court in appeal from which no appeal shall have been admitted by the Sudder Court or by a decree of the Sudder Court from which either no appeal may have been preferred to Her Majesty in Council, or an appeal having been preferred no proceedings in the suit have been transmitted to Her Majesty in Council,” the words *and important* “after the exercise of due diligence,” “or order made or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,” “or order made” and the second clause were

r 13) (1) When an appeal has been dismissed under sect 501 (now O 47 r 1) the Lower Court has no jurisdiction to review its judgment or decree that decree having merged in the decree of the Appellate Court (2) The Code of 1859 only referred to review of decrees but where a Judge had reviewed an order passed confirming a sale in execution of a decree the Privy Council did not treat that review as a nullity but dealt with the case on its merits (3)

Clause (a) —The admission of a special appeal debarred a review even though the person applying did not prefer the appeal (4) likewise if the special appeal has been tried and disposed of (5) In such a case the Lower Court could not review so as to modify the substance of its decree but it might for the purpose of correcting a clerical error, (6) but if a review be applied for in proper time and before an appeal has been preferred the Judge was held not prevented from proceeding upon the application for review by the subsequent presentation of an application to appeal to the Privy Council and he had full power and was bound to proceed under the application for review (7) but in that case the application for leave to appeal had not been granted and the Madras High Court formerly held that the preferring of an appeal subsequent to the application for review stays the review proceedings (8) But the Allahabad High Court apparently hold a contrary opinion for there an order passed on review purporting merely to amend the original decree was held to amount to a new decree superseding the original decree and an appeal filed pending review could not be heard as the decree under appeal had ceased to exist (9) A Full Bench of the Madras High Court has now held that the review proceedings are not stayed by the preferring of an appeal (10) An applicant may withdraw his appeal and apply for a review (11) as by the cancellation of the order for admission of the appeal it may be taken that no appeal had been admitted and if refused it is not where the appeal instead of being withdrawn is actually dismissed (12)

Clause (c) —This does not include a judgment on a reference from a Subordinate Court (13) The Madras

High Court has held that sect 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act is merely directory and not mandatory, (1) but the Calcutta High Court has held the contrary (2)

"Discovery of new and important matter or evidence — Though review is allowed on this ground the Privy Council have recently pointed out that the Code exacts strict conditions so as to prevent litigants lying on their oars when they ought to be looking for evidence (3) It must be shown that it is *prima facie* evidence in the cause (4) The new evidence must be clear and conclusive (5) It need not be sufficient *per se* to show that the previous decision was wrong or be such as to cause an overpowering balance of evidence in favour of the applicant (6) But the discovery of evidence not originally available tending to prove that a decree had been obtained by perjury is ground for an application for review (7) A judgment on special appeal cannot be reviewed merely on the ground that new evidence to prove a fact had been discovered (8) inasmuch as it would have been inadmissible to impeach the decree on the hearing of the special appeal itself (9) though it might be good ground for an application for review to the Lower Court (10)

There has been a conflict of decisions as to whether a new and authoritative exposition of the law is or is not new and important matter justifying the granting of a review. On the one hand it has been held that the publication of a decision subsequent to the case sought to be reviewed being decided was ground for a review (11) that where a review was sought on the strength of a Full Bench decision it should have been made within ninety days of that decision (12) and that where a review had been properly granted the case should be governed by any new exposition of the law laid down since the date of the original decision (13) also that the decision of the Privy Council in an appeal is new and important matter for the purposes of an application for review in respect of a decree made on a subsequent accrual of the same cause of action as that on which the decree appealed against was based (14) On the other hand it has been held that a subsequent Full Bench case overruling the authority on

(1) Ramasami v Kurisu 13 M L J 8 (1889)
(2) Jogi Ahir v Bishen Dayal 18 C 83 (1890)

(3) Kessowji Issur v G I Iv Co 11 C W N 21 (1902)

(4) Pam Dhum v Jov Nara 1 L W I 36 S B L I 111 Jo note (1869)

(5) Heera Lal v Iam Taruck 23 W I 33 (1875) see Mahabir Prasad v Collector of Allahabad 36 A 27 (1913) where a suit was dismissed on two grounds new evidence on one alone is not ground for review

(6) Inre Appa Rao 10 M J 131 A 100 (1886)

(7) Munsh Musulul v Surendra 10 C W N 100 (1912) Abdul Huq v Abdul Hafiz 14 C W N 105 (1910) Lakshmi v

Nar 11 JSC 36 (1911) 10 C W N 1010

(8) Bhyrub Nath v Kally Chunder 16 W I 11 (1881)

(9) Jackammal v Fainappa 3 M H C 461 (1880)

(10) Pa chanant Padha Nalb 4 I L J 213 (1850) Naik v R. Nar R. P. T. (1907) 3 A 71 (1907)

(11) Achuta v Mamma 10 M J 30 (1880) Banerjee v Padma Kersha 10 W I 143 (1881)

(12) Forbes v Dya utoolah 10 W F 410 (1868)

(13) Shama Churn v Bendabun 9 W I 151 (1868) Bura Loodho v Koylash Chund 6 W R 100 (1866)

(14) Waghela v Masulim 13 B 30 (1888) I am Lal v Kalka, 33 A 100 (1911)

which the judgment sought to be reviewed had been based (1) or the discovery of a fresh authority, (2) were not grounds for granting an application for review. In the last cited case it was, however, held that when a Court is satisfied that its judgment had proceeded upon an erroneous view of the law this rule allows a review. A new exposition of the law is, however, not a just and reasonable cause for not having applied for a review within the time prescribed for such application (3).

"After the exercise of due diligence"—This is the effect of the decisions in the cases cited (4) in the second of which it was held that although the petitioner stated he did not know of the existence of the evidence at the time the suit was tried it by no means followed that he ought not to have known of it and that if he had made due search he might not have discovered it.

"Could not be produced"—This must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court before it grants an application for review, (5) but an application for review having been admitted on other grounds fresh evidence may be received though no reason has been assigned for its non production at the original trial (6).

"At the time when the decree was passed"—This rule does not authorize the review of a decree which was right when made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event (7).

"Mistake or error"—If the mistake or error is on the face of the judgment or if it is shown that the decision has proceeded upon a mistaken view of the law (8) or if the error be on the face of the record (9) or on the face of the judgment or the decree it is clear that it is irregular and incorrect or not in compliance with the provisions of the law, a review lies (10). The absence of a formal finding on an issue tried and decided by a High Court is not an error calling for review of judgment (11).

"Any other sufficient reason."—Whilst an error on a point of law is a ground for review, (12) the reason is not confined to either positive error in law

- (1) *Amrit Lal v. Madho Das*, 6 A 292 (1851), see also *M. Hub Chunder v. Radha* 7 W R 105 (1867) *Dwarkanath v. Manick Chunder*, 9 W R 102 (1868).
- (2) *Vellaya v. Jaganatha*, 7 M 307 (1883), see also *Bance Persai v. Radha Pershad* 10 W L 113 (1871), *Chandl Charan v. Monoranjan* 17 C L J 416 (1913).
- (3) *Shanti Churn v. Bindabun*, 9 W R 181 (1863), *Bura Boodho v. Koylash Chund* 6 W R 100 (1860), *Luncharan v. Curudas* 9 B L R 167, 18 W R 317 (1842).
- (4) *S. Chaitanya v. Nam Soonlurte*, 14 W L R 6 B L R App 37 (18 0), *Heera Lal v. Iam Tarock*, 23 W R 323 (1875).
- (5) *Dwarkanath v. Kishorilal Marsh* 53 (1863), *Omrao Thakoor v. Gopal Munda* 16 W R 7 (1871), *Nubaki Durr v. Jaful Chunder*, 20 W R 426 (18 3).
- (6) *Bihari Lal v. Trailakhomaji* 3 B L R 1 C 316 (1869).
- (7) *Kotla v. Vellark* 24 W L, 2-1 1 107, 1 C W N 7-5 (1900); 2 Bom L 1 771.
- (8) *Sharup Chandra Paswanee*, 14 C 127 (1887).
- (9) *Husain v. Collector of Madras*, 11 A 175 (1869).
- (10) *Barham v. Banarsi* 3 C L J 110 (1907).
- (11) *Sahapattil v. Subraya* 2 M 58 (1875).
- (12) *Koh Poh v. Mung Tay* 10 W L 143 (1869).

or new evidence to be brought forward which could not be produced on the first hearing (1) And the cases do not limit the discretion of the Court in saying what reason is good and sufficient or what may be so far requisite to the ends of justice as to support an application for review (2) The Court must decide this in each case on its own circumstances The reason must be one sufficient to the Court before which the application for review is made It may depend upon a question of law or upon a question of fact or of mixed law and fact It is not limited only to the cases in which the right to review is extended in England (3) It cannot moreover, be treated as an universal rule that no point can be raised on an application for review which has already been discussed and decided on the original hearing or that no new point which was not raised on the hearing can be argued on the application for review In each case the Court must consider and decide whether a review is necessary to correct any evident error or omission or is otherwise requisite for the ends of justice (4) The following cases therefore are cited as instances only of the exercise of the power, which however is not limited to such cases Where a Court wrongly excluded material evidence (5) or refused to admit additional evidence on appeal, (6) or the parties and the Judge were under a misapprehension as to the contents of a document or the Judge alone was misled on the point, (7) or the Judge in deciding the case omitted to consider the effect of important documentary evidence filed with the plaint which was not taken issue upon and which materially affected the merits of the case (8) or the question of limitation (9) or discredited material documentary evidence without inspecting it or declared the report of a Commissioner unworthy of reliance because he was a muharrir (10) or omitted to try a point which was urged before him (11) by mistake, (12) or had placed the onus of proof on the wrong party (13) it was held that there was sufficient ground for granting a review As also in the case of omission to serve the respondent with notice of appeal and his consequent absence at the hearing (14) or the dismissal of a suit for non joinder of parties necessary under sect 8, of the Transfer of Property Act, (15) or the dismissal on the technical ground that the stamp was originally insufficient but which was subsequently found to have been sufficient, (16) or

(1) Reasut Hossein & Abdullah 2 C 131 31 A 221 (1876)

(2) Ib As to the generality of these terms see Gopal Chandra Lahiri & Solomon 13 C 62 (1886) and the case in next note

(3) Amur Hasan & Ahmal Al 9 A 36 (1886)

(4) Chitaman & Pyari Mohan 6 B L R 176 (1870) 15 W R F B 1 Bhawalal & Rajendra 5 B L R 321 (1870) Haree Pershad & Nankishore 17 W P 479 (1872) Kalu & Vashram 1 B 543 (1877)

(5) Reasut & Abdullah 2 C 140 31 A 221 (1876)

(6) Ram Lal & Pang Lal 17 W 147 (1871)

(7) Gopal Chandra & Solomon 13 C 62

(1886)

(8) Mahadeva & Sappant 1 B 6 & 12 & 13

(9) Ramu Bai & Dayal & Co 1 A

391 (1891)

(10) Abdul Rahim & Jussa 1 A 1

(1877)

(11) Hussan Ali & Son 1 A

131 (1871) 1 A 131 & 132

W R 223 (1877) 1 A 131

(12) Wise & Co 1 A 131

(13) Harikar & Son 1 A 131

P C 599 (1877)

(14) Chandra & Son 1 A 131

(15) Chandra & Son 1 A 131

83 (1877)

(16) Chandra & Son 1 A 131

A 131 & 132

where the point was raised for the first time in delivering judgment, (1) or the Judge had made an error in calculation, (2) or had based his decision on a decree which was subsequently set aside on appeal (3) The production of an authority, which ought to have been but which was not cited at the first hearing laying down a view of the law contrary to that taken by the Judge, is sufficient ground (4) though formerly it was held otherwise (5) So where the Privy Council had given an authoritative exposition at variance with the decision of the High Court on which the decree sought to be reviewed had been based a review was allowed (6)

A decree against a minor properly represented in the suit cannot be reopened on review by the minor on attaining majority, on the ground that the decree did not reserve an opportunity to him to show cause against it on attaining majority, (7) but otherwise where the Court passing the decree in terms of a compromise against a minor did not inquire into the circumstances which led to the filing of the petition of compromise nor granted any leave to compromise under sect 462 (now O XXXII r 7) (8) Where, however he seeks to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise made by his guardian and on which the decree was based was fraudulent, his remedy was formerly held to be by suit and not by way of review (9) But by a later decision it was held that fraud practised upon a party in connection with a petition of compromise was a good ground for reviewing the decree made thereon (10) A mistake in copying out a petition of compromise may not itself be a good ground for review but coupled with an allegation of fraud it is (11)

A review has been refused to be allowed on the ground that if the facts had been better or more fully placed before the Court the decision would have been different (12) even coupled with the fact that there was a subsequent decision of the Privy Council on the point the petition being seven years after the decision sought to be reviewed, (13) or merely to supply defects on the part of pleaders in their conduct of appeals, (14) or to enable the Court to reconsider its judgment on the same evidence, (15) or on the ground that the Court improperly neglected to examine a witness, if the objection was not taken when the case was heard by the Court of Appeal, (16) or that the Court's decision is contrary to the

(1) Gungapershad v Maharani 12 I A 71 (1891), Sulliman v New Oriental Bank, 17 B 274 (1890)

(2) Mirza Akbar v Mullick, 25 W R 63 (1875)

(3) Moorarjee v Mahomed Akmal 22 W R 101 (1874)

(4) Muhammad Yusuf v Abdul Rahman, 16 I A 101 (1889), Jatra v Aukhil 21 C 336 (1896)

(5) Illem v Basheer, 1 C 185, 21 W R 382 (1875)

(6) Ranco Pershad v Ratha Pershad 15 W P 113 (1871)

(7) Curranias v Lakshmi 10 B 71 (1881)

(8) Barhamlen v Bannarjee 3 C 1, 110 (1901), see also Kushtosh v Tara Prayana 10 C 612 (1881)

(9) Ib

(10) Pask Chandra v Rajani Ram 10 C W N 286 (1907)

(11) Ib

(12) Chunder Churn v Jeebhoyram 25 W R 321 (1870)

(13) Jadub Ratta Rati Lochun 19 W 1 189 (1873)

(14) Poonnonnath v Jeebhoy 10 W R 589 (1874)

(15) Jachman v Mian 2 A 203 (1870)

(16) Munshi v Jeebhoy 10 W 1 12 (1868)

weight of evidence (1) The Privy Council has, however, held that the decision in the last mentioned case does not limit the discretion of the Court in saying what reason is good and sufficient or what may be so far requisite to the ends of justice as to support an application for review (2) That the Appeal Court's decision was based on a ground first raised in appeal was held no reason for granting a review (3) And grounds which virtually disclose reasons for an appeal from a decision cannot, it has been said be the bases of a review (4) It has also been held that a point raised on appeal but abandoned in argument cannot ordinarily be a ground for review, (5) and that the fact that one Divisional Bench of the High Court has decided a point at variance with the decision of another Divisional Bench is not such a ground (6)

"May apply"—The proceedings taken to obtain a review pass through three stages In the first place the party applies for a rule, which application is either granted or rejected This is the first stage If the rule is granted the other side shows cause, upon which the rule is made absolute or discharged This is the second stage The last stage is where if the rule is made absolute, the case is directed to be reheard, and an order or decree passed upon such hearing The application should if possible be to the Judge who passed the decree or order sought to be reviewed, or as the Privy Council has put it — "We do not say that there might not be cases in which a review might take place before another and a different Judge, because death or some other unexpected or unavoidable cause might prevent the Judge who made the decision from reviewing it, but we do say that such exceptions are allowable only *ex necessitate* We do say that in all practicable cases the same Judge ought to review" (7) Expedition in presenting a petition for review is indispensable (8) A party applying must show that there is good and sufficient cause for granting the review before he can be heard to argue that the decision is erroneous (9) There may be exceptional circumstances which will warrant the Judicial Committee in allowing even after an order of His Majesty in Council has issued upon their report, a rehearing at the instance of one of the parties, but this is an indulgence with a view mainly to prevent irremediable injustice when by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard, and an order has been made inadvertently, as if he had been heard (10) An application for review is the proper method of setting aside a decree made on a compromise (11) As to whether a second application can be made for review, see r 9, *post*

(1) Nasiruddin v Inlonsarayan B L R, F B 367, 5 W R 93 (1866)

(2) Reasut v Abdulloali, 2 C 140, 3 I A 221 (1876)

(3) Cowell v Mohadeb 17 W R 182 (1872)

(4) Sheo Ratan v Lappu Kuar, 5 A 14 (1882), but see Amir Hasan v Ahmad Ali 9 A 36 (1886)

(5) Sabapathi v Subraya 2 M 53 (1878)

(6) Nobeen Kilon v Shih Pershad 9 W R 161 (1865)

(7) Moheshur Singh v Government of

India 3 W R 45, 7 Moo I A 304 (1859) followed in Surat Soondurce v Rajendur Kishore, 9 W R 125 (1868), and see O XLVII, r 2

(8) Moheshur Singh v Government of India 3 W R 45, 7 Moo I A 30 (1859)

(9) Bhowabal v Rajendra 5 B L R 321 (1870)

(10) In re Appa Rao, 10 M 73, 13 I A 153 (1886)

(11) Anushootob v Tara Prasanna 10 C 612 (1891)

"Review of judgment."—"Review of judgment" and "review of decree" are used interchangeably in sect 114 and in O XLVII rr 1 and 2 (1) Where on an application for review on several points the Judge allowed it on only one point which might have been dealt with under sect 206 (now 152) it was held still to be an application for review, (2) and an order for amendment of a decree under that section is an order passed upon review of judgment within the meaning of Art 179, Schedule II clause (5) of the Limitation Act (3) As a general principle no review can be admitted of a judgment passed on a compromise, (4) though where it is necessary to set aside a decree made upon a compromise, the proper course is by way of review (5) The expression "review of judgment" has been held to include an amendment of decree that does not necessitate any alteration in the judgment (6)

Practice—An application for review commences ordinarily with an *ex parte* application under this rule. The Court may then either reject the application at once, or may grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause why the review should not be granted. In the second stage, the application may either be admitted or rejected, and it is obvious that the hearing of this rule may involve to some extent an investigation into the merits. If the rule is discharged the case ends. If, on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached, the case is re heard on the merits and may result in a repetition of the former decree or in some variation of it. Though in one aspect the result is the same whether the rule is discharged or on the re hearing the original decree be repeated, in law there is a material difference, for, in the latter case, the whole matter having been re opened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case the parties are relegated to, and still rest on the old decree (7) In practice, however, these three stages are not always kept distinct, but are sometimes combined (8) The Allahabad High Court has held that it is not necessary that an application for review should be accompanied by a copy of the decree, order, or judgment sought to be reviewed (9) It has been held that the Code does not contemplate that the Court on being satisfied of the existence of good grounds for review should (instead of making an order admitting the review) admit the new evidence and hear the case, not on the merits but as to admissibility of review on the basis of such evidence taken with

- (1) *Kali Prasunno v Lal Mohun* 25 C 253 (1897), 2 C W N 219
- (2) *Jovkishen v Ataoor Rohoman*, 6 C 22 (1880)
- (3) *Aushootosh v Tara Prasanna*, 10 C 612 (1884)
- (4) *Purmessure v Romeczooddeen*, 5 W R 226 (1866)
- (5) *" "* 10 C 229 (1884)
- (6) *Tr. v. "* (1913) As when there has been fraud, *Rasik Chandra v Rajani Ranjan*, 10 C W N 286 (1905)
- (7) *Kali Prasanno Roy v Lal Mohun Guha*, 2 C W N 319 (1897) dist in *Raghu Nath Ghoshal v Nafakelat Hossain* 3 C W N 192 (1900), s o, 8 C 177 As to remedy in case of mistake in decree, see *Jogeswar Atha v Ganga Behnu* 8 C W N 473 (1901)
- (8) *Vadlal v Fulechand* 30 B 56 7 Bom L R 661 (1905)
- (9) *Lekhraj v Kanhya Singh*, 18 W R 491 (1872)
- (10) *Wajid Ali v Nawab Kishore* 17 A 213 (1893), but see *Adaraj Edulji v Manikji Edulji*, 4 B 414 (1880), and as to the Calcutta High Court r 2 Ch XI Part II of the Appellate Side Rules

other evidence in the case and finally reject the review on the ground that the new evidence so taken did not assist the applicant (1)

"Party who is not appealing may apply"—This is the effect of the decision in the case cited (2)

Appeal—An appeal lies in certain cases from an order granting a review (3) But it does not lie from an order rejecting an application for review. The proper procedure where that is open is to appeal from the order sought to be reviewed (4) No appeal lies from an order on review amending a sale certificate (5) or of an order dismissing an execution case for non payment of process fees (6) Where a decree holder made an application under sect 108 (now O IX r 13) to set aside an adjustment of decree and on its being refused applied that the application be treated as one for review and on its refusal appealed against the order under sect 108 and also took the ground that the review should have been allowed the Appeal Court refusing to interfere with the order under sect 108 could not it was held remand the case in regard to the application for review (7) See r 7, *post*

Limitation—Under the Code of 1859 the period of limitation was ninety days as prescribed by sect 377 of that Code. Now it is governed by the Limitation Act IX of 1908 Sched I, Arts 161 162 and 173. The pendency of a special appeal is not 'a just and reasonable cause' for extending the time for the admission of an application for review (8) Where there were a number of *pro forma* defendants and the decree was against "the defendant" it was held that the application for review must be made within three years after the decree is made for review in

calculating the limitation on appeals there was a diversity of opinion in the case cited (10) Rampu J holding that the general rule for extending the time to prefer an appeal and for excluding the time taken up in prosecuting an application for review is that the delay may be excused if the applicant can show that he had reasonable grounds for applying for a review instead of preferring an appeal, and Mookerjee J holding that the general rule deducible from judicial decisions is that a *bona fide* application for review presented and prosecuted with due diligence should except in special cases be regarded as a sufficient cause for not presenting an appeal within the prescribed period

Court fees—On an application to review the portion of a decision relating to costs only, the applicant must pay stamp duty on the entire claim of the

(1) Puranler r 1 an nara n 14 C L J 103 (1911)

(2) Bunkoor Baskoonun a 7 W 1 166 (1867)

(3) O XVIII r 7

(4) Vadlale Fulchand 30 B 50 7 L m L P 661 (1905) Nanda r Rampi Lal 3 A L J 119 (1906) and O XVIII r 7 and the cases thereunder. But see Beasut r Abdollah 7 C 141 31 A 221 (1876).

(5) Joseph Roy r Ram Kumar 26 C 2, 1

3 C W N 3 4 (1894) see also Sadlo Kunwar r Bansi Dhar 23 A 476 (1901)

(6) Paja Pulmanunl Singh r Doorga Iershal Dooley 4 C W N 39 (1899)

(7) Nanda r Rampi Lal 3 A L J 111 (1906)

(8) Lucas r Stephen 9 W 1 311 (1848)

(9) Bunkoor Baskoonun a 7 W 1 166 (1867)

(10) Chetala Lal r Shabla 33 C 1323 (1906) 10 C W N 986 3 C L J 545

suit under Art 5, Sched I of the Court Fees Act, (1) but the Bombay High Court have held that the Court fee need only be sufficient to cover the amount of the claims in regard to which review was sought (2) In calculating the eighty nine days within which an application for review may be presented on payment of half the fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal under Art 5, Sched I of the Court Fees Act, 1870 the time during which the Court is closed for vacation cannot be excluded (3)

24
cl
1

2 An application for review of a decree or order of a Court, not being a High Court, upon some ground other than the discovery of such new and important matter or evidence as is referred to in rule 1 or the existence of a clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree, shall be made only to the Judge who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed, but any such application may, if the Judge who passed the decree or made the order has ordered notice to issue under rule 4, sub rule (2), proviso (a), be disposed of by his successor

To whom applications for review may be made—This rule combines sect 624 of Act X of 1837 and the last clause added to sect 626 of Act XIV of 1882 by Act VII of 1888 The wording has been changed and the rule has been framed to include orders as well as decrees the words *or the existence of a* have been substituted for “same” and the word *arithmetical mistake* added

‘Upon some ground other than—This does not include supposed

ing majority applied to set aside a decree made on a compromise when a minority on the ground that the Court did not inquire into the circumstances which led to the filing of the petition of compromise and that the record showed no leave to compromise had been granted under sect 462 (now O XXXII r 7) it was held that the successor to the Subordinate Judge who heard the original case was competent to entertain the application for review (6)

“New and important matter”—A decision of the Privy Council in an appeal has been held to be new and important matter for the purposes of an application for review in respect of a decree made on a subsequent accrual of the same cause of action as that on which the decree appealed against was based (7) See also notes to r 1

(1) *Nobin Chandra v Mohamed Uzir* 3 C W N 292 (1898)

(2) *In re Manohar G Tambekar* 4 B 26 (1879)

(3) *In re Kote* 9 M 134 (1880)

(4) *Behari Lal v Mungolaurath* 5 C 110 (18 9)

(5) *Khema Kanuji v Dhanyu Fiamji* 14 B 101 (1889)

(6) *Barhardeo v Banarsi* 3 C L J 113 (1901)

(7) *Waghela v Mashudin* 13 B 330 (1888), *Ram Lal v Kalka* 23 A 566 (1911)

"Shall be made"—The remarks of the Privy Council in regard to expedition in presenting applications for review should be borne in mind. Their Lordships said, "We do not say that there might not be cases in which a review might take place before another and a different Judge, because death or some other unexpected and unavoidable cause might prevent the Judge who made the decision from reviewing it, but we do say that such exceptions are allowable only *ex necessitate*. We do say that in all practicable cases the same Judge ought to review, and that for the attainment of that object expedition in presenting a petition for the review is indispensable, and the only practical course for attaining that end is by accelerating the hearing of the review before accident or unexpected events shall have removed the original Judge" (1).

"Made"—Where a petition for review of judgment is presented to the Judge who delivered it and he directs notices to issue thereon (2) or directs the application to be entered on the register and that the fees for service of notice be deposited, and is then transferred, his successor has jurisdiction to make the order sought to be revised (3). In such cases the grounds for review are not confined to those mentioned in this rule. But it would be otherwise where the Judge to whom the petition was presented merely ordered a copy of the decree to be produced and did not issue notice (4). The Allahabad High Court, however, have construed 'made' to include a hearing and determination of the application for review (5). This variance of opinion has been set at rest by the concluding clause of this rule which has affirmed the decisions of the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.

"Only to the Judge"—The primary intention of granting a review is a reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge as distinguished from an appeal, which is a hearing before another tribunal (6). If a Court has been abolished and its business transferred to another Court presided over by another Judge, the latter cannot entertain an application for review except in the cases mentioned in this rule, (7) nor can a Judge by transferring a case to his own file confer on himself the power to review an order of dismissal pronounced by a Judge subordinate to him (8). A Judge of a Mofussil Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to review a case tried by his predecessor subject to the provisions of this rule (9).

3 The provisions as to the form of preferring appeals shall apply

Form of applications for review apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to applications for review.

(1) Moheshur Singh v. Government of India 3 W R 45, 7 Moo I A 304 (1899)

(2) Karoo S. v. D. O. Narain 10 C 80, 13 C L R 261 (1883). Ramasami v. Kurru 13 M 178 (1889), Ganpat v. Jivan 16 B 603 (1891)

(3) Fazal Biswas v. Jamadar, 13 C. 231 (1886).

(4) Cheru v. Cheru 12 M 50 (1889)

(5) Pandalam v. Jhingur, 4 A 278 (1882)

(6) Moheshur Singh v. Government of India 3 W R 45 7 Moo I A 304 (1899). Shamsur Ali v. Jagannath 17 C. W. N 403 (1912)

(7) Saranappa v. Narayanasami 8 M 267 (1885)

(8) Elam v. Hurriah Chunder, W. L. (1861) M. 29. 1st Nat. v. Gowhar, 2 W. P. H. C. 23 (1870)

(9) Shamsur v. Kurkut, 6 C. 235 (1890)

Form of applications for review—This rule corresponds with sect 625 in the Codes of 1877 and 1882, save that "provisions" has been substituted for "rules heretofore contained" and "preferring" for "making". Applications for review should be drawn up in the same manner as applications for the admission of special appeals, and should set forth concisely the grounds of objection to the decision sought to be reviewed (1) The Bombay High Court has held that the petition for review must be accompanied by a copy of the decree sought to be reviewed, (2) but the Allahabad High Court has held the contrary (3) If the grounds of review are certified they should be certified by the pleader who appeared originally in the appeal (4) In granting a review the Court should not travel beyond the grounds mentioned in the application for review (5)

- 241 4 (1) *Where* it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application
- Application where rejected
- (2) *Where* the Court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, it shall grant the same
- Application where granted

Provided that—

- (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party, to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order, a review of which is applied for and
- (b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge, or could not be adduced by him when the decree or order was passed or made, without strict proof of such allegation

Applications where—

part of sect 378 of Act

words in italics and the omission noted below, with sect 625 of Act 1877 and 1882 In Act VIII of 1859 the first clause ran "*If the Court shall be of opinion that there are not any sufficient grounds for a review, it shall reject the application,*" the present wording of that clause was adopted by Act X of 1877 In the second clause that Act added the words "*application for the*" before "*review*" and substituted "*should be granted*" for "*desired is necessary to correct an evident error or omission or is otherwise requisite for the ends of justice*"

(1) *Mahadaji v. Vithal* 1 B H C 185 (1864)

(2) *Adarni Edulji v. Mansji Edulji* 4 B 414 (1880)

(3) *Wajid Ali v. Nawal K. Shore* 17 A 213 (1893)

(4) *Rousseau v. Pinto* 10 W R 54 (1863)
Toong Oong v. British India Steam Navigation Co. 24 W R 430 (1875)

(5) *Purna Chandra v. Md. Mahtab* 5 O W R 485 (1901)

and "*grant the same*" for "*grant the review*" Proviso (b) was added by the Code of 1877 The present Code has substituted "*where*" for "*if*" and added the words "*or order*" and "*or made*" appearing in italics, but has omitted the words "*and the Judge shall record with his own hand his reasons for such opinion*" before the first proviso (1) Clause (c) of the former section has been embodied in r 2 ante The form of Notice is given in the First Schedule Appendix G, No 14

This rule applies to orders rejecting or admitting reviews and not to judgments on review (2) A decree of a Division Bench of the High Court dismissing an appeal for default in depositing the estimated costs of preparation of the paper book can only be set aside by an order under this rule (3)

An application for review involves three stages It commences ordinarily with an *ex parte* application under sect 523 (now O XLVII r 1) The Court then may either reject the application at once, or may grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause why the review should not be granted In the second stage the application may either be admitted or rejected, and it is obvious that the hearing of the rule may involve to some extent, an investigation into the merits If the rule is discharged, then the case ends If, on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached, the case is heard on the merits, and may result in a repetition of the former decree or in some variation of it Though in one aspect the result is the same whether the rule is discharged or on the re-hearing the original decree be repeated in law there is a material difference, for in the latter case the whole matter having been re-opened there is a fresh decree In the former case the parties are relegated to and still rest on the old decree (4) In practice these three stages are not always kept distinct but are sometimes combined (5)

"**Shall reject the application**"—Such rejection cannot alter the judgment sought to be reviewed or the decree founded upon it and nothing which the Judge says with reference to his refusal to grant the review can be binding so as to alter such judgment or decree (6) Where on special appeal the case was remanded for trial of a particular issue and an application for review was made in order that the suit might be remanded for the trial of another issue, it was held that as that would involve going through the record again the application could not be granted as it would in fact be to grant a second special appeal (7)

"**Shall grant the same**"—Under the Code of 1859 which provided that where an application for review was beyond the prescribed time a Judge should record his reasons for admitting it such proceeding and the order

(1) See Thakur Shunker Buxsh v Balwant Singh 4 C W N 203 (1899) s c 27 C 333

(2) Agar v Howah Bye, 1 Ind Jur N S 23 (1866)

(3) Fatimunnissa v Deeki Parshad 24 C 300 (1896)

(4) Adhisi v Fulhai I, 30 B 56 (1895)

7 Bom. L R 661

(5) Lekhra v Kanhya Singh 18 W L 191 (1872)

(6) Pamhurry v Mothoorji 20 W L 450 (1873)

(7) Juchuniloo v Wae 12 W L 402 (1869)

admitting the review could be made in one and the same proceeding (1) An order intended to operate as an order for review is not invalidated by an irregularity in its form by reasons of which it purports to be an order made on an application to set aside the decree and restore a suit for trial (2) The order made under this rule is not one on the re-hearing of the case on review, that comes later (3) Although a District or Assistant Judge or Special Judge under sect 74 of the Dikhan Agriculturists Relief Act is not governed by this Code, he has discretion to grant a review on the ground of mistake, (4) or non service of notice, (5) and he may review an *ex parte* order, (6) but notice of the application must be served on the other side (7) The Codes of 1877 and 1882 required the Judge granting an application for review to record with his own hand his reasons for his opinion, and it was held that this should be done before the review of judgment was granted (8) The failure to do so did not necessarily make the act one without jurisdiction, (9) but such an order was bad and the case must be remanded (10) This was not a hard and fast rule, the words were directory, and the order was not necessarily invalid though there might be cases in which it was necessary in the interests of justice that the reasons should be recorded, and in such cases the recording would be essential to the validity of the order (11) In granting a review the Court should not travel beyond the grounds mentioned in the application for review (12)

Clause (a) — Notice must be served on the opposite party to appear before a suit can be revived, (13) but not in the case of a review of an application for the admission of a special appeal, as such application being *ex parte*, a review of the same is also *ex parte* (14) In the Codes of 1877 and 1882 this clause only made mention of decrees and not orders. The omission has been rectified by the present rule

Clause (b) — Lord Russell, M R, said, "Re hearing a cause upon obtaining fresh evidence is a most dangerous practice. It is the duty of suitors to bring forward all their evidence at the first, and nothing would be more mischievous than to allow the principle to prevail, that a person should endeavour to get a case heard upon imperfect evidence, and trust to succeeding on that evidence, and then, when it is found that he has not succeeded, to bring forward further evidence" (15) When a Judge wrongly construed a document, an application

(1) *Ajonnassa v Sany Kant*, 11 W R 56 (1869), s c, 2 B L R A C 181

(2) *Manicka v Gurusami*, 23 M 496 (1899)

(3) *Rajendro Protap v Bhowabul*, 14 W R 105 (1870)

(4) *Badricharya v Ramchandra*, 19 B 113 (1893)

(5) *Ramsing v Babu*, 19 B 116 (1893)

(6) *Ramchandra v Draupadi*, 20 B 281 (1893)

(7) *Rupchand v Balwant*, 11 B 591 (1887)

(8) *Bharon v Pam Sahai*, 3 A 316 (1888)

(9) *Ashrafannissa v Inact Hossein*, 13 W R 439 (1870), 5 B L R 315

(10) *Gyanund v Depin Mohun*, 22 C 734 (1895)

(11) *Manicka v Gurusami*, 23 M 496 (1899)

(12) *Purpa Chandra v Nil Madhul*, 5 G W N 485 (1901)

(13) *In re Hara M hun Mookerjee*, 10 W R 135 (1871)

(14) *Joy Koomar v Ekharoo*, 18 W R 175 (1872), 10 B L R 153

(1907) P C

for the purpose of correcting the error on review accompanied by another similar document to assist the Court was held not to be an application coming within this rule (1) When the new evidence with anything like diligence, have be review was refused, (2) but where the for review certain documents to show that the Judge's decision was erroneous on the evidence originally before him, it was held that he was not in fault in not producing them previously, as they were not originally necessary to the proof of his claim (3) The applicant must also show that the new evidence is *prima facie* evidence in the cause (4)

"Strict proof"—The Privy Council have recently emphasized this condition (5) Want of such proof is a ground of appeal, (6) and the decision on review must be reversed, (7) but where a party had no opportunity of giving such proof owing to the opposite party, who had notice, not appearing and making no objection, the opposite party cannot afterwards be allowed to object (8) Strict proof means proof according to the forms of law, that is, with close adherence to rule (9) It is not sufficient to make an affidavit that the applicant was not aware of the existence of a document, but he must also show that he used due diligence and made inquiries to ascertain its existence and found it was not available, (10) but an applicant for review on the ground that he had not been afforded sufficient time to produce a document at the original hearing has not to prove the document was not within his knowledge (11)

5. Where the Judge or Judges, or any one of the Judges, is who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for a review is presented, and is not or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order

(1) Gunesh Ram v Rohinee, 1405 P 236 (1870)

(2) Brojendro v Wise 19 W R 130 (1873), Ram Dhun v Joy Narain 12 W R 536 (1869), 8 B L R App 36, note

(3) Gunesh Ram v Rohinee, 14 W L 236 (1870)

(4) Ram Dhun v Joy Narain 12 W R 536 (1869), 8 B L R App 36 note

(5) Kessowji Issur v G I P P v Co 11 C W N 721 (1907)

(6) Shamsheer v Ram Chund 12 W L 174 (1865), Khetul Chunder v Prasad 11 B L R 426 note, 12 W L 461 (1st), Bhyrub Chunder v Malhub Pam 20 W L 81 11 B L R 423 (1873)

(7) Naffar Chand v Sanke, 81 L L 1 App 35, 10 W L 432 (1888), Ursao v

Goakul 8 B L L 1 App 34 10 W P 1 (1871), Nudarchund v Icedoy 11 B L L 424 note, 17 W R 458 (1872), Nissa Bibee v Madoor Rulvan 18 W P 413 (1872), see also Jhabboo v Jasoal 17 W R 230 (1872) and Brojendro v Wise 19 W L 130 (1873)

(8) Pam Joy v Jugod Surr 22 W L 303 (1874)

(9) Ahur Koni Kar v Mohendra Lal D, App 26 of 1911 (Latter Patent) 31 March, 1915, Calcutta (see Jenkins C J, and Wood r ff J)

(10) Nektanath v Shari Saur 14 W L 26 81 L L 1 App 37 (1870)

(11) Coor Dvair Daka Nodva 22 W P 446 (1874)

to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall hear the application, and, no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same.

Applications for review in Courts consisting of two or more Judges—This rule is a modified form of sect 379 of Act VII of 1859. That section commenced "*If the Court to which the application for a review of its judgment has been presented be a Court consisting of two or more judges whenever the judge or judges who may have passed the decree or if the decree have been passed by two or more judges, when any of such judges shall*" By sect 627 of Act X of 1877 these words were altered to the form the rule now takes save for the words in italics, down to the words "*continues or*" That Act also substituted "*is not or are not*" for "*shall not be*" "*conveys no decree or order*" for "*is not*" from

same "*upon a consideration of the merits of the application and record an order or opinion thereon*" The present Code substituted "*Where for*" "*If*" and added the words "*made the*" appearing in italics. An application for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed by two Judges for default in depositing the estimated amount of costs for the preparation of the paper book was held not an application for review, and could not be disposed of by one of such Judges under this rule, (1) but a later decision, of the Full Bench has overruled that decision so far as it held it was not an application for review, (2) and presumably therefore the rest of that decision is not law.

"Attached to the Court"—A Judge absent on leave and for whom another is officiating is not "attached to the Court" and the review may be disposed of by the remaining Judge who heard the appeal originally (3)

"No other Judge shall hear the same"—A review may be admitted by the sole remaining Judge of the Bench which heard the case originally (4) If it be admitted by the two Judges who originally heard the case it may be disposed of by the sole remaining Judge. The Chief Justice cannot appoint a Bench to do so (5)

8] **6** (1) *Where the application for a review is heard by more than one Judge, and the Court is equally divided, the application shall be rejected*

(2) *Where there is a majority, the decision shall be according to the opinion of the majority*

(1) Ramhari v Madan Mohan 23 C 339 (1895)

(2) Fatimunnissa v Deoki Pershad 24 C 101 C W N 21 (1896)

(3) Aubrey Churn v Shamont, 10 C 785

(1889)

(4) Jardine Skinner & Co v Diun Kisher 13 W R 82 (1870)

(5) Aubrey Churn v Shamont 10 C 785 (1889)

"Application where rejected."—This rule was introduced into the Code by sect. 628 of Act X. of 1877. By the present Code the word "*Where*" has been substituted for "*If*" and "*is*" for "*be*."

7. (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable; but an order granting an application may be objected to on the ground that the application was—

Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application

(a) in contravention of the provisions

of rule 2,

(b) in contravention of the provisions of rule 4, or

(c) after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed therefor and without sufficient cause.

Such objection may be taken at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in any appeal from the final decree or order passed or made in the suit.

(2) Where the application has been rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear, he may apply for an order to have the rejected application restored to the file, and, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when such application was called on for hearing, the Court shall order it to be restored to the file upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for hearing the same.

(3) No order shall be made under sub-rule (2) unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party.

Order of rejection not appealable objections to order granting application.—This was introduced by sect 629 of Act X of 1877. The words "*An order of the Court rejecting the application shall be final*" (the form they then took) were taken from sect 378 of Act VIII of 1859. That section also provided that an order granting the review should be final. This provision was repealed by sect 629 of Act X. of 1877. The present rule corresponds with that section, save that the words "*not be appealable*" have been substituted for "*be final*," and "*the application*" for "*it*," "*taken*" for "*made*," "*from*" for "*against*," and "*where it is*" for "*if it be*," the words "*passed or*" added, the wording of sub-rule (3) rearranged, and the last clause of the former section, which now forms the basis of O XLVII r 9, omitted.

"Shall not be appealable."—The wording used in the earlier Codes was "*shall be final*" and was held to preclude appeal (1). That decision was in reference to the wording as it appeared in sect 378 of the Code of 1859, but

(1) Nusservoodeen v. Indurnaram, 5 264 (1869); Pance Ram v. Hussein Ali, 11 W. R. 93 (1866); B. L. R., F. B. 367. See W. R. 181 (1869); Malhoomutty v. Phanspur, also Nalan Chunder v. Girdharree, 11 W. R. 13 W. R. 167 (1870).

the word "final" in the late Code has been similarly interpreted (1) No appeal lies, even if the application be rejected by a single Judge on the Original Side of the High Court, (2) or if the application be for the review of an order dismissing an execution for non payment of process fees (3) An opinion was expressed under the last Code that an order of rejection was not open to revision (4) It must, however, be now noted that the order is not now "final" but "not appealable" The effect of an order rejecting an application for review is not to alter the judgment sought to be reviewed or the decree founded upon it, and nothing which the Judge says with reference to his refusal to grant the review can be binding so as to alter such judgment or decree (5) When an order is made rejecting a review, the time allowed for appeal to the Privy Council against the judgment sought to be reviewed runs from the date of the judgment and not that of the order rejecting the review (6)

"May be objected to"—The appeal may be on the grounds mentioned in this rule and on no other (7) An order admitting a review is not a judgment within the meaning of sect 15 of the Letters Patent so as to admit of an appeal from it save on the grounds mentioned in this rule, (8) but it may be dealt with under sect 622 (now sect 115) (9) Where a Court with materials before it comes to the conclusion that a review which has been applied for is necessary to correct an evident error or omission or for the ends of justice and grants the application accordingly, the order so made is not open to be questioned on special appeal (10) nor is an order directing the parties to examine the persons who had sworn the affidavits on which the application for review was based as also to produce other evidence, being an interlocutory order neither granting nor rejecting the review appealable (11) That there is no sufficient reason for granting the review is no ground of appeal (12) No second appeal lies from an

(1) *Golunla Pam v Bholanath* 15 C 432 (1888)

(2) *Achaya v Ratnavelu* 9 M 253 (1885)

(3) *Pudmanund v Doorga Pershad* 4 C W N 39 (1899)

(4) *Ram Lal v Ratan Lal* 26 A 572 (1904) But see *Ramanadham Chetty v Narayanan Chetty* 27 M 602, 607 (1904) where it was held that if there was no appeal the Court could interfere in revision

(5) *Ramhurry v Mathoor Mohun* 20 W P 450 (1873)

(6) *Soudamince v Dheraj Mohatab*, B L R F B 585 (1866)

(1897), *Laht Mohan v Purna Chandra* 3 C W N 511 (1899) *Ramanadham Chetty v Narayanan Chetty* 27 M 602, 607 (1904)

Srimath Dairasi Kaman v Noor Mahomed 31 M 47 (1907) *Tholan v Kunhikutty*, 21 M L J 93 (1912), and see *Gopala Aiyar v Ramasami Sastri* 31 M 49 (1907), and

Sadaruddin v Ekramuddin 19 C I J 2 (1913) p. 278, if an order is made without jurisdiction, the remedy is by way of review on under sect 115

(8) *Aubrey Churn v Shamont* 11 C. 753 (1839)

(9) *Chundlar Sonbai* 21 B 328 (1890)

(10) *Sishebjan v Saffur* 22 W R. 258 (1874)

(11) *Dwarika Nath v Bhabatarini* 1 C W N 711

(12) *Munni Pam v Basheer Pasha* 24 C 578 (1897) *Ali Akbar v Khurshed* 24 A 695, 3 A L J 460 (1905)

Nandan v Belari Singh 22 C 3 (1894).

Baroda Churn v Gobind Prashad 22 C 984 (1895)

Mahabir v Nathin 1 C W N 338 (1895)

Daryal v Badri 18 A 44 (1895).

Munni Ram v Bihari Perkaish 24 C 878

order granting an application for review (1) but it does from an original decretal order as amended on review (2) An appeal under this rule is not controlled by sect 104 sub sect (2) An appeal against an order granting a review would lie under sub rule (1) of this order even where no appeal would lie against the final decree disposing of the case (3)

Clause (b) — Appeals have been allowed where the Judge has not recorded his reason for granting an application for review, (4) or where he has granted a review without inquiry or proof that the new evidence was not within the knowledge of the applicant at the hearing or could not be adduced by him before the decree was passed, (5) or on the ground that by going through the evidence a second time the Judge might come to a different conclusion, (6) or merely to enable the case to be re argued (7) Upon an appeal it may be open to the Court of Appeal to say that the Judge ought not to have admitted a review (8) The clause does not refer to the weight or sufficiency of evidence and an Appellate Court cannot set aside an order of review merely because in its opinion the probative force of the evidence is insufficient to establish the allegations made in support of the application for review though such evidence had such probative force to the Court granting the review (9)

Clause (d) — This is the effect of the decisions cited (10) The object of placing a limitation on the time within which applications for review may be made is that the finality of a decision should be left in doubt no longer than the requisites of justice imperatively demand (11) Though an appeal lies in such cases an application under sect 15 of the High Court Charter Act does not necessarily lie (12) Unless the delay was accounted for (13) and the Court was satisfied as to there being good and sufficient cause for the delay the application for review ought to have been rejected (14) and the review and

(1) *Than Singh v Chintun Singh* 11 C 206 (1885) *Papayya v Chelamayya* 12 M 125 (1888), *Gopal Das v Alif Khan* 11 A 393 (1889)

(2) *Bala Nath v Balsa Nath* 13 B 496 (1889)

(3) *Shamsur Ali Jagannath* 17 C W N 403 (1912)

(4) *Gyanund v Rupan* 22 C 34 (1892)

(5) *Rhyrb Cl under v Madhub Ram* 11 R L R, F R 473, 20 W I 84 (1873) *Jhubho Sahoo v Jisoda* 17 W R 230 (1872) *Nubokulore v Jadub* 20 W P 426 (1873)

(6) *Chunder Churn v Looddnram* 25 W R 324 (1870)

(7) *Koleemoodben v Heerun* 21 W P 186 (1875)

(8) *Resant v Abdoolah* 3 I A 221 2 C 131 (1870) and see *Manindra v Balarani* 11 C L J 161 (1899)

(9) *Ahr Kanti Kar v Motendra Lal De*

App 20 of 1911 (Letters Patent) Calcutta 31 March 1916 (see *Jenks CJ*, and *Woodroffe, J*)

(10) *Shama Churn v Binabun* 9 W P 181 (1869) *Kristo Gobind v Jugobundhoo* 12 W R 94 (1869), *Cour Pershad v Anjub* 11 W P 291 (1875) *Madho Das v Rukun* 2 A 287 (1890) *Purna Chandra v Nil Madhub* 5 C W N 480 (1901)

(11) *Moheshur Singh v Bengal Government* 7 M L A 303 304 (1859) 3 W R P C 45

(12) *Ashrafannusa v Inaat Hossein* 5 B L I 316 13 W P 430 (1870) but see *Freenath v Kartatto Invec* 18 W P 286 (1872)

(13) *Kaheenath v Luckheeraram* W P (1864) 91 *Jhubho Sahoo v Jisoda* 17 W P 250 (1872)

(14) *Asur Ali v Wafutooneesa* 13 W R, 33 *Jocul Katoore v Ogur Nara n* 8 W I 483

all subsequent proceedings under it are invalid (1) But if there be just and reasonable cause for the admission of the application for review even after two years, the High Court will not interfere under sect 15 of the Charter Act (2) It has been held that ignorance of the legal effect of the judgment is not a justification of delay, (3) nor ignorance on the part of legal advisers of the contents of a document, copy of which was in their possession at the time of the original hearing (4) nor that an application presented in time was refused as not properly stamped, (5) nor the omission of contentions and arguments which might have been adduced within proper time, (6) nor where the applicant was a minor till shortly before the making of the decree sought to be reviewed (7) or even till after it was made, (8) nor is the pendency of a special appeal (9) nor the pendency of an appeal dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction (10) The time occupied in the appeal should not be deducted (11) nor can the time occupied in prosecuting a prior application for review be deducted in calculating limitation (12) A new exposition of the law was held not to be a just and reasonable cause for not having presented the application for review within the prescribed time (13) When however, a suit was dismissed as wrongly framed, and the plaintiff brought a second suit in which the Full Bench held that the course taken in the first suit was the proper one the plaintiff was allowed a review in the first case though out of time that being a very different thing from interfering with previous decisions of the Court in other cases between other parties (14) The period of limitation is now prescribed by Art 173, Sched I, Division III, Limitation Act IX of 1908 Under the Code of 1859 it was governed by sect 377 of that Code, which fixed the period at ninety days

"Such objections may be taken"—The provision that objection can be taken by appeal against the order or on appeal against the final decree, has been held not to be controlled by sect 591 (now sect 105) (15) The fact that a party on the re-hearing of the case produced fresh evidence himself did not debar him on appeal from objecting on the same ground namely that the opposite party had not established that with due diligence he could not have

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------------|--|------------|----|
| (1) Gungaharam v Gonoomonee, 8 W P 184 (1867) | Luchmon Singh v Shumshere Singh 3 I A 58 C 9 (1874) | 14 B L R 373 | (1874) | 101 (1865) | 1) |
| (2) Ajonissa v Surja Kant 2 B L R, A C 181 (1879) | 11 W R 56 | | (1881) | | |
| (3) Gulam Husen v Sayad Musa 8 B 260 (1884) | | | (11) It | | |
| (4) Gopal Chandra v Solomon 13 C 62 (1886) | | | (12) Vaman v Mahan 20 B 48 (1901) | | |
| (5) Munro v Cawnpore Municipal Board 12 A 57 (1889) | | | (13) Onoop Chunder v Fikowice 6 W P 167 (1886) | | |
| (6) Madho v Rukman 2 A 287 (1879) | | | Shama Churn v Bandabao Chunder, 9 W R 181 185 (1863) | | |
| (7) Gopal Narhar v Hanmant 6 B 107 (1881) | | | Kashan v Bakshee Caver 10 W R 20 (1873) | | |
| (8) In re Appa Rao 10 M 72 (1886) [P C] | | | Pankajwarhal v Damodhar 61 H C A C 146 (1863) | | |
| but see Houghton v Folley, L R 18 F q 573 | | | (14) Jantzenjoy v Dasenancy 8 C 700 | | |
| | | | (15) Gnanul v Pop n Mol n 23 C 731 (1905) | | |

adduced the new evidence on which his application for review was based, as he had urged in opposition to such application (1) Where in the opinion of the Privy Council the High Court had wrongly allowed a review and had admitted additional evidence, their Lordships did not consider it right to exclude that evidence from their consideration (2)

8 When an application for review is granted, a note is
Registry of applica- thereof shall be made in the register and
tion granted, and order the Court may at once re hear the case or
for re-hearing make such order in regard to the re hearing
as it thinks fit.

Registry of application granted, and order for re hearing—This rule corresponds with sect 380 of Act VIII of 1859 That section after the word "register" ran "*of suits or appeals (as the case may be) and the Court shall give such order in regard to the re hearing of the suit as it may deem proper in the circumstances of the case*" The present wording was adopted by sect 620 of Act X of 1877 There has been some diversity of decision on the question as to what may be gone into at the re hearing The Calcutta High Court formerly held that the applicant was only entitled to go into the points on which the rule granting the review was allowed and that matters not mentioned when the rule was argued could not be gone into (3) but later the same Court held it was discretionary with the Court to re hear the whole case or only the particular point on which the review was granted (4) The Bombay High Court has, however held that when a review has been admitted the whole case is reopened (5) And it has recently been held by the Calcutta High Court that the expression 'rehear the case' means 'rehear the whole case' and that if the case is to be reheard only upon special points the order must be made under the last words of the section which enable the Court to make such orders as it thinks fit (6) It has been held that where a case is admitted to review by the deciding Judge and is afterwards tried by another Judge the new Judge must try the point directed by the order of review (7) and that a Judge granting a review on one point has no power to go into or to decide a matter already decided finally and as to which no application for review was made (8) When a plaintiff obtained a review on the ground that he was entitled upon the allegations and proofs on the record to the full relief which

(1) *Pran Nath v Sree Kant* 2 C L R 257 (1878)

(2) *Fajlukhet v Gool Chand* 1 L W 1 47 (1869), 13 Moo I A 209 226 but see *Pran Nath v Sree Kant*, 2 C L R 257 (1878)

(3) *Dhironidhar v Agra Bank* 5 C L R 86 (1879). This case was recently discussed in *Salarudin v Ekramuddin* 19 C L J 225 (1913) pp. 229 230 when it was suggested by Mookerjee, J., that the real intention was to decide that the Court had a discretion to

refuse to entertain a new question.

(4) *Hurbans v Thakoor Purshad* 9 C 20 13 C 1 R. 255 (1884). *Thakoor Prasad v Baluck Isam* 1 C L J 1 11

(5) *Sainal Ranchhod v Dullab* 10 B H C 360 (1873).

(6) *Salarudin v Ekramuddin*, 19 C L J 225 (1913) Jenkins, C.J. and Mookerjee, J.

(7) *Hurro Chunder v Isam Kureer* W J (1864) 141

(8) *Bygnath v Wureer* 24 W J 427 (1875).

he had sought, it was held not to be open to the defendant on the re-hearing to adduce evidence he ought to have done at the hearing (1) A Court should in its judgment on the re-hearing give reasons for coming to a different conclusion from that which it had previously formed (2) When a case is re-heard on review the order on the re-hearing is a new decree whatever the result is, (3) even though on the application for review coming on for re-hearing the Judge allowed it on a comparatively insignificant point and forthwith directed a clerical error in the decree to be rectified, and the time within which to appeal on the decree runs from the date of such order (4)

Practice—See notes to rr 1 and 4, ante

29. **9. No application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained**

Review of review—With verbal alterations and a transposition this rule is the same as the last paragraph of sect 629 of the former Code. The first portion of the rule refers to the second, and the second portion refers to the third, stage of the proceedings through which an application for a review may pass (5). It has been a question whether these words are tantamount to saying "no second application for review shall be made," that is whether such an application is barred in all cases (6). As regards this, it is clear that if an application for review is allowed at the second stage, then the order allowing the application cannot, as being an order made on an application for review be itself reviewed. Similarly an order made in the third stage after the admission of the application for review and after the case has been re-heard, whether that order confirms or reverse the decree sought to be reviewed, is a new decree (7). There is here a decree or order as the case may be, passed or made upon a review, and this rule prohibits a further review (8). There remains a third case viz where the application for review is rejected at the first or second stage and the case is in consequence not re-heard. In this case the order itself rejecting the application for review cannot be reviewed. But the question then arises whether a second application for review of the original order or decree may be made on different grounds. For instance, does the rejection of an application based on the ground of alleged error apparent on the face of the record preclude a subsequent application based on the ground of the discovery of new evidence? It may be

(1) *Banee Madhub v Pakaktur* 20 W R 225 (1873)

(2) *Chund Moyee v Kaku Koomar*, 6 W R 18 (1876)

(3) *Sondaminee v Mahatab Chand Bahadur*, B I R, F B 585 (1866)

(4) *Jaykishan v Ataoor Rohoman* 6 C 2 (1880)

(5) See as to these stages *Vadhal v Fulchand* 30 B 56 at p 60 (1903)

(6) See *Golinda Ram Mondal v Bholanath*

Bhatta 15 C 432 435 (1885) *Vaman v Malhari* 25 B 485 491 (1902) and cases there cited

(7) *Vadhal v Fulchand* 30 B 56 (1903). *Joykishan Vookerjee v Ataoor Rohoman* 6 C 22 (1880) *Soulan mao Dossre v Mahatab Chand Bahadur* B I R 1 B 585 586 (1866)

(8) *Muhammad Yusuf v Abdul Raiman* 101 A 101 106 (1889) s c 16 C 719 757

contended that this rule does not cover the case because on the facts stated the second application is not for a review of the order made on an application for review nor is it for a review of a decree or order passed or made on a review. On the other hand though the original order is directly attacked by such a subsequent application the effect of the latter if successful is to grant the review which though on different grounds was previously refused. It has been said (1) that the present provision was first inserted in the Code of 1877 to meet the decision of the Full Bench in *Nasiruddin Khan v. Indro naryan Chowdhry* (2) that the Court may admit a review even after a prior order rejecting it. On the other hand the Calcutta High Court has held (3) that though the order of rejection is final in the sense that it cannot be made the direct subject of review these provisions do not prohibit the admission of a subsequent application for review of the original decree on a different ground from that which was the basis of the previous application which was refused.

(1) *Vaman v. Malhari* 20 B 48 191
(1902) s c 4 Bom L R 121
(2) B I R F B 307 (1906)

(3) *Gobinda Ram Mondal v. Bholanath Bhatta* 15 C 432 (1888) and the case cited in last note

ORDER XLVIII.

Miscellaneous.

93.] 1. (1) Every process issued under this Code shall be served at the expense of the party on whose behalf it is issued, unless the Court otherwise directs.

(2) The court-fee *chargeable* for such service shall be paid within a time to be fixed before the process is issued.

Costs of service.

"Unless the Court otherwise directs"—In the matter of H O Studd (1) Rampini, J, said "This provision of the Civil Procedure Code does not appear to me to give a Court any power to depart from the rules of the High Court on the subject of the levy of process fees, or to remit those fees. The section relates to the payment of process fees by the parties to a suit, and gives the Court, acting judicially, power to make an order, between party and party only, as to who should pay the process fees. It does not expressly give power to remit the fees, or, what comes to the same thing to order that the process should be served free, or, in other words, at the expense of Government, and in the present case we cannot, I think make such an order under sect 93, C P C, seeing that the Government is no party to the suit." Ghose, J, however, declined to express any opinion upon the question "whether or not the Court has the power to relax in any case the process fee rules," and Rampini, J, himself pointed out that some Benches readily grant a relaxation of these rules.

Within a time to be fixed by the Court—If no time is fixed, there is no obligation to pay the court fee, and where processes could not be served on witnesses for non payment of the court fee, in such a case it was held that the suit could not be dismissed for default of evidence (2)

94.] 2 All orders, notices and other documents required by this Code to be given to or served on any person shall be served in the manner provided for the service of summons.

(1) 3 C W N 82 (1898)

(2) Purshad Lal v Umbika Pershad : B I R App 25 = c, 11 W R 290 (1899) and see Mohun Mundur : Brij Bhokun 9

W R 127 (1898), where it was held that the party was not bound to pay into Court until the latter had fixed what was reasonable

ORDER XLIX.

Chartered High Courts

636]

1 Notice to produce documents, summonses to witnesses, and every other judicial process, issued in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, and of its matrimonial, testamentary and intestate jurisdictions, except summonses to defendants, writs of execution and notices to respondents may be served by the attorneys in the suits, or by persons employed by them, or by such other persons as the High Court, by any rule or order, directs

2 Nothing in this schedule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any rules in force at the commencement of this Code for the taking of evidence or the recording of judgments and orders by a Chartered High Court

Saving in respect of Chartered High Courts
High Courts.—This rule, which embodies sect 633 of the last Code, empowers the Court to determine whether the judgments should be given orally or in writing, or according to any mode which might appear to it best in the interests of justice, and where rules have been made the rules and not sect 574 (now O XLI r 31) apply (1)

638]

3 The following rules shall not apply to any Chartered High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, namely.—

- Application of rules*
- (1) rule 10 and rule 11, clauses (b) and (c), of Order VII,
 - (2) rule 3 of Order X;
 - (3) rule 2 of Order XVI,
 - (4) rules 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16 (so far as relates to the manner of taking evidence) of Order XVIII,
 - (5) rules 1 to 8 of Order XX; and
 - (6) rule 7 of Order XXXIII (so far as relates to the making of a memorandum),
- and rule 35 of Order XLI shall not apply to any such High Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

ORDLR L

Provincial Small Cause Courts

1 *The provisions hereinafter specified shall not extend to Provincial Small Cause Courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, or to Courts exercising the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes under that Act, that is to say—*

(a) *so much of this schedule as relates to—*

(i) *suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes or the execution of decrees in such suits,*

(ii) *the execution of decrees against immoveable property or the interest of a partner in partnership property,*

(iii) *the settlement of issues, and*

(b) *the following rules and orders—*

Order II, r 1 (frame of suit),

Order X, r 3 (record of examination of parties),

Order XV, except so much of rule 4 as provides for the pronouncement at once of judgment,

Order XVIII, rules 5 to 12 (evidence),

Orders XLI to XLV (appeals),

Order XLVII, rules 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 (review),

Order LI

ORDER LI.

Presidency Small Cause Courts.

1. *Save as provided in rules 22 and 23 of Order V, rules 4 and 7 of Order XXI, and rule 4 of Order XXVI, and by the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, this schedule shall not extend to any suit or proceeding in any Court of Small Causes established in the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.*

Appendices to the First Schedule: Forms.

APPENDIX A

PLEADINGS

(1) TITLES OF SUITS.

IN THE COURT OF

A B (*add description and residence*)

Plaintiff,

against

C D (*add description and residence*)

Defendant

(2) DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES IN PARTICULAR CASES

The Secretary of State for India in Council

The Advocate General of

The Collector of

The State of

The A B Company, Limited, having its registered office at

A B, a public officer of the C D Company

A B, (*add description and residence*), on behalf of himself and all other creditors of C D, late of (*add description and residence*)

A B (*add description and residence*), on behalf of himself and all other holders of debentures issued by the Company, Limited

The Official Receiver

A B, a minor (*add description and residence*) by C D [*or by the Court of Wards*], his next friend

A B (*add description and residence*) a person of unsound mind [*or of weak mind*]
by C D, his next friend

A B, a firm carrying on business in partnership at

A B (*add description and residence*), by his constituted attorney C D (*add description and residence*)

A B (*add description and residence*), Shebait of Thakur

A B (*add description and residence*), executor of C D, deceased

A B (*add description and residence*), heir of C D, deceased

(3) PLAINTS

No 1

MONEY LENT

(Title)

I B the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

- 1 On the day of 19 , he lent the defendant
rupees repayable on the day of 19 , he lent the defendant
- 2 the defendant has not paid the same, except rupees paid on the
day of 19 , he lent the defendant
- [If the plaintiff claims exemption from any law of limitation say —]
- 3 The plaintiff was a minor [*or insane*] from the day of 19 , he lent the defendant
- 4 [Facts showing when the cause of action arose and that the Court has jurisdiction]
- 5 The value of the subject matter of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is
rupees and for the purpose of court fees is rupees
- 6 The plaintiff claims rupees, with interest at per cent from
the day of 19 , he lent the defendant

No 2

MONEY OVERPAID

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

- 1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff agreed to buy an
the defendant agreed to sell bars of silver at annas per tola of fine

plaintiff was ignorant when he made the payment

- 4 The defendant has not repaid the sum so overpaid

[As in paras 1 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief clause 1]

No 3

GOODS SOLD AT A FIXED PRICE AND DELIVERED

(Title)

I *B*, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , *E F* sold and delivered to the defendant [one hundred barrels of flour, or the goods mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, or sundry goods].

2 The defendant promised to pay rupees for the said goods on delivery [or on the day of , some day before the plaint was filed]

3 He has not paid the same

4 *E F* died on the day of 19 By his last will he appointed his brother, the plaintiff, his executor

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

7 The plaintiff as executor of *E F* claims [Relief claimed]

No 4

GOODS SOLD AT A REASONABLE PRICE AND DELIVERED

(Title.)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant [sundry articles of house furniture], but no express agreement was made as to the price

2 The goods were reasonably worth rupees

3 The defendant has not paid the money

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 5

GOODS MADE AT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST AND NOT ACCEPTED

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 *E F* agreed with the plaintiff

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 6

DEFICIENCY UPON A RE-SALE [GOODS SOLD AT AUCTION]

(Title)

I *B*, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff put up at auction sundry [goods] subject to the condition that all goods not paid for and removed by the

purchaser within [ten days] after the sale should be re sold by auction on his account, of which condition the defendant had notice

2 The defendant purchased [one crate of crockery] at the auction at the price of rupees

3 The plaintiff was ready and willing to deliver the goods to the defendant on the date of the sale and for [ten days] after

4 The defendant did not take away the goods purchased by him, nor pay for them within [ten days] after the sale, nor afterward

5 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff re sold the [crate of crockery], on account of the defendant, by public auction, for rupees

6 The expenses attendant upon such re sale amounted to rupees

7. The defendant has not paid the deficiency thus arising, amounting to rupees

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 7

SERVICES AT A REASONABLE RATE

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows:—

1 Between the day of 19 , and the day of 19 , at , plaintiff [executed sundry drawings, designs and] but no express agreement was made as rupees

[As in paras 1 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 8

SERVICES AND MATERIALS AT A REASONABLE COST

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows:—

1 On the day of 19 , at , the plaintiff built a house known as No , in , and furnished the materials therefor, for the defendant, at his request, but no express agreement was made as to the amount to be paid for such work and materials rupees

2 The work done and materials supplied were reasonably worth

3 The defendant has not paid the money

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 9

USE AND OCCUPATION

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, executor of the will of A 1 , deceased, states as follows:—

1 That the defendant occupied the [house No , Street] by per mission of the said A 1 , from the day of 19 , until the

day of 19 , and no agreement was made as to payment for the use of the said premises

2 That the use of the said premises for the said period was reasonably worth rupees.

3 The defendant has not paid the money

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

6 The plaintiff is executor of A B claims [Relief claimed]

No 10

ON AN AWARD

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff and defendant, having a difference between them concerning [a demand of the plaintiff for the price of ten barrels of oil, which the defendant refused to pay] agreed in writing to submit the difference to the arbitration of E F and G H, and the original document is annexed hereto

2 On the day of 19 , the arbitrators awarded that the defendant should [pay the plaintiff rupees]

3 The defendant has not paid the money

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 11

ON A FOREIGN JUDGMENT

(Title)

A B the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 at in the State [or Kingdom] of , the Court of that State [or Kingdom] in a suit therein pending between the plaintiff and the defendant, duly adjudged that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff rupees with interest from the said date

2 The defendant has not paid the money

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1 and Relief claimed]

No 12

AGAINST SURETY FOR PAYMENT OF RENT

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 E F hired from the plaintiff for the term of years the [house No , Street] at the annual rent

—1
the

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1 and Relief claimed.]

No 13

BRIEF OF AORFEMENT TO PURCHASE LAND

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, and the original document is hereto annexed

[Or, On the day of 19 , the plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed that the plaintiff should sell to the defendant and that the defendant should purchase from the plaintiff forty bighas of land in the village of for rupees]

2 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff, being then the absolute owner of the property [and the same being free from all incumbrances as was made to appear to the defendant], tendered to the defendant a sufficient instrument of transfer of the same [or, was ready and willing, and is still ready and willing, and offered, to transfer the same to the defendant by a sufficient instrument] on the payment by the defendant of the sum agreed upon

3 The defendant has not paid the money

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 14

NOT DELIVERING GOODS SOLD

(Title)

A B the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 rupees on delivery

2 On the [said] day the plaintiff was ready and willing, and offered, to pay the

defend
3
of the 1

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 15

WRONGFUL DISMISSAL

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 and defendant mutually the capacity the plaintiff as (monthly) d upon the illing to con

service of the defendant and has ever since in such service during the remainder of the said year, whereof the defendant always has had notice

3 On the day of 19 , the defendant wrongfully discharged the plaintiff, and refused to permit to serve as aforesaid, or to pay him for his services

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 16

BREACH OF CONTRACT TO SERVE

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed that the plaintiff should employ the defendant at an [annual] salary of rupees, and that the defendant should serve the plaintiff as [an artist] for the term of [one year].

2 The plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement [and on the day of 19 , offered so to do]

3 The defendant [entered upon] the service of the plaintiff on the above mentioned day, but afterwards, on the day of 19 , he refused to serve the plaintiff as aforesaid

[As in paras 1 and 3 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 17

AGAINST A BUILDING FOR DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, and the original document is hereto annexed [Or state the tenor of the contract]

[2 The plaintiff duly performed all the conditions of the agreement on his part]

3 The defendant [built the house referred to in the agreement in a bad and unworkmanlike manner]

[As in paras 1 and 3 of Form No 1 and Relief claimed]

No 18

ON A BOND FOR THE FIDELITY OF A CLERK

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 the plaintiff took *E F* into his employment as a clerk

2 In consideration thereof on the day of 19 , the defendant agreed with the plaintiff that if *E F* should not faithfully perform his duties as a clerk to the plaintiff, or should fail to account to the plaintiff for all monies evidences of debt or other property received by him for the use of the plaintiff, the defendant would pay to the plaintiff whatever loss he might sustain by reason thereof not exceeding rupees

[Or, 2 In consideration thereof, the defendant by his bond of the same date bound to the condition to the plaintiff of debt or other antiff, the bond

SHOULD DO THIS

No 19

BY TENANT AGAINST LANDLORD, WITH SPECIAL DAMAGE

(Tiffe)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the defendant, by a registered instrument, let to the plaintiff [the house No. Street], for the term of years, contracting with the plaintiff that he, the plaintiff, and his legal representatives should quietly enjoy possession thereof for the said term

2 All conditions were fulfilled and all things happened necessary to entitle the plaintiff to maintain this suit

3 On the _____ day of _____ during the said term, E F, who was the lawful owner of the said house, lawfully evicted the plaintiff therefrom, and still withholds the possession thereof from him.

4 The plaintiff was thereby [prevented from continuing the business of a tador at the said place, was compelled to expend rupees in moving and lost the custom of G H and I J by such removal]

[13 in parav 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 20

ON AN AGREEMENT OF INDEMNITY

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows -

made upon him on account of any indebtedness of the firm

2 The plaintiff duly performed all the conditions of the agreement on his part

3 On the _____ day of _____ 19____, [a judgment was recovered against the plaintiff and defendant by E F, in the High Court of Judicature at _____ upon a debt due from the firm to E F, and on the _____ day of _____ 19____] the plaintiff paid _____ rupees [in satisfaction of the same].

4 The defendant has not paid the same to the plaintiff

(As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed)

No 21

PROCURING PROPERTY BY DECEIT

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows -

DECLASSIFIED, HANDLED AND FILED

2 The plaintiff was thereby induced to sell (and deliver)

4 The defendant has not paid for the goods delivered by the plaintiff, in preparing and shipping the goods and procuring their restoration, expended rupees 1000/- (one thousand) of plaintiff's money.

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 22

FRAUDULENTLY PROCURING CREDIT TO BE GIVEN TO ANOTHER PERSON

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the defendant represented to the

rupees [on months credit]

3 The said representations were false and were then known by the defendant to be so, and were made by him with intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff [or, to deceive and injure the plaintiff]

4 E F [did not pay for the said goods at the expiration of the credit aforesaid, or] has not paid for the said rice, and the plaintiff has wholly lost the same

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 23

POLLUTING THE WATER UNDER THE PLAINTIFF'S LAND

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is, and at all the times hereinafter mentioned was possessed of certain land called and situate in , and of a well therein, and of

and polluted the well and the water therein and the springs and streams of water which flowed into the well

3 In consequence the water in the well became impure and unfit for domestic and other necessary purposes, and the plaintiff and his family are deprived of the use and benefit of the well and water

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1 and Relief claimed]

No 24

CARRYING ON A NOXIOUS MANUFACTURE

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is, and at all the times hereinafter mentioned was, possessed of certain lands called , situate in ,

2 Ever since the day of 19 , the defendant has wrongfully caused to issue from certain smelting works carried on by the defendant large quantities of offensive and unwholesome smoke and other vapours and noxious matter,

4 " might be from, and of the 1- as as he otherwise would have had

[Is in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 25

OBSTRUCTING A RIGHT OF WAY

(Title)

1 B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is, and at the time hereinafter mentioned was possessed of [a house in the village of]

2 He was not [the 1 to 9 - all of - - - - -]

3 On the day of 19 , defendant wrongfully obstructed the said way, so that the plaintiff could not pass [with vehicles or on foot or in any manner] along the way [and has ever since wrongfully obstructed the same]

4 (State special damage if any)

[Is in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 26

OBSTRUCTING A HIGHWAY

(Title)

for medical attendance

[Is in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

stones in the
fell over the
d great pain
red expense

No 27

DIVERTING A WATER COURSE

(Title)

1 B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is, and at the time hereinafter mentioned was possessed of a [mill] situated on a [stream] known as the , in the village of , district of

2 By reason of such possession the plaintiff was entitled to the [flow] of the stream for working the mill.

3 On the day of 19 , the defendant, by cutting the bank of the stream, wrongfully diverted the water thereof so that less water ran into the plaintiff's mill

4 By reason thereof the plaintiff has been unable to grind more than sacks per day whereas, before the said diversion of water he was able to grind sacks per day

[Is in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 28

OBSTRUCTING A RIGHT TO USE WATER FOR IRRIGATION

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 Plaintiff is, and was at the time hereinafter mentioned, possessed of certain lands situate, etc., and entitled to take and use a portion of the water of a certain stream for irrigating the said lands

2 On the day of 19 , the defendant prevented the plaintiff from taking and using the said portion of the said water as aforesaid, by wrongfully obstructing and diverting the said stream

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 29

INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE ON A RAILROAD

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows

1 On the day of 19 , the defendants were common carriers of passengers by railway between and

2 On that day the plaintiff was a passenger in one of the carriages of the defendants on the said railway

3 While he was such passenger, at (or near the station of)
or between the stations of and) a collision occurred on the said

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

[Or, thus — 2 On that day the defendants by their servants so negligently and

No 30

INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT DRIVING

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is a shoemaker, carrying on business at The defendant
is a merchant of

of the lands as he otherwise would have had

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 25

OBSTRUCTING A RIGHT OF WAY

(Title)

I B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is, and at the time hereinafter mentioned was possessed of [a house in the village of _____] public and his

2 On the _____ day of _____ 19____, the plaintiff, by cutting the said way, _____ along the _____ 4 (Sh _____)

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 26

OBSTRUCTING A HIGHWAY

(Title)

1 The defendant wrongfully dug a trench and heaped up earth and stones in the _____ or the _____ and was prevented from attending to his business for a long time, and incurred expense _____ pain _____ for medical attendance

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 27

DIVERTING A WATER COURSE

(Title)

I L, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is, and at the time hereinafter mentioned was possessed of a mill situated on a [stream] known as the _____, in the village of _____, district _____ of _____

2 By reason of such possession the plaintiff was entitled to the flow of the stream for working the mill

3 On the _____ day of _____ 19____, the defendant, by cutting the bank of the stream, wrongfully diverted the water the said _____ so that less water ran into _____

_____ per day _____ sacks _____

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed]

No 28

OBSTRUCTING A RIGHT TO USE WATER FOR IRRIGATION

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 Plaintiff is and was at the time hereinafter mentioned possessed of certain lands situate etc, and entitled to take and use a portion of the water of a certain stream for irrigating the said lands

2 On the day of 19, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from taking and using the said portion of the said water as aforesaid by wrongfully obstructing and diverting the said stream

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1 and Relief claimed]

No 29

INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE ON A RAILROAD

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows

1 On the day of 19 the defendants were common carriers of passengers by railway between and

2 On that day the plaintiff was a passenger in one of the carriages of the defendants on the said railway

3 While he was such passenger at [or near the station of
or between the stations of and] a collision occurred on the said

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1 and Relief claimed]

[Or thus — 2 On that day the defendants by their servants so negligently and

No 30

INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT DRIVING

(Title)

A B the above named plaintiff states as follows

1 The plaintiff is a shoemaker carrying on business at The defendant
is a merchant of

profits

(As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed)

No 31

FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the _____ day of _____ 19____, the defendant obtained a warrant of arrest from _____ [a Magistrate of the said city, or as the case may be] on a charge of _____, and the plaintiff was arrested thereon, and imprisoned for _____ [days, or hours, and gave bail in the sum of _____ rupees to obtain his release]

2 In so doing the defendant acted maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause

3 On the _____ day of _____ 19____, the Magistrate dismissed the complaint of the defendant and acquitted the plaintiff.

4 Many persons whose names are unknown to the plaintiff hearing of the arrest, and supposing the plaintiff to be a criminal, have ceased to do business with him.

complaint

(As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1, and Relief claimed)

No 32

MOVEABLES WRONGFULLY DETAINED

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the _____ day of _____ 19____, plaintiff owned [or state facts showing a right to the possession] the goods mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed [or describe the goods], the estimated value of which is _____ rupees

2 From that day until the commencement of this suit the defendant has detained the same from the plaintiff

3 Before the commencement of the suit, to wit on the _____ day of _____ 19____ the plaintiff demanded the same from the defendant, but he refused to deliver them

(As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1)

6 The plaintiff claims—

(1) delivery of the said goods, or _____ rupees, in case delivery cannot be had,

(2) _____ rupees compensation for the detention thereof

The Schedule

No 33

AGAINST A FRAUDULENT PURCHASER AND HIS TRANSFEREE WITH NOTICE

(Title)

A B the above named plaintiff, states as follows —
_____ for the purpose
that [he

2 The plaintiff was hereby induced to sell and deliver to *C D*, [one hundred boxes of tea], the estimated value of which is rupees

3 The said representations were false, and were then known by *C D* to be so [or, at the time of making the said representations, *C D* was insolvent, and knew himself to be so]

4 *C D* afterwards transferred the said goods to the defendant *E F* without consideration [or who had notice of the falsity of the representation]

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

7 The plaintiff claims—

- (1) delivery of the said goods, or rupees, in case delivery cannot be had,
- (2) rupees compensation for the detention thereof

No 34

RESCISSON OF A CONTRACT ON THE GROUND OF MISTAKE

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 the defendant represented to the plaintiff that a certain piece of ground belonging to the defendant situated at

 rupees as part of the purchase money

4 That the said piece of ground contained in fact only [five bighas]

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

7 The plaintiff claims—

- (1) rupees, with interest from the day of 19
- (2) that the said agreement be delivered up and cancelled

No 35

AN INJUNCTION RESTRAINING WASTE

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

6 The plaintiff claims that the defendant be restrained by injunction from committing or permitting any further waste on the said premises

[Pecuniary compensation may also be claimed]

No 36

INJUNCTION RESTRAINING NUISANCE

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 Plaintiff is, and at all the times hereinafter mentioned was the absolute owner of [the house No Street, Calcutta]

2 The defendant is, and at all the said times was the absolute owner of [a plot of ground in the same street]

3 On the day of 19 , the defendant erected upon his said plot a slaughter house, and still maintains the same and has at present the blood

4 []
has been

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

7 The plaintiff claims that the defendant be restrained by injunction from committing or permitting any further nuisance

No 37

PUBLIC NUISANCE

(Title)

A B , the above named plaintiff, states as follows :—

1 The defendant has wrongly heaped up earth and stones on a public road known as Street at so as to obstruct the passage of the public along the same and threatens and intends, unless restrained from so doing to continue and repeat the said wrongful act.

2 The plaintiff has obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General [or of the Collector or other officer appointed in this behalf] to the institution of this suit

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

The plaintiff claims—

(1) a declaration that the defendant is not entitled to obstruct the passage of

(2)

the earth and stones wrongfully heaped up as aforesaid

No 38.

INJUNCTION AGAINST THE DIVERSION OF A WATER COURSE

(Title)

A B , the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

[As in Form No 27]

The plaintiff claims that the defendant be restrained by injunction from diverting the water as aforesaid

No 39

RESTORATION OF MOVEABLE PROPERTY THREATENED WITH DESTRUCTION AND FOR AN INJUNCTION

(Title)

A B , the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

— from defendant

2 On the day of 19 , he deposited the same for safe keeping with the defendant

3 On the day of 19 , he demanded the same from the defendant and offered to pay all reasonable charges for the storage of the same

4 The defendant refuses to deliver the same to the plaintiff and threatens to conceal, dispose of, cut or injure the same if required to deliver it up

5 No pecuniary compensation would be an adequate compensation to the plaintiff for the loss of the [painting]

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

8 The plaintiff claims—

(1) that the defendant be restrained by injunction from disposing of, injuring or concealing the said [painting],

(2) that he be compelled to deliver the same to the plaintiff

No 40

INTERPLEADER.

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1, Before the date of the claims hereinafter mentioned G H deposited with the plaintiff [describe the property] for [safe keeping]

2 The defendant G D claims the same (under an alleged assignment thereof to him from G H)

3 The defendant E F also claims the same (under an order of G H transferring the same to him)

6 The suit is not brought by collusion with either of the defendants

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

9 The plaintiff claims—

(1) that the defendants be restrained, by injunction, from taking any proceedings against the plaintiff in relation thereto

(2) that they be required to interplead together concerning their claims to the said property,

[(3) that some person be authorized to receive the said property pending such litigation]

(4) that upon delivering the same to such [person] the plaintiff be discharged from all liability to either of the defendants in relation thereto

No. 41

ADMINISTRATION BY CREDITOR ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER CREDITORS.

(Title.)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 E F, late of was at the time of his death and his estate still is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of [here insert nature of debt and security, if any]

2 E F died on or about the day of By his last will, dated the day of he appointed G D his executor [or devised his estate in trust etc., or died intestate as the case may be].

3 The will was proved by G D [or letters of administration were granted, etc.].

4 The defendant has possessed himself of the moveable [and immoveable, or the proceeds of the immoveable] property of E F, and has not paid the plaintiff his debt
[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

7 The plaintiff claims that an account may be taken of the moveable [and immoveable] property of E F, deceased, and that the same may be administered under the decree of the Court

No 42

ADMINISTRATION BY SPECIFIC LEGATEE

(Title)

[Alter Form No 41 thus]—

[Omit paragraph 1 and commence paragraph 2] E F, late of , died on or about the day of . By his last will, dated the day of , he appointed C D his executor, and bequeathed to the plaintiff [here state the specific legacy]

For paragraph 4 substitute—

The defendant is in possession of the moveable property of E F, and, amongst other things of the said [here name the subject of the specific bequest]

For the

lered to deliver to him the said

No 43

ADMINISTRATION BY PECUNIARY LEGATEE

(Title)

[Alter Form No 41 thus]—

[Omit paragraph 1 and substitute for paragraph 2] E F, late of , died on or about the day of . By his last will dated the day of , he appointed C D his executor and bequeathed to the plaintiff a legacy of rupees

In paragraph 4 substitute ' legacy ' for ' debt '

Another Form

(Title)

E F, the above named plaintiff states as follows —
day of

By
"

failure of his issue as aforesaid

2 The will was proved by the defendant on the day of the plaintiff has not been married

day of

3 The testator was at his death entitled to moveable and immoveable property the defendant entered into the receipt of the rents of the immoveable property and got in the moveable property, he has sold some part of the immoveable property

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

6 The plaintiff claims—

- (1) to have the moveable and immoveable property of *A B* administered in this Court, and for that purpose to have all proper directions given and accounts taken,
- (2) such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require

No 44

EXECUTION OF TRUSTS

(Title)

4 *B* the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 He is one of the trustees under an instrument of settlement bearing date on or about the day of made upon the marriage of *E F* and *G H* the father and mother of the defendant [or an instrument of transfer of the estate and effects of *F F* for the benefit of *C D* the defendant and the other creditors of *F F*]

2 *A B* has taken upon himself the burden of the said trust and is in possession of [or of the proceeds of] the moveable and immoveable property transferred by the said instrument

3 *C D* claims to be entitled to a beneficial interest under the instrument

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

6 The plaintiff is desirous to account for all the rents and profits of the said immoveable property [and the proceeds of the sale of the said or of part of the said

administration in the presence of *C D* and such other persons so interested as the Court may direct or that *C D* may show good cause to the contrary

[*N B* —] Where the suit is by a beneficiary the plaint may be modelled *mutatis mutandis* on the plaint by a legatee]

No 45

FORECLOSURE OF SALE

(Title)

1 *B*, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 The plaintiff is mortgagee of lands belonging to the defendant

2 The following are the particulars of the mortgage

(a) (date)

shortly the transfers or detention

(If the plaintiff is mortgagee in possession add)

- 3 The plaintiff took possession of the mortgaged property on the day of _____ and is ready to account as mortgagee in possession from that time
[As in paras 1 and 5 of Form No 1]

- 6 The plaintiff claims —

(1) payment, or in default [sale or] foreclosure [and possession],

[If here Order 34, rule 6, applies]

(2) in case the proceeds of the sale are found to be insufficient to pay the amount due to the plaintiff, then that liberty be reserved to the plaintiff to apply for a decree for the balance

No 46

REDEMPTION

(Title)

I B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

- 1 The plaintiff is mortgagor of lands of which the defendant is mortgagee

- 2 The following are the particulars of the mortgage —

(a) (date),

(b) (names of mortgagor and mortgagee),

(c) (sum secured),

(d) (rate of interest),

(e)

(f)

etc. shortly the transfers or detachments

(If the defendant is mortgagee in possession, add)

- 3 The defendant has taken possession [or has received the rents] of the mortgaged property

[As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No 1]

- 6 The plaintiff claims to redeem the said property and to have the same reconveyed to him [and to have possession thereof]

No 47

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No 1)

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

day of _____

and signed by the
— real property

re agreement

perform the

[As in paras 1 and 2 of Form No 1]

— and let the defendant specifically perform the obligation of the said contract

No 48

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No 2)

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff, states as follows —

1 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, in writing and the original document is hereto annexed

The defendant was absolutely entitled to the immovable property described in the agreement

2 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff tendered rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument

3 On the day of 19 , the plaintiff again demanded such transfer [or the defendant refused to transfer the same to the plaintiff]

4 The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer

5 The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase money of the said property to the defendant

[As in paras 1 and 5 of Form No 1]

8 The plaintiff claims—

(1) that the defendant transfers the said property to the plaintiff by a sufficient instrument [following the terms of the agreement],

(2) rupees compensation for withholding the same

No 49

PARTNERSHIP

(Title)

A B, the above named plaintiff states as follows —

1 He and C D, the defendant have been for years [or months] past carrying on business together under articles of partnership in writing [or under a deed, or under a verbal agreement]

2 Several disputes and differences have arisen between the plaintiff and defendant as such partners whereby it has become impossible to carry on the business in partnership with advantage to the partners [Or the defendant has committed the following breaches of the partnership articles

(1)

(2)

(3)

]

[As in paras 1 and 2 of Form No 1]

5 The plaintiff claims—

(1) dissolution of the partnership,

(2) that accounts be taken,

(3) that a receiver be appointed

[N.B.—In suits for winding up of any partnership, on it the claim for dissolution, and instead insert a paragraph stating the facts of the partnership having been dissolved]

(4) WRITTEN STATEMENTS

General defences

Denial	
Protest	<p>The defendant denies that he is a partner in the defendant firm of</p> <p>The defendant denies that he made the contract alleged or any contract with the plaintiff.</p> <p>The defendant denies that he contracted with the plaintiff as alleged or at all.</p> <p>The defendant admits assets but not the plaintiff's claim.</p> <p>The defendant denies that the plaintiff sold to him the goods mentioned in the plaint or any of them.</p>
Limitation	The suit is barred by article or article of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act 1908
Jurisdiction.	<p>The Court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit on the ground that (<i>set forth the grounds</i>)</p> <p>On the day of a diamond ring was delivered by the defendant to and accepted by the plaintiff in discharge of the alleged cause of action</p>
Insolvency	<p>The defendant has been adjudged an insolvent.</p> <p>The plaintiff before the institution of the suit was adjudged an insolvent</p>
Minority	
Payment into Court	
	aforesaid)
Performance remitted	The performance of the promise alleged was remitted on the (date)
Rescission	The contract was rescinded by agreement between the plaintiff and defendant
Res judicata	
Estoppel.	
	(the estoppel)
Ground of defence subsequent to institution of suit	<p>Since the institution of the suit that is to say on the day of (<i>set out facts</i>)</p>

No 1

DEFENCE IN SUITS FOR GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED

1		
2		
3		
		[or]
4	} Except as to Rs	, same as {
5		
		payment day of

No 2

DEFENCE IN SUITS ON BONDS

- 1 The bond is not the defendant's bond
- 2 The defendant made payment to the plaintiff on the day according to the condition of the bond
- 3 The defendant made payment to the plaintiff after the day named and before suit of the principal and interest mentioned in the bond

No 3

*DEFENCE IN SUITS ON GUARANTEES

- 1 The principal satisfied the claim by payment before suit
- 2 The defendant was released by the plaintiff giving time to the principal debtor in pursuance of a binding agreement.

No 4

DEFENCE IN ANY SUIT FOR DEBT

- 1 As to Rs 200 of the money claimed, the defendant is entitled to set off for goods sold and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff
Particulars are as follows —

	Rs
1907, January 25th	150
" February 1st	50
	<hr/>
Total	200

- 2 As to the whole (or as to Rs part of the money claimed) the defendant made tender before suit of Rs and has paid the same into Court

No 5

DEFENCE IN SUITS FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE DRIVING

- 1 The defendant denies that the carriage mentioned in the plaint was the defendant's carriage and that it was under the charge or control of the defendant's servants

collision with it

- 4 The defendant does not admit the statements contained in the third paragraph of the plaint

No 6

DEFENCE IN ALL SUITS FOR WRONGS.

- 1 Denial of the several acts (or matters) complained of

No 7.

DEFENCE IN SUITS FOR DETENTION OF GOODS

1. The goods were not the property of the plaintiff
 2. The goods were detained for a lien to which the defendant was entitled
- Particulars are as follows.—

1907, May 3rd To cartage of the goods claimed from Delhi to Calcutta —
 45 maunds at Rs 2 per maund Rs 0

No 8

DEFENCE IN SUITS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

- 1 The plaintiff is not the author [assignee, &c.]
- 2 The book was not registered.
- 3 The defendant did not infringe

No. 9

DEFENCE IN SUITS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE MARK

- 1 The trade mark is not the plaintiff's
- 2 The alleged trade mark is not a trade mark.
- 3 The defendant did not infringe

No 10

DEFENCES IN SUITS RELATING TO NUISANCES

- 1 The plaintiff's rights are not ancient [or deny his other alleged prescriptive rights]
 - 2 The plaintiff's rights will not be materially interfered with by the defendant's buildings
 - 3 The defendant denies that he or his servant pollute the water [or do what is complained of, &c.]
 - 4 The plaintiff has been guilty of laches of which the following are particulars —

1870	Plaintiff's mill began to work
1871	Plaintiff came into possession
1883	First complaint
- [The defendant will rely on the above at produced any defence, e.g. limitation as to payment of damage]

No 11

DEFENCE TO SUIT FOR FORECLOSURE

until (if more than one has been foreclosed)

3 The suit is barred by article _____ of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1909

4 The following payments have been made, viz:—

(Insert date.)	.	.	.	Rs
(Insert date)	.	.	.	1000
	.	.	.	500

5 The plaintiff took possession on the _____ of _____, and has received the rents ever since.

6 That plaintiff released the debt on the _____ of _____

7 The defendant transferred all his interest to A. B. by a document, dated _____.

No 12

DEFENCE TO SUIT FOR REDEMPTION

1 The plaintiff's right to redeem is barred by article _____ of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1909.

2 The plaintiff transferred all interest in the property to A. B.

3 The defendant, by a document dated the _____ day of _____ transferred all his interest in the mortgage debt and property comprised in the mortgage to A. B.

4 The defendant never took possession of the mortgaged property, or received the rents thereof

(If the defendant admits possession for a time only, he should state the time, and deny possession beyond what he admits.)

No 13

DEFENCE TO SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

.....

9 (or) The agreement is unfair.

10 (or) The agreement was entered into by mistake

11 The following are particulars of (7), (8), (9), (10) (or as the case may be)

12 The agreement was rescinded under Conditions of Sale, No 11 (or by mutual agreement)

(In cases where damages are claimed and the defendant disputes his liability to do so, he must deny the agreement or the alleged breaches, or show whatever other ground of defence he intends to rely on, e.g. the Indian Limitation Act, accord and satisfaction, release, fraud, etc.)

No 14

DEFENCE IN ADMINISTRATION SUIT BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

1 A. B.'s will contained a charge of debts. He died insolvent. He was entitled at his death to some immoveable property which the defendant sold and which produced the net sum of Rs. _____, and the testator had some moveable property which the defendant got in, and which produced the net sum of Rs. _____

3 The defendant made up his accounts and sent a copy thereof to the plaintiff on the day of 19 , and offered the plaintiff free access to the vouchers to verify such accounts but he declined to avail himself of the defendant's offer

4 The defendant submits that the plaintiff ought to pay the costs of this suit

No 15

PROBATE OF WILL IN SOLEMN FORM

1 The said will and codicil of the deceased were not duly executed according to the provisions of the Indian Succession Act 1865 [or of the Hindu Wills Act 1870]

Defendant

nence of
n to the

1 2 3 4

appointed the defendant sole executor thereof

The defendant claims —

- (1) that the Court will pronounce against the said will and codicil propounded by the plaintiff
- (2) that the Court will decree probate of the will of the deceased dated the 1st January, 1873 in solemn form of law

No 16

PARTICULARS (O 6 r 5)

(Title of Suit)

The following are the particulars of (here state the matters in respect of which particulars have been ordered) delivered pursuant to the order of the of

(Here set out the particulars ordered in paragraphs if necessary)

APPENDIX B.

PROCESS.

No 1.

SUMMONS FOR DISPOSAL OF SUIT (O 5, rr 1, 5)

(Title)

To

[Name, description and place of residence]

WHEREAS has instituted a suit against you for , you are hereby summoned to appear in this Court in person or by a pleader duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit, or who shall be accompanied by some person able to answer all such questions, on the day of 19 , at o'clock in the noon, to answer the claim, and as the day fixed for your appearance is appointed for the final disposal of the suit, you must be prepared to produce on that day all the witnesses upon whose evidence and all the documents upon which you intend to rely in support of your defence

Take notice that, in default of your appearance on the day before mentioned the suit will be heard and determined in your absence

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19

Judge

NOTICE—1 Should you apprehend your witnesses will not attend of their own accord, you can have a summons from this Court to compel the attendance of any witness, and the production of any document that you have a right to call upon the witness to produce, on applying to the Court and on depositing the necessary expenses

- 2 If you admit the claim, you should pay the money into Court together with the costs of the suit, to avoid execution of the decree, which may be against your person or property, or both

No 2

SUMMONS FOR SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES (O 5, rr 1, 5)

(Title)

To

[Name, description and place of residence]

WHEREAS has instituted a suit against you for you are hereby summoned to appear in this Court in person, or by a pleader duly instructed, and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit, or who shall be accompanied by some person able to answer all such questions on the day of 19 , at o'clock in the noon, to answer the claim and you are directed to produce on that day all the documents upon which you intend to rely in support of your defence

Take notice that, in default of your appearance on the day before mentioned the suit will be heard and determined in your absence

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19

Judge

4 N

- NOTICE —1 Should you apprehend your witnesses will not attend of their own accord you can have a summons from this Court to compel the attendance of any witness, and the production of any document that you have a right to call on the witness to produce, on applying to the Court and on depositing the necessary expenses
- 2 If you admit the claim, you should pay the money into Court together with the costs of the suit, to avoid execution of the decree, which may be against your person or property, or both

No 3

SUMMONS TO APPEAR IN PERSON (O 5, r 3)

(Title)

10

[Name, description and place of residence]

WHEREAS has instituted a suit against you for you are hereby summoned to appear in this Court in person on the day of 19 at o'clock in the noon, to answer the claim, and you are directed to produce on that day all the documents upon which you intend to rely in support of your defence

Take notice that, in default of your appearance on the day before mentioned the suit will be heard and determined in your absence

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19

J. J.

No 4

SUMMONS IN SUMMARY SUIT ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT (O 57, r 2)

(Title)

To

[Name, description and place of residence]

WHEREAS has instituted a suit against you under Order XXVIII balance of principal and

111111

19

Judge

No 5

NOTICE TO PERSON WHO, THE COURT CONSIDERS, SHOULD BE ADDED AS CO PLAINTIFF (O 1, r 10)

(Title)

To

[Name, description and place of residence]

WHEREAS has instituted the above suit against for and whereas it appears necessary that you should be added as a plaintiff in the said

suit in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved

Take notice that you should on or before _____ day of _____ 19____
signify to this Court whether you consent to be so added

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____

Judge

No 6

SUMMONS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF A DECEASED DEFENDANT (O 22 r 4)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS the plaintiff _____ instituted a suit in this Court on the _____ day of _____ 19____, against the defendant _____ who has since deceased, and whereas the said plaintiff has made an application to this Court alleging that you are the legal representative of the said _____ deceased and desiring that you be made the defendant in his stead

You are hereby summoned to attend in this Court on the _____ day of _____ 19____, at _____ A M to defend the said suit and, in default of your appearance on the day specified, the said suit will be heard and determined in your absence

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19____

Judge

No 7

ORDER FOR TRANSMISSION OF SUMMONS FOR SERVICE IN THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER COURT (O 5 r 21)

(Title)

WHEREAS it is stated that _____ defendant in the above suit is at present residing in _____ It is ordered that a summons returnable on the _____ day of _____ 19____, be forwarded to the _____ Court of _____ for service on the said _____ with a duplicate of this proceeding

The court fee of _____ chargeable in respect to the summons has been realized in this Court in stamps

Dated _____ 19____

Judge

No 8

ORDER FOR TRANSMISSION OF SUMMONS TO BE SERVED ON A PRISONER (O 1 r 1)

(Title)

To

The Superintendent of the Jail at _____

UNDER the provisions of Order V rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a summons in duplicate is herewith forwarded for service on the defendant _____ who is a prisoner in jail. You are requested to cause a copy of the said summons to be served upon the said defendant and to return the original to this Court signed by the said defendant, with a statement of service as required thereon by you.

Judge

No 9

ORDER FOR TRANSMISSION OF SUMMONS TO BE SERVED ON A PUBLIC SERVANT OR SOLDIER (O 5, r 27, 28.)

(Title)

To

You are requested to cause a copy of the said summons to be served upon the said defendant and to return the original to this Court signed by the said defendant, with a statement of service endorsed thereon by you

Judge

No 10

TO ACCOMPANY RETURN OF SUMMONS OF ANOTHER COURT (O 5, r 23)

(Title)

Read proceeding from the forwarding for service on in Suit No of 19 of that Court

Read Serving Officer's endorsement stating that the and proof of the above having been duly taken by me on the oath of and it is ordered that the be returned to the with a copy of this proceeding

Judge

Note—This form will be applicable to process other than summons the service of which may have to be effected in the same manner

No 11

AFFIDAVIT OF PROCESS SERVER TO ACCOMPANY RETURN OF A SUMMONS OR NOTICE (O 5, r 18)

(Title)

The Affidavit of son of I make oath and say as follows—
(1) I am a process server of this Court
(2) On the day of 19 I received a summons issued by the Court of in Suit No of 19 in the said Court, dated the day of 19 for service on
(3) The said was at the time personally known to me, and I served the said summons on her on the day of 19, at about o'clock in the noon at by tendering a copy thereof to her and requiring her signature to the original summons

(a)

(b)

(a) Here state whether the person served signed or refused to sign the process, and in whose presence
(b) Signature of process server

or,

(3) The said was not personally known to me, and I was accompanied by me to the said Court, and I served about o'clock in the noon at during a copy hereof to her and requiring her signature to the original summons

(a)

(b)

(a) Here state whether the person served signed or refused to sign the process, and in whose presence
(b) Signature of process server

or,

(3) The said _____ and the hour in which he ordinarily resides being personally known to me, I went to the said house, in _____ and there on the _____ day of _____ 19____ at about _____ o'clock in the _____ noon, I did not find the said _____

(a)
(b)

(a) Enter fully and exactly the manner in which the process was served with special reference to Order 5 rules 15 and 17

(b) Signature of process server

or,
(3) One _____ accompanied me to _____ and there pointed out to me _____ which he said was the house in which _____ ordinarily resides I did not find the said _____ there

(a)
(b)

(a) Enter fully and exactly the manner in which the process was served with special reference to Order 5 rules 15 and 17

(b) Signature of process server

or,
If substituted service has been ordered, state fully and exactly the manner in which the summons was served with special reference to the terms of the order for substituted service

^{Served}
^{At} _____ by the said _____ before me this _____ day of _____ 19____

Empowered under section 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure to administer the oath to deponents

No 12

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT (O 9, r 6)

(Title)

To [Name, description and place of residence]

WHEREAS this day was fixed for the hearing of the above suit and a summons was issued to you and the plaintiff has appeared in this Court and you did not so appear but from the return of the Nazir it has been proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the said summons was served on you but not in sufficient time to enable you to appear and answer on the day fixed in the said summons,

Notice is hereby given to you that the hearing of the suit is adjourned this day and that the _____ day of _____ 19____ is now fixed for the hearing of the same in default of your appearance on the day last mentioned the suit will be heard and determined in your absence

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19____

Justice

No 13

SUMMONS TO WITNESS (O 16 rr 1 & 2)

(Title)

To _____
WHEREAS your attendance is required to _____ on behalf of the _____ in the above suit you are hereby required (personally) to appear before this Court on the _____ day of _____ 19____ at _____ o'clock in the forenoon and to bring with you (or to send to this Court)

A sum of Rs. _____, being your travelling and other expenses and subsistence allowance for one day, is herewith sent. If you fail to comply with this order without

lawful excuse, you will be subject to the consequences of non attendance laid down in rule 12 of Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19
Judge

(2) If you are detained beyond the day aforesaid, a sum of Rs _____ will be tendered to you for each day's attendance beyond the day specified

No 14

PROCLAMATION REQUIRING ATTENDANCE OF WITNESS (O 16, r 10)

(Title)

To

proclamation is therefore, under rule 10 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, issued requiring the attendance of the witness in this Court on the day of _____ at _____ o'clock in the forenoon, and from day to day until he shall have leave to depart, and if the witness fails to attend on the day and hour aforesaid he will be dealt with according to law.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____

19____ Judge

No 15

PROCLAMATION REQUIRING ATTENDANCE OF WITNESS {O 15, r 10}

(Title)

of 10 at o'clock in the forenoon, and if the witness fails to attend on the day and hour aforesaid he will be dealt with according to law.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____

Judge

No 16

WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY OF DEFENDANT. (D 16 r 12)

(Title)

To

and witness to the value of _____ and to be _____
inventory thereof, within _____ days _____ of _____
(days) under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____
for _____

No 17

WARRANT OF ARREST OF WITNESS (O 16 r 10)

(Title)

To

The Bailiff of the Court

WHEREAS has been duly served with a summons but has failed to attend [absconds and keeps out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service of a summons], You are hereby ordered to arrest and bring the said before the Court

You are further ordered to return this warrant on or before the day of 19 with an endorsement certifying the day on and the manner in which it has been executed or the reason why it has not been executed

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19

Judge.

No 18

WARRANT OF COMMITTAL (O 16 r 16)

(Title)

To

to do, This is to require you to receive the said into your custody in the civil prison and to produce him before this Court at on the said day and on such other day or days as may be hereafter ordered

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this day of 19

Judge

No 19

WARRANT OF COMMITTAL (O 16 r 17)

(Title)

To

The Officer in charge of the Jail at

WHEREAS, who e attendance is required before this Court in the above named case to give evidence (or to produce a document) has been arrested and brought before the Court in custody, and whereas owing to the absence of the plaintiff (or defendant) the said cannot give such evidence (or produce such document), and whereas the Court has called upon the said to give security for his appearance on the day of 19, at which he has failed to do, This is to require you to receive the said into your custody in the civil prison and to produce him before this Court at on the day of 19

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this day of 19

Judge.

APPENDIX C

DISCOVERY, INSPECTION AND ADMISSION

No 1

ORDER FOR DELIVERY OF INTERROGATORIES (O 11, r 1)

In the Court of
Civil suit No

of

19

A B

Plaintiff,

against

C D, E F and G H

Defendants

Upon hearing and upon reading the affidavit of filed the
day of 19 , it is ordered that the be at liberty
to deliver to the interrogatories in writing, and that the said do
answer the interrogatories as prescribed by Order XI, rule 8, and that the costs of this
application be

No 2

INTERROGATORIES (O 11, r 4)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Interrogatories on behalf of the above named [plaintiff or defendant C D] for the
examination of the above named [defendants E F and G H or plaintiff]

1 Did not, etc

2 Has not, etc

etc,

etc,

etc

[The defendant E F is required to answer the interrogatories numbered
[The defendant G H is required to answer the interrogatories numbered

}]

No 3

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES (O 11, r 9)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

The answer of the above named defendant E F to the interrogatories for his
examination by the above named plaintiff

In answer to the said interrogatories, I, the above named F I, make an oath and
say as follows —

1 } Enter answers to interrogatories in paragraphs numbered consecutively

2 } on the ground that it

3 I object to answer the interrogatories numbered
[state grounds of objection]

No 4

ORDER FOR AFFIDAVIT AS TO DOCUMENTS (O 11, r 12)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Upon hearing It is ordered that the do within

No 5

AFFIDAVIT AS TO DOCUMENTS (O 11, r 13)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

I, the above named defendant C D, make oath and say as follows—

1. I have in my possession or power the documents relating to the matters in question in this suit set forth in the first and second parts of the first schedule hereto

2. I object to produce the said documents set forth in the second part of the first schedule hereto [*state grounds of objection*]

3. I have had, but have not now in my possession or power the documents relating to the matters in question in this suit set forth in the second schedule hereto

4. The last mentioned documents were last in my possession or power on [*state when and what has become of them, and in whose possession they now are*]

5. According to the best of my knowledge, information and belief I have not now, and never had, in my possession, custody or power, or in the possession, custody or power of my pleader or agent, or in the possession, custody or power of any other person on my behalf, any account, book of account, voucher, receipt, letter, memorandum paper or writing, or any copy of or extract from any such document or any other document whatsoever, relating to the matters in question in this suit or any of them, or wherein any entry has been made relative to such matters or any of them other than and except the documents set forth in the said first and second schedules hereto

No 6

ORDER TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS FOR INSPECTION (O 11 r 14)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Upon hearing and upon reading the affidavit of filed the
day of 19 ; It is ordered that the do at all reasonable times,
on reasonable notice, produce at , situate at , the following
documents, namely, , and that the be at liberty to inspect and
peruse the documents so produced, and to make notes of their contents. In the mean
time it is ordered that all further proceedings be stayed and that the costs of this
application be

No 7

NOTICE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS (O 11 r 16)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Take notice that the [*plaintiff or defendant*] requires you to produce for his inspection the following documents referred to in your [*suit or written statement or affidavit*]
dated the day of 19 .

[*Describe documents required*]

V 1 Plead for the

To Z, Pleader for the

APPENDIX C

DISCOVERY, INSPECTION AND ADMISSION

No 1

ORDER FOR DELIVERY OF INTERROGATORIES (O 11, r 1)

In the Court of

Civil suit No

4 B

of

19

Plaintiff

against

C D, E F and G H

Defendants

Upon hearing

day of

and upon reading the affidavit of

filed the

19

, it is ordered that the

be at liberty

to deliver to the

interrogatories in writing, and that the said

do

answer the interrogatories as

prescribed by Order XI, rule 8 and that the costs of this

application be

No 2

INTERROGATORIES (O 11, r 4)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Interrogatories on behalf of the above named [plaintiff or defendant C D] for the examination of the above named [defendants E F and G H or plaintiff]

1 Did not, etc

2 Has not, etc

etc,

etc

etc

{The defendant E F is required to answer the interrogatories numbered

{The defendant G H is required to answer the interrogatories numbered

No 3

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES (O 11, r 9)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

The answer of the above named defendant E F to the interrogatories for his examination by the above named plaintiff

In answer to the said interrogatories, I the above named E F, make an oath and say as follows—

1 } Enter answers to interrogatories in paragraphs numbered consecutively

3 I object to answer the interrogatories numbered in the group 1 if at [state grounds of objection]

No 4

ORDER FOR AFFIDAVIT AS TO DOCUMENTS (O 11, r 12)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Upon hearing It is ordered that the do within
days from the date of this order, answer on affidavit stating which documents are or
have been in his possession or power relating to the matter in question in this suit and
that the costs of this application be

No 5

AFFIDAVIT AS TO DOCUMENTS (O 11, r 13)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

I, the above named defendant C D, make oath and say as follows:—

1. I have in my possession or power the documents relating to the matters in
question in this suit set forth in the first and second parts of the first schedule hereto

2. I object to produce the said documents set forth in the second part of the first
schedule hereto [*state grounds of objection*]

3. I have had, but have not now in my possession or power the documents relating
to the matters in question in this suit set forth in the second schedule hereto

4. The last mentioned documents were last in my possession or power on [*state when
and what has become of them, and in whose possession they now are*]

5. According to the best of my knowledge, information and belief I have not now,

documents set forth in the said first and second schedules hereto.

No 6

ORDER TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS FOR INSPECTION (O 11 r 14)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Upon hearing and upon reading the affidavit of filed the
day of 19 , It is ordered that the do at all reasonable times,
on reasonable notice, produce at , situate at , the following
documents, namely, , and that the be at liberty to inspect and
peruse the documents so produced, and to make notes of their contents. In the mean
time it is ordered that all further proceedings be stayed and that the costs of this
application be

No 7

NOTICE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS. (O 11 r 16)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*.)

Take notice that the [*plaintiff or defendant*] requires you to } produce for his inspection
the following documents referred to in your (plaint or written statement or affidavit
dated the day of 19).
[*Describe documents required*]

A 1 Pleader for the

To 7, Pleader for the

No 8

NOTICE TO INSPECT DOCUMENTS (O 11, r 17)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

Take notice that you can inspect the documents mentioned in your notice of the
 day of 19 [except the documents numbered in that
 notice] at [insert place of inspection] on Thursday next, the instant, between
 the hours of 12 and 4 o'clock

Or, that the [plaintiff or defendant] objects to giving you inspection of documents
 mentioned in your notice of the day of 19, on the ground
 that [state the ground] —

No 9

NOTICE TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS (O 12 r 3)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

... [plaintiff or defendant] in this suit propose to adduce in

possibility of all such
 plaintiff [or defendant]

T 1 1,
 [Here describe the documents and specify as to each one
 a copy]

No 10

NOTICE TO ADMIT FACTS (O 12, r 5)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

... [plaintiff or
 defendant] here
 lay from
 as to the
 fact that

G. H. [unclear] [unclear]

20

- 2 That he died intestate.
- 3 That N was his only lawful son
- 4 That O died on the 1st April, 1896
- 5 That O was never married

No 11

ADMISSION OF FACTS PURSUANT TO NOTICE (O 12 r 5)

(Title as in No 1, *supra*)

THE PLAINTIFFS

PLAINTIFFS

E F, pleader [or agent] for defendant [or plaintiff]
To G H pleader [or agent] for plaintiff [or defendant]

Facts admitted

Qualifications or limitations, if any subject to which they are admitted

1		1
2		2
3		3 But not that he was his only lawful son
4 That O is	4	4 But not that he died on the 1st April, 1896
5 That O was never married	5	

No 12

NOTICE TO PRODUCE (GENERAL FORM) (O 12 r 8)

(Title as in No 1 *supra*)

I take notice that you are hereby required to produce and show to the Court at the first hearing of this suit all books papers letters copies of letters and other writings and documents in your custody possession or power containing any entry memorandum or minute relating to the matters in question in this suit and particularly

G H pleader [or agent] for plaintiff [or defendant]

To I I pleader [or agent] for defendant [or plaintiff]

APPENDIX D

DECREEES

No 1

DECREE IN ORIGINAL SUIT (O 20, IT 6, 7)

(Title)

Claim for
This suit coming on this day for final disposal before _____ in the presence
of _____ for the plaintiff and of _____ for the defendant, it is ordered and
decreed that _____ and that the sum of Rs _____ be paid by the
to the _____ on account of the costs of this suit, with interest thereon at the rate
of _____ per cent per annum from this date to date of realization
GIVEN under my hand and seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____
Judge

Costs of Suit.

Plaintiff				Defendant			
	Rs	A	P		Rs	A	P
1 Stamp for plaint				Stamp for power			
2 Do for power				Do for petition			
3 Do for exhibits				Pledger's fee			
4 Pledger's fee on Rs.				Subsistence for witnesses			
5 Subsistence for witnesses				Service of process			
6 Commissioner's fee				Commissioner's fee			
7 Service of process							
Total.				Total			

No 2

SIMPLE MONEY DECREE (Section 34)

(Title)

Claim for
This suit coming on this day for final disposal before _____ in the presence
of _____ for the plaintiff and _____ for the defendant, it is ordered that
the _____ do pay to the _____ on
at the rate of _____ per cent _____
of the said sum and do also pay _____
thereon at the rate of _____ per cent per annum from this date to the date of
realization
GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19____
Judge

Costs of Suit

Plaintiff				Defendant			
	Rs.	A	P		Rs.	A	P
1 Stamp for plaint				Stamp for power			
2 Do for power				Do for petition			
3 Do for exhibits				Pleader's fee			
4 Pleader's fee on Rs.				Subsistence for witnesses			
5 Subsistence for witnesses				Service of process			
6 Commissioner's fee				Commissioner's fee			
7 Service of process							
Total				Total			

No 3

PRELIMINARY DECREE FOR FORECLOSURE (O. 34, r 2)

(Title)

This suit coming on this day, etc. It is hereby declared that the amount due to the plaintiff on account of principal, interest and costs calculated up to the day of 19, is Rs. , and it is decreed as follows —

(1) That if the defendant pays into Court the amount so declared due on or before the said day of 19, the plaintiff shall deliver up to the defendant, or to such person as he appoints all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall, if so required, retransfer the property to the defendant free from the mortgage and from all incumbrances created by the plaintiff or any person claiming under him. [Where the plaintiff claims by derived title add or by those under whom he claims] [Where the plaintiff is in possession add and shall put the defendant in possession of the property]

(2) That if such payment is not made on or before the said day of 19, the defendant shall be debarred from all right to redeem the property.

Schedule

Description of the mortgaged property

No 4

PRELIMINARY DECREE FOR SALE (O. 34, r 4)

(Title)

This suit coming on this day, etc. It is hereby declared that the amount due to the plaintiff on account of principal, interest and costs calculated up to the day of 19, is Rs. , and that such amount shall carry interest at the rate of per cent per annum until realization and it is decreed as follows —

or by those under whom he claims] [Where the plaintiff is in possession add and shall put the defendant in possession of the property]

(2) That if such payment is not made on or before the said day of

defendant

(3) That if the net proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay such amount and such subsequent interest and costs in full, the plaintiff shall be at liberty to apply for a personal decree for the amount of the balance

Schedule

Description of the mortgaged property

No 5

PRELIMINARY DECREE FOR REDEMPTION (O 34 r 7)

(Title)

This suit coming on this day, etc., It is hereby declared that the amount due to the defendant on account of principal, interest and costs calculated up to the day of 19, is Rs. and it is decreed as follows —

from the mortgage and from all incumbrances created by the defendant or by those under whom he claims] [Where the defendant claims by derived title add or by those under whom he claims] [Where the defendant is in possession add and shall put the plaintiff in possession of the property]

made on or before the said day of

Schedule

Description of the mortgaged property

No 6

DECREE FOR FORECLOSURE — FIRST MORTGAGEE & SECOND MORTGAGEE AND MORTGAGOR — SUCCESSIVE PERIODS FOR REDEMPTION

(Title)

and that on the day of 19 (b) there shall be due to the plaintiff for interest the further sum of Rs. making in all Rs. y, and it is further declared that on the day of 19 (b) there shall be due to the first defendant on account of principal, interest and costs Rs. z,

and it is decreed as follows —

(1) That if the first defendant pays into Court the said sum of Rs. x on or before the day of 19 (a) the plaintiff shall deliver up etc. (as in Form No 3)

(2) That in default of the first defendant paying the said sum on or before the said day he shall be deprived from all right to redeem the property

(3) That in case of such foreclosure and if the second defendant pays into Court the said sum of Rs *y*, on or before the _____ day of _____ 19____, (b) the plaintiff

second defendant pays into Court the said sums of Rs *y* and Rs *z* on or before the _____ day of _____ 19____, (b) the first defendant shall deliver up, etc (as in Form No 3)

(6) That in default of the second defendant paying the said sums on or before the said day he shall be debarred from all right to redeem the property [Where the second defendant is in possession add and shall put the first defendant in possession of the property]

(a) Insert a day not less than six months from the date of decree

(b) Insert a day within three months from the date mentioned in (a)

No 7

DECREE FOR SALE—FIRST MORTGAGE & SECOND MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGOR— ONE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION

(Title)

It is hereby declared that the amount due to the plaintiff on account of principal, interest and costs calculated up to the _____ day of _____ 19____ is Rs *x* and that on the said day there will be due to the first defendant on account of principal, interest and costs Rs *y*;

and it is decreed as follows—

(1) That if the defendants or either of them pay into Court the said sum of Rs *x* on or before the said _____ day of _____ 19____, the plaintiff shall deliver up, etc (as in Form No 4)

(2) That if payment of the said sum is not made on or before the _____ day

interest and costs as aforesaid, and that the balance if any be paid to the second defendant

(3) That in case the defendants or either of them shall pay the said sum of Rs *x* as aforesaid, he or they shall be at liberty to apply to the Court that the plaintiff's mortgage may be kept alive for the benefit of the person making the said payment or otherwise as he or they may be advised

(4) That if the net proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the said sum of Rs *x* and such subsequent interest and costs in full the plaintiff shall be at liberty to apply for a personal decree for the amount of the balance

No 8

DECREE FOR SALE—SECOND MORTGAGE & FIRST MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGOR— ONE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION

(Title)

[Insert declarations of the amounts due to the plaintiff Rs *y* and to the first defendant Rs *x* as in Form No 7]

pays into Court the said sum of _____
19____ the first defendant shall

(2) That if payment of the said sum is not made on or before the _____ day of _____ 19____, the first defendant shall be at liberty to apply that the suit be

to the first defendant of the said sum of Rs. x and such subsequent interest and costs as may be allowed by the Court: secondly, in payment to the plaintiff of the said sum of Rs. y and such subsequent interest and costs as aforesaid: and that the balance, if any, be paid to the second defendant

(3) That if the plaintiff shall pay the said sum of Rs. x into Court on or before the _____ day of _____ 19____, the second defendant shall be at liberty to pay

No. 9.

DECREE FOR SALE—SUB MORTGAGEE'S MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGEE, THE AMOUNT OF THE ORIGINAL MORTGAGE EXCEEDING THAT OF THE SUB MORTGAGE.

(Rule 1)

[Insert declarations of the amounts due to the plaintiff Rs. x and to the first defendant Rs. y as in Form No. 7.]

IN
the
year
of

19__

10
00

subsequent interest and costs as aforesaid.

IN the

year
of

No 10

FINAL DECREE FOR FORECLOSURE (O 34, r 3)

(Title)

made

It is hereby decreed as follows —

That the defendant and all persons claiming through or under him be debarred from all right to redeem the mortgaged property set out and described in the schedule hereunto annexed [Where the defendant is in possession add and shall put the plaintiff in possession of the said property]

Schedule

Description of the mortgaged property

No 11

DECREE AGAINST MORTGAGOR PERSONALLY (O 34, r 6)

(Title)

Whereas the net proceeds of the sale held under the final decree for sale passed in this suit on the day of 19 , and now in Court to the credit of

of the said sum

No 12

DECREE FOR RECTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENT

(Title)

19 It is hereby declared that the , dated the day of , does not truly express the intention of the parties to such . And it is decreed that the said be rectified by

No 13

DECREE TO SET ASIDE A TRANSFER IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS

(Title)

19 It is hereby declared that the , dated the day of , and made between and , is void as against the plaintiff and all other the creditors if any, of the defendant.

No 14

INJUNCTION AGAINST PRIVATE NUISANCE

(Title)

Let the defendant, his agents, servants and workmen, be perpetually restrained from burning, or causing to be burnt, any bricks on the defendant's plot of land marked B in the annexed plan, so as to occasion a nuisance to the plaintiff as the owner or occupier of the dwelling house and garden mentioned in the plan as belonging to and being occupied by the plaintiff

No 15

INJUNCTION AGAINST BUILDING HIGHER THAN OLD LEVEL.

(Title)

or obstruct such of the plaintiff's windows in his said premises as are ancient lights

No 16

INJUNCTION RESTRAINING USE OF PRIVATE ROAD

(Title)

any purpose whatsoever

No 17

PRELIMINARY DECREE IN AN ADMINISTRATION SUIT

(Title)

It is ordered that the following accounts and inquiries be taken and made, that is to say —

In creditor's suit—

1 That an account be taken of what is due to the plaintiff and all other the creditors of the deceased

In suits by legatees—

2 That an account be taken of the legacies given by the testator's will

In suits by next of kin—

3 That an inquiry be made and account taken of what, or of what share, if any the plaintiff is entitled to as next of kin for one of the next of kin of the intestate

— a creditor's
suit by
legatee
or next
of kin

as may be necessary will follow omitting the first formal words as in a creditor's suit]

4 An account of the funeral and testamentary expenses

5 An account of the moveable property of the deceased come to the hands of the defendant, or to the hands of any other person by his order or for his use

6 An inquiry what part (if any) of the moveable property of the deceased is outstanding and undisposed of

7 And it is further ordered that the defendant do, on or before the _____ day of _____ next, pay into Court all sums of money which shall be found to have come to his hands, or to the hands of any person by his order or for his use

8 And that if the _____ * shall find it necessary for carrying out the objects of the suit to sell any part of the moveable property of the deceased, that the same be sold accordingly, and the proceeds paid into Court

9 And that Mr E F be receiver in the suit (or proceeding), and receive and get in all outstanding debts and outstanding moveable property of the deceased and pay the same into the hands of the _____ * (and shall give security by bond for the due performance of his duties to the amount of _____ rupees)

10 And it is further ordered that if the moveable property of the deceased be found insufficient for carrying out the objects of the suit, then the following (url) er inquiries be made, and accounts taken, that is to say—

(a) an inquiry what immoveable property the deceased was seized of or entitled to at the time of his death,

(b) an inquiry what are the incumbrances (if any) affecting the immoveable property of the deceased or any part thereof

(c) an account so far as possible, of what is due to the several incumbrancers and to include a statement of the priorities of such of the incumbrancers as shall consent to the sale hereinafter directed

11 And that the immoveable property of the deceased, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to make up the fund in Court sufficient to carry out the object of the suit, be sold with the approbation of the Judge, free from incumbrances (if any) of such incumbrancers as shall consent to the sale and subject to the incumbrances of such of them as shall not consent

12 And it is ordered that G H shall have the conduct of the sale of the immoveable property, and shall prepare the conditions and contracts of sale subject to the approval of the _____ * and that in case any doubt or difficulty shall arise the papers shall be submitted to the Judge to settle

13 And it is further ordered that for the purpose of the inquiries hereinbefore

that all other acts ordered to be done be completed before the _____ day of _____, and that the _____ * do certify the result of the inquiries and the accounts and that all other acts ordered are completed and have his certificate in that behalf ready for the inspection of the parties on the _____ day of _____

15 And, lastly it is ordered that this suit [r proceeding] stand adjourned for making final decree to the _____ day of _____

(Such part only of this decree is to be used as is applicable to the particular case)

No 18

FINAL DECREE IN AN ADMINISTRATION SUIT BY A LEGATTE

(Tail)

1 It is ordered that the defendant _____ do on or before the _____ day of _____ pay into Court the sum of Rs _____ the balance by the said certificate found to be due from the said deceased on account of the estate of _____ the testator and also the sum of Rs _____ for interest at the rate of _____ per cent per annum from the _____ day of _____ to the _____ day of _____, amounting together to the sum of Rs _____

* Here insert name of person or persons

- 2 Let the * of the said Court tax the costs of the plaintiff and defendant in this suit, and let the amount of the said costs, when so taxed be paid out of the said sum of Rs _____ ordered to be paid into Court as aforesaid as follows —
- (a) The costs of the plaintiff to Mr _____, his attorney [or pleader] or, and the costs of the defendant to Mr _____, his attorney [or pleader]
- (b) And (if any debts are due) with the residue of the said sum of Rs _____ after payment of the plaintiff's and defendant's costs as aforesaid, let the sums, found to be owing to the several creditors mentioned in the schedule to the certificate, of the * together with subsequent interest on such of the debts as bear interest, be paid, and, after making such payments, let the amount coming to the several legatees mentioned in the _____ schedule, together with subsequent interest (to be verified as aforesaid), be paid to them
- 3 And if there should then be any residue, let the same be paid to the residuary legatee

No 19

PRELIMINARY DECREE IN AN ADMINISTRATION SUIT BY A LEGATEE, WHERE AN EXECUTOR IS HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF LEGACIES

(Title)

- 1 It is declared that the defendant is personally liable to pay the legacy of Rs _____ bequeathed to the plaintiff.
- 2 And it is ordered that an account be taken of what is due for principal and interest on the said legacy,
- 3 And it is also ordered that the defendant do, within _____ weeks after the date of the certificate of the * pay to the plaintiff the amount of what the * shall certify to be due for principal and interest,
- 4 And it is ordered that the defendant do pay the plaintiff his costs of suit the same to be taxed in case the parties differ

No 20

FINAL DECREE IN AN ADMINISTRATION SUIT BY NEXT OF KIN

(Title)

- 1 Let the * of the said Court tax the costs of the plaintiff and defendant in this suit, and let the amount of the said plaintiff's costs when so taxed be paid by _____
- * and let the defendant retain for her own use out of such sum _____ when taxed
- 2 And it is ordered that the residue of the said sum of Rs _____, after payment of the plaintiff's and defendant's costs as aforesaid be paid and applied by defendant as follows —
- (a) Let the defendant, within one week after the taxation of the said costs by the * as aforesaid, pay one third share of the said residue to the plaintiffs A. B., and C. D., his wife, in her right as the sister and one of the next of kin of the said E. F., the intestate
- (b) Let the defendant retain for her own use one other third share of the said residue, as the mother and one of the next of kin of the said E. F., the intestate
- (c) And let the defendant, within one week after the taxation of the said costs by the * as aforesaid, pay the remaining one third share of the said residue to G. H., as the brother and the other next of kin of the said E. F., the intestate

* Here insert name of proper officer

No 23

DECREE FOR RECOVERY OF LAND AND MESNE PROFITS

(Title)

It is hereby decreed as follows —

(1) That the defendant do put the plaintiff in possession of the property specified in the schedule hereunto annexed

(2) That the defendant do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs with interest thereon at the rate of per cent per annum to the date of realization on account of mesne profits which have accrued due prior to the institution of the suit

Or

(2) That an inquiry be made as to the amount of mesne profits which have accrued due prior to the institution of the suit.

(3) That the Court do award interest at the rate of per cent per annum from the date of institution of the suit to the date of realization of the sum of Rs

Court] [the expiration of three years from the date of the decree]

Schedule

APPENDIX E

EXECUTION

No 1

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A PAYMENT OR ADJUSTMENT SHOULD NOT BE RECORDED
AS CERTIFIED (O 21, r 2)

(Title)

To WHEREAS in execution of the decree in the above named suit has
been applied to this Court that the sum of Rs. recoverable under the decree has
been ^{paid} ~~adjusted~~ and should be recorded as certified, this is to give you notice that you are to
appear before this Court on the day of 19 , to show cause
why the ^{payment} ~~adjustment~~ aforesaid should not be recorded as certified.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Judge

No 2

PRECEPT (Section 46)

(Title)

UPON hearing the decree holder it is ordered that this precept be sent to the Court
of at under section 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
with directions to attach the property specified in the annexed schedule and to hold the
same pending any application which may be made by the decree holder for execution of
the decree

Dated the day of ^{Schedule} 19

Judge

No. 3

ORDER SENDING DECREE FOR EXECUTION TO ANOTHER COURT (O 21, r 6)

(Title)

WHEREAS the decree holder in the above suit has applied to this Court for a certificate to be sent to the Court of at for execution of the decree in
the above suit by the said Court, alleging that the judgment-debtor resides or has
property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the said Court, and it is deemed
necessary and proper to send a certificate to the said Court under Order XXIV, rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is

Ordered

That a copy of this order be sent to with a copy of the decree and of
any order which may have been made for execution of the same and a certificate of
non satisfaction.

Dated the day of 19 .

No. 23

DECREE FOR RECOVERY OF LAND AND MESNE PROFITS

(Title)

It is hereby decreed as follows —

(1) That the defendant do put the plaintiff in possession of the property specified in the schedule hereunto annexed

(2) That the defendant do pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs _____ with interest thereon at the rate of _____ per cent per annum to the date of realization on account of mesne profits which have accrued due prior to the institution of the suit.

Or

(2) That an inquiry be made as to the amount of mesne profits which have accrued due prior to the institution of the suit

(3) That an inquiry was made as to the amount of mesne profits from the institution of the suit until [the delivery of possession to the decree holder] [the relinquishment of possession by the judgment debtor with notice to the decree holder through the Court] [the expiration of three years from the date of the decree]

Schedule

APPENDIX E

EXECUTION.

No 1

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A PAYMENT OR ADJUSTMENT SHOULD NOT BE RECORDED
AS CERTIFIED (O 21, r 2)

(Title.)

To

WHEREAS in execution of the decree in the above named suit has
been applied to this Court that the sum of Rs. recoverable under the decree has
been ^{paid} ~~adjusted~~ and should be recorded as certified, this is to give you notice that you are to
appear before this Court on the day of 19 , to show cause
why the ^{payment} ~~adjustment~~ aforesaid should not be recorded as certified

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Judge.

No 2

PRECEPT (Section 46)

(Title)

UPON hearing the decree holder it is ordered that this precept be sent to the Court
of at under section 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
with directions to attach the property specified in the annexed schedule and to hold the
same pending any application which may be made by the decree holder for execution of
the decree

Dated the day of Schedule
19 — — —

Judge

No 3

ORDER SENDING DECREE FOR EXECUTION TO ANOTHER COURT (O 21, r 6)

(Title)

It is necessary and proper to send a certificate to the said Court under Order XXI, rule 6, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it is

Ordered

That a copy of this order be sent to with a copy of the decree and of
any order which may have been made for execution of the same and a certificate of
non satisfaction

Dated the day of 19 .

Judge

No 4

CERTIFICATE OF NON SATISFACTION OF DECREE (O 21, r 6)

(Title)

Certified that no (1) satisfaction of the decree of this Court in Suit No
of 19 , a copy which is hereunto attached, has been obtained by execution within the
jurisdiction of this Court

Dated the day of 19

J lge

(1) If partial strikes it out and is to be written in

No 5

CERTIFICATE OF EXECUTION OF DECREE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER COURT
(O 21, r 6)

(Title.)

Number of the Court by which the decree was passed	Names of parties	Date of application for execution	Number of the execu- tion case	Process is not an- d tes of service thereof	Costs of execution	Amount received	How the case is disposed of	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
					Rs 11	Rs 11		

Signature of Muharrir in charge

Signature of Judge

No 6

APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION OF DECREE (O 21 r 11)

In the Court of
I, decree holder, hereby apply for execution of the decree herein below set forth —

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10								
No of suit	Nature of suit	Date of decree	Whether any appeal preferred	Payment made or not	Interest payable if any with date and result	Amount with interest due upon cost of execution or other relief granted thereby together with particular of any other decree	Amount of costs, if any awarded	Against whom to be executed	Made in which the execution of the decree is required								
780 of 1897	A B—Plaintiff C D—Defendant.	October 11th 1897	No	None	Rs 314-8-2 recorded on application dated the 4th March, 1899	Rs 314-8-2 principal [interest at 6 per cent. per annum, from date of decree till payment]	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>As awarded in the decree</td> <td>Rs. A P</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Subsequently incurred</td> <td>47 10 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>8 2 0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>55 12 4</td> </tr> </table>	As awarded in the decree	Rs. A P	Subsequently incurred	47 10 4		8 2 0	Total	55 12 4	Against the defendant C D	<p>[When attachment and sale of moveable property is sought]</p> <p>I pray that the total amount of Rs [together with interest on the principal sum up to date of payment] and the costs of taking out this execution be realized by attachment and sale of defendant's moveable property as per annexed list and paid to me</p> <p>[When attachment and sale of immoveable property is sought]</p> <p>I pray that the total amount of Rs [together with interest on the principal sum up to date of payment] and the costs of taking out this execution be realized by the attachment and sale of defendant's immoveable property specified at the foot of this application and paid to me</p>
As awarded in the decree	Rs. A P																
Subsequently incurred	47 10 4																
	8 2 0																
Total	55 12 4																

I declare that what is stated herein is true to the best of my knowledge and belief

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19____ Signed _____, Decree holder

[When attachment and sale of immoveable property is sought]
Description and Specification of Property

_____ situated in the
villa _____ north by private
and an old house

I declare that what is stated in the above description is true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and so far as I have been able to ascertain the interest of the defendant in the property therein specified.

Signed _____, Decree holder

No 7.

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY EXECUTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE (O 21, r 22)

(Title.)

To _____
WHEREAS _____
has made application to this Court for execution of decree in Suit No _____ of
19 _____, on the allegation that the said decree has been transferred to him
by assignment, this is to give you notice that you are to appear before this Court
on the _____ day of _____ 19 _____, to show cause why execution
should not be granted

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____
19 _____ Judge

No 8

WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT OF MOVEABLE PROPERTY IN EXECUTION OF A DECREE
FOR MONEY. (O 21, r 30)

(Title.)

To _____
The Bailiff of the Court.

WHEREAS

day of _____

19 _____

DECREE

Principal
Interest
Costs

Costs of execution
Further interest

Total

as noted in the Warrant, _____ has not been
said sum of Rs _____
paid. These are to command you to attach
the moveable property of the said _____

you by the _____ shall pay to you the
the said _____ together with
_____ of Rs _____

from this Court _____ day

You are further commanded to return this warrant on or before the _____ day
of _____ 19 _____, with an endorsement certifying the day on which and manner in which it
has been executed, or why it has not been executed

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____
19 _____

Schedule

Judge

No. 9

WARRANT FOR SEIZURE OF SPECIFIC MOVEABLE PROPERTY ADJUDGED BY DECREE
(O 21, r 31)

(Title.)

To _____
The Bailiff of the Court
WHEREAS _____
on the _____ day of _____ 19 _____ was ordered by decree of this Court passed
of 19 _____, to deliver to the plaintiff the moveable property for a _____ as are in

the moveable property) specified in the schedule herunto annexed, and whereas the said property (or share) has not been delivered,

These are to command you to seize the said moveable property (or a share of the said moveable property), and to deliver it to the plaintiff or to such person as he may appoint in his behalf

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Schedule.

Judge

No 10

NOTICE TO STATE OBJECTIONS TO DRAFT OF DECREE (O 21, r 31)

(Title)

To
TAKE notice that on the day of 19 , the decree holder in the above suit presented an application to this Court that the Court may execute on your behalf a deed of , whereof a draft is hereunto annexed, of the immoveable property specified hereunder, and that the day of 19 is appointed for the hearing of the said application, and that you are at liberty to appear on the said day and to state in writing any objections to the said draft.

Description of Property

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Judge

No 11

WARRANT TO THE BAILIFF TO GIVE POSSESSION OF LAND, ETC (O 21, r 35)

(Title)

To
The Bailiff of the Court
WHEREAS the undermentioned property in the occupancy of has been decreed to , the plaintiff in this suit You are hereby directed to put the said in possession of the same, and you are hereby authorized to remove any person bound by the decree who may refuse to vacate the same

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Schedule

Judge.

No 12

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY WARRANT OF ARREST SHOULD NOT ISSUE (O 21, r 37)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS has made application to this Court for execution of decree in suit No of 19 , by arrest and imprisonment of your person, you are hereby required to appear before this Court on the day of 19 , to show cause why you should not be committed to the civil prison in execution of the said decree

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Judge.

declare that

Signed

, Decree Holder

No 7

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY EXECUTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE (O 21 r 23)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS

has made application to this Court for execution of decree in Suit No. of 19, on the allegation that the said decree has been transferred to him by assignment this is to give you notice that you are to appear before this Court on the day of 19, to show cause why execution should not be granted

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this day of 19

Judge

No 8

WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT OF MOVEABLE PROPERTY IN EXECUTION OF A DECREE FOR MONEY (O 21, r 30)

(Title)

To

The Bailiff of the Court

WHEREAS

day of 19

the
0

DECREE

0
7
6Principal
Interest
CostsCosts of execution
Further interest

Total

paid These are to command you the moveable property of the said as set forth in the schedule hereunto annexed or which shall be pointed out to you by the said and unless the said shall pay to you the said sum of Rs together with Rs, the costs of this attachment to hold the same until further orders

day
in which it

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court 19

Signed

J. J. J.

No 9

WARRANT FOR SEIZURE OF SCHEDULED MOVEABLE PROPERTY IN EXECUTION OF A DECREE (O 21, r 31)

(Title)

To

The Bailiff of the Court

WHEREAS

was ordered by decree of this Court passed on the day of 19 in Suit No. to deliver to the plaintiff the moveable property for a share in

the moveable property) specified in the schedule hereunto annexed, and whereas the said property (or share) has not been delivered,

These are to command you to seize the said moveable property (or a share of the said moveable property) and to deliver it to the plaintiff or to such person as he may appoint in his behalf

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Schedule.

Judge

No 10

NOTICE TO STATE OBJECTIONS TO DRAFT OF DOCUMENT (O 21, r 34)

(Title)

To
TAKE notice that on the day of 19 , the decree holder in the above suit presented an application to this Court that the Court may execute on your behalf a deed of , whereof a draft is hereunto annexed, of the immovable property specified hereunder, and that the day of 19 is appointed for the hearing of the said application, and that you are at liberty to appear on the said day and to state in writing any objections to the said draft

Description of Property

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Judge

No 11

WARRANT TO THE BAILIFF TO GIVE POSSESSION OF LAND ETC (O 21, r 35)

(Title)

To
The Bailiff of the Court
WHEREAS the undermentioned property in the occupancy of has been decreed to , the plaintiff in this suit You are hereby directed to put the said in possession of the same, and you are hereby authorized to remove any person bound by the decree who may refuse to vacate the same

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Schedule

Judge.

No 12

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY WARRANT OF ARREST SHOULD NOT ISSUE (O 21, r 37)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS has made application to this Court for execution of decree in suit No of 19 , by arrest and imprisonment of your person, you are hereby required to appear before this Court on the day of 19 , to show cause why you should not be committed to the civil prison in execution of the said decree

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

No 13

WARRANT OF ARREST IN EXECUTION (O 21, r 33)

(Title)

To

The Bailiff of the Court

WHEREAS was adjudged by a decree of the Court in Suit No
of 19 , dated the day of 19 , to pay to the decree holder the sum of

Principal			
Interest			
Costs			
Execution			
Total			

Rs as noted in the margin, and
whereas the said sum of Rs has not
been paid to the said decree-holder in satis-
faction of the said decree, these are to com-
mand you to arrest the said judgment
debtor and unless the said judgment debtor
shall pay to you the said sum of Rs ,
together with Rs for the costs for
executing this process, to bring the said
defendant before the Court with all con-

venient speed. You are further commanded to return this warrant on or before the
day of 19 , with an endorsement certifying the day on which and
manner in which it has been executed, or the reason why it has not been executed

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
19 .

Judge

No 14

WARRANT OF COMMITTAL OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR TO JAIL (O 21, r 10)

(Title)

To

The Officer in charge of the Jail at

WHEREAS has
been brought before this Court this day of 19 , under a
warrant in execution of a decree which was made and pronounced by the said Court on
the day of 19 , and by which decree it was ordered
that the said should pay - the decree not satisfied the
the name of
therein

for the subsistence of the said
during his confinement under this warrant of committal
GIVEN under my signature and the seal of this Court, this
19

day of

Judge.

No 15

ORDER FOR THE RELEASE OF A PERSON IMPRISONED IN EXECUTION OF A DECREE
(Sections 55, 59)

(Title)

To

The Officer in charge of the Jail at

UNDER orders passed this day, you are hereby directed to set free
judgment debtor now in your custody

Judge

Dated

No 16

ATTACHMENT IN EXECUTION

PROHIBITORY ORDER, WHERE THE PROPERTY TO BE ATTACHED CONSISTS OF MOVABLE PROPERTY TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED SUBJECT TO A LIEN OR RIGHT OF SOME OTHER PERSON TO THE IMMEDIATE POSSESSION THEREOF (O 21, r 46)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS
has failed to satisfy a decree passed against _____ on the _____ day of _____ 19____, in Suit No _____ of 19____, in favour of _____ for Rs _____, It is ordered that the defendant be, and is hereby, prohibited and restrained, until the further order of this Court from receiving from _____ the following property in the possession of the said _____, that is to say, _____, to which the defendant is entitled, subject to any claim of the said _____, and the said _____ is hereby prohibited and restrained, until the further order of this Court from delivering the said property to any person or persons whomsoever.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____.

Judge

No 17

ATTACHMENT IN EXECUTION

PROHIBITORY ORDER, WHERE THE PROPERTY CONSISTS OF DEBTS NOT SECURED BY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (O 21, r 46)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS
has failed to satisfy a decree passed against _____ on the _____ day of _____ 19____, in Suit No _____ of 19____, in favour of _____, It is ordered that the defendant be, and is hereby, prohibited and restrained, until the further order of this Court, from making payment of the said debt, or any part thereof, to any person whomsoever or otherwise than into this Court.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____.

Judge

No 18

ATTACHMENT IN EXECUTION

PROHIBITORY ORDER, WHERE THE PROPERTY CONSISTS OF SHARES IN THE CAPITAL OF A CORPORATION (O 21, r 46)

(Title)

To _____ Defendant, and to _____ Secretary of _____ Corporation
WHEREAS _____ has failed to satisfy a decree passed against _____ on the _____ day of _____ 19____, in Suit No _____ of 19____, in favour of _____ for Rs _____, It is ordered that you, the defendant, be, and you are hereby, prohibited and restrained until the further order of this Court, from making any transfer of _____ shares in the aforesaid Corporation, namely, _____ or _____ and you, _____, the Secretary, are hereby restrained from permitting any such

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____.

19

Judge.

No 19

ORDER TO ATTACH SALARY OF PUBLIC OFFICER OR SERVANT OF RAILWAY COMPANY
OR LOCAL AUTHORITY. (O 21, r 48.)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS

, judgment debtor in the case of

him under the decree; You are hereby required to withhold the said sum of _____ due to
from the salary of the said _____ in monthly instalments of _____ and to
remit the said sum (or monthly instalments) to this Court

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____

19 _____

Judge

No 20

ORDER OF ATTACHMENT OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT (O 21, r 51)

(Title)

To

The Bailiff of the Court.

WHEREAS an order has been passed by this Court on the _____ day of _____
19 _____ for the attachment of _____, You are hereby directed to
seize the said _____ and bring the same into Court

GIVEN under my hand and seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____

19 _____

Judge

No 21

ATTACHMENT

PROMISSORY ORDER, WHERE THE PROPERTY CONSISTS OF MONEY OR OF ANY SECURITY
IN THE CUSTODY OF A COURT OF JUSTICE OR OFFICER OF GOVERNMENT (O 21, r 52)

(Title)

To

Sir,

Proceed
the money

I request that you will hold the said money subject to the further order of this Court

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,
Judge

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19 _____

No 22

NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT OF A DECREE TO THE COURT WHICH PASSED IT (O 21, r 53)

(Title)

To

The Judge of the Court of _____

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the decree obtained in your Court on the
_____ day of _____ 19 _____ by _____ in Suit No _____
in which he was _____ and _____ has been attached by this

Court on the application of _____ the _____ in the suit specified above. You are therefore requested to stay the execution of the decree of your Court until you receive an intimation from this Court that the present notice has been cancelled or until execution of the said decree is applied for by the holder of the decree now sought to be executed or by his judgment debtor.

I have the honour, etc.,
Judge

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19____

No 23

NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT OF A DECREE TO THE HOLDER OF THE DECREE (O 21, r 53)
(Title)

To _____
WHEREAS an application has been made in this Court by the decree holder in the above suit for the attachment of a decree obtained by you on the _____ day of _____ 19____, in the Court of _____ in Suit No _____ of 19____, in which _____ was _____ and _____ was _____. It is ordered that you, the said _____, be, and you are hereby, prohibited and restrained, until the further order of this Court, from transferring or charging the same in any way.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19____

Judge

No 24

ATTACHMENT IN EXECUTION

PROHIBITORY ORDER WHERE THE PROPERTY CONSISTS OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY (O 21, r 54)
(Title)

To _____ Defendant
WHEREAS you have failed to satisfy a decree passed against you on the _____ day of _____ 19____, in Suit No _____ of 19____, in favour of _____ for Rs _____, it is ordered that you, the said _____, be and you are hereby, pro-

hibited, from purchasing, gift or otherwise

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19____

Schedule

Judge

No 25

ORDER FOR PAYMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF ETC., OF MONEY, ETC., IN THE HANDS OF A THIRD PARTY (O 21, r 56)
(Title)

To _____
WHEREAS the following property _____ has been attached in execution of a decree in Suit No _____ of _____ 19____ passed on the _____ day of _____ 19____, in favour of _____, for Rs _____, It is ordered that the property so attached, consisting of Rs _____ in money and Rs _____ in currency notes, or a sufficient part thereof to satisfy the said decree, shall be paid over by you the said _____ to _____.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____

Judge

No 26

NOTICE TO ATTACHING CREDITOR (O 21, r 35)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS _____ has made application to this Court for the removal of attachment on _____ placed at your instance in execution of the decree in Suit No _____ of 19 _____, this is to give you notice to appear before this Court on _____, the _____ day of _____ 19 _____, either in person or by a pleader of the Court duly instructed to support your claim as attaching creditor
GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19 _____

Judge

No 27

WARRANT OF SALE OF PROPERTY IN EXECUTION OF A DECREE FOR MONEY (O 21, r 66)

(Title)

To

The bailiff of the Court

THESE are to command you to sell by auction after giving _____ days' previous notice, by affixing the same in this Court house and after making due proclamation, the _____ property attached under a warrant from this Court, dated the _____ day of _____ 19 _____, in execution of a decree in favour of _____ in _____ suit No _____ of 19 _____, or so much of the said property as shall realize the sum of Rs _____, being the _____ of the said decree and costs still remaining unsatisfied.

You are further commanded to return this warrant on or before the _____ day of _____ 19 _____, with an endorsement certifying the manner in which it has been executed or the reason why it has not been executed

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19 _____

Judge

No 28

NOTICE OF THE DAY FIXED FOR SETTLING A SALE PROCLAMATION (O. 21, r 66)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS in the above named suit _____ the decree holder has applied for the sale of _____, You are hereby informed that the _____ day of _____ 19 _____ has been fixed for settling the terms of the proclamation of sale
GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____ 19 _____

J lge

No 29

PROCLAMATION OF SALE (O 21 r 66)

(Title)

By Order XX of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure

Decided by the
of _____ in which
was plaintiff and
was defendant

amounting with costs and interest up to _____

_____ as liborut

below, and the liabilities and claims attaching to the said property, so far as they have been ascertained, are those specified in the schedule against each lot.

In the absence of any order of postponement, the sale will be held by at the monthly sale commencing at o'clock on the s'

In the event, however, of the debt above specified and of the costs of the sale being tendered or paid before the knocking down of any lot, the sale will be stopped.

At the sale the public generally are invited to bid, either personally or by duly authorized agent. No bid by, or on behalf of, the judgment-creditors above mentioned, however, will be accepted, nor will any sale to them be valid without the express permission of the Court previously given. The following are the further

Conditions of Sale

1 The particulars specified in the schedule below have been stated to the best of the information of the Court, but the Court will not be answerable for any error, misstatement or omission in this proclamation.

2 The amount by which the biddings are to be increased shall be determined by the officer conducting the sale. In the event of any dispute arising as to the amount bid, or as to the bidder, the lot shall at once be again put up to auction.

3 The highest bidder shall be declared to be the purchaser of any lot, provided always that he is legally qualified to bid, and provided that it shall be in the discretion of the Court or officer holding the sale to decline acceptance of the highest bid when the price offered appears so clearly inadequate as to make it advisable to do so.

4 For reasons recorded, it shall be in the discretion of the officer conducting the sale to adjourn it, subject always to the provisions of rule 69 of Order XXI.

purchase money to the officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit the property shall forthwith be put up again and re-sold.

7 The full amount of the purchase money shall be paid by the purchaser before the Court closes on the fifteenth day after the sale of the property, exclusive of such day or if the fifteenth day be a Sunday or other holiday, then on the first office day after the fifteenth day.

8 In default of payment of the balance of purchase money within the period allowed, the property shall be re-sold after the issue of a fresh notification of sale. The deposit, after defraying the expenses of the sale may if the Court thinks fit, be forfeited to Government and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this day of

19

July

Schedule of Property

Number of lot.	Description of property to be sold, with the name of each owner where there are more judgment-creditors than one	The revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate if the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or a part of an estate paying revenue to Government.	Detail of any incumbrances to which the property is liable	Claim if any which have been put forward to the property and any other known particulars bearing on its nature and value
----------------	--	--	--	--

No 30

ORDER ON THE NAZIR FOR CAUSING SERVICE OF PROCLAMATION OF SALE (O 21, r 66.)

To

(Title)

The Nazir of the Court

WHEREAS an order has been made for the sale of property of a debtor specified in the schedule

Dated the

day of

19

Schedule

Judge

No 31

CERTIFICATE BY OFFICER HOLDING A SALE OF THE DEFICIENCY OF PRICE ON A RT SALE OF PROPERTY BY REASON OF THE PURCHASER'S DEFAULT (O 21, r 71)

(Title)

Certified that at the re sale of the property in execution of the decree in the above purchaser, there was a Rs. and that the making a total of Rs.

which sum is recoverable from the defaulter

Dated the

day of

19

Officer holding the sale

No 32

NOTICE TO PERSON IN POSSESSION OF MOVABLE PROPERTY SOLD IN EXECUTION (O 21, r 74)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS has become the purchaser at a public sale in execution of the decree in the above suit of now in your possession, you are hereby prohibited from delivering possession of the said to any person except the said

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

19

Judge

No 33

PROHIBITORY ORDER AGAINST PAYMENT OF DEBTS SOLD IN EXECUTION TO ANY OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER (O 21, r 74)

(Title)

To

and to

WHEREAS has become the purchaser at a public sale in execution of the decree in the above suit of being debts due from you to you . It is ordered that you be, and you are hereby, prohibited from receiving, and you from making payment of, the said debts to any person or persons except the said

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of

19

Judge

No. 31

PROHIBITORY ORDER AGAINST THE TRANSFER OF SHARES SOLD IN EXECUTION
(O 21, r 79)

(Title)

To _____ and _____, Secretary of _____ Corporation
WHEREAS _____ has become the purchaser at a public sale in execution of the
decree, in the above suit, of certain shares in the above Corporation, that is to say, of
_____ standing in the name of you _____, It is ordered that you
be, and you are hereby prohibited from making any transfer of the said shares to any
person except the said _____, the purchaser aforesaid, or from receiving any
dividends thereon, and you
Secretary of the said Corporation, from permitting any such transfer or making any such
payment to any person except the said _____, the purchaser aforesaid
GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of
19 _____

Judge

No. 35

CERTIFICATE TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR AUTHORIZING HIM TO MORTGAGE, LEASE OR SELL
PROPERTY (O 21, r 83)

(Title)

WHEREAS in execution of the decree passed in the above suit an order was made on
the _____ day of _____ 19 _____, for the sale of the under mentioned property

the date
of sale

19

Description of property

Judge

No. 36

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY SALE SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE (O 21, rr 90-92)

(Title)

To _____ WHEREAS the under mentioned property was sold on the _____ day of
_____ 19 _____, in execution of the decree passed in the above named suit, and

could not be
day of

19

Description of property

J. Jgr

No 37

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY SALE SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE (O 21, r 91, 92)

(Title)

To
 WHEREAS _____, the purchaser of the under mentioned property sold on the
 day of _____ 19____, in execution of the decree passed in the above

19

*Description of property**Judge*

No. 38

CERTIFICATE OF SALE OF LAND (O 21, r 94)

(Title)

THIS is to certify that _____ has been declared the purchaser at a sale by public
 auction on the _____ day of _____ 19____, of _____ in execution of
 decree in this suit, and that the said sale has been duly confirmed by this Court.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____

19

Judge

No 39

ORDER FOR DELIVERY TO CERTIFIED PURCHASER OF LAND AT A SALE IN EXECUTION
(O 21, r 95)

(Title)

To

The Bailiff of the Court.

WHEREAS _____ has become the certified purchaser of _____ at a sale in
 execution of decree in Suit No _____ of 19____. You are hereby ordered
 to put the said _____, the certified purchaser, as aforesaid, in possession of the
 same.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____

19

Judge.

No 40

SUMMONS TO APPEAR AND ANSWER CHARGE OF OBSTRUCTING EXECUTION OF DECREE
(O 21, r 97)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS _____, the decree holder in the above suit, has complained to this
 Court that you have resisted (or obstructed) the officer charged with the execution of
 the warrant for possession.

You are hereby summoned to appear in this Court on the _____ day of _____
 19____, at _____ A M, to answer the said complaint

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____

19

Judge

No 41

WARRANT OF COMMITTAL. (O 21, r 9b)

(Title)

To

The Officer in charge of the Jail at

WHEREAS the under mentioned property has been decreed to , the plaintiff in this suit, and whereas the Court is satisfied that without any just cause resisted [or obstructed] and is still resisting [or obstructing] the said in obtaining possession of the property, and whereas the said has made application to this Court that the said be committed to the civil prison,

You are hereby commanded and required to take and receive the said into the civil prison and to keep him imprisoned therein for the period of days

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19

Judge

No 42

AUTHORITY OF THE COLLECTOR TO STAY PUBLIC SALE OF LAND (Section 72)

(Title)

To

Collector of

SIR

In answer to your communication No , dated , representing that the sale in execution of the decree in this suit of land situate within your district is objectionable, I have the honour to inform you that you are authorized to make provision for the satisfaction of the said decree in the manner recommended by you

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient servant,

Judge

APPENDIX F.

SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

No 1

WARRANT OF ARREST BEFORE JUDGMENT (O. 38, r 1.)

To (Title)

To

as nc

Principal
Interest
Costs

total

take the sum of

defendant is about to
These are to command you to demand and
receive from the said the sum
of Rs as sufficient to satisfy the
plaintiff's claim, and unless the said sum
of Rs is forthwith delivered to
you by or on behalf of the said to

and finally disposed of and until satisfaction of any decree that may be passed against
him in the suit

19 GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

Judge

No 2

SECURITY FOR APPEARANCE OF A DEFENDANT ARRESTED BEFORE JUDGMENT
(O. 38, r 2)

(Title)

WHEREAS at the instance of the plaintiff in the above suit,

of
it
it
it
d

myself, my heirs and executors, to pay to the said Court, at its order, any sum or sums
that may be adjudged against the said defendant in the said suit

Witness my hand at this day of 19 (Signed)

Witnesses

1
2

No 3

SUMMONS TO DEFENDANT TO APPEAR ON SURETY'S APPLICATION FOR DISCHARGE
(O 38, r 3)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS who became surety on the day of 19 , for your appearance in the above suit, has applied to this Court to be discharged from his obligation.

You are hereby summoned to appear in this Court in person on the day of 19 , at A M, when the said application will be heard and determined.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19 .

Judge.

No 4

ORDER FOR COMMITTAL (O 38, r 4)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS , plaintiff in this suit, has made application to the Court that security be taken for the appearance of , the defendant, to answer any , the Court has called out in lieu of , be pronounced against him, until satisfaction of the decree

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court this day of 19

Judge

No 5

ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT, WITH ORDER TO CALL FOR SECURITY FOR FULFILMENT
OF DECREE (O 38, r 5)

(Title)

To
The Bailiff of the Court
WHEREAS has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant in the above suit , These are to command you to call upon the said defendant on or before the day of 19 , either to furnish security for the sum of £s to produce and place at the disposal of this Court when required or the value thereof, or such portion of the

date on which and the manner in which it has been executed, or the reason why it has not been executed

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19 .

Judge

No 6

SECURITY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PROPERTY (O 38 r 5)

(Title)

WHEREAS at the instance of _____, the plaintiff in the above suit, the defendant, has been directed by the Court to furnish security in the sum of Rs _____ to produce and place at the disposal of the Court the property specified in the schedule hereunto annexed,

Therefore I _____ have voluntarily become surety and do hereby bind myself, my heirs and executors, to the said Court, that the said defendant shall produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the property specified in the said

exceeding the said sum as the said Court may adjudge

Schedule

Witness my hand at _____ this _____ day of _____ 19____ (Signed)

Witnesses

1

2

No 7.

ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT, ON PROOF OF FAILURE TO FURNISH SECURITY (O 38, r 6)

(Title)

to

The Bailiff of the Court

WHEREAS _____, the plaintiff in this suit, has applied to the Court to call _____ the defendant to furnish security to fulfil any decree that may be made

19 GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____

Judge

No 8

TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS (O 39, r 1)

(Title)

Plender of [or Counsel for] the _____
written
and upon
of after
service

notice and defendant not appearing add, and also that _____ This Court doth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendant C. D, his servants, agents and workmen,

from pulling down, or suffering to be pulled down, the house in the plant in the said suit of the plaintiff mentioned [or in the written statement, or petition, of the plaintiff and evidence at the hearing of this motion mentioned] being No. 9, Oilmongers Street, Hindupur, in the Taluk of _____, and from selling the materials whereof the said house is composed, until the hearing of this suit or until the further order of this Court

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 ____.

Judge

[Where the injunction is sought to restrain the negotiation of a note or bill, the ordering part of the order may run thus—] _____ to restrain the defendants _____

order of this Court

[In Copyright cases] _____ to restrain the defendant C. D., his servants, agents or workmen, from printing, publishing or vending a book, called _____, or any part thereof, until the, etc

[Where part only of a book is to be restrained] _____ to restrain the defendant C. D., his servants, agents or workmen, from printing, publishing, selling or otherwise disposing of such parts of the book in the plant [or petition and evidence, etc.] mentioned to have been published by the defendant as hereinafter specified, namely that part of the said book which is entitled _____ and also that part which is entitled _____ [or which is contained in page _____ to page _____ both inclusive] until _____, etc

[In Patent cases] _____ to restrain the defendant C. D., his agents, servants and workmen, from making or vending any perforated bricks [or as the case may be] upon the principle of the inventions in the plaintiff's plant [or petition, etc., or written statement etc.] mentioned, belonging to the plaintiffs, or either of them during the remainder of the respective terms of the patents in the plaintiff's plant [or as the case may be] mentioned, and from counterfeiting, imitating or resembling the same in inventions, or either of them, or making any addition thereto or subtraction therefrom until the hearing, etc

[In cases of Trade marks] _____ to restrain the defendant C. D., his servants,

expressed as, by colourable imitation or otherwise, to represent the composition or blacking sold by the defendant to be the same as the composition or blacking manufactured and sold by the plaintiff A. B. and from using trade cards so contrived or expressed as to represent that any composition or blacking sold or proposed to be sold by the defendant is the same as the composition or blacking manufactured or sold by the plaintiff A. B., until the, etc

[To restrain a partner from in any way interfering in the business] _____ to restrain the defendant C. D., his servants and agents, from entering into any contract, and from accepting, drawing, endorsing or negotiating any bill of exchange, note, or written security in the name of the partnership firm of B. and D. and from contracting any debt, buying and selling any goods, and from making or entering into any verbal or written promise, agreement or undertaking, and from doing or causing to be done, any act, in the name or on the credit of the said partnership-firm of B. and D., or whereby the said partnership-firm can or may in any manner become or be made liable to or for the payment of any sum of money, or for the performance of any contract, promise or undertaking until the, etc.

No 3

APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER (O 40, r 1)

(Title)

To
 WHEREAS has been attached in execution of a decree passed in the above
 suit on the day of 19, in favour of You are
 hereby (subject to your giving security to the satisfaction of the Court) appointed receiver
 of the said property under Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 with full
 powers under the provisions of that Order

You are required to render a due and proper account of your receipts and disburse-
 ments in respect of the said property on You will be entitled to remunera-
 tion at the rate of per cent upon your receipts under the authority of this
 appointment

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of
 19 .

Judge

No 10

BOND TO BE GIVEN BY RECEIVER (O 40 r 3)

(Title)

Know all men by these presents that we and and
 are jointly and severally bound to of the Court of
 Rs to be paid to the said or his successor in office for the time being
 For which payment to be made we bind ourselves and each of us in the whole our and
 by these presents

for the

of the above,

APPENDIX G.

APPEAL, REFERENCE AND REVIEW.

No 1.

MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL. (O. 41, r 1)

(Title)

The above named appeals to the Court at from the decree of in Suit No. of 19, dated the day of 19, and sets forth the following grounds of objection to the decree appealed from, namely:—

No 2.

SECURITY BOND TO BE GIVEN ON ORDER BEING MADE TO STAY EXECUTION OF DECREE (O 41, r 5)

(Title.)

To
This security bond on stay of execution of decree executed by wit
nesseth:—
That , the plaintiff in Suit No. of 19, having sued
, the defendant, in this Court and a decree having been passed on the
day of 19, in favour of the plaintiff, and the defendant
having preferred an appeal from the said decree in the Court, the said appeal
is still pending

Witnessed by

Schedule

(Signed)

No 9

APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER (O 40, r 1)

(Title)

To
 WHEREAS has been attached in execution of a decree passed in the above
 suit on the day of 19 , in favour of , You are
 hereby (subject to your giving security to the satisfaction of the Court) appointed receiver
 of the said property under Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with full
 powers under the provisions of that Order

You are required to render a due and proper account of your receipts and disburse-
 ments in respect of the said property on You will be entitled to remunera-
 tion at the rate of per cent upon your receipts under the authority of this
 appointment

19 GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

Judge

No 10

BOND TO BE GIVEN BY RECEIVER (O 40, r 3)

(Title)

Know all men by these presents that we, and and
 are jointly and severally bound to of the Court of in
 Rs to be paid to the said or his successor in office for the time being
 as shall our and
 represents

for the

above

D

n

d

1

e

terms of the condition of the bond

No 9

APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER (O 40, r 1)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS has been attached in execution of a decree passed in the above suit on the day of 19 , in favour of , You are hereby (subject to your giving security to the satisfaction of the Court) appointed receiver of the said property under Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with full powers under the provisions of that Order.

You are required to render a due and proper account of your receipts and disbursements in respect of the said property on . You will be entitled to remuneration at the rate of per cent upon your receipts under the authority of this appointment

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19 .

Judge

No 10

BOND TO BE GIVEN BY RECEIVER (O 40, r 3)

(Title)

Know all men by these presents, that we and in are jointly and severally bound to of the Court of Re to be paid to the said or his successor in office for the time being For which payment to be made we bind ourselves, and each of us, in the whole, our and " " " " by these presents

for the

ler of the above
and to get

shall
certify on
be move
unt and
rom him
shall be

How the

terms of the condition of the bond

No 3

SECURITY BOND TO BE GIVEN DURING THE PENDENCY OF APPEAL. (O 41, r 6)

(Title)

To
This security bond on stay of execution of decree executed by
witnesseth —

That , the plaintiff in Suit No of 19 , having sued
 , the defendant, in this Court and a decree having been passed on the
 day of 19 in favour of the plaintiff, and the defendant
having preferred an appeal from the said decree in the Court, the said appeal
is still pending

Now the plaintiff decree holder of the said decree and has
been called upon to furnish security to the extent of Rs
hereunto annexed, and covenant that if the decree of the first Court be reversed or varied
by the Appellate Court, the plaintiff shall restore any property which may be or has been
taken in execution of the said decree and shall duly act in accordance with the decree
made by the Appellate Court, and shall be liable to pay the costs of the appeal thereunder, and

balance To this effect I execute this security bond this day of
19

Schedule

Witnessed by

(Signed)

1.
2

No 4.

SECURITY FOR COSTS OF APPEAL. (O 41, r 10)

(Title.)

To
This security bond for costs of appeal executed by of
witnesseth —
19 Suit No of
 furnish security for costs of
 appeal, mortgaging the
 property and not transfer the said
 property

of the
hereby
to pay the amount due, I and my legal representatives
the balance To this effect I execute this security bond this day of
19

Schedule

Witnessed by

1
2

(Signed)

No 11

NOTICE OF APPEAL IN FORM PAUPERIS. (O 44, r 1)

(Title)

WHEREAS the above named has applied to be allowed to appeal as a pauper from the decree in the above suit dated the day of 19, and whereas the day of 19 has been fixed for hearing the application notice is hereby given to you that if you desire to show cause why the applicant should not be allowed to appeal as a pauper an opportunity will be given to you of doing so on the afore mentioned date

Given under my hand and seal the seal of the Court this day of 19

Judge

No 12.

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL TO THE KING IN COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED (O 45 r 3)

(Title)

To
TAKE notice that has applied to this Court for a certificate that as regards amount or value and nature the above case fulfils the requirements of section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or that it is otherwise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.

The day of 19 is fixed for you to show cause why the Court should not grant the certificate asked for

Given under my hand and seal the seal of the Court, this day of 19

Registrar

No 13

NOTICE TO RESPONDENT OF ADMISSION OF APPEAL TO THE KING IN COUNCIL (O 46 r 8)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS, the in the above case has furnished the security and made the deposit required by Order XLV rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908

Take notice that the appeal of the said to His Majesty in Council has been admitted on the day of 19

Given under my hand and seal the seal of the Court this day of 19

Registrar

No 14

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A REVIEW SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED (O 47 r 4)

(Title)

To
TAKE notice that has applied to this Court for a review of its decree passed on the day of 19 in the above case. The day of 19 is fixed for you to show cause why the Court should not grant a review of its decree in this case

Given under my hand and seal the seal of the Court this day of 19

Judge

No 8

MEMORANDUM OF CROSS OBJECTION. (O 41, r. 22)

(Title)

WHEREAS the _____ has preferred an appeal to the _____ Court at _____
 from the decree of _____ in Suit No _____ of 19 _____, dated the _____
 day of _____ 10 _____, and whereas notice of the day fixed for
 objection to the decree appealed from, namely —

No 9

DECREE IN APPEAL. (O 41, r. 35)

(Title)

Appeal No _____ of 19 _____ from the decree of the Court of _____ dated
 the _____ day of _____ 19 _____

Memorandum of Appeal

Plaintiff
Defendant.

The _____ above named appeals to the _____ Court at _____
 from the decree of _____ in the above suit, dated the _____ day of _____
 19 _____, for the following reasons, namely —
 This appeal coming on for hearing on the _____ day of _____ 19 _____
 before _____, in the presence of _____ for the appellant and
 of _____, are to be
 paid _____ to Rs _____ to be paid by _____
 Given under my hand this _____ day of _____ 19 _____ Judge

Costs of Appeal

Appellant	Amount	Respondent	Amount
1 Stamp for memorandum of appeal	Rs _____ a _____ p _____	Stamp for power Do for petition Service of processes Plader's fee on Rs _____	Rs _____ a _____ p _____
2 Do for power			
3 Services of processes			
4 Pleader's fee on Rs _____			
Total		Total	

No 10

APPLICATION TO ATTEND IN FORMÂ PAUPERIS (O 44, r. 1)

(Title)

_____ above named present the accompanying memorandum

 belonging to me with the estimated _____
 Dated the _____ day of _____ 19 _____ (Signed) _____
 to be applied

No 3

NOTICE OF PAYMENT INTO COURT (O 24, r 2)

(Title)

Take notice that the defendant has paid into Court Rs. _____
and says that that sum is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim in full.
X Y, Pleader for the defendant.

To Z, Pleader for the plaintiff.

No 4

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE (GENERAL FORM.)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS the above named
has made application to this Court that
You are hereby warned to appear in this Court in person or by a pleader duly instructed
on the _____ day of _____ 19____
at _____ o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause against the application, failing wherein, the
said application will be heard and determined *ex parte*
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____
Judge

No 5

LIST OF DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY PLAINTIFF (0 13 1 1)

(Title)

No	Description of document	Date if any which the document bears	Signature of party or pleader
1	2	3	4

APPENDIA H

MISCELLANEOUS.

No 1

AGREEMENT OF PARTIES AS TO ISSUES TO BE TRIED (O 14 r 6)

(Title)

WITNESSES

the said Court shall hold to be due thereon) and I will accept the said sum of Rupees (or such sum as the Court shall hold to be due) in full satisfaction of my claim on the bond aforesaid [or that upon such finding I, the said will do or abstain from doing etc etc]

Plaintiff
Defendant

Witnesses

1
2

Dated the day of 19

No 2

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR THE TRANSFER OF A SUIT TO ANOTHER COURT FOR TRIAL
(SECTION 24)

In the Court of the District Judge of
No of 19

To
WHEREAS an application dated the day of 19 has been made to this Court by the in Suit No of 19 now pending in the Court of the at in which is plaintiff and is defendant, for the transfer of the suit for trial to the Court of the at of the

You are hereby informed that the day of 19 has been fixed for the hearing of the application, when you will be heard if you desire to offer any objection to it.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19
Judge

interrogatories which accompany this letter of request (or *requisitoire*) touching the said matters in question in the presence of the agents of the plaintiff and defendant, or such of them as shall, on due notice given, attend such examination

And I further have the honour to request that you will be pleased to cause the answers of the said witnesses to be reduced into writing, and all books, letters, papers and documents produced upon such examination to be duly marked for identification and that you will be further pleased to authenticate such examination by the seal of your tribunal, or in such other way as is in accordance with your procedure, and to return the same, together with such request in writing, if any, for the examination of other witnesses to the said Court

(Note—If the Request is directed to a Foreign Court, the words "through His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for transmission" should be inserted after the words "other witnesses" in the penultimate line of this form)

No 9

COMMISSION FOR A LOCAL INVESTIGATION, OR TO EXAMINE ACCOUNTS (O 26 rr 9, 11)

(Title)

To
Whereas it is deemed requisite, for the purposes of this suit that a commission for should be issued, You are hereby appointed Commissioner for the purpose of

Process to compel the attendance before you of any witnesses or for the production of any documents, whom or which you may desire to examine or inspect will be issued by any Court having jurisdiction on your application

A sum of Rs. , being your fee in the above is herewith forwarded
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

19
Judge

No 10

COMMISSION TO MAKE A PARTITION (O 26 r 13)

(Title)

To
Whereas it is deemed requisite for the purposes of this suit that a commission should be issued to make the partition or separation of the property specified in and according to the rights as declared in the decree of this Court dated the day of 19 . You are hereby appointed Commissioner for the said purpose and are directed to make such inquiry as may be necessary to divide the said property according to the best of your skill and judgment in the shares set out in the said decree and to allot such shares to the several parties You are hereby authorized to award sums to be paid to any party by any other party for the purpose of equalizing the value of the shares

1458

III CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

FIRST SCHEDULE
V 3 6-5

No 6.

NOTICE TO PARTIES OF THE DAY FIXED FOR EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS ABOUT TO
LEAVE THE JURISDICTION (O 18 r 16)

To

(Title)

WHEREAS in the above suit application has been made to the Court by plaintiff (or defendant)
that the examination of _____, a witnessrequired by the said _____ in the said suit
may be taken immediately, and it has been shown to the Court to satisfaction that the
said witness is about to leave the Court's jurisdiction (or any other good and sufficient
cause to be stated)Take notice that the examination of the said witness
will be taken by the Court on the _____ day of _____ 19____
Dated the _____ day _____
of _____ 19____ J (1) r

No 7

COMMISSION TO EXAMINE ASENT WITNESS (O 26 r 4, 16)

To

(Title)

WHEREAS the evidence of _____ is required by the _____ in the above
suit and whereas you are requested to take the evidence on interrogatories
(or in _____) of such witness _____ and you are hereby appointed Commissioner
for that purpose. The evidence will be taken in the presence of the parties or their agents
if in attendance who will be at liberty to question the witness on the points specified
and you are further requested to make return of such evidence as soon as it may be
taken.Process to compel the attendance of the witness will be issued by any Court having
jurisdiction on your application.A sum of Rs _____ being your fee in the above matter with full and full
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this _____ day of _____
19____ J (1) r

No 8

LETTER OF REQUEST (O 26 r 5)

(Title)

(abstract of claim)

And whereas it has been represented to the said Court that it is necessary for the

L. F. of
(H. of
I F. of

at 1

And it appearing that such witnesses are resident within the jurisdiction of your
honourable Court,And I
Court
19____request
and
of
cents

of the said plaintiff and defendant shall humbly request you in writing so to summon) to attend at such time and place as you shall appoint before some one or more of you or such other person as according to the procedure of your Court is competent to take the examination of witnesses, and that you will cause such witnesses to be examined upon the interrogatories which accompany this letter of request (or *videlicet*) touching the said matters in question in the presence of the agents of the plaintiff and defendant, or each of them as shall, on due notice given, attend such examination.

And I further have the honour to request that you will be pleased to cause the answers of the said witnesses to be reduced into writing, and all books, letters, papers and documents produced upon such examination to be duly marked for identification, and that you will be further pleased to authenticate such examination by the seal of your tribunal, or in such other way as is in accordance with your procedure, and to return the same, together with such request in writing, if any, for the examination of other witnesses to the said Court.

(Note.—If the Request is directed to a Foreign Court, the words "through His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for transmission" should be inserted after the words "other witnesses" in the penultimate line of this form.)

No. 9

COMMISSION FOR A LOCAL INVESTIGATION, OR TO EXAMINE ACCOUNTS. (C. 20, 11, D. 11.)

(Title.)

To
WHEREAS it is deemed requisite, for the purposes of this writ, that a commission should be issued; You are hereby appointed Commissioner for the purpose

Process to compel the attendance before you of any witnesses, or for the production of any documents, whom or which you may desire to examine or inspect, will be issued by any Court having jurisdiction on your application.

A sum of Rs. , being your fee in the above, is herewith forwarded.
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

19
J. L. J.

No. 10

COMMISSION TO MAKE A PARTITION. (C. 20, 11, D.)

(Title.)

To
WHEREAS it is deemed requisite for the purposes of this writ that a commission should be issued to make the partition or separation of the property specified in, and according to the rights as declared in, the decree of this Court, dated the day of 19 ; You are hereby appointed Commissioners for the said purpose and are directed to make such inquiry as may be necessary, to divide the said property according to the best of your skill and judgment in the shares set out in the said decree, and to allot such shares to the several parties. You are hereby authorized to award sums to be paid to any party by any other party for the purpose of equalizing the value of the shares.

Process to compel the attendance before you of any witnesses, or for the production of any documents whom or which you may desire to examine or inspect, will be issued by any Court having jurisdiction on your application.

A sum of Rs. , being your fee in the above, is herewith forwarded.
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

19
J. L. J.

No. 6

NOTICE TO PARTIES OF THE DAY FIXED FOR EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS ABOUT TO
LEAVE THE JURISDICTION (O 18, r 16)

To

(Title)

WHEREAS

required by _____ in the said suit
may be taken immediately, and it has been shown to the Court to satisfaction that the
said witness is about to leave the Court's jurisdiction (or any other good and sufficient
cause, to be stated)

witness _____
day of _____ 19

of _____ 19 _____ Judge

No. 7

COMMISSION TO EXAMINE ABSENT WITNESS (O 26, rr 4, 16)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS the evidence of _____ is required by the _____ in the above
suit, and whereas _____ you are requested to take the evidence on interrogatories
(or in the case of such witness _____ and you are hereby appointed Commissioner
for that purpose. The evidence will be taken in the presence of the parties or their agent
if in attendance, who will be at liberty to question the witness on the points specified,
and you are further requested to make return of such evidence as soon as it may be
taken.

Process to compel the attendance of the witness will be issued by any Court having
jurisdiction on your application.

A sum of Rs _____ being your fee in the above, is herewith furnished
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____

19 _____ J. J. J.

No. 8

LETTER OF REQUEST (O 26, r 5)

(Title)

(Heading —To the President and Judges of, etc, etc, or as the case may be)

WHEREAS a suit is now pending in the _____
in which A B is plaintiff and C D is defendant, And in the said suit the plaintiff claims
(abstract of claim),

And whereas it has been represented to the said Court that it is necessary for the
purposes of justice and for the due determination of the matters in dispute between the
parties, that the following persons should be examined as witnesses upon oath touching
such matters, that is to say

I I, of _____ and
G H, of _____
I J, of _____

And it appearing that such witnesses are resident within the jurisdiction of your
honourable Court,

and I _____ to request
Court _____ of the said
you _____ or more of
the agents

interrogatories which accompany this letter of request (or *requisitoire*) touching the said matters in question in the presence of the agents of the plaintiff and defendant, or such of them as shall, on due notice given, attend such examination

And I further have the honour to request that you will be pleased to cause the answers of the said witnesses to be reduced into writing, and all books, letters, papers and documents produced upon such examination to be duly marked for identification, and that you will be further pleased to authenticate such examination by the seal of your tribunal, or in such other way as is in accordance with your procedure, and to return the same, together with such request in writing, if any, for the examination of other witnesses to the said Court

(Note—If the Request is directed to a Foreign Court, the words "through His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for transmission" should be inserted after the words "other witnesses" in the penultimate line of this form.)

No 9

COMMISSION FOR A LOCAL INVESTIGATION, OR TO EXAMINE ACCOUNTS (O 26, rr 9, 11)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS it is deemed requisite, for the purposes of this suit, that a commission should be issued, You are hereby appointed Commissioner for the purpose

Process to compel the attendance before you of any witnesses or for the production of any documents, whom or which you may desire to examine or inspect will be issued by any Court having jurisdiction on your application

A sum of Rs. , being your fee in the above, is herewith forwarded
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

19

Judge

No 10

COMMISSION TO MAKE A PARTITION (O 26, r 13)

(Title)

To
WHEREAS it is deemed requisite for the purposes of this suit that a commission should be issued to make the partition or separation of the property specified in and

according to the best of your skill and judgment in the shares set out in the said decree, and to allot such shares to the several parties You are hereby authorized to award sums to be paid to any party by any other party for the purpose of equalizing the value of the shares

Process to compel the attendance before you of any witness, or for the production of any documents whom or which you may desire to examine or inspect, will be issued by any Court having jurisdiction on your application

A sum of Rs. , being your fee in the above, is herewith forwarded
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

19

Judge.

No 11

NOTICE TO MINOR DEFENDANT AND GUARDIAN. (O 32, r 3)

(Title)

To

Minor Defendant
Natural Guardian

WHEREAS an application has been presented on the part of the plaintiff in the above suit for the appointment of a guardian for the said minor defendant, you, the said minor, and you (1) (1) Here insert the name of guardian are hereby notified that you of

dated
of the

said suit

19

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

Judge

No 12

NOTICE TO OPPOSITE PARTY OF DAY FIXED FOR HEARING EVIDENCE OF PAUPERISM
(O 33, r 6)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS has applied to this Court for permission to institute a suit against in forma pauperis under Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whereas the Court sees no reason to reject the application, and (1) (1) Here insert the name of the party against whom the suit is instituted has been fixed for receiving such

19

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of

No 13

NOTICE TO SURETY OF HIS LIABILITY UNDER A DECREE (Section 145)

(Title)

To

WHEREAS you did on become liable as surety for the performance of any decree which might be passed against the said defendant in the above suit, and whereas a decree was passed on the day of 19 against the said defendant for the payment of (1) (1) Here insert the amount of the decree against you

before the
to show cause why the said decree
and if no sufficient cause shall be, within the time
order for its execution will be

19

day of

Judge

at
Court of the
of
Register of Civil Suits in the year 19

PLAINTIFF				CLAIM		APPEARANCE		JUDGMENT		APPEAL		EXECUTION				RETURN OF EXECUTION						
Name		Description	Place of residence	Name	Description	When the cause of action accrued	Day for parties to appear	I Plaintiff	Defendant	Date	For whom	For what amount or	Date of decision of appeal	Judgment in appeal	Date of application	Date of order	Against whom	For what amount of money	Amount of costs	Amount paid into Court	Arrested	
Minute of other Return than Payment or Arrest, and date of every Return																						

NOTE.—Where there are numerous plaintiffs or numerous defendants the name of the first plaintiff only, or the first defendant only, as the case may be, need be entered in the register.

REGISTER OF DEEDS (1811-1819)

COURT (OR HIGH COURT) AT

RECOVERY OF APPEALS FROM DECRYPTS in the year 19

[illegible]

THE SECOND SCHEDULE.

ARBITRATION.

Arbitration in Suits.

1. (1) *Where in any suit all the parties interested agree* ^{Parties to suit may apply for order of reference.} *that any matter in difference between them shall be referred to arbitration, they may, at any time before judgment is pronounced, apply to the Court for an order of reference.*
- (2) Every such application shall be in writing and shall state the matter sought to be referred.

References *—Shama Sundram Iyer & Abdul Latif 4 C W N 92, 27 C 61 [reference to arbitration on verbal application], followed in Abdul Hamid v Riz ud-din, 30 A 32 (1907), Beni Madhub Mitter v Priya Nath Mandal, 5 C W N 268 [arbitration award, if binding on person not party to reference], Chooney Money & Ram Kinkar Dutt, 5 C W N 242 28 C 155 [valuators not arbitrators and therefore order of reference not under section], Ghulam Julani v Muhammad Ahmad, 6 W N 226 [scheme of Code as to arbitration], Debi Churn Manna & Bipra Prasad Jana 7 C W N 186 [withdrawal of suit after award], Fakir Chand Dey & Tin Cowrie Dey 7 C W N 180 [agreement to refer—not in writing—whether adjustment of suit], Sheo Das Misser v Broja Nandan Pershad, 7 C W N 313 [application by pleader not specially authorized], Protap Chunder Dey & Toolkey Das Dey 29 C 793 [sections applicable to arbitrations in a suit], Hardeo Sihar & Gauri Shankar 28 A 35, Lutawan v Lachya, 36 A 69 (T B) (1913) [authority of guardians of minor to agree to reference], Parsidh Naram Singh & Ghanshyam Narain Singh, 9 C W N 873 [award on reference not agreed to by all parties] Inder Subbarami v Kandadai Rajamannar, 26 M 47 [reference on petition not joined in by all the parties to the suit], Kadhu Singh & Baljit Singh 29 A 423 [application for reference signed by pleader holding defective *talalat namah*] Pitam Mal & Sidiq Ali, 29 A 229, Ishar Das & Keshab Das 32 A 657 (1910) [meaning of words "all the parties to a suit"], Ramjawan Ram & Kali Charan Singh 29 A 429 [authority of pleader to agree to reference], Haji Wedina Casseem &

* The cases here noted are decisions subsequent to the last edition of O Kincaly's Code and reported up to and including September, 1914

Luxumbai, 1 Bom L R 617 [Court has no power of its own motion to order reference—absence of written application], Lal Mohun Pillai v Surya Kumar Das 11 C W N 1152 [reference not concurred in by all parties], Harakbhai v Jamrabai, 15 Bom L R 340 (1912), 37 B 639 [this schedule does not contemplate reference to arbitration by parties to a pending suit outside that suit and without intervention of Court], Jidu v Kailas 37 C 63 (1909) [award upon a private reference], Sabta Prasad v Dharam Kirti 35 A 107 (1912)

[s 507] 2 The arbitrator shall be appointed in such manner as
Appointment of arbitrator may be agreed upon between the parties

[s 508] 3 (1) The Court shall, by order, refer to the arbitrator
Order of reference the matter in difference which he is required to determine, and shall fix such time as it thinks reasonable for the making of the award, and shall specify such time in the order

(2) Where a matter is referred to arbitration the Court shall not, save in the manner and to the extent provided in this schedule deal with such matter in the same suit

References —Sita Ram v Bhawanji Din Ram 26 A 105 [delivery of award within time fixed by Court] Asad ul Ishaq v Muhammad Nur 27 A 459 [validity of award made but not reaching the Court within the time limited], Dutt v Khedn 33 A 645 (1911) Lachman Das v Abparakash 30 A 169 (1908) [omission to fix date of delivery is fatal to award] Pichkauri Pami v Dand Rai 20 A 505 (1908) [no second reference on same suit allowed]

[s 509] 4 (1) Where the reference is to two or more arbitrators,
Where reference is to two or more arbitrators provision shall be made in the order for a difference of opinion among the arbitrators—
(a) by the appointment of an umpire,
or

(b) by declaring that, if the majority of the arbitrators agree, the decision of the majority shall prevail or

(c) by empowering the arbitrators to appoint an umpire, or

(d) otherwise as may be agreed between the parties or, if they cannot agree, as the Court may determine

(2) Where an umpire is appointed the Court shall fix such time as it thinks reasonable for the making of his award in case he is required to act

[s 510] 5 (1) In any of the following cases, namely —
[s 507(2)] Power of Court to appoint arbitrator in certain cases (a) where the parties cannot agree within a reasonable time with respect to the appointment of an arbitrator, or the person appointed refuses to accept the office of arbitrator, or

(b) where an arbitrator or umpire—

(i) dies, or

(ii) refuses or neglects to act or becomes incapable of acting, or

(iii) leaves British India in circumstances showing that he will probably not return at an early date, or

(c) where the arbitrators are empowered by the order of reference to appoint an umpire and fail to do so,

any party may serve the other party or the arbitrators, as the case may be, with a written notice to appoint an arbitrator or umpire

(2) If, within seven clear days after such notice has been served or such further time as the Court may in each case allow, no arbitrator or no umpire is appointed, as the case may be, the Court may, on application by the party who gave the notice, and after giving the other party an opportunity of being heard, appoint an arbitrator or umpire or make an order superseding the arbitration, and in such case shall proceed with the suit

References—*Jamna Kunwar v Nasir Ali* 21 A 412 [arbitrators neglecting to file award], *Mirza Sidik v Musst Kamz* P C 15 C W N 1005 (1911), 38 I A 181 14 C L J 313 [not necessary that the arbitrator who refuses must have accepted office before refusing]

6 Every arbitrator or umpire appointed under paragraph 4 or paragraph 5 shall have the like powers

Powers of arbitrator or umpire appointed under paragraph 4 or 5

as if his name had been inserted in the order of reference

7 (1) The Court shall issue the same processes to the parties and witness whom the arbitrator or umpire desires to examine as the Court may

Summoning witnesses and default

issue in suits tried before it

(2) Persons not attending in accordance with such process, or making any other default, or refusing to give their evidence, or guilty of any contempt to the arbitrator or umpire during the investigation of the matters referred, shall be subject to the like disadvantages, penalties and punishments, by order of the Court on the representation of the arbitrator or umpire, as they would incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court

8 Where the arbitrators or the umpire cannot complete the award within the period specified in the

Extension of time for making award

order, the Court may if it thinks fit, either allow further time, and from time to time, either before or after

the expiration of the period fixed for the making of the award, enlarge such period, or may make an order superseding the arbitration, and in such case shall proceed with the suit

References—*Jamna Kunwar v Nasir Ali*, 24 A 312 [order for super session], *Sitarun v Bhawan Din Ram* 26 A 107 [delivery of award within time fixed], *Asad ul lah v Muhammad Nur*, 27 A 159 [here the completion and delivery of the award are not distinguished the one from the other]

- [s 515] 9 *Where* an umpire has been appointed, he may enter on the reference in the place of the arbitrators,—
 Where umpire may arbitrate in lieu of arbitrators (a) if they have allowed the appointed time to expire without making an award, or
 (b) if they have delivered to the Court or to the umpire a notice in writing stating that they cannot agree

- [s 516] 10 *Where* an award in a suit has been made, the persons who made it shall sign it and cause it to be
 Award to be signed and filed filed in Court, together with any depositions and documents which have been taken and proved before them, and notice of the filing shall be given to the parties

References—See *Nobin Kally Dabee v Ambica Churn Banerjee*, 5 C W N 803 [application to set aside award—time from which limitation begins to run], *Asad ul lah v Mahommed Nur*, 27 A 459 [meaning of word “made”], *Benode v Pran Chandra*, 14 C L J 143 (1898) [award void when arbitrator signs a blank paper on which the decision is to be written by other arbitrators]

- [s 517.] 11 Upon any reference by an order of the Court, the arbitrator or umpire may, with the leave of the Court, state the award as to the whole or any part thereof in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court, and the Court shall deliver its opinion thereon, and shall order such opinion to be added to and form part of the award

References—*Parshotam v Ramgopal*, 35 N 130 (1910) The mere use of “may” does not convert a reference to the Court for its opinion into a special case

- [s 518] 12 The Court may, by order, modify or correct an award,—
 Power to modify or correct award (a) where it appears that a part of the award is upon a matter not referred to arbitration

and such part can be separated from the other part and does not affect the decision on the matter referred, or

- (b) where the award is imperfect in form, or contains any obvious error which can be amended without affecting such decision, or
- (c) where the award contains a clerical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission

Reference—Narsingh & Ajodhya, 16 C W N 256 (1911), 15 C L J 110 [latitude of arbitrators]

13 The Court may also make such order as it thinks fit [s 519]
Order as to costs of arbitration respecting the costs of the arbitration where any question arises respecting such costs and the award contains no sufficient provision concerning them

14 The Court may remit the award or any matter referred [s 520]
Where award or matter referred to arbitration may be remitted to arbitration to the re consideration of the same arbitrator or umpire, upon such terms as it thinks fit,—

- (a) where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration, unless such matter can be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred,
- (b) where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution,
- (c) where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it

References—Dhanyubhai Gudharbhai & Vathurbhai Ghulabhai 28 B 287 [see notes to next clause] Mustafa Khan & Phulji Bibee 27 A 526 [see notes to paras 20, 21], Thereevengal Dittcheengar v Vaidyanatha 29 M 303 [award determining matters not referred]

15 (1) An award remitted under paragraph 14 becomes [s 521]
Grounds for setting aside award void on failure of the arbitrator or umpire to re consider it But no award shall be set aside except on one of the following grounds, namely —

- (a) corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator or umpire,
- (b) either party having been guilty of fraudulent concealment of any matter which he ought to have disclosed, or of wilfully misleading or deceiving the arbitrator or umpire,

(c) the award having been made after the issue of an order by the Court proceeding with the suit allowed by the Court and proceeding with the suit in such case shall proceed with the suit

(1) Where an award is made or is set aside under clause (1) the Court shall make an order superseding the arbitration and in such case shall proceed with the suit

References—*Dhanyabhai Gudharbhai v. Vathurbhai Ghisabhai* 28 B 287 [not sufficient merely to allege a ground under this or last clause it must also be proved], *Kili Charan Sirdar v. Sarit Chunder Chowdhury* 70 W N 546 30 C 397 [misconduct does not necessarily imply "corruption", jurisdiction of Small Cause Court], *Damodar Trimbak v. Raghunath Hari* 4 Bom L R 267 26 B 551 [order setting aside award is not subject to revision], *Ram Naram Roy v. Banj Nath Malla*, 29 C 36 [misconduct of arbitrator], *Nida Marthi Mukhanti v. Tharamana Ramayya* 26 M 76 [misconduct of arbitrator], *Asad ulah v. Mahmmed Nur*, 27 A 459 [meaning of word "made"], *Ganga Prasad v. Kura*, 28 A 408 [no appeal from order setting aside award] but see *Achuthayya v. Thunamayya* 31 M 345 (1906) (contra), *Wajee Mathura Das v. Eby Umarsoy*, 29 B 285 [see next clause], *Nadeer Chand v. Gobind Chandar* 2 C L J 61 [misconduct], *Behari Lal Chauri Lal* 29 A 457 [misconduct], *Aishabai v. Essaji* 15 Bom L R 392 (1913) [honest though mistaken admission of a document in evidence by umpire], *Ganesh v. Malhar* 13 C L J 399 (1911), *Shri Krishna v. Satish* 38 C 529 (1913), *Haji Ahmed v. Essaji* 14 Bom L R 1007 (1912) [private enquest by arbitrator], *Amir Begam v. Badr ud-din* P C 19 C L J 493 (1914) [misconduct], *Buccleugh v. Metropolitan Board of Works* 5 H L 418 (1872) [misconduct]

L 522]

16 (1) Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for re consideration in manner aforesaid and no application has been made to set aside the award, or the Court has refused such application, the Court shall, after the time for making such application has expired, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award

(2) Upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except in so far as the decree is in excess of, or not in accordance with, the award

References—*Shyam Charan Pramanik v. Probod Dasgupta* 8 C W N 96 [second appeal lies from decree of Appellate Court made in accordance with an award by an arbitrator to whom the case had been referred to the first Court and whose award the first Court had set aside], *Bhadrani Chatterjee v. Sirhomangala Deb* 8 C W N 916 [no appeal on ground of misconduct], *Ghulam Tekam v. Muhammad Husain* 4 Bom L R 161 [no appeal], *G. C. W. N. 226* [appeal], *Subhash Chandra v. Subramanyam Aiyar* 31 M 17

(1908), Chooney Money v Ram Kinkar Dutt, 28 C 115, 5 C W N 242 [refers valuers not arbitrators], Indur Subbaram v Kondadar, 26 M 47 (1902) [appeal] [not followed in Konakku Nagalinga v Nagalinga Naik, 32 M 510 (1909)], Gobardhan Das v Jai Kishore, 22 A 224 [appeal], Pirsiddh Narain Singh v Ghanshyam Narain Singh, 9 C W N 873 [appeal and second appeal] [he from decree passed on award on reference not agreed to by all parties], Waljee Mathura Das v Ebn Umersey, 29 B 285 [appeal], Nadar Chand v Gobind Chander, 2 C L J 61, 65 [appeal], Sham Lal v Misri Kunwar, 29 A 426 [appeal], distinguished in Behari Lal v Chuni Lal, 29 A 457 [appeal], Ramesh Chandra Dhar v Karunamoye Dutt, 33 C 498 [appeal] Chairman of Purnea Municipality v Siva Sunkar Ram 33 C 899 [appeal], Janoley Nath Gula v Brojo Lal Guha, 33 C 757 [see clause 21], Abdul Tahir v Azmut Bibi 2 C L J 80 [award, decree made in terms of, by Appellate Court if appealable], Chintamani v Haladhar, 10 C W N 601 (appeal) [See notes to clause 20] Shih Kristo v Satish, 39 C 822 (1912), and see Rangoon Botatoung Co v Collector Rangoon (P C), 40 C 21 (1912) [appeal to Privy Council] Surja Narain v Bunwari Jha, 18 C L J 35 (1913) [no appeal, though validity of award assailed]

Order of reference on agreements to refer

17 (1) Where any persons agree in writing that any difference between them, shall be referred to arbitration, the parties to the agreement, or any of them, may apply to any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates, that the agreement be filed in Court

(2) The application shall be in writing and shall be numbered and registered as a suit between one or more of the parties interested or claiming to be interested as plaintiff or plaintiffs, and the others or other of them as defendants or defendant, if the application has been presented by all the parties, or, if otherwise, between the applicant as plaintiff and the other parties as defendants

(3) On such application being made the Court shall direct notice thereof to be given to all the parties to the agreement, other than the applicants, requiring such parties to show cause, within the time specified in the notice, why the agreement should not be filed

(4) Where no sufficient cause is shown, the Court shall order the agreement to be filed, and shall make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed in accordance with the provisions of the agreement or, if there is no such provision and the parties cannot agree, the Court may appoint an arbitrator

Nanak Chand, 9 P R (1913), Dutta v Kheda, 33 A 645 (1911), Ghulam Khan v Muhammad Hassan, P C, 29 C 167 (1902), Venkateshala Reddi v Rangiah Reddi 36 M 353 (1911) [order filing an agreement to arbitrate is a decree and appealable] [See sect 101 (d)] See also Sury v Narayan Rao v Sarabhai, 21 M L J 263 (1911), Thiruvengadu Thiengar v Vaidinatha Ayyar, 29 M 303 (1906) [death of one of parties—application by legal representative], Tin Coury Dey v Fakir Chand Dey, 30 C 218 [agreement to refer not in writing—agreement in pending suit], Sheo Dal v Sheo Shankar Singh, 27 A 53 [agreement to refer made pending suit—such agreement a bar to continuance of suit]

18 *Where any party to any agreement to refer to arbitration, or any person claiming under him, institutes any suit against any other party to the agreement, or any person claiming under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such suit may, at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, apply to the Court to stay the suit, and the Court, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement to refer to arbitration, and that the applicant was, at the time when the suit was instituted and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an order staying the suit*

[s 524] 19 The foregoing provisions, as far as they are consistent with any agreement filed under paragraph 17, shall be applicable to all proceedings under the order of reference made by the Court under that paragraph, and to the award and to the decree following thereon

Arbitration without the intervention of a Court

[s 525] 20 (1) *Where any matter has been referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court, and an award has been made thereon, any person interested in the award may apply to any Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the award that the award be filed in Court*

(2) The application shall be in writing and shall be numbered and registered as a suit between the applicant as plaintiff and the other parties as defendants

(3) The Court shall direct notice to be given to the parties to the arbitration other than the applicant, requiring them to

show cause, within a time specified, why the award should not be filed

References.—Mahomed Wahiduddin v Hakuman 29 C 278 [objection to validity of reference], Macnaghten v Rameshwar Sing, 30 C 831 [valuation not an award], Seshayya v Chengayya 24 M 31 [award relating to property partly outside jurisdiction], Ghulam Jilani t Muhamamad 6 C W N 226 [scheme of Code, referred to in Kunji Lal v Durga Prasad 32 A 484 (1910)], Narsing Das v Ajodhya Prasad, 31 C 203 [the words in the former section 'the matter to which the award relates' refer to the subject matter of the arbitration and not the matters actually awarded], Mohes Chunder t Amar Chand 19 C L J 260 (1913), Ganri Shankar v Maida Koer 31 C 516 [withdrawal of application], Ponnusami Mudali v Mandi Sandara, 27 M 255 [appeal, revision], Kalika Ram t Babu Lal, 26 B 205 [appeal], Mustafa Khan t Phulja Bibi, 27 A 526 [no power to amend or remit], distinguished in Bahadur Singh t Nagipuran, 30 A 151 (1908), Thiruvengadathengar v Vaidinatha, 29 M 303 [order on application is decree and appealable, see next clause], Chintamoney t Haladhar, 10 C W N 601 [appeal, distinction between cases when application to file award is allowed and when it is refused], Najm ud din Ahmad t Albert Pucsh, 29 A 584 [decree on award made without allowing time to file objections—appeal], Bhajahari Baha v Belary Lal Bisak, 33 C 881 [a valid award is operative though neither party has sought to enforce it], Tek Lal Singh t Sripati 19 C L J 123 (1913), Basant Lal v Kanye Lal, 28 A 21 [order refusing to file award, appeal] Ganesb Singh t Kashi Singh 28 A 621 [jurisdiction of Court to decide as to validity of reference, and see Manilal v Vanmali Das 29 B 621] Abdul Ali v Anwar Ali 11 C W N 220 [appeal] Raghavendra t Gururao 15 Bom L R 362 (1913) [scope of clause], Ramdhari t Ram Charitter 38 C 143 (1910) [rejection of application out of Court] Narsingh v Ajodhya 16 C W N 206 (1911) 15 C L J 110 [final award in part] Muhammad Ibrahim v Ahmad Said, 32 A 503 (1910), Nagendra t Hirendra 16 C W N 34 (1911) Dhanpat Rai v Must Kahan Devi 30 P R 109 (1914) Thiruvengadathengar t Vaidinatha Ayyar, 29 M 303 (1905) [award determining matters not referred] See cases cited under clause 16, *ante*

21 (1) Where the Court is satisfied that the matter has been referred to arbitration and that an award has been made thereon and where no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in paragraph 14 or paragraph 15 is proved, the Court shall order the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award

(2) Upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except in so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award

References.—Protap Chunder Dey t Toolsee Dasa Dey 24 C 93 [sectn 14 of Code applicable to arbitrations in a suit] Gobardh on Das t Jai Ki hen D ,

22 A 224 [appeal undue influence—coercion], Gridharbhai v Mathurbhai Ghulabhai, 28 B 287 [proof of allegations against award], Mustafa Khan v Phulja Bibi, 27 A 526 [in last clause]; Janakey Nath Guha v Brojo Lal Guha 33 C 757 [appeal lies from order directing award to be filed], Abdul Talur v Azmut Bibi, 2 C L J 88 [order refusing to file award is a decree], Chintamoney v Haladhar, 10 C W N 601 [see clause 20], Abdul Ali v Anwar Ali 11 C W N 220 [ibid], Ganes v Malda, 13 C L J 399 (1911) [order made under this clause is appealable under sect 104, cl (f)] Dianpat Rai v Musst Kahan Devi 30 P R 109 (1914) Bhagat Ram v Pares Ram 84 P R (1907)

1 of
8771

22 *The last thirty seven words of section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, shall not apply to any agreement to refer to arbitration, or to any award, to which the provisions of this schedule apply*

Exclusion of certain words in the Specific Relief Act 1877

23 *The forms set forth in the Appendix, with such variations as the circumstances of each case require, shall be used for the respective purposes therein mentioned*

Forms

APPENDIX

No. 1.

APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE

(Title of suit)

1. This suit is instituted for *(state nature of claim)*
- 2 The matter in difference between the parties is *(state matter of difference)*
- 3 The applicants being all the parties interested have agreed that the matter in difference between them shall be referred to arbitration.
- 4 The applicants therefore apply for an order of reference.

A. B
C. D

Dated the day of 19 .

NOTE—If the parties are agreed as to the arbitrators it should be so stated

No 2

ORDER OF REFERENCE

(Title of suit)

Upon reading the application presented on the day of 19
it is ordered that the following matter in difference arising in this suit, namely —

be referred for determination to X and Y or in case of their not agreeing then to the determination of Z, who is hereby appointed to be umpire, and such arbitrators are to

Liberty to apply.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19 .

Judge.

No 3

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW ARBITRATOR

(Title of suit)

Whereas by an order, dated the day of 19 *(state order of reference and death, refusal, etc., of arbitrator)*, it is by consent ordered that Z be

19 .

Judge.

No 4

SPECIAL CASE

(Title of suit)

In the matter of an arbitration between A B of _____ and C D of _____
the following special case is stated for the opinion of the Court —

(Here state the facts concisely in numbered paragraphs)

The questions of law for the opinion of the Court are —

First, whether _____

Secondly, whether _____

X
Y

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19 ____

No 5

AWARD

(Title of suit)

In the matter of an arbitration between A B of _____ and C D of _____
WHEREAS in pursuance of an order of reference made by the Court of _____ and
dated the _____ day of _____ 19 ____ the following matter in difference
between A B and C D, namely, _____

has been referred to us for determination,

Now we, having duly considered the matter referred to us do hereby make our
award as follows —

We award—

(1) that _____

(2) that _____

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19 ____

X
Y

THE THIRD SCHEDULE

EXECUTION OF DECREES BY COLLECTORS.

1. *Where the execution of a decree has been transferred to the Collector under section 68, he may—* [s 321]
Powers of Collector
(a) proceed as the Court would proceed when the sale of immoveable property is postponed in order to enable the judgment debtor to raise the amount of the decree, or
(b) raise the amount of the decree by letting in perpetuity, or for a term, on payment of a premium, or by mortgaging, the whole or any part of the property ordered to be sold, or
(c) sell the property ordered to be sold or so much thereof as may be necessary

This schedule deals with the functions of the Collector as the authority invested with jurisdiction to see that the decree is satisfied. The authority is given for the purpose of enabling him to determine the best mode of satisfying the decree. But his discretion does not extend to any jurisdiction to determine whether the decree has been satisfied or not (1)

2. *Where the execution of a decree, not being a decree ordering the sale of immoveable property in pursuance of a contract specifically affecting the same, but being a decree for the payment of money in satisfaction of which the Court has ordered the sale of immoveable property, has been so transferred, the Collector, if, after such inquiry as he thinks necessary, he has reason to believe that all the liabilities of the judgment debtor can be discharged without a sale of the whole of his available immoveable property, may proceed as hereinafter provided* [s 322]
Procedure of Collector in spec. cases

“Powers.”—The Collector, it has been held, is limited to one or other of the courses specifically mentioned in the section (2)

(1) Bhurchand v. Vira 14 Bom. L. R. 757 (1912), 37 B. 22

(2) Madhavji Karandikar v. Hari Chikre 7 B. 332 (1883)

No 4

SPECIAL CASE

(Title of suit)

In the matter of an arbitration between A B of _____ and C D of _____
the following special case is stated for the opinion of the Court —

(Here state the facts concisely in numbered paragraphs)

The questions of law for the opinion of the Court are —

First, whether _____

Secondly, whether _____

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19 _____

X
Y

No 5

AWARD

(Title of suit)

In the matter of an arbitration between A B of _____ and C D of _____
WHEREAS in pursuance of an order of reference made by the Court of _____ and
dated the _____ day of _____ 19 _____ the following matter in difference
between A B and C D, namely _____

has been referred to us for determination,

Now we, having duly considered the matter referred to us do hereby make our
award as follows —

We award—

(1) that _____

(2) that _____

Dated the _____ day of _____ 19 _____

THE THIRD SCHEDULE

EXECUTION OF DECREES BY COLLECTORS.

1. *Where the execution of a decree has been transferred [s 321] to the Collector under section 68, he may—*
- Powers of Collector.**
- (a) proceed as the Court would proceed *when the sale of immoveable property is postponed in order to enable the judgment debtor to raise the amount of the decree; or*
 - (b) raise the amount of the decree by letting in perpetuity, or for a term, on payment of a premium, or by mortgaging, the whole or any part of the property ordered to be sold, or
 - (c) sell the property ordered to be sold or so much thereof as may be necessary.

This schedule deals with the functions of the Collector as the authority invested with jurisdiction to see that the decree is satisfied. The authority is given for the purpose of enabling him to determine the best mode of satisfying the decree. But his discretion does not extend to any jurisdiction to determine whether the decree has been satisfied or not (1)

- 2 *Where the execution of a decree, not being a decree [s 322] ordering the sale of immoveable property in pursuance of a contract specifically affecting the same, but being a decree for the payment of money in satisfaction of which the Court has ordered the sale of immoveable property, has been so transferred, the Collector, if, after such inquiry as he thinks necessary, he has reason to believe that all the liabilities of the judgment-debtor can be discharged without a sale of the whole of his available immoveable property, may proceed as hereinafter provided*
- Procedure of Collector in special cases**

"Powers"—The Collector, it has been held, is limited to one or other of the courses specifically mentioned in the section (2)

(1) *Blurchand v Vira*, 14 Bom. L. R. 757 (1912), 37 B 32

(2) *Madhavji Karandkar v Hari Chikne*, 7 B 332 (1953)

[s. 322A.]

3. (1) In any such case as is referred to in paragraph 2, the Collector shall publish a notice, allowing a period of sixty days from the date of its publication for compliance and calling upon—

Notice to be given to decree-holders and to persons having claims on property.

(a) every person holding a decree for the payment of money against the judgment-debtor capable of execution by sale of his immoveable property and which such decree-holder desires to have so executed, and every holder of a decree for the payment of money in execution of which proceedings for the sale of such property are pending, to produce before the Collector a copy of the decree, and a certificate from the Court which passed or is executing the same, declaring the amount recoverable thereunder;

(b) every person having any claim on the said property to submit to the Collector a statement of such claim, and to produce the documents (if any) by which it is evidenced.

(2) Such notice shall be published by being affixed on a conspicuous part of the court-house of the Court which made the original order for sale, and in such other places (if any) as the Collector thinks fit; and where the address of any such decree-holder or claimant is known, a copy of the notice shall be sent to him by post or otherwise.

[s. 322B.]

4. (1) Upon the expiration of the said period, the Collector shall appoint a day for hearing any representations which the judgment-debtor and the decree-holders or claimants (if any) may desire to make, and for holding such inquiry as he may deem necessary for informing himself as to the nature and extent of such decrees and claims and of the judgment-debtor's immoveable property, and may, from time to time, adjourn such hearing and inquiry.

Amount of decrees for payment of money to be ascertained, and immoveable property available for their satisfaction.

(2) Where there is no dispute as to the fact or extent of the liability of the judgment-debtor to any of the decrees or claims of which the Collector is informed, or as to the relative priorities of such decrees or claims, or as to the liability of any such property for the satisfaction of such decrees or claims, the Collector shall draw up a statement, specifying the amount to be recovered for the discharge of such decrees, the order in which such decrees and claims are to be satisfied, and the immoveable property available for that purpose.

(3) Where any such dispute arises, the Collector shall refer the same, with a statement thereof and his own opinion thereon, to the Court which made the original order for sale, and shall, pending the reference, stay proceedings relating to the subject thereof. The Court shall dispose of the dispute if the matter thereof is within its jurisdiction, or transmit the case to a competent Court for disposal, and the final decision shall be communicated to the Collector, who shall then draw up a statement as above provided in accordance with such decision.

Amount of decrees to be ascertained and property available for their satisfaction—It was held that the assignees of a decree for money obtained against a person whose property had been taken over by the Collector under sect 326, Act X of 1877, whilst such property was under the management of the Collector, were not entitled to be placed on the list of creditors prepared by the Collector under sect 322b of the last Code. An application to be placed on the said list of creditors should be made to the Collector and not to the District Judge (1). An appeal from a decision under this section by which a disputed claim is settled, has, in Madras, been treated as a miscellaneous appeal, i.e. an appeal from a decree not passed in a regular suit (2).

5 The Collector may, instead of himself issuing the notices [s 322c]
and holding the inquiry required by *para*
* Where District Court may issue notices and hold inquiry. *graphs 3 and 4*, draw up a statement specifying the circumstances of the judgment debtor and of his immoveable property so far as they are known to the Collector or appear in the records of his office, and forward such statement to the District Court, and such Court shall thereupon issue the notices, hold the inquiry and draw up the statement required by *paragraphs 3 and 4* and transmit such statement to the Collector.

Issue of notice and inquiry by District Court—Under the Bengal North West Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887 the High Court has power to authorize Subordinate Judges and Munsiffs to take cognizance of references by Collectors under sect 322c of the former Code (Act XII of 1887 sect 23 (2) (c)).

6 The decision by the Court of any dispute arising under [s 322d]
Effect of decision of Court as to dispute *paragraph 4 or paragraph 5* shall as between the parties thereto, have the force of and be appealable as a decree.

- (1) *Murari Das v Collector of Chhargur* referred to in *Narayan v Bhagwant* 10 L. J. 313 (1890) also from *Almad Khan v Malho* "A. C." (1890)
(2) *Srinivasa v 1* (a), 4 M. 420 (1882)

Effect of decision —As to the nature of the appeal and the Court fee duty payable, see the cases cited in the notes to paragraph 4

323 } 7 (1) Where the amount to be recovered and the property available have been determined as provided in paragraph 4 or paragraph 5, the Collector may,—

Scheme for liquidation
of decrees for payment
of money

- (a) if it appears that the amount cannot be recovered without the sale of the whole of the property available, proceed to sell such property, or,
- (b) if it appears that the amount with interest (if any) in accordance with the decree, and, when not decreed, with interest (if any) at such rate as he thinks reasonable, may be recovered without such sale, raise such amount and interest (notwithstanding the original order for sale)—
 - (i) by letting in perpetuity or for a term, on payment of a premium, the whole or any part of the said property, or
 - (ii) by mortgaging the whole or any part of such property, or
 - (iii) by selling part of such property, or
 - (iv) by letting on farm, or managing by himself or another, the whole or any part of such property for any term not exceeding twenty years from the date of the order of sale, or
 - (v) partly by one of such modes, and partly by another or others of such modes
- (2) For the purpose of managing the whole or any part of such property, the Collector may exercise all the powers of its owner
- (3) For the purpose of improving the saleable value of the property available or any part thereof, or rendering it more suitable for letting or managing, or for preserving the property from sale in satisfaction of an incumbrance, the Collector may discharge the claim of any incumbrancer which has become payable or compound the claim of any incumbrancer whether it has become payable or not and, for the purpose of providing funds to effect such discharge or composition may mortgage, let or sell any portion of the property, which he deems sufficient. If any dispute arises as to the amount due on any incumbrance with which the Collector proposes to deal

under this *clause*, he may institute a suit in the proper Court, either in his own name or the name of the judgment-debtor, to have an account taken, or he may agree to refer such dispute to the decision of two arbitrators, one to be chosen by each party, or of an umpire to be named by such arbitrators.

- (4) In proceeding under this *paragraph* the Collector shall be subject to such rules consistent with this Act as may, from time to time, be made in this behalf by the *Local Government*

Liquidation of money decree—With regard to the rules referred to in last paragraph, see N W P list of Local Rules and Orders, ed 1894, p 112, Burmah Rules Manual ed 1897, p 114, Central Provinces List of Local Rules and Orders, ed 1896, p 45 (1) In the case of the Central Provinces the notifications are also issued under sect 320 of the last Code. As for interest to be taken into account, see *Burchand v Vira*, 14 Bom L R 787 (1912), 37 B 32. It has been held that the powers here conferred on the Collector and those conferred on the Talukdari Settlement officers by sect 3 of the Bombay Talukdari Settlement Act are both enabling and are not necessarily contradictory (2)

8 Where, on the expiration of the letting or management under *paragraph* ~ the amount to be recovered has not been realized, the Collector shall notify the fact in writing to the judgment-debtor or his representative in interest, stating at the same time that, if the balance necessary to make up the said amount is not paid to the Collector within six weeks from the date of such notice, he will proceed to sell the whole or a part of the said property, and, if on the expiration of such six weeks the said balance is not so paid, the Collector may sell the property or part accordingly

9 (1) The Collector shall, from time to time, render accounts to Court the Court which made the sale an account of all his hands and of all charges incurred in the execution and performance of the powers and duties imposed on him under the provisions of this *Section* balance at the disposal of the Court

(2) Such charges shall include any amount from time to time due to the Government or any part thereof, the rent (if any)

superior holder in respect of such property or part, and, if the Collector so directs, the expenses of *any* witnesses summoned by him.

(3) *The balance shall be applied by the Court—*

(a) *in providing for the maintenance of such members of the judgment-debtor's family (if any) as are entitled to be maintained out of the income of the property, to such amount in the case of each member as the Court thinks fit; and*

(b) *where the Collector has proceeded under paragraph 1, in satisfaction of the original decree in execution of which the Court ordered the sale of immoveable property, or otherwise as the Court may under section 73 direct; or*

(c) *where the Collector has proceeded under paragraph 2,—*

(i) *in keeping down the interest on incumbrances on the property;*

(ii) *where the judgment-debtor has no other sufficient means of subsistence, in providing for his subsistence to such amount as the Court thinks fit; and*

(iii) *in discharging rateably the claims of the original decree-holder and any other decree-holders who have complied with the said notice, and whose claims were included in the amount ordered to be recovered.*

(4) *No other holder of a decree for the payment of money shall be entitled to be paid out of such property or balance until the decree-holders who have obtained such order have been satisfied, and the residue (if any) shall be paid to the judgment-debtor or such other person as the Court directs.*

Reference —*Govind v Sakhiram*, 36 B 519 (1911), 14 Bom L R 527
[at the disposal of the Court]

[s. 325] 10 *Where the Collector sells any property under this Schedule, he shall put it up to public auction in one or more lots, as he thinks fit, and may—*

Sales how to be conducted.

(a) *fix a reasonable reserved price for each lot;*

(b) *adjourn the sale for a reasonable time whenever, for reasons to be recorded, he deems the adjournment necessary for the purpose of obtaining a fair price for the property;*

(c) *buy in the property offered for sale, and re-sell the same by public auction or private contract, as he thinks fit.*

11 (1) So long as the Collector can exercise or perform [s. 325A]

Restrictions as to
alienation by judgment
debtor or his represen-
tative and prosecution
of remedies by decree-
holders

in respect of the judgment debtor's immovable property or any part thereof any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on him by *paragraphs 1 to 10* the judgment debtor or his representative in interest shall be incompetent to mortgage charge lease or alienate such property or part except with the written permission of the Collector, nor shall any Civil Court issue any process against such property or part in execution of a decree for the payment of money

(2) During the same period no Civil Court shall issue any process of execution either against the judgment debtor or his property in respect of any decree for the satisfaction whereof provision has been made by the Collector under *paragraph 7*

(3) The same period shall be excluded in calculating the period of limitation applicable to the execution of any decree affected by the provisions of this *paragraph* in respect of any remedy of which the decree holder has been temporarily deprived

Object of section.—As to the object of this section and the exclusion from computation of the time during which the property is under the management of the Collector see case noted below (1)

12 Where the property of which the sale has been [s. 325B]

Provision where pro-
perty is in several dis-
tricts

ordered is situate in more districts than one, the powers and duties conferred and imposed on the Collector by *paragraphs 1 to 10* shall be exercised and performed by such one of the Collectors of the said districts as the Local Government may by general rule or special order direct

13 In exercising the powers conferred on him by *para* [s. 325C]

Powers of Collector to
compel attendance and
production

graphs 1 to 10 the Collector shall have the powers of a Civil Court to compel the attendance of parties and witnesses and the production of documents

(1) See *1st & 2nd P. 19 B. 1910* (1911) *Magnam & Rakuba* 30 B 10 (1911) *1st Bona, L. P. 1911* and see *Muhanmal & M. Hamid* 23 A 1911

(1910) (meaning of *al'ana*) and see also *Khushalchand & Nandram* 30 B 10 (1911) (Collector's powers cease with satisfaction of decree).

THE FOURTH SCHEDULE

(See Section 155)

ENACTMENTS AMENDED

1	2	3	4	5
Year	No	Short title	Amendment.	
1870	VII	The Court fees Act, 1870	In article 1 of Schedule I, after the word "plaint" the words "written statement pleading a set off or counter claim" and after the word "Act" the words "or of cross objection" shall be inserted	

From article 11 of Schedule II the words "from an order rejecting a plaint or" shall be omitted.

For the entry in the first column of Schedule II relating to article 19 the following entry shall be substituted, namely —

"Agreement in writing stating a question for the opinion of the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"

THE FIFTH SCHEDULE

(See Section 156)

ENACTMENTS REPEALED

1	2	3	4
Year	No	Subject or short title	Extent of repeal
<i>Acts of the Governor General in Council</i>			
1870	VII	The Court fees Act, 1870	Section 16, and article 15 of Schedule II
1882	IV	The Transfer of Property Act, 1882	Sections 85 to 90 inclusive, 92 to 94 inclusive, 96, 97, 99 and in section 100 the words "and all the provisions hereinafore contained as to a mortgagee instituting a suit for the sale of the mortgaged property"
"	XIV	The Code of Civil Procedure	The whole Act
"	XV	The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882	The last paragraph of section 3
1888	VI	The Debtors Act, 1888	Sections 2 to 8
"	VII	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1888	So much as is unrepealed, except section 1, section 65 and section 66, sub sections (1), (3) and (4)
"	X	The Presidency Small Cause Courts Law Amendment Act, 1888	So much as is unrepealed
1890	VIII	The Guardian and Wards Act, 1890	Section 63
1891	XII	The Repealing and Amending Act, 1891	So much as relates to Act XIV of 1882 and Act VII of 1888
1892	VI	The Indian Limitation Act and Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1892	In the title and preamble the words "and the Code of Civil Procedure" and sections 2, 3 and 4
1891	V	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1891	The whole Act
1895	VII	The Punjab Laws Act Amendment Act, 1895	Sections 1 and 2
"	VIII	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1895	The whole Act
1900	VI	The Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900	So much of the schedules as relate to Act XIV of 1882.

J. M. MACPHERSON,

Secretary to the Government of India.

THE FIFTH SCHEDULE

(See Section 156)

ENACTMENTS REPEALED

1	2	3	4
Year	No	Subject or short title	Extent of repeal
<i>Acts of the Governor General in Council</i>			
1870	VII	The Court fees Act, 1870	Section 16 and article 15 of Schedule II
1882	IV	The Transfer of Property Act, 1882	Sections 85 to 90 inclusive, 92 to 94 inclusive, 96, 97, 99 and in section 100 the words "and all the provisions hereinbefore contained as to a mortgagee instituting a suit for the sale of the mortgaged property"
"	XIV	The Code of Civil Procedure	The whole Act
"	XV	The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882	The last paragraph of section 3
1888	VI	The Debtors Act, 1888	Sections 2 to 8
"	VII	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1888	So much as is unrepealed, except section 1, section 63 and section 66, sub sections (1), (3) and (4)
"	X	The Presidency Small Cause Courts Law Amendment Act, 1888	So much as is unrepealed
1890	VIII	The Guardian and Wards Act, 1890	Section 53
1891	XII	The Repealing and Amending Act, 1891	So much as relates to Act XIV of 1882 and Act VII of 1888
1892	VI	The Indian Limitation Act and Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1892	In the title and preamble the words "and the Code of Civil Procedure" and sections 2, 3 and 4
1891	V	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1891	The whole Act
1895	VII	The Punjab Laws Act Amendment Act, 1895	Sections 1 and 2
"	XIII	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1895	The whole Act
1900	VI	The Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900	So much of the schedules as relate to Act XIV of 1882

J. M. MACPHERSON,

Secretary to the Government of India.

APPENDIX A.

INDIA

ORDERS, ETC., OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,
UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
CORRECTED UP TO JUNE, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of India Gazette, Part I
Declaration under Section 650A of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) as to service of summons of Mysore Courts by Courts in British India	No 232, I I Date, 25 11 81	1881, p 589
Ditto of Hyderabad Courts	No 752 I B Date, 17 3 09	1899, p 153
Ditto of Courts in certain Tributary States	{ No 2808, I B Date, 10 7 03 No 3260, I B Date, 12 8 03	1903, p 610. 1903, p 774
Declaration under Section 29 of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to service of summons of certain Courts in the Benares State by Courts in British India	No 1340, I B Date, 30 6 11	1911, p 490
Ditto of Courts in certain States named	No 1314, I B Date, 30 6 11	1911, p 491
Application of Section 650A of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) to the Court of Political Agent, Sholapur.	No 3491, I B Date, 15 10 87	1887, p 591
Ditto to certain Courts named	No 2417, I Date 31 5 87 No 327, F C. Date, 31 1 07	1887, p 256 1907, p 74
Ditto to certain Rajpoot Courts	No 4313, I A Date, 22 11 97	1897, p. 1060
Ditto to certain Courts in Travancore, Cochin, Banganapalle, Pudukota, and Sander	{ No 3097, I A. Date, 10 8 01. No 850, I A Date, 28 2 02	1901, p 792 1902 p 471
Application of Section 650A of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) to certain Courts in Travancore	No 4229, I A Date, 16 11 01.	1901, p 977

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of India Gazette Part I
Application of Section 29 of the Code (Act V of 1908) to Courts in the Straits Settlement and Ceylon	No 214 Date, 16 2 09	1909, p 152
Ditto to Courts in France, Spain, Belgium, Russia, Germany, and Portugal	No 852, C Date, 3 2 13	1913 p 102
Ditto to certain Courts named and service of summons of Courts in British India by such Courts	No 663, I B Date, 16 3 12 No 2444, I B Date, 26 11 12 No 512, I B Date, 17 3 13 No 683, I B Date, 3 4 13 No 330, I B Date, 4 3 14	1912 p 349 1912, p 1618 1913, p 233 1913, p 329 1914 p 324
Declaration under Section 434 of the Code (Act X of 1877) as to execution of decrees of Courts in Cooch Behar by Courts in British India.	No 53, F Date 7 3 79	1879 p 149
Ditto of Courts in Mysore	No 233, I F Date, 25 11 81	1881, p 589
Declaration under Section 229B of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) as to execution of decrees of Courts in Travancore by Courts in British India.	No 4035, I Date, 10 12 85	1885, p 667.
Ditto of Courts in Cochin	No 4035, I Date, 10 12 85	1885, p 667
Ditto of Chief Court of Pudukottai	No 4393, I A Date, 8 12 01	1901, p 917
Ditto of Civil Courts in Beroza	No 2684, I A Date, 3 7 08	1908, p 591
	No 2877, I A Date, 13 7 06.	1906 p 472
	No 3401, I A Date, 21 8 08	1908, p 803
Declaration under Section 229B of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) of certain Courts in Native States	No 4428, I B Date, 29 12 08	1909, p 21
	No 609, I B Date, 1 4 09	1909, p 256
	No 419, I B Date, 15 2 12	1912 p 136.
	No 688, I B Date, 3 4 13	1913, p 329
Declaration under Section 44 of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to execution of decrees of certain Courts in Benares State by Courts in British India	No 1341, I B. Date, 30 6 11.	1911, p 490

Subject	Number and date	Year and issue of India Gazette, Part I
Notification under Section 45 of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to execution of decrees of Courts in British India by Courts in territories named	No 2053, I B	
	Date, 22 9 11	1911, p. 782
	No 1147, I B	
	Date, 23 5 12	1912, p. 591
	No 513, I B	
	Date, 17 3 13	1913, p. 231
	No 688, I B	
	Date, 3 4 13	1913, p. 329
Ditto by Courts named	No 790, I B	
	Date, 9 4 13	1913, p. 390
Application of Section 45 of the Code (Act V of 1908) to the Court of the Political Officer in Sikkim	No 789, I B	
	Date, 9 4 13	1913, p. 390
Ditto to certain Courts specified and service of summons of Courts in British India by such Courts	No 756, I B	
	Date, 9 4 13	1913, p. 386
	No 787, I B	
	Date, 9 4 13	1913, p. 388
	No 3297, I B	
	Date, 3 10 13	1913, p. 903
	No 788, I B	
	Date, 9 1 13	1913, p. 390
Declaration under Section 60 of the Code (Act V of 1908) of exemption from attachment or sale of stipends and gratuities of certain family pension funds	No 1	
	Date, 1 1 09	1909, p. 5
Delegation under Section 433 (4) of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) of functions conferred on the Governor General in Council by Sub Sections (1) (2), and (3) thereof.	No 1504, I	
	Date, 8 5 96	1896, p. 222
Ditto under Section 86 (4) of the Code (Act V of 1908) of functions conferred by Sub-Sections (1), (2), and (3) thereof	No 749, L B	
	Date, 27 3 12	1912, p. 389
Declaration under O V, r 26 (b) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to service of summons of Courts in British India by Courts in the Kashmir State	No 2302, I B	
	Date, 29 11 10	1910, p. 1163
Ditto by Courts in certain States named	No 1445, I L	
	Date, 30 6 11	1911, p. 492
Ditto by certain Courts of the Hyderabad State	No 1037, I B	
	Date, 9 5 12	1912, p. 510
Ditto by certain Courts of the Bikaner State	No 929, I B	
	Date 3 1 13	1913, p. 426

Subject	No. and date	Year and page of India Gazette Part I
Direction under Order 43 (I) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to service of notice of attachment of salary or allowance of persons employed in the Indian Telegraph Department and in the Post Office of India	No 3374 G Date, 5 5 10	1910 p 365
Ditto of persons employed in the High Court, Calcutta in the Home Department of the Government of India and in offices subordinate to that Department	No 1662 Date, 29 11 10	1910 p 1153
Ditto of persons employed in the Finance Department of the Government of India and in offices subordinate thereto	No 1153 A Date 24 2 11 No 657 A Date, 15 10 12	1911, p 126 1912, p 1150
Ditto of officers employed under the order of the Military Secretary to H E the Viceroy	No 792 Date 25 5 11	1911, p 361
Ditto of persons employed in the offices of Government Examiners of Railway Accounts	No 657, A Date, 15 10 12	1912 p 1150
Ditto of persons employed in the offices of the Accountant General Behar and Orissa and the Comptroller, Assam	No 619 A Date 17 6 13	1913, p 647

APPENDIX B.

BENGAL.

ORDERS, ETC., OF THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA
UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
CORRECTED UP TO JUNE, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of Calcutta Gazette Part I
Declaration under Section 55 (2) of the Code (Act V of 1908) that no employee of the Telegraph Department shall be liable to arrest in execution of a decree unless seven days' notice has been given.	No 1593, J D Date, 14 7 10	1910, p 989
Rule under Section 327 of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) for regulating the sale of land in execution of decrees (Sambalpur District)	No 3880 Date, 5 10 96	Central Provinces Revenue Manual, 1907, Vol III, Circular No IV-9, p. 76.
Declaration under Section 320 of the Code (Act X of 1877) that execution of decrees in certain cases shall be transferred to the Deputy Commissioner, Sambalpur District	No 4577 Date, 26 11 77	Ditto
Rules under Section 320 of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) for carrying out the provision of that Section	No 3158 Date, 27 5 01	Ditto pp 77 to 81
General rules under Section 122 of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to procedure		See Rules of the High Court, Calcutta, Appellate Side, 1910
Amendments in the above rules	No. nil Date, 27 1 11	1911, pp 120, 298
Rules under Sections 122 and 128 (b) of the Code (Act V of 1908) relating to the Judicial business of Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, etc		See High Court Rules and Orders, Appellate Side, Civil, 1910, Vol I
Revised rule 26 for the Rules under Sections 122 and 128 (b) of the Code (Act V of 1908) relating to the Judicial business of Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, etc	No. nil Date, 21 2 11	1911, p. 318

Subject	Number and date	Year and page Calcutta Gazette Part I Central Province Gazette 1902 Part III p 503
Declaration under Section 645 of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) that Urya is the Court language in the Sambalpur District.	No 10967 Date, 10 12 02	
Notification under Section 1854 (1) of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) as to Judges who shall take down evidence with their own hands in the English language	No., nil Date, 26 11 92 No 1174, J D Date, 7 6 07 No 4338 Date, 21 12 08	1892 p 1063 1907, p 1012 1908, p 2000
Ditto under Section 139 (1) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to Ditto	No 76, J Date, 9, 1 13	1913, p 68
Empowering District Judges to appoint Commissioners to take affidavits (vide Section 139 (c) of the Code (Act V of 1908))	No 2000, J D Date, 16 7 09	1909 p 1003
Direction under O XXI, r 48 (1) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to service of notice of order attaching the salary or allowances of public officers and of servants of local authorities	No 2947, J Date, 6 10 11	1911, p 1401
Rules under O XXVI, r 9, prov of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to the persons to whom Commissions shall be issued	No 2004, J Date 16 7 09 No 3157, J Date, 25 11 09 No 1336, J Date, 1 5 11	1909, p 1003 1909, p 1729 1911, p 663
Rules under O XXVI, r 9, prov of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to the persons by whom local investigations are to be held	No 2001, J Date, 16 7 09 No 2742, J Date, 7 10 09	1909, p 1003 1909, p 1290
Rules of practice for the Original Side of the High Court (vide Section 129 of the Code (Act V of 1908))	No., nil Date 14 2 14	1914 Part II, p 305

ANNULMENTS ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA.

THE CALCUTTA GAZETTE 1910, PART I, r 1344

HIGH COURT NOTICE.

Notification.

The following Rule having been framed by the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal in the exercise of the power vested in it by section 122 of the Code—

G. C.

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), and sanctioned by the Governor General in Council under section 126 of the same Code, is published for general information

By order of the High Court,

R. L. Ross,
Registrar

High Court, English Dept (Civil), the 21st September, 1910.

RULE No. * OF 1910.

In the form of "Decree in Appeal," No 9 of Appendix G to the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), *cancel* the words from "Memorandum of Appeal" to "the following reasons, namely —"

* There is no number given in the Gazette

APPENDIX C.

MADRAS

ORDERS, ETC., OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COURT, MADRAS,
UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
CORRECTED UP TO DECEMBER, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of Fort St George Gazette Part II
General rules of procedure under Part X of the Code (Act V of 1903)		See the Rules of the High Court, Madras, Appellate Side, 1902, and The Civil Rules of Practice, Madras, 1905
Substituting new rule for rule No 531 of the Rules of the High Court, Madras, A S, 1902	No 1422 Date, 16 12 09	1909, p 1791
Adding new rule 10A to the above rules	Ditto	Ditto
Substituting new rule for rule No 277 of the Civil Rules of Practice, Madras, 1905	Ditto	Ditto
Amending Rule 192 (1) of above Civil Rules	Date, 3 3 11	1911, p 471
Amending Rule 53 of above Civil Rules	Date, 18 7 12	1912, p. 1142
Amending Rule 149 of above Civil Rules	Date, 6 12 13	1913, p 2072
Amending Rules 13 and 99 of above Civil Rules	Date, 24 3 14	1914, p 679
Adding new rules 100B and 100C to the Rules of the High Court, Madras, A S., 1902	Date, 13 3 11	1911, p 536
Ditto to the Schedule of rates in Rule 102 of Ditto	Ditto	Ditto.

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of Fort George Gazette Part II
Directions under Section 138 (1) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to Judges who shall take down evidence with their own hands in the English language	Date, 3 6 14	1914, p 1117
	Date, 6 11 14	1914, p 2038
	Date, 9 11 14	Ditto
	Date, 10 11 14	Ditto

ANNULMENTS, ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT, MADRAS

PORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE

1910, PART II, P 870

Notification dated 19th May, 1910.

Under the provisions of section 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the previous sanction of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the following amendment has been made to clause 4 of Rule 3 of Order XXXII of Schedule I to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 —

Omit the words "to the minor and" occurring after the words "except upon notice

A DAVIES,
Deputy Registrar

High Court of Judicature, Madras,
19th May, 1910

PORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE.

1910, PART II, P 1823.

Notification

Under the provisions of Part V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the previous sanction of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the High Court has made the following rule, which is to be inserted as sub-rule (1-A) of Rule 7 of Order XXXII of Schedule I of the said Code and framed the following form, which is to be added to Appendix D to the said Schedule as Form No. 24, viz. —

Rule — "(1-A) — Where an application is made to the Court for leave to enter into an agreement or compromise or for withdrawal of a suit in pursuance of a consent of a minor or other person under

the effect that the agreement or compromise or withdrawal of a suit is for the benefit of a minor or other person under disability. A decree or order for the

or lunatic

(File)

This suit coming on this day for final disposal in the presence of etc., and C. D., the defendant, a minor by F. F., his guardian *ad litem*, applying that this suit may be

compromised in the terms of an agreement in writing dated the day of and made between A. B., the plaintiff of the one part and the said C. D. by the said guardian *ad litem* of the other part (or, on the terms hereafter set forth) and it appearing to this Court that the said compromise is fit and proper and for the benefit of the said minor, this Court doth sanction the said compromise on behalf of the said minor, and with the consent of all parties hereto. It is ordered as follows:—

(Set out the terms of the compromise)

FOOTNOTE—This rule and form supersede Rule No. 119 and Form No. 3a of the Civil Rules of Practice, 1905 and Rule No. 33A of the Rules of the High Court Madras, Appellate Side.

H. D. C. REILLY
Registrar

High Court of Judicature Madras
30th November, 1910

FORT ST. GEORGE GAZETTE

1911, PART II, P. 666

Notification.

Under the provisions of Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and with the sanction of the High Court of Madras, the following is notified:—

determined by the death of the client or the pleader or by revocation in accordance with the provisions of the said Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

H. D. C. REILLY,
Registrar

High Court of Judicature Madras
3rd April 1911

FORT ST. GEORGE GAZETTE.

1911, PART II, P. 692

Notification

High Court of Judicature, Madras
12th April, 1911

H. D. C. REILLY
Registrar

FORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE

1911, PART II, PP 1695 TO 1702

Notification

Under the provisions of Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and all other powers hereunto enabling and with the previous sanction of His Excellency the Governor in Council the High Court has made the following amendments and additions to the First Schedule of the said Code, viz —

(1) In Order IV, Rule 2, number the present Rule 2 (1) and add as Rule 2 (2)—

“Registers in accordance with Forms No 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 in Appendix H are prescribed for use in all Civil Courts having jurisdiction over the classes of suits and cases specified therein”

(2) In Order XXI, Rule 17, add as Rule 17 (5)—

“Registers in accordance with Forms Nos 19, 20, and 21 in Appendix H are prescribed for use in all Civil Courts having jurisdiction over the classes of cases specified therein.”

(3) In Order VII, Rule 9, for Rule 9 (2) substitute—

{ an-
dified

therein

(4) In Appendix H delete Forms Nos 14 and 15 and add the following as Forms Nos 14 to 25 —

Form No. 14.

REGISTER OF ORDINARY SUITS INSTITUTED

Court
Year

Instructions

If the case has been received by transfer, or instituted under Order XXXVII,

Schedule I, C.C.P.

4 Note carefully the new heads 8 and 10 and fresh additions to heads 9 and 12

5 The Certified Copies of Judgment and Decree in Second Appeal sent to the Lower Appellate Court should be forwarded by it to the Court of First Instance which will return them to the former Court after recording the necessary entries under head 9

value of particulars of the claim or as to the date or place of...
under head 6

1 Ordinary Suit No of 101.
Presentation
2 Date of Filing

- 3 Plaintiff—Name, description, and place of abode
 4 Defendant—Name, description, and place of abode.
 5 Particulars of Claim—*Claim for*

Cause of action arose at _____ on _____

- 6 Date for *Defendant's first appearance*.

Vakil for { Plaintiff.
 { Defendant

7.
 8.
 9.

10. 'er
 XXI, Schedule I, C C P.

11. *Execution—*

Number	Date of Application	Order and date	Against whom	For what, and amount, if for money	Amount of costs

12 *Return of Execution—*

Amount paid into Court	Persons arrested	Minute of other return than payment or arrest, and date of every return, including entry of order in appeal with date

Form No. 15.

REGISTER OF SMALL CAUSE SUITS INSTITUTED.

Court
 Year

Instructions.

If the suit has been received by transfer or remanded or restored to file, a note

4 Any amendments or alterations made during the progress of the suit in the

Form No. 19.

REGISTER OF EXECUTION PETITIONS RECEIVED (ON THE SIDE)

Court
Year

Instructions

Applications for transmission of decrees for execution beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts passing them should not be entered in this Register, but must be entered in the Register of Miscellaneous Cases Received (Form No. 17).

Number of Execution Petition	Date of presentation	Number of connected suit and of last previous application	Name of decree-holder and of his pleader	Name of judgment-debtor and of his pleader	Items of decrees or order to be executed with date of any proceedings from which fines runs for this application	Mode of assistance, and section of code or law, prescribing it	Order, with reasons, for closing of proceedings under this application, and date	Number of appeal with result and date
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Form No. 20.

REGISTER OF DECREES OF OTHER COURTS RECEIVED FOR EXECUTION UNDER SECTIONS 38 AND 39, C.C.P.

Court
Year

Date of receipt.	Serial number	Name of the decreeing Court	Number of suit on the file of that Court	Number of connected execution or miscellaneous application, if any, presented in this Court	Lower Court to which sent for execution	Nature and date of communication to the decreeing Court (vide Section 41, C.C.P.)	Amount of postage, if any, received	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
							Rs. A P.	

Form No. 21.

REGISTER OF EXECUTION PETITIONS DISPOSED OF.

Court
Year

Instructions

1. The date to be entered in column 4 will always be the latest date. In the case

sent to jail and date of release, for the purposes of columns 24 to 27 of Statement No. 21.

<i>Number of miscellaneous cases</i>	<i>Date of presentation</i>	<i>Number of connected case, if any</i>	<i>Name of petitioner, if any, and of his Vakil</i>	<i>Name of defendant and of his Vakil</i>	<i>Purport of case and section of law</i>	<i>Final order with date.</i>	<i>Number of appeal with result and date.</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Form No. 18.

REGISTRE OF MISCELLANEOUS CASES DISPOSED OF.

Court
Year

Instructions

1. This register will show all miscellaneous cases of every kind whether instituted
Contempt
the case of
restored to file, the date of original institutions should be entered and the
date of restoration noted in the column of remarks

[illegible]

Form No. 19.

REGISTER OF EXECUTION PETITIONS RECEIVED (ON THE SIDE)

Court
Year

Instructions

Number of Execution Petition	Date of presentation	Number of connected suit and of last previous application	Name of decree holder and of his pleader	Name of judgment-debtor and of his pleader	Terms of decree or order to be executed, with date of any proceedings from which time runs for this application	Made of assistance, and section of code or law, prescribing it	Order, with reasons, for closing of proceedings under this application, and date	Number of appeal with result and date
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Form No. 20.

REGISTER OF DECREES OF OTHER COURTS RECEIVED FOR EXECUTION UNDER SECTIONS 38 AND 39, C.C.P.

Court
Year

Date of receipt.	Serial number	Name of the decreeing Court	Number of suit on the file of that Court	Number of connected execution or miscellaneous application if any presented in this Court	Lower Court to which sent for execution	Nature and date of communication to the decreeing Court (vide Section 41, C.C.P.)	Amount of postage, if any received	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
							Rs. A P.	

Form No. 21.

REGISTER OF EXECUTION PETITIONS DISPOSED OF

Court
Year

Instructions

1. The date to be entered in column 4 will always be the latest date. In the case of petitions restored to file, the date of original institution should be entered, and the date of restoration noted in the column of remarks.

2. Note in the remarks column the number of judgment-debtors imprisoned in each case, the value of decree under which judgment-debtor was imprisoned and date when sent to jail and date of release, for the purposes of columns 31 to 37 of Statement No. XI.

Serial number	Number of the execution petition disposed of	Number of connected case	Date of institution or of receipt of it or order of transfer	Date when proceedings were finally closed	Withdrawn, rejected, or not prosecuted	Transferred	In full	In part	Execution wholly instructious	Involved in execution as petitioner disposed of	Realized	Imprisoned	Arrested but released	Movable property	Immovable property	Possession given of	Specific performance enforced	Partition effected (Section 54, C.P.)	Execution otherwise effected	Actual number of days intervening between institution and disposal	Remarks	(If the petition is only for part satisfaction of the decree, note the fact)	Corresponding roll number of statement No. 1 of Part I							
1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
											Rs.	Rs.																		

- 9 Objections under Rule 22, Order XLI, Schedule I, C.C.P., if any, filed by whom.
10. Number of application for review (or re hearing) with result and date
Fresh Judgment, if any with date

Form No. 25

REGISTER OF MISCELLANEOUS APPEALS DISPOSED OF

Court
Year

Instructions

The date to be entered in column 2 will always be the latest date. In the case of appeals restored to file, the date of original institution should be entered

Serial number	Number of the miscellaneous appeal disposed of	Date of institution, or of the receipt of the order of transfer	Date of disposal	Transferred to another Court	Dismissed under Rule 11, Order XLI	Disposed of												Actual number of days intervening between institution and disposal	Remarks					
						Without contest	With contest								After trial	Uncontested (columns 8 to 11)	Contested (columns 12 to 16)							
							Dismissed for default or otherwise not prosecuted	Order confirmed	Order modified	Order reversed	Remanded	On oath or by arbitration or compromise	Order confirmed.	Order modified	Order reversed	Remanded.								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20					
				7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	21	22	23	24					
																			Corresponding columns of Statement No. V Part II(a)					
																			Order XLI					

H. D. C. REILLY,
Registrar,

High Court of Judicature, Madras,
30th October, 1911

PORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE,

1912, PART II, p. 151

Notification.

Under the provisions of Part V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the previous sanction of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the High Court has made

the following amendment of Form No. 15 of Appendix E to the First Schedule of the said Code, viz —
For the word "Dated" substitute the words "Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of "

High Court of Judicature, Madras
19th January, 1912

H D C. RILLY,
Registrar

FORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE.

1912, PART II, P. 194

Notification

Under "previous bar the following Code, viz:—

- (1) In Rule 27 after the words "send it" insert the words "by registered post prepaid for acknowledgment."
- (2) In Rule 28 after the words "shall send" insert the words "by registered post prepaid for acknowledgment."
- 3) Insert as Rule 29A—

3) Insert as Rule 29A—
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, where the defendant is a public officer (not belonging to His Majesty's Military or Naval forces or His Majesty's Indian Marine Service) sued in his official capacity, service of summons shall be made by sending a copy of the summons to the defendant for acknowledgment.

H. D. C. Ruffy,
Rechnung

High Court, Madras.
29th January, 1912

PORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE.

1913, PART II, PP 13 AND 14

Notification

Under the provisions of Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the
not has made

1. *Staphylococcus aureus* (Staphylococcus aureus)

[illegible]

provided that when the property seized is subject to special and natural decay or when the expense of keeping it in custody is likely to exceed its value, the attaching officer may sell it at once, and

provided also that, when the property attached consists of live-stock, agricultural implements or other articles which cannot conveniently be removed and the attaching officer does not act under the first proviso to this rule, he may at the instance of the

judgment debtor or of the decree holder or of any person claiming to be interested in such property leave it in the village or place where it has been attached

(a)

(b) In the charge of an officer of the Court, if a suitable place for its safe custody be provided and the remuneration of the officer for a period of 15 days at such rate as may from time to time be fixed by the High Court be paid in advance.

(2) Whenever an attachment made under the provisions of this rule ceases for any of the reasons specified in rule 55 or rule 57 or rule 60 of this order, the Court may order the restitution of the attached property to the person in whose possession it was before attachment.

43A. (1) Whenever attached property is kept in the village or place where it is attached, the attaching officer shall forthwith report the fact to the Court and shall with his report forward a list of the property seized.

(2) If attached property is not sold under the first proviso to rule 43 or retained in the village or place where it is attached under the second proviso to that rule, it shall be brought to the Court house and delivered to the proper officer of the Court

43B. (1) Whenever attached property kept in the village or place where it is attached is live stock, the person at whose instance it is so retained shall provide for its maintenance, and, if he fails to do so and if it is in charge of an officer of the Court it shall be removed to the Court house.

Nothing in this rule shall prevent the judgment debtor or any person claiming to be interested in such stock from making such arrangements for feeding the same as may not be inconsistent with its safe custody.

(2) The Court may direct that any sums which have been expended by the attaching officer or are payable to him if not duly deposited or paid, be recovered from the proceeds of property, if sold, or be paid by the person declared entitled to delivery before he receives the same. The Court may also order that any sums deposited or paid under these rules be recovered as costs of the attachment from any party to the proceedings. And (2) add the following form to Appendix E to the said schedule, viz:—

⁴⁴ No. 15A.

Bond for safe custody of moveable property attached and left in charge of person interested and sureties

(ORDER \A) RUT 43)

In the Court of _____ at _____
Civil Suit No. _____ of _____
V. of _____
_____ against _____
(D) of _____

191, in execution of a decree in favour of
of 191 on the file of
left in the charge of the said L.J.,

Now the condition of this obligation is that, if it is called upon to account for and produce when required before the court, it shall

next friend of a minor or as his guardian for the suit

Provided that the interest of that person is not adverse to that of the minor and that he is not, in the case of a next friend, a defendant, or, in the case of a guardian for the suit, a plaintiff

is for the minor's welfare that another person be permitted to act or be appointed, as the case may be.

consents

of any fund in Court in which the minor is interested, and may give directions for the repayment or allowance of the costs as justice and the circumstances of the case may require

II For Form No 11 of Appendix H to the Code of Civil Procedure the following form is substituted :—

Form No 11.

Notice to guardian appointed or declared or to father or other natural guardian, or to the person in charge of the minor

(ORDER XXXII, RULE 3 (5))

(Title.)

To
Guardian appointed or declared, or father or other natural guardian, or person in charge of the minor

Whereas an application has been presented on the part of the
in the above suit for the appointment of a guardian for the suit for the said minor, you
are hereby required to take notice that, unless within days

Form No. 11A.

Notice to proposed guardian

(ORDER XXXII, RULE 4 (3))

(Title)

To

residing at

Take notice that the above named petitioner has made an application to this Court to appoint you guardian for the suit of minor defendant in No of 191, and that the said application will be heard on the day of next

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 191

appellant or respondent in a matter pending before the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, except in cases under appeal to the King in Council, shall be deemed to be a quasi judicial act within the meaning of Section 128 (2) (i) of the Code of Civil Procedure and may be performed by the Registrar, provided that contested applications and applications presented out of time shall be posted before a Judge for disposal

S O HEWSON,

Second Asst. Registrar

High Court of Judicature, Madras,
29th May, 1914

PORT ST OFOROE GAZETTE

1914, PART II, p 1814

Notification

as it thinks fit, to translate accounts and other documents which are
of the Court.

(2) The report of the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record

(3) Before issuing any Commission under this Order, the Court may order such sum (if any) as it thinks reasonable for the expense of the Commission to be, within a time to be fixed, paid into Court by the party at whose instance or for whose benefit the Commission is issued

C G MACKAY,

Registrar

High Court of Judicature, Madras,
2nd October, 1914

FORT ST GEORGE GAZETTE,

1914, PART II, 1 2038

Notification

Under the provisions of Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with

(2) The Judgment may be pronounced by dictation to a short hand writer in open Court, where the presiding Judge has been specially empowered in that behalf by the High Court

as pronounced and shall be
rewards be altered or added

C G MACKAY,
Registrar

High Court of Judicature, Madras,
9th November, 1914

APPENDIX D

BOMBAY

ORDERS, ETC., OF THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COURT, BOMBAY,
UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
CORRECTED UP TO 1ST DECEMBER, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of the Bombay Govt Gazette Part I
Appointing, with reference to Section corresponding to Section 55 (1) of the Code (Act V of 1908), the Surat Civil Jail for the Courts in the Broach District	No 4897, Jud Date, 25 9 05	1905, p 1320
Notification under Section 55 (2) of the Code (Act V of 1908)		1910, p 1012
Declaration under Section corresponding to Section 63 of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to the execution of decrees in certain cases	No 3600, Jud Date, 24 5 80 No 1771, Jud Date, 16 3 81 No 4520, Jud Date, 24 7 82 No 762, Jud Date, 9 2 92 No 2053, Jud Date, 12 4 92 No 8039, Jud Date, 27 11 00 No 5218, Jud Date 20 9 07, amending the above Nos 3600, 762, and 8039 No 5219, Jud. Date, 20 9 07	1880, p 510 1891, p 140 1892, p 557 1892, p 120 1892 p 348 1900 p 2129 1907, p 1627 1907, p 1627
Rules under Section corresponding to Section 70 of the Code (Act V of 1908) for transmission of certain decrees from Court to Collector and for their execution	No 499, Jud Date, 24 1 80	1880 p 96
Ditto new rule for Rule 2 of the above rules	No 1338, Jud Date, 23 2 02	1902, p 321
Ditto modifying Rule 9 and substituting new rules for Rules 7 and 11 of the above rules	No 3132 Jud. Date, 8 5 83	1883 p 358
Ditto modifying Rule 11	No 1179A Jud Date, 16 2 80	1880, p 214

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of the Bombay Govt. Gazette, Part I
Rules under Section corresponding to Section 70 of the Code (Act V of 1908) for transmission of certain decrees from Court to Collector and for their execution. Amending Rule 11	No 6137, Jud Date, 17 9 83	1883, p 605
Ditto - New Rule 12A	No 3280, Jud Date, 11 5 85	1885, p 631
Ditto, cancelling para 2 of Rule 12A	No 2890, Jud Date, 29 5 90	1890, p 510
Ditto cancelling the last para. of Rule 12A.	No 3341A, Jud Date 18 5 95	1895, p 613
Ditto New Rules 16 and 17	No 92, Jud, Date, 8 1 90	1890, p 38
Appointment under Section corresponding to Section 85 of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 6789, Political Date, 10 10 89	1889, p 873 1913, p 542
Ditto under Section corresponding to Section 93 of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 6216A, Jud Date, 20 11 06 No. 61, Jud Date, 7 1 07	1906, p 1710 1907, p 36
General Rules, etc., under Section corresponding to Section 122 of the Code (Act V of 1908)		Rules and Orders compiled and issued under the authority of the Bombay High Court
Exemption from personal appearance in Court under Section 133 of the Code (Act V of 1908)		1912, p 1220, and 1913, p 233

AMENDMENTS ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT, BOMBAY

THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT GAZETTE,

1910, PART I, PP 1496 AND 1497

*Miscellaneous Notifications, Appointments, etc., by His Majesty's High Court of
Judicature (Appellate Side)*

No 2030—The following rules have been made by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act V of 1908, and have received the sanction of His Excellency the Governor in Council and are published for general information —

RULE 1

;

..

..

where he is residing and may be sent to him by the Court by post registered for acknowledgment. An acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the defendant or an endorsement by a postal servant that the defendant refused service shall be deemed by the Court issuing the summons to be *prima facie* proof of service. In all other cases the Court shall hold such inquiry as it thinks fit and either declare the summons to have been duly served or order such further service as may in its opinion be necessary."

RULE II

the
Bombay

Civil Procedure Code of 1908,
High Court, Appellate Side,

Where on a memorandum of appeal presented within the time prescribed for the same, the time being the time being Registrar may part as the case may be of such Court fees and may admit the appeal to the register even though the subsequent payment of Court fee may have been made after the time prescribed for presentation of the appeal."

RULE III

Clause (a) of rule 2, Order III, be amended to read as follows —

"Persons holding general powers of attorney from parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance, application, or act is made or done, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications, and acts on behalf of such parties"

RULE IV

Form No. 10 in Appendix B, Schedule I, of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, be amended to read as follows

"To accompany Returns of Summons of another Court (Order V, r 23)

Read proceeding from the (Title) forwarding of that Court
for service on in Suit No of 19
Read Serving Officer's endorsement stating that the and
proof of the above having been duly taken by me on the oath of
it is ordered that the be returned to the
with this proceeding
I hereby declare that the said summons on have been
duly served Judge.

NOTE.—This form will be applicable to process other than summons the service of which may have to be effected in the same manner

By order of the High Court,
P. E. PERCIVAL,
Registrar

Bombay, 9th September, 1910

APPENDIX L

ALLAHABAD

UP GOVERNMENT'S ORDERS, ETC. UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CORRECTED UP TO DECEMBER 1914

subject	Number and date	Year, part or page of the U. P. Gazette
Notification under Section 55 (2) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to persons who shall not be liable to arrest in execution of decrees	No 654/VI-217 Date 6 6 10	1910, Part I p 550
Rules under Sections 68 and 70 of the Code (Act V of 1908) for transferring to Collector execution of certain decrees and rules of procedure therefor	No 1887/I-238 Date, 7 16 11 No 1353/I-238 Date, 12 7 12 No 2538/I-196, Date 20 11 13	1911, Part I p 1005 1912, Part I, p 640 1913, Part I p 1293
Sanctioning exercise of powers under Section 93 of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 1622/VII-447 Date, 6 12 12	1912 Part I p 1240
Exempting personal appearance in Court under Section 133 (1) of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 1/VII-233 Date, 1 3 09 No 918/VII-83 Date, 8 9 09 No 707/VII-215 Date 23 5 11 No. 1429/VII-521 Date, 16 11 14	1909 Part I p. 3 1909 Part I, p 774 1911, Part I, p 474 1914, Part I, p. 1626
Empowering certain Courts to appoint Commissioners to take affidavits, vide Section 139 (c) of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 3869 Date, 7 12 10	1910, Part II, p 2077
Notification appointing Munsarims of Civil Courts in the Province of Agra to receive applications for execution under O XXI r 10, of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 2207 Date, 29 6 11	1911 Part II, p 1073
Direction under O XXI, r 48 (1) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to service of notice of order attaching the salary or allowance of public officers	No 1053/VI-197 Date, 12 8 11	1911, Part I, p. 777

ANULMENTS, ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT ALLAHABAD

THE UP GAZETTE.

1913, PART II, 1 323

Notification No 712 35 (a) /5 Date of the 27th February, 1913

In continuation of
1913 and under Section
addition is made to the
section —

To Order XXI, rule 126, add—

"Provided that, when the amount does not exceed Rs.5 it may be paid to the Sahn by money order on requisition by the Amin, and the presentation of the certificate may be dispensed with."

N B —In the above mentioned notification No 285-35 (a) the above addition was published for information and objection of persons interested.

N B --The above mentioned "Rules framed by this Court" are contained in a book published by the High Court, Allahabad, and reproduced at p 703, page

Notification No 1824/33 (a)-11 Date: Allahabad, the 24th November, 1914

and with
for those

at present in use —

(1) substitute the following for Form No. 5 (H.C.J. Form, Part XXII, No. 71) in Appendix H of the said Code

No. 5

List of documents produced by Plaintiff (order 13 Rule 1)

In the Court of _____, at _____ District _____

Suit No. _____ of 19____

Plaintiff

Versus

Defendant

1st of documents produced with the plaint (or at first hearing) on behalf of plaintiff (or defendant)

This list was filed by

this day of 19

1

3

Serial
number

Description and
date, if any, of the
document

What became of the document

Remarks

closure in the
envelope

Signature of party or pleader
producing the list.

(2) Substitute the following for the form already in use (H.C. Form Part IV, No 26) under Order XVIII rule 13, and Order XX rules 4, 6, and 7—

Evidence, judgment, and decree (Order XVIII, rule 13 and Order XX, rules 4, 6, and 7).

Suit No 19

Present

Judge of Small Cause Court

Date of institution	Name of plaintiff	Name of defendant	Amount of claim		
			Rs	A	P

Decision.

Date	In whose favour	Against whom	Amount decreed			Costs awarded			By whom payable
			Rs	A	P	Rs	A	P	

Orders before first hearing

Claim
Issue

Reply

(On reverse of form)

Evidence for plaintiff
Finding

Evidence for defendant

By order of the Court
G R MURRAY ICS,
Registrar

NB—In the above mentioned notification No 3577/35 (a) the above substituted forms were published for information and objection of persons interested

Book of Rules framed by the High Court of Judicature, North-Western Provinces, under Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Act No V of 1908

These rules have been framed under Part A of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No I of 1908, and form part of the First Schedule of the said Act

COMPARATIVE TABLE

(In reference to Rules of the 4th of April 1901)

Sections of the 4th of April 1901	Where to be found	Remarks
11	Order XVIII rule 9	
2	Order V, rule 31	
28 Para 2	Notes to Order V, rule 27	
45 (3)	Order XIII rule 13	
45 Note	Order XIII rule 12	
52	Order XVI rule 22	
61	Order XX rule 4	

COMPARATIVE TABLE (continued)

Rules of the 4th of April 1884	Where to be found	Remarks
62	Order XIX, rule 5	
63	Order XIX, rule 6	
64	Order XIX, rule 7	
65	Order XIX, rule 8	
66	Order XIX, rule 9	
67	Order XIX, rule 10	
68	Order XIX, rule 11	
69	Order XIX, rule 12	
70	Order XIX, rule 13	
71	Order XIX, rule 14	
72	Order XIX, rule 15	
77 (1)	Order XX, rule 21 (1)	
77 (2)	Order XX, rule 21 (2)	
77 (3)	Order XX, rule 21 (3)	
77 (4)	Order XX, rule 21 (4)	
77 (5)	Order XX, rule 21 (5)	
83 Para. 2	Order XXI, rule 104	
89	Order XXI, rule 105	
93, Para. 1	Order XXI, rule 105	
93, Para. 2	Order XXI, rule 105	
93, Para. 3	Order XXI, rule 105	
94, Para. 3	Order XXI, rule 110	
96	Order XXI, rule 111	
97	Order XXI, rule 112	
102	Order XXI, rule 113	
110	Order XXI, rule 114	
110A	Order XXI, rule 115	
111	Form No. 43, Appendix E	
119	Form No. 16, Appendix H	
130	Form No. 11, Appendix F	
131	Form No. 12, Appendix F	
135	Order XXXI, rule 3	
Appendix 4 (1)	Order XXI, rules 116 to 130	
Form No. 4.	Form No. 20, Appendix B	

NOTE TO ORDER V, RULE 27.

[23, para. 2.] A list of heads of offices to whom summonses shall be sent for service on the servants of Railway Companies working in whole or in part in these provinces is given in appendix (2) of the General Rules (Civil) of 1911.

[See pages 6-8L]

Order 1.

(22) 31. An application for the issue of a summons for a party or a witness shall be made in the form prescribed for the purpose. No other forms shall be received by the Court.

rule 4 (f), mark such document with *serial figures* in the case of documents admitted as evidence for a plaintiff, and with *serial letters* in the case of documents admitted as evidence for a defendant, and shall *initial* every such serial number or letter. When there are two or more parties defendants, the documents of the first party defendant may be marked A1, B1, C1, &c., AA1, BB1, &c., and those of the second A2, B2, C2, &c., AA2, BB2, &c. When a number of documents of the same nature is admitted, as for example a series of receipts for rent, the whole series shall bear one figure or capital letter or letters and a small figure or small letter shall be added to distinguish each paper of the series.

Order XVI

22. (1) Save as provided in this rule and in rule 2, the court shall allow travelling and other expenses on the following scale—

- (a) In the case of witnesses of the class of cultivators, labourers, and menials, six annas a day,
 - (b) in the case of witnesses of a better class, such as zamindars, traders, pleaders, and persons of corresponding rank, from eight annas to two rupees a day, as the Court may direct; and
 - (c) in the case of witnesses of superior rank, including officers of Government in receipt of a salary of not less than Rs 200 a month, from three to five rupees a day.
- (2) If a witness demand any sum in excess of what has been paid to him, such sum shall be allowed if he satisfy the court that he has actually and necessarily incurred the additional expense.

ILLUSTRATION

A post office employé summoned to give evidence is entitled to demand from the party, on whose behalf or at whose instance he is summoned, the travelling and other expenses allowed to witnesses of the class or rank to which he belongs and in addition the sum for which he is liable as payment to the substitute officiating during his absence from duty. The sum so payable in respect of the substitute will be certified by the official superior of the witness on a slip which the witness will present to the court from which the summons issued.

(3) If a witness be detained for a longer period than one day the expenses of his detention shall be allowed at such rate, not usually exceeding that payable under clause (f) of this rule, as may seem to the court to be reasonable and proper.

Provided that the court may, for reasons stated in writing, allow expenses on a higher scale than that hereinbefore prescribed.

Order XIX

4. Affidavits shall be entitled In the court of _____ at _____ (naming such court). If the affidavit be in support of, or in opposition to, an application respecting any case in the court, it shall also be entitled in such case. If there be no such case it shall be entitled *In the matter of the petition of*

5. Affidavits shall be divided into paragraphs and every paragraph shall be numbered consecutively and, as nearly as may be, shall be confined to a distinct portion of the subject.

6. Every person making any affidavit shall be described therein in such manner as shall serve to identify him clearly, and where necessary for this purpose, it shall contain the full name, the name of his father, of his caste or religious persuasion, his rank or degree in life, his profession, calling, occupation or trade, and the true place of his residence.

knowledge, he must do so directly and positively, using the words "I affirm" or make oath and say."

[ss] 9. Except in interlocutory proceedings, affidavits shall strictly be confined to facts as the declarant is able of his own knowledge to prove. In interlocutory proceedings

person or persons from whom he received such information. When the application for the opposition thereto rests on facts disclosed in documents or copies of documents produced from any court of justice or other source, the declarant shall state what is the source from which they were produced, and his information and belief as to the truth of the facts disclosed in such documents.

(97) 10. When any place is referred to in an affidavit, it shall be correctly described. When in an affidavit any person is referred to, such person, the correct name and address of such person, and such further description as may be sufficient for the purpose of the identification of such person, shall be given in the affidavit.

[53] 11. Every person making an affidavit for use in a civil court shall, if not personally known to the person before whom the affidavit is made, be identified to that person by

in manner already specified and unless such petition or affidavit be accompanied by an affidavit of identification of such woman made at the time by the person who identified her

her _____ and any other interest or claim to be made shall, before the

711 14 The person before whom an affidavit is made, or a sworn place when

7a]

Order 11

77(11) a court of
by decree or
not to be
and
late
the
for
rec

or order is at variance with the judgment or contains some clerical or arithmetical error. Such objection shall state clearly what is the error, defect, or variance alleged, and shall be signed and dated by the person making it.

(2) If any such objection be filed on or before the date specified in the notice, the Munsarim shall enter the case in the earliest weekly list practicable, and shall, on the date fixed, put up the objection together with the record before the Judge who pronounced the judgment, or, if such Judge has ceased to be the Judge of the court, before the Judge then presiding. [77(2)]

(3) If no objection has been filed on or before the date specified in the notice, or if an objection has been filed and disallowed, the Munsarim shall date the decree as of the day on which the judgment was pronounced and shall lay it before the Judge for signature in accordance with the provisions of rules 7 and 8. [77(3)]

(4) If an objection has been duly filed and has been allowed, the correction or alteration directed by the Judge shall be made. Every such correction or alteration in the judgment shall be made by the Judge in his own handwriting. A decree amended in accordance with the correction or alteration directed by the Judge shall be drawn up, and the Munsarim shall date the decree as of the day on which the judgment was pronounced and shall lay it before the Judge for signature in accordance with the provisions of rules 7 and 8. [77(4)]

(5) When the Judge signs the decree he shall make an autograph note stating the date on which the decree was signed. [77(5)]

Order XXI

101. When the certificate prescribed by section 41 is received by the court which sent the decree for execution, it shall cause the necessary details as to the result of execution to be entered in its register of civil suits before the papers are transmitted to the record room. [32, para 2]

105. Every attachment of moveable property under rule 43, of Negotiable Instruments under rule 51, and of immoveable property under rule 54, shall be made through a Civil Court Amra, or bailiff unless special reasons render it necessary that any other agency should be employed, in which case those reasons shall be stated in the hand writing of the presiding Judge himself in the order for attachment. [33]

106. When the property which it is sought to bring to sale is immoveable property within the definition of the same contained in the law for the time being in force relating to the registration of documents, and the decree is not sent to the Collector for execution under section 68, the court, before ordering a sale shall call upon the Sub Registrar within whose sub-district such property is situate to search his registers and report as to what encumbrances, if any, it appears from the registers to be liable. [33 para 1]

*107. Where an application is made for the sale of land or of any interest in land, the court shall before ordering sale thereof, call upon the parties to state whether such land is or is not ancestral land within the meaning of Notification No. 1887/I—238-10, dated 7th October, 1911, of the Local Government, and shall fix a date for determining the said question.

On the day so fixed, or on any date to which the enquiry may have been adjourned, the court may take such evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, as it may deem necessary, and may also call for a report from the Collector of the district as to whether such land or any portion thereof is ancestral land.

After considering the evidence and the report, if any, the court shall determine whether such land, or any, and what part of it, is ancestral land.

The result of the enquiry shall be noted in an order made for the purpose by the presiding Judge in his own handwriting.

108. When the property which it is sought to bring to sale is revenue paying or revenue free land or any interest in such land, and the decree is not sent to the Collector for execution under section 69, the Court, before ordering a sale, shall also call upon the Collector in whose district such property is situate to report whether the property is subject to any (and, if so, to what) outstanding claims on the part of Government. [32, para 2]

[103 para 1] 109. The reports of the Sub Registrar and Collector shall be open to the inspection of the parties or their pleaders, free of charge between the time of the receipt by the court and the declaration of the result of the enquiry

No fees are payable in respect of search and report by the Sub Registrar and Collector

[104 para 2] 110 The result of the enquiry under rule 66 shall be noted in an order made for the purpose by the presiding Judge in his own handwriting The court may in its discretion adjourn the inquiry, provided that the reasons for the adjournment are stated in writing, and that no more adjournments are made than are necessary for the purposes of the inquiry

[105] 111 If after proclamation of the intended sale has been made any matter is brought to the notice of the court which it considers material for purchasers to know the court shall cause the same to be notified to intending purchasers when the property is put up for sale

[107] 112 first instance
execution
they shall either wholly or in part be omitted therefrom

[108] 113 When permission has been given to a decree holder to bid for property the court ordering the sale shall inform the officer appointed to conduct the sale whether there are any persons in addition to the decree holder entitled to share in the sale proceeds

[110] 114 Whenever any civil court has sold in execution of a decree or other order any house or other building situated within the limits of a Military Cantonment or station the Officer of the place shall contain full particulars of the property sold and of the sale in a book to be kept by the purchaser

[110A] 115 Whenever any civil court has sold in execution of a decree or other order any land or other property in respect of which licences have to be taken

Arms Act

[Appendix A
(1)]

as to the attachment of live stock or other

[Appendix A
(1)]

debtor on his furnishing security, or in the case of a person willing to undertake the responsibility of its custody and to produce it as required by the court

[Appendix A
(1)]

pound k

(a)
(b)
(c)

animals

they were committed to his custody
his subordinate by whom they were com

mitted to his custody, and shall give such attaching officer or subordinate a copy of the entry

[Appendix A
(1)]

119 For every animal committed to the custody of the pound keeper as aforesaid

And the sums so levied shall be sent to the Treasury for credit to the Municipal or District Board, as the case may be, under whose jurisdiction the pound is. All such sums shall be applied in the same manner as fines levied under section 12 of the said Cattle Trespass Act.

120. The pound keeper shall take charge of, feed and water, animals attached and committed as aforesaid until they are withdrawn from his custody as hereinafter provided and he shall be entitled to be paid for their maintenance at such rates as may be, from time to time, prescribed under proper authority. Such rates shall, for animals specified in the section mentioned in the last preceding rule, not exceed the rates for the In any case, for special reasons to be ment to be made for maintenance at

121. The charges herein authorised for the maintenance of live stock shall be paid to the pound keeper by the attaching officer for the first fifteen days at the time the animals are committed to his custody, and hereafter for such further period as the court may direct, at the commencement of such period. Payments for such maintenance so made in excess of the sum due for the number of days during which the animals may be in the custody of the pound keeper shall be refunded by him to the attaching officer.

rule 118

123. For the safe custody of moveable property other than live stock while under attachment, the attaching officer shall, subject to approval by the court, make such arrangements as may be most convenient and economical.

124. With the permission of the court the attaching officer may place one or more persons in special charge of such property.

125. The fee for the services of each such person shall be payable in the manner prescribed in rule 116. It shall not be less than two annas, and shall ordinarily not be more than three and a half annas per diem. The court may at its discretion allow a higher fee, but if it do so, it shall state in writing its reasons for allowing an exceptional rate.

presiding Judge

Provided that, where the amount does not exceed Rs 5, it may be paid to the Sahib by money order on requisition by the Amin, and the presentation of the certificate may be dispensed with.

127. When in consequence of an order of attachment being withdrawn or for some other reason, the person has not been employed or has remained in charge of the property for a shorter time than that for which payment has been made in respect of his services, the fee paid shall be refunded in whole or in part, as the case may be.

128. Fees paid into court under the foregoing rules shall be entered in the Register of Petty Receipts and Repayments.

129. When any sum levied under rule 119 is remitted to the treasury, it shall be accompanied by an order in triplicate (in the form given as form 9 of the Municipal Account Code), of which one part will be forwarded by the Treasury Officials to the District or Municipal Board, as the case may be. A note that the same has been paid into the Treasury as rent for the use of the pound, will be recorded on the extract from the pass book.

130. The cost of preparing attached property for sale, or of conveying it to the place where it is to be kept or sold, shall be payable by the decree holder to the attaching officer. In the event of the decree holder failing to provide the necessary funds, the

APPENDIX E

No 13.

The security to be furnished under section 55 (4) shall be, as nearly as may be, by a bond in the following form —

In the Court of _____ at _____
Sut No _____ of 19____
against _____
A B. of _____ Plaintiff,
C D of _____ Defendant

WHEREAS in execution of the decree in the suit aforesaid _____ arrested under a warrant and brought before _____

_____ as sufficient security in the _____
_____ appear when called upon, and that he will within _____
_____ apply under section 5 of Act No III of 1907, to be declared _____
an insolvent, Therefore I, E. F., inhabitant of _____

_____ have voluntarily become security, and do hereby bind myself, my heirs and _____
executors to _____ as Judge of the said court and his successors _____
in office that the said C. D will appear at any time when called upon by the said court, _____
and will apply in the manner and within the time herebefore set forth, and in default _____
of such appearance or of such application, I bind myself, my heirs and executors, to _____
pay to the said court, on its order, the sum of Rs _____

Witness my hand at _____ this _____ day of _____ 19____
(sd) E. F.
Surety

Witnesses :

APPENDIX F

No 11

The security to be furnished under Order XXXVIII, rule 9, shall be, as nearly as may be, by a bond in the following form —

In the Court of _____ at _____
Sut No _____ of 19____
Plaintiff,
Defendant

Amount of suit, Rupees _____

WHEREAS in the suit above specified the plaintiff _____ aforesaid, has applied _____
to the said court that the said defendant, _____, may be called on to furnish sufficient _____
security to fulfil any decree that may be passed against him in the said suit, or that on _____
his failure so to do, certain property of the said defendant, _____, may be attached,

And whereas, on the failure of the said defendant, _____, to furnish such _____
security, or, show cause why it should not be furnished, the property aforesaid of the _____
said defendant, _____, has been attached by order of the said court

Therefore "I _____, inhabitant of _____, have voluntarily become _____
security and hereby bind myself my heirs and executors, to _____ as Judge _____
of the said court, and his successors in office, that the said defendant, _____, shall _____
produce and place at the disposal of the said court, when required, the property herein _____
below specified namely (here give description of property or refer to an annexed schedule), _____
or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to fulfil such decree _____
and shall when required pay the costs of the attachment, and in default of his so doing _____
I bind myself, my heirs and executors, to pay to _____ as Judge of the said court _____
and his successors in office on its order, such sum to the extent of rupees (here enter _____

and the costs of the attachment) as the
 day of 19
 (Signed)
 Witnesses Surety

No. 12

[131] The security to be furnished under Order XXXIX, rule 2 (2), shall be, as far as may be, by a bond in the following form —

In the Court of at
 Suit No. of 19
 Plaintiff,
 Defendant

and required security now and
 voluntarily become security

contract, or relating to the same property or right), and in evidence whereof I bind myself, my heirs and executors to pay into court, on the order of the court, such sum to the extent of rupees , as the court shall adjudge against the said defendant

Witness my hand at this day of 19
 (Signed)
 Witnesses Surety

APPENDIX H

No. 4

Notice to show cause (General Form)

IN THE COURT OF
 AT DISTRICT

Civil Suit No. of 19
 Miscellaneous No. of 19
 resident of
 resident of

10 Whereas the above named
 application to this court that
 to appear in this court in person or by a pleader duly instructed on the day
 of the forenoon, to show cause against the
 appl. and

judge

APPENDIX F

PUNJAB.

ANNULMENTS, ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT, PUNJAB

The Punjab Government's Orders, etc.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure corrected up to December, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of the Punjab Gazette
Rules under Section 128 (b) of the Code (Act V of 1908) for the maintenance and custody of live stock, etc.	No. 5 G. Date, 1 1 09 No 2212 G Date, 12 6 09	1909, Part III, p 1 1909, Part III, p 571.
Extension of the Code (Act V of 1908) to the Scheduled districts in the Punjab	No 1 A Date, 1 1 09	1909, Part I, p. 12
Cancelling 11 former Notifications under the Codes of 1877 and 1882	No 1 B Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Appointment with reference to Section 2 (7) of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 1 C Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Rules under Section 70 (1) (c) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to appeals from certain orders	No. 1 D Date 1 1 09	Ditto
Sanctioning exercise of powers under Section 93 of the Code (Act V of 1901)	No 1 E Date, 1 1 09	1909, Part I, p. 13
Exempting personal appearance in Court under Section 133 of the Code (Act V of 1901)	No 1 F Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Empowering District Judges to appoint Commissioners to take affidavits, vide Section 139 (c) of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 1 G Date, 1. 1 09	Ditto
Under O XXVII, * r 2, authorising persons to act for Government	No 1 H Date, 1 1 09	Ditto.

* In the Gazette it is O XXVI which is apparently wrong

CHIEF COURT, PUNJAB.

THE PUNJAB GAZETTE,

1909 PART III, p 2

Notification No 6 G, dated 1 1 09.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of Act X, 1897, the General Clauses Act, the following draft rules made under section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the Hon'ble the Chief Court of the Punjab to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of the civil courts subject to its superintendence, are published for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby. Notice is hereby given that the draft rules will be taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Judges of the Chief Court on or after the 31st day of January, 1909. Any objections or suggestions which may be made to the draft rules should reach the Registrar of the Chief Court by that date.

After rule 7 of Order II, insert:—

" 8 (1) Where an objection, duly taken, has been allowed by the Court, the plaintiff shall be permitted to select the cause of action with which he will proceed and shall, within a time to be fixed by the Court, amend the plaint by striking out the remaining causes of action.

(2) When the plaintiff has selected the cause of action with which he will proceed, the Court shall pass an order giving him time within which to submit amended plaint for the remaining causes of action and for making up the Court-fees that may be necessary. Should the plaintiff not comply with the Court's order the Court shall proceed as provided in rule 18 of Order VI and as required by the provisions of the Court-fees Act."

To rule 10 of Order V, the following proviso should be added —

" Provided that in any case if the plaintiff so wishes the Court may attempt to serve the summons in the first instances by registered post instead of in the mode of service laid down in this rule, and provided always that should the defendant not appear in answer to the summons so issued, the Court shall have service effected in accordance with the provisions of this Order."

In the second paragraph of rule 2 of Order VII, after the words "and the defendant" insert "or for moveables in the possession of the defendant, or for debts of which the value he cannot, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, estimate", after the words "the amount" insert "or value."

Order IX, rule 9 (1):—To rule 9 (1) the following proviso should be added:—

" Provided that the plaintiff should not be precluded from bringing another suit for redemption of a mortgage, although a former suit may have been dismissed for default."

Order XXI, rule 29.—After rule 29 of Order XXI the following rule should be inserted:—

" 29A. When a suit under rule 63 of this Order is pending, the Court in which such suit is filed may, if it considers that execution of the former decree should be stayed, intimate the fact to the executing court, which shall thereupon stay execution until the suit is decided."

In Order XXI, rule 75, after the word "stored" shall be added the words "or can be sold to greater advantage in an unripe state, such as green wheat or gram."

Order XXX, rule 1.—To rule I of Order XXX the following explanation shall be added —

Explanation —" This rule applies to a joint Hindu family trading partnership."

Order XXXII, rule 1.—To rule 1 the following paragraph shall be added:—

" Such person may be ordered to pay any costs in the suit as if he were the plaintiff."

* Amended and confirmed by Notification No 2212 G, dated 12 5 09

* In the Gazette it is 65 That is apparently wrong

APPENDIX F

PUNJAB

ANNULMENTS, ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT, PUNJAB

The Punjab Government's Orders, etc

Under the Code of Civil Procedure corrected up to December, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of the Punjab Gazette
Rules under Section 123 (b) of the Code (Act V of 1908) for the maintenances and custody of live stock, etc	No. 5 G. Date, 1 1 09 No 2212 G Date 12 5 09	1909, Part III, p 1 1909, Part III, p 571
Extension of the Code (Act V of 1908) to the Scheduled districts in the Punjab	No 1 A Date, 1 1 09	1909, Part I, p 12
Cancelling 11 former Notifications under the Codes of 1877 and 1882	No. 1 B Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Appointment with reference to Section 2 (7) of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 1 C Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Rules under Section 70 (1) (c) of the Code (Act V of 1908) as to appeals from certain orders	No 1 D Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Sanctioning exercise of powers under Section 93 of the Code (Act V of 1901)	No 1 E Date, 1 1 09	1909, Part I, p 13
Exempting personal appearance in Court under Section 133 of the Code (Act V of 1901)	No 1 F Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Empowering District Judges to appoint Commissioners to take affidavits vide Section 139 (c) of the Code (Act V of 1908)	No 1 G Date, 1 1 09	Ditto
Under O XXVII,* r 2, authorising persons to act for Government	No 1 H Date 1 1 09	Ditto

* In the Gazette it is O XXVI which is apparently wrong

APPENDIX G.

BURMA

ANNULMENTS ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST
SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGHER COURT BURMA

Burma Government Notification, etc.,

Under the Code of Civil Procedure corrected up to December 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of Burma Gazette Part I
Cancellation of notification issued under the old Code	No 31 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p. 163.
Under Section 2 (7) of the Code (Act V of 1908) appointment of Officers to perform functions imposed on the Government pleader under O XXIII, rr 6 and 9 of the said Code	No 32 Date 23 2 1910	Ditto
Under Section 55 (1) of the said Code for the detention of persons ordered to be detained by Court	No 33 Date, 23 2 1910 No 43 Date 6 3 1912	Ditto 1912, p. 155
Under Section 55 (2) of the said Code directing notice to be given before arrest of certain employees	No 60 Date, 29 4 1910 No 14 Date, 17 1 1912 No 94 Date, 12 6 1913.	1910, p. 347 1912, p. 21 1913 p. 357
Under Section 57 of the said Code fixing scale of subsistence allowance	No 35 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p. 166
Under Section 61 of the said Code declaring partial exemption of certain agricultural produce from attachment or sale in execution	No 116 Date, 4 8 1913	1913, p. 485
Under Section 93 of the said Code appointing Government Advocate to exercise Advocate General's powers under Section 91 and 92 of the said Code	No 36 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p. 166
Exemption from personal appearance in Court under Section 133 (1) of the said Code	No 37 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p. 166

1st Schedule, Order V, rule 18, form 11.—For the 3rd and 4th parts of (3) in the form read:—

(3) The said and his house in which he ordinarily resides being
personally known to me
related out to me by

I went to said house in and there on the day of 19
 at o'clock in the ^{fore}noon, I did not find the said

I enquired from } neighbours
{(a)
{(b)

I was told that had gone to and would not be
 back till

(Signature of process server)

By order, &c ,

A L. DANSON,

Registrar

THE PUNJAB GAZETTE,

1909, PART III, p 571

Notification No. 6012 G, dated 12.5.09:—

edure, 1908, and
 in 1909 1908

AMENDMENT

In notification No 6 G, dated the 1st of January, 1909, for "In Order XX, rule 75 (2), etc," read "In Order XXI, rule 75, etc"

By order, &c ,

A L. DANSON

Registrar.

APPENDIX G.

BURMA

ANNULMENTS, ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE RULES IN THE FIRST SCHEDULE OF THE CODE MADE BY THE HIGH COURT, BURMA

Burma Government Notification, etc.,

Under the Code of Civil Procedure corrected up to December, 1914

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of Burma Gazette Part I
Cancellation of notification issued under the old Code	No 31 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p 163
Under Section 2 (7) of the Code (Act V of 1908) appointment of Officers to perform functions imposed on the Government pleader under O XXXIII, rr 6 and 9 of the said Code.	No 32 Date, 23 2 1910	Ditto
Under Section 55 (1) of the said Code for the detention of persons ordered to be detained by Court	No 33 Date, 23 2 1910 No 43 Date, 6 3 1912	Ditto 1912, p 155
Under Section 55 (2) of the said Code directing notice to be given before arrest of certain employees	No 60 Date, 20 4 1910 No 14 Date, 17 1 1912 No 94 Date, 12 6 1913	1910, p 347 1912, p 24 1913, p 357
Under Section 57 of the said Code fixing scale of subsistence allowance	No 35 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p 166
Under Section 61 of the said Code declaring partial exemption of certain agricultural produce from attachment or sale in execution	No 116 Date, 4 8 1913	1913, p 485
Under Section 93 of the said Code appointing Government Advocate to exercise Advocate General's powers under Section 91 and 92 of the said Code	No 36 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p 166
Exemption from personal appearance in Court under Section 133 (1) of the said Code	No 37 Date, 23 2 1910	1910 p 166

Subject	Number and date	Year and page of Burma Gazette, Part I
Under Section 137 (2) of the said Code declaring what the language of certain Courts shall be	No 38 Date, 23 2 1910 No 128 Date, 15 8 1910	Ditto. 1910, p 764
Under Section 138 (1) of the said Code directing in what cases evidence shall be taken down with the Judge's own hand in the English language	No 39 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p. 166
With reference to Section 139 (c) of the said Code empowering District Courts to appoint Commissioners to take affidavits	No 40 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p 166
Directions under O XXI, r 48 (1) of the said Code as to service of notices of order attaching the salary or allowances of certain officers	No 77 Date, 10 6 11	1911, p 394.
Rules under O XXVI, r 9 (prov) of the said Code as to the persons to whom commissions shall be issued	No 38 Date, 17. 3 1913	1913, p. 148
With reference to O XXVII, rr 1 and 4, of the said Code appointing the Government Advocate to be the recognized agent of the Government for certain purposes	No 41 Date, 23 2 1910	1910, p 166

THE BURMA GAZETTE,

March 10th, 1910, PART IV, p 291

The 15th March, 1910

No 3 (General) —Under the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the previous sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court of Lower Burma directs that the following alterations shall be made in the First Schedule Appendices E and F —

(1) In the heading of Form No. 5 of Appendix E, for the words and figures "Order 21, Rule 6, the word and figures "section 41" shall be substituted

(2) In Appendix F the last two forms shall be numbered respectively 9 and 10 instead of 6 and 7

R. C. S. KRISHA,
Registrar

Dated Rangoon, the 17th March, 1910

No 4 (General) —In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court of Lower Burma directs that for sub-rule 1 of Rule 18, Order XXVI, First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the following shall be substituted:—

When a commission is issued under this order, the parties to the suit shall appear before the Commissioner in person or by the agents or pleaders, unless otherwise directed by the Court, within fifteen days.

The 30th March 1910

No 7 (General).—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court of Lower Burma directs that for Rule 13, Order XXI, first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the following shall be substituted:—

(1) When application is made for execution of a decree relating to immovable property included within the Cadastral or Town survey and the decree does not contain a plan of the property, or for execution of decree by the attachment and sale of such property, the application must be accompanied by a certified extract from the latest *Kuia* or town map, with the boundary of the land in question marked with a distinctive colour. The particulars specified in the annexed instructions, which have been issued regarding the filling up of forms of process concerning immovable property, must also be furnished so far as they are not given in the plan. In the case of other immovable property a plan is not required, but such of the particulars in the annexed instructions as can be given must be supplied:—

1 If the property to be sold is agricultural land which has been cadastrally surveyed and of which survey maps exist, the area, *Kuia* number, latest holding number (if different kinds of holding, e.g. rice land and garden holdings are numbered in different series, the kind of holding must be stated), field numbers (if the property does not coincide with one complete holding, year of *Kuia* map from which the holding number is taken), and revenue last assessed upon the land, must be given.

2 In the case of other agricultural land, the area and village tract within which it falls, distance and direction from nearest town or village and boundaries should be specified.

3 In the case of land in large towns the area, block or quarter name or number, the lot number (if there are separate series of lots, the series should be stated, and where the land forms part only of a lot, particulars regarding that part), the holding number in the latest town survey map, if any, and year of the map the rent or revenue last assessed on the land, must be given.

4 In the case of buildings situated in a large town when the land on which such buildings stand is not affected, the name or number of the street, or, if the street has neither name nor number, the quarter or block name or number, the number of the

7 The judgment debtor's share or interest in the property should be specified

(2) The cost of the certified extract shall be reckoned in the costs of the application

R. C. S. KRISHN,
Registrar

THE BURMA GAZETTE.

July 16th, 1910, PART IV, P 769

The 12th July, 1910

W. B. BRANDER,
Offg Registrar

may

be numbered consecutively and, as nearly as

tion is made, making an

a suit in which the applica

identify him clearly, that is to say, by the name

a manner as will serve to

father, his profession or trade, and the place of his residence

'8 When the declarant in any affidavit speaks to any fact within his own know ledge, he must do so directly and positively, using the words 'I affirm' (or 'Make oath') 'and say'

'9 When the particular fact is not within the declarant's own knowledge, but is stated from information obtained from others, the declarant must use the expression,

'I am informed' (and if such be the case, should add) 'and verily believe it to be true,' or he may state the source from which he received such information. When the state ment rests on fact disclosed in documents or copies of documents procured from any Court of Justice or other source, the deponent shall state what is the source from which they were procured and his information or belief as to the truth of the facts disclosed in such documents

'10 Every person making an affidavit, if not personally known to the Com missioner, shall be identified to the Commissioner by some person known to him, and the Commissioner shall specify at the foot of the petition, or of the affidavit (as the case may be) 'a name and description of him by whom the identification is made, as well

seemed perfectly to understand the same at the time of making the same. If an interpreter is employed the Commissioner shall state in his certificate the name of the interpreter, and the fact that he was sworn to interpret truly

'12 In administering oaths and affirmations to declarants the Commissioner shall be g

and 23

in a district in which there is a Land Records establishment and become final, or if the the same is appeal has become final and the

in which the land is situate

sent to the Sub Registrar within whose sub-district the land is situate

22 The certificate shall be in Form (Civil) 96, and shall be signed by the presiding officer of the Court

Land Records and Sub

ix months of the
ourt which passed
section 31

the Court
, and shall

than one
f he were
ee holder
released

shall, however, pay the full amount due

the balance shall be divided ratably among the decree holders and paid to them.

In Order XXI, the following shall be inserted as Rules 45A, 45B, 46A, and 57A respectively—

[45A and 45B substituted by Notification No 11 (General) of 1-10-12 (see p 141, post.)]

"46A When a debt alleged to be due by a third party to a judgment debtor has been attached under Rule 46 and has not been paid into Court under sub rule (3) of that rule, the Court may, on the application of the decree holder issue a notice to such third party in Form Civil 74. A copy of such notice shall also, if possible, be served on the judgment-debtor. When at the hearing of such notice the third party shows no cause, and admits the debt to be due the Court may intimate to him that he should pay into Court the amount admitted by him to be due, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree and that if he fails to do so, he may be subjected to a suit.

"57A A judgment debtor may secure release of his attached property by giving security to the value thereof to the Court.

In Order XXI the following shall be substituted for Rule 65.—

'63 (1) Sales shall be conducted by the Bailiff or Deputy Bailiff, but the duty may be entrusted to a process server when the property is moveable property not exceeding Rs 50 in value, and when in the opinion of the Court, for reasons recorded in the diary of the process, the Bailiff or Deputy Bailiff cannot personally conduct the sale.

"(2) Subject to the terms of the proviso to Rule 43 and of Rule 74, some one day in each week shall be set apart and regularly observed for holding sales in execution of decree, and some well known place in the vicinity of the Court house or the public bazaar shall be selected for the purpose.

"(3) Subject as aforesaid, and unless the Court is of opinion that for any special reason a sale on the spot where the property is attached or situated will be more beneficial to the judgment debtor, all property, whether moveable or immoveable, attached in

of sale, and paid to the officer conducting the sale under the orders of the Court as his authorized commission—

When the proceeds of sale do not exceed Rs.500—5 per cent

Where they exceed Rs 500 and do not exceed Rs 5000—5 per cent on the first Rs 500 and 2 per cent on the remainder

Where they exceed Rs 5000—at the above rate on the first Rs 5000 and one per cent on the remainder

[The 14th March, 1914]

No 3 (General)—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court of Lower Burma directs that the following addition shall be made to Rule 65 of Order XXI of the First Schedule—

The following shall be added to sub rule 4—

"The calculation of the commission shall be on the whole amount realized in pursuance of one application for execution."

'(5) Subject to the provisions of sub rule (13) of Rule 45B, no further sum beyond this authorized commission and the cost of conveyance of property to the place of

(7) No officer of a subordinate Court shall receive any larger commission or fee in respect of any sale of property (mortgaged or otherwise) held in execution or pursuance of any decree or order of the Court directing or authorizing such sale than that allowed by sub rule (4) above

"(8) The gross proceeds of sales shall be entered in Register II and in Bailiff's Register I and shall be paid into the Treasury."

In Order XXI the following shall be inserted as Rule 81A and added as Rule 104

to be taken
by the
the
en
ed
by

C XXXI

FEES TO COMMISSIONERS FOR LOCAL INVESTIGATION, AND COMMISSIONERS OF PARTITION OR TO TAKE ACCOUNTS, OR FOR THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

added by Notification of 10 11 11 Civil Courts
to
or

the Home Department (Judicial
prohibited from accepting
other provinces
execution of a com
nt The execution
to perform when

nce, which If charges have been
issuing the commission
red to Commissioners of partition or to take
uses, namely —
a meeting shall not exceed three gold mohurs
a no hour

FEES TO COMMISSIONERS FOR ADMINISTERING OATH OR AFFIRMATION
TO A DECLARANT OF AN AFFIDAVIT

AFFIRMATION
of a Divisional
on a declarant
all be 1 and by

or of solemn affirmation elsewhere than in
the Court by order in writing,
en at the same time and place, the fee shall
the first,
ling any number of affidavits at the same

- (c) in no case shall
time and place exceed Rs 50.
(d) in pauper suits and appeals, when the affidavit of a pauper is taken, no fee
do 24 shall be taken out of Court hours The fees
r for administering the oath or solemn affirmation

"26. No fee shall be charged for the administration of an oath under the order of any Court other than those specified in Rule 21."

In Order XXXVII, Rule 2, the following shall be inserted as sub-rule (1A) :—

"(1A). The sum which shall ordinarily be entered in the form of summons as the sum which the plaintiff will be allowed for costs in the decree, shall be ascertained and fixed by adding up the amounts of the following—

Court fees on plaint and petitions—the full value of the stamps necessary

Process fees—the full value of the stamps necessary.

Advocate's or pleader's fee (where an advocate or pleader has presented the plaint)—

" —Rs. 17

the following shall be inserted after the word

"or of his applying for such leave within ten days from the service of the summons on him and on proof that the summons was duly served on him more than ten days before."

To Order XII, Rule 1, the following shall be added as sub-rule (3) :—

real, as many

"FORM 15A.

Form of Certificate of the Payment of Fees for the Custody of Attached Property.

IN THE COURT OF

Civil Case No. of 19 .

TO THE BAILIFF.

Reference: The warrant of attachment of in the possession
of issued for execution on the at

10 .

Certified that a further sum of Rs. has been paid in stamps for custody fees under Rule 2, Article 3 (b), of the Process fee rules in respect of the above mentioned attachment.

Date 1

Court Clerk "

THE BURMA GAZETTE,

DECEMBER 3RD, 1910, PART IV, PP. 1250-1251.

The 25th November, 1910

No. 22 (General) —In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief

decree either—

(a) declaring the amount due to the plaintiff for principal and interest on the mortgage at the date of the decree and for his costs of the suit (if any) awarded to him, or

(b) ordering that an account be taken of what will be due to the plaintiff for principal and interest on the mortgage on a day within three months of the date of such decree to be fixed by the Court, and for his costs of the suit as aforesaid,

and directing—

(c) that if the defendant pays into Court the amount declared by the decree to be due or the amount found due on the account ordered on or before a date

six months from the date of the decree, or, in the case of an account being ordered, six months from the date of declaring in Court the amount found due, together with interest on the amounts payable at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the decree, or from the date up to which the account has been taken, until payment, the plaintiff shall deliver up to the defendant or to such person as he appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall, if so required by the defendant, re-transfer to him, free from mortgage and from all incumbrances created by the plaintiff or any person claiming under him, or, where the plaintiff claims by derived title, by those under whom he claims, and shall also, if necessary, put the defendant in possession of the property, but

- (d) that, if payment of such amounts is not made on or before the day fixed for payment, the defendant shall be debarred from all right to redeem the property

decree, either—

- (a) declaring the amount due to the defendant for principal and interest on the mortgage at the date of the decree, and for his costs of the suit (if any) awarded to him, or
 (b) ordering that an account be taken of what will be due to the defendant for principal and interest on the mortgage on a day within three months of the date of such decree to be fixed by the Court, and for his costs of the suit as aforesaid, and directing—
 (c) that if the plaintiff pays into Court the amount declared by the decree to be due, or the amount found due on the account ordered, on or before a

6 per cent per annum from the date of the decree, or, in the case of an account being ordered, six months from the date of declaring in Court the amount found due, until payment, the defendant shall

(d)

property.

- (5) The words "for payment" shall be inserted after the word "fixed" in Rule 8 (1).

THE BURMA GAZETTE

PART IV

1911 August, 1911

of the First Schedule.—

In Rule 66 the following shall be added at the end of sub rule (2)

Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in the case of movable property not exceeding Rs 250 in value

The 19th August, 1911.

No. 15 (General).—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court of Lower Burma directs that the following alterations shall be made to Order V of the First Schedule.—

the Court shall either take down the deposition of the peon serving the summons as to the time when, and the manner in which the summons was served; or cause the peon to make an affidavit before the Baidiff if the Baidiff has been empowered to administer oaths; and shall transmit the same, together with the summons, to the Court whence the summons originally issued

(2) In the case of process received from India and Upper Burma if the person on whom the summons is to be served is not personally known to the process server an affidavit or deposition by the person who pointed out to the process server the said person or his ordinary residence or place of business shall also be attached to the summons.

(3) When a process is forwarded for service by one Court in Lower Burma to another Court in Lower Burma and when the person on whom the process is to be served is not personally known to the process server the case, in connection with which the process was issued, shall not be heard *ex parte* without an affidavit or deposition of some person who pointed out to the process server the person to be served or his ordinary residence.

The onus shall be upon the person at whose instance the summons is issued, either himself or by an agent, to point out to the process server the person on whom the process is to be served or his ordinary residence or place of business

(4) When the summons has been returned by the process server under Rule 17, a declaration of due service or of failure to serve shall be recorded in Form (Civil) 46, and sent with the summons to the Court by which it was issued.

The 4th April, 1912

No. 16 (General).—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code of

tion of the property, but

and
above.

The following shall be substituted for sub-rule (1) of Rule 3: Where the defendant pays into Court the amount declared due as aforesaid, within the said period,

THE BURMA GAZETTE,

OCTOBER 19TH, 1912, PART IV, P. 1121

The 15th October 1912

No. 11 (General) —In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court of Lower Burma directs that the following alterations shall be made in Order XXI and in Appendix E of the First Schedule of the said Code —

For Rule 45A substitute the following :—

“45A (1) Before issuing a warrant for the attachment of moveable property which

the process server to whom it is issued for execution. If a temporary peon is employed for the custody of the attached property, the process server shall state in his report of the attachment the name of the temporary peon employed and the date from which his duties commenced

If the further fees required are not paid, the attachment shall cease as soon as the period for which fees have already been paid expires. In such a case the amount paid prior to the cessation of the attachment shall not be allowed to the attaching decree holder as costs.

(4) The payment of fees under sub-rule (1) shall be made in cash to the Bailiff and

(5) Temporary peons employed for the custody of attached property shall be

of Law “—“Court Fees realized in cash”)

(6) The remuneration of temporary peons employed to take charge of attached

Treasury as if it were a repayment of deposit and shall then disburse the amount due to

together with such subsequent costs as are mentioned in Rule 10, the Court shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering the plaintiff to deliver up the documents which under the terms of the preliminary decree he is bound to deliver up, and, if so required,—

(b) ordering him to re-transfer the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree, and, also, if necessary,—

except that instead of the direction contained in clause B thereof, there shall be the following direction,—

That if such payment is not made within the said period the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold and the proceeds of the sale (after defraying thereout the expenses of the sale) be paid into Court and applied in payment of what is due to the plaintiff as aforesaid together with subsequent interest on the said amount at the

period together with such subsequent costs as are mentioned in Rule 10 the Court shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering the plaintiff to deliver up the documents which under the terms of the preliminary decree he is bound to deliver up, and, if so required,—

(b) ordering him to re-transfer the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree, and, also, if necessary,—

of the property, but
(B) that if such payment is not made

amount due to the defendant on the

period together with such subsequent costs as are mentioned in Rule 10 the Court shall pass a decree—

(a) ordering the defendant to deliver up the documents which under the terms of the preliminary decree he is bound to deliver up,

THE BURMA GAZETTE,

OCTOBER 19TH, 1912, PART IV, P. 1121

The 15th October, 1912

No. 11 (General).—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 122 of the Code

(2) In sending the warrant for execution to the Bailiff the Court Clerk shall certify at the foot of the warrant that the receipt granted by the Bailiff for the necessary fees has been filed in the record, the Bailiff shall then endorse on the warrant the name of the process server to whom it is issued for execution. If a temporary peon is employed for the custody of the attached property, the process server shall state in his report of the attachment the name of the temporary peon employed and the date from which his duties commenced.

attachment after that date unless further fees are paid before that date. The payment of any such further amount shall immediately be certified to the Court Clerk by the Bailiff in Form 15A of Appendix E.

If the further fees required are not paid, the attachment shall cease as soon as the period for which fees have already been paid expires. In such a case the amount paid prior to the cessation of the attachment shall not be allowed to the attaching decree-holder as costs.

(4) The payment of fees under sub rule (1) shall be made in cash to the Bailiff and the amount shall be at once entered in Bailiff's Register No. 11. The Court Clerk shall on receipt of the Bailiff's acknowledgment (Form 15A) file it in the record and make an entry to that effect in the diary.

(5) Temporary peons employed for the custody of attached property shall be

peons but if the services of the former are utilized, the fees paid shall be credited direct into the Treasury to "Process servers' Fees" ("XVI-A, Law and Justice"—"Courts of Law"—"Court Fees realized in cash")

(6) The remuneration of temporary peons employed to take charge of attached property shall be paid direct by the Bailiff to them on the order of the Judge.

Before passing such order, the Judge must verify the name of the payee from the report of the attachment and must satisfy himself that the amount proposed to be paid

the peon or peons concerned, whose acknowledgment of receipt shall be taken in Bailiff's Register I

amount that is chargeable for peons including the amount of the last payment, he shall direct that the excess be refunded to the payer

is in the hands of the Bailiff that officer shall make the refund in the ordinary way prescribed in his Register II for repayments. If the amount has been credited into the Treasury, he shall prepare a bill for the amount to be refunded in the prescribed treasury form and shall lay it before the Judge for signature with the record of the case in the same way as a bill for the remuneration of temporary peons. Before signing the refund order, the Judge must satisfy himself that the amount is available for refund by examining Bailiff's Register I and the record. The bill when signed by the Judge will be given to the payee, with instructions to present it for payment at the Treasury or sub treasury.

For Rule 45B substitute the following:—

"45B (1) In addition to the fees payable before a warrant issues for the attachment of moveable property under Rule 45A, the Bailiff shall require the attaching decree holder to deposit a sum of money sufficient to cover the cost of attachment other than the pay of peons employed to take charge of it for such period as the Bailiff may think fit.

Explanation—The costs in question might be for example (a) Rent of building in which to store attached furniture (b) Cost of conveying the attached property from the place of attachment to Court or to a secure place of custody, (c) Cost of feeding and tending live stock. (1) Cost of proceeding to the place of attachment to sell perishable property.

(2) If the attaching decree holder fails to comply with the Bailiff's requisition, the

is exhausted

erty shall unless the Court otherwise
ult member of his family who may be
ty kept on his premises or elsewhere,
ody is duly provided. The option so
f the Court
e these may be employed, so far as is

personal custody of the Bailiff may

liff on his
the property
remains in the
Court make such

arrangement for its safe custody under his own supervision as may be most convenient and economical

(10) If there be a Government pound in or near the place where the Court is held, the Bailiff shall be at liberty to place in it such attached live stock as can be properly there kept, in which case the pound keeper will be responsible for the property to the Bailiff and shall receive the same rates for accommodation and maintenance thereof as are paid in respect of impounded cattle of the same description

(11) Whenever property is attached and any person other than the judgment debtor shall claim the same, or any part of it the officer shall nevertheless unless the decree holder desires to withdraw the attachment of the property so claimed, remain in possession and shall direct the claimant to prefer his claim to the Court

(12) If the decree holder shall withdraw an attachment or if it shall cease under sub rule (2) or (4) the Bailiff's officer shall inform the debtor or, in his absence an adult member of his family that the property is at his disposal

(13) If any portion of the deposit made under sub rule (1) or (4) remains unexpended it shall be refunded to the decree holder in the manner prescribed for such refunds in sub rule 9 of Rule 45A. Any difference between the cost of attachment of moveable property (other than costs referred to in Rule 45A) and the sums deposited by the

is still a deficiency, the amount shall be paid by Government

Appendix E.—For Form 15A substitute the following —

NO 15A

FORM OF CERTIFICATE OF THE PAYMENT OF FEES FOR THE CUSTODY OF ATTACHED PROPERTY

In the Court of
Civil Case No. of 19

To

The COURT CLERK

REFERENCE—The warrant of attachment of in the possession of
issued for execution on the at 19

Certified that a further sum of Rs. has been paid in cash for custody fees
under Rule 17 (1) (b) (2) of the Process Fees Rules in respect of the above mentioned
attachment

Date

Puliff

THE BURMA GAZETTE

FEBRUARY 4TH, 1911, PART IV, P. 91

The 31st January, 1911

No 2 (General) —With reference to section 128 (2) (i) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the following rules for the delegation to the Deputy Registrar of the Court of judicial, quasi judicial and non judicial duties made by the Chief Court of Lower Burma and sanctioned by the Local Government are published for general information —

The rules shall be inserted in the First Schedule to the Code as "Order LII—Delegation of judicial etc., duties.

From the date in which the rules come into force, all existing rules regulating the procedure of the Chief Court in its Original Jurisdiction to a contrary effect are, so far as they are contrary, superseded

rule, the matter shall, at the request of the applicant or his Advocate or Pleader, be referred to the Judge

(u) A Deputy Registrar may refer to the Judge any matter which he considers to be a fit and proper one to be so referred by reason of its importance or difficulty or novelty or by reason of the order to be made thereon being appealable or for any other cause —

(1) Appeal —

(2) —

(3) —

(4) —

(5) —

(6) —

(7) —

(8) —

(9) Applications for fresh summons or notice and for short date summons and notices

(10) Applications for —

(11) —

(12) —

— for want of

undefended list of causes

(13) Applications for transfer of suits from the list of contested suits to any other list

(14) —

— of parties to
devolution of any

(15) applications to amend plaint, petition, or subsequent proceedings where the amendment asked for is purely formal. All amendments whether made by order of a Judge or under this rule shall be attested by a Deputy Registrar

(16) Applications for further and better statement of particulars under Order XI, Rule 5

(17) Applications for leave to file further written statements

(18) Applications for orders for discovery and for orders concerning the admission, production or —

(19) —

(20) —

— rules 16, 22 or 37, or where notice is otherwise necessary or considered desirable

(21) Applications for order for the transmission of a decree with the prescribed certificates, etc., with power to issue notice under Order XXI, Rule 16 and Rule 22

(22) Applications for the execution of a document or for the endorsement of a negotiable instrument under Order XXI, Rule 34

(23) Applications for examination of judgment debtor as to his property under Order XXI, Rule 41

(24) Applications falling under section 52 of the Code

(25) Applications for leave under Order XXI, Rule 50, sub rule (2)

(26) Applications for the issue of proclamations of sale under Order XXI, Rule 64, and for directions as to the publication thereof under Rule 67

(27) Applications for confirmation of sale and certificate of sale to purchaser of immovable property.

- (28) Applications for possession under Order XXI Rules 83 and 96
- (29) Applications for special costs in connection with the attachment and sale of immovable property
- (30) Applications for special directions to the Bailiff as to the service or execution of any process of the Court
- (31) Applications for order for withdrawal of attachment or for return of a warrant
- (32) Applications for order for payment of money realized in execution or otherwise deposited in Court, including applications to share in assets realized under section 73 unless the case is in one of the cause lists for the day
- (33) Applications for commissions to examine witnesses under Order XXVI, Rule 1, unless the suit is in one of the lists of causes for the day and applications for *de bene esse* examination
- (34) Applications for extension of time under Order XXVII, Rule 7, or by a party in default for further time to file written statement or affidavit of documents,
-
- (36) Applications for leave to issue execution under Order XXV, Rule 9
- (37) Applications for leave to sue or defend *in forma pauperis* and investigation as to the pauperism of petitioner for leave to sue or defend a suit or to appeal as a pauper
- (38) Applications by receivers and others relating to the management and disposal of property
- (39) Applications for orders of reference to arbitration unless the suit is in one of the lists of causes for the day
-
- c
r
- officer of such Court
- (43) Applications for an order for the issue of a proceeding to another Court for the production of a record of such Court or of notice or subpoena to a public officer for the production of a public record or register
- (44) Applications for inspection or copy of a will
- (45) Applications for orders of production of prisoners and others under the Prisoners Act, 1900
- (46) All matters affecting procedure arising out of applications under the Indian Succession Act, 1865, the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, the Court fees Act, 1870, the Indian Companies Act, 1882, the Indian Trustees Act, 1866, the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act, 1866, the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 the Powers of Attorney Act, 1892, the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and generally in the matter of any Act unless otherwise provided in the Act itself or by the rules thereunder or by these rules

shall be costs in the cause

THE BURMA GAZETTE,

OCTOBER 21ST, 1911, PART IV, P. 923.

CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA.

NOTIFICATION

Dated Rangoon, the 19th October, 1911

No. 19 (GENERAL).—With reference to section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and with the sanction of the Local Government, the Chief Court, Lower Burma,

—Original Side Rules of Procedure—

The rules contained in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, so far as they are inconsistent with or contrary to the Rules herewith published and, so far as the practice and procedure of the Original Side of the Chief Court of Lower Burma only are concerned, be deemed to have been altered or superseded by the rules secondly above-mentioned

ORDER LIII

Original Side Rules of Procedure.

Preliminary

1

respondent in miscellaneous proceedings.

2 In the absence of a Deputy Registrar an Assistant Registrar shall exercise all the functions of a Deputy Registrar under these rules

3 Except upon close holidays the offices of the Court shall be open to the public for business from 10 30 a m until 4 30 p m on all week days except Saturdays, and on Saturdays from 10 30 a m until 2 p m

Institution of Proceedings

and each

date

verif

him by an officer of the Court, who shall note on the summons and the date

6 The first two paragraphs of the preceding rule apply to copies of documents intended to be served upon other parties to a suit or proceeding. Press copies shall not be accepted.

7 Plaints, written statements, petitions and affidavits presented to the Court in its original civil jurisdiction shall be intitled 'In the Chief Court of Lower Burma, Original Civil Jurisdiction'. A space shall be left for the description and number of the suit or proceeding.

8 No correspondence relating to suits or proceedings before the Court can be attended to, but any person having business in the Court or its office shall transact the same in person or by a duly authorized agent, advocate or pleader.

9 Except in plaints and in petitions initiating miscellaneous proceedings, the names, descriptions and places of residence of the plaintiffs and defendants, other than the first plaintiff, defendant, petitioner or respondent, need not be set out but the words "and another" or "and others, whichever may be applicable shall be added after the name of the first plaintiff or defendant.

10 In every document relating to a suit or proceeding already instituted, the number of the suit or proceeding shall be entered before the document is presented.

11 A party, advocate or pleader presenting a written statement, affidavit, or petition, except in matters as of course, shall send a copy or copies thereof to the other party or parties to the suit or proceeding or their advocate or pleader within 24 hours from the time of presentation of the document.

12 In every petition the section or sections of the Act (if any) under which the

in the Chief Court. The senior interpreters shall exercise the power conferred by this rule only within the precincts of the Court.

16 Upon receipt of a document bearing a court fee label a Deputy Registrar shall examine the correctness of the court fee and if, in his opinion, it is insufficient he shall

shall submit the document to the Judge for orders.

regarding the admissibility of a plaint, with reference to the provisions of the Code and of these rules, and any other remarks upon matters to which he may think it desirable to call the attention of the Judge.

He shall then submit the plaint or petition to the Judge for orders, unless he is

a matter of right and of course, notice shall ordinarily be served to the other party interested to show cause why the order asked for should not be granted. If a party making an application desires that the order be made without notice to any other party interested, reasons for making the order without such notice should be set out in his petition.

90. When a plaintiff or petitioner asks that an order be made without notice to any other party interested, he shall state in his petition the reasons for asking that the order be made without notice.

application of the Code upon presentation of a plaint, a Deputy Registrar shall put thereon his initials, and a note of the date of presentation. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

the Court. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

91. When a plaint or document instituting a proceeding is presented to the Office of the Registrar, the Registrar shall put thereon his initials, and a note of the date of presentation. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

of the Code upon presentation of a plaint, a Deputy Registrar shall put thereon his initials, and a note of the date of presentation. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

92. When a plaint or document instituting a proceeding is presented to the Office of the Registrar, the Registrar shall put thereon his initials, and a note of the date of presentation. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

shall not be registered as distinct proceeding in which they are made execution of decree, or claims preferred. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

directing the issue of the process. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

28. When a petitioner for Letters of Administration or probate or the appointment of a guardian of the person or property of a minor on giving security fails to furnish the required security within three months, the Court may, upon the application of any interested party, remove the guardian or administrator.

directing the issue of the process. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

28. When a petitioner for Letters of Administration or probate or the appointment of a guardian of the person or property of a minor on giving security fails to furnish the required security within three months, the Court may, upon the application of any interested party, remove the guardian or administrator.

directing the issue of the process. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

28. When a petitioner for Letters of Administration or probate or the appointment of a guardian of the person or property of a minor on giving security fails to furnish the required security within three months, the Court may, upon the application of any interested party, remove the guardian or administrator.

directing the issue of the process. If the document is not in the English language, a translation of the Court must be presented at the same time.

28. When a petitioner for Letters of Administration or probate or the appointment of a guardian of the person or property of a minor on giving security fails to furnish the required security within three months, the Court may, upon the application of any interested party, remove the guardian or administrator.

must be paid by the plaintiff to the Defendant. The Defendant may also be ordered to the effect that it has been taken of the Plaintiff's property. The Plaintiff may also be ordered by the court to pay the Defendant the costs of the Defendant. The Plaintiff may also be ordered to pay the Defendant the costs of the Defendant. The Plaintiff may also be ordered to pay the Defendant the costs of the Defendant.

29. After the payment of the costs of the Defendant, the Defendant may be ordered to the effect that it has been taken of the Plaintiff's property. The Plaintiff may also be ordered by the court to pay the Defendant the costs of the Defendant. The Plaintiff may also be ordered to pay the Defendant the costs of the Defendant. The Plaintiff may also be ordered to pay the Defendant the costs of the Defendant.

30. When a plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs of the Defendant, the plaintiff shall be at liberty, subject to the leave of the court, to present a fresh application for the same matter.

31. Copies of decrees of other courts shall be sent to the Chief Court for execution under section 21 of the decree. The court shall apply the execution with interest on the after the receipt of the copy of the decree by the Chief Court. The court shall be returned with an endorsement to that effect signed by a Deputy Registrar and a certificate of non satisfaction.

32. When an attaching creditor fails to bring the attached property to sale for a period of three months after the date of the attachment, his application shall be liable to be dismissed and the attachment to be removed after notice to him by a Deputy Registrar, provided that the matter shall at the request of the applicant or his advocate or pleader be referred to the Judge in Chambers.

33. Ordinarily and unless the Judge otherwise directs the summons shall be for final disposal of the suit.

34. A plaintiff who desires that a summons for settlement of issues shall issue, or that a summons shall be in Form I of Appendix B to the Code, shall intimate such desire in writing on the plaint.

35. Ordinarily the summons shall require the defendant to appear on the fourth or no subsequent Monday after the date of issue of the summons and shall inform him that if he wishes to defend the suit he must present a written statement of his case to the

of the notice in List (5), (6) or entered in such list has or not sitting on the before any other Judge

the summons.

(7) If the defendant resides or all the defendants reside in Burma but the defendant if any of the defendants who do not reside in Burma resides in Burma, within twenty-eight clear days after such date.

(d) If the defendant or any of the defendants resides in Bengal or Burma, until forty days after the date of the summons, elsewhere than in

(e) In all other cases, regard to the place of residence of the defendant, 2

41 All acts which relate to the first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure or other process as may be ordered by the Court, the same had been order

Process

42 A writ or other process may be signed by a Judge or a Deputy Registrar

43 A summons and other process to be served in Burma, but beyond the local limits of the original jurisdiction of the Court shall be sent by post to the Court of widest jurisdiction, not being a Divisional Court, at the headquarters of the Township in which the person to be served resides. If the summons is to be served out of Burma it shall be sent for service as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

44 A summons or other process which is returnable on a day and in which a written statement has not been filed or an appearance, caveat or statement of objections has not been entered by or on behalf of the defendant or respondent or any of the defendants or respondents up to the previous Saturday shall be entered in the said list for enquiry as to the sufficiency of the service of the summons, notice or citation. At such enquiry which may, if necessary, be adjourned from time to time, affidavits or further affidavits may be received or evidence taken as to the service of the summons, notice or citation.

45 If a summons or other process is not returned on the day specified in the summons or other process, the Bailiff shall submit the affidavit or statement of service of the summons or process, the Bailiff shall submit the affidavit or statement of service as to service.

46 No summons or other process shall be served or executed on Sunday, Christmas Day or Good Friday except by leave of a Judge or a Deputy Registrar.

Address for Service

47 Every summons or other process shall be served on the defendant or respondent at his address for service.

48 If a summons or other process is not returned on the day specified in the summons or other process, the Bailiff shall submit the affidavit or statement of service of the summons or process, the Bailiff shall submit the affidavit or statement of service as to service.

Court Lists, Book of Sums, Hearings, and Disposal of ex parte Suits and Orders.

51. Lists of pending cases shall be kept under the following heads —

- (1) Suits for appointment of defendants
- (2) Uncontested suits
- (3) Miscellaneous proceedings
- (4) Interlocutory proceedings
- (5) Contested short suits
- (6) Contested Commercial suits
- (7) General contested suits
- (8) Postponed cases
- (9) Daily list of cases for hearing

52. In a suit which is not defended by the defendant or any of the defendants and is (a) one for a liquidated demand, or (b) for damages, a Deputy Registrar may, provided that the plaintiff does not desire to be heard by a Judge, record such evidence as may be necessary to prove the claim *ex parte* and may be tendered on behalf of the plaintiff, and shall if he so records evidence submit the case to the Judge or one of the Judges in Chambers with (a) a draft of the minutes of the decree to be passed in the suit or (b) a report as to the amount of damages which in his opinion may be awarded to the plaintiff, for an *ex parte* decree or for such order as may be deemed proper, and the Judge may thereupon either pass an *ex parte* decree or such order as he may deem proper, or adjourn the case into Court for hearing and disposal.

53. Suits other than those for a liquidated demand or damages which are not defended by the defendant or any of the defendants shall be set down for *ex parte* hearing and disposal by the Court on the next or any subsequent motion day after the summons has been declared duly served.

54. Cases to be set down in Court under one or other of the last two preceding rules shall be entered in List 2.

55. If a written statement has been put in by the defendant or any of the defendants, the Deputy Registrar on being satisfied as to the due service of the summons on the

58. After a summons or notice against any defendant or respondent has been issued and found to be not duly served and no application is made for a fresh summons or notice, or if it has been issued and found to be not duly served three times, the Deputy Registrar may submit the case for orders to the Court.

59. Processes or orders to be served on a party to a suit or proceeding may be served

61 Every case appearing on the Daily List shall be deemed to have been fixed or adjourned for hearing on the day on which it appears in such list

62 A party who desires that a case shall not be brought on to the Daily List in its turn or before a certain date, must promptly apply for in order to that effect

63 Cases on the Daily List shall be called on for hearing in turn as they appear in the lists

64 The hearing of a suit entered on the Daily List shall not be postponed except on good cause shown

65 A copy of the lists shall be kept affixed to the notice board of the Court and the Chief Clerk and the Bench Clerks shall be responsible that the lists are properly kept from day to day

66 Nothing hereinbefore contained shall affect the power of the Judge to fix any

67 Each written statement shall, by way of list or schedule, refer to any document is not then filed, by which it is intended to be supported. No documents not referred to in such statement or filed in the suit, shall be received in evidence at the hearing unless by leave of the Judge

setting forth the same, and in such case shall forthwith serve a copy of the same on the plaintiff or his advocate

written state
ment of the

ink

72 The attestation of any amendment under Order II, Rules 6-7 Order VI, Rule 11 and Order VII Rule 11, Order VI, Rules 16-17, or Order XXI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall unless otherwise ordered by the Court, be done by a Deputy Registrar

Commercial Suits

73 In contested commercial suits the plaintiff may take out a general summons in form No. 1

when in the
fect to the
interlocutory in-
ons exami
in No 2 in

costs thereof, and as to the costs thereof, and as to the costs thereof

the schedule of forms hereto annexed with such variations as circumstances may require.

75. No affidavit shall be made or used on the hearing of the said summons except by special order of the Judge.

Summary Suits

79. When an order has been made giving leave to the defendant to defend a suit filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant shall, within one week from the date of such order, file his written statement, unless the Judge, who grants leave, orders the affidavit of the defendant to be taken as his written statement, and the suit shall be set down in List No. 5, 6 or 7 referred to in Rule 51.

Documents filed in Courts

80. A Deputy Registrar may perform the first one of the following duties:—

the record

82. The Bench Clerk shall make and sign the endorsements enjoined by Order XIII, Rules 4 and 6 of the Code on documents admitted or rejected. The list of documents and articles admitted in evidence shall be prepared in Form ^{Judicial} General 27 by the Bench

for that purpose

Discovery and Inspection

ordered further to pay into Court as aforesaid such additional sum as the Judge shall direct. The party seeking discovery shall with his interrogatories or, where any payment into Court has been so ordered as aforesaid with the order for discovery, serve a copy of the receipt for the said payment into Court, and the time for answering or making discovery shall in all cases commence from the date of the service of the interrogatories or order for discovery. The party from whom discovery is sought shall not be required to answer or make discovery unless and until the said payment, if so ordered as aforesaid has been made.

87 Unless the Judge shall at or before the trial otherwise order, the amount paid in under the preceding rule shall after the suit or matter has been finally disposed of, be paid out to the party by whom the same was paid in if appearing in person, on his request, or to his Advocate on such Advocate's request where such party is represented by Advocate in the event of the costs of the cause or matter being adjudged to such party, or no order as to costs being made, but, in the event of the Judge ordering such party to pay the costs of the suit or matter, the amount in Court shall be subject to a lien for the costs ordered to be paid to any other party.

88 A Deputy Registrar is authorized to allow any party to a suit or proceeding or his advocate or pleader or agent to inspect in the presence of an officer of the Court at a convenient time any document filed in Court under Order VII, Rule 14 or Order XIII, Rule I of the Code, or any document admitted in evidence in the suit or proceeding.

Summonses to Witnesses

89 A summons to a witness may be applied for by a party to a suit or proceeding or his advocate or pleader at any time after its institution and during its pendency.

The application should be made to a Deputy Registrar.

90 The party applying shall within 24 hours from the time when the application is filed pay to the Bailiff or if the summons is to be served beyond the limits of the original jurisdiction of the Court to the Accountant such sum for the travelling and other expenses of the person or persons summoned as may be requisite according to the following scale —

	Maximum			Minimum		
	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
Soldiers mariners laborers carriers, domestic servants servants etc	2	8	0	0	12	0
Tradesmen	1	0	0	1	0	0
Merchants managers of banks zemindars gentlemen of property	12	0	0	4	0	0
Auctioneers brokers professional accountants	10	0	0	3	0	0
Professional men	10	0	0	8	0	0
Editors engineers and surveyors	12	0	0	3	0	0
Officers in civil employ drawing not less than Rs. 600 a month according to rank	12	0	0	0	0	0
Military and Naval officers, according to rank	8	0	0	2	0	0
Shroffs bunnias schoolmasters commanders and officers of ships	1	0	0	2	0	0
Art clerks and other clerks	4	0	0	2	0	0
Police Inspectors petty officers military or marine	4	0	0	2	0	0
Customs house officers and engine drivers	4	0	0	2	0	0
Godown servants	5	0	0	1	0	0
Females according to station						

In special cases or in cases not provided for in the scale the Court shall allow such fees as it thinks fit.

91 A Deputy Registrar shall issue summonses as soon as possible after the Bailiff or the Accountant has endorsed the application with his receipt for the money paid and ordinarily without reference to a Judge. In case of any disagreement or doubt as to the scale of travelling and other expenses which should be tendered to a witness the Deputy Registrar shall refer the matter to the Judge.

92 If a witness evidence is not taken or completed on the first day on which he is attended in obedience to a summons the party who has summoned him shall before 1 p.m. on that day deposit with the Bailiff of the Court the same amount as was originally

allowed for the next day of hearing, and if on that day his evidence is not taken or completed, his allowance for the next day of hearing shall be deposited, and so on until the witness has been discharged, or until the case has been concluded.

93 Witnesses must apply in person to the Bailiff for their expenses allowed for attending on every day after the first day.

94 No expenses of witnesses shall be included in the costs allowed, except such as have been paid through the Bailiff or the Accountant or certified by the Judge or by a Deputy Registrar.

Examination of Parties and Witnesses by the Court

95 The substance of the examination held by the Court under Order X, Rule 2, shall be reduced to writing by the Judge or a Gazetted Officer of the Court and shall form part of the record.

Court as soon as possible after his statement has been recorded and the Judge shall, if necessary, correct the same and shall sign it.

97 In cases in which an appeal is not allowed other than those dealt with under Rule 52 it shall not be necessary to take down the evidence of the witnesses in writing at length, but the Judge or a Gazetted Officer of the Court in the presence and under

record

direction of the Judge and Rule 15 thereof shall be read as referring to evidence taken down or made under the rules heretofore set out.

Commissioners

advocate

104 When—

- (a) A Commission is issued by the Court for a local investigation or to examine accounts under Order XXVI, Rule 9 or Rule 11 of the First Schedule, or
- (b) An Arbitration award is made.

etc. etc.

Arrangement of Records.

105 The records of regular suits shall be divided into four parts each having a separate facing sheet, namely—

- (1) The main file
- (2) The document file
- (3) The interlocutory file
- (4) The process file

106 In the main file shall be filed in the following order the—

- (1) Dmy,
- (2) Pleadings,
- (3) Issues,
- (4) Evidence for the plaintiff taken in the Court and upon commission,
- (5) Affidavits (if any) read for the plaintiff at the hearing under Order XIX, Rule 1 of the Code,
- (6) Interrogatories administered by him and the answers thereto,
- (7) Evidence taken in Court and upon commission for the defendant or each defendant in order,
- (8) Affidavits read as aforesaid for him or them,
- (9) Interrogatories administered by him or them and answers,
- (10) Evidence of witnesses called by the Court under Order XVI, Rule 14 of the Code,
- (11) Judgment,
- (12) Decree

NOTE.—The proceedings upon or leading up to the issue or return of a commission or in connection with interrogatories and answers shall be filed in the interlocutory file

107 In the document file shall be filed the list of documents under Order VII

every part of each document may be readily open to view

108 In the interlocutory file shall be filed all petitions, proceedings, and orders (except as otherwise provided) made or issued by the Court in the suit, and orders made or issued by the Court in connection with the proceedings in the suit.

(a) Powers of attorney,

(b) Summonses and other processes and affidavits relating thereto,

(c) Lists of witnesses,

The Diary

111 The diary shall be framed so as to show as concisely as possible every stage of, and every proceeding taken in the suit and the party or parties present in person or by advocate or pleader at every proceeding. Very short proceedings and orders, such as proceedings and orders for the adjournment of a case may be written on the diary for the signature of the Judge but when orders not purely formal have to be made, the Bench Clerk should put up a judgment form with the file when submitting it to the Judge.

The Judgment

112 When judgment is given orally a note thereof in writing or in shorthand shall be taken by an Officer of the Court, or person authorized by the Judge.

Such note shall be submitted to the Judge for correction, and for signature.

Decrees and Formal Orders

Assistant Registrar. When the draft of a decree is ready a notice shall be posted on the Court notice board that the draft is ready for inspection in the office of one of the Deputy Registrars. If it is not objected to within four days from the date of the notice, a decree in the terms of the draft shall be submitted to a Judge or a Deputy Registrar for signature.

If the parties do not agree to the form which the decree shall take the case shall be set down upon the daily list on as early a date as may be convenient to speak to the minutes of decree.

116 If a party or an advocate intimates to a Deputy Registrar immediately after an order has been passed by a Judge that he wishes to see the formal order before it is submitted to the Judge for signature, the same procedure as for decrees shall be adopted in respect of the draft formal order.

117 Every decree or order for the payment of money out of a fund subject to the order of the Court shall, for the purpose of such payment, be deemed to authorize the sale and subdivision of the securities belonging to the fund, or of a sufficient portion thereof.

118 In a decree for maintenance out of property charged with payment of the allowance the Court may appoint subject to such condition (if any) as it shall think fit, a Receiver thereunder with directions, in case of default in payment of the maintenance, to take possession of the property and sell the same, and out of the sale proceeds to pay the allowance for maintenance.

Time

121 In all cases in which any particular number of days, not expressed to be clear

day also, and any succeeding day or days on which the offices continue closed provided that written statements due in vacations may be filed on the day the Court reopens

122 Whereby these rules, or in any decree or order time for doing any act or taking any proceedings is limited by months, and where the word "month" occurs in any document which is part of any legal procedure under these rules, such time shall be computed by calendar months, unless otherwise expressed

123 The day on which an order for security for costs is served, and the time thence forward until and including the day on which such security is given shall not be reckoned in the computation of time allowed to plead, answer interrogatories, or take any other proceeding in the suit or matter

Execution Proceedings

of the decree or order

125 The certified copy together with the other documents mentioned in Order XX, Rule 6 of the Code shall be sent by registered post

126 The process fees prescribed for the warrant of attachment and for the order of sale shall be annexed to every application for execution by attachment and sale of property

127 In every application for the attachment of moveable property the approximate value of the property sought to be attached shall be stated according to the best of the

(continued)

Sale of Immoveable Property

129 An application for the sale of immoveable property attached must be accompanied by an affidavit of some person who has searched the register of deeds for entries relating to the property. In the affidavit the result of the search must be stated. An

130 A Deputy Registrar shall prepare every proclamation and the party seeking to have the property sold shall be bound to furnish

and interest of
thereas to the
an abstract of
of the Deputy

132.
requested so to do, and
in the proclamation

it shall be sent with a warrant for sale

er the
di from
-er
ily be

held within the precincts of the Court house. If the party at whose instance the property is to be sold desires that it should be sold on the spot, he must state his wish in his application for sale and deposit with the Bailiff the prescribed fee for attendance at the spot. After the place of sale has been stated in the proclamation, it shall not be altered.

136. If the party at whose instance the property is to be sold desires that it should be sold on the spot, he must state his wish in his application for sale and deposit with the Bailiff the prescribed fee for attendance at the spot. After the place of sale has been stated in the proclamation, it shall not be altered.

"I declare to have been the highest bidder for the purchase of the property above set forth (or of lot No.) for the sum of Rs.

137. When a conveyance to a purchaser at a sale by the Court is necessary, the purchaser shall cause a draft to be prepared and presented to a Deputy Registrar within one week from the date of sale.

Upon receipt thereof the Deputy Registrar shall give notice thereof to the advocates or pleaders of the parties to the suit with an intimation that the draft will be open to their inspection for four days, and that, if not objected to, it will be returned to the purchaser as approved of by the Court.

If the draft is objected to, the Deputy Registrar shall settle the draft after considering the objections to it, and shall then if so required by either party submit it to the Judge for orders.

Sale of Moveable Property

139. As soon as possible after an attachment of moveable property, the Bailiff shall report to the Court the fact of the attachment and shall furnish a list of the articles attached and their approximate value and shall note if any of them are not liable to attachment or sale.

If any of the articles or things fall within the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 43 of the Code, it shall be so stated in the report and list.

140. The report and list shall be submitted to the Judge or a Deputy Registrar who shall pass such order for sale as he may think fit although the decree holder may not apply for a sale order. A warrant for sale shall be transmitted to the Bailiff, who shall forthwith prepare and issue a proclamation.

141. Every proclamation shall be advertised in a local newspaper or advertiser for at least 15 days (except in the case of property mentioned in the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 43 of the Code) and the cost of advertising shall be deducted from the proceeds of sale.

142. Moveable property mentioned in the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 43 of the Code, shall be sold as soon as may be convenient after it has been attached. Other moveable property shall be sold on the third Saturday after the day on which the proclamation shall have been fixed up in the Court.

Garnishee Orders

144 If the garnishee does not forthwith pay or deliver into Court the amount due from or the property deliverable by him to the judgment debtor, or so much as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree and the cost of execution and does not dispute his liability

a decree against him

before the hearing desire the trial to be before a Judge, proceed to determine such issue, and upon the determination of such issue shall pass such order upon the notice as shall be just

has a lien or charge upon, or an interest in it, the sum, or a portion of it, due to such third person to appear and state the nature of his claim (if any) upon such debt or property, and prove the same, if necessary

147 After hearing such third person, and any other person who may subsequently be ordered to appear, or in the case of such third or other person not appearing when ordered the Judge or a Deputy Registrar may pass such order as is hereinafter provided,

Such third or other person shall have the same right to require as it may affect his interests shall be before a Judge as is conferred by Rule 145 upon the parties therein named

148 Payment or delivery made by or execution levied upon the garnishee under any such order as aforesaid shall be a valid discharge to him as against the judgment debtor and any other person ordered to appear as aforesaid, for the amount paid

served with the garnishee order An appearance by any person in pursuance of the foregoing rules and of any proceedings

151

execution

152 An appeal to the Court shall be allowed from all orders of a Deputy Registrar under Rules 143 to 150

Motions—Injunctions

there

his advocate to pay such sum by way of damages as the Court may award as compensation in the event of a party affected sustaining prejudice by such injunction

Examinations de bene esse

156 The examination of a witness under Order XVII, Rule 16 shall ordinarily be taken by a Deputy Registrar or Assistant Registrar unless the Judge shall otherwise direct

157 The officer taking an examination *de bene esse* shall have regard to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and shall in case the Advocate or other person examining the witness press any question which such officer shall have disallowed, record such question and the answer thereto for the consideration of the Judge before whom the deposition may thereafter be put in evidence

158 After the deposition of any witness shall have been taken down, and before it is signed by him, it shall be distinctly read over and, when necessary, translated to the witness in order that mistakes or omissions may be rectified or supplied. The deposition shall be signed by the witness and left with the officer who took it down and the latter shall subscribe his name and the date of the examination

Security to Court

Court are tendered, a report shall be called for from the Bailiff as to whether the principal and sureties possess within the jurisdiction of the Court property of value equal to the amount of the security required

161 No sureties shall without the order of the Judge or a Deputy Registrar, be accepted, unless they make an affidavit or affidavits stating that the property which each of them possesses or that their properties combined, are equal in value to the amount of the security demanded, over and above any incumbrances to which such properties may be liable, and over and above the amount for which they may have

Bailiff's Commission on Sales of mortgaged and attached Property

163 The commission to be drawn by the Bailiff on sales of mortgaged or attached property shall be at the following rates —

(1) On sales of mortgaged property—

When the proceeds of sale do not exceed Rs 500
When they exceed Rs 500 but do not exceed Rs 5 000

5 per cent
5 per cent on the first Rs 500 and 2 per cent on the balance

When they exceed Rs 5 000

At the above rates on the first Rs 5 000 and 1 per cent on the balance

(2) On sales of attached property—

When the proceeds of sale do not exceed Rs 10 000
When the proceeds of sale exceed Rs 10 000

5 per cent
5 per cent on the first Rs 10 000 and 1 per cent on the balance

164 When a sale of immovable property is set aside under the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 89, 91 or 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the costs of the sale shall be paid to the person who has paid the same.

165 Within the time specified in the application of the party at whose instance the property is to be sold, a fee of Rs. 5 shall be paid to the Court.

166

167

SCHEDULE OF FORMS

No 1 (Rule 69)

IN THE CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA

Original Civil Jurisdiction

Suit No. of 19 .

Plaintiff

vs

Defendant

day of 19 .

(Signed)

Plaintiff

(Signed)

Plaintiff's Advocates

No 2 (Rule 73)

IN THE CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA

Original Civil Jurisdiction

Suit No. of 19 .

Plaintiff,

vs

Defendant,

of part of be made

Let it be ordered that

in this suit as follows —

Particulars [That the

deliver within days

such particulars]

[That the file an affidavit of documents in ten days]
Interrogatories (For leave to interrogate, the answers to be filed within days)

Inspection of documents Commission

Inspection of property

Examination of witnesses

Any other interlocutory matter or thing

Dated the day of

No 3 (Rule 74)

IN THE CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA.

Original Civil Jurisdiction

Suit No of 19 .

Plaintiff,

Defendant

Upon hearing the Advocates on both sides and upon reading the affidavit of filed herein the following directions are hereby given —

Particulars — Defendant in a week to give particulars of
Admissions — That the plaintiff is
Discovery — Defendant in a week to produce
Interrogatories — Plaintiff may interrogate as to only interrogatories to be
 initialled by me
Inspection of Documents — Plaintiff undertakes to produce at the hearing.
Inspection of Property — None.
Commissions — None
Examination of Witnesses — To be examined on commission or otherwise as the
 case may be.

No 4 (Rule 143)

IN THE CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA.

Original Civil Jurisdiction

Civil Execution Case No of 19 .

Plaintiff,

Defendant

To Take notice that you are hereby required on or before the day of
 19 to pay to the Bailiff of this Court the sum of
 attached in your hands by order dated day of 19 , or otherwise
 to appear in person or by an Advocate or Pleader of this Court before the undersigned at
 11 15 a m in the forenoon on the day aforesaid and show cause to the contrary in default
 whereof an order for payment may be passed against you
 Dated this day of 19
 Advocate for

Deputy Registrar.

THE BURMA GAZETTE,

OCTOBER 21st, 1911, PART IV, : 945

Chief Court of Lower Burma.

NOTIFICATION

Dated Rangoon the 19th October, 1911

The rules contained in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, shall, so far as they are inconsistent with or contrary to the Rules herewith published and, so far as the practice and procedure of the Appellate Side of the Chief Court of Lower Burma only are concerned, be deemed to have been altered or superseded by the rules secondly abovementioned

ORDER LIV

Appellate Side Rules of Procedure.

Preliminary

1 In the absence of the Assistant Registrar the Chief Clerk shall exercise all the functions of the Assistant Registrar under these rules

2 Except upon close holidays the offices of the Court shall be open to the public on business from 10 30 a m until 4 30 p m on all week days except Saturdays, and on Saturdays from 10 30 a m until 2 p m

Initiation of Proceedings

3 Memoranda, applications and affidavits shall be either printed, type written or written in a clear and legible hand, in the English language on durable white foolscap paper on one side only of the paper and so as to leave a clear margin one inch and a half wide on the left side

The matter shall be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, and each paragraph shall contain as nearly as may be a separate ground of objection or allegation Dates and figures shall be filled in before presentation When native dates are given, the corresponding English dates shall always be added

Material corrections or alterations shall be authenticated by the initials of the person signing a memorandum, application or affidavit

4 All memoranda of appeal and applications shall be presented to the Assistant Registrar

5 Memoranda of appeal and applications for revision shall be accompanied by certified copies of the following documents —

(1) The decree or order against which an appeal or an application is made,

(2) The judgment on which such decree or order is founded, unless the Court dispenses therewith and

(3) In appeals and applications from appellate decrees or orders the judgment of the Court of First Instance, unless the Court dispenses therewith

6 Whenever a memorandum of appeal or application is presented to the Assistant Registrar and it is in his opinion insufficiently stamped, or if he considers that the relief claimed is under valued he shall fix a time under section 107 (2) or 141 within which such memorandum of appeal or application shall be properly stamped or the valuation amended

7 Where a memorandum of appeal or application is amended the Assistant Registrar shall sign or initial the amendment

8 The date of hearing an appeal or application for revision shall be fixed by the Assistant Registrar and shall be notified in the manner prescribed by Order XLII, Rule 14 He shall also fix the time for filing a memorandum of objections as provided for in Rule 26

9 The cost of issuing notice of the date of hearing to the respondent shall be deposited within seven days from the date of order directing such notice to issue unless the Assistant Registrar consents to an extension of time

10 When notice is ordered to issue to the respondent, the appellant or applicant shall in tendering the process fees furnish as many copies on plain paper of the grounds of appeal or application as there are respondents

11 On receipt of the records of the lower Court or Courts the Assistant Registrar shall issue a notice to the appellant or applicant requiring him to state within a specified time what documents in the connected records he wishes to have translated In the event of such statement not being made within the time allowed he shall either extend the time for good cause shown or in the warning list (see Rule 35) for the following week

call upon the party to show cause before him why the case should not be laid before the Court for orders, under Order XVII Rule 7

12. When the documents to be translated have been determined, the Assistant Registrar shall cause an estimate of the cost of the translation to be prepared, and shall proceed as provided in the rules for the translation of documents

13. The Assistant Registrar is authorized to take necessary steps to cause the service of fresh notices, if required, to dispose of applications for substituted service to grant postponements by consent and dispose of applications for bringing legal representatives of deceased parties on the record and granting postponements, if necessary for the purpose of service

14. When a notice is returned unserved, or not duly served, and the Assistant Registrar orders the issue of fresh notice and fixes a fresh date, the case should be called out in the presence of the Assistant Registrar in open Court fifteen minutes before the Court sits on the date originally fixed, in case the respondent may put in an appearance, and, if he does he should be informed of the postponed date and his signature taken

Process

15. Warrants, notices and other processes shall be signed, sealed and issued by the Assistant Registrar, provided that every warrant or order committing a person to custody in jail shall be signed by the Judge

16. Notices and other processes to be served within the local limits of the original jurisdiction of the Court shall be delivered for service to the Bailiff who shall endorse thereon the date of receipt by him

accompany the officer to point him out

sent for service as provided by section 28, Order V Rules 21—23 and 25 to the Court named by the party

20. Unless otherwise ordered a second or subsequent notice or process shall not be issued until after the one previously issued has been returned

Address for Service

Benches—Classes of cases to be heard by and composition of.

24 The following classes of cases shall be heard and determined by a Bench of at least two Judges, namely:—

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)
- (e) F and rules
- (f)
- (g) Any appeal, review, revision, or original suit which the Senior Judge may order to be heard or determined by a Bench of Judges

Note.—This rule must be read subject to the operation of express provisions of law, such as section 18 of the Indian Press Act, 1910

25 A Full Bench shall consist of all the Judges, or of such number of Judges, not

Lists to be maintained by the Assistant Registrar.

A List of all incomplete cases.

B List of cases ripe for hearing that are to be called on a fixed date.

hearing
apt from day to day.
on the respondent

the following week

38 When a case under the Indian Divorce Act, in which a decree for dissolution of

waiting
ing for

39 The diary shall be framed so as to show as concisely as possible every stage of and every proceeding taken in the case, and the party or parties present in person or by advocate or pleader at every proceeding. Very short proceedings and orders, such as proceedings and orders for
for the signature of the Judge
Bench Clerk should put up a
Judge

* *Note*—So much of Rule 35 of Order XLII as requires the decree to be signed and dated by the Judge or Judges who pass it, does not apply to the Chief Court of Lower Burma in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. See section 16 (3) Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900

spelling to be corrected unless the advocate concerned shows any good reason to the contrary

If the name was incorrectly spelled in the Lower Court it should nevertheless be correctly spelled in the Chief Court, the name as previously incorrectly spelled being added in brackets, if necessary, to prevent confusion. The same rule shall be applied as far as practicable to names of natives of India. But any person who writes English has the right to spell his own name in any way he likes, and the spelling of his ordinary signature should be adopted in all documents in Court.

47 No correspondence relating to cases before the Court can be attended to, but any person having business in the Court or its office shall transact the same in person or by a duly authorized agent, advocate or pleader.

48 The Registrar, Deputy Registrars, Assistant Registrars and the Senior Interpreters attached to the Chief Court for Burmese, Hindustani, Gujarati, Chinese, Tamil and Telugu, are empowered to administer the oath to deponents of affidavits to be filed in the Chief Court.

The Senior Interpreters shall exercise the power conferred by this rule only within the precincts of the Court.

49 The Chief Clerk shall certify the copies referred to in Order XLI, Rule 37.

Appeals to the Privy Council

50 Petitions for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council shall be presented to the Assistant Registrar who, if the petition is in order, will issue notice in the form attached on the respondent to show cause before a Bench consisting of at least two Judges (see Rule 24 above) why the certificate prayed for should not be granted.

51 When a certificate is granted, the appellant shall, within the period prescribed by Order XLV, Rule 7, give security for the costs of the respondent to the extent of Rs 4,000. In cases of special magnitude and importance, the Court may require security for a larger sum, provided that security shall not in any case be required for a sum exceeding Rs 10,000.

52 Security shall be furnished either by the deposit of cash or Government securities to the amount required or subject to the provisions of Rule 54 by a first mortgage of immoveable property. Cash deposited under this rule shall be paid to the Bailiff of the Court. Government securities so deposited shall be made over to the Registrar or a Deputy Registrar.

53 When cash or Government securities are deposited under Rule 52 a security bond shall be executed in Form A or Form B attached, as the case may be.

54 If a charge on immoveable property is tendered as security, the appellant shall file a draft mortgage bond together with a valuation of the property verified by affidavit. The value of the property shall be at least double the amount of the security required, and in the case of land on which there are buildings which are brought into the valuation of the property, or where a mortgage of buildings only is tendered, the buildings must be insured.

55 On tender of a charge on immoveable property as security, notice of the tender shall be given to the opposite party requiring him to show cause, if he wishes to do so within a time to be fixed by the Court, why the security tendered should not be accepted.

56 If the security tendered appears to the Court to be unsatisfactory, the appellant shall be so informed.

57 In every security bond, the appellant shall bind himself to pay such costs of the opposite party as may be allowed by the Court in the event of the appeal not being prosecuted.

58 Within the period prescribed by Order XLV, Rule 7, the appellant shall also deposit with the Bailiff of the Court the sum of Rs 1,000 or such sum as the Assistant Registrar may determine to defray the expenses of printing, translating, transcribing, indexing and transmitting a copy of the record.

59 If the appellant shall fail within the time prescribed to furnish security for costs, or to deposit the amount required for the preparation of the transcript record in accordance with Rules 51 and 58 the proceedings shall be placed before the Court for disposal.

60 When the Court admits the appeal, it shall always clearly state in its order who are the actual parties at the time of admission.

which have not within the time specified, been expressly asked for by the parties. The Assistant Registrar shall also on payment to him of a fee of Rs. 16 furnish to the parties a list of the papers, which make up the record; and shall require each party within fourteen days to indicate any paper which he considers immaterial. If the parties are agreed as to the papers to be omitted, those papers shall not be transcribed. If the Assistant Registrar thinks that any paper, as to the omission of which the parties are not agreed, should be omitted, he shall refer the matter for the determination of the Court. Where it is decided to include any paper against the wish of any party, the transcript shall show clearly that the inclusion of the paper was objected to by that party.

62. The Assistant Registrar shall arrange the papers in the transcript in the order specified below and shall prefix an index to the transcript. He shall also attach to the index a certified list of all papers omitted from the transcript under Rule 61.—

Order of arrangement of Papers

- 1 Diary sheet of the Original Court
2. Plaint
- 3 Written statement
- 4 Examinations by the Court under Order 2
- 5 Issues settled.
- 6 Oral evidence for the party beginning, including evidence given by a witness for such party on commission.
- 7 Oral evidence for the opposite party or parties, including evidence given by a witness for such party or parties on commission
- 8 Documentary evidence for the party beginning
- 9 Documentary evidence for the opposite party
- 1 —
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1

vide

63. When the record is to be printed the style to be adopted shall be as follows —
- (i) The form known as *Donny Quarto* (i.e., 54 cms in length and 42 in width) shall be followed
 - (ii) The size of the paper used shall be such that the sheet, when folded and trimmed shall be 11 inches in length and 8½ inches in width

(iii) The type to be used in the text shall be Pica type but Long Primer shall be used in printing accounts, tabular matter and notes

(iv) The number of lines in each page of Pica type shall be 47 or thereabouts, and every tenth line shall be numbered in the margin

66. When the record is printed in India, 100 copies of the transcript shall be struck off. Twenty copies shall be supplied to the party at whose cost the record is printed. Any other party to the suit shall be supplied with copies of the record on payment of the cost price. Copies so supplied shall not be certified. A charge of Re 1 for every 750 words shall be made for proof reading. Money paid for proof reading shall be paid to Government.

When the record is ready, if it is to be printed in England, one certified copy

shall be sent to His Majesty's Privy Council, Whitehall, at the

same time as the record is printed in India, and 100

copies shall be

sent to the Registrar of the Court.

The Registrar shall correct by the Registrar or initialing, every eighth page thereof.

Where part of the record is printed in India and part is to be printed in England respectively,

the rule shall, as far as practicable, apply to such parts as are printed in India and the parts as

are to be printed in England respectively.

68. All costs incurred in British India whether allowed by the Court under Rule 57

or otherwise, shall be recoverable, as if they were the amount of a decree for money.

NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY A CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL TO HIS MAJESTY IN COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED (Rule 50)

Code of Civil Procedure, Order XLV, Rule 3 (2).

IN THE CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION No. of 19.

Arising out of Civil Appeal No. of 19.

Applicant,

vs.

Respondent.

To

Take notice that the applicant abovenamed has through applied to this Court for a certificate that as regards amount or value and nature the above case fulfils the requirements of section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or that it is otherwise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.

The day of 19 is fixed for you to show cause why the Court should not grant the certificate asked for.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this day of 19.

Process fee, Rs. realized

Assistant Registrar.

FORM A. (Rule 53)

BOND BY AN APPELLANT TO HIS MAJESTY IN COUNCIL FOR SECURITY FOR THE COSTS OF THE RESPONDENT WHEN CURRENCY NOTES ARE OR CASH IS DEPOSITED.

KNOW ALL MEN by these presents that I

native of

am held and firmly bound to the Senior Judge of the Chief

Court of Lower Burma in the sum of Rupees

to be paid to the

said Senior Judge his successors in office or assigns for which payment well and truly to be made I bind myself my heirs and legal representatives

son of

now residing at

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand at this
day of 19

Signed by the said

Signature of Appellant

in the presence of

*Address
Occupation*

son of

WHEREAS I the above bounden
was ^{an appellant} ^{the respondent} in Civil ^{1st} ^{2nd} Appeal No of 19 in the said Chief Court

to furnish security for the costs which may be incurred by the respondent in this Court and before His Majesty's Privy Council upon or in consequence of my said appeal to His Majesty to the amount of Rupees AND WHEREAS on the day of 19 I deposited in the said Chief Court the sum of Rs NOW THE CONDITION of the above written bond is such that if the said respondent shall be paid such costs as I or my heirs or legal representatives shall be ordered to pay to him by the decree or order of His Majesty in Council or by order of this Court as costs incurred on or in consequence of my said appeal then the above written bond shall be void and of no effect otherwise the same shall remain in full force and virtue AND I HEREBY agree and declare that the said amount deposited by me as aforesaid shall remain under the control of the said Chief Court as and for security for payment by me or my heirs or legal representatives of such amount or amounts as may be made payable by me or them as costs as aforesaid and that upon my failure to pay such amount or amounts the Court may order that the said amount deposited or so much thereof as may be necessary shall be paid towards the discharge of the amount or amounts which may be payable by me or my heirs or legal representatives as aforesaid PROVIDED that if no costs shall be ordered to be paid by me or by my heirs or legal representatives the amount deposited shall unless otherwise detained be returned to me or them

FORM B (Pule 53)

BOND BY AN APPELLANT TO HIS MAJESTY IN COUNCIL FOR SECURITY FOR THE COSTS OF THE RESPONDENT WHEN GOVERNMENT PROMISSORY NOTES ARE DEPOSITED

KNOW ALL MEN by these presents that I

son of

native of

now residing at

am held and firmly bound to the Senior Judge of the Chief Court of Lower Burma in the sum of Rupees to be paid to the said Senior Judge his successors in office or assigns for which payment well and truly to be made I bind myself and my heirs and legal representatives

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand at

this

day of

19

Signature of Appellant

Signed by the said

in the presence of

*Address
Occupation*

son of

WHEREAS I the above bounden
was ^{an appellant} ^{the respondent} in Civil ^{1st} ^{2nd} Appeal No of 19 in the said Chief Court AND WHEREAS the decision of the Court upon the said appeal having been adverse I presented a petition to the said Court praying for a certain

ORDER LV.

THE COURT OF SMALL CAUSES, RANGOON.

RULES RELATING TO ITS PROCEDURE.

Preliminary

- 1 In these rules, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,—
- (1) the word "Judge" means the Judge or Additional Judge of the Small Cause Court, Rangoon,
 - (2) the words "plaintiff" and "defendant" respectively include petitioner and respondent in miscellaneous proceedings.
- 2 In the absence of the Chief Clerk the second clerk shall exercise all the functions of the Chief Clerk under these rules.
- 3 Except on close holidays the offices of the Court shall be open to the public for business from 10 30 a.m. until 4 30 p.m. on all week days except Saturdays, and on Saturdays from 10 30 a.m. till 2 p.m.

Institution of Proceedings

1011 b.m.

Provided that, in proceedings to which all the parties are Burmans and in which the relief sought does not exceed Rs. 500, the pleading, petitions or affidavits may be in Burmese.

his pleader

7 In plaints and in petitions initiating miscellaneous proceedings the names, descriptions, and places of residence of the parties must be fully set out or the omission to do so

Chief Clerk Urgent applications may be presented to the Judge on his taking his seat on the bench. On a close holiday urgent applications may be presented to the Chief Clerk, who will forward them to the Judge.

12 Upon receiving a document bearing a court fee label the Chief Clerk shall examine it. If the court fee be insufficient, he shall return the document, if it be sufficient, he shall cancel the stamp. If the Chief Clerk and the party presenting the

sent it, it shall be person pre

14 A diary form shall be used in every proceeding, and the Chief Clerk shall enter on it the name of the person presenting the plaint or petition and the date of presentation.

15 No correspondence or telegrams relating to suits or proceedings before the Court will be attended to, but any person having business in the Court or its office shall transact the same in person or by a duly authorized agent or pleader.

16 The Chief Clerk shall divide the plaints as follows —

- (a) plaints in suits for sums not exceeding Rs 150
- (b) plaints in suits between Burmans for sums not exceeding Rs 500
- (c) all other plaints

for admission and disposal.

18 If the Judge entertains no doubt as to the admissibility of the plaint, or as to

or belief

20 An agent desiring to institute or defend a suit shall, at the time of presenting the

of presentation If the document is not in English it must be accompanied by a

found correct, shall endorse on
it and shall initial the same
when it has been admitted it shall

23. When a plaint or document

24. A plaint or document is not a party to the suit

and upon
of
hours
In
of
for
final

between the date of
of the jurisdiction of

the Court —

(1) In suits the value of which exceeds Rs 1000 —

(b)

(c) Where any one defendant resides in India —

(d) Where any one defendant resides out of India — three months

Miscellaneous and execution applications will ordinarily be heard on Mondays and

except v
commiss

29

jurisdiction of the Court shall be delivered to the Bailiff for service or execution, who shall endorse thereon the date of receipt by him

If the person to be served is known to the Bailiff or to any of his staff, the Bailiff shall cause the process to be served forthwith. If the person to be served is not so known, the Bailiff shall require the party applying for the process to provide some person to identify the person to be served, and shall fix a time when one of his officers will be ready to proceed to effect service

30 Processes for service in Burma but beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court shall be sent by post to a Court at the headquarters of a township in which the person to be served resides. If the process is to be served out of Burma, it shall be sent for service as required by section 28 and Order V, Rules 21 to 23 and 25, of the Code to the Court named by the party

31 Unless otherwise ordered, a second or subsequent process shall not be issued until the previous one has been returned

32 Proof of service may be made by affidavit. Such affidavits must state fully all particulars which must necessarily be proved before the summons or process can be held to have been duly served. The Bailiff and Deputy Bailiff are empowered to administer the oath to the deponents of such affidavits

33 No summons or other process shall be served or executed on a Sunday, Christmas Day, or Good Friday except by leave of the Judge

Hearing

Daily File and Cause List

35 All undisposed of cases shall be entered in the daily file under the respective dates fixed for hearing

36 A daily cause list shall be prepared from the daily file and shall show the causes for hearing in the following order—

- (1) Executions
- (2) Miscellaneous applications
- (3) Regular suits—
 - (a) For settlement of issues
 - (b) For disposal—
 - (i) defended
 - (ii) undefended

37 Cases in the daily list shall be called on in turn in the order in which they appear in the list

Documents filed in Court

40 Documents not impounded under the Stamp Act or ordered by the Judge to be retained shall, on application made, be returned after fifteen days from the date of

judgment, unless the proceedings have in the meanwhile been sent for by the Chief Court

42 The Bench Clerk shall make and sign the endorsements enjoined by Order XIII, Rules 4 and 6, of the Code on documents admitted or rejected

Inspection of Documents filed

43 The Chief Clerk is authorized to permit the inspection of any document filed in Court by a party or his pleader in the presence of an officer of the Court

Summons to Witnesses

as from the time when the travelling and other expenses according to the following

scale ۱۰۰٪

	Maximum	Minimum
	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Soldiers mariners labourers, carriers, domestic servants sircars etc	3 0 0	0 4 0
Tradesmen	4 0 0	1 0 0
Merchants, managers of banks, zemindars, gentlemen of property	12 0 0	2 0 0
Auctioneers, brokers, professional accountants	10 0 0	1 0 0
	10 0 0	2 0 0
	10 0 0	2 0 0
Do a month,	12 0 0	6 0 0
	12 0 0	6 0 0
Do of ships	4 0 0	12 0 0
	6 0 0	0 0 0
	4 0 0	12 0 0
	4 0 0	12 0 0
	2 0 0	1 0 0
Godown sircars	4 0 0	0 8 0
Females, according to station		

In special cases or in cases not provided for in the scale, the Court shall allow such

11. after the Buliff has

I be certified to

and com

50

shall see

received as expenses of the witness. If the expenses are not paid, then make an order for the issue of the summons.

51 On receipt of a commission for the examination of a witness from another Court, the Chief Clerk shall send it to the Bailiff, who shall note on it whether any and what money for expenses has been received as expenses of the witness. If sufficient money has been received, the Chief Clerk shall make an order for the issue of the summons to the witness.

52 Any money received as expenses of witnesses remaining unexpended shall be returned by the Bailiff, under the orders of the Judge, to the Court of issue.

Commissions

53 The hearing of a suit in which a commission has been issued under Order XXVI of the Code shall be postponed until the return of the commission, unless the Judge otherwise directs.

54 An application for commissions shall be made promptly after the grounds on which it is asked for are known, and the petitions for it shall be accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits, setting out the facts relied upon as grounds for the issue of the commission, and when they first became known to the applicant.

55 In commissions for the examination of witnesses which are addressed to the Judge and in which the delegation of the Commissioner's duties to an Advocate or Pleader has not been authorized, the Judge shall have power to appoint such advocate or pleader or official of the Court as he may determine to execute the commission.

56 When an order for the issue of a commission to take evidence on interrogatories has been made, the party obtaining the order shall within four days from the date thereof, file his interrogatories, and the documents, if any, to accompany the commission and

from the date of the order

58 On default in the observance of these rules by a party obtaining an order for a commission, the commission shall not issue without leave of a Judge and on default by the opposite party, he shall not be allowed to join in the commission without such leave.

Arrangement and Numbering of Records

59 The records shall be arranged in the following order —

A—Regular Suit File

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) Facing sheet | (5) Evidence taken on commission |
| (2) Diary | (6) Documents tendered in evidence |
| (3) Pleadings | (7) Judgment |
| (4) Evidence taken by the Judge. | (8) Decree |
| (9) Processes in the regular suit | |

B—Miscellaneous Proceedings File

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| (1) Facing sheet | (3) Evidence |
| (2) Application | (4) Order |
| (5) Processes in the miscellaneous proceedings | |

C—Execution File

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|
| (1) Facing sheet | (3) Order |
| (2) Application | (4) Processes in the execution |

60 The diary shall be framed so as to show as concisely as possible every stage of and every proceeding taken in the suit, and the party or parties present in person or by pleader at every proceeding and shall ordinarily be signed by the Bench Clerk. But

if it is the sole record of a judicial order other than that of a postponement or of an adjournment or of a direction for the issue of process, then it shall be signed by the Judge

Judgments, Orders and Decrees

61 Judgments and orders shall only be pronounced after they are written, and shall bear the date on which they are delivered

Decrees shall bear the date of delivery of judgment, and also the date of signature

it is submitted to the Judge for signature, he may be allowed to do so, and if there is any disagreement as to the form of decree or order, or the taxing of the costs, the case shall be set down on the daily list, on as early a date as may be convenient, to speak to the minutes of decree

Pauper Suits

62 After the disposal of every suit in which a pauper is concerned, the Chief Clerk shall send to the Collector of Rangoon a memorandum of the Court fees due and payable by the pauper

Execution Proceedings

63 Applications under section 39 of the Code to send a decree or order for execution to another Court shall be made by verified petition, and shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the decree or order

21-11-11

sale shall be annexed to every application for the sale of property

66 In every application for the attachment of moveable property the approximate value of the property sought to be attached shall be stated according to the list of the

of moveable property it shall be

Sale of Attached Property

21-11-11

69

report to
attached and their approximate value, and shall also state the date of attachment or sale

If any of the articles or things fall within the proviso of Order XXI, Rule 43, of

A

Order XXI
Rule 43
proceed-

Order XXI
Rule 43

property shall be sold on the third Saturday after the day on which the proclamation shall have been fixed up in the Court

Security to Court

74 When sureties are required and persons resident within the jurisdiction of the Court are tendered, a report shall be called for from the Bailiff as to whether the principal and sureties possess within the jurisdiction of the Court property of value equal to the amount of the security required

over and above any incumbrances to which such properties may be liable, and over and above the amount for which they have previously given security and for which they are at the time liable as sureties

Bailiff's Commission on Sales of Attached Property

77 The Bailiff's commission on sales of attached property is the same as in Order LIII, Rules 163, 164, 165 and 166

THE BURMA GAZETTE

26TH AUGUST, 1911, PART IV 1 760

CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA

NOTIFICATION

Dated Rangoon, the 22nd August 1911

"Order LVI—Rules

RULES

I—Classification of Record

(a) suits and cases affecting immovable property, including suits for foreclosure, redemption, or sale,

if it is the sole record of a judicial order other than that of a postponement or of an adjournment or of a direction for the issue of process, then it shall be signed by the Judge

Judgments, Orders and Decrees

need after they are written, and shall

minutes of decree

Pauper Suits

62 After the disposal of every suit in which a pauper is concerned, the Chief Clerk shall send to the Collector of Rangoon a memorandum of the Court fees due and payable by the pauper

Execution Proceedings

63 Applications under section 39 of the Code to send a decree or order for execution to another Court shall be made by verified petition, and shall be accompanied by a

Order XXI,

the order of
sale of pro

the approximate
best of the

applicant's benefit
67 In applications for execution by attachment, it shall be expressly stated whether the property sought to be attached is in the possession of the judgment debtor or not, and the place where the property is to be found shall be clearly stated in the application for execution and shall report to the Court before the application has been complied with before

Sale of Attached Property

the Sheriff shall
the articles
not liable to

69

report to
attached and their approximate value
attachment or sale

If any of the articles or things fall within the proviso of Order XXI, Rule 43, of the Code, the Sheriff shall report and list them to the Judge, who shall pass such order as he may think fit. The provisions of the Code relating to the sale of property by the Sheriff shall not apply for a sale ordered by the Judge, who shall forthwith prepare and

A warrant for the sale of the property shall be issued by the Court.

71 Every proclamation shall be advertised in a local newspaper or advertiser for at least fifteen days (except in the case of property mentioned in the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 43 of the Code), and the cost of advertising shall be deducted from the proceeds of the sale.

to Order XXI Rule 43, of the Code, shall be attached to the order of sale.

property shall be sold on the third Saturday after the day on which the proclamation shall have been fixed up in the Court

Security to Court

73 When security is required to be given it shall be taken either in cash or in the form of a bond. Such bond shall be with or without sureties as the Judge may direct, and shall be in favour of the Bailiff of the Court for the time being.

74 When sureties are required and persons resident within the jurisdiction of the Court are tendered, a report shall be called for from the Bailiff as to whether the principal and sureties possess within the jurisdiction of the Court property of value equal to the amount of the security required.

75 No sureties shall, without the order of the Judge, be accepted unless they make an affidavit or affidavits stating that the property which each of them possesses, or that their properties combined, are equal in value to the amount of the security demanded, over and above any incumbrances to which such properties may be liable and over and above the amount for which they have previously given security and for which they are at the time liable as sureties.

76 On the application of the Bailiff summonses may be issued to persons named by him to appear before him, or to produce before him documents of title for the purpose of his inquiry into the value of the property of any person tendered as a surety.

Bailiff's Commission on Sales of Attached Property

77 The Bailiff's commission on sales of attached property is the same as in Order LIII, Rules 163, 164, 165 and 166.

THE BURMA GAZETTE

26TH AUGUST, 1911, PART IV p. 700

CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA

NOTIFICATION

Dated Rangoon, the 22nd August 1911

"Order LVI Rules

RULES

I—Classification of Records

Class I—Records of—

- (a) suits and cases affecting immoveable property, including suits for foreclosure, redemption, or sale,

to an office or to establish or set aside an

it, or in which
any question
between parties

improved

1514

4130

skin of lunatics

1 - an administrator or by the Gu... of 3 minutes
a application in the case, f the

Class III —Records of—

(a) all suits which do not come under Class I or Class II;
Class III — Records of—
(a) all suits which do not come under Class I or Class II;
(b) all suits which do not come under Class I or Class II;

(b) cases under the Succession (Property) Protection
in the Succession Certificate Act, 1889.

Acquisition Act, 1891, .
I under that
property ,

let have transacted -

may from time to time direct to be

(c)

included

a - as a matter of

Class IV — Records of execution proceedings

in a separate case, the record of
from the date of
only applications
in Miscellaneous

an appeal

In this rule the word "suit," "case" or "proceeding"

II —Arrangement of Records.

2. Every record under Class I, Class II, and Class III shall be divided into the first two files, A and B, and placed in cases other than appeals, at all contain

(n) **Diary**

114
115

(c)

463

(iii) Order 141, 1950

Advised on the 1st inst.

1, Order 11, Rule 14

- (f) List of documents produced by the parties at the first hearing, Order XIII, Rule 1 (2)
- (g) Written statements or counter petitions of the parties
- (h) Petitions, proceedings, and orders in interlocutory matters
- (i) Opening proceedings
- (j) Issues
- (k) Oral evidence for plaintiff * taken in Court and on commission
- (l) List of documents admitted in evidence for plaintiff *
- (m) Documents ‡ admitted in evidence for plaintiff *
- (n) Oral evidence for defendant † taken in Court and on commission
- (o) List of documents admitted in evidence for defendant †
- (p) Documents ‡ admitted in evidence for defendant †
- (q) Report of Commissioner appointed under Order XXVI
- (r) Award of arbitrators or petition of compromise
- (s) Report or account of a Receiver
- (t) Judgment
- (u) Decree
- (v) Final decree in mortgage or administration suits

proclamation sale

Table of contents—

- (a) Powers of attorney
 - (b) Summonses and other processes and affidavits relating thereto §
 - (c) List of witnesses
 - (d) Petitions relating to adjournments, attendance of witnesses etc.
 - (e) Other papers not included in Trial Record
 - (f) Letters, etc., calling for records, etc.
- 3 Every record under Class IV shall consist of two files, A and B
- File A shall contain besides the fileleaf with table of contents—
- (a) Diary
 - (b) Application for execution
 - (c) Papers received from Court which passed the decree Order XXI, Rule 6
 - (d) Plans of lands to be attached
 - (e) Petitions, proceedings, and orders in interlocutory matters
 - (f) Petitions objecting to the execution other than claims under Order XXI, Rule 58
 - (g) Warrants and prohibitory orders issued to effect execution by attachment or delivery of property and returns thereto
 - (h) Warrant of sale
 - (i) Proclamation of sale

(p) Copy of order in appeal or revision

File B shall contain all other papers

* Substitute ' defendant ' if defendant begins.

4 The A file of the trial record of an Appellate Court shall contain, besides the flyleaf with tables of contents—

- (a) Diary
- (b) Memorandum of appeal
- (c) Copy of judgment and decree of Lower Court
- (d) Written statements, if any
- (e) Petitions, proceedings, and orders in interlocutory matters
- (f) Oral evidence, if any
- (g) Judgment
- (h) Decree

under Small Cause

INDEX

PRACTICE IN ENGLISH COURTS, 1910

ABSENT foreigner and jurisdiction, 153

ABUSE of judicial precedent, 9
of process, inherent power to prevent, 9

ACCOUNTS

ACCOUNTS, commission to adjust or examine, 341
partnership, decrees in suit for taking, 886

ACKNOWLEDGMENT of service of summons, 646

ACQUIESCENCE by co defendant in place of suing, 172
of defendant outside jurisdiction, and place of suing,
172, 174, 175

in dismissal, a bar, 498

not a question of fact but of legal inference, 401

ACT OF COURT, construction of, 30
presumption as to, 30

ACT of State, meaning of term, 77

ACTING for client, meaning of term, 630

ACTION, grounds of, and duty of party, 121, 122

ACTUAL residence, 175 *See* RESIDENCE

ADDITION of parties, 545-569

of respondent, 1288

against whom suit dismissed, 1288a

ADDITIONAL evidence in appeal, 1307-1310

review, 121, 1355-1366

Judge, 52a

ADJOURNMENT, application for, and appearance, 750, 750a
of sale, 985-986

pleader applying for, and appearance, 1293

ADJOURNMENTS (O XVII), 837-841

and order for costs of, 837

test whether order or decree, 35, 36
 when conclusive in another Court, 136
 it exists, 36
 which is not a decree, 33

ADMINISTRATION (general), judgment for, 1128
 proceedings, 24, 25
 suit and suit for land, 163, 164
 decree in, 882, 893

ADMINISTRATOR *See* REPRESENTATIVE (LEGAL)

ADMIRALTY cause, assessors in, 493
 jurisdiction, appeal from Judge exercising, 55

ADMISSIBILITY of depositions, and Commission, 1092, 1093
 of evidence on information and belief 851

ADMISSION (O XII), 801-804

ADMISSIONS, 1092
 of facts, 1092, 1310

, 843

ADOPTION of reasons in appeal, 1310

ADVERTISEMENT of sale proclamation, 983

ADVOCATE and definition of pleader, 34, 59. *See* PLEADER
 and personally working for gain, 182

ADVOCATE GENERAL and public trusts, 456, 361-367
 position of, 364

ADVOCATE GENERAL, 1092, 1310

92

of documents, 1092

form of same, 789

conclusiveness of, 792 *See* DISCOVERY

signature of admissions, 803

power to order, 203

AFFIDAVITS (O XIX.), 850, 851

AFFIRMANCE in appeal to the Privy Council, 453, 454
 judgment of and statement of reasons, 1316

AFFIXING copy of summons on premises, 616, 618

AGENCY not included in carrying on business, 1115

AGENT, and carrying on business, 174, 181
 and interpleader, 1173
 act of, 893

AGENT—*continued*

service on summons on, 1221, 1212
 suit for account between principal and, 857
 to accept service, 636

AGENTS (recognized) (O. III.), and appearance, 748—750
 appearance, application, or act by, 629
 authority of, 631
 presence of, not necessarily appearance of party, 750
 service of process on, 634
 who are, 632

AGGREGATE value and consolidation in appeal to the Privy Council, 1332
 value of suits tried together, 452

AGREEMENT introducing fresh parties, 69*n*
 not to appeal, effect of, 387
 damages for breach of, 383*n*
 on behalf of minor, 1140—1144
 to give time, 221, 222
 state issue, 821, 822

AGRICULTURAL land, and saving clause, 59, 60
 produce and attachment, 305, 306, 939, 940, 941
 before judgment, 1193

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION, 4-6
 practise as to, 5-8
 right to use, 5

ALIEN enemy, suits by, 348
 friend, suits by, 348

(private) after attachment, 310-315

ALLEGATIONS in pleadings, 662-666, 699-706, 730-731
 uncertain on record, 119

ALTERATION of judgment, 853
 of law and *res judicata*, 111

ALTERNATIVE case, 683
 causes of action and embarrassing pleadings, 672
 claim, 682
 payment in decree for delivery of movable property, 867
 prayer for value of goods as compensation, 867
 titles, claim based on, 704

AMBIGUITY in decree, 117*n*, 850

by what Court, 867
 erroneous order of, 861
 inherent power as to, 19, 860
 limit of power as to, 860
 notice in, 861
 memorandum of appeal, 1263
 plaint, inherent power as to, 19
 in addition of defendant, 515, 51*n*

- AMENDMENT—*continued*
 of pleadings, 673-694
 and change of character of suit, 690-694
 costs, 691
 as to parties, 688
 relief, 689-690
 substance of plaint, 687
 principles on which granted, 682-686
 refused, 686
 provisions as to, 678, 679
 written statement, 18
- ANCILLARY property and execution, 284
 in Oudh, and execution, 293
- ANCILLARY relief, omission to grant, 123
- ANNUITY and attachment, 913
- ANTICIPATION, property subject to restraint upon, and attachment, 179
- APPEAL, a substantive right, and how given, 20, 494
 and adjournment, 837
 application for execution by transferee, 911, 912
 of O XXII, 1066
 arbitration proceedings, 46, 1469
 attachment before judgment, 1188
 cognizance, 418, 422
 consent decree, 387
 court fees in pauper suits, 48
 death of party, 1045, 1050-1053, 1055-1059
 decrees, 385
 difference of opinion of Judges, 393
 error, etc., in Order, affecting case, 426-429
 or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction, 394-397
ex parte decree, 386
 injunction, 1201, 1212
 Letters Patent, 52-56
 misjoinder, 394
 point not raised before Division Bench, 65
 powers of Appellate Court, 430-433
 preliminary decrees, 391
 receiver, 1258
 remand, 427, 432
res judicata, 139, 145
 withdrawal and adjustment of suit, 1073
 by pauper (O XLIV), 444, 1326-1329
 costs of, 212-214
 Courts authorized to hear, 386
 death of respondent during, 566, 567
 decision "final," though habeas to, 112
 decree in, 1318-1321
 costs in, 1320, 1321
 defined, 381
 dismissal of, and decree, 47
 effect of dismissal in point of form, 145
 withdrawal, 36
 entry of judgment *nunc pro tunc*, 919
 from appellate decrees, 337-338, (O XLII), 1323
 and cognizance, 418-421
 decision contrary to law, 406-407
 error or defect in procedure, 411
 material issue, 410
 Small Cause Courts, 417-422
 usage having the force of law, 409-410
ex parte, 412
 scope of, 412-417
 second appeal, 399-406
 where none, 417-422

APPEAL—*continued*

- from dismissal of suit 389
- Division Court, 51, 53
- ex parte decree, 756
- order dismissing suit at adjourned hearing, 839
- filing agreement to arbitrate, 1409
- for restitution, 46
- in insolvency, 41
- of rejection in review 1372
- orders, 37-42, 425-430, (O XLIII), 1324, 1327
 - in execution, 1274
 - execution proceedings, 48, 49
 - passed in revision, 479
 - refusing to set aside abatement, 1062
- original decrees, 391-397, (O XLII), 1209-1322
- from what decrees, 379
- further evidence in, 814
- general power to transfer, 163
 - provisions relating to, 430-432
- grounds of, 1261-1263
- heard by Bench of Judges, 392-394
- in execution, and stay, 921, 922
- judgment in, 1310-1318
- jurisdiction in, 83, 61
 - and valuation, 51, 55b, 451, 453, 983
- nature of, 379-383
- on a matter of costs, 217, 218
 - common ground, 1261-1267
- order rejecting, and decree, 46, 47
- pendency of, and bar of subsequent suit, 97, 303
 - in pendency*, 932
 - judgment, 362
- question whether appeal lies, 35
- received by Court without jurisdiction 74
- right of, 384
- time for, and amendment of decree, 862
- to the Privy Council, 434-456, 1330-1379
 - and affirmance, 453
 - certificate, 419
 - concurrent judgments on fact, 411-454
 - conditions, 450
 - costs, 413
 - decree, 444
 - final order, 416
 - jurisdiction in, 435-437
 - powers of High Court after admission of, 439
 - question of law, 454-456
 - rehearing, 440
 - savings, 435
 - special leave, 438-439
 - value, 451, 452
 - bars to, 431
 - by pauper, 411
 - value of subject matter, 434
 - when allowed, 434
- when deemed pendent, 97
- who may bring, 387-391

APPEALABLE value, 83, 84, 451-453

- and damages claimed but not ascertained, 452a
- interest, 84a
- mesne profits, 84a
- cases, how evidence taken in, 844
- decision, and *res judicata*, 139

APPEARANCE (O IX), 747-774

- ability to answer material questions, 751
- and party who has omitted to serve notice, 753
- issue of summons 637-639

APPEARANCE (O IX)—*continued*

- and pleader applying for adjournment, 750, 1283
- at what time parties must be present, 752
- by defendant on day of adjourned hearing, 757
 - no appeal from refusal to allow same, 758
 - defendant's remedy, 758
- only, 753
 - applicability of rule, 755, 758, 760
 - non appearance, 759
 - plaintiff's remedy in dismissal, 760
- day fixed for, 747
- defined, 748
- dismissal of suit in case of summons unserved and lapse of a year, 751
 - date from which time runs, 751
 - object of rule, 755
- on non payment of Court fees, etc., 751
- when neither party appears, 752
- in appeal, 7279-7284
 - examination of witness, 1091
 - limitation, 753
 - meaning of term, 629, 630, 748-751
 - objection by defendant before day fixed, 747
 - on ground of incomplete service, 761
 - of debtor in arrest, 930-937
 - foreign Sovereigns and jurisdiction, 76n
 - Judge on rule to show cause, 66n
 - minor, 1133
 - one of several plaintiffs or defendants for others, 570, 571
 - partners, 1116
 - on day fixed in summons 747
 - (personal), exemption of Purdanashin women, 489
 - persons of rank, 489
 - of party, when directed, 775-776
 - other circumstances as grounds for exemption, 489
 - plaint rejected for default of, in Mambaidari Court, and *res judicata*, 723
 - "plaintiff" includes legal representatives 751
 - procedure when only plaintiff appears, 755
 - applicability of rule, 755
 - ex parte* decree, 755
 - appeal from same, 757
 - under protest in suit against firm, 1125-1126
 - effect of, 1124
 - form of, 1121
 - when defendant not appearing alleged insane, 751
 - fresh suit barred, 760
 - application for order setting dismissal aside, 760
 - applicability of rule, 760
 - party absent but recognized agent present, 760, 751
 - suit should be dismissed for default of, 752
 - without issue of summons ("gratia"), 639

APPELLATE Bench and Full Bench, 12

- the Privy Council, 12
- differing from another, 12
- Court and events since challenged order, 382
 - interference with discretion as to costs, 218
 - transfer of suit (Act 22), 100, 192
 - disposal by, and *res judicata*, 101
 - function of, 381-383
 - matters not entertained by, 140n
 - nature of, 75
 - powers of, 430-432
- decree, appeal from (O XLII), 1323
- jurisdiction of High Court, 21

APPLICABILITY of Code to Revenue Courts, 61

- APPLICATION and certificate of adjustment or payment, 890
- and final order, 416

APPLICATION—*continued*.

- by auction purchaser to set aside sale, 1020
- in case of plaintiff attaining majority, 1146
- plaintiff attaining majority, 1145
- for adjournment, and appearance, 720, 1283
- amendment of decree, 859, 860
- disposal of suit by minor, 1146
- execution and Sect. 17...169
 - of decree, 901, 903, 912, 919
 - and cross-claims, 916
 - cross-decree, 915
 - by joint decree-holder, 904
 - transferee of decree, 907-912
- leave to appeal as pauper, 444
- re-hearing of appeal, 1283
- restitution, 437-503
- review, 437, 861, 1367-1373
 - grant of, 1377

APPOINTMENT of arbitrator, 1464

- of pleader, 631, 635
- receiver (O. XL), 1215-1238

APPORTIONMENT of costs, 210, 211

ARBITRATION proceedings, 44, 45

- and appeal, 45
- position under former code, 44
- (Second Schedule), 1463-1472

ARBITRATOR and tribunal in exemption from arrest, 491

- appointment of, 1464

ARREARS of rent, receiver's title to, 1246

ARREST and appearance of debtor, 936, 937

- and detention in civil prison, 934-937
- subsistence allowance, 945
- warrant for, 945

ASSESSORS in Admiralty or Vice Admiralty cause, 493

- ATTENDANCE of deponent, 870
 of witness, 833-836
 power to compel, 203
 witnesses (O. A. J.), 825-836
- ATTORNEY, and definition of pleader, 58
 service by, 1342
- ATTORNEYMENT by tenant in possession, and Receiver, 1246
- AUCTION PURCHASER, alleged to have bought on behalf of another, 322-326
 and application to set aside sale, 1020
 execution, 260, 261
 order disallowing claim to attached property, 971
 restitution, 503
 setting aside sale on ground of fraud, etc., 1010
 not entitled to notice in setting aside *ex parte* decree, 773
 title of, 315-322
- AUCTION, sale by, in execution, 977-1044
- AUTHORITY of case law (American), 12
 (English) 12, 13
 (Indian), 9, 10
 of reasons given by Judge, 11
 superior Courts, 12
 to and for right held in common, 136
- AUTONOMY of caste, 85, 86a
- AFFIRMMENT (inconsistent) in defence, 730
 of performance of condition precedent, 662
 on which no issue framed, taken to be admitted, 815
- AWARD, and stay of execution, 923
 allegation in plaint to set aside, 701
 in arbitration, 1466
 of costs, 207-218, and see COSTS
 mesne profits, 611
 remitted by Court, 1467
 setting aside, 1467
 sustaining judgment and *res judicata*, 145
- BALANCE due on mortgage, recovery of, 1167
 of purchase money unpaid, 1000
- BALUTE, right to, and interest in immovable property, 161
- Limitation. See LIMITATION
lis pendens, 95-99, and see *LIS PENDENS*
res judicata, 99-156, and see *RES JUDICATA*
 for jointness, 583
 of review by admission of special appeal 416
 to further suit (Sect. 12), 100
express, 64, 86
 by Criminal Procedure Code, 96
 Municipal Acts, 87
 Revenue Acts 96
 of a provisional character, 88
implied, 88-97
 award of costs, 79
 exceptions, 89
 instances, 89, 90
 public policy or morality, 88
 provisions of Statutes, 83

CAPACITIES, person suing in different, 29

CAPACITY, distinct, no estoppel, 126

of parties and plaintiff, 62a

party to suit and *res judicata*, 29

res judicata, 125, 135

CARRYING ON BUSINESS, 1115

agent, 641, 645

and actual residence, 175

corporation, 175, 180

permanency, 181

at several places by different agents, 181

by defendant and place of suing, 172, 180-182

Government and jurisdiction, 314a

captain of ship trading to port, 87a

foreigner, through agent, 174

meaning of term, 180, 1115

personally, 181

through agent, 174

CASE, meaning of, in revision, 465

law, authority of, 9-13

interpretation of judgment in, 12

CASTE, autonomy of, 85, 85a

joinder of several members, 520a

questions, 85, 85a

and interference by Court, 85

suit by several members of for maladministration, 520

for enforcement of right relating to, 85

restoration to, 85

when not confined to Hindus, 86a

CAUSE OF ACTION, accrual of, in suit for refund of assets, 339

allegation which is of the essence of, 665

alternative, 672

and accrual of damage, 580a

alienation of family property by widows, 609a

combination of defendants, 576a

consolidation, 627

continuing contract, 544

torts, 592

contract, 187

for service, 594

damages claimed, 593, 593a

different torts, 592

distinct acts of ouster, 589, 590, 590a

frame of suit, 573-625

and contract, 593-596

jurisdiction, 580-582

mortgage, 595-598

possession, 598

tort, 588-593

existence of in prior suit presupposed, 577

identity of, 583, 584

joinder of, 602-625; and see JOINDER

joinder, in suit for immovable property, 721

have to sue, 160a

place of suing, 172, 180-182

plaintiff's right, 608, 614a, 615

quasi contract, 187

rent suit, 594a

res judicata, 102

sak certificate, 316a

"same matter," 527, 608, 607, 607a

CAUSE OF ACTION—*continued*

and Sect 17 168

separate covenants 591, 591n

rights, 587

series of acts, 590

several statements in label, 590

subject matter, 70

suit by members of *farwed* against *Larnavan*, 609n

reversioners, 609n

symbolical possession, 242n

torts, 185

distinguished from subject matter, 521

how alleged in plaint 682-702

identity of, 583

and relief, 593, 596'

rule only against splitting, 624

not a case of *in est* 593 593n

11

'2 585, 608

not accruing within local limits, 640n

—

running account 595

(Sect 20), 182-186

separate against separate defendant, 597n

suit separate as regards, 625

splitting 575, 575n

test of identity of, 121

to be stated in notice under Sect 50 346

unity of, 589

wages, 535

— as for separate trials 624 t 26

taken for first time on appeal 717

CAUTIONERS assailing whole will, and *res judicata*, 176

1 1739

execute, 272

18

1

1710 1710

CERTIFICATE—continued

of sale, question what properties pass under, 405n

refusal to amend, 265n

satisfaction, 892, 893n, 894

under Succession Certificate Act, 709a, 710

CFSS, agents for recovery of, and revivificate, 134

CHANGE in law, and *res judicata*, 110, 110n

CHARACTER of suit, change of, and amendment of pleading, 690-691

CHARGE for plaintiff's costs in interpleader, 1173

on property outside jurisdiction, 159n

CHARITABLE trust, 356-376

CHARITIES, jurisdiction over, 358, 358n

CHARTER (Clause 12), and cause of action, 182, 183

and imprisonment for contempt, 160

jurisdiction of High Courts, 161

CHARTERED High Courts (O XLIX.), 1982

CHIPP (Ruling) and sub, 319-353

by or against minor, etc., 1118

personal privilege, 332

CHOICE of Forum. 173

CH01 A Nagpore Landlord and Tenancy Act, 22, 29

Procedure Act, and saving clause, 60

second appeal, 60

CHURCHWARDENS and sent on behalf, 363n

CIVIL COURT, and definition of decree, 42

CIVIL NATURE, rights of a, 81

suite of α , meaning of term, 13, 81, 83

(C. I. A. M., adverse and binder, 564)

alternative, to SI

Based on alternative title, 501

defined, 601

9 **07** **1** **ATM - mm P** **6** **P.P.**

CLH NF, and authority of pleader, 631n

CAUSE OF ACTION—*continued*

- and Sect 17 168
 - separate covenants, 591, 591a
 - rights, 587
 - series of acts, 590
 - several statements in libel, 590
 - subject matter, 70
 - suit by members of *tarwad* against *Larnavan*, 609a
 - reversioners, 609a
 - symbolical possession, 242a
 - torts, 185

- -

- distinguished from subject matter, 621
- how alleged in plaint, 682-702
- identity of, 583
 - and relief, 593, 686'
 - rule only against splitting, 624
- inclusion of in suit, 583, 583a

- - -

n, 576

- separate against separate defendant, 581a
- suit separate as regards 628
- splitting 575, 575a
- test of identity of, 121
- to be stated in notice under Sect 80 341
- unity of 589
- wages, 590
- when Court may order separate trials 624 626
 - deemed stated, 716
 - objection that none is disclosed can be taken for first time on appeal 717
- where arising in suit for legacy, 189a

CAVATORS assailing whole will, and *res judicata*, 156

- - - 1117

- -

(CERTIFICATE—continued)

of sal, question what properties pass under 405a

refusal to amend. 265a

satisfaction, 892, 893n, 894

under Succession Certificate Act, 2007, 710

CFSS, suits for recovery of, and res judicata, 134

CHANGE in law, and *res judicata*, 110, 110n

CHARACTER of suit, change of, and amendment of including 190-191

CHARGE for plaintiff's costs in Interpleader. 1173

on property outside jurisdiction, 159a

CHARITABLE trust, 356-376

CHARITIES, jurisdiction over, 358, 358m

CHAPTER (Clause 12), and cause of action, 182, 183

and imprisonment for contempt, 16m

jurisdiction of High Courts, 101

CHARTERED High Courts (O XLIX), 1382

CHIFF (Ruling) and cont, 349-353

by or against minor, etc., 1148

personal privilege, 352

CHOICE of Forum, 173

CHOTA Nagpore Landlord and Tenancy Act, 22, 29

Procedure Act, and saving clause, 60
second appeal, 60

CHURCHILL ARDFENS and suit on behalf, 363n

CIVIL COURT, and definition of decree, 42

CIVIL NATURE rights of a. 84

suite of a, meaning of term, 63, 81, 85

CLAIM, adverse and powder, 500

alternative, 181

Based on alternative title 3, 701

defined, CO)

nature, not amount, determines jurisdiction, 81

relinquishment or omission of part of, 573-602

splitting, 576

statement of (English) and "plant," 200

under another, 67n

unwarrantable addition to, and prediction, 82, 83

whole must be included in suit 575

CLIFN1, and authority of pleader, 631n

judicial discretion. 30

jurisdiction to imprison for contempt. If "

Madras Pent Recovery Act, 30

Mamlat'lar's Courts, 26

CODE--continued

- and pecuniary jurisdiction, 62
- proceedings in Revenue Courts, 27-29
- provisions of Rent Acts, 27, 28
- Revenue Courts, 27, 28, 28a, 61, 62
- savings of special laws and procedure, 59
- Small Cause Courts, 62-64
- subordination of Courts, 59
- chief feature of, 2, 3
- date of coming into force, 31
- definitions in, 32-35
- extent of operation, 31
- how far applicable to testamentary and intestate jurisdiction, 25
- inherent powers apart from, 16-19
- jurisdiction in cases not affected by, 21
- meaning of British India in, 31, 32
- method of construction of, 3, 4
- not exhaustive, 14, 20
- preamble to, 1
- provisions conflicting with Probate and Administration Act, 25
- repeal by, 2
- Scheduled District, 32
- short title of, 31
- title of, 1
- to what Courts it applies, 22
- extent binding, 15
- exhaustive, 15

- CO DEFENDANTS and *res judicata*, 128, 129
- improperly joined taking part in defence, 553
- watching appeal, refused costs, 212
- when discovery or inspection obtained against, 795
- issue between allowable, 815

- COGNIZANCE, and appeal, 418-422
- and civil nature of suit, 85
- place of suing (Sect. 15) 156-155
- bar of, 80-95, and see Bar
- of crime, 154

COLLECTION of mesne profits, 874

- COLLECTOR, and execution against immovable property, 227, 331
- party to suit, 256, 256a
- suits in Mofussil (public charities), 365a
- transfer of a decree for rent to Civil Court, 28
- duty of, in partition, 295
- estate in rent roll of, 905a
- execution of decree by (*Third Schedule*), 1175-1181
- transferred decree by, 936
- extract from register of, in attachment, 905
- jurisdiction of, 29
- suits to which same a party, 159a

- COLLUSION as affecting judgment, 67a, 83, 170
- and interpleader, 1174

- COMBINATION and joinder, 611, 611a
- respondent, 690a
- of defendants and cause of action, 590a

"COMMANDING OFFICER" defined, 1168

- COMMISSION Agent, suit against, where cause of action arises, 197a
- and application for leave to sue as pauper, 1152
- investigation by, 1093-1095
- issued by foreign Court, 312
- to examine or adjust accounts, 311
- person of rank, exempt from jurisdiction of *magistrate*, 400
- witness, 312. See EXAMINATION of witnesses
- to make a partition, 311. See PARTITION

- COMMISSIONER to take accounts and by 59n
- COMMISSIONS (O XAJ) 1088-1105
- COMPANIES joint stock trading in foreign currency 112
- COMPANION of party or of pleader examination of 75
- COMPARISON of plaint with judgment and *res judicata* 115n
- COMPENSATION alternative prayer for value of goods as 86^c
 for obtaining arrest, etc (Sect 9) 378
 trespass to property in plaintiff's possession 16^c
 wrong to immovable property and place of suing 108 3^c,
 person or moveables 171 172
 wrongful seizure of cattle suit for 49
 plaintiff entitled to possession and, 931
 suits and different jurisdictions 170
- COMPTINACT and foreign judgment 100 11n
 and *res judicata* 136-142
 uncertainty of local limits 170
 how determined 79 80
 in *res judicata* 19
 meaning of, in Sect 15 157
 of Execution Court, 241, 261n
 Foreign Court presumption as to 101
 on what it depends, 157
 under Act X of 1877 135
- COMPETENT jurisdiction, when Court said to be of 66
 meaning of term as regards jurisdiction 66n
- COMPROMISE, addition to decree of clause not contained in, 146n
 affecting will 25
 appeal withdrawn under, 116
 as regards a will when unlawful under Code 25
 by Hindu female, 146
 pleader 631n
 decree against minor and review 147
 in accordance with 146n
 in adjustment of suit 1073
 representative suit, 640
 suit by or against minor, 1140, 1141
 induced by fraud, 450n 895
 judgment in terms of 655
 must be treated as new contract, 1077
 of decree by agreement, effect of, 224
 trial of question, 265n
 withdrawing claim, and jurisdiction, 165
- CONCISE statement and plaint, 712, 713
- CONCLUSIVENESS of affidavits of documents, on what points, 792, 793
 foreign judgment, 148, 149
- CONCURRENT judgments on fact, 441-443
 jurisdiction and *res judicata* 136, 137
 lis pendens, 26
 of Small Cause and Munsif's Courts in Madras 151
- CONDITION PRECEDENT in pleading 661, 662
 defined, 665
 when avertment of performance of implied, 662
- CONDITIONAL attachment, 1186, 1188
- CONDITIONS of applicability of O II r 2 378
 imposed on right to appeal to the Privy Council, 4 n
 in stay of execution, infringement of 622
 order not fulfilling and certificate of Steno, 417n
- CONDUCT of party and costs, 213
 of suit, 570

- CONDUCTING the sale, measuring of term, 1019
- CONFESSION and avoidance in defence, 730
of judgment by defendant, 823
- CONFINING suit, order, 626
- CONFLICT between Code and Probate Act, 27
of evidence in appeal, 1312
- CONFLICTING cases, 11, 13
decisions and *res judicata*, 117
- CONJUGAL RIGHTS, suit for restitution of, and cause of action, 187n
- CONSENT and addition as next friend, 545
 plaintiff or next friend, 567
 and consolidation in appeal to the Privy Council, 1332
 departure from practice, 69n
 inherent incompetency of Court, 351
 jurisdiction, 68-70, 68n, 69n, 142
 nature of decree, 69n
 arbitrator appointed against and illegality, 475, 476n
 decree and appeal, 387
 doctrine of penalties, 205n
 by, against minor without leave, 1143
 and dismissal of suit, 146n
 clause in, not contained in compromise, 116n
 no appeal from, 381, 387
 procedure for setting aside, 387
 Judge made arbitrator by, 65
 judgment by 145, 146
 and estoppel, 145
 need not be in writing, 663
 of minor's guardian without sanction, 205n
 parties, and Probate, 25
 order, jurisdiction to set aside, 146
 to discontinuance of action, 146n
 order (after decree), for payment by instalments, 169
 suits of Governor General, 76n
 Governor of Madras, 76
 Bombay, 76n
- CONSOLIDATION of suits, 17, 627
of suits in Admiralty, 24
 appeal to the Privy Council, 1312, 1337
 after, 628
 application of rule, 627
 by consent, 627
 where order obtained, 627
- CONSPIRACY and joinder, 630n
- CONSTRUCTION, suits to, 4-8
 and earlier decisions, 3, 9, 10
 intention of legislation, 1, 9
 language of Act, 3, 9
 previous state of law, 3
 statute *passim*, 13n
 in technical sense, 11
 and consolidating Act, 3
 a document involves question of fact and of law, 491, 494
 bare denial of contract in pleading, 662
 decree as to relief by orders, 151
 definition of pleader, 57, 59
 enactments affecting jurisdiction, 89
 "formal," in Sect. 21, 29
 judgment, *in omnibus in partibus* 856, 874 n
 "re-ordinatio" and "dwelling" 176
 rule in setting aside ex parte decrees, 794

CONSTRUCTION—*continued*

- of Sect 17 .167
- Sect 47 .48, 49
- term "suit," 196
- will, 274
 - costs in suit for, 209_n
- to be liberal, 13, 14

CONSTRUCTIVE habitation, 161_nCONTEMPT OF COURT and costs, 209
and exemption from arrest, 491

- nature of order passed on, 46
- none in not filing written statement, 745
- order and appeal, 423_n, 428, 428_n

CONTENTIONS of parties and interpretation of decree, 117_n
inconsistent, 576, 576_n

CONTENTS of plaint, 200

59_n

- merger of, in decree, 206
- suit arising out of, and cause of action 187
- for, and recovery of dower, 187_n

CONTRACT Act, and place of suing, 179

CONTRIBUTION, decree for, 838
for costs, suit for, 209_n
liability in, 838_nCONTUMACY of party, 776_nCONVERSION of several things and cause of action, 592_nCONVEYANCE by registrar in execution, 931_nCONVICT (life), not civilly dead, 655_n

CO OWNER with judgment debtor, bidding in execution sale, 993

CO PLAINTIFF, dismissal as against one, 615_nCOPY of decree and judgment presented with memorandum of appeal, 1257
drafts, delivery of, in execution, 930
etc., sent and filed in transfer for execution, 898, 899COPYRIGHT, cognizance of suit for damages, 157
suit for infringement of, 171_nCO SHARIF, suit against, 136_nCO SHARIFS, suits by, and former, 661_n

- CONDUCTING the sale, meaning of term, 1019
- CONFESSION and avoidance in defence, 730
of judgment by defendant, 823
- CONFINING suit, order, 626
- CONFLICT between Code and Probate Act, 25
of evidence in appeal, 1312
- CONFLICTING cases, 11, 13
decisions and *res judicata*, 147
- CONJUGAL RIGHTS, suit for restitution of, and cause of action, 187n
- CONSENT and addition as next friend, 545
 plaintiff or next friend, 567
and consolidation in appeal to the Privy Council, 1332
 departure from practice, 69n
 inherent incompetency of Court, 384
 jurisdiction, 48-50, 68n, 69n, 146
 nature of decree, 69n
arbitrator appointed against and illegality, 475, 476n
decree and appeal, 387
 doctrine of penalties, 203n
 by, against minor without leave, 144
 and dismissal of suit, 146n
 clause in, not contained in compromise, 146n
 no appeal from, 381, 387
 proceduro for setting aside, 387
Judge made arbiter by, 63
judgment by, 145, 146
 and estoppel, 145
need not be in writing, 568
of minor's guardian without sanction of
 parties, and Probate, 25
order, jurisdiction to set aside, 146
to discontinuance of action, 146n
 order (after decree) for payment by instalments, 869
 suits of Governor General, 76n
 Governor of Madras, 76
 Bombay, 76n
- CONSOLIDATION of suits, 17, 627
of suits in Admiralty, 24
 appeal to the Privy Council, 1332, 1333
 after, 628
 application of rule, 627
 by consent, 627
 whom order obtained, 627
- CONSPIRACY and joinder, 530n
- CONSTRUCTION, aids to, 4-8
and earlier decisions, 3, 9, 10
 intention of legislation, 4, 9
 language of Act, 3, 9
 previous state of law, 3
 statute *passu*, 13n
in technical sense, 11
of a consolidating Act, 3
a document involves question of fact and of law, 401, 415
bare denial of contract in pleading, 662
decree as to relief by orders, 154
definition of pleader, 57, 58
enactments affecting jurisdiction, 86
 "formal," in Sect. 2, 36
judgment, inconsistent in parts, 856, 857n
 "residence" and "dwelling," 176
rule in setting aside *ex parte* decrees, 509

CONSTRUCTION—*continued*

- of Sect 17 167
- Sect 47 48, 49
- term "suit," 19b
- will, 274
- costs in suit for, 209a
- to be liberal, 13, 14

CONSTRUCTIVE habitation, 181a

CONTEMPT OF COURT and costs, 408

- and exemption from arrest, 491

- nature of order passed on, 46
- none in not filing written statement, 745
- order and appeal 423a, 428, 428a

CONVENTIONS of parties and interpretation of decree 117a

- inconsistent, 576, 576a

CONTENTS of plaint, 200

CONTRACT and cause of action, 187-189 593-596

- bare denial of same in } leading 662
- breach of part of, within jurisdiction, 190

- merger of, in decree, 206
- suit arising out of and cause of action 187
- for and recovery of dower, 187a

CONTRACT ACT, and place of suing 173

CONTRIBUTION decree for, 858

- for costs, suit for, 209a
- liability in 858a

CONTUMACY of party, 776a

CONVERSION of several things and cause of action 632a

CONVEYANCE by registrar in execution 931a

CONVICT (life) not civilly dead, 655a

COWNLR with judgment debtor bidding in execution and 333

CO PLAINTIFF dismissal as against one 615a

COPY of decree and judgment presented with memorandum of appeal, 125

- drafts delivery of in execution 930
- etc., sent and filed in transfer for execution 838 839

COPYRIGHT, cognizance of suit for damages 157

- suit for infringement of, 171a

- suits against, and joinder 564a
- by or against (O XXIX) 1110-1112
- where deemed to carry on business 173

CO SHARER, suit against, 136a

CO SHARERS suits by, and joinder 564a

- COSTS**, Advocate General suing with relators *for*, 365*n*
 and appealable value, 402
 conduct of party, 212
 decree, 855, 259
 in pre-emption suit, 883, 884
 default in payment of pre-emptive price, 883
 election on mortgage, 624*n*
 estate or fund administered, 269*n*
 guardianship proceedings, 210
 interpleader, 1174
 irrelevant matter, 213
 legal representative, 209
 matrimonial cause, 210
 misconduct of plaintiff, 213*n*
 nominal damages, 214, 214*n*
 Official Assignee, 209
 personal liability of judgment debtor, 20*n*
 mortgagor, 20*n*
 plea of want of jurisdiction, 70*n*
 pleader *à fees*, 215, 215*n*
 resistance to consolidation, 627*n*
 suit in wrong Court, 156*n*
 Appeal Court interfering with exercise of discretion as to, 218
 as to, 217, 218
 apportionment of, 210
 arbitrarily awarded, 215*n*
 attorney and client, 209*n*
 award of, by Court without jurisdiction, 207
 calculation of, 215
 charge for, and interpleader, 1173
 decree as to and appeal to the Privy Council, 456
 deposit of, in appeal by party *amending*, 674*n*
 discretion of Court, 210
 estimate of in appeal to the Privy Council, 133*n*
 execution for, 216
 following the event, 211
 in amendment of pleadings, 655
 after change of character of suit, 691
 arbitration, 1467
 construction of wills, 209*n*
 criminal proceedings, 89
 how recovered, 89
 fraudulent valuation of suit, 23
 payment into Court, 1041
 reference, 1351, 1352
 setting aside decree, *ex parte*, 764
 suit relating to public trust, 575
 withdrawal of appeal, 1274
 interest on, 217
 no separate suit for recovery of, 50
 not awarded and set-off, 216, 216*n*
 following the event, 207
 objection as to, 216
 of adjournment, 37
 Administrator General, 209*n*
 appeal, 1320
 to the Privy Council, 1346, 1347
 commission to examine person of rank exempt from personal appearance, 400
 take evidence, 1103
 defendant who is struck out, 537
 fresh summons to witness after setting aside decree, 773*n*
 further particulars or statement in pleading, 161
 interrogatories, 782
 legal representative, 209*n*
 mortgage subsequent to decree, 1160
 person *à* side party without consent, 209*n*
 with *à* side party, 161*n*, 211*n*
 publication of sale proclamation, 943

COSTS—*continued*.

of rejected application for leave to appeal, 455n
 remand, 1321
 service, 1380, 1381
 successful defendant, 209n
 translation in appeal to the Privy Council, 860n
 trustee, 209n
 unsuccessful co plaintiff, 511
 witness in Magistrate's Court and *res judicata*, 155
 omission to award, 208

separate, 214, 215
 set off, 19, 216, 217, 855
 against mortgage money, 210n
 solicitor's lien for, 210n

COUNSEL, witness appearing by, costs of, 210 *See* PLEADER

COUNTERCLAIM, not a separate action for purposes of execution, 915n
 omitted from Schedule, and why, 488
 scandalous, 18n

COURT, act of, 30
 and conduct of suit, 510

District, and execution of decree, 1477
 definition in Evidence Act, 51

pendency of appeal in, 151n
 suit in, 95
 how jurisdiction derived, 67
 to be guided, 11

COURT—*continued*

to be brought before it, 501, 507n
stay, 190, 191n

suit on writ in, 33, 34
suit in wrong, and costs, 156n
transfer of business, 507
when said to be of competent jurisdiction 65

COURTS, relationship of, 12
subordination of, 51, 59

COURT FEES Act, decision under, 39
not a decree, 43n
and application for review, 1365
claim for interest, 204
joinder of claim for mesne profits, 623n
presentation of appeal, 1260
return of plaint, 714
suit as pauper, 1153, 1159
Valuation Act and pecuniary jurisdiction, 157
valuation of suit, 80

COVENANT and registrar conveying in execution, 330
separate, and cause of action, 594, 594n
when separate contracts, and cause of action, 594n

CREDIBILITY of witnesses, and appeal, 1312

CREDITOR, and Administration suit, 832
attaching goods not belonging to debtor, 375n

CRIME, local cognizance of, 161
suit for enforcement of punishment of, 161

CRIMINAL case right of appeal to the Privy Council, 436n
depositions in, 818n
costs in, 89, 89n
Court, decision of, and *res judicata*, 103, 105n
evidence in, and in Civil Court, 105
finding in, and *res judicata*, 118

61, 160

CROSS APPEAL, 391n

CROSS CLAIM, in execution of decree, 1003
and set off, 738

CROSS DECREES, execution of, 914-916

CROSS OBJECTIONS and appeal from original decree, 1266, 1289-1291

CROSS SUIT, and *res judicata* in appeal, 139
stay of, 191n

CURE of technicality, 397

CUSTOM and pre-emption, 881

DAMAGE, accrual of, and cause of action, 550n
and cause of action, 592
special where none in public nuisance, 355, 356
to land, claim for, 165, 166

DAMAGES, amount of, when question of fact, 410
and frame of suit, 537-593
injunction, 1082

for appeal contrary to agreement, 388n
for wrongful arrest, when suit for, 925
in malicious prosecution, 590
question of, 973n

740

DAMDUPAT, rule of, 205n, 206, 206n

DATE and interest ordered in decree, 294

and of amendment, and limitation 686n, 862
n n n 1912

DEATH of decree holder, 800
of defendant and jurisdiction 185
judgment debtor before satisfaction, 271-276
partner 1120
party (O XXII) 1045-1053
after institution of suit, 78
and enforcement of decree, 279 283
fresh suit, 126n
n n n 1902

SUBJECT, 101

sale under separate decrees for instalments of, 932n
secured by mortgage of immovable property, and attachment, 937
within meaning of Transfer of Property Act and decree, 909

DEBUTTUR, objection that property, 255*n*

DECISION *see* *judgment*

DECLARATION of validity of assignment of decree, suit for, 911

DECREE, against person not summoned, 637

ambiguity in, 117*n*, 856

amendment of, 860-864

and costs, 855, 859

and *res judicata*, 103 *see also* 1481

payment by instalments, 808-810

rejection of appeal, 47, 48

plaint, 46-47

appellate, appeal from (O XLII), 1323

assignment of in equity, 908*n*

right under, 60

at variance with judgment, 117*n*

certified copies of, 889

comment on definition, 35-50

convent, no appeal from, 387

how set aside, 387

contents of, 855-859

date of, 865, 866

declaratory, giving consequential relief, 243*n*

deemed valid till reversal or supersession, 91

defined, 32, 33

generally, 33-50, 444, 445

ex parte, 100, 101

following judgment, 201

formality in 36, 36*n*

for delivery of moveable property, 867

contents of same, 867

"for money" defined, 337

for possession and mesne profits, 870-881

recovery of immoveable property, 866

and *res judicata*, 103

joint, foregoing right to execute, 892*n*

DECREE—*continued.*

meaning of, is a question relating to execution, 243
 not according to law, when binding, 35
 effect of, 35
 of the Privy Council, 1343
 practice with respect to same, 1343, 1344
 on default, and Sect. 2, 36
 merits and processual order, 42
 (O. XX.), 835-839

for partition, 1100

silent as to interest on costs, 217
 subsistence of, 319a
 test whether final, 444
 transfer of part of, 903a
 right under, 60

decrees on, and Sect. 2, 36

tender after, 884a

expenses of witness, 828
 pre-emption suit, 883, 884
 presenting written statement, 746
 production of evidence, 824
 order for dismissal for, not a decree, 33

DEFAULTS, several, in payment of instalments, and cause of action, 593

DEFECT, general power to amend, 509
 in plaint as to signature or verification, 668a
 proclamation of sale, 979, 979a

DEFECTIVE statement of reasons by Appellate Court, 1716

DEFENCE and estoppel in appeal, 415
 inconsistent, 704
 matter specially pleaded in, 729, 730
 written statement of, 727-734, 746

DEFFENDANT, addition as, of person refusing to join as plaintiff, 77a
 addition of parties claiming under, 560a
 and issue not tendered, 120

in Letters Patent *see* . . .

residing in another province, and service of summons, 203
summons to appear and answer claim, 202
who may be joined as, 511

DEFICIENCY of Court fees, 507

DEFINITION of act of State, 77
of actual residence, 175
attached to the earth, 61
British India, 32
carrying on business, 180
Code, 32
cond . . .

holder, 33
district, 33
execution, 219
final decree, 33, 37
foreign Court, 33
judgment, 33
former suit (Sect 11), 99
Government pleader, 33
immoveable property, 61
Judge, 33
judgment, 33
debtor, 33
legal representative, 33
litigation under same title, 134
mesne profits, 33
moveable property, 34, 61
order, 34
party (in larger legal sense), 124
plaint, 200
pleader, 34
preliminary decree, 33
point, 1299
prescribed, 34
property, 60, 61
public officers, 34
relief claimed (Sect 11), 123
Revenue Court, 61
rights of a civil nature, 77
rules, 35
saleable interest, 1021
scheduled District, 32
share in a corporation, 35
signed, 35
trial, 199
try, 101
wrong done, in Sect 19. . 171

DELEGATION to Collector, of power to execute decrees against immoveable property,
327-331
of execution of process, 921

- DELIVERY of draft of document, 930
 endorsement of negotiable instrument, 930
- possession, representative resuming, 266a
- DEMEANOUR of witness, 816
 and appeal, 1311, 1312
- DEPONENT, attendance of, 850
- DEPOSIT—
 setting aside sale, 1004-1010
 Small Cause Courts, 63
 of costs by party amending, 894a
 purchase money, default in, 883
 tender after same, 885a
 with agent, and interpleader, 1173
- DETENTION in civil prison (Sect. 55), 286-293
 of resisting or obstructing debtor, 1035-1038
- DETERMINATION of attachment, 959
- DEVASTHAN of idol, and public trust, 370a
- DEVOLUTION of joint rights, 1120
- DILIGENCE in collection of mesne profits, 874
 meaning of, 873a
- DISALLOWANCE of addition, 566a
 of costs of special appellant, 211a
 set off, 738a
- DISCHARGE of injunction, 1210, 1211
- DISCOVERY—
 affecting documents, 788
 affidavit in answer, 780
 no exception to be taken to same, 787
 time for same, 786
 of documents, 788
- 779
- incriminating interrogatory, 781
 inspection of documents, 791

DISCOVERY—*continued*

insufficiency, supererogation, 787
 interrogatories to be submitted to Court, 782
 irrelevance in discovery, and in cross-examination, distinguished, 784
 leave to interrogate, 779
 meaning of "material," 781

order for inspection, 796

 application for same and affidavit in support, 796
 requiring answer or further answers, 787
 party made only for purpose of, 801n
 power to order, 203
 premature, 798
 privilege, 785, 791

putting aside and striking out interrogatories, 786
 verified copies, 798
 what documents must be included in affidavit, 790
 when further affidavit required, 792

DISCREPANCY between proclamation and certificate, 979n

DISCRETION, judicial, and appeal to the Privy Council, 456

and attendance of witness, 833, 833n
 Code, 30
 interest after date of suit, 204, 205
 decree, 205

exercise of, 30

 and irregularity, 408
 by Receiver, 1246
 in equitable set off, 739

t, 211

nature of, 30

refusal to exercise, as to additional evidence, 408n
 to recognize assignment of decree, 50
 when exercise of, liable to review or appeal, 408

DISMISSAL acquiesced in, a bar, 498

for default, order of, not a decree, 33
 refusing to answer interrogatories, 41
 of appeal and decree, 40

res judicata, 39

 for default of appearance, 1282

 under O. XLII r. 11..863

application for execution, 959

minor co plaintiff from suit on attaining majority, 1146

suit, 751, 752, 754, 758, 760

 appeal from, 789

res judicata, 40n, 116, 117, 144

suit, distinguished from rejection of plaint, 718

DISMISSAL—*continued*

- of suit, for default in appearance by both parties 752, 753
- plaintiff, 753
- payment of court fees, 751, 752
- non appearance after adjournment, 839
- in default of security for costs 1084, 1085 ..

DISPAUPERING, 1156**DISPOSAL** of suit at first hearing (O XV), 823-824

- of suit in non appearance after adjournment, 838
- on preliminary point and remand, 1296

DISPOSSESSION and delivery in execution, 932

- by decree holder, 1040
- of stranger, 932

DISQUALIFICATION of Judge by personal interest, 60, 60*n*
and transfer of suit, 195 196, 196*n***DISSENT** from judgment in appeal, 1318**DISSOLUTION** of partnership, decrees in suit for, 886**DISTRRAINT**, suit for recovery of property under, 165**DISTRIBUTION** of assets, 331-340

transfer of suit, 196, 195

appeal, or proceeding, 103

presentation of plaint, 201

(in Bombay) and suit when Government party, 158

defined, 33

Judge, 61

and additional Judge, 52*n*

jurisdiction of, 79

(Scheduled), 32

DIVISION COURT, appeal from, 54, 55

point not raised before, 65

DIVORCE—

Act, English, rules of, 26

procedure, 26

proceedings and attachment before judgment, 1190

DOCUMENTS, admission of, 801

construction of, question of fact and of law, 401, 415

decree for execution of 930, 931

delivery and service of draft of, 970

of copy of draft, 930

discovery of, 787 788 793 *See* **DISCOVERY**

impounding of, 807

inspection of, 794-796

relied on in plaint, enjoining or annexing a list of, 712

return of, 809

specification of, in Special Case, 1175

transmission of, in appeal to the Privy Council 1338

DOMICILE of foreign corporation 180

- DRAFT of document or of endorsement in execution, 930
- DRUM, omission of beat of, in proclamation of attachment, 958
proclamation by beat of, 931, 1033
- DUES for different years and identity of relief, 98
- DWELL, distinguished from reside, 178
 meaning of term, 176, 177
- DWELLING, and residence, 174, 175
- EASEMENT and claim in alternative, 692*n*
 right to, and execution sale, 218*n*
- "EFFECTUAL service" defined, 653
- EJECTMENT by landlord and party to suit, 561
 suit changed into redemption suit, 859*n*
 for, and *res judicata*, 134
- ELECTION and joinder of plaintiffs, 511
 by plaintiffs, 615*n*, 618*n*, 621*n*
 and remand, 1293
- EMBARRASSING matter in pleadings, 672
 pleadings, 705*n*
- ENDORSEMENT in transfer of negotiable instruments and shares, 905
 of hand and place of payment, 189*n*
 negotiable instrument, 930
 instruments or shares sold by Court, 905
 on copies of admitted entries, 807
 summons, and evidence of service, 640, 657
- ENDOWMENT, foreign, funds of, 184
 objection that property held for, 255
- ENFORCEMENT of foreign judgment, 160, 163
- ENGLISH Admiralty Court, practice of, 24
 Courts, jurisdiction of, 153
decision, applicability of principle in, 13
 doctrine of *res judicata*, 101
 Rules and Orders and Code, 13
 as to set off, 737*n*
 in divorce, 26
 writ, service of, in India, 651
- ENLARGEMENT of time, 506
- ENTRY of judgment *sunt pro tunc*, 857, 919
- EQUITABLE execution, and Receiver, 330*n*
 jurisdiction of High Courts, 161
in personam, 165
 set off, 738, 739, 739*n*
- *EQUITIFS, transfer of decrees subject to, 907
- EQUITY (natural), consideration of, 14, 16, 20, 21
 of redemption and bar of second suit, 90, 91
res judicata, 133
 when attachable in execution, 297
- ERROR affecting merits or jurisdiction, 394-397
 and review, 1360
 restitution, 499
 Appellate Court only a Court of, 75
 in exercise of jurisdiction, 67, 68
 finding of fact, and second appeal, 399-400
 grant of relief, 68*n*

ERROR—*continued*

in order amending decree, 864
 orders, 426-430
 procedure, 411
 and second appeal, 117

when award not vitiated by, 1467

ESTIMATE of expenses in appeal to the Privy Council, 1336

ESTIMATION of mesne profits, 872, 873

ESTOPPEL, 117, 118

and agreement to be bound by oaths of others, 144
 decree in spite of finding, 118

as to valuation against a defendant, 81n
 binding, though suit relates to different property, 118
 by judgment by consent, 145
 not taking on review, 117

EVASION in defence, 732, 733

EVENT, costs following, 211-214
 meaning of term, 211, 212
 not following, 207
 and reasons, 213

EVIDENCE, additional, in appeal, 1307-1310
 admitted in wrongly granted review, 1176
 Act, and foreign judgment, 1176

as to valuation, 81n, 831
 on information, 117

as to valuation, and Court of Equity, 819n
 decree by *quaradar*, 125n
 made without, 470n
 documents relied on as, 723, 724
 documentary, production of, 805
 estoppel part of law of, 101

ERROR—*continued*

in order amending decree, 424
orders, 426-431
procedure, 411

power to amend, 609
when award not vitiated by, 1467

ESTIMATE of expenses in appeal to the Privy Council, 1336

ESTIMATION of mere profits, 872, 873

ESTOPPEL, 117, 118

and agreement to be bound by oaths of others, 144
decree in spite of finding, 118
without jurisdiction, 113
defendant appealing against co defendant, 391a
judgment by consent, 145
matter alleged in written statement, 119
plea of want of jurisdiction, 70
privity, 121a
as to valuation against a defendant, 81a
binding, though suit relates to different property, 116

EVASION in defence, 732, 733

EVENT, costs following, 211-214
meaning of term, 211, 212
not following, 207
and reasons, 213

EVIDENCE, additional, in appeal, 1307-1310

on information and belief, 871
identity of cause of action, 121
material objects, 811
pleading, slight variance between, 680
test of identity of suits, 118
by sale certificate, 316a
clear disregard of, in judgment, 410
conflict of, and appeal, 1312
de bene esse, and Court of Equity, 819a
decreed by *paradar*, 125a
made without, 470a
documents relied on as, 723, 724
documentary, production of, 805
estoppel part of law of, 101

EVIDENCE—*continued*

- failure to produce, at first hearing, 824
 - when case for final disposal, 824
- how taken in appealable cases, 844
- in Court without jurisdiction, 67n
- insufficient, decision on, 1297
- issue on which taken, and finding, 855n
- manner of recording, 846n
- memorandum of, 845
 - taken by another Judge, 848
 - when judge unable to make same, 847
- misconception of, and second appeal, 407
- new, and application for review, 1359
- not produced when Court satisfied, and appeal, 844
- of *mesne profits*, 876
 - service of summons, 649
- substantial injury in execution sale, 1019
- on new issue in Appellate Court, 820, 830n
- rehearing, record of, 1306
- order passed without, 460n
- party not permitted to adduce, 478n
 - summoned to give, by opponent, 778, 778n
- plaintiff's default before close of, and *res judicata*, 144
- power to issue summons to give, 204
- prima facie*, of residence, by recital in bond, 174
- proceedings in Criminal Court, 105
- production of, guided by issues fixed, 816
- proof of refusal to take, 844n
- refusal to take or record, is error of procedure, 411
- statement and production of, at hearing of suit, 842-851
- summons to give, 825
- under Sect. 138, how taken, 845
- use of answers to interrogatories, 800
- want of, not cured by default in contesting a point, 817

EXAMINATION by commission, 1088-1105

- by Court (O. X.), 775-776
 - ascertainment whether obligations admitted or denied, 775
 - oral examination of party, or companion of party or of pleader, 775
 - substance of examination to be written by Judge, 775
 - when personal appearance of party directed, 776
- in proclamation of sale, 977
- of applicant for leave to sue as pauper, 1152
- serving officer, 650
- witness in house, 489, 489n
 - open Court, 843-849
- witnesses (O. XVIII.), 842-849
- pro interesse suo*, 1239
 - practice in, 1239n

EXCESS in realization, restitution of, 498

- recovered under decree, recovery of, 95

EXCHANGE, rate of, and appeal to the Privy Council, 1345**EXECUTION** (Part II), 210-340

- after transfer, 900
- against immoveable property, and second appeal, 418n
- and alienation after attachment, 310-315
- arrest and detention, 286-290
- attachment, 293-316; and *see* ATTACHMENT
- distribution of assets, 331-340
- duration of imprisonment, 291
- exemption of women from arrest and detention, 290
- partition or separation of shares, 285, 286
- release from imprisonment, 291, 292
- sale, 316-327; and *see* SALE
- transferees and legal representatives, 271-278
- appeal from orders in, 1274

228

- for costs, 216
- interest on money realized in, and recovered, 91
- jurisdiction in, 83, 84
 - and interest after decree, 84
 - over, 169, 170, 224
- liability of ancestral property, 231
- limit for time for, 268-271
- limitation of powers, 232-234
- of decree, 564
 - against firm, 948-952
 - and merits of decree, 634
- what orders made in are appealable, 48
- transferred decree, 231
- (Order XXI), 890-1014
- procedure in, 278, 491, 495
- proceedings, addition of party in, 546a
 - and suit, 43
 - construction of, Sect. 47. 48, 49
 - co widow joined as joint decree holder, 556
- order in, and *res judicata*, 107, 108a, 154, 154a, 155
- suit within meaning of Sect. 10 97
- technical defect in, 464a
- auction purchaser, 260
- fraud, 249-252
- "parties," 256
- representative, 256
- separate suit, 252
- technical defects, 261
- construction of, 239
- matters held to be within, 211
- object of, 238
- orders held to be within, 245
- when case not within, 247-249
- transfer of decree, 230, 231
- what acquired by purchaser in, 314, 315
- decree may be executed, 223

FINDING—*continued*

- of fact, concurrent, 411-413, 454-456
 - error in legal inference from, 402-405
 - of law in, 402
- on immaterial matters, and *res judicata*, 119*n*
- remand, correctness of, 1313
- Special Case, 1175
- unnecessary issue, and *res judicata*, 117
- test whether incidental or not, 118
- which operates as *res judicata*, 118

FINE, and defaulting witness, 204

FIRM, execution of decree against, 948, 952
suits by or against (O XXX.), 1113-1126

FISHERY, suit for rent of, and immovable property, 171

FITNESS for appeal, certificate, 449

FORCE, preventing execution of decree by, and limitation, 269, 270

FOREIGN corporation, domicile and residence, 180
Court, 51

- commission issued by, 341
- defined, 33
- included by "Court" in Sect. 11 104

nature of such fraud, 150

conclusiveness of, 148-150

defined, 33

duty to obey is new cause of action, 587

enforcement of, 150

execution of decree upon, 154

how enforced, 93

jurisdiction determined, 148

used, 147

in rem, 150

limitations to operation as *res judicata*, 149

mistake of fact or of law in, 149

natural justice, 149

conclusive and not, 100

territory, service of summons in, 656-657

execution of decrees in, 251

FORM, effect of dismissal of appeal in point of, 145
 matters of, and Privy Council, 138
 of action when immaterial, 701
 execution of document, or of negotiable instrument, 930

FORMS—

Appendix A.—Pleadings—

(1) Titles of suits, 1385

(2) Description of parties in particular case, 1385

(3) Pleadings—

No. 1. Money lent, 1386

No. 2. Money lent, 1386

No. 3. Money lent, 1386
 No. 4. Money lent, 1386
 No. 5. Money lent, 1386
 No. 6. Money lent, 1386
 No. 7. Money lent, 1386
 No. 8. Money lent, 1386
 No. 9. Money lent, 1386
 No. 10. Money lent, 1386

No. 11. On a foreign judgment, 1389

No. 12. Against surety for payment of rent, 1389

No. 13. Against surety for payment of rent, 1389

No. 14. Against surety for payment of rent, 1389

No. 15. Against surety for payment of rent, 1389

No. 16. Breach of contract to serve, 1391

No. 17. Against a builder for defective workmanship, 1391

No. 18. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 19. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 20. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 21. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 22. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 23. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 24. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 25. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 26. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 27. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 28. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 29. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 30. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 31. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 32. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 33. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 34. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 35. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 36. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 37. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 38. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 39. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 40. On a bond for the fidelity of a clerk, 1391

No. 41. Administration by creditor on behalf of himself and all other creditors, 1399

No. 42. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 43. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 44. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 45. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 46. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 47. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 48. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

No. 49. Administration by specific legatee, 1400

no other

is transfer with

Noted, 1399

ground of mistake 1397

struc-

FORMS—continued

Appendix E—Execution—continued.

- No 39 Deed to convey land by judgment of sale, 1440
 No 40 Summons to appear and answer charge of obstructing execution of decree, 1444
 No 41 Warrant of committal, 1445
 No 42 Authority of the collector to stay public sale of land, 1445

Appendix F—Supplemental Proceedings—

- No 1 Warrant of arrest before judgment, 1446
 No 2 Security for appearance of a defendant arrested before judgment, 1446
 No 3 Summons to defendant to appear on surety's application for discharge, 1447
 No 4 Order for committal, 1447
 No 5 Attachment before judgment, with order to call for security for fulfilment of decree, 1447
 No 6 Security for the production of property, 1448
 No 7 Attachment before judgment on proof of failure to furnish security, 1448
 No 8 Temporary injunctions, 1448
 No 9 Appointment of a receiver, 1450
 No 10 Bond to be given by receiver, 1450

- No 3 Security bond to be given during the pendency of appeal, 1452

No 4
 No 5
 No 6

- No 7 Notice to a party to a suit not made a party to the appeal, but joined by the Court as a respondent, 1453
 No 8 Memorandum of cross objection, 1454

No 9 Affidavit of appeal, 1454

No 10

No 11

No 12

King in

- No 13 Notice to respondent of admission of appeal to the King in Council, 1455

- No 14 Notice to show cause why a review should not be granted, 1455

Appendix H—Miscellaneous—

- No 1 Agreement of parties as to issues to be tried, 1456
 No 2 Notice of application for the transfer of a suit to another Court for trial, 1456
 No 3 Notice of payment into court, 1457
 No 4 Notice to show cause (general form), 1457
 No 5 List of documents produced by plaintiff, 1457

GENERAL CLAUSES ACT applicability of definitions in 51
 GHATWALI lands in Burhoom and execut on 283
 (*shikm*) tenure and execut on 283
 tenure future rents and profits as such not attachable 298
 tenures in Kharukpore and execut on 283
 COMASTAH of firm when a recognized agent 634
 GOODS sold and place of delivery 189
 wrongful detent on of and cause of act on 590
 CORAH land su t for and joinder 643 644

party to su t n Bombay 158
 pleader defined 33
 solicitor costs of 210
 sued where cause of act on arises 181n
 su t by or against (O XXVII) 1106 110

GOVERNOR GENERAL as ent to Code 1
 in Council and transfer of su t 200

GRADE Court of lowest mean ng of term 10

GRANT of rel of error in 68n

GRATIS appearance without issue of summons 639

GRATUITIES and attachment 301

GRAND 0

GUARDIAN and su t by or aga nst m nor or person of unsound m nd 11 J-114b
 (of m nor) fraud or negl gence of 133

HANDWRITING documents merely tendered for comparison of 7 4
 874

examination *de bene esse* 849
 of witness 843
 further ev dence after close of plaint if a case 843
 how ev lence taken n appealable cases 844
 memorandum of evidence 840
 n unappealable cases 846 84
 object on to and appeal 844
 power to examine w ness immediately 848
 inspect 849
 recalling witness 849
 record in English 840
 remarks on demeanour of w ness 846
 r ght to begin 84
 statement and product on of evidence 84

HEARING—*continued*

of suit (O XVIII), taking down particular question and answer or objection, 846
when Judge unable to make memorandum of evidence, 847
witnesses excluded from Court, 844

HEBANAMA construction, a substantial question of law, 455

HEIR, and accrual of cause of action in suit for legacy, 189n

and alienation by Hindu widow, 690n

legal representative, 263, 268n

representation of widow, 276n

decree against Mahomedan, 280

in possession, sued, 281

of mortgagee, suit by, and joinder, 564n

mortgagor, opportunity to redeem, 281

obligee, suit by, and joinder, 565n

HEIRS, suit against some, and bar, 593n

HEIRSHIP, certificate of suit to set aside, 187n

succession by, in execution of decree, 275

HIGH COURT, a Court within meaning of Sect 9 65

Admiralty side of, 24

and aids to construction, 6-8

amendment of decree, 855, 855n

decision of another, 11

delivery of paper books in appeal, 1284

dismissal after summons returned unsworn, 751

Insolvent Court, 23

jurisdiction *in personam*, 165, 166, 167

Mamlatdar's Court, 26, 26n

property partly outside jurisdiction, 160

relation to subordinate Court, 21

stay to avoid inconvenience, 96

suit on decree of Small Cause Court, 93

transfer of suit (Sect 22), 190, 192

appeal, or proceeding (Sect 24), 193

(Letters Patent), 194

appellate jurisdiction of, and conferring jurisdiction, 168

(Calcutta), and Mofussil service of summons, 655

local limits of, 74n

calling cases to it—*file*, 507n

Chartered, and execution before ascertainment of costs, 481

power to examine witness immediately, 446

(O XLIX.) 1382

savings, 481

special provisions, 481

application of, 481

when not affected by rules in judgment and decree, 853-855, 866

who may address, 481

constitution of, 1, 2

definition and General Clauses Act, 61

duty of, in appellate jurisdiction, 31

how jurisdiction conferred on, 67

inherent powers of *See* INHERENT

interference of, and jurisdiction, 460, 470

judgment under Letters Patent, 52-56

jurisdiction of, 71, 74, 160, 482

and revision, 458-468

over charities 458, 458n

to imprison for contempt, 16n

limit of powers under Sect 17 .107, 163

local jurisdiction of, 33

not bound by decisions of other High Courts, 12

only limit upon original jurisdiction of, 79

original civil jurisdiction of, and Sect 16 159

side not subordinate, 54n

power to transfer suit under Letters Patent (clause 17) 194

(Presidency), and meaning of cause of action 183 184

HUNDI

son, and father's debt, 131
rights of, 130

son adopted during litigation, 711
decree against, 126-128, 276
and representation, 276a
reversioners, 280
joint family in execution proceedings, 276
suit by or against, and *res judicata*, 126-128
worshippers in temple, interest of, 359, 359a

HOLIDAY, close, sale on, 201a
presentation of plaint on, 200

HUNDI, payment by, and accrual of cause of action, 189
where endorser liable to pay, 189a

HUSBAND of married trustee or executrix, and joinder, 1128

HYDERABAD, service of summons in, 654

IDENTIFICATION of defendant's premises (service of summons), 647, 649
of immoveable property, 866
in attachment, 904
land in dispute impossible, duty of Court, 720

IDENTITY of cause of action, test of, 121
of matter in issue, 114
parties, 123-126
relief and *lis pendens*, 95, 96, 97, 98
demands for different years, 98
suit, 106
test of in *res judicata*, 118

IDOL, debt incurred for by Shebait, 132
future voluntary offerings to, not attachable, 298
right of worship of, and execution, 300

ILLEGALITY and irregularity, 1013
and misjoinder, 619
res judicata, 150
review and revision, 473-477
validity of sale, 1013, 1014

IMMATERIAL matter and *res judicata*, 119

IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY. *See* PROPERTY

IMPLICATION, decision by, 116
of grant of ancillary relief, 123

IMPLIED averment of performance of condition, 662
contract in pleadings, 662

IMPOUNDING of documents (O XIII), 805-812

IMPROVEMENTS during wrongful possession, profits of, 33, 34

INCOMPETENCY (inherent), and consent to jurisdiction, 3-4

- INCONSISTENT titles and defences in pleadings, 704, 706
- INCONVENIENCE, stay on account of, 96
- INCRIMINATING interrogatory, 785
- INCUMBRANCE and distribution of assets, 331, 332, 339
and proclamation of sale, 981, 982
- INDEMNITY in suit on lost negotiable instrument, 724
- INDIA (British). *See* BRITISH INDIA
- INDIAN Councils Acts, laws under and saving clause, 61
law, apparent mistake as to, in foreign judgment, 149
- INFANT. *See* MINOR
- INFORMATION and belief, evidence on, 851
- INFORMATIONS, exhibited by Advocate-General, 344
- INFRINGEMENT of provisions of Code, 13
right, suit based on, and plaint, 704
- INHERENT jurisdiction, saving of, 508
power and remand, 1300, 1301
security for restitution, 503
stay, 1272
to amend records, duration of, 860
extent of same, 861
invent procedure, 16n, 17n
stop abuse of records, 18n, 1269
- INJUNCTION (ancient right), and suit to recover debt or damages, 1082
and appeal, 1201, 1212
payment into Court, 1082, 1083
relief, 712
restitution of conjugal rights, 928
decree containing, and legal representative, 277
for, and corporation, 926-928
defined, 1196
mandatory, 1197, 1201, 1202
restraining defendant from suing plaintiff, 1240
without leave, 1240
- INJURY (substantial), and setting aside sale, 1010, 1010
- INQUIRY as to pauperism, 1150
and appeal, 1328
as to jurisdiction, 67n, 75n
merits and foreign judgment, 153
plea of payment by mortgagor, 892n
rent and mesne profits, 870, 871
value in appeal to the Privy Council, 1333, 1334
by Collector in execution, 1475

- INSANITY, alleged, of defendant, and non appearance, 751
- INSOLVENCY, and Code, 3
 exception of High Court in exercise of jurisdiction in, 482
 jurisdiction, 21-24
 of High Court, 482
 of party (O XXII), 1059, 1060
 orders in, 24
 petition in, and signature and verification, 1113
 proceedings, 44
 set off in, 738
- INSOLVENT Act, and residence, 177
 Court, 21-24
 constitution of, 23
 limit of jurisdiction, 23
 nature of, 23
 relation to High Court, 22, 23
 estates and decree in administration suit, 892
- INSPECTION of documents (O XI), 777-800 *See* DISCOVERY
- INSTITUTION OF SUIT, 200-202
 and place of suing *See* PLACE OF SUING
 public charities, 350
 date of, 202, 682
 "in forma pauperis," 1149-1151
 in summary procedure on negotiable instruments, 1177
 not barred by Sect. 10 (*lis pendens*), 97
 of interpleader, 1172-1174
 (O IV), 636
- INSTRUMENT (negotiable) *See* NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
- INSUFFICIENCY of plaint, 715-720
 of stamping of plaint, effect, 715-720
- INTENTION of Legislature, 3, 8, 9
 not clearly expressed, 4, 6
- INTEREST Act, decisions on, 205*n*
 after decree, 204, 205
 and jurisdiction in execution 84
 discretion as to, 205
 after suit, order as to, in decree, 204
 and decree, 204, 205, 206
 dismissal of "the rest of the claim" 206
 Limitation Act, 870
 payment by instalments, 868
 restitution, 502, 502*n*
 return of purchase money, 1029
 before suit, 204
 decree silent as to further, 204
 of money recovered under reversed decree, 43
 on costs, 217
 in Privy Council appeal, 1346
 deposit, 1081
 mesne profits, 881
- (saleable), meaning of, 1021
 in private sale, 1023
 subsequent to decree and appraisable value, 452
- INTERFERENCE by High Court with subordinate Court, 21
 of High Court and jurisdiction, 461, 470

INTERIM order, 1210, 1211
 defined, 1210
 instead of injunction, 1210
 sale, 1212

INTERLOCUTORY decree, 37
 judgment, 447
 order and final decree, 37
 revision, 465, 466, 467
 res judicata, 154, 165
 meaning of term, 446
 orders, 444-448, 1212
 (O XXXIX.), 1195-1214
 proceedings, affidavits in, 850
 costs in, 107, 860

INTERNATIONAL law, and Sect 20 186
 incorrect view of, in foreign judgment, 100, 140

INTERPLEADER, 354
 and agents and tenants, 1173
 stakeholder, 1174
 (O XXXV.), 1172-1174

INTERPRETATION of Act See CONSTRUCTION
 of deposition, 845
 question of law, 440a

INTERROGATORIES, 777-800, and see DISCOVERY
 dismissal for refusal to reply to, 42
 incriminating, 786
 in examination by commission, 1091
 power to make orders relating to, 203

INTERVENTION in suit by petition, 1241a

INTRASTATE, jurisdiction 25

INVENTIONS, cognizance of suits for damages concerning, 157

INVENTORY in attachment, 904, 905, 1213

INVESTIGATION (local), commission to make, 341, 1093-1095

INVESTMENT, order for, 1213

IRRE

1 - 610

IRRELEVANCE in discovery and in cross examination distinguished, 784

IRRELEVANCY in pleadings, 670

IRRELEVANT matter, introduction of, and costs, 213, 1346

ISSUE, end of, 109
 and *res judicata*, 108-111
 defined, 712
 general, 731

1 - 610 111

not framed, and *res judicata*, 110
 tendered, and defendant, 120

ISSUE—*continued*.

- of summons (O. V.), 637-660
 - to witness, 826
 - same distinguished from leave to supplement evidence, 826
- parties at, and not at, 823, 824
- settlement of (O. XIV.), 813-822
- unnecessary, and plaintiff, 120
 - res judicata*, 147
- when said to arise, 108

ISSUES, resetting by Appellate Court, 1303

- framing by Appellate Court, 1304

JOINER, 511-572

- and cause of action outside jurisdiction, 185
 - plaintiffs in different Courts, 157
 - suits relating to mortgages, 1162-1164
- of causes of action, 602
 - action against several alienees, 608
 - alternative case, 613
 - and claim by or against executor, administrator, or heir, 621
 - jurisdiction, 623
 - not cognate*, 619

procedure under last Code, where misjoinder, 617, 618

present Code, 620

"same defendants jointly," 613

examples of misjoinder on this point, 614

examples when no misjoinder, 615

summary of rules, 605, 607

parties to suits, 511-569

effect of misjoinder or non joinder, 541

nature of rules, 515-518

objections as to, 570-572

scope of rules, 511-513

waiver of objections, 571, 572

defendants, 511

plaintiffs, 511

respondent by Appellate Court, 1288

trustees and legal representatives, 1125

order, 1000,

and execution, 1006

JUDGMENT, admissibility of, in evidence, 104

against dead man, 78

one of several joint debtors, effect of, 823

party deceased after institution of suit, 78

before same, 78

q. v. - -

q. v.

q. v. v. v.

effect of pending appeal on, 382

enforced *in personam*, 166

erroneous, of competent Court, 67, 68

- - - - -

improperly obtained, 58

and *res judicata* 104

in arbitration, 1468

case law, how to be read, 10

rem, 150

Special Case, 1175, 1176

terms of compromise, 855

meaning different from English, 52

of, under Letters Patent, 52-57

- - - - -

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

signature of, 853

when pronounced 852

written by predecessor § 2

pronouncement of, 204

sect 37 204

vitiated by fraud § 5

when action lies on, 92

action on not permitted 33

JUDGMENT DEBTOR 33

and exemption from arrest, 490

recovery of excess recovered under decree 91

includes a ship, 50

meaning of term, 50

legal representative of, 50

transfer of liability of, 50

JUDGMENTS, final and interlocutory distinguished 447**JUDICIAL** act, presumption as to 70discretion *See* Discretion

.

.

.

.

.

compromise withdrawing claim 165

consent of parties, 68

place of suing, 156-158
 public charitable trust, 357-358
 reference, 1349-1351
 residence, 174-179
 subject-matter, 70, 71
 suit as pauper, 1153
 suit for attached property, 974
 torts, 185, 186

conc

construction of enactments affecting, 86
 Courts outside British, but not foreign, 61
 decree without, and estoppel, 117
 res judicata, 142
 determined by nature of claim, 81, 82
 different, and compensation suits, 171
 kinds of, 67

derived and conferred, 67

INDEX, 1011
in personam, of Courts other than Presidency High, 167
 test of, 166
 in set-off, 743, 744
 Special Case, 1175, 1176
 inherent, 507, 508
 instances of, 10-13
 of subordinate Court, 21, 22
 saving of, 507, 508
 inquiry as to, 67n, 75n
 judgments of Courts of co ordinate, 11n

JURISDICTION—*continued*

limited but exclusive, 73

local, 67

and cession of territory, 31

change of residence, 78

consent, 68

death of person liable, 185

district, 33

cause of action outside, and joinder, 185

limits of, 73, 74

nature of, 73

waiver of, 68a

meanings of term, 66, 67, 469, 470

in different Sections of Code, 67

Sect 9 .67

not conferred by consent when incompetency inherent, 384

given by consent, 142

objection as to, after remand, 414, 414a

to, when to be taken, 390

of Civil Court, and execution by Collector, 328

in partition of revenue paying land, 1101

Collector, 29

English Courts, 152

High Court, 71-74, 160, 482

and revision, 458-468

original civil, of "Presidency" High Courts, and Sect 10 159

species of, and extent of same, 72

Small Cause Court, 62-64

Sovereign in Council, 435, 437

on what it depends, 142

consent of parties, 67, 68

equitable set off in excess of, 71a

how determined, 157

limit of, in particular Courts, 79

in particular suit, 79

and over valuation, 80, 81

how determined, 79, 80

mode of valuation, 80

not ousted by finding, 82

though limit afterwards passed, 82, 81

waiver of, 68a

personal, and death of party, 78

non resident foreigners, 76, 77

general rule as to, 77

how conferred, 75

on what it depends, 74

special exemptions from, 76, 76a, 77

plea to, and setting aside sale (O XX1 r 90), 1013

presumption as to, 141

sale under decree without, 1013

special, 157

Admiralty, 21

Courts—Small Cause, 26

Mamlatdar's, 26

Revenue, 27-30

exclusive and transfer of suit, 195

JURISDICTION—*continued*
 special, insolvency, 24
 matrimonial, 26
 saving of, 59

decree for fraud, 186
 try prior suit (O II), 579-582
 valuation of subject matter of appeal for purpose of, 386
 want of, 14
 and interference by High Court in revision, 460, 470
 when causes of action united, 622
 whether whole cause of action should arise within, 183, 184

IUSTIFICATION, plea of, when embarrassing, 672

KANAM, nature of claim on, 135

KAPINDAH and party to suit, 526
 effect of decree against, 526

KARVAPPAN, and suits for land in possession of *anandran*, 599
 effect of decree against, 131
 of Malabar family and *res judicata*, 131
 position of, 131a

KHAS possession decree for, 911

LAND Acquisition Act, proceedings under, not suits, 45, 105, 427
 claim for damage to, 163

LAND Government 327

LANDHOLDER and saving clause, 59, 60

LANDLORD and tenant, denial of relationship and *res judicata*, 131
 remedies of, 70

LANDS situate in more than one jurisdiction 897

LANGUAGE in appeal to the Privy Council, 153a
 of statute and construction, 3, 9
 subordinate Courts, 493

LAW, application of, by judge, 20
 decision before alteration of and *res judicata* 111

question of in appeal to the Privy Council, 454-476
 special or local saving of, 19
 when decree not according to, is binding 35

LAWS, the, meaning of term in preamble, 22

FALSE by Receiver, 1241a, 1246, 1246a

LEAVE, and place of suing, 172, 173

sue, and institution of suit, 159n
 suits for immoveable property, 169, 179n
 as pauper, 1155
 refusal of, 41
 use documents otherwise inadmissible, 726
 verify plaint, 668
 withdraw registered appeal, 1274
 suit or appeal, effect of, 36

LEGAL representative See REPRESENTATIVE

LEGISLATION (previous), 1, 2
 intention of, 4, 8, 9

LESSOR, and *res judicata*, 133, 131

LESSOR, and *res judicata*, 133, 131

LETTER of request, 1089
 to examine witness, 311

LETTERS PATENT, 459
 (Allahabad), and presentation of copy of judgment, 1261
 admission of appeal, 1261
 and appeal apart from former Code, 448

LIABILITY, joint and several, and *res judicata* 130

LABEL, and cause of action, 529
 and place of suing, 186
 postponement pending test action, 625

LIEN for costs in interpleader, 1174
 for costs (solicitor's), 218n
 of pleader for costs and set off, 734

LIMITATION Act, an addition and rejoinder, 346, 362, 363

application for leave to move, 7
 review, 1365
 to amend decree, 861, 862
 pay by instalments, 869

LIMITATION ACT—*continued*

- in proemption, 885, 886
- survival of suit, 1052, 1057, 1062, 1065
- powers in execution of transferred decree, 232, 233
- LIMITATIONS (pecuniary, etc.), and place of suing, 158, 172, 173
- LIMITS, local, of jurisdiction, 73, 73*n*
- LIQUIDATION of decree by Collector, 1478
- LIS PENDENS, 48, 49, 95, 99
 - and execution proceedings, 96
 - identity of parties, 99
 - relief, 98, 99
 - jurisdiction to grant relief, 99
 - matter in issue, 97
 - pending appeal, 98, 932
 - priority in time, 97
 - res judicata*, 48, 96
 - sale in execution, 933
 - extends to alienations pending suit, 96
 - object of rule, 95
 - rule does not bar institution of suit, 97
- LITIGANT, how ascertained, 125
- LITIGATION under same title, 131
- LOCAL Government, 59

rules in sale of land, 341
sanction of rules, 451

(1)
3

SALES, 91, 93, 97
offices and suits relating to rules, 86

LOCUS SOLUTIOVIS, 187, 188

LOSS of records, 91
of right to execute (through neglect), 91

LOST negotiable instrument, suit on, 721

LUNATICS, and discovery of documents, 801
suit by or against (O XXXII), 1129-1118

- MADRAS Rent Recovery Act and Code, 30
- MAGISTRATE, order by, and Civil Courts, 87
refusal of costs of witness by, and *res judicata*, 155
- MAH ALS of Orissa and execution of decrees, 235
- MAHOMEDAN co heir, decree against and execution, 280, 281
daughter, decree against and execution, 280
law and pre-emption, 884, 885
- MAINTENANCE suit, decree in, and *res judicata*, 147
- MAJORITY, attainment of, under Indian Majority Act, 1129
of judges in appeal, 391
- MALABAR Tarwad and cause of action, 599
- MALADMINISTRATION suit by several members of caste, 520n
- MALICE, allegation of, in pleading, 662
and disallowance of costs, 214
- MALICIOUS prosecution, action for, and cause of action, 590
- MAMLATDAR, and costs decreed by High Court, 216
and power to levy costs decreed by High Court, 216
jurisdiction of, and dispossession of stranger, 932
over officers of Government, 26n
- MANAGER and Receiver, 1218, 1219
- MANDATORY Injunction, 1197-1197n, 1200
- MARRIAGE of party (O XXII), 1909
- MARRIED trustee or executrix, husband of, and, under, 112n
- MATRIALITY in discovery, 724
- MATRIMONIAL jurisdiction, 26
- MILLAR M, Receiver appointed to recover, 1219n

MEMORANDUM of appeal, 1259-1267

amendment or rejection of, 1263
and pauper, 1327

grounds of appeal, 1261
misdescription, 1260
objections not taken, 1262
point overlooked, 1313, 1314
presentation, 1259
scandalous matter, 1259

of cross objection, 1294

evidence, 815, 817

objections to findings after remand, 1305

MESNE MORTGAGEE and redemption, and foreclosure, 1109

notice, 611

interest, 581

calculation of, 874

claim for, distinct from claim to recover possession, 501
included in recovery of money, 740

decree for, 870, 871

defined, 33

meaning of term, 612

nature of, 871

suit for, 871a

MILITARY men, suit by or against (O XXVIII), 1108, 1109

res judicata, 102

service of summons on, 615

succeeding to estate, and transfer by operation of law, 904

suit by or against (O XXXII), 1129-1133

MINORITY, disputed by defendant, 1133
in India, 1129

WISCONSIN, proceedings, not suits, 45
and execution proceedings, 107
unconnected with suits, cognizance of, 157
when suits, 106

MISCONCEPTION and appeal as to fact, 402
of evidence, and second appeal, 407
facts and transfer of suit, 196

WISCONDUCT of Judge, appeal grounded on, 382
of party and costs, 213

DISJOINDER, and appeal, 391
 distinguished from absence of cause of action, 601
 kinds of, 541, 542
 objection on ground of, in appeal, 415
 of causes of action, 603-612
 objection for, 617-622
 parties, 541-545
 objection for, 570-572
 subjects of suit, 607 *and see* JOINDER

MISPRISION in embodying judgments, 440

MISREPRESENTATION and statement of claim, 700

MIS STATEMENT in petition for special leave to appeal. 439

MISTAKF, and review, 1360

(CRITICAL OF ARITHMETIC), ARITHMETIC OF 373
in decree, whether suit will lie to rectify 861
of fact or of law in foreign judgment 149

MUTASHARA coparcener judgment del tor, death of 313
family, compromise made by Kurta of 1077
law, property under, and execution against her 27.

MONY, decree for, defined, 377
decree for payment of, and instalments 869 See
interest, 204 205
suit for, 108c
recovery of meaning of term 740

319

MORTGAGE and costs 209
 pursue, and prior and sub 1162 1163

MORTGAGES of immovable property and relating to (a) XXXX (b) 11.1

MORTGAGOR and revjnd cals 137
entitled to set off cost* 216

MOTION for appointment of Receiver how founded, 1226
to secure attendance of witnesses 834

MOVE AND property See **PROPERTY**

VI KHITAR (certificated) and recognized agent 633

MULTIPLICATIONS 603

MUNICIPAL Acts, and *lex cognovance*, 87

MUNICIPALITY, suit against, 158*n*

MUNICIPALITY, suit against, — jurisdiction, 877

presentation of plaint at private residence of, 201
village, and *Small Cause Court in Madras*, 167

MUTUALITY of debts in set off, 742
test of *res judicata*, 103

NAME in plaint, 703
other than own, suit against person carrying on business in, 1113-1126

NATIVE ladies (not exempt under Sect. 132), examination of, 1090
State, suit on judgment of Court in, 93, 155*n*

NATURAL justice and foreign judgment, 100, 149
meaning of term, 149

NATURE of suit, how ascertained, 418

NAZIR not a public officer, 58*n*
selling property, unaware of postponement of sale 977

NEGOTIABLE instrument, summary procedure on (O XXXVII), 1177-1182
attachment of, 932
decree for endorsement of, 930, 931
(lost), suit on, 724
transfer of, 995

NEXT FRIEND of minor or of person of unsound mind, 1129-1148

NON APPEARANCE (O IX) 747-774

NON JOINDER 541, 544, and *see* JOINDER

in amendment of *decree*, *see*
appeal 1280-1284

— of Court 1170

debtor, 994

NOTICE—*continued*

transfer of suit (Sect. 22), 190-191
 to set aside decree, 774
 sale, 1022, 1024
 attachment of debts and shares, etc., 944
 attachment against person of debtor, 926
 cross objection, 1289
 day fixed for hearing appeal, 1280
 service of same 1280

omission to serve, 753
 service of, 1380
 to admit, documents, 801
 facts, 803
 concur in appointing arbitrator, 1465
 inspect documents, 795
 produce documents for inspection, 795
 show cause against execution, 917, 918
 in arrest of debtor, 934, 935
 reference on agreement, 1469
 tenant in occupancy of immovable property, 933

NOTIFICATIONS of Governments under the Code, 1484, 1488, 1491, 1510, 1513, 1526, 1529

NOVATION, distinguished from amendment of decree, 862

NUISANCE, public, and suit, 355, 356
 to immovable property, and suit for same, 167

NUISANCES, public, suits relating to, 48-59

OATH of another, agreement to be bound by, and estoppel 144
 under Oaths Act, decree on, and *res judicata*, 145

OBEDIENCE (personal), relief obtainable through, 167
 and place of suing 178

OBITER dictum and *res judicata*, 119

grounds of, in memorandum of appeal 121
 in suit by minor, 1131-1134
 (patently valid) to jurisdiction 714
 technical, 14
 to admission of *res judicata*, 1373
 attachment 904
 draft of document or of final instrument 930-931
 filings after return 1407
 hearing by judge or Judge 200
 jurisdiction 703
 waiver of 13
 when to be raised 12, 20, 100
 local jurisdiction 174
 place of suit or absence of, 174-177, 174

OBJECTION—*continued*

to proclamation, 673

recording of evidence and appeal, 814, 815

transfer of suit (Sect. 22) 190, 192

verification, 669

OBSTRUCTION to possession of immovable property, 1035-1040

OCCUPANCY of tenant, delivery of immovable property in, 933

OFFICE of corporation, and carrying on business, 172

OFFICES, personal and local, and religious rites, 86

OFFICIAL assignee, and costs, 209, and see ASSIGNEE

OMISSION of part of claim, 573-602

to award costs, 208

grant relief, and *res judicata*, 121

notice point in appeal, 1314

serve notice, 751

sue, effect of, 579, 580

try or frame issue, 1304

ONUS See BURDEN OF PROOF

OPERATION of law transfer by, 908

OPINION, difference of, and appeal from Division Bench, 55

OPTION of plaintiff in compensation suits, 171

ORAL assignment of decree, 50

examination by Court, 775-776

ORDERS and appeal, 426-430

and decree, 37, 38

execution, 219

" " " " " " 1204, 1205

ORDER, or

" " " " " " 1204, 1205

" " " " " " *res judicata* 108, 151, 157, 158n

when decrees 43

insolvency, nature of, 24

miscellaneous proceedings, 45

interim, 1210, 1211

" " " " " " 1202

" " " " " " on appeal, meaning of term, 418

procedural and decrees on merits 42

rejecting appeal, and decrees, 47

plaint and decrees, 46, 47

service of, 1380

valuation in attachment, and appeal 981

which may be reviewed, 1376, 1377

ORDERS IN FIRST SCHEDULE—

I. Parties to suits, 511-572

II. Frame of suit, 573-628

III. ~~Appearance and non appearance~~

IV. Written statement and set off, 727-746

IX. Appearance and non appearance, 747-774

X. ~~Appearance and non appearance~~

-849

1006

XXV. Security for costs, 1081-1087

XXVI. Commissions, 1088-1105

XXVII. ~~Commissions~~

, 1106-1107

XXXI. Suits by or against trustees, executors, and administrators 1127, 1128

XXXII. Suits by or against minors, or persons of unsound mind, 1129-1148

XXXIII. Suits by paupers, 1149-1161

XXXIV. Suits relating to mortgages of immoveable property, 1162-1171

XXXV. Interpleader, 1172-1174

XXXVI. Special case, 1175, 1176

XXXVII. Summary procedure on negotiable instruments 1177 1182

XXXVIII. Arrest and attachment before judgment, 1183 1194

XXXIX. Temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders 1195-1211

XL. Appointment of Receivers, 1215-1258

XLI. Appeals from original decrees, 1259-1322

XLII. ~~Appeals from original decrees~~

-1345

OUSTER, after suit brought, and amendment of plaint 640
when acts of, separate causes of action 541

OVER VALUATION of suit, 81

Inquiry as to, 81, and see VALUATION

PANDA, interest of, 383

PARSI widow not exempt from personal appearance as such, 441

PARTICULARITY in pleading, 664

PARTICULARS endorsed on admitted documents 504, 607

in pleading, 601, 604a

plaint, 615

of set off sufficient without specific allegation of same, 743

and *res judicata*, 129, 129*n*
 in suit for, 887
 nature of, 129

issue of commission to take depositions

right to enforce, is legal incident of joint tenancy, 134
 separate suits for, 168*n*

when suit for, barred by former suit, 570*n*

PARTNER, and execution against firm, 948-952

substituted service, 652*n*

PARTY

PARTNERSHIP, and place of suing under Contract Act, 179

account, 886

debt, suit to recover, and joinder, 563*n*

dissolution of, 886

burden of proof, 887*n*

party to suit, 563

procedure in, 887*n*

suits, transposition of parties, 559

unincorporated, and party to suit, 516

PARTY, absence of, 565

addition of party to suit, see *see* and *see* Addition

and, 1264

1194

PARTY—*continued*.

and cure of definition of boundaries 507a
 failure to produce evidence, 821
 identity in *res judicata*, 123-126
 independent grounds of action, 121
 intervenor, 263a
 joinder of trustees or legal representatives, 1128
lis pendens, 99

product, 495-500

representative, question between, 267a

restitution, 497-503

right to appeal 389-391

waiver of jurisdiction, 68a

in

co defendants not joining in appeal, 391

contention of, and interpretation of decree, 117a

contumacy of, 776a

death, marriage, and insolvency of (O XXII), 1045-1066

of, and enforcement of decree, 279

fresh suit, 126a

jurisdiction, 185

larger legal sense, 124

impleading, 1009

joinder of, 511-572; and see JOINDER

made only for purpose of discovery, 781a

meaning of term, 124

misconduct of, and costs 213

moving in Appeal Court for leave to give further evidence 820a

necessary in setting aside sale, 1011

on 236-245

refusing to give evidence, 835

remedy of, when admission wrongly allged 406

rights of, 39-43

striking out, 545-570

third, and communication for purpose of litigation, 781a

fraudulent sale, 1016a

can impeach assignment of decree, 910

claim to attached property, 914, 915

seizure of property of, 910a

to suits (O I) 511-572

when exempt from arrest, 490-491

person not, is bound by decree, 124

who is a necessary, 525

to be made, 525a

who may be, 514

and *res judicata*, 129, 129_n
 in suit for, 887
 nature of, 129
 issue of commission to make, 341
 made by Collector, 285, 286
 mesne profits in, 871_n

when suit for, barred by former suit, 579_n

PARTNER, and execution against firm, 918-932
 substituted service, 652_n
 deceased or bankrupt, administration of assets, 130_n
 personal decree against, and execution, 276_n
 suit by surviving, 565_n
 maintained against in other capacity, 514_n
 verification by one, 668_n

PARTNERS, appearances of, 1123
 death of, and suit, 1120
 disclosure of names of in suit, 1113
 service on, 1114
 suit by or against, 1113-1126 *See Firm*
 suits between, 1125

PARTNERSHIP, and place of suing under Contract Act, 179
 account, 886
 debt, suit to recover, and joinder, 563_n
 dissolution of, 886

16

PARTY, absence of, 565

plaints, 1261

47-1191

PARTY—*continued.*

anil cure of definition of boundaries 867n
 failure to produce evidence, 821
 identity in *res judicata*, 123-126
 independent grounds of action, 121
 intervenor, 267n
 joinder of trustees or legal representatives, 1128
lis pendens, 99

pleader, 43-436
 representative, question between, 267n
 restitution, 497-503
 right to appeal, 389-391
 waiver of jurisdiction, 68n

co defendants not joining in appeal, 391
 contention of, and interpretation of decree, 117n
 contumacy of, 776n
 d

jurisdiction, 183

larger legal sense, 121
 impleading, 1009
 joinder of, 611-672, and see JOINDER
 made only for purpose of discovery, 781n
 meaning of term, 121
 misconduct of, and costs, 213
 moving in Appeal Court for leave to give further evidence 820n
 necessary in setting aside sale, 1011

rights of, 53-43
 striking out, 545-550
 third, and communication for purpose of litigation, 781n
 fraudulent sale, 1016n

discharge from arrest 400 401

PATNARI, witness disbelieved as such, 408

PATNIDAR, impleaded as defendant, 567
when proper party to suit, 565a

PAYMENT - - - - -

Court fees in, and appeal, 47

PAYMENT by instalments, decree for, 868-870
decree for, and interest, 204-206

as issue *ex parte* decree, 764, 771, 771a
by judgment, debtor, 907
in interpleader, 1172
summary procedure, 1181
of attached debt, 942
cost of commission, 1103
expenses of witness, 826-828
purchase money of immoveable property, 1000-1001
under decree, 890-897
in pre-emption suit, 883-886
when sale of immoveable property postponed, 907
of Court fees for service, 1380
fees on documents 507 869

voluntary, no suit to recover, 88

PECUNIARY interest of judge, 66a
jurisdiction 62

how determined, 157, and see *JURISDICTION*

PENALTY, and interest, 205a
for default in attending as witness, 204
not producing documents, 724

to the Privy Council, effect of, 444
suit, 95-98, and see *LIT PENDENS*
pending (Sect 24) denotes duly pending, 198

PENDING suit, meaning of term, 197

PERFORMANCE of condition precedent and pleading, 661
implied agreement of, 662
of contract, place of, and jurisdiction, 188

PERIOD, enlargement of, 506

PERMANENCY, and carrying on business, 191

PERMISSION See *LEAVE*

PERPETUAL injunction, 929
and limitation, 929

PERSON, definition of, in General Clauses Act, 50

PERSONAL jurisdiction. See *JURISDICTION (PERSONAL)*
offices and suits relating to rites, 86

PLACE, and accrual of cause of action in contract, 187
of performance of contract, and jurisdiction, 188
presentation of plaint, 201
suing, 156
 and actual residence, 175
 cancellation of contract, 187
 carrying on business, 180-182, and *see* CARRYING ON BUSINESS
 (illustrations), 173
 " " " " "
 " " " " "
 " " " " "
 " " " " "
 forum of defendant, 171
immovable property, in different jurisdictions, 167
libel, 156

relief obtainable through obscenity, 153
where subject matter, 153

amendment of 013-014, and see AMENDMENT
in addition of defendant, 545
and appointment of Receiver, 1231, 1236

defect as to signature or verification, 668n
defined, 200
direction to file separate, 625
identification of land in, 695, 707, 707n
in suit in public trust, 368

action for misrepresentation, 700

Liability, 410

inspection of, 724
loss of, 724
production of, 723-725

PLAINT—*continued*

(O VII), fictitious names, 698
 grounds of exemption from limitation, 696
 immoveable property, 695
 inconsistent defences, 61
 : titles, 701, 705

points to be included in, 701
 prayer for further relief, 703
 presentation of fresh, 723
 procedure on admission of, 712
 rejection of, 715, 722
 appeal from, 721
 applicability of rule, 715
 disclosure of cause of action, 716-718
 form of order, 718
 in part, 718
 insufficient stamp, 715
 procedure on, 722
 time to be fixed, 719
 when incumbent, 720
 order may be made, 718

representative character, 696
 return of, 715

suit as representative, test by statements in plaint, 698
 technical objections, 704
 title, description and names of parties, 697-699
 what plaint must show, 710

presentation of, and stamp, 202
 date of, 202
 in institution of suit, 200, 201
 place of, 201
 time of, 200
 to whom, 201
 rejection of, and decree, 46-48
 return of, for amendment, 078
 election, 616a, 618a
 signature of, 660, 667
 verification of, 666-670

PLAINTIFF. See PARTY TO SUIT

another name, i.e.
 benamidar, 616-618

PLAINTIFF—*continued*

on behalf also of others interested, 533-541
 minor at time of former suit, 599
 in conduct of, and costs, 213, 213a
 misjoinder and nonjoinder of, 541, 545
 not bound to apply to have proper party added, 556
 obtaining leave to omit to sue, 599

PLAINTIFFS, who ought to sue in different Courts, and joinder, 158

PLAN neither admitted nor proved, decree based on, 403a

PLEADER, absence of, 753, 753a

remuneration from client, 215

attitude, of

appearance, 629

service of process on, 635

order passed without hearing, 478a

PLEADINGS and plaint (O. VII), 695-726
 and written statement and set off, 727-746
 embarrassing, 705a
 findings inconsistent with, 403a

PLAINF—*continued*

(O V H

titles, 701, 705
inference of law, and arguments, 701
letters of administration, 709

object and essential parts of, 696
operative and ultimate facts, 702
particulars, 695
points to be included in, 701
prayer for further relief, 703
presentation of fresh, 723
procedure on admission of, 712
rejection of, 715, 722
 appeal from, 721
 applicability of rule, 715
 disclosure of cause of action, 716 718
 form of order, 718
 in part, 718
 insufficient stamp, 718
 procedure on, 722
 time to be fixed, 719
 when incumbent, 720
 order may be made, 716
 right of action barred, 720
reple on separate grounds, 712
 or remedy, 706
 to be specified in, 712
representative character, 696
return of, 715

in institution of suit, 200, 201
place of, 201
time of, 200
to whom, 201
rejection of, and decree, 46-48
return of, for amendment, 678
 election, 616n, 618n
signature of, 666, 667
verification of, 666-670

PLAINTIFF *See* PARTIES TO SUIT

and choice of forum, 172
unnecessary issue, 120
validity of decree held by him, 576n
arbitrator *litte*, 192
benamidar, 516-518
claiming too much, 680
election by, 616n, 618n
in doubt as to proper defendant, 522
joinder as, 511-523, and *see* JOINDER

PLEADINGS—*continued*

generally (O VI), 661-691

allegation of implied contract, 662

relation, 662

malice, etc., 662

notice, 662

Plaintiff's
Statement of

jurisdiction, 664

presumption of law, 663

signature of, 666-667

striking out, 670-673

unnecessary or scandalous matter, 671

verification of, 666-670

Mofussil, construction of, 1211a

POINT

POLLUM, liability of successor to an unsettled, 277

fresh life estate in, 277

decree for, construed to include mesne profits, 850n

delivery of, 1033

formal, 932

exclusive, suit for, and joint, 859n

formal, admitted by tenant, 934

and cause of action for fresh suit, 242n

Khas, 931

1012

- 81, 247n

POSSESSOR of estate of deceased Hindu and representation, 276

POST, acceptance of plaint sent by, 201

letter sent through, instead of summons, 67n

service by 1381

POSTAGE, payment of, 197

POSTPONEMENT of payment of decretal amount 849-850
of sale and proclamation 979a

POSTSCRIPT, in document, Judge overruling 402a

POWER (inherent) *See* INHERENT POWER
inherent, of Court, instances of 16-19
savings of, 709
of attorney in suit, 632, 633
Court not expressly taken away, 16
and matter not touched by Code, 16

POWERS in executing transferred decree, 231, 232
of Court pending appeal, 1739
Appellate Court, 430-431

PRACTICE and aids to construction 6-9
and amendment of written statement, 18
place of suing 156
point not dealt with by Code, 16
departure from, and consent, 69a
established, force of, 15, 15a
in Admiralty side, 24
application for review, 1364
regard to pleadings, 779, 779a
incorrect, 16a
of English Admiralty Court 24
Insolvency Court, 23
uniformity in, 10

PRAYER for relief, 706
for further relief, 708

PREAMBLE, 1
effect of, 1-30

PRECEDENT, judicial, and abuse of, 9, 10
judicial, over ruling same, 11a

PRECEPT in execution of decrees, 235

PRELIMINARY, 31-64
decree, 33, 37, 38
and appeal, 37, 391, 888

inquiry as to value of suit 20, 21
judgment 447
order, 37
and appeal from final decree, 38a
point and remand, 1296-1300

PREROGATIVE, Royal, and jurisdiction of Sovereign in Council, 437

PRESCRIBED, defined 31

PRESSENTATION of memorandum of appeal 1259-1260
of plaint in institution of suit, 200-202 *and see* PLAINT

PRESERVATION of property pending appeal, 1310

PRESIDENCY Small Cause Court, and saving clause, 63, 64
not affected by Sect 2 51
towns, and insolvency law, 22

in favour of effectual service, 652, 653, 655
of law, and pleading, 663
order of institution of suits, 202
that Judge has exercised his discretion, 218n
where no order for transfer on face of proceedings, 196

PREVIOUS decisions, 3, 9
history of law, 4
legislation, 1-3, 6, 7
state of law, 3

PRICE, deficiency of, 986, 987
interest on, 987

PRIEST, officiating, interest of, 366, 366n

PRINCIPAL and agent, suit for account between, 887

PRIOR mortgage, sale subject to, 1169
mortgagee and suit, 1162-1164

PRIORITY and stay of suit (Sect 10), 97

PRISON, service on defendant in, 655

PRIVACY, right of, and suit, 86

PRIVATE right claimed in common, and *res judicata*, 100, 136

in interrogatories, 123

PRIVITY to party, 124, 124n, 125

PRIV

proceedings, *as to* in
and suits, 44
order in, and decree, 44

PROCEDURE and uniformity of decision, 10
alterations in, retrospective in effect, 510
and *res judicata*, 101
as to place of suing, 156
error in, affecting jurisdiction, 473, 473n
application of, and jurisdiction, 470n
cf, 411

PROCEDURE—*continued*

for miscellaneous proceedings 494-496
former of Provincial Courts 1

probate and administration 25
Sent and Revenue Courts 27-30
inherent power to invent 18n 17n

procedure for 491 496

PROCESS for execution 920
service of 1350 1352

PROCESSIONAL order and decree on merits 42
rights and rights of parties 42

discrepant from certificate 9 9n
waiver of mis statement in 940n

PROHIBITION not to be presumed 17 17n

PROHIBITION in plaint 700 701 71n
in pleadings 672

PROOF of refusal to take evidence 844n
substitution of speculation for 403n
want of in review 1371

PROPERTY (ancestral) liability of in execution 24
defined 60 61

immovable and place of suing 158
incorporeal hereditaments 61
attachment of 293-315 96-98
certificate of sale 1029
decree upon a mortgage is not 1012
for possession and mesne profits 870-882
recovery and identification 866-86
defined 61
delivery of 1031 1033
under decree, 931 934

joinder in suit for recovery of, 631-634

sale of, 996
 setting aside sale of, 1010
 suit for, and Letters Patent, 163
 money charged on, 161n
 suits deemed to be for, 160, 161

share in, 945
 decree for delivery of, 367
 deemed to follow the person, 165
 defined, 34, 61
 delivery of, in sale, 991
 growing crops, 57, 61
 instances of, 904n
 sale of, 991-1010

of :

PROSECUTION, order directing, 53n

PROTECTING order in execution proceedings, 906, 907

PROTEST against jurisdiction, 70

PROVINCE, service of summons in other, 203

PROVINCIAL Small Cause Courts, and savings clause, 62, 63

PUBLIC matters, suits relating to, 355-376

 morality and implied bar, 83

 officer, 58

 and public servant in Penal Code, 58

 defined, 34

 how far made defendants 726a

 see XVIII 1106, 1107

PUBLICATION of sale-proclamation, 993

PUISNE mortgagee, and suit, 1162

PUNISHMENT of crime, suit for enforcing, 151

PURCHASE on behalf of another, 321-327

in execution, what required by, 315, 316
 not implicated in fraud in sale, 270n

PURCHASER—*continued*

PURCHASE MONEY, deduction of costs in pre-emption suit, 217
 payment of, in pre-emption, 881-886
 right to receive back, 931a

PURDANASHIN ladies and arrest, 288
 discovery of documents, 799
 substituted service, 652a
 as witnesses, 1090, 1090a
 exemption from personal appearance, 480
 zenana of, entering, 288

PUTNI holding, purchase of, and representation, 260

REDEMPTION—see *see also* 930 930 930

of law, 454-456

RAIYATI, suit against, to set aside *pollah*, and *res judicata*, 131

RAIYATI land, and assessment of mesne profits, 874

RAIYATWARI tenure in Madras, and partition, 263

RAJ, impartible, and assets, 277

RAJAH, and exemption from personal appearance, 490

RATE of exchange, and appeal to the Privy Council, 1343
 of interest, 204

on costs, 207

RE ADMISSION of appeal dismissed for default, 1283
 of remanded suit, 1290

REASONABLE selection of appeal, 1316

declined, 1216

by subordinate Judge, 1226a
 of property of shrine, 1242a
 possession taken before actual appointment of, 1235a
 sought against legal representative, 1243a

RECITAL in bond, *prima facie* evidence of residence, 174n

RECORD and name of transferee of decree, 910
 copies of, in appeal to the Privy Council, 1337, 1338
 destroyed, and second suit, 94

1315, 1316

RECOUPMENT distinguished from set off and payment, 736

RECOVERY of amount recovered under reversed or superseded decree, 91

suit for, 600
 money in restitution, 499
 suit for, meaning of, 740
 and set off, 734-743
 moveable property under distraint or attachment, 158, 165
 possession of immoveable property, decree for, 870, 871

8

1

REFUND of assets, suit for, 339
 of balance of deposit in appeal, 1779
 costs, 212
 under reversed decree, 502a, 1317
 payment under decree, 501a

REFUSAL, of certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, 1339
of leave to defend in summary procedure, 1180, 1181
review, 1362
or inability of trustee to sue, 1127
to accept service of summons, 645, 647
obey decree for execution of documents, 930
endorsement of negotiable instrument, 930
recognize law of British India, 100

REGISTER. of suits. 636

REGISTRAR, appointment of, as next friend disapproved, 1138
executing conveyance, 931

in execution, 930, 931
expenses of same, 930
memorandum of appeal, 1264
sale certificate, 1029, 1030
security bond, 1341

REGISTRY of applications granted in review, 1377

REGULARITY, presumption of, 30

RE HEARING of appeal by the Privy Council, 440
order for, and review, 1377

• • •

plaint, 113-123
and decree, 33, 46-48

RELATION of Courts, 12
 legal, condemned in India, and foreign judgment, 150
 of landlord and tenant, and *res judicata*, 134

RELATORS, suit in name of (in Public Charities), 365

RELEASE of imprisoned debtor, 291, 292
of surety for restitution in appeal to the Privy Council, 1341

RELIEF, amendment of pleadings as to, 688-690
 alternative, 613, 712
 and ouster of jurisdiction, 82n
 stamp, 80n
 inconsistent, 50n
 ancillary, deemed granted, 123
 and cause of action, 612
 d. 1999, 817, 858

•

grant of, by decree in appeal, 1318-1320

1000

■ ■ ■

• • •

• 4

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

1

1

RELIEF—*continued*,

obtainable through personal audience, 167

and place of suing, 168

value, 153

subsidiary, *see*

unaffected by change in procedure, 510

when right to, claimed in common, 136

RELINQUISHMENT of possession with notice, 870, 880

REMAND, and appeal, 427, 432

REMEDIES, splitting of, 575, 596

REMEDY and claim, 601

defined, 601

errors in procedure, 417

landlord, 29

RENT, decrees for, 870

to be paid by tenant, 870

RENT COURTS, how distinguished from Civil Courts, 27-30

REPEAL of enactments in Fifth Schedule, 509

REPORT, on action of accounts, 1093

on security, 1041

REPRESENTATION and Hindu father, 130

and manager of Hindu family, 131

REPRESENTATIVE and execution (Sect. 47), 258, 259, 260
and *res judicata*, 126

notice to show cause against execution, 917, 918
suit in *forma pauperis*, 1159
survival of suit, 1019-1059, 1066
burden of proof in execution against, 283
claim by or against, personally, 621, 622
defined, 33, 257, 274

-275

judgment debtor, 50
plaintiff and restoration of suit, 754
sued as such, and set off, 743
suit, 362-365, 533, 545
as, 708, 709
by or against (O XXXI), 1127, 1128

RESUME on default by purchaser, 999, 1000
loss on, 1000

RESUMPTION

issue, and decision before change of law, 110
point of law, 109

suit 103-107
and execution proceedings, 106, 107, 108
finding of Criminal Court, 105
identity of suit, 105

PATNARI, witness disbelieved as such, 408

PATNIDAR, impleaded as defendant, 567
when proper party to suit, 563n

PAYMENT

PAYMENT by instalments, decree for, 868-870
decree for, and interest, 204-206

summary procedure, 1181
of attached debt, 942
cost of commission, 1103
expenses of witness, 826-828
purchase money of immoveable property, 1000-1001
under decree, 890-897
in pre-emption suit, 893-896
when sale of immoveable property postponed, 937
of Court fee for service, 1360
fees on documents, 507

869

voluntary, no suit to recover, 68

PECUNIARY interest of judge, 66n
jurisdiction 62

how determined, 157; and *see* Jurisdiction

PENALTY, and interest, 205n
for default in attending as witness, 201
not producing documents, 524

PENDING

suit, 95-98, and *see* *ITS* *PENDING*
pending (Sect. 21) denotes duly pending, 198

PENDING suit, meaning of term, 197

PERFORMANCE of condition precedent and pleading, 661
implied agreement of, 672
of contract, place of, and jurisdiction, 188

PERIOD, enlargement of, 506

PERMANENCY, and carrying on business, 181

PERMISSION *See* *Leave*

PERPETUAL injunction, 925
an limitation, 929

PERSON, definition of, in General Clauses Act, 50

PERSONAL jurisdiction. *See* Jurisdiction (*PERSONAL*)
offices, and suits relating to rites, 86

PLACE

BUT

CARRYING ON BUSINESS

effect of clause (d), Sect 16..164
 equitable jurisdiction in *personam*, 165
 forum of defendant, 174
 immovable property, in different jurisdictions, 167
 libel, 186
 limitations (Sect 20), 173
 local jurisdiction, 159, 161
 meaning of "immovable property," 160
 "resides," 175-179

relief obtainable through obedience, 158
 where subject matter, 158

PLAINT, allegation of fraud in, 700, 700a, 703a
 mistake in, 703a
 allegations in, and date of verification, 675a
 amended by Court of Appeal, 17a
 amendment of, 677-691, and see AMENDMENT
 in addition of defendant, 545
 and appointment of Receiver, 1231, 1236

defect as to signature or verification, 668a
 defined, 200
 direction to file separate, 625
 identification of land in, 695, 707, 707a
 in suit in public trust, 368
 summary procedure on negotiable instrument, 1179
 meaning of term, 200
 (O VII), 693-726
 account, 695
 action for misrepresentation, 700
 alternative titles (examples), 704
 inconsistent reliefs, 708
 certificate under Succession Certificate Act, 709
 contents of statement, 702, 703
 defendant's interest and liability, 696
 liability, 710
 description of object, 717
 difference between positions of plaintiff and defendant, 71
 documents relied on in, 723-726
 failure to produce, 725
 inspection of, 721
 loss of, 724
 production of, 723-726

PLAINT—*continued*

(O VII), fictitious names, 698

money suit, mesne profits or account, 695
 object and essential parts of, 696
 operative and ultimate facts, 702
 particulars, 695
 points to be included in, 701
 prayer for further relief, 708
 presentation of fresh, 723
 procedure on admission of, 712
 rejection of, 715, 722
 appeal from, 721
 applicability of rule, 715
 disclosure of cause of action, 716-718
 form of order, 718
 in part, 718
 insufficient stamp, 718
 procedure on, 722
 time to be fixed, 719
 when incumbent, 720

to be specified in, 712
 representative character, 696
 return of, 715

technical objections, 701

date of, 200
 in institution of suit, 200, 201
 place of, 201
 time of, 200
 to whom, 201
 rejection of, and decree, 46-48
 return of, for amendment, 67b
 election, 616a, 618a
 signature of, 666, 667
 verification of, 666-670

PLAINTIFF. See PARTY TO SUIT

in particular, 516-518
 claiming too much, 650
 election by, 611a, 618a
 in doubt as to proper defendant, 532
 under as, 511-523, and see JOINDER

PLAINTIFF—*continued*

on behalf also of others interested, 533-541
 minor at time of former suit, 599

"
 " "
 " "
 " "

zemindar, 515

PLAINTIFFS, who ought to sue in different Courts, and joinder, 158

PLAN neither admitted nor proved, decree based on, 403n

PLEADING ALONG, 825, 787

COSTS, 210, 210n

remuneration from client, 215

PLEADING, 22

" " " " " "

service of process on, 630
 order passed without hearing, 475n

PLEADINGS and plaint (O VII), 695-726
 and written statement and set off, 727-746
 embarrassing, 705n
 findings inconsistent with, 403n

PLEADINGS—*continued*

generally (O VI), 661-694

allegation of implied contract, 662

relation, 662

malice, etc., 662

notice, 662

" " " "

presumption of law, 663

signature of, 666-667

striking out, 670-673

unnecessary or scandalous matter, 671

verification of, 666-670

Mofussil, construction of, 1211a

POINT " " " " " "

POLLEUM, liability of successor to an unsettled, 277
fresh life estate in, 277decree for, construed to include mesne profits, 680a
delivery of, 1033

formal, 932

exclusive, suit for, and joint, 853a

formal, admitted by tenant, 934

and cause of action for fresh suit, 212a

Khas, 931

Liquidator in, and Receiver, 1233a

nature of, 932

217a

with notice, 670, 680
representative resisting delivery of, 268awrongful, and liability for mesne profits, 680
profits due to improvement, 32, 31

POSSESSOR of estate of deceased Hindu and representation, 276

POST, acceptance of plaint sent by, 201
letter sent through, instead of summons, 629
service by, 1381

POSTAGE, payment of, 197

- POSTPONEMENT of payment of decretal amount, 868, 870
 of sale and proclamation, 979a
- sale after order of, 1021a
- POSTSCRIPT, in document, Judge over-looking, 402a
- POWER (inherent) *See* INHERENT POWER
 inherent, of Court, instances of, 16-19
 savings of, 508
 of attorney in suit, 632, 633
 Court not expressly taken away, 16
 and matter not touched by Code, 16
- POWERS in executing transferred decree, 231, 232
 of Court pending appeal, 1339
 Appellate Court, 430-433
- PRACTICE and aids to construction, 6-8
 and amendment of written statement, 15
- in Admiralty suit, 24
 application for review, 1364
 regard to pleadings, 779, 779a
 incorrect, 16a
 of English Admiralty Court, 24
 Insolvency Court, 22
 uniformity in, 10
- PRAYER for relief, 706
 for further relief, 708
- PREAMBLE, 1
 effect of, 1-20
- PRECEDENT, judicial, and abuse of, 9, 10
 judicial, over ruling same, 11a
- PRECEPT in execution of decrees, 233
- PRE EMPTION and Mahomedan Law, 883, 884
 suit and deduction of costs, 216, 217
 payment into Court, 867-869
 decree in, 883-886
- PRELIMINARY, 31-64
 decree, 33, 37, 38
 and appeal, 37, 391, 888
 in administration suit, 882, 883
 dissolution of partnership, 886
- QUEST, 100
 and appeal from final decree, 39a
 point and remand, 1296-1300
- PREROGATIVE, Royal, and jurisdiction of Sovereign in Council, 437
- PRESCRIBED, defined, 34
- PRESENTATION of memorandum of appeal, 1259-1260
 of plaint in institution of suit, 200-202, and *see* PLAINT
- PRESERVATION of property pending appeal, 1340

- PREVIOUS decisions 3, 9
 history of law, 4
 legislation, 1-3, 6, 7
 state of law, 3
- PRICE, deficiency of, 986, 987
 interest on, 987
- PRIEST, officiating, interest of, 366, 366a
- PRINCIPAL, and agent, suit for account between, 887
- PRINCIPLE, first, application of, 10a, 11a
 of law (established), value of 10a
 upon which causes advanced, 17a
- PRIOR mortgage, sale subject to, 1169
 mortgagee and suit, 1162-1164
- PRIORITY and stay of suit (Sect 10), 97
- PRISON, service on defendant in, 135
- PRIVACY, right of, and suit, 56
- PRIVAT^Y right claimed in common, and *res judicata*, 100, 136
- PRIVILEGE and scaling up portions of documents, 79f
 exemption from arrest *See* EXEMPTION
 personal appearance, *See* APPEARANCE
 in interrogatories, 785
- PRIVILEGE to party, 121, 124a, 125
- PRIVILEGE, definition of, and foreign Courts, 51
 first objection to jurisdiction before, 19
 Val id practising before, 54a
- PROBATE and Administration Act, conflicting with Code, 25
- proceeding whether a suit, 106
- proceedings, 25-59a
 and suits, 44
 order in, and decree, 44
- PROCEDURE and uniformity of decision, 10
 alterations in retrospective in effect, 510

PROCEDURE—continued.

for miscellaneous proceedings, 494-496

former, of Provincial Courts. 1

Supreme Courts, 1

proceeding for. 491-496

PROCESS for execution, 920

service of. 1390, 1362

PROCESSIONAL order and decree on merits, 42

rights and rights of parties. 42

discrepant from cellobiose, 979 μ

waiver of my statement in. 980n

PROFITS, attachment of, by attachment of property 298

due to improvements, 33, 34

in pre-emption, 856

of immovable property, and cause of action 591

PROHIBITION not to be presumed, 15, 15n

PROLIXITY in plant, 700, 705-717a

in pleadings, 672

PROOF of refusal to take evidence, §418

- substitution of speculation for, #13

want of, in review, 1371

PROPERTY (ancestral), liability of, in execution, 284

decree upon a mortgage is not. 1012

for possession and mesne profits, \$70-\$85

recovers, and is tentatively p. 866-867

defined, it

delivery of, 1034, 1035

un let decree, 931.931

sale of, 996
 setting aside sale of, 1010
 suit for, and Letters Patent, 159
 money charged on, 161n
 suits deemed to be for, 160, 161

decree for delivery of, 867
 deemed to follow the person, 165
 defined, 34, 61
 delivery of, in sale, 994
 growing crops, 57, 61
 instances of, 904n
 sale of, 991-1010

of third party, 904, 905

PROSECUTION, order directing, 53n

PROTECTING order in execution proceedings, 906, 907

PROTEST against jurisdiction, 70

PROVINCE, service of summons in other, 203

PROVINCIAL Small Cause Courts, and savings clause, 62, 63

PUBLIC matters, suits relating to, 355-376

 morality and implied law, 89

 officer, 58

 and public servant in Penal Code, 58

 defined, 34

 how far made defendants, 526n

 in official capacity, suit by or against (O XVIII), 1106, 1107

 in personam, 355-376

PUBLICATION of sale proclamation, 983

PUISNE mortgagee, an 1 suit, 1162

PUNISHMENT of crime, suit for enforcing, 171

PURCHASE on behalf of another, 322-327

in execution, what acquired by, 315, 316
 not implicated in fraud in sale, 250*

PURCHASE-MONEY, deduction of costs in pre-emption suit, 217
 payment of, in pre-emption, 881-886
 right to receive back, 931a

PURDANASHIN ladies and arrest, 288
 discovery of documents, 799
 substituted service, 652a
 as witnesses, 1090, 1090a
 exemption from personal appearance, 489
 zenana of, entering, 288

PUTVI holding, purchase of, and representation, 260

QUESTIONS re pre-emption, 236, 21a, 21a

 of law, 454-456

RAIYAT, suit against, to set aside *pollah*, and *re-judicate*, 131

RAIYATI land, and assessment of mesne profits, 874

RAIYATWARI tenure in Madras, and partition, 285

RAJ, impartible, and assets, 277

RAJAH, and exemption from personal appearance, 490

RATE of exchange, and appeal to the Privy Council, 1345
 of interest, 204
 on costs, 207

RE ADMISSION of appeal dismissed for default, 1285
 of remanded suit, 1296

RECEIPTS re pre-emption, 1216

defined, 1216

RECITAL in bond, *prima facie* evidence of residence, 174*n*
 record of, 174*n*

316

RECOUPMENT distinguished from set off and payment, 730
 or superseded decree, 91

money in restitution, 499
 suit for, meaning of, 740
 and set off 734-745
 moveable property under distraint or attachment, 158, 160
 possession of immovable property, decree for, 870, 871

55

REFUND of assets, suit for, 339
 of balance of deposit in appeal, 333
 costs, 212
 under reversed decree, 502*n*, 1317
 payment under decree, 601*n*

REFUSAL of certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, 1339
 of leave to defend in summary procedure, 1180, 1181
 review, 1362
 or inability of trustee to sue, 1127
 to accept service of summons, 616, 617
 obey decree for execution of documents, 930
 endorsement of negotiable instrument, 930
 recognize law of British India, 100

REGISTER of suits, 636

REGISTRAR, appointment of, as next friend disapproved, 1138
 executing conveyance, 931

.
 .
 .

in execution, 930, 931

expenses of same, 930

memorandum of appeal, 1264

sale certificate, 1029, 1030

security bond, 1341

REGISTRY of applications granted in review, 1377

REGULARITY, presumption of, 30

RE HEARING of appeal by the Privy Council, 440
 order for, and review, 1377

.

plaint, 416-423

and decree, 33, 46-48

RELATION of Courts, 12

legal, condemned in India, and foreign judgment, 150

of landlord and tenant, and *res judicata*, 131

RELATORS, suit in name of (in Public Charities), 365

RELEASE of imprisoned debtor, 291, 292

of surety for restitution in appeal to the Privy Council, 1311

RELIEF, amendment of pleadings as to, 688-690

alternative, 613, 712

and ouster of jurisdiction, 828

stamp, 828

inconsistent, 704

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

denied refused, 123

RELIEF—*continued.*

obtainable through personal obedience, 167
and place of suing, 158

unaffected by change in procedure, 310
when right to, claimed in common, 136

RELINQUISHMENT of possession with notice, 870, 880

REMAND, and appeal, 427, 432

and new points which can be taken by defendant after, 411
by Appellate Court, 1296-1307

costs of, and decree in appeal, 1321

improper order of, 1297

objections first taken after, 414

to findings after, 1306

when order of, treated as without jurisdiction, 67

REMEDIES, splitting of, 575, 536

REMEDY and claim, 601

defined, 601

errors in procedure, 417

landlord, 29

REMOVAL from file of plaint by minor suing without next friend, 1132, 1133
of guardian to suit, 1145
next friend, 1144

of, and saving clause, 59, 60

suit, where to be instituted, 156

suits for recovery of, and *res judicata*, 131

in Bengal and rules in discovery, 777

RENT COURTS, how distinguished from Civil Courts, 27-30

REPEAL of enactments in Fifth Schedule, 609

REPORT in examination of accounts, 1093

local investigation, 1094

partition, 1100, 1101

of Commissioners, and evidence, 1095, 1096

on security, 1341

REPRESENTATIVE and execution (Sect. 47) 258, 259, 260
and res judicata, 126

claim, 200

17 18

claim by or against, personally, 121, 122
defined, 33 257, 274

as, 100, 100

by or against (O XXXI), 1127, 1128

RE SALE on default by purchaser, 999, 1000
loss on, 1000

RFS 11 1127 1 10 12

interlocutory orders, 101 100
issue, and decision before change of law 110
point of law 109

suit 100-100 100 100 100

RLES

as penultimate decision, 139
 applicability of Explanation IV, 122
 VI, 136

Banamidars, 128
 co defendants, 128, 129
 competent jurisdiction, 136-142
 compromises, 146
 concurrent jurisdiction, 137, 138
 conflicting decisions, 147
 consent orders, 146
 different title, 122
 titles, 134

former hearing and decision, 142
 Hindu widow, 126-128
 how bar constituted, 118
 identity of cause of action, 121
 parties, 124
 immaterial matter, and *obiter dicta*, 119
 joint and several liability, 130
 contractor, 129, 130
 wrongdoers, 129, 130
karnavan, 131
 lessor and lessee, 133
 maintenance suits, 147
 manager guardian, 132
 of joint Hindu family, 131
 matter constructively in issue, 119
 minor, 132
 mortgagor, 133
 of rule, 99, 118-156
 omission to grant relief, 123
 partition, 129, 131
 persons not party to suit, 124
 classes of same, 124
 point not raised, 121
 presumption as to jurisdiction, 141
 privity, 125, 125a
 public and private rights, 100, 136
 representation, 126
 shebait, 132

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

effect of, on cause of action, 102
 English doctrine of 101
 in former Codes, 102
 on what it is based, 103
 test of, 102
 identity of relief not material to, 98

not affected by mistake of law, 103

RES JUDICATA—continued

relief deemed refused, 123
whether rule applicable to appeals, 101

RESCISSION of special leave to appeal, 439

RESIDENCE, actual, 172, 175, 177
and appearance in person, 610
arrest outside jurisdiction, 191
Insolvent Act, 177
plaint, 695, 697
service of summons, 641, 642, 618
at more places than one, 178
change of, pending suit, 78

of defendant, and jurisdiction, 16—
place of suing, 178, 172-179
out of British India, and security for costs, 1084
period of, 178
temporary, 178, 179
and place of suing, 172
voluntary, 172, 176
when no permanent, 178

RESISTANCE to execution, 340
to possession of immovable property, 1030-1040

RESTITUTION, 497-503
of conjugal rights, decree for, 926-930
on reversal or variance of decree, 475-503
order for, and appeal, 48
security, 922
security for, 503
and appeal 1272, 1274

RESTORATION of appeal, 1285-1288
of suit (after dismissal), 753

RETENTION of jurisdiction, 97

RETIREMENT of next friend, 1141
of guardian to suit, 1145

RE TRANSFER of suit, appeal, or proceeding, 193

RETURN of documents (O. XIII), 805-813
of plaint, for amendment, 624
when suit in wrong Court, 713-715
purchase money, 1027-1029

REVENUE Acts, and bar of cognizance, 86
Court, 27
and Code 61, 62
defined, 61
jurisdiction of, 73
no suit on rent decree 41, 93
sleeper, jurisdiction of, 99

REVENUE PAYING land, and partition 888

REVERSAL of decree, and recovery of amount recovered, 61
restitution on, 473-503

REVERSIONER, and Hindu widow and *res judicata* 126-128

REVERSIONER, suit by, and joinder, 612

RES

Benamidar, 128
 to defendants, 128, 129
 competent jurisdiction, 136-142
 compromises, 146
 concurrent jurisdiction, 137, 138
 conflicting decisions, 147
 consent orders, 146
 different title, 122
 titles, 134
 dismissal of former suit, 144
 effect of appeal, 139, 145
 ex parte, 122

how bar constituted, 118
 identity of cause of action, 121
 parties, 124
 immaterial matter, and *obiter dicta*, 110
 joint and several liability, 130
 contractor, 129, 130
 wrongdoers, 129, 130
 turnover, 131
 lessor and lessee, 133
 maintenance suits, 147
 manager-guardian, 132
 of joint Hindu family, 131
 matter constructively in issue, 119
 minor, 132
 mortgagor, 133
 of rule, 99, 118-156
 omission to grant relief, 123
 partition, 129, 134
 persons not party to suit, 124
 classes of same, 124
 point not raised, 121
 presumption as to jurisdiction, 141
 privity, 125, 125a
 public and private rights, 100, 126
 representation, 126
 shikhar, 132

SECTION JUDGMENTS

effect of, on cause of action, 102
 English doctrine of, 101
 in former Codes, 102
 on what principle based, 103
 test of, 102

not affected by mistake of law, 109

LES JUDICIA—continued

- RESCISSION of special leave to appeal, 439
- RESIDENCE, actual, 172, 175, 177
 and appearance in person, 640
 arrest outside jurisdiction, 491
 Insolvent Act, 177
 plaint, 695, 697
 service of summons, 641, 642, 618
- of defendant, and jurisdiction 152
 place of suing 158, 172-179
 out of British India, and security for costs, 1081
 period of, 178
 temporary, 178, 179
 and place of suing, 172
 voluntary, 172, 176
 when no permanent, 178
- RESISTANCE to execution, 1040
 to possession of immovable property, 1035-1040
- RESTITUTION, 497-503
 of conjugal rights, decree for, 926-930
 on reversal or variance of decree, 475-503
 order for, and appeal, 48
 security, 922
 security for, 503
 and appeal, 1272, 1273
- RESTORATION of appeal, 1285-1288
 of suit (after dismissal), 753
- RETENTION of jurisdiction, 97
- RETIREMENT of next friend 1144
 of guardian to suit, 1145
- RETRANSFER of suit, appeal, or proceeding, 194
- RETURN of documents (O XII), 805-813
 of plaint, for amendment 621
 when suit in wrong Court 713-715
 purchase money, 1027-1029
- RAFFAUF Acts and bar of cognizance, 84
 Court, 27
 and Code, 61, 62
 defined, 61
 jurisdiction of, 73
 no suit on rent decree of 73
 officer, jurisdiction of 99
- RAFFAUF PAYING land, and partition 888
- REVERSAL of decree, and recovery of amount recovered, 91
 restitution on 43-543
- REVERSIONER, and Hindu widow and *res judicata* 126-128
- REVISIONER's suit in, and *res judicata* 612

REVIEW, 860-863

- and decree against minor, 1363
- ex parte* decree, 773, 774
- order for adjournment of hearing, 836
- signed and dated judgment, 860
- application for, 861

defendant, 1361

plaintiff

(Part VIII), 157-180

REVISION, 865

- and jurisdiction of High Court, 456-468
- Rent Recovery Act (Madras), 60
- want of jurisdiction, 470
- of order amending decree, 864
- rejecting application to sue as pauper, 1153
- refusal of summons to witness, 826
- (Part VIII), 457-480
- submission for, 1352

RESIST, in common, and *res judicata*, 100, 136

- meaning of term in dicta, 73
- of a civil nature, 81, 85
- appeal, how given, 29
- the parties, 39-42
- to begin at hearing of suit, 642
- in hearing of appeal, 1281
- immovable property, and place of suing, 158, 164
- "to sue," defendant, 1046
- taken away by implication, 92

RITES religious, right depending on question as to, 65

suits relating to, 65, 86

RULES (Part X.) 483-488

- defined, 35
- of procedure in delegation of execution to Collector, 328
- nature of, 14
- decision on English, 12

SALARY and attachment, 293, 294, 295, 296, 301, 302, 315, 346

suit for, and jurisdiction, 189a

SALV, adjournment of

at
by

in civil, distinguished from *sal* by registrar, 260a

when conducted, and how made, 277

SALE—continued.

- certificate of, 1029, 1030
 - and right of action, 316a
 - effect of, 318a
- fraud vitiating, 219, 219a
- in execution, 976-1044
 - and *lis pendens*, 932
 - of decree subsequently reversed, 772
- objections as to nature of possession, 255
- of goods, and delivery, 189
 - immovable property, 998-1010
 - and bid by co sharer, 1002
 - certificate, 1029
 - defaulting purchaser, 999, 1001, 1002
 - re-sale, 1002
 - resistance to, 1035-1040
- postponement of, 334, 335
 - when to become absolute, 1021-1027
- and delivery, 334
 - transfer of shares, etc., 995
 - irregularity in, 993
 - negotiable instruments, 992
 - of party summoning witness, 828
 - share in corporation, 992
- on close holiday, 201a
- order refusing to pass order for, 266a
- place of, 981
- time of, 481, 484
- to decree holder, 988-991
- under decree, made without jurisdiction, 1013
- validity of, and fraud by plaintiff, 1021
- without disclosing charge, 320a

SALEABLE interest, 1021, 1028

- SANCTION, consent of minor's guardian without, 265a
- of execution by transferee of decree, 997, 910
- Governor General in delegation of execution to Collector, 327
- suit in public trust, object of, 356, 367

SATISFACTION of claim and payment into Court, 1081

- setting aside *ex parte* decree after, 766

SAVING, and Provincial Small Cause Courts, 62

- of Chartered High Court, 1382

- SCANDALOUS counter claim 18_n
 matter in bills of costs, 670
 memorandum of appeal 15_r, 1259
 pleadings, 670, 671
- SCHEDULED district and Sect 17 168
 districts, 32
- SEAL, use of, for signature, 58, 59
- "SEALING UP" privileged portions of documents, 791
- SECOND appeal, 397-422
 and Bengal Tenancy Act, 268_n
 construction of document, 415
 matter of jurisdiction, 419_n
 at instance of auction purchaser, 268_n
 objection to jurisdiction, first taken on, 156_n
 (O XLII), 1323
- SECRETARY OF STATE in Council, and body corporate, 180
 liability of, to be sued, 77
- SECTIONS OF CODE—
- | | |
|----|----------|
| 1 | 31, 32 |
| 2 | 32-59 |
| 3 | 59 |
| 4 | 59-61 |
| 5 | 61 |
| 6 | 62 |
| 7 | 62, 63 |
| 8 | 63, 64 |
| 9 | 65-65 |
| 10 | 65-69 |
| 11 | 69, 100 |
| 12 | 100 |
| 13 | 100 |
| 14 | 101-156 |
| 15 | 156-158 |
| 16 | 158-167 |
| 17 | 167-170 |
| 18 | 170, 171 |
| 19 | 171, 172 |
| 20 | 172-190 |
| 21 | 190 |
| 22 | 190 |
| 23 | 190-193 |
| 24 | 193-200 |
| 25 | 200 |
| 26 | 200-202 |
| 27 | 202 |
| 28 | 203 |
| 29 | 203 |
| 30 | 203 |
| 31 | 204 |
| 32 | 204 |
| 33 | 204 |
| 34 | 204-207 |
| 35 | 207-218 |
| 36 | 219-227 |
| 37 | 228 |
| 38 | 229, 230 |
| 39 | 230 |
| 40 | 231 |
| 41 | 231 |
| 42 | 232-234 |
| 43 | 234 |
| 44 | 234, 235 |
| 45 | 235 |
| 46 | 235, 236 |

SECTIONS OF CODE—*continued*

47	236-268
48	268 271
49	271, 272
50	272 278
51	278, 279
52	279 283
53	284
54	284-286
55	286-290
56	290
57	291
58	291
59	292-293
60	293-305
61	305, 306
62	306, 307
63	307-310
64	310-315
65	315-322
66	322 327
67	327
68	327
69	328
70	328
71	328-330
72	330
73	331-340
74	340
75	341
76	341
77	341
78	342
79	343, 344
80	344-347
81	348
82	348
83	348 349
84	349 350
85	350
86	351-3 3
87	353
88	354
89	355
90	355
91	355 356
92	356
93	356-376
94	377
95	378-380
96	381-391
97	391, 392
98	392 3 11
99	394-397
100	397
101	397
102	417-422
103	422
104	423-426
105	426-430
106	430
107	430
108	432
109	434
110	434
111	434
112	435
113	457

SECTIONS OF CODE—*continued*

114	457
115	458 480
116	481
117	481
118	481
119	481
120	483
121	483
122	483
123	483
124	484
125	484
126	484
127	485
128	485
129	486
130	486
131	486
132	487
133	487
134	490
135	490
136	491, 492
137	493
138	493
139	493
140	493
141	494-494
142	496
143	497
144	497-503
145	503-506
146	506
147	506
148	506
149	507
150	508
151	508
152	509
153	509
154	509
155	509
156	509
157	509
158	510

SECURITY and arrest before judgment, 1184

and judgment debtor about to be declared an insolvent, 287, 289, 290

leave to defend in summary procedure, 1180

stay of execution, 922 923

temporary injunctions, 1195, 1202

by Receiver, 1216

for appearance of witness, 204

costs, by returning next friend, 1144

in appeal, 1275-1279

to the Privy Council, 1331-1337

divorce 26

(O XXV) 1084-1087

effect of failure to furnish, 1084, 1087

when may be required from plaintiff, 1084

restitution, 503

and appeal, 1272, 1273

SEPARATE causes of action against separate defendants 687n
costs 214 215
defences, 730

for partition 108n
to set aside decree, 765
trial, power to order, 611, 624-626
and appellate Court, 626

SERVANT not a member of family (service of summons), 645

process on recognized agent, 634
pleader 637
summons 202 203
and minor, 643 643n
railway officials, 641n
foreign, 203
in another province 203
Baluchistan 651n
suit against firm, 1114
notice in same, 1121
on corporation 1110
O V, 641-660
defendant appearing before, 752
refusing or not found, 616
delivery or transmission 611
duty of serving officer 639
endorsement in 641
examination of return of officer 641
in foreign territory 646
mode of 642
in Civil Public Officer etc 658
defendant in another jurisdiction 653
prison 655
out of British India 645
male member of family 645
several defendants 642
soldiers 658
wrong person of similar name 645
personal or on agent 644 645
substituted 650-653
substitution of letter 651

651

S11 Of 1 and costs not awarded 216 217n
as decree incapable of being enforced 216
cross decrees 914 915
distribution of assets 734
appeal from decree in case of 888 889
decree holder (purchasing) entitled to and deposit 691
decree in case of, 888
equitable in excess of pecuniary jurisdiction, 71

- SIGNATURE and initiailling, 59
 and sealing 59
 defect as to, in plaint, 668*n*
 in Code, when includes stamping, 35
 meaning of "person referred to," 59
 of admissions, 804
 amendment of application for execution, 912
 memorandum of appeal, 1263
 application for execution, 902
 order for sale, 978
 to sue as pauper, 1151
 appointment of pleader, 635
 award in arbitration 1466
 decree, 865, 866
 in appeal 1318
 deposition by Judge 841
 judgment, 853
 in appeal, 1311
 memorandum of appeal, 1259
 evidence by Judge, 845
 plaint under O XXVII, 1106
 pleading in suit by corporation 1110
 or against firm 1111
 pleadings 665-667
 process for execution 939
 summons, 637-639
- SILENCE in decree as to further interest 204
- SIMULTANEOUS execution 917
- SMALL CAUSE instituted in ordinary Court, and second appeal, 419
 Court, 26
 and appeal, 417-422
- suit for refund of assets 340
- Presidency, 51
 and saving clause, 61-64
 not affected by Sect. 2 51
- Provincial and saving clause, 62, 63
 jurisdiction of 164
- suits cognizable by, 419
 transfer for execution to 897
- SOLICITOR, service of summons on, 638
- SOLICITOR, and costs due from client, 216
 lien for costs, 216*a*

SET OFF—*continued*

(O VIII), and account, 736

usance of, 739

distinguished from a plea of payment, 736

counter claim, 737

recoupment, 738

effect of, 734, 744

equitable, 737, 739, 739a

SETTING ASIDE award in arbitration, 1167

consent decree, 387

decree *ex parte*, 764-774

after satisfaction, 766

and appeal, revision, review, 773

"Court," 769

"decree," 769

"due service," 768

effect of, 773

limitation and burden of proof, 767

not without notice, 774

of share in appeal, 1267

SETTLEMENT of issues (O XIV) 813-822, and see INDEX

SHARE in a corporation, sale of, 994

what is deemed included by, 37

in moveable property, attachment of, 845

(undivided) in immovable property, and execution, 931, 932, 1002, 1003

SUIT BILL, and attachment, 301

claiming land as such, and means profits, 872

nonjoinder of, 543

suit for declaration of title to, 117

SIGNATURE and intialling, 79

and sealing 59

defect as to, in plaint, 608a

in Code, when includes stamping 35

meaning of "person referred to, 59

of admissions, 801

— — — — —

appointment of pleader, 635

award in arbitration 1406

decree, 865, 866

in appeal 1318

deposition by Judge 811

judgment, 857

in appeal 1311

memorandum of appeal, 1251

evidence by Judge 845

plaint under O XXII, 1106

pleading in suit by corporation 1110

or against firm 1111

pleadings 604-607

process for execution 920

summons 637-639

SILENCE in decree as to further interest 204

SIMULTANEOUS execution 917

SMALL CAUSE instituted in ordinary Court and second appeal, 419
Court, 26

and appeal, 417-422
— — — — —

Presidency, 51

and saving clause, 62-64

not affected by Sect 2-71

Provincial and saving clause, 62-63

jurisdiction of 164

suits cognizable by 419

transfer of execution to 817

SOLEDER service of summons in C S

SOLICITOR, and costs due from client, 216

lien for costs, 216a

SET OFF—*continued*
(O)

executor or administrator, 743
 defendant's position in claiming, 738
 defined, 736
 disallowance of, 739*n*
 distinguished from a plea of payment, 736
 counter claim, 737
 recoupment, 736
 effect of, 734, 744
 equitable, 737, 739, 739*n*
 general principle of, 737, 737*n*
 jurisdiction in, 743
 illustrations of, 735
 meaning of "suit for recovery of money," 739, 740
 must be specially pleaded, 743
 mutuality of debts, 742
 not an of "49

what is essential to, 743*n*

and appeal, revision, review, 773
 " Court," 769
 " decree," 769
 " due service," 766

effect of, 744, 744*n*

decree in summary procedure, 1101, 1102
 dismissal of suit, 753, 754
 injunction, 1210, 1211
 sale, 1010-1021
 of share in appeal, 1267

SETTLEMENT of issues (O XIV) 813 822, and see 1891 23

11, 111, 112, 112, 113

SUBJUNCTION and attachment, 301

SHEPHERD

20

SIGNATURE and in t a l l i n g 59

an l e a l n g 59

defect as to in p l a i n t 668a

in Code when includes stamping 37

n e a n i n g of p e r s o n r e f e r r e d t o 79

of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 801

a n n o u n c e m e n t of a n n o u n c i a t i o n f o r e x e c u t i o n 910

S U P E R I O R C O U R T

S U P E R I O R C O U R T

p l e a d i n g a g a i n s t c o r p o r a t i o n 1110

o r a g a i n s t f i r m 1111

p l e a d i n g s o n 1-667

p r o c e s s f o r e x e c u t i o n 900

s u m m o n s 637 639

S U P P O R T i n l e c t u r e a s t o f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t 904

S I M U L T A N E O U S e x e c u t i o n 917

S M A I L C A U S E i n s t i t u t e d i n o r d n a r y C o u r t a n d s e c o n d a p p e a l 419

C o u r t 20

a n d a p p e a l 417-422

P r e s i d e n c y 81

a n d l e a v i n g c l a u s e 63 61

n o t a f f e c t e d b y S e c t 7 1

P r o v i n c i a l a n d l e a v i n g c l a u s e 63 63

j u r i s d i c t i o n 161

s u b a c g n a l l e l y 419

t r a n s f e r f o r e x e c u t i o n 8

S O I D I E T s e r v i c e of s u m m o n s i n C 5

S O I C I T O R a n d c o s t s l i e f r o m c l i e n t 216

l i e n f o r c o s t s 216a

SET OFF—*continued*

(O VIII), and ascertained sum, 740
 lien for costs, 745, 745n
 unliquidated damages, 740, 741
 by agent, 889
 executor or administrator, 743
 defendant's position in claiming, 738
 defined, 736

recoupment, 736
 effect of, 741, 744
 equitable, 737, 739, 739n

SETTING ASIDE award in arbitration, 1467

consent decree, 387
 decree *ex parte*, 764-774
 after satisfaction, 766
 and appeal, revision, review, 773
 "Court," 769
 "decree," 769
 "due service," 768

effect of, 772
 limitation and burden of proof, 767
 not without notice, 774
 object of rule, 764
 on application of defendant, 761
 proof, how given, 768

rule, 1030-1041

of share in appeal, 1267

SETTLEMENT of issues (O XIV), 812-822, and *see* Issues

See also Settlement of issues

831, 832, 1002, 1003

SHEBUT, and attachment, 301

claiming land as such, and mesne profits, 872
 nonjoinder of one, 647n
 suit for declaration of title to la, 167

STATEMENT—*continued*.

written, specially pleaded defence, 730
 specific dealing, 730, 731
 denial, 730, 732, 733
 time for presentation of, 727

STAY by Execution Court, 267*n*

in reference to High Court, 1349
 of execution, 922-924
 and limitation, 922
 security, 892
 for costs, pending appeal, 1342
 in appeal to the Privy Council, 1339, 1341
 summary procedure, 1181
 pending suit, 892

of proceedings, 47, 48

 by the Privy Council, 1342

 sale by Collector, 330-331

 pending appeal, 1273

 suit, and execution-proceedings, 96

 identity of parties, 99

 relief, 98, 99

 jurisdiction to grant relief, 99

lis pendens, 95-99

 matter in issue, 97

 pending appeal, 98

lump sum, 99

 does not bar institution of suit, 97

 pending appeal, 1267-1274

 appointment of new next friend, 1145

STIPEND, and attachment, 293, 301

STIPULATION by pleader, 931*n*

STOPPAGE of sale, 985, 986

STRANGER, right of, not affected by attachment before judgment 1190
 to suit, dispossession of, 932

STRIKING off application for execution, 960-963

 petition of appeal to the Privy Council, 1337, 1339

 out embarrassing pleadings, 705*n*

 party, 545

 pleadings, 670-673

 how constituted, 70

 determined, 80

 meaning of term, 68*n*, 71

 of suit, defined, 1072

SUBMISSION for revision, 1352

SUBORDINATION, and transfer of suit, 19*n*

 of Courts, 51, 59

 and review, 469

SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE of imprisoned *debtors*, 533

time for presentation of, 727

S.

security, 892
for costs, pending appeal, 1342
in appeal to the Privy Council, 1339, 1341
summary procedure, 1181
pending suit, 892
of proceedings, 47, 48
by the Privy Council, 1342
sale by Collector, 330-331
pending appeal, 1273
suit, and execution-proceedings, 96
identity of parties, 99
relief, 98, 99
jurisdiction to grant relief, 99
lis pendens, 95-99
matter in issue, 97
pending appeal, 98

does not bar institution of suit, 97
pending appeal, 1267-1274
appointment of new next friend, 1145

STIPEND, and attachment, 293, 301

STIPULATION by pleader, 631a

STOPPAGE of sale, 985, 986

STRANGER, right of, not affected by attachment before judgment 1190
to suit, dispossession of, 932

pleadings, 670-673

SUBJECT-MATTER, and place of suing, 155

SUBMISSION for revision, 1332

Judge, jurisdiction of, 79

SUBORDINATION, and transfer of suit, 105
of Courts, 51, 59
and review, 469

SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE of imprisoned & Mor., 635

SUBSISTING decree, measure of, 315

SUBSTANCE of issues to be regarded, 690
point of, 733

SUBSTITUTED service of summons, 650-653

SUCCESSION by heirship and representation, 275

by and against military men (O. XXVIII.), 1102, 1109

change of character of, and amendment of pleading, 640-694

conduct of, 570

construction of term, 19

determination of subject matter and value, 80

end of, 109

ex-contraria, and notice under Sect. 80, 345

for compensation (Sect. 95) barred by award, 37

land, 160-165

mere profits, nature of, 571

money, measure of term, 106

recovery of money and set-off, 739, 740

sale (mortgage), 1160

in name of wrong plaintiff, 540

instituted in Court without jurisdiction, 74

institution of, 201-202

interest after, 204-206

before, 204

matters for determination re, 71

mean end of term, 105, 106

in O. II phrase of suit, 577

(Sect. 34), 190

miscellaneous proceedings re, 45

not defined, 43

revival of, a limitation not necessary, 710

scope of term, 43

(Sect. 10), and proceeding in execution, 97

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

valuation of, 231

SUII—*continued*

- when Courts have jurisdiction to try, 65
 - of civil nature, 65, 84, 85
 - and cognizability 85
- where to be instituted, 79, 156
- withdrawal of, 197 199, and *see* SUITS

SUITS by aliens, 348-353

- by co sharers and jointer, 563*n*

-315

SUMMARY dismissal of appeal, 1279

- procedure on negotiable instruments (O XXXVII) 1176-1182

SUMMONS, dismissal for default in serving 752

- foreign, service of 203

costs of second 773*n*

SUNDAY, and presentation of plaint 200

- arrest on under process of a Mofussil Court 255
- local inquiry on, 201*n*

SUPPRESSION of decree, 499, 500, 500*n*SURETY *See* SECURITY

- and Small Cause Court 63
- discharge of, 289
- execution against, 504
- in arrest before judgment, 1184 1185
- order against, and appeal 48

SURGEON, and carrying on business 181

SYMBOLICAL POSSESSION, 90*n*, 94*n* 942

- and cause of action 242*n*
- limitation 1032 1035
- second suit, 36
- not despoession 1044

TALABAN 4, failure to deposit, 761

TALUK, sale of portion outside jurisdiction 227*n*

- situate outside jurisdiction, 104*n*

TALUQDARS, Acts for relief of, 87*n*

- and mesne profits, 574
- committee of not a Court under Sect. 11 104
- (On lib, suit & r, and amendment, 657*n*

TITLE—continued

TITLES, alternative, 704
inconsistent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and immoveable property. 165

TORT, action on; the essentials, 471
act of ouster separate, 539
and cause of action, 185

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action, 592
on different properties, 592

TRADE, carrying on, 633

TRADING NAME, suit against person who uses. 1126.

by Governor General in Council, 200
evidence in, 848
*record of reasons for, 196
on misconception of fact, 196
under Letters Patent (clause 13), 198

TRANSFEREE of rights before or after decree, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 800n
interest on same, 801n

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1338
of order of the Privy Council 1343, 1344

TRAVELER, in defence, 730

TRUSTS and immovable property, Cl
unsevered, and execution sale, 248n

TRESPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167n

TRESPASSER and mono-profits, 873, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 199
 motion for temporary injunction treated as, 1211
 separate, power to order, 511
 separate, 624, 625

TITLE—*continued*

- question of, and special appeal, 73a
 - what is a different, 122
- same and different and *res judicata*, 134
- short, of Code, 31
- to restitution 501, 502
- varying relief after proof of, 413a

TITLES, alternative, 704

- inconsistent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and unmoveable property, 165

TORT, action on, the essentials, 171

- act of ouster separate, 589
- and cause of action, 185
- as a general rule, separate cause of action, 589
- connected with contract, 589
- unity of title to property injured, 589
- compensation for, and Sect 19 171

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action, 592

- on different properties, 592

TRADE, carrying on, 633

TRADING NAME, suit against person who uses, 1126

- evidence in, 848
- record of reasons for, 196
- on misconception of fact, 196
- under Letters Patent (clause 13), 191

TRANSFEREE of rights before or after decree, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 860a

Interest on same, 860a

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1339

- of order of the Privy Council, 1313, 1344

TRAVELLER, in defence, 730

TRUST and immoveable property, 61

- unswered, and execution sale, 248a

TRESPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167a

TRESPASSER and mesne profits, 873, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 199

- motion for temporary injunction treated as, 1211
- separate, power to order, 511
- separate, 624, 625

- TARP 4D, suit by members of, against /arnagan, 609n
- TATCHAN community, suit on behalf of, 363n
- TAXATION of costs by dissenting trustee, 209 :
- TECHNICAL objections, 14, 706
 as to jurisdiction, 171
 sense and construction 9, 11
- TECHNICALITY and execution proceedings, 464n
 avoidance of, 18
- TEMPLE, interest of worshipper in, 359n
 rights of worshipper in, 359
 scheme for management of, 361
- TEMPORARY injunctions (O XXXIX), 1195-1214
 residence *See* RESIDENCE
 and place of suing, 172
- TENANT and interpleader, 1173
 in common, and joinder, 543n
- TENANTS (registered), decree against, and *res judicata*, 133
- TENDER before action, and payment into Court, 1082
 of expenses of witness, 827
- TERMS on which *ex parte* decree set aside, 771
 effect of non compliance with same, 772
- TERRITORIAL jurisdiction, 152, 153 *See* LOCAL
- TEST action, postponement of suit pending, 128
 for joinder, 615n
 in bar by former suit, 584n
- meaning of Court, 7
 relevancy, 784
 7, 12, 102
- 12
- 1305
- 70
- is usual, xxx
 matter should have been in issue, 121
- TESTAMENTARY jurisdiction, 25
 procedure in, 25, 25n
 7, 12, 102
- 859
- TITLE, and cause of action, 608, 608n
 sale certificate, 315-319, 315n-319n
 stay by *lis pendens*, 95
 deeds of immoveable property, 162, 163n
 decision by Revenue Court not a bar, 114n
 on, 73n
 incidentally questioned, and suit for l in l, 163n
 of auction purchaser, 315-322
 Code, 1
 party in plaint, 197-199

TITLE—*continued.*

TITLES, alternative, 704
inconsistent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and immoveable property, 165

TORT, action on; the essentials, 171
act of ouster separate, 589
and cause of action, 185
as a general rule, separate cause of action, 588
connected with contract, 589
unity of title to property injured, 589
compensation for, and Sect 19 171

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action, 592
on different properties, 592

TRADE, carrying on, 633

TRADING NAME, suit against person who uses, 1126

to Court in another province, 231

evidence in, 848
record of reasons for, 196
on misconception of fact, 196
under Letters Patent (clause 13), 194

TRANSFEREE of rights before or after decree, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 860
interest on same, 862

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1332
of order of the Privy Council, 1313, 1344

TRAVERSE, in defence, 730

TRFES and immoveable property, 61
unsevered, and execution sale, 248

TRESPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167

TRESPASSER and mesne profits, 873, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 190
motion for temporary injunction treated as, 1211
separate, power to or for, 511
separate, 624, 625

TITLE—*continued*

- question of, and special appeal 73a
- what is a different, 122
- same and different, and *res judicata*, 134
- short, of Code, 31
- to restitution 501, 502
- varying relief after proof of, 413a

TITLES, alternative 704

- inconsistent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and immoveable property, 165

TORT, action on, the essentials, 171

- act of ouster separate 589
- and cause of action, 185

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action 512

- on different properties 592

TRADE, carrying on, 633

TRADING NAME, suit against person who uses, 1126

- pendency, 197, 198
- Small Cause Court, 199
- special jurisdiction, 198
- subordination, 199
- by Governor General in Council, 200
- evidence in, 848
- record of reasons for, 196
- on misconception of fact, 196
- under Letters Patent (clause 13), 194

TRANSFERENCE of rights before or after decree, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 860a

interest on same, 841a

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1338

- of order of the Privy Council 1343, 1344

TRAVELLER, in defence, 730

TREAS and immoveable property, 61

- unsevered, and execution sale, 248a

TRESPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167a

TRESPASSER and mesne-profits, 873, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 109

- motion for temporary inunction treated as, 1211
- separate, power to order, 511
- separate, 624, 625

TRUST, charitable and *see* 177

TRUSTEE, and security for costs in suit by pauper, 1150
 bar by former suit by, 365n
 costs of, 209, 209n
de annis et de redditibus

UMPIRE in arbitration, 1466

UNCERTAIN allegation on record, 119

UNCERTAINTY in decree for recovery of immovable property, 867
 of local limits, 170, 171

UNDERVALUATION of suit, 718

UNIFORMITY of decisions, importance of, 10n

UNNECESSARY matter in pleadings 671

UNSOUND mind, persons of, suit by or against 1147, 1148

USAGE having the force of law, 409, 410

USER, right of, is question of fact, 409

VAKALUTNAMA and presentation of appeal 1260
 filing of, is not appearance, 746

VAKIL and compromise, 1075, 1076
 and definition of pleader, 57, 58
 presentation of appeal, 1259, 1260
 included by definition of pleader, 34
 practising before the Privy Council 58n

VALIDITY of appointment of Judge, 66n, 66

VALUATION and joinder of causes of action, 622
 and jurisdiction in appeal, 380, 450, 451
value of property

and appeal, 81, 81n, 721, 722
mesne profits demanded by plaintiff, 84n
 suits (mode of), 80, 81
 question as to clause, and appeal, 39n
 subject matter not capable of exact, 81n

inquiry as to, in appeal to the Privy Council, 1333

VALUE—*continued*

- of means profits subsequent to suit, and appealable value, 452
- suit and jurisdiction in appeal, 83, 84
 - Suits Valuation Act, 83
 - how determined, 80
 - in appeal to the Privy Council, 451-453
 - and consolidation, 1332, 1333
- proclamation of sale, 982

VERIFICATION of application for execution, 902

- order for sale, 978
- to sue as pauper, 1151

VESSEL, defendant or judgment creditor, 60

VESTING order, 996

VEXATIOUS action and costs, 213

WAIVER and appeal, 415, 416a

WANT of jurisdiction, 14, 68-70

- estoppel from pleading, 70, 70a

WARRANT in execution, 920

WARRANTY of title and sale, 321, 1031

WASILAT, accrual of cause of action as to, 871

- and joint opposition to plaintiff's possession, 872

WILLS, construction of, 274

WITNESS appearing by counsel, and costs, 210

- attendance before Commissioner, 1101
- commission to examine, 341
- credibility of, on appeal, 407, 1312, 1312a
- default in attendance by, 204
- punishment of, 201

SET OFF—continued
(O VIII)

executor or administrator, 743
defendant's position in claiming, 738
defined, 736

equity of, 731, 734
equitable, 737, 739, 739a

equity of plaintiff pleaded, 744

SETTING ASIDE award in arbitration, 1467
consent decree, 737
decree *ex parte*, 764-774
 after satisfaction, 766
 and appeal, revision, review, 773
 "Court," 769
 "decree," 769
 "due service," 766

share, 1919-1921
of share in appeal, 1267

SEIZURE of issue (O XIV), 813-822, and *see* 1381-29

SHARE in a corporation, sale of, 991
 what is deemed included by, 95
in moveable property, attachment of, 945
(undivided) in immoveable property, and execution, 931, 932, 1002, 1003

SHEBET, and attachment, 301
claiming land as such, and mesne-profits, 872
nonjoinder of one, 543a
suit for declaration of title to be, 164

- SIGNATURE** and initialing, 50
 and sealing, 59
 defect as to, in plaint, 668a
 in Code, when includes stamping, 35
 meaning of "person referred to," 59
 of admissions, 804
 amendment of application for execution, 912
 memorandum of appeal, 1263
 application for execution, 902
 order for sale, 978
 to sue as pauper, 1151
 appointment of pleader, 635
 award in arbitration, 1166
 decree, 805, 806
 in appeal, 1318
 deposition by Judge, 844
 judgment, 853
 in appeal, 1311
 memorandum of appeal, 1259
 evidence by Judge, 845
 plaint under O. XXVII, 1106
 pleading in suit by corporation, 1110
 of against *Reus*, 1113
 pleadings, 603-607
 process for execution, 920
 summons, 617-639
- SILENCE** in *decree* as to further interest, 701
- SIMULTANEOUS** execution, 917
- SMALL CAUSE** (instituted in ordinary *Chancery*, and *several* appeal, 419
Court, 26
 and appeal, 417-427
 attachment, 1187
 award of costs, 210
 case in which account to be taken, 425a
 exceptions from Final Decree, 1322-1326

SOVEREIGN Prince, and suit by or against, 349-353
 minor, etc, 1118
 personal privilege of, 352

SPECIAL appeal, 400
 and grounds, 1263
 disallowance of costs, 211n

vacancies, 430
 jurisdiction, 22-35
 Courts of, 157

439

SPECIFIC denial, and dealing in written statement, 730, 732, 733
 enactment, when none, 16

relief, appointment of Receiver is form of, 1221
 rules, when none, 16n
 terms in gift of jurisdiction, 98

SPECIFICATION of documents in Special Case, 1175
 of points in additional evidence, 1310
 share or interest, and attachment, 905

SPLITTING of action and instalments, 594n
 cause of action, 575, 575n

STAKE HOLDER and interpleader, 1174

STAMP, and presentation of plaint, 202
 and sale certificate, 1030
 in cases of alternative relief, 80n
 on plaint, insufficiency of, 715, 718, 719
 revision of exclusion for want of, 474n
 want of, 412n

STAMPING, when included by "signed" in Code, 35

STATE Act of, not regarded as foreign judgment, 151n

STATEMENT by plaintiff accepting payment into Court, 1081
 in plaint, contents of, 701-703
 reference, 1349, 1350
 of grounds by Judge, 33
 object and reasons, 5
 reasons at first hearing, 853n
 written admissions, 734
 amendment of, 18
 and appearance, 746
 set off, 734-746
 subsequent pleadings, 745
 confession and avoidance, 730
 damages, 732
 default in presenting, 746
 evasive denial, 732
 general issue, 731
 matter alleged in, and estoppel, 110
 nature of, 728
 of defence (O VIII L 727
 point of substance, 733
 separate and inconsistent defences, 730

STATEMENT—*continued.*

written, specially pleaded defence, 730
 specific dealing, 730, 731
 denial, 730, 732, 733
 time for presentation of, 727

STAY by Execution Court, 267*n*

in reference to High Court, 1319
 of execution, 922-924
 and limitation, 922
 security, 892
 for costs, pending appeal, 1342
 in appeal to the Privy Council, 1339, 1341
 summary procedure, 1181
 pending suit, 892

jurisdiction to grant relief, 99
lis pendens, 95-99
 matter in issue, 97

rule as to, 93
 does not bar institution of suit, 97
 pending appeal, 1267-1274
 appointment of new next friend, 1145

STIPEND, and attachment, 293, 301

STIPULATION by pleader, 631*n*

STOPPAGE of sale, 985, 986

STRANGER, right of, not affected by attachment before judgment, 1190
 to suit, disposition of, 932

pleadings, 670-673

how constituted, 70
 determined, 80
 meaning of term, 68*n*, 71
 of suit, defined, 1072

SUBMISSION for revision, 1352

Judge, jurisdiction of, 28

SUBORDINATION, and transfer of suit, 12*n*
 of Courts, 51, 54

and review, 469

SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE of imprisoned debtor, 925

SUBSISTING decree, meaning of, 319*n*

SUBSTANCE of issues to be regarded, 680*n*
point of, 733

SUBSTITUTED service of summons, 650-653

SUBSTITUTION, distinguished from amendment of decree, 862
in appeal of manager of temple for idol, 684*n*
Secretary of State for Magistrate, 688*n*
of assignees *pendente lite*, 536, 536*n*
beneficiaries as plaintiffs, 1127, 1128
letter for summons, 659
plaintiff by Court, 545, 549

SUCCESSION by heirship and representation, 275

SUIT, and appealable value, 434, 450, 451
and execution proceedings, 43, 44
insolvency proceedings, 44
as representative, 708, 709
by and against military men (O XXVIII), 1108, 1109
change of character of, and amendment of pleading, 690-694
conduct of, 570
construction of term, 196
determination of subject matter and value, 80
dismissal of, distinguished from rejection of plaint, 718
on non appearance of plaintiff, 751, 752, 754, 758, 753
disposal of, at first hearing (O XV), 823-824
effect of withdrawal, 38
end of, 109
ex contractu, and notice under Sect 80, 345*n*
for compensation (Sect 95) barred by award, 378
land, 160-165
income profits, nature of, 871*n*
money, meaning of term, 1086
recovery of money and set off, 739, 740
sale (mortgage), 1169
former, meaning of term (Sect 11), 54
frame of, O II, 573-624
general power of transfer, 103-200
guardian for, and minor, 1133-1137
hearing of (O XVIII), 842-849
identity of, 106
in name of wrong plaintiff, 545
instituted in Court without jurisdiction, 74
institution of, 200-202
interest after, 204-206
before, 204
matters for determination in, 71
meaning of term, 103, 106
in O II (frame of suit), 577
(Sect 24), 196
miscellaneous proceedings not, 45
not defined, 43
on foreign judgment, 93
parties to (O I), 511-572
proceedings held not to be, 105
questions involved in, 563-567
representation of beneficiary in, 1127
restoration of, 753
revival of, administration not necessary, 710
scope of term, 43
(Sect 10), and proceeding in execution, 97
separate, and execution (Sect. 47), 236, 252, 253
as regards separate causes of action, 107
stay of, and *lit pendens*, 95-99
to recover partnership debt and jointer, 663*n*
transfer of (Sect 22), 190-200
valuation of, 80, 81

SUIF—*continued*.

- when Courts have jurisdiction to try, 15
- of civil nature, 65, 84, 85
- and cognizability, 85
- where to be instituted, 79, 156
- withdrawal of, 193-199, and *see* Suits

SUITS by aliens, 348-353

- by co sharers and jointer, 563*n*

-348

SUMMARY dismissal of appeal, 1279

- procedure on negotiable instruments (O XXXVII), 1176-1182

SUMMONS, dismissal for default in serving, 762

- foreign, service of, 263

costs of second, 773*n*

SUNDAY, and presentation of plaint, 200

- arrest on, under process of a Mofussil Court, 235
- local inquiry on, 201*n*

SUPERSESION of decree, 499, 500, 500*n*SURETY *See* SECURITY

- and Small Cause Court, 63
- discharge of, 289
- execution against, 504
- in arrest before judgment, 1184, 1185
- order against, and appeal, 48

SURGEON, and carrying on business, 180

SYMBOLICAL POSSESSION, 90*n*, 91*n*, 932

- and cause of action, 242*n*
- imitation, 1032, 1033
- second suit, 36
- not dispossession, 1044

TALABANA, failure to deposit, 761

TALUK, sale of portion outside jurisdiction, 227*n*

- situate outside jurisdiction, 169*n*

TALUQDARS, Acts for relief of, 87*n*

- and mesne profits, 574
- committee of, not a Court under Sect. 11.. 104
- (Oudh), suit by, and amendment, 629*n*

TARIFF 1D, suit by members of, against *Jarnaran*, 609*n*

TATCHAN community, suit on behalf of, 383*n*

TAXATION of costs by dissenting trustee, 209*n*

TECHNICAL objections, 14, 706

as to jurisdiction, 171
sense and construction 9, 11

TECHNICALITY and execution proceedings, 464*n*
avoidance of, 13

TEMPLE, interest of worshipper in, 359*n*

rights of worshipper in, 359

scheme for management of, 361

TEMPORARY injunctions (O XXXIX), 1195-1214

residence *See RESIDENCE*

and place of suing, 172

TENANT and interpleader, 1173

in common, and joinder, 543*n*

TENANTS (registered), decree against, and *re j iditale*, 137

TENDER before action, and payment into Court, 1082
of expenses of witness, 827

TERMS on which *ex parte* decree set aside, 771

effect of non compliance with same,

TERRITORIAL jurisdiction, 152, 153 *See LOCAL*

TEST action, postponement of suit pending, 628

for joinder, 615*n*

in bar by former suit, 584*n*

See 311

1305

adjudication is of no use in

decree against Hindu widow binds reversioners, 240

is final, 444

matter should have been in issue, 121

TESTAMENTARY jurisdiction, 25

procedure in, 25, 25*n*

TESTAMENTARY jurisdiction, 1264

incidentally questioned, and suit for land, 163*n*
of auction purchaser, 315-322

Code, 1

party in plaintiff, 697-699

TITLE—*continued*

TITLES, alternative 704
inconsistent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and immoveable property, 165

TORT, action on, the essentials, 171
act of ouster separate 589
and cause of action 185

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action 592
on different properties 592

TRADE, *carrying on*, 633

TRADING NAME suit against person who uses 1126

subordination, 199
by Governor General in Council, 200
evidence in, 848
record of reasons for, 196
on misconception of fact, 196
under Letters Patent (clause 13), 194

TRANSFER of rights *before or after decree*, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 800n
interest on same, 801n

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1329
of order of the Privy Council 1343 1344

TRAVEL in defence, 730

TREAS and immoveable property, 61
unsevered, and execution sale, 248*

TRESPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167a

TRESPASSER and mesne-profits, 673, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 199
motion for temporary injunction treated as, 1211
separate, power to order, 511
separate, 624, 625

VALUE—*continued*

- of mesne profits subsequent to suit, and assessable value, 452
- suit and jurisdiction in appeal, 83, 84
 - Suits Valuation Act, 83
 - how determined, 80
 - in appeal to the Privy Council, 451-453
 - and consolidation, 1332, 1333
- proclamation of sale, 982

VARIANCE between specific decree and judgment, 117n

- of decree, restitution on, 497-503
- injunction, 1210, 1211
- slight, between plaintiff's pleading and evidence, 680

VERIFICATION of application for execution, 902

- order for sale, 978
- to sue as pauper, 1151
- objection to, 669
- of pleadings, 666-670
 - in suit by corporation, 1110, 1112
 - or against firm, 1113

VESSEL, defendant or judgment debtor, 60

VESTING order, 996

VEXATIOUS action and costs, 213

WARRANT—*continued*

use of depositions, and appeal, 415, 416

WANT of jurisdiction, 14, 63-70

estoppel from pleading, 70, 70n

WARRANT in execution, 920

WARRANTY of title and sale, 321, 3031

WARRANT, accrual of cause of action as to, 871

- and joint opposition to plaintiff's possession, 872
- calculation of, 876
- effect of decree for possession with, 880
- paid in kind or in money, and interest, 881
- received by respondent without being entitled to it, 882n

WILL, construction of, 274

-1080

WITNESS—*continued*

discrediting for general reasons, is error of law, 407
 examination of (O XVIII), 842-849
 expenses of, 826-828
 export, fee of, 827
 letter of request to examine, 341
 refused costs, 210
 summoning and attendance of (O XVI), 825-836
 summons to (Sect 31), 204

WOMAN plaintiff, and security for costs, 1084

WOMEN, exemption of, from arrest in execution, 290
 who are exempt from personal appearance, 489

WORK, meaning of, 182

WRITTEN, all notices and orders to be, 496
 statement *See* STATEMENT

WRONGS, actionable, jurisdiction in, 171

ZFMINDAR, and means profits, 874
 and sale in execution 283
 defendant with *palindar*, and separate costs, 211
 suing in own name by agent, 615

VALUE—*continued*

- of mesne profits subsequent to suit, and appealable value, 452
- suit and jurisdiction in appeal, 83, 84
 - Suits Valuation Act, 83
 - how determined, 80
 - in appeal to the Privy Council, 451-453
 - and consolidation, 1332, 1333
- proclamation of sale, 982

VERIFICATION of application for execution, 902

- order for sale, 978
- to sue as pauper, 1151
- objection to, 669
- of pleadings, 666-670
 - in suit by corporation, 1110, 1112
 - or against firm, 1113

VESSEL, defendant or judgment debtor, 50

VESTING order, 996

VEXATIOUS action and costs, 213

WAIVER and appeal, 415, 416

WANT of jurisdiction, 14, 68-70

estoppel from pleading, 70, 70a

WARRANT in execution, 920

WARRANTY of title and sale, 321, 1031

WASILAT, accrual of cause of action as to, 671

- and joint opposition to plaintiff's possession, 672
- calculation of, 676
- effect of decree for possession with, 680
- paid in kind or in money, and interest, 681
- received by respondent without being entitled to it, 602a

WILL, construction of, 274

-1089

Suit, 100

or appeal, effect of, 36

WITNESSES appearing by counsel, and costs, 210

- attendance before Commissioner, 1104
- commission to examine, 341
- credit due of, an appeal, 407, 1312, 1312a
- in default in attendance by, 204
- penalty due of, 204

TRUST, charitable, and English Equity, 370*n*

TRUSTEE, and security for costs in suit by pauper, 1150
bar by former suit by, 365*n*

costs of, 209, 209*n*

de son fait and, 1150

to remove, when brought, 373*n*

UMPIRE in arbitration, 1466

UNCERTAIN allegation on record 119

UNCERTAINTY in decree for recovery of immovable property, 867
of local limits 170, 171

UNDERVALUATION of suit, 718

UNIFORMITY of decisions, importance of, 100

UNNECESSARY matter in pleadings, 671

UNSOUND mind, persons of, suit by or against, 1147, 1149

USAGE having the force of law, 409, 410

USER, right of, is question of fact, 409

VAKALUTNAMA and presentation of appeal, 1260
filing of, is not appearance, 746

VALIDITY of appointment of Judge, 65*n*, 66

VALUATION and joinder of causes of action, 622
and jurisdiction in appeal, 386, 430, 431

and appeal, 81, 81*n*, 721, 722

means profits demanded by plaintiff, 81*n*

suits (mode of), 80, 81

question as to clause, and appeal, 39*n*

subject-matter not capable of exact, 81*n*

VALUE and transfer of suit (Sect. 22), 102

VALUE—*continued*

in appeal to the Privy Council, 451-453

proclamation of sale, 932

and consolidation, 1332, 1333

VERIFICATION of application for execution, 902

order for sale, 978

to and as pauper, 1151

VESSEL, defendant or judgment creditor, 60

VESTING order, 996

VEXATIOUS action and costs, 213

WAIVER and appeal, 415, 416a

and Court without inherent jurisdiction, 199a

WAN of jurisdiction, 14, 68-70

estoppel from pleading, 70, 70a

WARRANT in execution, 920

WARRANTY of title and sale, 321, 1031

WASIL 17, accrual of cause of action as to, 571

and joint opposition to plaintiff's possession, 872

calculation of, 576

effect of decree for possession with, 580

paid in kind or in money, and interest, 581

received by respondent without being entitled to it, 622a

WILL, construction of, 274

7-1089

or appeal, effect of, 36

WITNESS appearing by counsel, and costs, 210

attendance before Commissioner, 1104

commission to examine, 341

credit to of, and appeal, 400, 1312, 1312a

default in attendance by, 204

judgment of, 204

TITLE—*continued*

to restitution, 501, 502
varying relief after proof of, 413*n*

TITLES, alternative, 704
inconsistent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and immoveable property, 165

TORT, action on, the essentials, 171
act of ouster separate, 589
and cause of action, 185
as a general rule, separate cause of action, 589
connected with contract, 589
unity of title to property injured, 589
compensation for, and Sect 19 171

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action 592
on different properties, 592

TRADE, carrying on, 633

TRADING NAME, suit against person who uses, 1126

to Court in another province, 231

penalty, 196, 197
Small Cause Court, 199
special jurisdiction, 198
subordination, 199
by Governor General in Council, 200
evidence in, 818
record of reasons for, 196
on misconception of fact, 196
under Letters Patent (clause 13), 194

TRANSFER of rights before or after decree, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 800*n*
interest on same, 800*n*

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1334
of order of the Privy Council, 1343, 1344

TRAVEL, in defence, 731

TREAS and immoveable property, 61
unreverted, an executory sale, 245*n*

TRESPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167*n*

TRESPASSER and mesne-profits, 873, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 190
motion for temporary injunction treated as, 421
separate, power to order, 311
separate, 624, 625

- TRUST, charitable, and English Equity, 370n
 express and constructive, 371
 for public purpose of charitable or religious nature, 356-376
 public and private, 370, 371
 whether public, 370n
- TRUSTEE, and security for costs in suit by pauper, 1150
 bar by former suit by, 365n
 costs of, 209, 209n
de son tort, position of, 368
 distinguished from trustee of constructive trust, 371
 refusing or unable to sue, 1125
 removal of, 373
 suit by or against (O XXXI), 1127, 1128
 for removal of, and jointer, 565n
 to remove, when brought, 373n
- UMPIRE in arbitration, 1466
- UNCERTAIN allegation on record 119
- UNCERTAINTY in decree for recovery of immovable property, 867
 of local limits 170, 171
- UNDERVALUATION of suit, 718
- UNIFORMITY of decisions, importance of, 110
- UNNECESSARY matter in pleadings, 671
- UNSOUND mind, persons of, suit by or against, 1147, 1148
- USAGE having the force of law, 409, 410
- USER, right of, is question of fact, 409
- VAKALUTNAMA and presentation of appeal, 1260
 filing of, is not appearance, 746
- VAKIL and compromise, 1075, 1076
 and definition of pleader, 57-58
 presentation of appeal, 1259, 1260
 included by definition of pleader, 34
 practising before the Privy Council 58n
- VALIDITY of appointment of *Vakil*
- VARIATION
- rescission of sale*, 982
 - suit for perpetual injunction, 451n
 - for Court fees and for jurisdiction distinguished, 451n
 - of attached property and appeal, 933
 - suit, 80, 80n, 83
 - and appeal, 81, 81n, 721, 722
 - means profits demanded by plaintiff, 81n
 - suits (*modo off*), 80, 81
 - question as to clause, and appeal, 39n
 - subject matter not capable of exact, 81n
- VALUE and transfer of suit (Sect 22), 192
 aggregate, and appealable value, 453
 appealable, and damages claimed, 452n
 when partial relief given, 453
 estimated, in Special Case, 1175
 inquiry as to, in appeal to the Privy Council, 1331

DISCOVERY—*continued*

non compliance with order for, 798
 notice to produce, for inspection, 795
 object and nature of, 777, 778
 objection to affidavit of documents, 791
 objections to answer interrogatories, 783
 (O XI), 777-800
 order for inspection, 796

, 784

796

power to order, 201
 premature, 798
 privilege, 785, 791
 production of documents, 793
 questions put *malâ fide*, 784
 refused if injurious to public interest, 785*n*
 "relating to any matter," meaning of, 791
 sealing in 791

786

what documents must be included in affidavit, 790
 when further affidavit required, 792

DISCREPANCY between proclamation and certificate, 979*n*

DISCRETION, judicial, and appeal to the Privy Council, 456

and attendance of witness, 833, 833*n*

Code, 30

interest after date of suit, 204, 205

decree, 205

transfer of suit (Sect. 22), 102

as to authorizing collector in stay sale, 330, 331

costs, appeal from exercise of, 217, 218

nature of, 207, 210, 211*n*

interference with exercise of, by Appellate Court, 211

manner of exercise, 30*n*, 408, 1229*n*

nature of, 30

refusal to exercise, as to additional evidence, 408*n*

to recognize assignment of decree, 50

when exercise of, liable to review or appeal, 408

DISMISSAL acquiesced in, a bar, 498

for default, order of, not a decree, 33

suit, 751, 752, 754, 758, 760
 appeal from, 389

res judicata, 40*n*, 116, 117, 144

suit, distinguished from rejection of plaint, 718

DISMISSAL,—*continued*

- of suit, for default in appearance by both parties 752, 753
 - plaintiff, 753
 - payment of court fees, 751, 752
 - non appearance after adjournment, 839
 - in default of security for costs, 1084, 1085
 - on application of minor attaining majority, 1146
 - default in pre-emption 833, 834
 - when summons not served etc (O IX r 5), 754
- on ground apart from merits, 39-42
- (summary) of appeal, 1279

DISPAUPERING, 1156

DISPOSSESSION and delivery in execution, 972

- by decree holder, 1040
- of stranger, 932

DISQUALIFICATION of Judge by personal interest, 66, 66a
and transfer of suit, 195, 196, 196a

DISSENT from judgment in appeal, 1318

DISSOLUTION of partnership, decrees in suit for, 880

DISTRRAINT, suit for recovery of property under, 165

DISTRIBUTION of assets, 331-340

DISTRICT Court, 33, 50, 51

- and additional or assistant Judge (Sect. 24), 193
- certain suits for damages, 157
- transfer of suit, 196, 198
- appeal, or proceeding, 193
- presentation of plaint, 201
- (in Bombay) and suit when Government party, 153

defined, 33

Judge, 51

and additional Judge, 52a

jurisdiction of, 79

(Scheduled), 32

DIVISION COURT, appeal from, 54, 55

point not raised before, 55

DIVORCE—

- Act, English, rules of, 26
- procedure, 26
- proceedings and attachment before judgment, 1190

DOCUMENTS, admission of, 801

construction of, question of fact and of law, 404, 415

decree for execution of, 930, 931

delivery and service of draft of, 930

of copy of draft, 930

discovery of, 785, 788-793 *See* DISCOVERY

impounding of, 809

inspection of, 794-796

power to make orders relating to, 203

production of, 793, 795, 805-808

proper custody of, not a question of fact, 404

protected in discovery, 785

rejection of, 806

relied on in plaint, endorsing or annexing a list of, 712

return of, 809

specification of, in Special Case, 1175

transmission of, in appeal to the Privy Council, 1338

DOMICIL of foreign corporation, 180

- DRAFT of document or of endorsement in execution, 930
- DRUM, omission of beat of, in proclamation of attachment, 958
proclamation by beat of, 934, 1033
- DUES for different years and identity of relief, 98
- DWELL, distinguished from reside, 176
meaning of term, 176, 177
- DWELLING, and residence, 174, 175
- EASEMENT and claim in alternative, 692n
right to, and execution sale, 218n
- "EFFECTUAL service" defined, 653
- EJECTMENT by landlord and party to suit, 561
suit changed into redemption suit, 859n
for, and *res judicata*, 134
- ELECTION and joinder of plaintiffs, 611
by plaintiffs, 616n, 618n, 624n
and remand, 1298
- EMBARRASSING matter in pleadings, 672
pleadings, 705n
-
- "
instruments or shares sold by Court, 995
on copies of admitted entries, 807
summons, and evidence of service, 649, 657
- ENDOWMENT, foreign, funds of, 184
objection that property held for, 255
- ENFORCEMENT of foreign judgment, 150, 153
- ENGLISH Admiralty Court, practice of, 24
Courts, jurisdiction of, 152
decision, applicability of principle in, 13
doctrine of *res judicata*, 101
Rules and Orders and Code, 13
as to set off, 737n
in divorce, 26
writ, service of, in India, 651
- ENLARGEMENT of time, 506
- ENTRY of judgment *nunc pro tunc*, 853, 919
- EQUITABLE execution, and Receiver, 336n
jurisdiction of High Courts, 161
in personam, 165
set off, 738, 739, 739n
- EQUITIES, transfer of decree subject to, 907
- EQUIT
-
-, 297
- ERROR affecting merits or jurisdiction, 394-397
and review, 1360
restitution, 498
Appellate Court only a Court of, 75
in exercise of jurisdiction, 67, 68
finding of fact, and second appeal, 399-406
grant of relief, 68n

III. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

II. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN THE COURTS.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

new parties, 123, 126

right to appeal, 337

EVASION in defence, 732, 733

EVENT, costs following, 211-214

meaning of term, 211, 212

not following, 207

and new parties, 211

and affidavits, 850, 851

on information and belief, 851

identity of cause of action, 121

clear disregard of, in judgment, 410

conflict of, on appeal, 1312

de bene esse, and Court of Equity, 810a

decree by *juratores*, 145a

made with us, 470a

documents relied on as, 741, 742

documentary, production of, 807

stopped part of law of, 101

memorandum of, 845

of mesne profits, 876

service of summons, 649

party not permitted to adduce, 178_n

summoned to give, by opponent, 778, 778_n

plaintiff's default before close of, and *res judicata*, 141

summons to give, 825

under Sect. 138, how taken, 845

use of answers to interrogatories, 800

want of, not cured by default in contesting a point, 817

EXAMINATION by commission, 1088-1105

by Court (O. X.), 775-776

ascertainment whether obligations admitted or denied, 775

oral examination of party, or companion of party or of pleader, 775

substance of examination to be written by Judge, 775

when personal appearance of party directed, 776

witnesses (O XVIII), 842-849

pro interesse suo, 1230

practice in, 1239_n

EXCESS in realization, restitution of, 498

recovered under decree, recovery of, 95

EXCHANGE, rate of, and appeal to the Privy Council, 1315

EXECUTION (Part II), 219-340

after transfer, 900

418_n

exemption of women from arrest and detention, 290

partition or separation of shares, 285, 286

release from imprisonment, 291, 292

sale, 315-327; and see SALE

transferees and legal representatives, 271 278

appeal from orders in, 1274

EXECUTION (Part II)—*continued*.

- application to orders, 219
- applications for, *see* proceedings in suits, 169
- certificate of result of, 231
- Courts of, 229, 230
- creditor, privity with purchaser at sale, 133
- decree incapable of, 219*n*, 240*n*
- definition of, 219
 - "Court which passed a decree," 227, 228
- delegation of, to Collector, 327-331
- dispute arising after, 245*n*
- effect of withdrawal of application for, 155
- enforcement against legal representative, 279-283
- for costs, 216
- interest on money realized in, and recovered, 94
- jurisdiction in, 83, 84
 - and interest after decree, 81
 - over, 109, 170, 224
- liability of ancestral property, 284
- limit for time for, 268-271
- limitation of powers, 232-234
- of decree, 864
 - against firm, 918-932
 - and merits of decree, 69*n*
 - sale in, and subsequent reversal of decree, 772
- decrees by Collector (Third Schedule), 1475-1481
 - passed in foreign territory, etc., 234
 - native States, 234
 - what orders made in are appealable, 48
- transferred decrees, 231
- (Order XXI), 890-1044
- procedure in, 278, 491, 495
- proceedings, addition of party in, 506*n*
 - and suit, 43
 - construction of, Sect 47 48, 49
 - co widow joined as joint decree holder, 556
 - ex parte* order in, 439, 495, 496
 - Judge to act on his determination in suit, 155*n*
 - not included in "suit" in O. II. r. 2 577
 - suit, 43
 - order in, and *res judicata*, 107, 108*n*, 154, 151*n*, 155
 - suit within meaning of Sect. 19 97
 - technical defect in, 464*n*
 - when order on, is a decree, 43
 - whether proceedings in suit, 107
- process in, how granted, 219
- questions to be determined by Court of, 236
- resistance to, 340
- sales, objections to, 48
- second application for, 15*n*
- Sect 47, and appeal, 262-263
 - "arising," 253
 - auction purchaser, 260
 - fraud, 249-252
 - "parties," 256
 - representative, 256
 - separate suit, 252
 - technical defects, 261
- construction of, 239
- matters held to be within, 241
- object of, 238
- orders held to be within, 245
- when case not within, 247-249
- transfer of decree, 250, 231
- what acquired by purchaser in, 314, 315
- decree may be executed, 224

EXEMPTION from arrest and public officer, 348

491

jurisdiction, 76, 76*n*, 77, 78

waiver of, 69

personal appearance, persons of rank, 489

Purdanashin women, 489

EXERCISE of judicial discretion. *See* DISCRETION

EXHIBITS, copies of, in appeal, 1281

in Court of first instance, 36

nature of, a question of fact, 748, 749

requisites for, 755, 756

setting aside of. *See* SETTING ASIDE

when defendant not heard, 746

order, and appeal, 1282

in execution proceedings, 495, 496

EXPENSES of collection of mesne profits, 874, 875

of commission, 1103

registration of document in execution, 930

witness, 828, 828*a*

necessary, of witness, 833, 834

and suit, 89

EXPERT witness, fee, 827, 828

EXTENT of operation of Code, 31

of British India, 32

EXTINGUISHMENT of judgment debt, 167*a*

FACT, and cause of action, 183, 183*a*

concurrent findings of, and appeal, 442, 443, 455, 456

concurrent judgments on, 441

new, to be specially pleaded, 729, 730

notice to admit, 802

operative and ultimate to be pleaded, 701

power to determine issues of, in second appeal, 422

FACTORS and jurisdiction, 181*a*

FILING of copies and certificate in transfer for execution, 899

FINAL decision (former), and *res judicata*, 142, 143

decree, and interlocutory order, 37

in foreclosure, 1165

mortgage suit for sale, 1166

decrees and orders, 444-449

judgment, 446

meaning of, in appeal, 444

term, 37

order defined, 444

FINDING, decree in spite of, and estoppel, 118

effect of absence of, and review, 1360

inconclusive, and *res judicata*, 143

on merits of case, and *res judicata*, 143

in first, and second appeal, 399-406, 1313

HINDING—continued

FINE, and defaulting witness, 204

FIRM, execution of decree against, 948, 952
suits by or against (O. XXX.), 1113-1126

FISHERY, suit for rent of, and immoveable property, 171

FITNESS for appeal, certificate, 449

FORCE, preventing execution of decree by, and limitation, 269, 270

FOREIGN corporation, domicile and residence, 160
Court, 51

commission issued by, 341

defined, 33

included by "Court" in Sect. 11, 104

suit pendent in, 95

suit for right to immovables, 164
vitiation by fraud, 150, 151

nature of such fraud, 150

conclusiveness of, 148-150

defined, 33

duty to obey is new cause of action, 587

enforcement of, 150

execution of decrees upon, 154

how enforced, 93

jurisdiction determined, 118

used, 147

see also 150

obtained on decree in British India, 151

presumption as to, 101

suits to enforce, 151, 152

use of, as bar, distinguished from attempt to enforce, 152

when not conclusive, 56

conclusive and not, 100

sovereign and exemption from jurisdiction, 76

submission to same, 76a

no substituted service on, 651

State (suit by), 318, 319

State, suit against envoy of, 351, 352

summons, service of, 202, 203

territory, service of summons in, 656-657

execution of decrees in, 231

FOREIGNER, and defendant in Sect 20..171
 and jurisdiction, 152, 153
 carrying on business through agent, 174
 non resident, and jurisdiction, 78, 181

FORM, effect of dismissal of appeal in point of, 145
 matters of, and Privy Council, 13a
 of action when immaterial, 701
 execution of document, or of negotiable instrument, 930

FORMS--

Appendix A.—Pleadings—

- (1) Titles of suits, 1385
- (2) Description of parties in particular cases, 1385
- (3) Plaints—

No. 1. Money lent, 1386

No. 2.

No. 3.

No. 4.

No. 5. 1387

No. 6

No. 7.

No. 8.

No. 9. 1388

No. 10. On an award, 1389

No. 11.

No. 12.

No. 13.

No. 14.

No. 15.

No. 16.

No. 17. 1391

No. 18.

No. 19.

No. 20.

No. 21.

No. 22. nother

No. 23.

No. 24.

No. 25.

No. 26.

No. 27.

No. 28.

No. 29.

No. 30.

No. 31.

No. 32.

No. 33.

No 33. Against a fraudulent purchaser and his transferee with
 notice 1396

No. 34.

No. 35.

No. 36.

No. 37.

No. 38.

No. 39.

No. 40.

No. 41.

No. 42.

No. 43.

No. 44.

No. 45.

No. 46.

No. 47.

No. 48.

No. 49.

No. 50.

No 49 Partnership, 1403

General defences, 1404

- No 1 Defence in suits for goods sold and delivered, 1404
- No 2 Defence in suits on bonds, 1405
- No 3 Defence in suits on guarantee, 1405
- No 4 Defence in any suit for debt, 1405
- No 5 Defence in suits for injuries caused by negligent driving, 1405
- No 6
- No 7
- No 8
- No 9
- No 10
- No 11
- No 12 Defence to suit for redemption, 1407
- No 13 Defence to suit for specific performance, 1407
- No 14 Defence in administration suit by pecuniary legatee, 1407
- No 15 Probate of will in solemn form, 1408
- No 16 Particulars, 1408

Appendix B —Process—

- No 1 Summons for disposal of suit, 1409
- No 2 Summons for settlement of issues, 1409
- No 3 Summons to appear in person, 1410
- No 4 Summons in summary suit on negotiable instrument, 1410
- No 5 Notice to person who, the Court considers, should be added as co plaintiff, 1410
- No 6 Summons to legal representative of a deceased defendant, 1411
- No 7 Order for transmission of summons for service in the jurisdiction of another Court, 1411
- No 8 Order for transmission of summons to be served on a prisoner, 1411
- No 9 Order for transmission of summons to be served on a public servant or soldier, 1413
- No 10 To accompany return of summons of another Court, 1413
- No 11 Affidavit of process server to accompany return of a summons or
- No 12
- No 13
- No 14
- No 15
- No 16
- No 17
- No 18
- No 19

Append

Appendix D —Decrees—

- No 1 Decree in original suit, 1420
- No 2 Simple money decree, 1420
- No 3 Preliminary decree for foreclosure, 1421
- No 4 Preliminary decree for sale, 1421
- No 5 Preliminary decree for redemption, 1422
- No 6 Decree for foreclosure — First Mortgagee as mortgagor and

Mortgagor — Successive periods for sale, 1422

FORMS—continued

Appendix D—Decrees—continued

- No 7 Decree for sale—First Mortgagee v. Second Mortgagee and Mortgagor—One period for redemption, 1423
- No 8 Decree for sale—Second Mortgagee v. First Mortgagee and Mortgagor—One period for redemption, 1423
- No 9 Decree for sale—Sub-mortgagee v. Mortgagee and Mortgagor, the amount of the original mortgage exceeding that of the
 No 10
 No 11
 No 12
 No 13 1425
 No 14
 No 15 1426
 No 16
 No 17
 No 18 1427
 No 19 Preliminary decree in an administration suit by a legatee, where an executor is held personally liable for the payment of legacies, 1428
 No 20 1423
 No 21 arship and the
 No 22 Final decree in a suit for dissolution of partnership and the taking of partnership accounts, 1429
 No 23 Decree for recovery of land and mesne profits, 1420

Appendix E—Execution—

- No 1 Notice to show cause why a payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, 1431
- No 2 Precept, 1431
- No 3 Order sending decree for execution to another Court, 1431
- No 4 Certificate of non satisfaction of decree, 1432
- No 5 Certificate of execution of decree transferred to another Court, 1432
- No 6 Application for execution of decree, 1433
- No 7 Notice to show cause why execution should not issue, 1434
- No 8 Warrant of attachment of moveable property in execution of a decree for money, 1434
- No 9 Warrant for seizure of specific moveable property adjudged by decree, 1434
- No 10 Notice to state objections to draft of document, 1435
- No 11 Warrant to the bailiff to give possession of land, etc., 1435
- No 12 Notice to show cause why warrant of arrest should not issue, 1435
- No 13 Warrant of arrest in execution, 1435
- No 14 Warrant of committal of judgment-debtor to jail, 1436
- No 15 Order for the release of a person imprisoned in execution of a decree, 1436
- No 16 Attachment in execution.—Prohibitory order, where the property to be attached consists of moveable property to which the defendant is entitled subject to a lien or right of some other person to the immediate possession thereof, 1437
- No 17 Attachment in execution.—Prohibitory order, where the property consists of debts not secured by negotiable instruments, 1437
- No 18
 No 19
 No 20 or local authority, 1438
 No 20 Order of attachment of negotiable instrument, 1438
 No 21 Attachment.—Prohibitory order where the property consists of money, or of any security in the custody of a court of justice or officer of Government, 1438
 No 22 Notice of attachment of a decree to the court which passed it, 1439
 No 23 Notice of attachment of a decree to the holder of the decree, 1439
 No 24 Attachment in execution.—Prohibitory order, where the property consists of immovable property, 1439
 No 25 Order for payment to the plaintiff, etc., of money etc., in the hands of a third party, 1439
 No 26 Notice to attaching creditor, 1440

FORMS--continued

Appendix E--Execution--continued.

- No 27 Warrant of sale of property in execution of a decree for money, 1440
 No 28 Notice of the day fixed for settling a sale proclamation, 1440
 No 29 Proclamation of sale, 1440
 No 30 1442
 No 31. 1 on a
 No 32 Notice to person in possession of moveable property sold in execution,
 1442
 No 1443
 No 35
 No 36
 No 37
 No 38
 No 39 1444
 No 40 execution
 No 41
 No 42

Appendix F--Supplemental Proceedings--

- No 1 Warrant of arrest before judgment, 1446
 No 2 Security for appearance of a defendant arrested before judgment,
 1446
 No 3 Summons to defendant to appear on surety's application for
 discharge, 1447
 No 4 Order for committal, 1447
 No 5 Attachment before judgment, with order to call for security for
 fulfilment of decree, 1447
 No 6 Security for the production of property, 1448
 No 7 Attachment before judgment on proof of failure to furnish security,
 1448
 No 8
 No 9
 No 10

1453

the appeal, but

- No 13 Notice of respondent of admission of appeal to the King in Council,
 1455
 No 14 Notice to show cause why a review should not be granted, 1455

Appendix H--Miscellaneous--

- No 1 Agreement of parties as to issues to be tried, 1456
 No 2 Notice of application for the transfer of a suit to another Court for
 trial, 1457
 No
 No
 No

FORMS—continued.

Appendix II — Miscellaneous — continued.

- No. 6
No. 7
No. 8
No. 9
No. 10
No. 11
No. 12
No. 13
No. 14
No. 15

Second Schedule—Appendix—

- No 1 Application for an order of reference, 1473
No 2 Order of reference, 1473
No 3 Order for appointment of new arbitrator, 1473
No 4 Special case, 1474
No 5 Award, 1474

FORMAL construction of term in Sect. 2.30
possession. See SYMBOLICAL.

FORMALITY in decree, 30, 36n

FORUM, choice of, 162

contractus, 187, 188

of defendant, 172, 173, 174

FRAME of suit (O IS), 573-628

FRAMING ISSUES, 813-829

parale suit, 249-262

701

r. 1253

134

p. 765

124

admission to matter tried, 160

ent, 150

5

7 certificate, 322, 326

NO. 1010, 1019

184

.687

270

of 19

47, 13

no question of, 113

number of action, 550

FULL BENCH, concurrence in reference to, 12n
when no reference, 12n

75 6 347

place of sung, 182

GARNISHED ORDERS, subject of, omitted from Schedule, and why, 488

GAZETTE, notification in, of transfer of suit, 200

- GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, applicability of definitions in, 51
- GHATWALI lands in Burbhoon, and execution, 283
 (*shilmi*) tenure and execution, 283
 tenure, future rents and profits as such not attachable, 298
 tenures in Kharukpore and execution, 283
- GOMASTAH of firm, when a recognized agent, 634
- GOODS sold and place of delivery, 189
 wrongful detention of, and cause of action, 590
- GORAH land, suit for, and joinder, 643, 644
- GOVERNMENT added as party by Court, 555
 and carrying on business, 180
 definition of public officer, 34
 (Indian) and jurisdiction, 76
 Local. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT
 party to suit in Bombay, 158
 pleader defined, 33
 solicitor, costs of, 210
 sued where cause of action arises, 181a
 suit by or against (O XXVII.), 1106, 1107
- GOVERNOR GENERAL, assent to Code, 1
 in Council and transfer of suit, 200
- GRADE, Court of lowest, meaning of term, 157
- GRANT of relief, error in, 68a
- "GRATIS," appearance without issue of summons, 639
- GRATUITIES and attachment, 301
-
- GUARDIAN, and suit by or against minor or person of unsound mind, 1129-1148
 (of minor), fraud or negligence of, 133
- HANDWRITING, documents merely tendered for comparison of, 724
- HEARING, disposal of suit at first, 823-824
 of appeal, 1291-1310
 Special Case, 1176
 suit (O XVIII.), 842-849
 depositions, and interpretation of, 845

 where several issues, 842
 examination *de bene esse*, 849
 of witness, 843
 further evidence after close of plaintiff's case, 843
 how evidence taken in appealable cases, 841
 memorandum of evidence, 845
 in unappealable cases, 846, 847
 objection to, and appeal, 844
 power to examine witness immediately, 848
 inspect, 849
 recalling witness, 849
 record in English, 845
 remarks on demeanour of witness, 846
 right to begin, 842
 statement and production of evidence, 842

HEARING—*continued*

of suit (O XVIII), taking down particular question and answer or objection, 816
 when Judge unable to make memorandum of evidence, 847
 witnesses excluded from Court, 841

HEBANAM construction, a substantial question of law, 155

HEIR, and accrual of cause of action in suit for legacy, 169n
 and alienation by Hindu widow, 656n
 legal representative, 258, 259n
 representation of widow, 276n
 decree against Mahomedan, 280

HEIRS, suit against some, and bar, 593n

HEIRSHIP, certificate of suit to set aside, 167n
 succession by, in execution of decree, 275

HIGH COURT, a Court within meaning of Sect. 9, 165

Admiralty side of, 21

and aids to construction, 6-5

amendment of decree, 855, 865n

decision of another, 11

delivery of paper books in appeal, 1281

dismissal after summons returned unexecuted, 754

Insolvent Court, 23

transfer of suit (Sect. 22), 190, 192

appellate jurisdiction

(Calcutta), and Mofussil service of summons, 655

local limits of, 74n

calling case to its file, 867n

Chartered, and execution before ascertainment of costs, 481

power to examine witness immediately, 846

(O XLIX.), 1382

savings, 481

special provisions, 481

application of, 181

when not affected by rules in judgment and decree, 853-855, 865

inherent powers of. *See* INHERENT

interference of, and jurisdiction, 460, 470

judgment under Letters Patent, 62-68

jurisdiction of, 71, 74, 160, 482

and revision, 458-468

over charities, 358, 358n

HINDU, and probate, 709
charitable trusts, 363

131

cases, and decree, 858, 858*n* * * *, 160*n*
son, and father's debt, 131
rights of, 130
suits by and against, as such, and joinder, 564*n*
widow, alienations by, and cause of action, 531, 585*n*, 608
joinder, 531*n*
and representation, 711
son adopted during litigation, 711
decree against, 126-128, 275
and representation, 275*n*
reversioners, 280

HOLIDAY, close, sale on, 201*n*
presentation of plaint on, 200

HUNDI, payment by, and accrual of cause of action, 189
where endorser liable to pay, 189*n*

HUSBAND of married trustee or executrix, and joinder, 1128

HYDERABAD, service of summons in, 654

IDENTIFICATION of defendant's premises (service of summons), 647, 649
of immoveable property, 866
in attachment, 904
land in dispute impossible, duty of Court, 720

IDENTITY of cause of action, test of, 121
of matter in issue, 114
parties, 123-126
relief and *lis pendens*, 95, 96, 97, 98
demands for different years, 98
suit, 106
test of in *res judicata*, 118

IDOL, debt incurred for by Shebait, 132
future voluntary offerings to, not attachable, 298
right of worship of, and execution, 300

review and revision, 473-477
validity of sale, 1013, 1014

IMMATERIAL matter and *res judicata*, 119

IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY. *See* PROPERTY

IMPLICATION, decision by, 116
of grant of ancillary relief, 123

IMPLIED averment of performance of condition, 662
contract in pleadings, 662

IMPOUNDING of documents (O XII), 803-812

IMPROVEMENTS during wrongful possession, profits of, 33, 34

INCOMPETENCY (inherent), and consent to jurisdiction, 354

- INCONSISTENT titles and defenses in pleadings, 709, 705
 INCONVENIENCE, stay on account of, 90
 INCRIMINATING interrogatory, 756
 INCUMBRANCE and distribution of assets, 311, 332, 339
 and proclamation of sale, 981, 982
 INDEMNITY in suit on lost negotiable instrument, 721
 INDIA (British). *See* BRITISH INDIA
 INDIAN Councils Acts, laws under and saving clause, 61
 law, apparent mistake as to, in foreign judgment, 119
 INFANT. *See* MINOR
 INFORMATION and belief, evidence on, 551
 INFORMATIONS, exhibited by Advocate General, 311
 INFRINGEMENT of provisions of Code, 13
 right, suit based on, and plaint, 704
 INHERENT jurisdiction, saving of, 508
 power and remand, 1300, 1301
 security for restitution, 503
 stay, 1272
 in case of fraud and misrepresentation, 19n
 persons of unsound mind (not so adjudged), 1147
 scandalous matter in memorandum of appeal, 18n, 1259
 of restitution, 500
 to amend records, duration of, 860
 extent of same, 861
 invent procedure, 16n, 17n
 stop abuse of records, 18n, 125J
 INJUNCTION (ancient light), and suit to recover debt or damages, 1082
 and appeal, 1201, 1212
 payment into Court, 1082, 1083
 relief, 712
 restitution of conjugal rights, 925
 decree containing, and legal representative, 277
 for, and corporation, 926-928

708

, 1221

(O XXXIX), 1195-1214

INJURY (substantial), and setting aside sale, 1010, 1019

INQUIRY as to pauperism, 1150
 and appeal, 1328

1333, 1334

in administration suit, 882
 local, in additional evidence in appeal, 1307
 Munsif sending case for 895n
 necessary for carrying out decree, 155
 whether assets exhausted, 1345

INSANITY, alleged, of defendant, and non appearance, 751

of High Court, 483
of party (O. XXII.), 1059, 1060
orders in, 24
petition in, and signature and verification, 1112
proceedings, 44
set off in, 738

INSOLVENT Act, and residence, 177

Court, 21-24
constitution of, 23
limit of jurisdiction, 23
nature of, 23
relation to High Court, 22, 23
estates and decree in administration suit, 882

INSPECTION of documents (O. XI.), 777-800. *See* DISCOVERY

INSTALMENTS of interest, and limitation, 869
payment by, and decree, 868, 869, 870, 1167
(several), default in, and cause of action, 593

INSTITUTION OF SUIT, 200-202

and place of suing. *See* PLACE OF SUING
public charities, 356
date of, 202, 682
"in forma pauperis," 1149-1151
in summary procedure on negotiable instruments, 1177
not barred by Sect. 10 (*lis pendens*), 97
of interpleader, 1172-1174
(O. IV.), 636

INSTRUMENT (negotiable) *See* NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT

INSUFFICIENCY of plaint, 715-720
of stamping of plaint, effect, 715-720

INTENTION of Legislature, 3, 8, 9
not clearly expressed, 4, 5

restitution, 502, 502n
return of purchase-money, 1029
before suit, 204
decree silent as to further, 204
of money recovered under reversed decree, 95
on costs, 217
in Privy Council appeal, 1316
deposit, 1081
mesne profits, 881
subsequent to suit, 1318
price not included in deficiency of price, 987
prior to decree and appealable value, 452

INTERFERENCE by High Court with subordinate Court, 21
of High Court and jurisdiction, 461, 470

- INTERIM** order, 1210, 1211
 defined, 1210
 material of injunction, 1210
 rule, 1212
- INTERLOCUTORY** decree, 37
 judgment, 117
 order and final decree, 37
 revision, 165, 166, 167
 res judicata, 171, 175
 meaning of term, 116
 orders, 111-118, 1212
 (O XXXIX), 1195-1211
 proceedings, affidavits in, 570
 costs in, 107, 560
- INTERNATIONAL**, law, and sect. 29, 156
 incorrect view of, in foreign judgment, 109, 110
- INTERPLEADER**, 351
 and agents and tenants, 1173
 stakeholder, 1174
 (O XXXV), 1172-1174
- INTERPRETATION** of Act. See CONSTRUCTION
 of deposition, 815
 question of law, 110a
- INTERROGATORIES**, 777-800, and see DISCOVERY
 dismissal for refusal to reply to, 12
 incriminating, 786
 in examination by commission, 1031
 power to make orders relating to, 203
- INTERVENTION** in suit by petition, 1211a
- JURISDICTION**, 25
- JURISDICTION** cognizance of suits for damages concerning, 157
- JURISDICTION** in attachment, 904, 905, 1213
- JURISDICTION** (local), commission to make, 311, 1033-1035
- INVESTMENT**, order for, 1213
- IRRELEVANCE** affecting jurisdiction or merits of cases, and misjoinder, 610
 affecting merits of case, or jurisdiction, 391, 397
 and exercise of discretion, 408
 review and revision, 177, 478
 as to Court, in place of suing, 156
 cured by certificate of sale, 1023
 in orders, and objection, 426-430
 pleadings, 670
 procedure of foreign Court, 153
 material in sale, 18, 1013-1018
 (instances of), 979-983
- IRRELEVANCE** in discovery and in cross examination distinguished, 784
- IRRELEVANCY** in pleadings, 670
- IRRELEVANT** matter, introduction of, and costs, 213, 1346
- ISSUE**, end of, 109
 and *res judicata*, 108-111
 defined, 712
 general, 731
 material, failure to determine, and appeal, 410, 411

ISSUE—*continued*.

, 826

res judicata, 147

when said to arise, 168

ISSUES, resetting by Appellate Court, 1303

framing by Appellate Court, 1304

JOINDER, 511-572

and cause of action outside jurisdiction, 185

plaintiffs in different Courts, 157

suits relating to mortgages, 1162-1164

of causes of action, 602

action against several alienees, 608

alternative case, 613

and claim by or against executor, administrator, or heir, 621

jurisdiction, 622

relief sought, 612

suit for recovery of immovable property, 621, 623

valuation for jurisdiction, 622

consolidation of suits, 627

examples of suits bad for misjoinder, 612

Hindu or Mahomedan heirs, 616

in suits by reversioners, 612

meaning of "cause of action," 608

jointly interested, 615

objections for misjoinder, 619, 620, 622, 628

order for separation, 625

confining suit, 626

origin and scope of rules, 603, 604

under, 617, 618

present Code, 626

"same defendants jointly," 613

examples of misjoinder on this point, 614

examples when no misjoinder, 615

summary of rules, 607, 607

parties to suits, 511-569

effect of misjoinder or non joinder, 544

nature of rules, 515-518

objections as to, 570-572

scope of rules, 511-517

waiver of objections, 571, 572

defendants, 511

plaintiffs, 511

respondent by Appellate Court, 1288

trustees and legal representatives, 1128

JOINT—continued.

- Hindu family, and *res judicata*, 130, 131
- holder, 115
- owners, 115
- party, 115
- possession of, 115
- property, and attachment, 115
- preference for co sharer in sale, 1002, 1003
- right distinguished from right enjoyed in common, 515, 517n
- to relief, 526
- devolution of, 1120
- tenancy and right to partition, 71, 131
- testator or contractor, and joinder of parties, 525
- judgment against one, 523
- wrongdoers and *res judicata*, 129, 130

JUDGE, Additional or Assistant, and Sect. 21.. 103

- and delegation of functions, 1023, 1023n
- finding on issues apart from decree, 555, 555n
- jurisdiction. See JURISDICTION
- presumption as to jurisdiction, 470
- prohibition from adding to judgment, 853, 853n
- public statement of reasons, 553n
- record of reasons, 1313
- reference to Full Bench, 12, 12n
- report on securities, 1311
- assumed to have exercised discretion, 218n
- authority of reasons given by, 11
- deciding on grounds not open to him, 218n
- declined, 33
- disqualification of, and transfer of suit, 196
- by personal interest, 66
- dissenting from judgment in appeal, 392-391, 1319
- (District), 50
- and additional, 52n
- duty of, and acceptance of established principle, 11
- constructing act of Court, 30
- exercise of discretion, 30
- interpretation of law, 9
- judicial notice of statute, 14
- passing orders, 30
- technical objections, 13
- in application of laws, 20
- to state and appraise evidence, 1316n
- when no specific enactment, 16
- giving reasons for decree, 851n
- in judgment of, 65
- in 402n
- 476n
- ha-
- included by
- jurisdiction of, and *res judicata*
- looking merely to appearance of documents, 1
- made arbiter by consent, 69
- misconduct of, and appeal, 382
- not considering all facts of case, 401, 401n
- legally appointed, and jurisdiction, 65, 66
- objection to, by party, and transfer of suit, 200
- opinion of, and costs, 1132n
- overlooking point in appeal, 1313, 1314
- postscript to document, 402n
- power to consult others, 52
- presumption as to due appointment of, 66
- statement of grounds by, 33
- reasons. See REASONS
- subordinate, and nomination of Receiver, 1226n
- vacating office before signing decree, 566
- when deemed presiding in separate Court, 52

JUDGMENT, admissibility of, in evidence, 104

against dead man, 78

one of several joint debtors, effect of, 823

party deceased after institution of suit, 78
before same, 78

.

.

defined, 33

effect of pending appeal on, 382

enforced *in personam*, 166

erroneous, of competent Court, 67, 68

.

defined, 33 *See FOREIGN JUDGMENT*

for general administration, 1128

one or more of joint parties 529

how far conclusive, 111

improperly obtained, 58

and *res judicata*, 104

in arbitration, 1468

case law, how to be read, 10

rem, 150

Special Case, 1175, 1176

terms of compromise, 855

meaning different from English, 52

.

on what to be based, 52

O XX, 852-889

findings on issues, 854

of Small Cause Court 854

signature of, 853

when pronounced, 852

written by predecessor, 852

pronouncement of, 204

See 33 204

vitiating by fraud 88

when action lies on, 92

action on, not permitted, 91

JUDGMENT DEBTOR, 33

and exemption from arrest, 490

recovery of excess recovered under decree 44

includes a ship 50

meaning of term, 50

legal representative of, 50

transfer of liability of, 50

JUDGMENTS, final and interlocutory distinguished 447**JUDICIAL** act, presumption as to 30

discretion *See DISCRETION*

JURISDICTION, Admiralty, appeal from Judge exercising, 55

and acquiescence of defendant outside, 172, 174, 176

cause of action, 182-190

choice by plaintiff, 172, 173

compromise withdrawing claim, 105

consent of parties, 65

JURISDICTION—*continued*

limited but exclusive, 73

local, 67

and cession of territory, 31

change of residence, 78

consent, 68

death of person liable, 185

district, 33

cause of action outside, and *joinder*, 185

limits of, 73, 74

nature of, 73

waiver of, 68*n**meanings of term*, 66, 67, 469, 470

in different Sections of Code, 67

Sect 9 67

not conferred by consent when incompetency inherent, 384

given by consent, 142

objection as to, after remand, 414, 414*n*

to, when to be taken, 190

of Civil Court, and execution by Collector, 328

in partition of revenue paying land, 1101

Collector, 29

English Courts, 152

High Court, 71-74, 160, 482

and revision, 458-463

original civil, of "Presidency High Courts, and Sect 16 159

species of, and extent of same, 72

Small Cause Court, 62-64

pecuniary, 62

how determined, 157

limit of, in particular Courts, 79

in particular suit 79

and over valuation 80, 81

how determined, 79, 80

mode of valuation, 80

not ousted by finding 82

though limit afterwards passed 82 81

waiver of, 68*n*

personal, and death of party, 78

non resident foreigners, 76, 77

general rule as to 77

how conferred, 75

on what it depends, 74

special exemptions from, 76, 76*n*, 77

plea to, and setting aside sale (O XXI r 90), 1013

presumption as to, 141

presumptions affecting 67*n*

protest against, 70

refusal of, through misconception, 459*n* 470*n*revisional, 458, 458*n*

sale under decree without, 1013

special, 157

Admiralty, 24

Courts—Small Cause, 26

Mamlatdar's, 26

Revenue, 27-30

exclusive and transfer of suit, 195

JURISDICTION—continued

special, insolvency, 24
matrimonial, 26
saving of, 59

74

when objection to, should it be raised, 69, 70
territorial *See* local
and foreigner leaving, 152, 153
in personal actions, 152

1272

decree for fraud, 166
try prior suit (O II), 579-582
valuation of subject matter of appeal for purpose of, 386
want of, 11

470

81

HUMILIATION, plea of, when embarrassing, 672

HAYLM, nature of claim on, 175

HAPIND III and party to suit, 526
effect of decree against, 526

HARYALIN, an I suits for land in possession of *anai dravan*, 599
effect of decree against, 111
of Malabar family and *res judicata*, 131
location of, 131n

HAS possession, decree for, 931

LAND Acquisition Act, proceedings under, not suits, 45, 103, 437
claim for damage to, 165

LAND, sale of, and rules made by Local Government, 327
suit for, and leave to sue, 159, 159a
Letters Patent, 159
meaning of term, 160-165

LANDHOF DER an I saving clause, 59, 60

LANDLORD and tenant, denial of relationship, and *res judicata*, 131
remedies of, 30

LANDS situate in more than one jurisdiction, 897

LANGUAGE in appeal to the Privy Council, 1378
of statute and construction, 3, 9
subordinate Courts, 493

LAW, application of, by judge, 20
decision before alteration of and *res judicata*, 111
interpretation of question of, 440a
new exposition of, and review, 1359

LAWS, the, meaning of term in preamble, 22

LEAST by Receiver, 1241n, 1246, 1246n

, 1113

decree holder to bind, 988, 989

as pauper, 1155

refusal of, 41

use documents otherwise inadmissible, 726

verify plaint, 668

withdraw registered appeal, 1274

suit or appeal, effect of, 56

LEGAL representative See REPRESENTATIVE

LEGISLATION (previous), 1, 2

intention of, 4, 8, 9

LESSEE, and *res judicata*, 133, 134LESSOR, and *res judicata*, 133, 134

LETTER of request, 1053

to examine witness, 341

, 1261

record of reasons by Judges, 1313

residence, 179

suits for immovable property, 154

(clause 13), and transfer of suit, 194

constituting High Courts, 1, 2

meaning of 'cause of action' in, 181

'judgment' under, 52-56

, 74

LIABILITY, joint and several, and *res judicata*, 130

LIBEL, and cause of action, 523

and place of suing, 186

postponement pending test action, 628

LIEN for costs in interpleader, 1174

for costs (solicitors), 2168

of pleader for costs and set off, 734

LIMITATION Act and limitation and joinder, 546, 568, 569

presentation of plaint, 204

stay of execution, 922

of appeal from amended decree, 562, 563

and appellate decree, 1319

application for leave to defend, 1180

review, 1368

to amend decree, 561, 562

pay by instalments, 863

LIMITATION ACT *continued*.

and date of amendment of pleading, 682

effect of order of remand, 1298

execution, 268

fresh suit (O XXIII), 1073

interest, 870

joinder of defendants, 563

381

payment of Court fees, 710

rejection of appeal, 47

resistance or obstruction by debtor, 1036, 1037

setting aside sale, 1011

substitution (O XX), 1065

of beneficiaries as plaintiffs, 1128

suit to establish right to possession, 1014

transfer of decree, 231

uncertified adjustment or payment, 896

decision before change of law as to, and *res judicata*, 111

erroneous decision on, 474

in pre-emption, 855, 856

survival of suit, 1052, 1057, 1062, 1065

powers in execution of transferred decree, 232, 234

LIMITATIONS (pecuniary, etc.), and place of suing, 159, 172, 173

LIMITS, local, of jurisdiction, 73, 73n

LIQUIDATION of decree by Collector, 1178

LIS PENDENS, 48, 49, 95, 99

and execution proceedings, 96

identity of parties, 99

relief, 98, 99

jurisdiction to grant relief, 99

matter in issue, 97

pending appeal, 98, 932

priority in time, 97

res judicata, 18, 96

sale in execution, 933

extends to alienations pending suit, 99

object of rule, 95

rule does not bar institution of suit, 97

LITIGANT, how ascertained, 125

LITIGATION under same title, 134

LOCAL Government, 50

sanction of rules, 484

law, rent litigation under, 62

savings of, 59, 60

offices and suits relating to rents, 86

LOCUS SOLUTIONIS, 187, 188

LOSS of records, 94

of right to execute (through neglect), 94

LOST negotiable instrument, suit on, 724

LUNATICS, and discovery of documents, 801

suit by or against (O XXXII), 1129-1148

- MADRAS Rent Recovery Act and Code, 30
- MAGISTRATE, order by, and Civil Courts, 87
refusal of costs of witness by, and *res judicata*, 155
- MAHALS of Orissa and execution of decrees, 235
- MAINTENANCE suit, decree in, and *res judicata*, 147
- MAJORITY, attainment of, under Indian Majority Act, 1129
of judges in appeal, 394
- MALABAR Tarwad and cause of action, 599
- MALADMINISTRATION suit by several members of caste, 520n
- MALICE, allegation of, in pleading, 662
and disallowance of costs, 214
- MALICIOUS prosecution, action for, and cause of action, 590
- MAMLATDAR'S Act, object of, 26
proceedings under, and resistance, 1037
Court, jurisdiction of High Court over, 26n
nature of, 26
procedure in, 26
suit by next friend in, 1130, 1131
- MANAGER and Receiver, 1218, 1219
and service in suit against firm, 1121, 1122
of Hindu joint family, position of, 131
and *res judicata*, 131
misappropriation by, and cause of action, 133
minor's estate, and *res judicata*, 132
- MANDATORY Injunction, 1197-1197n, 1200
- MARRIAGE of party (O XXII), 1059
- MARRIED trustee or executrix, husband of, and, under, 112n
- MATERIAL, distinguished from relevant, 784
from which issues may be framed, 813
irregularity in sale (instances of), 980
meaning of term, 784
objects producible as evidence, 812
proposition defined, 712
- MATERIALITY in discovery, 754
- MATRIMONIAL jurisdiction, 26
- MATRI-MONIAL, in dispute, how ascertained, 679
issue, and *lis pendens*, 95, 97, 98
res judicata, 111-118, and see *RES JUDICATA*
of substance, *res judicata* is, 118
to be specially pleaded in defence, 729
unnecessary or scandalous in pleading, 670, 671
- MELLIETH, Receiver appointed to recover, 1219n

- MEMORANDUM of appeal, 1259-1267
 amendment or rejection of, 1267
 and pauper, 1327
 copy of decree, or order, 1260
 judgment, 1260
 duty and jurisdiction of Court, 1259
 form and contents of, 1259
 grounds of appeal, 1261
 misdescription, 1260
 objections not taken, 1262
 point overlooked, 1313, 1311
 presentation, 1259
 scandalous matter, 1259
 of cross objection, 1291
 evidence, 845, 847
 objections to findings after remand, 1305

MESNE-MORTGAGES and redemption, and foreclosure, 1169

- contents of decree, 856, 858
 decree, 877
 interest, 881
 after suit, 201
 joinder in recovery of immovable property, 621
 relinquishment of possession, 880
 sale of decree for possession of land, 981
 wilful default, 874
 calculation of, 874
 claim for, distinct from claim to recover possession, 591
 included in recovery of money, 740
 decree for, 870, 871
 defined, 33
 extent of liability for, 873
 in money suits, and plaint, 695, 708
 interest on, 1318
 liability for (examples), 872
 meaning of term, 874
 nature of, 871
 suit for, 871a
 object of suit for, 874

MILITARY men, suit by or against (O. XXVIII), 1108, 1109

- MINOR, and application for transfer (Sect. 24), 193
 and discovery of documents, 781, 782
 limitation in execution, 270
 res judicata, 132
 security for costs, 1086
 brother joined as defendant, 524
 made plaintiff on coming of age, 553
 manager of estate of, and *res judicata*, 132
 partner, 949
 service of summons on, 645
 succeeding to estate, and transfer by operation of law, 908
 suit by or against (O. XXXII), 1129-1143

MINORITY, disputed by defendant, 1133
in India, 1129

MISCELLANEOUS, proceedings, not suits, 45
and execution proceedings, 107
unconnected with suits, cognizance of, 157
when suits, 106

MISCONDUCT of Judge, appeal grounded on, 382
of party and costs, 213

objection on ground of, in appeal, 415
of causes of action, 603-612
objection for, 617-622
parties, 541-545
objection for, 570-572
subjects of suit, 603, and *see* JUDGMENT

MISPRISION in embodying judgments, 440

MISREPRESENTATION and statement of claim, 700

MIS STATEMENT in petition for special leave to appeal, 439

MISTAKE, and review, 1360
and setting aside consent order, 146

of fact or of law in foreign judgment, 149

MITAKSHARA coparcener judgment debtor, death of, 313
family, compromise made by Kurta of, 1077
law, property under, and execution against heir, 275

MOFUSSIL Courts, and jurisdiction over public charities, 308, 359
power to commit for contempt, 1231
receipt by purchasing decree holder in, 990
Small Cause Court, and review by successor, 1367

MONEY, decree for, defined, 337
decree for payment of, and instalments, 868, 869
interest, 204, 205
suit for, 1086
recovery of, meaning of term, 740

MORTGAGE, and distribution of assets, 331, 332, 333
and identity of cause of action, 596, 598
proclamation of sale, 977
receiver, 1234

MORTGAGEE and costs, 209
pursue, and prior and suit, 1162-1165

MORTGAGES of immoveable property, suits relating to (O XXIV), 1162-1171

MORTGAGOR, and *res judicata*, 131
entitled to set off costs, 216

MOTION for appointment of Receiver, how founded, 1276
to secure attendance of witnesses, 831

MOVEABLE property. *See* PROPERTY

MUKHTAR (certificated), and recognized agent, 633

MULTIPARTI CAUSES, 603

MUNICIPAL Acts, and bar of cognizance, 87

MUNICIPALITY, suit against, 158n

MUNSLIF, and award of means-profits in excess of pecuniary jurisdiction, 877
and decree after remand, 1304

. 137-138

MUTUALITY of debts in set off, 712
test of *res judicata*, 103

NAME in plaint, 703

other than own, suit against person carrying on business in, 1117-1126

NATIVE ladies (not exempt under Sect. 132), examination of, 1090
State, suit on judgment of Court in, 93, 153n

NATURAL justice and foreign judgment, 100, 119
meaning of term, 119

NATURE of suit, how ascertained, 118

NAZIR not a public officer, 58n

selling property, unaware of postponement of sale, 977

NEGOTIABLE instrument, summary procedure on (O XXXVII), 1177-1182
attachment of, 952
decree for endorsement of, 930, 931
(lost), suit on, 721
transfer of, 995

NEXT FRIEND of minor or of person of unsound mind, 1129-1148

NON APPEARANCE (O IX), 747-774

NON JOINDER, 541, 544, and *see* JOINDER

.

minor attaining majority, 1146
in amendment of decree, 864
appeal, 1280-1284
arbitration without intervention of Court, 1470
attachment of decrees, 954

execution against legal representative, 274
interlocutory orders, 1213

NOTICE *continued*

- of admission of appeal to the Privy Council 133
- appeal (to original court) 1280
- application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council 1330-1331
- review, 1335
- transfer of suit (Sec. 22) 190-191
- to set aside decree, 774
- sale, 1022-1024
- attachment of debts and shares, etc., 944
- attachment against person of debtor 926
- cross objection, 1289
- day fixed for hearing appeal, 1280
- service of same 1280
- for receiving evidence of pauperism 1104

- sale by auction, 978, 980
- omission to serve, 753
- service of, 1380
- to admit, documents, 801
- facts, 803

- reference on agreement, 1169
- tenant in occupancy of immovable property, 933

NOTIFICATIONS of Governments under the Code, 1484, 1488, 1491, 1510, 1513, 1526, 1529

NOVATION, distinguished from amendment of decree, 562

NUISANCE, public, and suit, 355, 356
to immovable property, and suit for same, 163

NUISANCES, public, suits relating to, 18, 58

OATH of another, agreement to be bound by, and estoppel, 144
under Oaths Act, decree on, and *res judicata*, 145

OBEDIENCE (personal), relief obtainable through, 167
and place of suing, 153

OBITER dictum and *res judicata*, 119

- duty of Judge though none taken, 14
- for inherent incompetency, 384
- misjoinder of causes of action, 617-622

- findings after remand, 1307
- hearing by particular Judge, 200
- jurisdiction, 395
- waiver of, 69
- when to be raised, 62, 70, 100
- local jurisdiction, 171
- place of suing, absence of, 172, 173, 174

, 900, 931

NOTICE—continued

review, 1328
transfer of suit (Sect 22), 190-191
to set aside decree, 774

1330, 1331

day fixed for hearing appeal, 1280

sale by auction, 978, 980
omission to serve, 753
service of, 1380
to admit, documents, 801
facts, 803
concur in appointing arbitrator, 1465
inspect documents, 795
produce documents for inspection, 795
show cause against execution, 917, 918
in arrest of debtor, 934, 935
reference on agreement, 1469
tenant in occupancy of immovable property, 933

NOTIFICATIONS of Governments under the Code, 1484, 1488, 1491, 1510, 1513, 1526, 1529

NOVATION, distinguished from amendment of decree, 862

NUISANCE, public, and suit, 355, 356
to immovable property, and suit for same, 163

NUISANCES, public, suits relating to, 18, 58

OATH of another, agreement to be bound by, and estoppel, 144
under Oaths Act, decrees on, and *res judicata*, 145

OBEDIENCE (personal), relief obtainable through, 167
and place of suing, 159

OBITER dictum and *res judicata*, 119

parties, 570-572
grounds of, in memorandum of appeal, 1281
in suit by minor, 1131-1133
(patently valid) to jurisdiction, 395
technical, 14
to admission of review, 1373
attachment, 964
draft of document or of negotiable instrument, 950, 951
findings after remand, 1307
hearing by particular Judge, 200
jurisdiction, 395
waiver of, 69
when to be raised, 69, 70, 190
local jurisdiction, 171
place of suing, absence of, 172, 173, 174

OBJECTION *continued*

to proclamation, 673

recording of evidence and appeal, 814, 815

transfer of suit (Sect. 22), 190, 192

verification, 669

OBSTRUCTION to possession of immovable property, 1035-1040

OCCUPANCY of tenant, delivery of immovable property in, 933

OFFICE of corporation, and carrying on business, 172

OFFICER (military or naval), and public officer, 34

of Court, qualification for suit, 1127

public, defined, 34

suit by or against in official capacity, 317-347

when exempt from arrest and attachment, 318

OFFICERS, personal and local, and relations with, 80

OFFICIAL, assignee, and costs, 201, and *see* ASSIGNEE

OMISSION of part of claim, 573 (a2)

to award costs, 205

grant relief, and *res judicata*, 123

notice point in appeal, 1311

serve notice, 753

sue, effect of, 574, 780

try or frame issue, 1701

ONUS *See* BURDEN OF PROOF

OPERATION of law, transfer by, 808

OPINION, difference of and appeal from Division Bench, 55

OPTION of plaintiff in compensation suits, 171

ORAL, assignment of decree, 50

examination by Court, 775-776

ORDERS and appeal, 420-430

and decree, 37, 38

defined, 34

directing accounts and appeal, 59

dismissing appeal, and decrees, 47

filing agreement to arbitrate, 1463

final and interlocutory, 444-449

for restitution, and appeal, 45

from which appeal lies, 423-426

held not to be judgments, 56

decrees, in tandem of, 57

to be judgments, 55, 56

in execution, appeal from, 1274

proceedings, and *res judicata*, 108, 154, 155, 155a

when decrees, 47

insolvency, nature of, 24

miscellaneous proceedings, 45

ultra vires, 1210, 1211

remand, when interlocutory decrees, 445

on appeal, meaning of term, 438

processual and decrees on merits, 42

rejecting appeal, and decrees, 47

plaint and decrees, 46, 47

ORDERS IN FIRST SCHEDULE—

- I Parties to suits, 511-572
- II Frame of suit, 573-628
- III Agents and pleaders, 629-636
- IV Institution of suits, 636
- V Issue and service of summons, 637-660
- VI Pleadings generally, 661-691
- VII Complaint, 695-726
- VIII Written statement and set off, 727-746
- IX Appearance and non appearance, 747-771
- X Examination by Court, 775-776
- XI Discovery and inspection, 777-800
- XII Admission, 801-804
- XIII Production, etc., of documents, 805-812
- XIV Settlement of issues, etc., 813-822
- XV Disposal at first hearing, 823-824
- XVI Summoning, etc., of witnesses, 825-836
- XVII Adjournments, 837-841
- XVIII Hearing of suit and examination of witnesses, 842-849
- XIX Affidavits, 850-851
- XX Judgment and decree, 852-889
- XXI Execution of decrees and orders, 890-1044
- XXII Death, marriage, and insolvency of parties, 1045-1066
- XXIII Withdrawal and adjustment of suits, 1067-1080
- XXIV Payment into Court, 1081-1083
- XXV Security for costs, 1084-1087
- XXVI Commissions, 1088-1105
- XXVII Suit by or against Government or public officers, 1106-1107
- XXVIII Suits by or against military men, 1108, 1109
- XXIX Suits by or against corporations, 1110, 1112
- XXX Suits by or against firms, etc., 1113-1120
- XXXI Suits by or against trustees, executors, and administrators, 1127, 1128
- XXXII Suits by or against minors, or persons of unsound mind, 1120-1148
- XXXIII Suits by paupers, 1149-1101
- XXXIV Suits relating to mortgages of immoveable property, 1162-1171
- XXXV Interpleader, 1172-1174
- XXXVI Special case, 1175, 1176
- XXXVII Summary procedure on negotiable instruments, 1177-1182
- XXXVIII Arrest and attachment before judgment, 1183-1191
- XXXIX Temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders, 1197-1211
- XL Appointment of Receivers, 1215-1258
- XLI Appeals from original decrees, 1259-1322
- XLII Appeals from appellate decrees, 1323
- XLIII Appeals from orders, 1324, 1325
- XLIV Pauper appeals, 1326-1329
- XLV Appeals to the King in Council, 1330-1319
- XLVI Reference, 1349-1354
- XLVII Review, 1355-1379
- XLVIII Miscellaneous, 1380, 1381
- XLIX Chartered High Courts, 1382
 - L Provincial Small Cause Courts, 1383
 - LI Presidency Small Cause Courts, 1384

OUSTER, after suit brought, and amendment of plaint, 1190
when acts of, separate causes of action, 554

OVER-VALUATION of suit, 81
inquiry as to, 81; and see VALUATION

PANDA, interest of, 383

PARSI widow not exempt from personal appearance as such, 149

PARTICULARIFY in pleading, 604

PARTICULARS endorsed on admitted documents, 806, 807
in pleading, 661, 664
plaint, 635
of set off sufficient without specific allegation of same, 743

ORDERS IN FIRST SCHEDULE—

- I. Parties to suits, 311-372
- II. Frame of suit, 373-628
- III. Agents and pleaders, 629-636
- IV. Institution of suits, 636
- V. Issue and service of summons, 637-661
- VI. Pleadings generally, 661-694
- VII. Plaint, 695-726
- VIII. Written statement and set-off, 727-746
- IX. Appearance and non-appearance, 747-774
- X. Examination by Court, 775-776
- XI. Discovery and inspection, 777-800
- XII. Admission, 801-804
- XIII.
- XIV.
- XV.
- XVI.
- XVII.
- XVIII. Hearing of suit and examination of witnesses, 842-849
- XIX. Affidavits, 850-851
- XX.
- XXI.
- XXII.
- XXIII.
- XXIV.
- XXV.
- XXVI.
- XXVII.
- XXVIII.
- XXIX.
- XXX.
- XXXI.
- XXXII.
- XXXIII.
- XXXIV.
- XXXV.
- XXXVI. Special case, 1175, 1176

OSTER, after suit brought, and amendment of plaint, (a)
when acts of, separate causes of action, 584

OVER-VALUATION of suit, 81
inquiry as to, 81; and see VALUATION

PANDA, interest of, 383

PARSI widow not exempt from personal appearance as such, 684

PARTICULARITY in pleading, 664

PARTICULARS endorsed on admitted documents, 800, 807

in pleading, 661, 664a

plaint, 695

of set off sufficient without specific allegations, 744

PARTY — *continued*

- and cure of delinquency of boundaries, 87n
- failure to produce evidence, 824
- identity in *res judicata*, 123-128
- in open lent grounds of action, 124
- intervenor, 263n
- joiner of trustees or legal representatives, 112n
- lis pendens*, 99
- more processual rights, 42
- mortgage suits, 1162-1163
- objection to hearing by particular Judge, 200
- pleader, 629-636
- representative, question between, 267n
- revolution, 197-207
- right to appeal, 359-391
- waiver of jurisdiction, 65n
- appearance and non appearance of. *See* APPEARANCE
- appellant not, 268n
- application in presence of, and notice, 192
- appointment of arbitrator against consent of, 429, 429n
- classes of persons not, 124, 125
- co-defendants not joining in appeal, 391
- contention of, and interrelation of decree, 117n
- contumacy of, 776n
- death, marriage, and insolvency of (O XVII), 1045-1066
- of, an enforcement of decree, 271
 - fresh suit, 126n
 - jurisdiction, 185
 - before or after institution of suit, 78
- defendant, successful, and right to appeal, 384, 390
- duty of, when witnesses do not appear, 811
- effect of order disallowing application, 76
- Government (in Bombay), 174
- in different capacities, 615
 - execution, defined, 236, 237
 - larger legal sense, 124
- impleading, 100n
- joiner of, 511-572; and *see* JOINDER
- made only for purpose of discovery, 791n
- meaning of term, 124
- misconduct of, and costs, 217
- moving in Appeal Court for leave to give further evidence, 820n
- necessary in setting aside sale, 1011
- nominal, and *res judicata*, 129n
- not at issue, 824
 - permitted to adduce evidence, 178n
- objection as to joinder of, 570-572
- or representatives, questions between, in execution, 236-238
- paying or receiving costs, 203
- person wrongly made, and costs, 208n, 211n
- persons other than, and judgment, 124
- privity to, 124, 124n
- real owner made, 128n
- refusing to give evidence, 835
- remedy of, when admission wrongly alleged, 408
- rights of, 39-43
- striking out, 545-570
- third, and communication for purpose of litigation, 786n
 - fraudulent sale, 1016n
 - can impeach assignment of decree, 910
 - claim to attached property, 964, 965
 - seizure of property of, 904n
- to suits (O I), 511-572
- when exempt from arrest, 490, 491
 - person not, as bound by decree, 124
- who is a necessary, 526
 - to be made, 559n
- who may be, 514

PITNARI, witness disbelieved as such, 108

PITNIDIR, impleaded as defendant, 507
when proper party to suit, 507*a*

PAUPER, appeal to the Privy Council, 111

111

leave to sue as, and leave to sue (Sect. 16), 159

PAYMENT by instalments, decree for, 868-870
decree for, and interest, 204-206

771, 771*a*

of attached debt, 912
cost of commission, 1103
expenses of witness, 826-828
purchase money of immoveable property, 1000-1001
under decree, 890-897
in pre-emption suit, 883-886
when sale of immoveable property postponed, 997
of Court fee for service, 1360
fees on documents, 507

under decree, 892, 896
voluntary, no suit to recover, 88

PLECUNIARY interest of judge, 61*a*
jurisdiction, 62

how determined, 157, and *see JURISDICTION*

PEYALTY, and interest, 205*a*
for default in attending as witness, 204
not producing documents, 724

PENDING, and transfer of suit, 197
of appeal, and bar of subsequent suit, 97, 98
in foreign Court, 152*a*
to the Privy Council, effect of, 114
suit, 95-98; and *see LIS PENDENS*
pending (Sect. 24) denotes duly pending, 198

PENDING suit, meaning of term, 197

PERFORMANCE of condition precedent and pleading, 661
implied agreement of, 612
of contract, place of, and jurisdiction, 188

PERIOD, enlargement of, 506

PERMANENCY, and carrying on business, 181

PERMISSION *See LEAVE*

PERPETUAL injunction, 928
and limitation, 929

PERSON, definition of, in General Clauses Act, 70

PERSONAL jurisdiction *See JURISDICTION (PERSONAL)*
offices, and suits relating to rates, 86

PLACE, and actual of cause of action in contract, 187
 of performance of contract, and jurisdiction, 188
 presentation of plaintiff, 201
 suing, 156
 and actual residence, 175
 cancellation of contract, 187
 carrying on business, 180-182, and *see* CARRYING ON BUSINESS
 (illustrations), 173
 cause of action, 182-190
 choice of forum, 173
 contract, 187-189
 effect of clause (*d*), Sect. 10, 164
 equitable jurisdiction in *personam*, 165
 forum of defendant, 174
 immovable property, in different jurisdictions, 167
 libel, 186
 limitations (Sect. 20), 173
 local jurisdiction, 159, 164
 meaning of "immovable property," 160
 "resides," 176-177

subject matter, 158
 suits deemed to be for immovable property, 161, 162
 171
 71

where subject matter, 158

PLAINT, allegation of fraud in, 700, 700n, 703n
 mistake in, 703n
 allegations in, and date of verification, 675n
 amended by Court of Appeal, 17n
 amendment of, 673-694; and *see* AMENDMENT
 in addition of defendant, 645
 and appointment of Receiver, 1234, 1236

contents of, 200
 defect as to signature or verification, 668n

, 1179

alternative titles (examples), 704
 inconsistent reliefs, 708
 certificate under Succession Certificate Act, 709

difference between positions of plaintiff and defendant, 705
 documents relied on in, 723-726
 failure to produce, 725
 inspection of, 724
 loss of, 724
 production of, 723-725

PLAINTIFF—*continued*

on behalf also of others interested, 533-541
 minor at time of former suit, 593
 in conduct of, and costs, 213, 215n
 misjoinder and nonjoinder of, 541, 543
 not bound to apply to have proper party added, 556
 obtaining leave to omit to sue, 599
 omission of part of claim by, 573-602
 option of, in compensation suits, 171
 person refusing to join as, 565n
 question who is the right, 547
 receiver of insolvent's estate, 518
 relinquishment of part of claim by, 573-602
 substitution or addition of, by Court, 545
 suit in name of wrong, 515
 valuation of suit by, not always conclusive, 51
 who may be joined as, 541
 zemindar, 515

PLAINTIFFS, who ought to sue in different Courts, and joinder, 158

PLAN neither admitted nor proved, decree based on, 103n

certificate of grounds for review, 1368
 compromise, 631n, 1075, 1076
 costs, 215, 215n
 remuneration from client, 215

(O' III.), 629-636

appearance, application or act by, for party, 629
 appearing in person, 630

when exempt from arrest, 190
 liable for costs in suit by minor, 1138

PRESIDENCY Small Cause Court, and saving clause, 63, 64
not affected by Sect. 2, 151
towns, and insolvency law, 22

jurisdiction, 67n, 111, 170

190

PREVIOUS decisions, 3, 9
history of law, 4
legislation, 1-3, 6, 7
state of law, 3

PRICE, deficiency of, 986, 987
interest on, 987

PRIEST, officiating, interest of, 366, 366n

PRINCIPAL and agent, suit for account between, 887

PRIOR mortgage, sale subject to, 1169
mortgagee and suit, 1162-1164

PRIORITY and stay of suit (Sect. 10), 97

PRISON, service on defendant in, 655

PRIVACY, right of, and suit, 56

PRIVATE right claimed in common, and *res judicata*, 100, 110

PRIVILEGE and sealing up portions of documents, 791
exemption from arrest. *See* EXEMPTION
personal appearance. *See* APPEARANCE
in interrogatories, 785

PRIVITY to party, 124, 124n, 125

PRIVY COUNCIL and attention to form, 13n
and essential justice of case, 13n
appeal to, and costs, 212, 213
value of suit, 84

, 25

when set aside, 88
proceeding whether a suit, 100
proceedings, 25, 59n
and suits, 44
order in, and decree, 44

470n

PROCEDURE—*Contd.*

- of execution as proceedings, 434-440
- former, 1 Provincial Courts, 1
- Supreme Courts, 1
- in case of refusal to take or record evidence, 811a
- delegation of execution to Collector, 325
- liquidation of partnership, p. 575a
- Magistrate's Court, 26
- matrimonial causes, 26
- probate and administration, 25
- Rent and Revenue Courts, 27-30
- inherent power to invent, 16a, 17a
- nature of, 13, 14
- object of rules, 13
- of foreign Court, irregularity in, 153
- Small Cause Court, 62, 64
- rules of, and retraction of new law, 310a

- PROCEEDINGS error or defect in power to amend, 401
- held not to be suits, 105-107
- judicial and administrative, distinguished, 256a
- miscellaneous not suits, 43
- procedure for, 401-406

- PROCESS for execution, 950
- service of, 1350, 1352

- PROCESSUAL order and decree on merits, 42
- rights and rights of parties, 42

- PROCLAMATION in attachment of immovable property, 950
- in delivery of occupied property, 933, 934
- of sale of immovable property, 1002
- sale by public auction, 973-975
- declaratory portion of, 979a
- defects in, 979a
- discrepant from certificate, 970a
- waiver of mis statement in, 950a

- PRODUCTION of documents, Order XIII, 803-812
- and effect of non production, and
- of documents, and discovery and inspection, 701-707
- in preparation of proclamation of sale, 974
- power to make order for, 201
- summons to witness, 824, 827

- PROFITS, attachment of, by attachment of property, 202
- due to improvements, 33, 34
- in pre-emption, 880
- of immovable property, and cause of action, 501

- PROHIBITION not to be presumed, 15, 15a

- PROXIMITY in plaint, 700, 703-717a
- in pleadings, 672

- PROOF of refusal to take evidence, 811a
- substitution of speculation for, 103a
- want of, in review, 1771

- PROPERTY (ancestral), liability of, in execution, 291
- defined, 60, 61
- immovable, and place of suing, 159
- incorporal interests, 61
- attachment of, 293-315, 350-358
- certificate of sale, 1020
- devies upon a mortgage is not, 1012
- for possession and means profits, 870-882
- recovery, and liquidation, 800-807
- defined, 61
- delivery of, 1011, 1013
- under decree, 811-814

- PURCHASER**—*continued*
 of land, and later suit against vendor, 111
pendente lite, 259a
 possession of, and limitation, 321a
 unable to obtain possession, 1027a
- PURCHASE MONEY**, deduction of costs in pre-emption suit, 217
 payment of, in pre-emption, 843-846
 right to receive back, 931a
- PURDANASHIN** ladies and arrest, 253
 discovery of documents, 799
 substituted service, 632a
 as witnesses, 1090, 1090a
 exemption from personal appearance, 189
 zenana of, entering, 268
- PURVI** holding, purchase of, and representation, 260
- QUESTION** arising in execution, 236, 240-249
 involved in suit, 563, 566
 material, ability to answer, and appearance, 715
 mixed, of law and fact, and second appeal, 415
 of fact, determination of, 122
 when decided by commissioner to examine accounts, 1098
 of law, 451-456
 and effect of sale certificate, 405a
 decision of, on appeal from remand, 400a
 on, and *res judicata*, 110
 in appeal to the Privy Council, 454-456
 of fact, when same may be stated in form of issue, 620
 to be determined by Court executing decree, 236
- RHYAT**, suit against, to set aside *pollak*, and *res judicata*, 131
- RHYATI** land, and assessment of mesne profits, 871
- RHYATWARI** tenure in Madras, and partition, 285
- RIZ**, impartible, and assets, 277
- RAJAH**, and exemption from personal appearance, 190
- RATE** of exchange, and appeal to the Privy Council, 1315
 of interest, 204
 on costs, 207
- RE ADMISSION** of appeal dismissed for default, 1285
 of remanded suit, 1296
- REASONS**, adoption of, in appeal, 1316
 cogent, for extending time, 1337
 for a finding, statement of, and appeal, 410
 admission of additional evidence, record of, 1309
 granting application for review, 1375
 refusing certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, 1339
 rejecting memorandum of appeal, statement of, 1263
 transfer or withdrawal of suit, record of, 196
 given by Judge, authority of, 11
 meaning of, 1316
 record of, by Judge, under Letters Patent, 3313
 in judgment of Appellate Court, 1311, 1315, 1316
 statement of, and costs not following event, 207, 214
 by Judge, and appeal, 1315, 1316
 in Bill, and construction, 8

- REFUSAL** of certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, 1339
 of leave to defend in summary procedure, 1140, 1141
 review, 1362
 or inability of trustee to sue, 1127
 to accept service of summons, 616, 647
 of decree for execution of documents, 950
 in enforcement of negotiable instrument, 100
 to recognize law of British India, 100
- REGISTER** of suits, 136
- REGISTRAR**, appointment of, as next friend disapproved, 1135
 executing conveyance, 931
- REGISTRATION Act**, and judicial proceedings, 202
 and appeal, 342
 of application in agreement to refer, 1463
 documents, 342
 in execution, 930, 931
 expenses of same, 950
 memorandum of appeal, 1261
 sale certificate, 1029, 1030
 security bond, 1311
- REGISTRY** of applications granted in review, 1377
- REGULARITY**, presumption of, 50
- RE HEARING** of appeal by the Privy Council, 440
 order for, and review, 1377
- REJECTION** of appeal, and decree, 47-48
 of application for review, 1363, 1369, 1372
 to sue as pauper, 1320
 memorandum of appeal, 1263, 1264
 plaint, 713-723
 and decree, 33, 46-48
- RELATION** of Courts, 12
 legal, condemned in India, and foreign judgment, 150
 of landlord and tenant, and *res judicata*, 134
- RELATORS**, suit in name of (in Public Charities), 365
- RELEASE** of imprisoned debtor, 291, 292
 of surety for restitution in appeal to the Privy Council, 1341
- RELIEF**, amendment of pleadings as to, 605-606
 alternative, 613, 712
 and ouster of jurisdiction, 624
 stamp, 804
 inconsistent, 704
 ancillary, deemed granted, 123
 and cause of action, 612
 decree, 847, 858
 frame of suit, 573, 600-602
 judgment in appeal, 1311
 by amendment of pleading, when given, 602
 way of injunction, essentials to grant, 1197
 claimed, and cause of action, 98
 construction of decree as to, by orders, 155
 discretion to grant preventive or protective, 1220
 error in grant of, 684
 grant of, by decree in appeal, 1318-1320
 granted on principle *quia timet*, 1223
 identity of, and *lis pendens*, 95, 97, 99
 not material for *res judicata*, 99
 jurisdiction to grant, and *lis pendens*, 99
 leave to omit, 602
 not asked by appellant, 1263
 expressly granted, and *res judicata*, 100
 deemed refused, 123

- RELIEF—*continued*.
 obtainable through personal obedience, 167
 and place of suing, 158
 omission to grant, and *res judicata*, 123
 partial, in appeal to the Privy Council, and value, 151
 prayer for, in pleading, 700-708
 subsidiary, 50a
 unaffected by change in procedure, 510
 when right to, claimed in common, 136
- RELINQUISHMENT of possession with notice, 870, 880
- REMAND, and appeal, 427, 432
 and new points which can be taken by defendant after, 111
 by Appellate Court, 1296-1307
 costs of, and decree in appeal, 1321
 improper order of, 1297
 objections first taken after, 414
 to findings after, 1306
 when order of, treated as without jurisdiction, 67
- REMEDIES, splitting of, 575, 536
- REMEDY and claim 601
 defined, 601
 errors in procedure, 417
 for breach of contract, 1208
 of decree holder in *res judicata*, 103
 restriction during execution by Collector, 1181
 defendant against *ex parte* decree, 757
 refusal to admit in adjourned hearing, 758
- landlord, 29
 or landholder, and saving clause, 59, 60
 minor not properly represented in suit, 1139
 party claiming paramount right against Receiver, 1239
 denying admission alleged by Judge, 106
 person excluded from record, 127
 plaintiff in dismissal of suit (for default), 760
 specific or compensatory, 1196
- REMOVAL from file of plaint by minor suing without next friend, 1132, 1133
 of guardian to suit, 1145
 next friend 1141
- RENT decree for, 870
 in Bengal, transfer of, 908
 of Revenue Court, no suit on, 93
ex parte decree for effect of, 146, 147
 litigation under local laws, 61, 63
 (money), erroneous decree for, 499, 500
 of land, and immoveable property, 61
 Recovery Act (Madras), and revision, 60
 of, and saving clause, 59, 60
 suit, where to be instituted, 156
 suits for recovery of, and *res judicata*, 134
 in Bengal and rules in discovery, 777
- RENT COURTS, how distinguished from Civil Courts, 27-30
- REPEAL of enactments in Fifth Schedule, 509
- REPORT in examination of accounts, 1093
 local investigation, 1094
 partition, 1100, 1101
 of Commissioners, and evidence, 1095, 1096
 on security, 1341
- REPRESENTATION and Hindu father, 130
 and manager of Hindu family, 131
 by party to suit, 125
 in appeal on common grounds, 1264-1267
 of beneficiary, in suit, 1127, 1128
 minor or person of unsound mind, 1129-1148

REPRESENTATIVE and execution (Sect. 47), 258, 259, 260

and *res judicata*, 126

capacity, suit in, and plaint, 697, 708, 711

in execution, defined, 257

legal, and assets, 283

costs, 209

notice to show cause against execution, 917, 918

suit in *forma pauperis*, 1150

enforcement of decree against, 279-283

execution against, on death of debtor before satisfaction, 272-278

of deceased partner, and suit by or against firm, 1120

party and jurisdiction, 185

judgment debtor, 50

plaintiff and restoration of suit, 751

sued as such, and set off, 743

suit, 362-363, 533, 545

as, 708, 709

by or against (O. XXXI), 1127, 1128

RE SALE on default by purchaser, 999, 1000

loss on, 1000

RES JUDICAT I, 99, 153

in caveators assailing whole will, 156

costs of witness in Magistrate's Court, 153

date of decision, 105

matter in issue, 111-118

a question of fact, 112

determination of question, 112

findings which operate as, 118

leading principles, 112

substantially, 112

test of identity of suits, 117

minor properly represented, 1139

nominal party, 129n

opinion incidentally expressed, 119

orders in execution proceedings, 107n, 151

redemption suit, 90-92

relinquishment of part of claim, 576

suit 105-109

and execution proceedings, 106, 107, 108

finding of Criminal Court, 105

identity of suit, 105

REVIEW, 860-863

- signed and dated judgment, 860^a, 838
- application for, 861
 - and transfer of suit, 198
 - by minor not properly represented, 1139
 - in case of consent decree, 281
- review, 1378
- (O XLVII), 1355-1379
- (Part VIII), 157-180

REVISION, 865

- (Part VIII), 157-180
- submission for, 1352
- RIGHT, in common, and *res judicata*, 100, 136
- meaning of term in Sect 2 35
- of a civil nature, 84, 85
 - appeal, how given, 29
 - the parties, 39-42

- RITES, religious, right depending on question as to, 65
- suits relating to, 65, 86

- RULES (Part X), 483-488
 - defined, 35
 - of procedure in delegation of execution to Collector, 328
 - nature of, 14
 - decision on English, 12

- SALARY and attachment, 293, 294, 295, 296, 301, 302, 945, 946
- suit for, and jurisdiction, 189^a

- SALE, adjournment or stoppage of, 985, 986
- amendment of decree after, 862ⁿ
- and decree amended after, 861
- defaulting purchaser, 986
- disputed debt, 983
- express warranty, 320ⁿ
- incumbrances, 982
- jurisdiction, 169, 170ⁿ
- land outside jurisdiction, 897

SALE—*continued*

- certificate of, 1024, 1030
 - and right of action, 316n
 - effect of, 318n
- fraud vitiating, 249, 249n
- in execution, 976-1014
 - and *lis pendens*, 972
 - of decree subsequently reversed, 772
- material irregularity in, 69
- mode of making proclamation, 943
- mortgage, final decree in, 1166
 - preliminary decree in, 1166
- objections as to nature of possession, 255
- of goods, and delivery, 159
 - immovable property, 993-1010
 - and bid by co sharer, 1002
 - certificate, 1020
 - defaulting purchaser, 990, 1001, 1002
 - re-sale, 1002
 - resistance to, 1035-1040
 - return of purchase money, 1027
 - setting aside, 1004-1021 162
 - time for payment, 1000
 - by what Court, 996
 - occupied by debtor, and delivery, 1031
 - tenant, and delivery, 1033
 - postponement of, 997, 998
 - when to become absolute, 1021-1027
- land, and rules made by Local Government, 727
- mortgaged immovable property, and place of suing, 158
- movable property, 991-996
 - agricultural produce, 994
 - and delivery, 991
 - transfer of shares, etc., 995
 - irregularity in, 993
 - negotiable instruments, 992
 - of party summoning witness, 828
 - share in corporation, 992
- on close holiday, 201n
- order refusing to pass order for, 266n
- place of, 981
 - and carrying on business, 182
- private, distinguished from Court sale, 261n
- property not liable to, and execution, 242, 242n
- setting aside, 1010-1021
- stay of pending appeal, 1273
- time of, 981, 984

SALEABLE, interest, 1021, 1028

SATISFACTION of claim and payment into Court, 1081

- setting aside *ex parte* decree after, 766

SAVING, and Provincial Small Cause Courts, 62

- of Chartered High Court, 1382
- inherent jurisdiction, 507, 508
- present right of appeal, 509
- Sect 4 59, 60
- suits to establish right to attached property, 965

SCANDALOUS counter claim, 18a
 matter in bills of costs, 670
 memorandum of appeal, 18a, 1270
 pleadings, 670, 671

SCHEDULED district and Sect 17 168
 districts, 32

SEAL, use of, for signature, 58, 59

"SEALING UP" privileged portions of documents, 701

at instance of auction purchaser, 268a
 objection to jurisdiction, first taken on, 156a
 (O XLII), 1323

SECRETARY OF STATE in Council, and body corporate, 180
 liability of, to be sued, 77

SECTIONS OF CODE.—

1 31, 32
 2 32-59
 3 59
 4 59-61
 5 61
 6 62
 7 62, 63
 8 63, 64
 9 65-95
 10 95-99
 11 99, 100
 12 100
 13 100
 14 101-156
 15 156-158
 16 158-167
 17 167-170
 18 170, 171
 19 171, 172
 20 172-190
 21 190
 22 190
 23 190-193
 24 193 200
 25 200
 26 200 202
 27 202
 28 203
 29 203
 30 203
 31 204
 32 204
 33 204
 34 204-207
 35 207-218
 36 219 227
 37 228
 38 229 230
 39 230
 40 231
 41 231
 42 232 234
 43 234
 44 234 235
 45 235
 46 235, 236

SECTIONS of (OD) column

47	218
48	218-219
49	219-220
50	220-221
51	221-222
52	222-223
53	223-224
54	224-225
55	225-226
56	226-227
57	227-228
58	228-229
59	229-230
60	230-231
61	231-232
62	232-233
63	233-234
64	234-235
65	235-236
66	236-237
67	237-238
68	238-239
69	239-240
70	240-241
71	241-242
72	242-243
73	243-244
74	244-245
75	245-246
76	246-247
77	247-248
78	248-249
79	249-250
80	250-251
81	251-252
82	252-253
83	253-254
84	254-255
85	255-256
86	256-257
87	257-258
88	258-259
89	259-260
90	260-261
91	261-262
92	262-263
93	263-264
94	264-265
95	265-266
96	266-267
97	267-268
98	268-269
99	269-270
100	270-271
101	271-272
102	272-273
103	273-274
104	274-275
105	275-276
106	276-277
107	277-278
108	278-279
109	279-280
110	280-281
111	281-282
112	282-283
113	283-284

SECTIONS OF CODE—*continued*

114	457
115	458-460
116	481
117	481
118	481
119	481
120	482
121	483
122	483
123	483
124	484
125	484
126	484
127	485
128	485
129	486
130	486
131	486
132	486
133	489
134	490
135	490
136	491, 492
137	493
138	493
139	493
140	493
141	494-496
142	496
143	497
144	497 <i>note</i>
145	503 <i>note</i>
146	506
147	506
148	506
149	507
150	508
151	508
152	509
153	509
154	509
155	509
156	509
157	509
158	510

SECURITY and arrest before judgment, 1184

- an judgment debtor about to be declared an insolvent, 287, 289, 290
- leave to defend in summary procedure, 1160
- stay of execution, 922, 923
- temporary injunctions, 1195, 1203

by Receiver, 1215

for appearance of witness, 204

costs, by returning next friend, 1144

in appeal, 1275-1279

to the Privy Council, 1334-1337

divorce 26

(O XXV) 1081-1087

effect of failure to furnish, 1084, 1087

when may be required from plaintiff, 1084

restitution, 503

and appeal, 1272-1273

in appeal to the Privy Council, 1340

- SEPARATE, causes of action against separate defendants, 587*n*
 costs, 214, 215
 defences, 730
 possession of share, decree in suit for, 887
 suit and execution (Sect. 47), 230, 232, 253
- and appellate Court, 503
- SERVANT not a member of family (service of summons), 645
- SERVICE of copy of cross objection, 1293
 of draft of document, or of negotiable instrument, 930
 notice in appeal, 1280-1284
 orders, notices, and other documents, 1350
 process, 1350
 process on recognized agent, 634
 pleader, 635
 summons, 202, 203
 and minor, 643, 643*n*
 railway officials, 641*n*
 foreign, 203
 in another province, 203
 Baluchistan, 651*n*
 suit against firm, 1114
 notice in same, 1121
 on corporation, 1110
 O V, 641-660
 defendant appearing before, 752
 refusing, or not found, 646
 delivery or transmission, 641
 duty of serving officer, 659
 endorsement in, 649
 examination of returning officer, 650
 in foreign territory, 656
 mode of, 642
 on Civil public officer, etc., 658
 defendant in another jurisdiction, 653
 prison, 655
 out of British India, 656
 male member of family, 645
 several defendants, 642
 soldiers, 658
 wrong person of similar name, 823
 personal or on agent, 644, 645
 substituted, 650-653
 substitution of letter, 659
 when dismissal where none, 751
 through Small Cause Court, 653, 654
 person in, and actual residence, 175
 personal, right of, and attachment, 293, 300
- SET OFF, and costs not awarded, 216, 217*n*
 and decree incapable of being enforced, 216
 cross decree, 914, 915
 distribution of assets, 334
 appeal from decree in case of, 888, 889
 decree holder (purchasing) entitled to, and deposit, 999
 decree in case of, 888
 equitable, in excess of pecuniary jurisdiction, 71
 in calculation of mesne profits, 876
 purchase by decree holder, 988, 989
 of costs, 216-217, 855, 860
 against mortgage money, 210*n*, 216
 purchase money, 19
 (O. VIII), 734-746
 and appeal, 744

SET OFF—*continued*

- (O. VIII), and ascertained sum, 710
 - lien for costs, 745, 745*n*
 - unliquidated damages, 740, 741
- by agent, 889
- executor or administrator, 713
- defendant's position in claiming, 738
- defined, 736
- disallowance of, 739*n*
- distinguished from a plea of payment, 736
 - counter claim, 737
 - recoupment, 736
- effect of, 731, 744
- equitable, 737, 739, 739*n*

, 740

- nature of, 742
- object of allowing, 742
- on separate grounds, 735
- particulars of, 734
- parties acting in different characters, 743
- right must be statutory, 736
- sums legally recoverable, 742
- what is essential to, 743*n*

SETTING ASIDE award in arbitration, 1167

- consent decree, 387
- decree *ex parte*, 764-774
 - after satisfaction, 766
 - and appeal, revision, review, 773
 - "Court," 769
 - "decree," 769
 - "due service," 768

- effect of, 772
- limitation and burden of proof, 767
- not without notice, 774
- object of rule, 764
- on application of defendant, 764
- proof, how given, 768
- terms and discretion, 772
- to whom relief given, 771
- ways in which decrees set aside, 765

- decree in summary procedure, 1181, 1182
- dismissal of suit, 753, 754
- injunction, 1210, 1211
- sale, 1010-1021
- of share in appeal, 1267

SETTLEMENT of issues (O. XIV), 813-822, and see ISSUES

SHARE in a corporation, sale of, 994

- what is deemed included by, 35
- in moveable property, attachment of, 945
- (undivided) in immoveable property, and execution, 931, 932, 1002, 1003

SHLBAIF, and attachment, 301

- claiming land as such, and mesne profits, 872
- nonjoinder of one, 543*n*
- suit for declaration of title to be, 163

SIL RIFP Acting sales manager, 319
 (payment to, of data book sold, 230 a
 sale by, distinguished for sale for the party, 200 a
 scoring property of third party, 100 a

SUBJECT MATTER, and for dwelling, 54
and for sale, 59
defect as to, in plaintiff, 668
in Code, when includes stamping, 75
meaning of "person related to," 53
of admission to, 804
and nonment of application for execution, 912
memorandum of appeal, 1263
application for execution, 902
order for sale, 978
to one as pauper, 1151
application for judgment, 635
award in arbitration, 1464
decree, 863, 866
in appeal, 1318
disposition by Judge, 844
judgment, 853
in appeal, 1311
memorandum of appeal, 1259
evidence by Judge, 815
plaint under O. XXVII, 1100
pleading in suit by corporation, 1110
or against firm, 1113
pleadings, 663-667
process for execution, 920
summons, 437-439

SILENCE in decree as to further interest, 201

SIMULTANEOUS execution 217

SMALL CAUSE Instituted in ordinary Court, and second appeal, 110
Court. 26

Presidency, 51

Transfer for execution to, 897

SOLDIER. *service of arms* **1001**, 658

SOLICITOR, and costs due from client, 210
lien for costs, 216n

SUBSISTING decree, meaning of, 319*n*

SUBSTANCE of issues to be regarded, 680*n*
point of, 733

SUBSTITUTED service of summons, 650-653

of assignees *pendente lite*, 536, 536*n*
beneficiaries as plaintiffs, 1127, 1128
letter for summons, 659
plaintiff by Court, 545, 549

SUCCESSION by heirship and representation, 275

451

44

as representative, 708, 709
by and against military men (O XXVIII), 1108, 1109
change of character of, and amendment of pleading, 690-694
conduct of, 570
construction of term, 196
determination of subject matter and value, 80
dismissal of, distinguished from rejection of plaint, 718
759

end of, 109

ex-contraktu, and notice under Sect 80.. 345*n*
for compensation (Sect 93) barred by award, 378
land, 160-163

740

sale (mortgage), 1160
former, meaning of term (Sect 11), 54
frame of, O II, 573-628

identity of, 106

in name of wrong plaintiff, 545
instituted in Court without jurisdiction, 74
institution of, 200-202
interest after, 204-206
before, 204
matters for determination in, 71

not defined, 43

on foreign judgment, 93
parties to (O I), 511-572
proceedings held not to be, 105
questions involved in, 565-567
representation of beneficiary in, 1127
restoration of, 753
revival of, administration not necessary, 710

transfer of (Sect 22), 190-200

valuation of, 80, 81

SUIT—*continued*

when Courts have jurisdiction to try, 45
 of civil nature, 47, 84, 85
 an Incapability, 85
 where to be instituted, 70, 106
 with trial of, 193-199, and *see* *Suits*

SUITs by alien, 348-353

by colonial agents and j. in *ex*, 363n

consolidation of, 627

deemed to be for immovable property, 160
 in particular cases (Part IV) 343-353
 respect of mortgages and joinder, 364n

withdrawing and a judgment of (O XVIII), 1066-1060¹⁵⁰

SUMMARY dismissal of appeal, 1279

procedure on negotiable instruments (O XXVII), 1176-1182

SUMMONS, dismissal for default in serving 772

foreign, service of, 203

in preparing proclamation of sale, 975

summary procedure on negotiable instrument, 1179

issue and service of, 637-660, and *see* *SERVICE OF SUMMONS*

service of, in suit against corporation 1110

firm, 1114

to appear and answer claim 202

consider sufficiency of affidavit of documents 191

defendant (Sect 27) 202

give evidence (O XVI) 525-536

power to issue 203

produce power to issue 203

witness (Sect 31), 204

costs of second, 773n

SUNDAY, and presentation of plaint 200

arrest on under process of a Mofussil Court 255

local inquiry on, 201n

SUPERSESION of clerks, 499, 500, 500n

SURETY *See* SECURITY

and Small Cause Court, 63

discharge of, 28J

execution against, 504

in arrest before judgment, 1184-1185

order against, and appeal, 48

SURGEON, and carrying on business 180

SYMBOLICAL POSSESSION 90n 94n 932

and cause of action 242n

limitation, 1032, 1035

second suit, 36

not dispossession, 1044

TALABANA, failure to deposit, 761

TALUK, sale of portion outside jurisdiction, 227n

situate outside jurisdiction, 169n

TALUQDARS, Acts for relief of, 87n

TARWAD, suit by members of, against *Jarnatan*, 609*n*

TATCHAN community, suit on behalf of, 363*n*

TAXATION of costs by dissenting trustee, 209*n*

TECHNICAL objections, 14, 706

as to jurisdiction, 171
sense and construction, 9, 11

TECHNICALITY and execution proceedings, 464*n*
avoidance of, 13

TEMP. .

TEMPORARY injunctions (O XXXIX.), 1195-1214
residence *See* RESIDENCE
and place of suing, 172

TENANT and interpleader, 1173
in common, and joinder, 543*n*

TENANTS (registered), decree against, and *res judicata*, 137

TENDER before action, and payment into Court, 1082
of expenses of witness, 527

TERMS on which *ex parte* decree set aside, 771
effect of non compliance with same, 772

TERRITORIAL jurisdiction, 152, 153 *See* LOCAL

TEST action, postponement of suit pending, 628
for joinder, 615*n*
in bar by former suit, 784*n*

22), 152

jurisdiction *in personam*, 167
meaning of Code, 9
relevancy, 784
res judicata, 103

is final, 444
matter should have been in issue, 121

TESTAMENTARY jurisdiction, 25
procedure in, 25, 25*n*

5, 796*n*
how counted when decree confirmed on appeal, 859
priority in, and stay of suit (Sect 10), 97

on, 73*n*
incidentally questioned, and suit for land, 163*n*
of auction purchaser, 315-322
Code, 1
party in plaint, 697-699

TITLE—*continued*

- question of, and special appeal, 73n
- what is a different, 122
- same and different and *res judicata*, 131
- short, of Code, 71
- to residuum, 501, 502
- varying relief after proof of, 413n

TITLES, alternative, 704

incoherent, 704

TOLLS, recovery of, and immovable property, 115

TORT, action on, the essentials, 171

- act of ouster separate, 581
- and cause of action, 185
- as a general rule, separate cause of action, 584
- connected with contract, 589
- unity of title to property injured, 589
- compensation for and Sect. 19, 171

TORTS, continuing, and cause of action, 502

on different properties, 502

TRADE, carrying on, 633

TRADING NAME, suit against person who uses, 1126

TRANSFER of business, 508

- of case and review, 1367, 1368
- letters for execution, 230-234, 597, 598, 599
- and limitation, 231, 232
- in Court in another province, 231

.

rights before or after decree, effect of, 258

suit (Sect. 22), 190-200

- and application for review, 198
- disqualification of Judge, 190, 190n
- pendency, 197, 198
- small Cause Court, 199
- special jurisdiction, 198
- subordination, 199

by Governor General in Council, 200

evidence in, 818

record of reasons for, 196

on misconception of fact, 196

under Letters Patent (clause 13), 194

TRANSFERRED of rights before or after decree, when a representative, 257, 258

TRANSLATION in appeals to the Privy Council, costs of, 860n

interest on same, 860n

TRANSMISSION of documents in appeal to the Privy Council, 1338

of order of the Privy Council, 1313, 1344

TRAVERSE, in defence, 730

TRFES and immovable property, 61

unsevered, and execution sale, 248n

TRLSPASS, to property in plaintiff's possession, 167n

TRESPASSER and mesne profits, 873, 874

TRIAL, meaning of term, 199

motion for temporary injunction treated as, 1211

separate, power to order, 511

separate, 624, 625

VALUE *continued*

- of in rem rights subsequent to suit, and appraisable value, 452
- suit and jurisdiction in appeal, 83, 81
- Suits Valuation Act, 83
- how determined, 80
- in appeal to the Privy Council, 451-454
- and consolidation, 1332, 1333
- proclamation of sale, 952

VARIANCE between specific decree and judgment, 117n

- of decree, restitution on, 497-501
- injunction, 1210, 1211
- slight, between plaintiff's pleading and evidence, 680

VERIFICATION of application for execution, 902

- order for sale, 978
- to sue as pauper, 1151
- objection to, 669
- of pleadings, 660-670
- in suit by corporation, 1110, 1112
- or against firm, 1113

VESSEL, defendant or judgment debtor, 60

VESTING order, 946

VEXATIOUS action and costs, 213

WAIVER and appeal, 415, 416n

- and Court without inherent jurisdiction, 145n
- of defect in signature of plaint, 607
- irregularity in suit by minor, 1131
- lack of verification, 607
- local jurisdiction, 68n
- objection to jurisdiction, 69, 161n
- proclamation of sale, 950
- use of depositions, and appeal, 115, 116

WAIVER of jurisdiction, 14, 68-70

- estoppel from pleading, 70, 70n

WAIVER in execution, 926

WAIVER of title and sale, 321, 1031

WARRANT, accrual of cause of action as to, 871

- and joint opposition to plaintiff's possession, 872
- calculation of, 876
- effect of decree for possession with, 880
- paid in kind or in money, and interest, 881
- received by respondent without being entitled to it, 602n

WILL, construction of, 274

WITHDRAWAL and adjustment of suit (O XXIII), 1067-1069

- and transfer of suit by Court, 193-200
- (by Court) of suit, appeal, or proceeding, 103
- from suit, leave for, in security for costs, 1084
- of appeal, 1319
- under compromise, 146
- application for execution, 165, 1028
- former suit, and *res judicata*, 115
- registered appeal, 1274
- suit, 190
- or appeal, effect of, 30

WITNESS appearing by counsel, and costs, 210

- attendance before Commissioner, 1164
- commission to examine, 341
- credibility of, and appeal, 467, 1312, 1312n
- default in attendance by, 204
- punishment of, 201

- KINNEY**—Law Relating to Official Trustees, etc. Rs. 4 [1915]
 — Law of Infants and Guardians. Rs 1 [1916]
 — The Succession Certificate Act. Rs 2 [1910].
- LYON AND WADDELL**—Medical Jurisprudence for India.
 By I B LYON, FCS, FIC Seventh Edition Edited by Lieut Col L A.
 WADDELL, CB, CIE, MB, LL.D, IMS retired Royal 8vo, cloth
 Rs 20 [1921]
- MITRA**—Steps to Muktharship and Revenue Agent-
 ship Examinations By B K MITRA, B.L Eighth Edition Rs 5 8 [1911]
- MITRA**—Synopsis of Leading Cases (English and Indian)
 Calcutta and Bombay University Law Examinations, Preliminary and Final
 By B K. MITRA, B.L Rs 3 [1908]
- MITRA**—Students' Guide to Law Examinations. By B K
 MITRA, B.L Eighth Edition Part I Preliminary Demy 8vo Rs 3 [1913]
- MITRA**—The Specific Relief Act. By M C MITRA, M.A.,
 B.L Third Edition Rs 4 [1907]
- MONNIER**—The Law of Confessions. By E R MONNIER, B.A
 Rs 6 [1907]
- MOOKERJEE**—Rules Relating to Legal Practitioners.
 Cloth Rs 2 Paper Rs 1 8 [1913]
- MORISON**—The Indian Arbitration Act: Being Act IX
 of 1899 With Explanatory Notes Rules and Index By the late H N MORISON,
 Bar at Law Second Edition Crown 8vo, cloth Rs 3-8 [1914]
- MUDDIMAN**—The Indian Law of Extradition: Being an
 Account of the Law and Procedure applicable to the surrender of fugitive
 offenders from and to British India By A P MUDDIMAN, CIE, ICS
 Demy 8vo cloth Rs 7 8 [1915]
- MUKHERJI**—The Indian Constitution, containing the fully
 annotated Law of the New Constitution in British India, including Election
 Rules Legislative Rules, etc By PANCHANANDAS MUKHERJI, M.A., &c
 Rs 12 [1923]
- MUKHERJI**—Indian Constitutional Documents (1773-
 1915) Compiled and Edited with an Introduction. With Supplement con-
 taining "The Government of India Act, 1915" By PANCHANANDAS
 MUKHERJI, M.A &c (Indian Citizens Series) Second Edition Demy 8vo,
 cloth 2 vols Rs 12 [1918]
- MUKHERJI**—The Co-operative Movement in India, in-
 cluding the Co-operative Societies Act of 1912 Second Edition [In preparation]
- NAWAWI**—Minhaj et Talibin. A Manual of Muhammadan
 Law according to the School of Shafi By MARIUDIN ABU ZAKARIA LAHTA IBN
 SHARIF EN NAWAWI Translated into English from the French Edition of
 L W C Van Den Berg by E C HOWARD, late District Judge, Singapore Royal
 8vo Cloth. Rs. 18 6 [1914]
- PEACOCK**—The Law of Easements in British India. By
 F PEACOCK, Bar at Law Tagore Law Lecturer, 1899 Third Edition Royal
 8vo [In the Press]

- PRIDEAUX**—The Indian Factories Act, A Guide to.
Being Act XII of 1911 By W H C PRIDEAUX, A NIEL, Inspector of
Factories Burma. Demy 8vo, cloth gilt Rs 4 8 [1917.
- RIVAZ**—The Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908).
With Notes. By the late Honble H T RIVAZ Bar at-Law Sixth Edition by
H O PEARSON, Bar at Law and B K ACHARYA, B.A., LL.B. Royal 8vo, cloth.
Rs 5 [1912.
- ROY**—The Revenue Sale Law of Bengal. By J. N. ROY,
Barrister at Law Additional District Magistrate.
Part I The Patni Sale Law. Rs 5 8. [1912.
Part II The Revenue Sale Law. Rs 6. [1912
Part III The Certificate Sale Law. [In the Press.
- RUMSEY**—Al Sirajiyah, or, The Mohammedan Law of Inheri-
tance With Notes and Appendix By ALMANIC RUMSEY Second Edition
Rs 4 8 [1899
- SHEPARD AND BROWN**—Commentaries on the Trans-
fer of Property Act By H H SHEPARD, M.A., Bar at-Law, and KENWORTHY
BROWN, M.A., Bar at-Law Eighth Edition Royal 8vo. [In the Press.
- SWINHOE**—The Case-Noted Penal Code. By CHARLTON
SWINHOE, Bar at Law Second Edition Crown 8vo Rs 4 [1909.
- TREVELYAN**—Hindu Law as administered in British
India. By Sir EVEREST JOHN TREVELYAN, D.C.L., Barrister at Law, late a Judge
of the High Court at Calcutta. Second Edition. Royal 8vo, cloth Rs 20 [1917.
- TREVELLYAN**—The Law Relating to Minors as adminis-
tered in the Province subject to the High Courts of British India. By Sir EVEREST
JOHN TREVELLYAN, D.C.L. Fifth Edition Royal 8vo, cloth gilt Rs 10 [1917.
- TREVELYAN**—The Law Relating to Hindu Wills. By Sir
EVEREST JOHN TREVELLYAN, D.C.L., Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition, revised.
Rs 10 [1914
- RYABI**—The Indian Contract Act designed for the
Use of Students and Practitioners By FAIZ BAKARUDIN FRANK, late Judge of
the High Court, Madras Royal 8vo, cloth. Rs 20 [1919
- UPTON**—The Principles of the Law of Interest in
British India. By EDWARD UPTON, Bar at-Law Demy 8vo, cloth. Rs 6. [1908.
- WILSON**—Anglo-Muhammadian Law. A Digest of the
Special Rules now applicable to Muhammadans as such by the Civil Courts
of British India. By Sir ROBERT EVERET WILSON, Bart, M.A., LL.M.,
Bar at Law Fifth Edition. Edited by A YUSUF ALI, C.B.E., LL.B., LL.M.
(Cantab.), F.R.S.L., Bar at-Law, I.C.S. (retired). Royal 8vo, cloth Rs 20.
[1921.
- WOODROFFE AND AMEER ALI**—Civil Procedure in British
India. A Commentary on Act V of 1908 By Sir JOHN G WOODROFFE, M.A.,
B.C.L., Bar at-Law, Judge of the High Court at Calcutta and Rt. Hon.
Syed AMEER ALI, M.A., C.I.E. Royal 8vo Buff leather back. Second Edition
by Sir JOHN G WOODROFFE and FRANK J MATHEW, Barrister at Law Royal
8vo, cloth, leather back. Rs 22 8 [1916
- WOODROFFE AND AMEER ALI**—The Law of Evidence
applicable to British India. Seventh Edition. By Sir JOHN G WOODROFFE, M.A.,
B.C.L., and FRANK J MATHEW, Barrister-at-Law Royal 8vo Rs 28 [1921
- WOODROFFE**—The Law of Injunctions and Receivers:
Being the Tagore Law Lectures, 1897 By J G WOODROFFE, M.A., B.C.L.
Vol. I The Law of Injunctions. Fourth Edition Royal 8vo, cloth.
Rs 12 [1916.
Vol. II. The Law of Receivers. Third Edition. Royal 8vo, cloth Rs 12.
[1919

